Edward Clark Porter.

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

OR, A

Rational Account of the Grounds

OF

NATURAL and REVEAL'D

RELIGION.

THE EIGHTH EDITION.

To which is now added

Part of another BOOK upon the ſame Subject,

Written *A. D.* MDCXCVII.

Publiſh'd from the AUTHOR'S Own

MANUSCRIPT.

The Second Volume.

By the Right Reverend Father in GOD,

EDWARD STILLINGFLEET, D. D.

Late Lord Biſhop of *Worceſter.*

LONDON,

Printed by *J. Heptinſtall,* for HENRY and GEORGE MORTLOCK,
at the *Phœnix* in St. *Paul's* Church-yard, MDCCIX.

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

OR A

Rational Account of the Grounds

OF THE

CHRISTIAN FAITH,

AS TO THE

TRUTH

AND

Divine Authority

OF THE

SCRIPTURES,

And the Matters therein contain'd.

By EDWARD STILLINGFLEET, M. A.

2 Pet. 1. 26. *For we have not followed cunningly devised Fables, when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eye-witnesses of his Majesty.*

Neque religio ulla sine sapientia suscipienda est, nec ulla sine religione probanda sapientia. Lactant. de fals. relig. cap. 1.

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To his most Honour'd Friend

And Patron

Sr. ROGER BOURGOINE,

Knight and Baronet.

SIR,

IT was the early felicity of *Moses*, when expos'd in an Ark of *Nilotic papyre*, to be adopted into the favour of so great a Personage as the Daughter of *Pharaoh*: Such another Ark is this Vindication of the Writings of that Divine and Excellent Person expos'd to the World in; and the greatest ambition of the Author of it is, to have it receiv'd into your Patronage and Protection. But altho' the Contexture and Frame of this Treatise be far below the excellency and worth of the subject (as you know the Ark in which *Moses* was put, *was of bulrushes daubed with slime and pitch,*) yet when You please to cast your eye on the matter contain'd in it, you will not think it beneath your Favour, and unworthy your Protection. For if Truth be the greatest present which God could bestow, or Man receive (according to that of *Plutarch*, Ὡς ἔδωρον ἀνθρώπῳ λαβεῖν μεῖζον, ἢ χαρίζεσθαι Θεῷ σεμνότερον ἀληθείας) then certainly those Truths deserve our most ready acceptance, which are in themselves of greaetst importance, and have the greatest evidence that they come from God. And altho' I have had the happiness of so near relation to You, as to know how little You need such discourses which tend to settle the Foundations of Religion, which you have rais'd so happy a Superstructure upon; yet withal I consider what particular kindness the Souls of all good Men bear to such designs, whose end is to assert and vindicate the Truth and Excellency of Religion. For those who are enrich'd themselves with the inestimable Treasure of true Goodness and Piety are far from that envious temper to think nothing valuable but what they are the sole possessors of; but such are the most satisfy'd themselves, when they see others not only

Plutarch. de Isid. & Osir.

admire but enjoy what they have the higheſt eſtimation of. Were all who make a ſhew of Religion in the World really ſuch as they pretend to be, Diſcourſes of this nature would be no more ſeaſonable, than the commendations of a great Beauty to one who is already a paſſionate admirer of it; but on the contrary we ſee how common it is for Men firſt to throw Dirt in the face of Religion, and then perſuade themſelves it is its natural Complexion; they repreſent it to themſelves in a ſhape leaſt pleaſing to them, and then bring that as a Plea why they give it no better entertainment.

It may juſtly ſeem ſtrange, that true Religion, which contains nothing in it but what is truly Noble and Generous, moſt rational and pleaſing to the Spirits of all good Men, ſhould yet ſuffer ſo much in its eſteem in the World, thro' thoſe ſtrange and uncouth vizards it is repreſented under. Some accounting the life and practice of it, as it ſpeaks ſubduing our Wills to the Will of God (which is the ſubſtance of all Religion) a thing too low and mean for their Rank and Condition in the World; while others pretend a quarrel againſt the Principles of it, as unſatisfactory to Humane Reaſon. Thus Religion ſuffers with the Author of it between two Thieves; and it is hard to define which is more injurious to it, that which queſtions the Principles, or that which deſpiſeth the Practice of it. And nothing certainly will more incline Men to believe that we live in an Age of Prodigies, than that there ſhould be any ſuch in the Chriſtian World, who ſhould account it a piece of Gentility to deſpiſe Religion, and a piece of Reaſon to be *Atheiſts*. For if there be any ſuch thing in the World as a true height and magnanimity of Spirit, if there be any ſolid Reaſon and depth of Judgment, they are not only conſiſtent with, but only attainable by a true generous Spirit of Religion. But if we look at that which the looſe and profane World is apt to account the greateſt Gallantry, we ſhall find it made up of ſuch pitiful ingredients, which any skilful and rational Mind will be aſham'd to plead for, much leſs to mention them in competition with true Goodneſs and unfeign'd Piety. For how eaſy is it to obſerve ſuch who would be accounted the moſt high and gallant Spirits, to quarry on ſuch mean preys, which only tend to ſatisfy their brutiſh appetites, or fleſh Revenge with the Blood of ſuch who have ſtood in the way of that airy title, *Honour!* Or elſe they are ſo little ap-

prehenſive

prehenſive of the inward worth and excellency of Human Nature, that they ſeem to envy the gallantry of Peacocks, and ſtrive to outvy them in the gayety of their Plumes; ſuch who are, as *Seneca* ſaith, *ad ſimilitudinem parietum extrinſecus culti*, who imitate the Walls of their Houſes in the fairneſs of the outſides, but matter not what rubbiſh there lies within. The utmoſt of their ambition is to attain *enervatam felicitatem quâ permadeſcunt animi*, ſuch a felicity as evigorates the Soul by too long ſteeping, it being the nature of all terreſtrial pleaſures, that they do Ἐκτήκειν καὶ ἀνυγραίνειν τὸ φρονοῦν; by degrees *conſume Reaſon*, by *effeminating* and *ſoftening* the *Intellectuals*. Muſt we appeal then to the judgment of *Sardanapalus* concerning the nature of Felicity, or inquire of *Apicius* what Temperance is? or deſire that *Sybarite* to define Magnanimity, who fainted to ſee a Man at hard labour?

Or doth now the conqueſt of Paſſions, forgiving Injuries, doing good, Self-denial, Humility, Patience under croſſes, which are the real expreſſions of Piety, ſpeak nothing more noble and generous than a luxurious, malicious, proud, and impatient Spirit? Is there nothing more becoming and agreeable to the Soul of Man, in exemplary Piety, and a Holy well-ordered Converſation, than the lightneſs and vanity (not to ſay rudeneſs and debaucheries) of thoſe whom the World accounts the greateſt Gallants? Is there nothing more graceful and pleaſing in the ſweetneſs, candor, and ingenuity of a truly Chriſtian temper and diſpoſition, than in the revengeful, implacable Spirit of ſuch whoſe Honour lives and is fed by the Blood of their Enemies? Is it not more truly honourable and glorious to ſerve that God who commands the World, than to be a ſlave to thoſe paſſions and luſts which put Men upon continual hard ſervice, and torment them for it when they have done it? Were there nothing elſe to commend Religion to the Minds of Men, beſides that tranquility and calmneſs of Spirit, that ſerene and peaceable temper which follow a good Conſcience where-ever it dwells, it were enough to make Men welcome that Gueſt which brings ſuch good entertainment with it. Whereas the amazements, horrors, and anxieties of Mind, which at one time or other haunt ſuch who proſtitute their Conſciences to a violation of the Laws of God, and the Rules of rectify'd Reaſon, may be enough to perſuade any rational Perſon, that Impiety is the greateſt folly, and Irreligion, madneſs,

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It cannot be then but matter of great pity to conſider that any Perſons, whoſe Birth and education hath rais'd them above the common People of the World, ſhould be ſo far their own enemies, as to obſerve the Faſhion more than the Rules of Religion, and to ſtudy Complements more than Themſelves, and read Romances more than the ſacred Scriptures, *which alone are able to make them wiſe unto ſalvation.*

But, SIR, I need not mention theſe things to You, unleſs it be to let you ſee the excellency of your choice, in preferring true Vertue and Piety above the Ceremony and Grandeur of the World. Go on, SIR, to value and meaſure true Religion, not by the uncertain meaſures of the World, but by the infallible dictates of GOD himſelf in his ſacred Oracles. Were it not for theſe, what certain foundation could there be for our Faith to ſtand on? and who durſt venture his Soul, as to its future condition, upon any Authority leſs than the infallible veracity of GOD himſelf? What certain directions for practice ſhould we have, what Rule to judge of Opinions by, had not God out of his infinite Goodneſs provided and preſerved this authentic Inſtrument of his Will to the World? What a ſtrange Religion would Chriſtianity ſeem, ſhould we frame the Model of it from any other thing than the Word of GOD? Without all controverſy the diſeſteem of the Scriptures upon any pretence whatſoever, is the decay of Religion, and thro' many windings and turnings leads Men at laſt into the very depth of Atheiſm. Whereas the frequent and ſerious converſing with the Mind of GOD in his Word is incomparably uſeful, not only for keeping up in us a true notion of Religion (which is eaſily miſtaken, when Men look upon the face of it in any other glaſs than that of the Scriptures) but likewiſe for maintaining a powerful ſenſe of Religion in the Soul of Men, and a due valuation of it, whatever its eſteem or entertainment be in the World. For tho' the true genuine Spirit of Chriſtianity (which is known by the purity and peaceableneſs of it) ſhould grow never ſo much out of credit with the World, yet none who heartily believe the Scripture to be the Word of God, and that the Matters reveal'd therein are infallibly true, will ever have the leſs eſtimation of it. It muſt be confeſs'd that the credit of Religion hath much ſuffer'd in the Age we live in thro' the vain pretences of many to it, who have only acted a part in it, for the ſake of ſome private intereſts of their own. And

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it is the uſual *Logic* of *Atheiſts*, *Crimine ab uno diſce omnes*; if there be any hypocrites, all who make ſhew of Religion are ſuch; on which account *the Hypocriſy of one Age makes way for the Atheiſm of the next.* But how unreaſonable and unjuſt that Imputation is, there needs not much to diſcover, unleſs it be an argument there are no true Men in the World, becauſe there are ſo many Apes which imitate them; or that there are no Jewels, becauſe there are ſo many counterfeits. And bleſſed be God, our Age is not barren of inſtances of real goodneſs and unaffected Piety; there being ſome ſuch generous Spirits as dare love Religion without the dowry of Intereſt, and manifeſt their affection to it in the plain dreſs of the Scriptures, without the paint and ſet-offs, which are added to it by the ſeveral contending parties of the Chriſtian World. Were there more ſuch noble Spirits of Religion in our Age, *Atheiſm* would want one of the greateſt pleas which it now makes againſt the truth of Religion; for nothing enlarges more the Gulf of *Atheiſm*, than that Μέγα χάσμα, *wide paſſage* which lies between the Faith and Lives of Men pretending to be Chriſtians. I muſt needs ſay there is nothing ſeems more ſtrange and unaccountable to me, than that the practice of the unqueſtionable duties of *Chriſtianity* ſhou'd be put out of countenance, or ſlighted by any who own, profeſs, and contend for the Principles of it. Can the profeſſion of that be honourable, whoſe practice is not? *If the Principles be true, why are they not practis'd? If they be not true, why are they profeſs'd?*

You ſee, SIR, to what an unexpected length my deſire to vindicate the Honour as well as Truth of Religion, hath drawn out this preſent Addreſs. But I may ſooner hope for your pardon in it, than if I had ſpent ſo much paper after the uſual manner of Dedications, in repreſenting You to Your ſelf, or the World. SIR, I know You have too much of that I have been commending, to delight in Your own deſerv'd Praiſes, much leſs in Flatteries, which ſo benign a ſubject might eaſily make one's pen run over in. And therein I might not much have digreſs'd from my deſign, ſince I know few more exemplary for that rare mixture of true Piety, and the higheſt Civility together, in whom that ineſtimable Jewel of Religion is plac'd in a moſt ſweet, affable, and obliging temper. But

altho'

altho' none will be more ready on any occaſion with all gratitude to acknowledge the great obligations You have laid upon me; yet I am ſo far ſenſible of the common vanity of *Epiſtles Dedicatory*, that I cannot ſo heartily comply with them in any thing, as in my hearty prayers to the Almighty for your good and welfare, and in ſubſcribing my ſelf,

SIR,

Your moſt humble

June 5. 1662. *and affectionate Servant,*

ED. STILLINGFLEET.

THE

THE PREFACE TO THE READER.

IT is neither to ſatisfy the importunity of Friends, nor to prevent falſe Copies (which and ſuch like excuſes I know are expected in uſual Prefaces) that I have adventured abroad this following Treatiſe: but it is out of a juſt reſentment of the affronts and indignities which have been caſt on Religion, by ſuch who account it a matter of judgment to disbelieve the Scriptures, and a piece of wit to diſpute themſelves out of the poſſibility of being happy in another World: When yet the more acute and ſubtile their arguments are, the greater their ſtrength is againſt themſelves; it being impoſſible there ſhould be ſo much wit and ſubtilty in the Souls of Men, were they not of a more excellent Nature than they imagin them to be. And how contradictious is it for ſuch Perſons to be ambitious of being cry'd up for Wit and Reaſon, whoſe deſign is to degrade the rational Soul ſo far below her ſelf, as to make her become like the Beaſts that periſh! If now the weight and conſequence of the ſubject, and the two great ſeaſonableneſs of it (if the common fame of the large ſpread of Atheiſm *among us be true) be not ſufficient Apology for the publiſhing this Book. I am reſolv'd rather to undergo thy cenſure, than be beholding to any other. The intendment therefore of this Preface is only to give a brief account of the ſcope, deſign, and method of the following Books, altho' the view of the Contents of the Chapters might ſufficiently acquaint thee with it. How for I have been either from tranſcribing, or a deſign to excuſe out of the hands of their admirers, the ſeveral Writings on the behalf of Religion in general, or Chriſtianity in particular (eſpecially* Mornay, Grotius, Amyraldus, *&c.) may eaſily appear by comparing what is contain'd in their Books and this together. Had I not thought ſomething might be ſaid, if not not more fully and rationally, yet more ſuitably to the preſent temper of this Age, than what is already written by them, thou hadſt been troubled with this Preface, much leſs with the whole Book. But as the Tempers and Genius's of Ages and Times alter, ſo do the arms and weapons which* Atheiſts *imploy againſt Religion:*

the most popular pretences of the Atheists *of our Age, have been the irreconcilableness of the account of Times in Scripture, with that of the learned and ancient Heathen Nations; the inconsistency of the belief of the Scriptures with the Principles of Reason; and the account which may be given of the Origin of things from Principles of Philosophy without the Scriptures: These three therefore I have particularly set my self against, and directed against each of them a several Book. In the first I have manifested that there is no ground of credibility in the account of ancient times given by any Heathen Nations different from the Scriptures, which I have with so much care and diligence inquir'd into, that from thence we may hope to hear no more of Men before* Adam *to salve the Authority of the Scriptures by, which yet was intended only as a design to undermine them; but I have not thought the frivolous pretences of the Author of that* Hypothesis *worth particular mentioning, supposing it sufficient to give a clear account of things without particular citation of Authors, where it was not of great concernment for understanding the thing it self. In the second Book I have undertaken to give a rational account of the grounds, why we are to believe those several Persons, who in several Ages were imploy'd to reveal the Mind of* God *to the World; and with greater particularity than hath yet been us'd, I have insisted on the Persons of* Moses, *and the Prophets, our Saviour and his Apostles, and in every of them manifested the rational evidences on which they were to be believ'd, not only by the Men of their own Age, but by those of succeeding Generations. In the third Book I have insisted on the matters themselves which are either suppos'd by, or reveal'd in the Scriptures; and have therein not only manifested the certainty of the foundations of all Religion, which lie in the being of* God *and Immortality of the Soul, but the undoubted truth of those particular accounts concerning the Origin of the Universe, of Evil, and of Nations, which were most liable to the* Atheists *exceptions, and have therein consider'd all the pretences of Philosophy Ancient or Modern, which have seem'd to contradict any of them; to which* (mantissæ loco) *I have added the Evidence of Scripture-History in the remainders of it in Heathen Mythology, and concluded all with a Discourse of the excellency of the Scriptures. Thus having given a brief view of the Design and Method of the whole, I submit it to every free and unprejudic'd judgment. All the favour then I shall request of thee is, to read seriously, and judge impartially; and then I doubt not but thou wilt see as much reason for Religion as I do.*

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ORIGINES

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

The Obscurity and Defect of Ancient History.

I. II. III. IV. *The knowledge of* Truth *proved to be the most natural perfection of the Rational Soul*; V. *Yet* Error *often mistaken for Truth: the Accounts of it.* VI. *Want of Diligence in its search*; VII. VIII. *The Mixture of Truth and Falshood: Thence comes either rejecting Truth for the Error's sake, or embracing the Error for the Truth's sake*; IX. *The first instanced in Heathen Philosophers,* XIII. *The second in Vulgar Heathen.* X. XI. XII. *Of* Philosophical Atheism, *and the grounds of it.* XIV. *The History of* Antiquity *very obscure.* XV. *The Question stated, where the true History of Ancient Times is to be found? in Heathen Histories, or only in Scripture?* XVI. *The want of Credibility in* Heathen Histories *asserted and proved by the general Defect for want of timely Records among Heathen Nations; the reason of it shewed from the first Plantations of the World.* XVII. *The manner of them discovered. The Original of* Civil Government. XVIII. *Of* Hieroglyphics. XIX. *The use of* Letters *among the* Greeks *no elder than* Cadmus; XX. *His Time enquired into: no elder than* Joshua: XXI. *The Learning brought into* Greece *by him.*

ENQUIRIES after Truth have that peculiar commendation above all other Designs, that they come on purpose to gratify the most noble Faculty of our Souls, and do most immediately tend to advance the highest perfection of our Rational Beings. For all our most laudable endeavours after Knowledge now, are only the gathering up of some scattered Fragments of what was once an entire Fabric, and the recovery of some precious Jewels which were lost out of sight, and sunk in the shipwrack of Humane Nature. That saying of *Plato, That all Knowledge is Remembrance, and all Ignorance Forgetfulness,* is a certain undoubted truth; if by Forgetfulness be meant the Loss, and by Remembrance the Recovery of those notions and conceptions of things which the Mind of Man once had in its pure and primitive State, wherein the Understanding was the truest Microcosm, in which all the Beings of the inferior World were faithfully represented according to their true, native, and genuine Perfections. GOD created the Soul of Man not only capable of finding out the Truth of I.

things, but furnished him with a sufficient κριτήριον, or Touchstone to discover Truth from Falshood, by a Light set up in his Understanding, which if he had attended to, he might have secured himself from all Impostures and Deceits. As all other Beings were created in the full possession of the agreeable Perfections of their several Natures, so was Man too; else God would have never closed the Work of Creation
Gen. 1. 31. with those words, *And God saw all that he had made, and behold it was very good*, that is, endued with all those Perfections which were suitable to their several Beings. Which Man had been most defective in, if his Understanding had not been endow'd with a large stock of Intellectual Knowledge, which is the most natural and genuine Perfection belonging to his Rational Being. For Reason being the most raised Faculty of Humane Nature, if that had been defective in its discoveries of Truth, which is its proper object, it would have argued the greatest maim and imperfection in the Being it self. For if it belongs to the perfection of the Sensitive Faculties to discern what is pleasant from what is hurtful, it must needs be the perfection of the Rational to find out the difference of Truth from Falshood. Not as tho' the Soul could then have had, any more than now, an actual notion of all the Beings in the World co-existing at the same time, but that it would have been free from all deceit in its Conceptions of things, which were not caused through inadvertency.

II. Which will appear from the several aspects Man's Knowledge hath, which are either upwards towards his Maker, or abroad on his Fellow-Creatures. If we consider that Contemplation of the Soul which fixes it self on that infinite Being which was the cause of it, and is properly θεωρία; it will be found necessary for the Soul to be created in a clear and distinct knowledge of him, because of Man's immediate obligation to obedience unto him. Which must necessarily suppose the Knowledge of Him, whose Will must be his Rule: for if Man were not fully convinced in the first moment after his Creation of the Being of Him, whom he was to obey, his first work and duty would not have been Actual Obedience, but a Search whether there was any supreme, infinite, and eternal Being or no; and whereon his Duty to him was founded, and what might be sufficient declaration of his Will and Laws, according to which he must regulate his obedience. The taking off all which doubts and scruples from the Soul of Man, must suppose him fully satisfied upon the first free use of Reason, that there was an Infinite Power and Being which produced him, and on that account had a right to command him in whatsoever he pleased; and that those commands of his were declared to him in so certain a way, that he could not be deceived in the judging of them. The clear knowledge of God will further appear most necessary to Man in his first Creation, if we consider that God created him for this end and purpose, To enjoy converse,
Clemens *Protrept.* p. 63. and an humble familiarity with Himself; he had then ἔμφυτον πρὸς τὸν θεὸν κοινωνίαν, in the language of *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Converse with God was as natural to him as his Being was.* For Man, as he came first out of God's Hands, was the Reflection of God himself on a dark Cloud, the Iris of the Deity; the similitude was the same, but the sub-
Gen. 1. 26. stance different: Thence he is said to be created after the Image of God. His knowledge then had been more intellectual than discursive; not so much imploying his Faculties in the operose deductions of Reason (the pleasant toyl of the Rational Faculties since the Fall) but had immediately

diately imploy'd them about the ſublimeſt objects; not about Quiddities and Formalities, but about Him who was the fountain of his Being, and the center of his Happineſs. There was not then ſo vaſt a difference between the Angelical and Humane Life: the Angels and Men both fed on the ſame dainties; all the difference was, They were in the ὑπερῷον, the upper room in Heaven, and Man in the ſummer parlor in Paradiſe.

III. If we take a view of Man's knowledge as it reſpects his Fellow-Creatures, we ſhall find theſe were ſo fully known to him on his firſt Creation, that he needed not to go to School to the wide World to gather up his conceptions of them. For the right exerciſe of that Dominion which he was inſtated in over the Inferior World, doth imply a particular knowledge of the Nature, Being and Properties of thoſe things which he was to make uſe of, without which he could not have improved them for their peculiar ends. And from this knowledge did proceed the giving the Creatures thoſe proper and peculiar Names which were expreſſive of their ſeveral Natures. For as *Plato* tells us, οὐ πάντα δημιουργὸν ὀνομάτων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀποβλέποντα εἰς τὸ τῇ φύσει ὄνομα ὂν ἑκάστῳ: *The Impoſition of Names on things belongs not to every one, but only to him that hath a full proſpect into their ſeveral Natures.* For it is moſt agreeable to Reaſon, that Names ſhould carry in them a ſuitableneſs to the things they expreſs; for Words being for no other end but to expreſs our Conceptions of things, and our Conceptions being but εἰκόνες καὶ ὁμοιώματα πραγμάτων, as the ſame Philoſopher ſpeaks, *The Reſemblances and Repreſentations of the things*, it muſt need follow, that where there was a true knowledge, the Conceptions muſt agree with the Things; and Words being to expreſs our Conceptions, none are ſo fit to do it, as thoſe which are expreſſive of the ſeveral Natures of the things they are uſed to repreſent. For otherwiſe all the uſe of Words is to be a meer Vocabulary to the Underſtanding, and an Index to Memory, and of no further uſe in the purſuit of knowledge, than to let us know what Words men are agreed to call things by. But ſomething further ſeems to be intended in their firſt Impoſition, whence the *Jews* call it הברלת המינים as *Mercer* tells us, *a Separation and Diſtinction of the ſeveral kind of Things:* and *Kircher* thus Paraphraſes the Words of *Moſes*; *and whatſoever* Adam *called every living creature, that was the Name thereof: i. e.* ſaith he, *Fuerunt illis vera & germana Nomina & rerum Naturis propriè accommodata.* But however this be, we have this further evidence of that Height of knowledge which muſt be ſuppoſed in the firſt Man, that as he was the Firſt in his Kind, ſo he was to be the Standard and Meaſure of all that followed, and therefore could not want any thing of the due perfections of Humane Nature. And as the *Shekel* of the Sanctuary was, if not double to others, (as Men ordinarily miſtake) yet of a full and exact weight, becauſe it was to be the Standard for all other weights (which was the cauſe of its being kept in the Temple) ſo if the Firſt Man had not double the proportion and meaſure of knowledge which his Poſterity hath, if it was not running over in regard of Abundance, yet it muſt be preſſed down and ſhaken together in regard of weight; elſe he would be a very unfit Standard for us to judge by, concerning the due and ſuitable Perfections of Humane Nature.

Plato *in* Cratylo.

Mercerus *in Gen.* 2. 19.

Kircher *Oedip. Ægypt.* Tom. 2. Claſſ. 2. cap. 1.

IV. But we need not have run ſo far back as the Firſt Man, to evince the knowledge of Truth to be the moſt natural Perfection of the Soul of

Man; for even among the preſent ruines of Humane Nature, we may find ſome ſuch noble and generous Spirits, that diſcern ſo much beauty in the face of Truth, that to ſuch as ſhould enquire what they find ſo attractive in it, their anſwer would be the ſame with *Ariſtotle*'s in a like caſe, it was τυφλὸς ἐρώτημα, *the Queſtion of thoſe who never ſaw it.* For ſo pleaſing is the enquiry, and ſo ſatisfactory the finding of Truth after the ſearch, that the reliſh of it doth far exceed the greateſt Epicuriſm of *Apicius*, or the moſt coſtly entertainments of *Cleopatra*; there being no Guſt ſo exquiſite as that of the Mind, nor any Jewels to be compared with Truth. Nor do any perſons certainly better deſerve the name of Men, than ſuch who allow their Reaſon a full employment, and think not the Erectneſs of Man's Stature a ſufficient diſtinction of him from Brutes. Of which thoſe may be accounted only a higher ſpecies, who can patiently ſuffer the impriſonment of their Intellectuals in a dungeon of Ignorance, and know themſelves to be Men only by thoſe characters, by which *Alexander* knew himſelf not to be a God, by their proneneſs to Intemperance and Sleep. So ſtrange a *Metempſychoſis* may there be without any change of Bodies; and *Euphorbus* his Soul might become a Brute without ever removing its lodging into the Body of an Aſs. So much will the Soul degenerate from it ſelf, if not improved; and in a kind of ſullenneſs ſcarce appear to be what it is, becauſe it is not improved to what it may be.

V. But, you'll ſay, if this knowledge of Truth be ſo great, ſo natural, ſo valuable a Perfection of Humane Nature, whence comes ſo much of the World to be over-run with Ignorance and Barbariſm? whence come ſo many pretenders to Knowledge, to court a Cloud inſtead of *Juno?* to pretend a love to Truth, and yet to fall down and worſhip Error? If there were ſo great a ſympathy between the Soul and Truth, there would be an impatient deſire after it, and a moſt ready embracing and cloſing with it. We ſee the Magnet doth not draw the Iron with greater force, than it ſeems to run with impatience into its cloſeſt embraces. If there had been formerly ſo intimate an acquaintance between the Soul and Truth, as *Socrates* fanſied of Friends in the other World, there would be an harmonious cloſure upon the firſt appearance, and no divorce to be after made between them.

True, but then we muſt conſider there is an intermediate ſtate between the former acquaintance, and the renewal of it, wherein all thoſe remaining Characters of mutual knowledge are ſunk ſo deep, and lie ſo hid, that there needs a new fire to be kindled to bring forth thoſe latent Figures, and make them again appear legible. And when once thoſe tokens are produced of the former Friendſhip, there are not more impatient longings, nor more cloſe embraces between the touched Needle and the Magnet, than there are between the Underſtanding and diſcovered Truth. But then withall, we are to conſider that they are but few whoſe Souls are awakened out of that Lethargy they are fallen into in this degenerate condition: the moſt are ſo pleaſed with their Sleep, that they are loth to diſturb their reſt; and ſet a higher price upon a lazy Ignorance, than upon a reſtleſs Knowledge. And even of thoſe, whoſe Souls are as it were between ſleeping and waking, what by reaſon of the remaining confuſion of the ſpecies in their Brains, what by the preſent dimneſs of their Sight, and the hovering uncertain Light they are to judge by, there are few that can put a difference between a meer Phantaſm and a real Truth. Of which theſe rational accounts

accounts may be given, *viz.* Why so few pretenders to Knowledge do light on Truth.

VI. (1.) First, *Want of an impartial diligence in the search of it.* Truth now must be sought, and that with care and diligence, before we find it; Jewels do not use to lie upon the surface of the Earth: High-ways are seldom paved with Gold; what is most worth our finding, calls for the greatest search. If one that walks the Streets should find some inestimable Jewel, or one that travels the Road meet with a bag of Gold, it would be but a silly design of any to walk the Street, or travel the Road, in hopes to meet with such a purchase to make them rich. If some have happily light on some valuable Truths, when they minded nothing less than them, must this render a Diligence useless in inquiries after such? No: Truth, tho' she be so fair and pleasing as to draw our affections, is yet so modest as to admit of being courted; and, it may be, deny the first suit, to highten our importunity. And certainly nothing hath oftner forbid the Banns between the Understanding and Truth inquired after, than Partiality and Preoccupation of Judgment, which makes Men enquire more diligently after the Dowry than the Beauty of Truth; its correspondency to their Interests, than its evidence to their Understandings. An useful Error hath often kept the keys of the Mind for free admission, when important Truths, but contrary to mens Preconceptions or Interest, have been forbidden entrance. Prejudice is the wrong byas of the Soul, that effectually keeps it from coming near the mark of Truth; nay, sets it at the greatest distance from it. There are few in the World that look after Truth with their own Eyes. most make use of Spectacles of others making, which makes them so seldom behold proper lineaments in the face of Truth; which the several tinctures from Education, Authority, Custom and Prediſpoſition do exceedingly hinder men from discerning.

VII. (2.) Another Reason why there are so few who find Truth, when so many pretend to seek it, is, *That near resemblance which Error often bears to Truth.* It hath been well observ'd, that Error seldom walks abroad the World in her own raiments; she always borrows something of Truth, to make her more acceptable to the World. It hath been always the subtilty of grand Deceivers to graft their greatest Errors on some material Truths, to make them pass more undiscernible to all such who look more at the Root on which they stand, than on the Fruits which they bring forth. It will hereafter appear how most of the grossest of the Heathen Errors have, as *Plutarch* saith of the *Ægyptian* Fables, ἀμυδρὰς τινας ἐμφάσεις καὶ ἀληθείας, *some faint and obscure resemblances of Truth*; nay more than so, as most pernicious weeds are bred in the fattest soils, their most destructive Principles have been founded on some necessary and important Truths. Thus Idolatry doth suppose the Belief of the existence of a Deity; and Superstition the Immortality of the Souls of Men. The Devil could never have built his Chapels, but on the same ground whereon God's Temples stood; which makes me far less wonder than many do, at the meeting with many expressions concerning these Two grand Truths in the Writings of ancient Heathens; knowing how willing the Devil might be to have such Principles still owned in the World, which by his depraving of them, might be the nourishers of Idolatry and Superstition. For the general knowledge of a Divine Nature, supposing men ignorant of the true God, did only lay a foundation to erect his idolatrous Temples upon; and the Belief of the Soul's surviving

ſurviving the Body after death, without knowledge of the true way of attaining Happineſs, did make men more eager of embracing thoſe Rites and Ceremonies, which came with a pretence of ſhewing the way to a bleſſed Immortality.

VIII. Which may be a moſt probable reaſon, why Philoſophy and Idolatry did increaſe ſo much together as they did; for tho' right Reaſon fully improved, would have overthrown all thoſe curſed and idolatrous practices among the Heathens; yet Reaſon only diſcerning ſome general Notions without their particular application and improvement, did only diſpoſe the moſt ordinary ſort of people to a more ready entertainment of the moſt groſs Idolatry. For hereby they diſcern the neceſſity of ſome kind of Worſhip, but could not find out the right way of it; and therefore they greedily followed that which was commended to them, by ſuch who did withall agree with them in the common Sentiments of Humane Nature: Nay, and thoſe Perſons themſelves who were the great maintainers of the ſublimer Notions concerning God and the Soul of Man, were either the great Inſtruments of advancing that horrid Superſtition among them, as *Orpheus* and *Apollonius*, or very forward complyers with it, as many of the Philoſophers were. Altho' withall it cannot be denied to have been a wonderful diſcovery of Divine Providence, by theſe general Notions to keep waking the inward Senſes of Mens Souls, that thereby it might appear when Divine Revelation ſhould be manifeſted to them, that it brought nothing contrary to the common Principles of Humane Nature, but did only rectifie the depravations of it, and clearly ſhew men that way which they had long been ignorantly ſeeking after. Which was the excellent advantage the Apoſtle made of the Inſcription on the Altar at *Athens* to the unknown
17. 23. God; *Whom*, ſaith he, *ye ignorantly ſerve, him I declare unto you.* And which was the happy uſe the Primitive learned Chriſtians made of all thoſe Paſſages concerning the Divine Nature, and the Immortality of the Souls of Men, which they found in the Heathen Writers, thereby to evidence to the World that the main *Poſtulata* or Suppoſitions of Chriſtian Religion were granted by their own moſt admired men: and that Chriſtianity did not raſe out, but only build upon thoſe common Foundations, which were entertained by all who had any Name for Reaſon.

IX. Tho' this, I ſay, were the happy effect of this building Errors on common Truths to all that had the advantage of Divine Revelation to diſcern the one from the other; yet as to others who were deſtitute of
(1.) it, they were liable to this twofold great inconvenience by it. Firſt, *for the ſake of the apparent rottenneſs of the Superſtructures, to queſtion the ſoundneſs of the Foundations on which they ſtood.* And this I doubt not was the caſe of many conſiderative Heathens, who obſerving what monſtrous and unreaſonable way of Worſhip obtaining among the Heathen, and not being able by the ſtrength of their own Reaſon, thro' the want of Divine Revelation, to deduce any certain inſtituted Worſhip, they were ſhrewdly tempted to renounce thoſe Principles, when they could not but abhor the Concluſions drawn from them; for there is nothing more uſual than for men who exceedingly deteſt ſome abſurd Conſequence they ſee may be drawn from a Principle ſuppoſed, to reject the Principle it ſelf for the ſake of that Conſequence; which it may be doth not neceſſarily follow from it, but thro' the ſhortneſs of their own Reaſon doth appear to them to do ſo. Thus when the intelligent Heathen

Heathen did apparently see that from the Principles of the Being of God, and the Immortality of Souls, did flow all those natural and inhumane Sacrifices, all those absurd and ridiculous Rites, all those execrable and profane Mysteries; out of a loathing the immoralities and impieties which attended these, they were brought to question the very truth and certainty of those Principles which were capable of being thus abused.

X. And therefore I am very prone to suspect the Apology usually made for *Protagoras*, *Diagoras*, and such others of them who were accounted Atheists, to be more favourable than true, *viz.* That they only rejected those Heathen Deities, and not the Belief of the Divine Nature. I should think this account of their reputed Atheism rational, were it any ways evident that they did build their Belief of a Divine Nature, upon any other grounds than such as were common to them with those whose worship they so much derided. And therefore when the Heathens accused the Christians of Atheism, I have full and clear evidence that no more could be meant thereby than the rejection of their way of Worship; because I have sufficient assurance from them that they did believe in a Divine Nature, and an instituted Religion most suitable to the most common received Notions of God, which they owned in opposition to all Heathen Worship. Which I find not in the least pretended to by any of the forementioned persons, nor any thing of any different way of Religion asserted, but only a destruction of that in use among them.

XI. And altho' the case of *Anaxagoras Clazomenius*, and the rest of the *Ionic* Philosophers, might seem very different from *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*, and those beforementioned, because altho' they denied the Gods in vulgar repute to be such as they were thought to be (as *Anaxagoras* call'd the Sun ωὐδὲν διάπυρον, *a mere globe of fire*, for which he was condemned at *Athens* to banishment, and fined five *Talents*; yet the Learned *Vossius* puts in this Plea in his behalf, That he was one that asserted the Creation of the World to flow from an eternal Mind:) altho' therefore, I say, the case of the *Ionic* Philosophers may seem far different from the others, because of their asserting the Production of the World (which from *Thales Milesius* was conveyed by *Anaximander* and *Anaximenes* to *Anaxagoras*) yet to one that throughly considers what they understood by their Eternal Mind, they may be sooner cleared from the imputation of Atheism, than Irreligion. which two certainly ought in this case to be distinguished; for it is very possible for men, meeting with such insuperable difficulties about the casual concourse of Atoms for the production of the World, or the eternal existence of Matter, to assert some Eternal Mind, as the first Cause of these things, which yet they may imbrace only as an Hypothesis in Philosophy to solve the Phænomena of Nature with, but yet not to make this Eternal Mind the object of adoration. And so their asserting a Deity was only on the same account as the Tragedians used to bring in their Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, when their Fables were brought to such an issue, and perplexed with so many difficulties, that they saw no way to clear them again, but to make some God come down upon the Stage to solve the difficulties they were ingaged in; or, as *Seneca* saith of many great Families, when they had run up their Genealogies so high that they could go no further, they then fetch'd their Pedigree from the Gods: So when these Philosophers saw such incongruities in asserting an infinite and eternal Series of Matter,

Voss. *de Idololat. c.* 1.

ter, they might by this be brought to acknowledge ſome active Principle which produced the World, tho' they were far enough from giving any religious worſhip to that Eternal Mind.

XII. Thus even *Epicurus* and his Followers would not ſtick to aſſert the Being of a God, ſo they might but circumſcribe him within the Heavens, and let him have nothing to do with things that were done on Earth. And how uncertain the moſt dogmatical of them all were, as to their opinions concerning the Being and Nature of their Gods, doth fully appear from the large Diſcourſes of *Tully* upon that ſubject: where is fully manifeſted their variety of opinions and mutual repugnancies, their ſelf-contradictions and inconſtancy in their own Aſſertions; which hath made me ſomewhat inclinable to think that the reaſon why many of them did to the world own a Deity, was, that they might not be Martyrs for Atheiſm: Which *Tully* likewiſe ſeems to acknowledge, when ſpeaking of the puniſhment of *Protagoras* for that Speech of his; *De diis neque ut ſint, neque ut non ſint, habeo dicere: Ex quo*, ſays he, *equidem exiſtimo tardiores ad hanc ſententiam profitendam multos eſſe factos, quippe cum pœnam ne dubitatio quidem effugere potuiſſet.* So that for all the verbal aſſerting of a Deity among them, we have no certain evidence of their firm belief of it, and much leſs of any worſhip and ſervice they owed unto it. And tho', it may be, they could not totally excuſs the Notions of a Deity out of their minds, partly thro' that Natural Senſe which is engraven on the Souls of Men; partly, as being unable to ſolve the difficulties of Nature without a Deity; yet the obſerving the notorious vanities of Heathen Worſhip, might make them look upon it as a mere Philoſophical ſpeculation, and not any thing that had an influence upon the government of mens lives: For, as in Nature, the obſerving the great mixture of Falſhood and Truth, made the *Academicks* deny any certain κριτήριον, or *Rule of judging Truth*; and the *Scepticks* take away all certain Aſſent: ſo the ſame conſequence was unavoidable here, upon the ſame principle. And that made even *Plato* himſelf ſo ambiguous and uncertain in his Diſcourſes of a Deity; ſometimes making him an Eternal Mind, ſometimes aſſerting the whole World, Sun, Moon, Stars, Earth, Souls and all, to be Gods, and even thoſe that were worſhip'd among the Heathens, as *Tully* tells us out of his *Timæus* and *De Legibus*; which, as *Velleius* the *Epicurean* there ſpeaks, *Et per ſe ſunt falſa & ſibi invicem repugnantia.* This is the firſt inconvenience following the mixture of truth and falſhood, *For the ſake of the falſhood to queſtion the truth it ſelf it was joyned with.*

Cicero *de Nat. Deor. l.* 1. *c.* 63.

XIII. (2.) The other is as great which follows, when truth and falſhood are mixed, *For the ſake of the Truth to embrace the Falſhood.* Which is a Miſtake as common as the other, becauſe men are apt to think, that things ſo vaſtly different as Truth and Falſhood could never blend or be incorporate together; therefore when they are certain they have ſome truth, they conclude no falſhood to be joyned with it. And this I ſuppoſe to have been the caſe of the more credulous and vulgar Heathen, as the other was of the Philoſophers; for they, finding Mankind to agree in this, not only that there is a God, but that he muſt be worſhip'd, did without ſcruple make uſe of the way of worſhip among them, as knowing there muſt be ſome, and they were ignorant of any elſe. And from hence they grew as confident believers of all thoſe Fables and Traditions on which their Idolatry was founded, as of thoſe firſt Principles and Notions from which the neceſſity of Divine Worſhip did ariſe.

And

And being thus habituated to the belief of these things; when Truth it self was divulged among them, they suspected it to be only a corruption of some of their Fables. This *Celsus* the *Epicurean* on all occasions in his Books against the *Christians* did fly to. Thus he saith the building of the Tower of *Babel*, and the confusion of Tongues, was taken from the Fable of the *Aloïdæ* in *Homer's Odysseis*; the story of the Floud, from *Deucalion*; Paradise, from *Alcinoüs* his Gardens; the burning of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*, from the Story of *Phaëton*. Which *Origen* well refutes, from the far greater antiquity of those relations among the *Jews*, than any among the *Greeks:* and therefore the corruption of the tradition was in them, and not in the *Jews*. Which must be our only way for finding out which was the original, and which the corruption; by demonstrating the undoubted antiquity of one beyond the other, whereby we must do as *Archimedes* did by the Crown of *Hiero*, find out the exact proportions of Truth and Falshood which lay in those Heathen Fables. Orig. c. Celf. l. 4. p. 174, 179.

XIV. And this now leads to the third Account, Why Truth is so hardly discerned from Error, even by those who search after it, which is *The great obscurity of the History of Ancient Times*, which should decide the Controversie. For there being an universal agreement in some common principles, and a frequent resemblance in particular traditions, we must of necessity, for the clearing the truth from its corruption, have recourse to ancient History, to see if thereby we can find out where the Original ttadition was best preserved, by what means it came to be corrupted, and whereby we may distinguish those corruptions from the Truths to which they are annexed. Which is the design and subject of our future discourse, *viz.* 'To demonstrate that there was a certain 'original and general tradition preserved in the World concerning the 'eldest Ages of the World; that this tradition was gradually corrupted 'among the Heathens; that notwithstanding this corruption there were 'sufficient remainders of it to evidence its true original; that the full account of this tradition is alone preserved in those Books we call *Scriptures:* That where any other History seems to cross the report contained in them, we have sufficient ground to question their credibility; and that there is sufficient evidence to clear the undoubted certainty of that History which is contained in the Sacred Records of 'Scripture. Wherein we shall observe the same method, which *Thales* took in taking the hight of the Pyramids, by measuring the length of their shadow; so shall we the hight and antiquity of Truth from the extent of the fabulous Corruptions of it. Which will be a work of so much the greater difficulty, because the truth we pursue after takes cover in so great antiquity, and we must be forced to follow its most flying footsteps thro' the dark and shady paths of ancient History. For tho' History be frequently called the Light of Truth, and the Herald of Times, yet that Light is so faint and dim, especially in Heathen Nations, as not to serve to discover the face of Truth from her counterfeit, Error; and that Herald so little skill'd, as not to be able to tell us which is of the elder House. The reason is; tho' Truth be always of greater Antiquity, yet Error may have the more wrinkled face, by which it often imposeth on such who guess antiquity by deformity, and think nothing so old as that which can give the least account of its own age. This is evidently the case of those who make the pretence of ancient History a plea for Infidelity, and think no argument more plausible to impugn the certainty of Divine Revelation, than the seeming repug-

nancy of ſome pretended Hiſtories with the account of ancient time reported in the *Bible.* Which being a pretext ſo unworthy, and deſigned for ſo ill an end, and ſo frequently made uſe of, by ſuch who account Infidelity a piece of antiquity as well as of reaſon, it may be worth our while to ſhew, That the Scriptures are no more liable to be baffled with Reaſon, than to be confuted by Antiquity.

XV. In order therefore to the removing of this ſtumbling-block in our way, I ſhall firſt evince, *That there is no certain credibility in any of thoſe ancient hiſtories which ſeem to contradict the Scriptures,* nor any ground of reaſon why we ſhould aſſent to them, when they differ from the *Bible:* and then prove, That all thoſe undoubted characters of a moſt certain and authentick hiſtory are legible in thoſe records contained in Scripture. Whereby we ſhall not only ſhew the unreaſonableneſs of infidelity, but the rational evidence which our faith doth ſtand on as to theſe things. I ſhall demonſtrate the firſt of theſe, *viz.* That there is no ground of aſſent to any ancient hiſtories which give account of things different from the Scriptures, from theſe arguments; The apparent defect, weakneſs and inſufficiency of them as to the giving an account of elder times; The monſtrous confuſion, ambiguity and uncertainty of them in the account which they give; The evident partiality of them to themſelves, and inconſiſtency with each other. I begin with the firſt of theſe, the defect and inſufficiency of them to give ſuch an account of elder times as may amount to certain credibility: which if cleared, will of it ſelf be ſufficient to manifeſt the incompetency of thoſe records, as to the laying any foundation for a firm aſſent to be given to them. Now this defect and inſufficiency of thoſe hiſtories is either more general, which lies in common to them all; or ſuch as may be obſerved in a particular conſideration of the hiſtories of thoſe ſeveral Nations, which have pretended higheſt to antiquity.

XVI. The general defect is, *The want of timely records to preſerve their hiſtories in.* For it is moſt evident, that the trueſt hiſtory in the world is liable to various corruptions thro' length of time, if there be no certain way of preſerving it entire. And that, thro' the frailty of memory in thoſe who had integrity to preſerve it; through the gradual increaſe of barbariſm and ignorance, where there are no ways of inſtruction; and thro' the ſubtilty of ſuch, whoſe intereſt it may be to corrupt and alter that tradition. If we find ſuch infinite variety and difference in men's accounts, as to the hiſtories of their own times, when they have all poſſible means to be acquainted with the truth of them; what account can we imagin can be given, where there was no way of preſerving to poſterity the moſt authentick relation of former Ages? Eſpecially, it being moſt evident, that where any certain way of preſerving tradition is wanting, a People muſt ſoon degenerate into the greateſt ſtupidity and barbariſm: becauſe all will be taken up in minding their own petty concerns, and no encouragement at all given to ſuch publick ſpirits, who would mind the credit of the whole Nation. For what was there for ſuch to employ themſelves upon, or ſpend their time in, when they had no other kind of learning among them, but ſome general traditions conveyed from father to ſon, which might be learned by ſuch who followed nothing but domeſtick employments? So that the Sons of *Noah,* after their ſeveral diſperſions and plantations of ſeveral Countries, did gradually degenerate into ignorance and barbariſm: For, upon their firſt ſetling in any Country, they found it employment ſufficient to cultivate

tivate the Land, and make habitations to live in, and to provide themſelves of neceſſaries for their mutual comfort and ſubſiſtence. Beſides this, they were often put to removes from one place to another, where they could not conveniently reſide; which *Thucydides* ſpeaks much of as to the ancient ſtate of *Greece*: and it was a great while before they came to imbody themſelves together in Towns and Cities, and from thence to ſpread into Provinces, and to ſettle bounds and extents of their Territories. The firſt Age after the plantation of a Country being thus ſpent, the next ſaw it neceſſary to fall cloſe to the work of huſbandry, not only to get ſomething out of the earth for their ſubſiſtence; but when by their diligence they had ſo far improved the Ground, that they had not only enough for themſelves, but to ſpare to others, they then found out a way for commerce one with another by exchange. This way of traffick made them begin to raiſe their hopes higher, of enriching themſelves; which when ſome of them had done, they bring the poorer under their power, and reign as Lords over them; theſe rich, with their dependents, ſtrive to outvye each other; whence came wars and mutual contentions, till they who got the better over their adverſaries, took ſtill greater authority into their hands: thence at firſt every City almoſt, and adjacent Territory, had a King over it; which by conflicting with each other, at laſt brought ſeveral Cities and Territories under the power of one particular perſon, who thereby came to reign as ſole Monarch over all within his Dominions.

XVII. For altho' there be ſome reaſon to think, that the Leaders of ſeveral Colonies had at firſt ſuperiority over all that went with them; yet there being evidence in few Nations of any continued ſucceſſion of Monarchs from the poſterity of *Noah*, and ſo great evidence of ſo many petty Royalties almoſt in every City (as we read of ſuch multitudes of Kings in the ſmall Territory of *Canaan*, when *Joſhua* conquered it,) this makes it at leaſt probable to me, that after the death of the firſt Leader, by reaſon of their poverty and diſperſedneſs of habitations, they did not incorporate generally into any Civil government under one head, but did riſe by degrees in the manner before ſet down; but yet ſo, that in the petty diviſions ſome prerogative might be given to him who derived his pedigree the neareſt from the firſt Founder of that plantation; which in all probability is the meaning of *Thucydides*, who tells us, when the riches of *Greece* began to increaſe, and their Power improved, Tyrannies were erected in moſt Cities, ἀφόρισον ἦσαν ὅτι ῥητοῖς γέρασι παλαιὰ καὶ βασιλεῖαι, *for before that time Kingdoms with honors limited were hereditary*; for ſo the Scholiaſt explains it, παλαιαὶ βασιλεῖαι ἀπὸ τῆς πατέρων παραλαμβανόμεναι κατὰ διαδοχὴν γένος. This then being the ſtate and caſe of moſt Nations in the firſt ages after their plantation, there was no likelihood at all of any great improvement in knowledge among them; nay ſo far from it, that for the firſt ages, wherein they conflicted with poverty and neceſſity, there was a neceſſary decay among them, of what knowledge had been conveyed to them: becauſe their neceſſities kept them in continual employment; and after they conquered Them, they began to conquer each other: ſo that till ſuch time as they were ſettled in peace under eſtabliſhed Common-wealths, there was no leiſure nor opportunity for any Arts or Sciences to flouriſh, without which all certain Hiſtories of their own former ſtate muſt vaniſh and dwindle into ſome fabulous ſtories. And ſo we find they did in moſt Nations; which thence are able to give no other account of themſelves,

Thucyd. l. 1. p. 10. Ed. Port.

but that they ſprung out of the earth where they lived; from which opinion the *Athenians* uſed to wear of old their golden Graſhoppers, as *Thucydides* relates. What account can we then expect of ancient times from ſuch Nations which were ſo defective in preſerving their own Originals?

XVIII. Now this defectiveneſs of giving teſtimony of ancient times by theſe Nations, will further appear by theſe two conſiderations: *Firſt*, What ways there are for communicating knowledge to poſterity. *Secondly*, How long it was ere theſe Nations came to be Maſters of any way of certain communicating their conceptions to their Succeſſors. Three general ways there are whereby knowledge may be propagated from one to another; by repreſentative Symbols, by Speech, and by Letters. The firſt of theſe was moſt common in thoſe elder times, for which purpoſe *Clemens Alexandrinus* produceth the teſtimony of an ancient Grammarian *Dionyſius Thrax* in his Expoſition of the ſymbol of the Wheels: *Clem. Alexan. Strom. l. 5.* ἐσήμαινον γὰρ ἃ διὰ λέξεως μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ συμβόλων ἔνιοι τὰς θεωρίας: *That ſome perſons made a repreſentation of their actions to others, not only by ſpeech, but by ſymbols too.* Which any one who is any ways converſant in the Learning of thoſe ancient times, will find to have been the chief way of propagating it (ſuch as it was) from one to another: as is evident in the Hieroglyphicks of the *Ægyptians*, and the cuſtom of Symbols from thence derived among the *Grecian* Philoſophers, eſpecially the *Pythagoreans*. It was the ſolemn cuſtom of the *Ægyptians* to wrap up all the little knowledge they had, under ſuch myſtical repreſentations, which were unavoidably clog'd with two inconveniences very unſuitable to the propagation of knowledge, which were Obſcurity and Ambiguity. For it not only coſt them a great deal of time to gather up ſuch Symbolical things which might repreſent their conceptions; but when they had pitched upon them, they were liable to a great variety of Interpretations, as is evident in all thoſe remainders of them, preſerved by the induſtry of ſome ancient Writers. As in their κρυσοῖσι, or *golden Images of their Gods*, they had ingraved two Dogs, an Hawk and an Ibis. By the Dogs ſome underſtood the two Hemiſpheres, others the two Tropicks; by the Hawk ſome underſtood the Sun, others the Æquinoctial; by the Ibis, ſome the Moon, others the Zodiack, as is evident in *Clemens*, who reports it. This way then is a moſt unfit way to convey any ancient tradition; by being both obſcure, ambiguous, and unable to expreſs ſo much as to give any certain light to future ages of the paſſages of the precedent.

XIX. The other ways of conveying knowledge, are either by Speech, or by Letters. The firſt muſt be by ſome vocal Cabala, delivered down from father to ſon: but Words being of ſo periſhing a nature, and man's Memory ſo weak and frail in retaining them, it is neceſſary for a certain communication of knowledge, that ſome way ſhould be found out more laſting than Words, more firm than Memory, more faithful than Tradition: which could not otherwiſe be imagined, than that the Author of his own conceptions ſhould himſelf leave them to the view of all poſterity; in order to which, ſome way muſt be contrived whereby mens Voices might be ſeen, and mens Fingers ſpeak. But how to expreſs all kind of ſounds, with the ſeveral draughts of a pen, and to confine them within the compaſs of twenty-four letters, is deſervedly called by *Galileo*, *admirandarum omnium inventionum humanarum ſignaculum*, *the choiceſt of all humane inventions*. And had we no other evidence of the

great

great obscurity of ancient history, the great difference as to the first inventor of letters, would be a sufficient demonstration of it. For almost every Nation hath had a several Author of them: The *Jews* derive them from *Adam* or *Moses*; the *Ægyptians* attribute their invention to *Thoyt* or *Mercury*; the *Grecians* to *Cadmus*; the *Phœnicians* to *Taautus*; the *Latins* to *Saturn*; others to the *Æthiopians*: and lest the *Pygmies* should be without their enemies, some think they were found out *à gruum volatu*, from the manner of the flying of Cranes. Thus it hath happened with most Nations; what was first among themselves, they thought to be the first in the world.

XX. But by whomsoever they were first invented, we are certain they were but lately in use in that Nation, which hath most vainly arrogated the most to it self in point of Antiquity, and yet had the least reason, I mean, the *Grecians*. Thence the Ægyptian Priest *Patenit* truly told *Solon, the Greeks were always children*, because they had nothing of the antiquities of former ages. If we may believe *Josephus*, they had no Writings earlier than *Homer*; but herein he is conceived to have served his cause too much, because of the Inscription of *Amphitryo* at *Thebes* in the Temple of *Apollo Ismenius* in the *Ionic* letters and two others of the same age to be seen in *Herodotus*; and because of the Writings of *Lycus*, *Orpheus*, *Musæus*, *Oroebantius Troezenius*, *Thaletas*, *Melesander*, and others. This we are certain of, the *Grecians* had not the use of letters among them 'till the time of *Cadmus* the *Phœnician*'s coming into *Greece*, whither he came to plant a Colony of *Phœnicians*, whence arose the story of his pursuit of *Europa*, as *Conon* in *Photius* tells us.

Procl. in Tim. Plat. *Joseph. c. App. lib. 1.* *Herodot. lib. 5.* *V. Bochar. Geograph. Sacr. p. 2. l. 2. c. 20.* *Conon apud Phot. Bibl. l. 37.*

And it is very probable, which learned men have long since observed, that the name *Cadmus* comes from the *Hebrew* קדם *Kedem*, and may relate as an appellative either to his Dignity, as *Junius* in his *Academia* conjectures, or more probably to his Country, the East, which is frequently call'd *Kedem* in Scripture. Some have conjectured further, that his proper name was עוג *Og*; upon what reason I know not, unless from hence, that thence by a duplication of the word came the *Greek* Ὠγυγος, who seems to have been no other than *Cadmus*, as will appear by comparing their stories together. Only one was the name his memory was preserved by at *Athens*, where the *Cadmeans* inhabited, as appears by the *Gephyræi*, who *Herodotus* tells us were *Phœnicians* that came with *Cadmus*; and others fansie the *Academia* there was originally called *Cadmea*; and the name *Cadmus* was preserved chiefly among the *Bœotians* in memory of the Country whence he came: it being likely to be impos'd by them upon his first landing in the Country; as many learned persons conceive, the name of an *Hebrew* was given to *Abraham* by the *Canaanites*, upon his passing over the river *Euphrates*. On this account then it stands to reason, that the name which was given him as a stranger, should be longest preserved in the place where it was first imposed. Or if we take קדם in the other sense, as it imports Antiquity; so there is still a higher probability of the affinity of the names of *Cadmus* and *Ogyges*; for it is certain, that the *Greeks* had no higher name for a matter of antiquity, than to call it Ὠγύγιον, as the Scholiast on *Hesiod*, *Hesychius*, *Suidas*, *Eustathius* on *Dionysius*, and many others observe. And which yet advanceth the probability higher, *Lucatius* or *Lactantius* the Scholiast on *Statius*, tells us, the other *Greeks* had this from the *Thebanes*; for, saith he, *Thebani res antiquas Ogygias nominabant*. But that which puts it almost beyond meer probability, is, that

Hist. l. 5. *Lactantius in Statii Theb. l. 2.*

Varro,

Varro, *Festus*, *Pausanias*, *Apollonius*, *Æschylus*, and others make *Ogyges* the Founder of the *Bœotian Thebes*, which were thence called *Ogygiæ*; and *Strabo* and *Stephanus* further say, that the whole Country of *Bœotia* was called *Ogygia*: now all that mention the Story of *Cadmus*, attribute to him the founding of the *Bœotian Thebes*. And withall it is observable, that in the *Vatican* Appendix of the *Greek Proverbs*, we read *Cadmus* called *Ogyges*; Ὠγύγια κακά, ὅπι τῷ ὀχληρῶν, ἐπεὶ συνέζη Κάδμον τὸν Ὠγύγην διὰ τὰς δυσκρασίας κακοῖς περιπεσεῖν. *Meursius* indeed would have it corrected, Κάδμον τὸν Ὠγύγε, as it is read in *Suidas*; but by the favour of so learned a man, it seems more probable that *Suidas* should be corrected by that; he bringing no other evidence of any such person as *Cadmus* a Son of *Ogyges*, but only that reading in *Suidas*; whereas we have discovered many probable grounds to make them both the same. That which I would now infer from hence is, the utter impossibility of the *Greeks* giving us any certain account of ancient times, when a thing so modern in comparison as *Cadmus* his coming into *Greece*, is thought by them a matter of so great antiquity, that when they would describe a thing very ancient, they described it by the name of *Ogyges*, who was the same with *Cadmus*. Now *Cadmus* his coming into *Greece*, is generally, by Historians, placed about the time of *Joshua*, whence some (I will not say how happily) have conjectured, that *Cadmus* and his company were some of the *Canaanites* who fled from *Joshua*, as others are supposed to have done into *Africa*, if *Procopius* his Pillar hath strength enough to bear such a conjecture. But there is too great a confusion about the time of *Cadmus* his arrival in *Greece*, to affirm any thing with any great certainty about it.

Vatic. App. Cent. 4. Prov. 52.

Meursius de Regno Att. Lib. 8. c. 5.

Yet those who disagree from that former Computation, place it yet lower. *Vossius* makes *Agenor Cadmus*'s Father contemporary with the latter end of *Moses*, or the beginning of *Joshua*; and so *Cadmus* his time must fall somewhat after. *Jac. Capellus* placeth *Cadmus* in the third year of *Othoniel*. The Author of the *Greek* Chronicle, in the *Marmora Arundeliana*, makes his coming to *Greece* to be in the time of *Helen* the son of *Deucalion*; which *Capellus* fixeth on the 73. of *Moses*, *A. M.* 2995. But Mr. *Selden* conceives it somewhat lower: and so it must be, if we follow *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who places it in the time of *Lynceus* King of the *Argives*, which he saith was ἑνδεκάτῃ ὕστερον Μωσέως γενεᾷ, *in the eleventh Generation after Moses*, which will fall about the time of *Samuel*: But tho' it should be so late, it would be no wonder it should be reckoned a matter of so great antiquity among the *Grecians*; for the eldest Records they have of any King at *Athens*, began at the time of *Moses*, whose contemporary *Cecrops* is generally thought to be; for at *Cecrops* his time it is the Marble Chronicle begins. Now that the *Grecians* did receive their Letters from the *Phœnicians* by *Cadmus*, is commonly acknowledged by the most learned of the *Greeks* themselves, as appears by the Ingenuous confession of *Herodotus*, *Philostratus*, *Critias* in *Athenæus*, *Zenodotus* in *Laertius*, *Timon Phliasius* in *Sextus Empiricus*, and many others: so that it were to no purpose to offer to prove that, which they who arrogate so much to themselves, do so freely acknowledge. Which yet hath been done to very good purpose by *Joseph Scaliger* and *Bochartus*, and many others from the form of the Letters, the order of the name of them. It seems probable that at first they might use the form of the *Phœnician* Letters, in which *Herodotus* tells us the three old Inscriptions were extant; and *Diodorus* tells us, that the

Vossius de Idol. l. 1. c. 13.

Strom. 1.

Scalig. Not. in Euseb. Chron. an. 1617.

Bochart Geogr. p. 2. l. 1. cap. 20.

brass

braſs pot which *Cadmus* offered to *Minerva Lindia*, had an inſcription on it in the *Phœnician* Letters: but afterwards the form of the Letters came by degrees to be changed, when for their greater expedition in writing they left the old way of writing towards the left hand, for the natural and expedite way of writing towards the right, by which they exchanged the ſites of the ſtrokes in ſeveral Letters, as it is obſerved by the fore-cited Learned Authors.

Not that the old *Ionic* Letters were nearer the *Phœnician*, and diſtinct from the modern, as *Joſ. Scaliger* in his learned Diſcourſe on the original of the *Greek* Letters, conceives; for the *Ionic* Letters were nothing elſe but the full Alphabet of twenty-four, with the additions of *Palamedes*, and *Simonides Ceus*; as *Pliny* tells us, that all the *Greeks* conſented in the uſe of the *Ionic* Letters: but the old *Attic* Letters came nearer the *Phœnician*, becauſe the *Athenians*, long after the Alphabet was increaſed to xxiv, continued ſtill in the uſe of the old 16, which were brought in by *Cadmus*; which muſt needs much alter the way of writing: for in the old Letters they writ THEOΣ for Θεὸς, which made *Pliny*, with a great deal of learning and truth, ſay, that the old *Greek* Letters were the ſame with the *Roman*. Thence the *Greeks* called their ancient Letters Ἀττικὰ γράμματα, as appears by * *Harpocration* and *Heſychius*; not that they were ſo much diſtinct from others, but becauſe they did not admit of the addition of the other eight Letters. *Scalig. ibid.* *Plin. Hiſt. 7. cap. 57.* **V. Manſſacum in Harpocr.* *Salmaſ. in Conſecr. Templ. p. 30.*

XXI. We ſee then the very Letters of the *Greeks* were no elder than *Cadmus*; and for any conſiderable Learning among them, it was not near ſo old. Some aſſert indeed that Hiſtory began from the time of *Cadmus*; but it is by a miſtake of Him for a younger *Cadmus*, which was *Cadmus Mileſius*, whom *Pliny* makes to be the firſt Writer in Proſe; but That he after attributes to *Pherecydes Syrius*, and Hiſtory to *Cadmus Mileſius*: and therefore I think it far more probable, that it was ſome writing of this latter *Cadmus*, which was tranſcribed and epitomized by *Bion Proconeſius*, altho' *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſeems to attribute it to the elder. We ſee how unable then the *Grecians* were to give an account of elder times, that were guilty of ſo much infancy and nonage, as to begin to learn their Letters almoſt in the noon-tide of the World, and yet long after this to the time of the firſt *Olympiad* all their relations are accounted fabulous. A fair account then we are like to have from them of the firſt Antiquities of the World, who could not ſpeak plain truth, 'till the World was above three thouſand years old; for ſo was it when the *Olympiads* began. *Plin. Nat. Hiſt. l. 5. c. 29. l. 7. c. 57.* *Clem. Strom. l. 6.*

So true is the obſervation of *Juſtin Martyr*, ἐδὲν Ἕλλησι πρὸ τῶν Ὀλυμπιάδων ἀκριβὲς ἱστόρηται; *the Greeks had no exact hiſtory of themſelves before the Olympiads*; but of that more afterwards.

This is now the firſt Defect which doth infringe the credibility of theſe Hiſtories, which is *the want of timely and early Records* to digeſt their own Hiſtory in.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the *Phœnician* and *Ægyptian* Hiſtory.

I. *The particular defect in the Hiſtory of the moſt learned Heathen Nations.* II. *Firſt the* Phœnicians. *Of* Sanchoniathon, *his Antiquity and Fidelity.* III. *Of* Jerom-baal, Baal-Berith. IV. *The Antiquity of* Tyre. Scaliger *vindicated againſt* Bochartus. V. Abibalus. VI. *The vanity of the* Phœnician *Theology.* VII. *The imitation of it by the* Gnoſtics. VIII. *Of the* Ægyptian *Hiſtory.* IX. *The Antiquity and Authority of* Hermes Triſmegiſtus. X. *Of his Inſcriptions on Pillars, tranſcribed by* Manetho. XI. *His Fabulouſneſs thence diſcovered.* Terra Seriadica. XII. *Of* Seth's *Pillars in* Joſephus, *and an account whence they were taken.*

I. HAving already ſhewed a general defect in the ancient Heathen Hiſtories, as to an account of ancient times; we now come to a cloſer, and more particular conſideration of the Hiſtories of thoſe ſeveral Nations which have born the greateſt name in the world for Learning and Antiquity. There are four Nations chiefly which have pretended the moſt to antiquity in the learned World, and whoſe Hiſtorians have been thought to deliver any thing contrary to Holy Writ in their account of ancient times, whom on that account we are obliged more particularly to conſider; and thoſe are the *Phœnicians*, *Chaldæans*, *Ægyptians*, and *Græcians*; we ſhall therefore ſee what evidence of credibility there can be in any of theſe, as to the matter of antiquity of their Records, or their Hiſtories taken from them. And the credibility of an Hiſtorian depending much upon the certainty and authority of the Records he makes uſe of, we ſhall both conſider of what value and antiquity the pretended Records are, and particularly look into the age of the ſeveral Hiſtorians. As to the *Græcians*, we have ſeen already an utter impoſſibility of having ancient Records among them, becauſe they wanted the means of preſerving them, having ſo lately borrowed their Letters from other Nations. Unleſs as to their account of times they had been as careful, as the old *Romans* were, to number their years by the ſeveral *clavi* or *nails*, which they fixed on the Temple-doors: which yet they were not in a capacity to do; not growing up in an entire body, as the *Roman* Empire did; but lying ſo much ſcattered and divided into ſo many petty Republicks, that they minded very little of concernment to the whole Nation. The other three Nations have deſervedly a name of far greater antiquity than any the *Græcians* could ever pretend to; who yet were unmeaſurably guilty of an impotent affection of Antiquity; and arrogating to themſelves, as growing on their own ground, what was with a great deal of pains and induſtry gathered but as the gleanings from the fuller harveſt of thoſe Nations they reſorted to. Which is not only true as to the greateſt part of their learning, but as to the account likewiſe they give of ancient times; the chief and moſt ancient Hiſtories among them being only a corruption of the Hiſtory of the elder Nations, eſpecially *Phœnicia*

nicia and *Ægypt:* for of these two *Philo Byblius* the translator of the ancient *Phœnician* Historian *Sanchoniathon*, saith, *they were* παλαιότατοι τῶν Βαρβάρων, παρ' ὧν καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ παρέλαβον ἄνθρωποι, *the most ancient of all the Barbarians, from whom the others derived their Theology*; which he there particularly instanceth in. *Philo Bybl. apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 8. p. 23. Ed. R. St.*

II. We begin therefore with the *Phœnician* History, whose most ancient and famous Historian is *Sanchoniathon*, so much admired and made use of by the shrewdest antagonist ever Christianity met with, the Philosopher *Porphyrius*. But therein was seen the wonderful Providence of God, that out of this *Eater* came forth *Meat*, and out of the *Lion*, *Honey*; that the most considerable testimonies by him produced against our Religion, were of the greatest strength to refute his own. For he being of too great Learning to be satisfied with the vain pretences of the *Græcians*, he made it his business to search after the most ancient Records, to find out somewhat in them to confront with the antiquity of the Scriptures; but upon his search could find none of greater veneration than the *Phœnician* History, nor any Author contending for age with this *Sanchoniathon*. Yet when he had made the most of his Testimony, he was fain to yield him younger than *Moses*, tho' he supposeth him elder than the *Trojan* Wars. And yet herein was he guilty of a most gross ἀντιστιχία, not much exceeding the *Græcians* in his skill in Chronology, when he makes *Semiramis* coexistent with the Siege of *Troy:* as is evident in his testimony produced at large by *Eusebius* out of his first *Book against the Christians*; nay, he goes to prove the truth of *Sanchoniathon*'s History by the agreement of it with that of *Moses* concerning the *Jews*, both as to their Names and Places, ἰσχεῖ ὃ τὰ περὶ Ἰουδαίων ἀληθεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς τόποις καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν αὐτῶν τὰ συμφωνότατα: whereby he doth evidently assert the greater Truth and Antiquity of *Moses* his History, when he proves the truth of *Sanchoniathon*'s from consonancy with that. *Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. 10. c. 8. p. 285.*

III. Two things more *Porphyry* insists on to manifest his credibility; the one I suppose relates to what he reports concerning the *Jews*, the other concerning the *Phœnicians* themselves. For the first, that he made use of the Records of *Jerom-baal* the Priest of the God *Ieuo*, or rather *Iao*; for the other, that he used all the Records of the several Cities, and the sacred Inscriptions in the Temples. Who that *Jerom-baal* was, is much discussed among Learned men, the finding out of which hath been thought to be the most certain way to determine the age of *Sanchoniathon*. The learned *Bochartus* conceives him to be *Gideon*, who in Scriptures is called *Jerub-baal*, which is of the same sense in the *Phœnician* Language, only after their custom changing one *b* into *m*, as in *Ambubajæ*, *Sambuca*, &c. But admitting the conjecture of this learned person concerning *Jerub-baal*, yet I see no necessity of making *Sanchoniathon* and him contemporary; for I no where find any thing mentioned in *Porphyry* implying that, but only that he made use of the Records of *Jerub-baal*, which he might very probably do at a considerable distance of time from him; whether by those ὑπομνήματα, we mean the Annals written by him, or the Records concerning his actions: either of which might have given *Sanchoniathon* considerable light in the history either of the *Israelites* or *Phœnicians*. And it is so much the more probable, because presently after the death of *Gideon*, the *Israelites* worshipped *Baal-berith*; by which most probably is meant the Idol of *Berith* or *Berytus*, the place where *Sanchoniathon* lived; by which means the *Bochart. Geogr. Sac. p. 2. l. 2. c. 17.* Judg. 8. 33.

Berytians might come easily acquainted with all the remarkable passages of *Jerub-baal*.

IV. But I cannot conceive how *Sanchoniathon* could be contemporary with *Gideon*, (which, if he were, he falls 182 years short of *Moses*,) especially because the building of *Tyre*, which that Author mentions as an ancient thing (as hath been observed by *Scaliger*) is by our best Chronologers placed about the time of *Gideon*, and about 65 years before the destruction of *Troy*. I know *Bochartus*, to avoid this argument, hath brought some evidence of several places called *Tyrus* in *Phœnicia*, from *Scylax* his *Periplus*; but none that there was any more than one *Tyrus* of any great repute for antiquity. Now this *Tyrus Josephus* makes but 240 years elder than *Solomon*'s Temple, and *Justin* but one year elder than the destruction of *Troy*. Neither can any account be given why *Sidon* should be so much celebrated by ancient Poets, as *Strabo* tells us, when *Tyre* is not so much as mentioned by *Homer*; if the famous *Tyre* were of so great antiquity and repute as is pretended. It cannot be denied but that there is mention in Scripture of a *Tyre* elder than this we speak of, *Joshua* 19. 29. which some think to be that which was called *Palætyrus*, which *Strabo* makes to be 20 furlongs distant from the great *Tyre*; but *Pliny* includes *Palætyrus* within the circumference of *Tyre*, and so makes the whole circuit of the City to be 19 miles. It is not to me so certain to what place the name *Palætyrus* refers, whether to any *Tyrus* before the first building of the great *Tyre*, or to the ruins of the great *Tyre* after its destruction by *Nebuchadnezzar*, compared with the new *Tyre*, which was built more inward to the Sea, and was after besieged by *Alexander* the Great. It may seem probable that *Palætyrus* may relate to the ruins of the great *Tyre*, in that it was after included in its circuit, and chiefly because of the prediction in *Ezekiel* 26. 4. *Thou shalt be built no more*; for the *Tyre* erected after, was built not on the Continent, but almost in the Sea. If so, then *Palætyrus* or the *old* famous *Tyrus* might stand upon a rock upon the brink of the Continent: and so the great argument of *Bochartus* is easily answered, which is, *that after it is mentioned in* Sanchoniathon's *History, that* Hypsouranius *dwelt in* Tyre, *upon the falling out between him and his brother* Usous, Usous *first adventured* εἰς θάλασσαν ἐμβῆναι, *to go to Sea*, which saith he, *evidently manifests that the* Tyre *mentioned by* Sanchoniathon *was not the famous Insular* Tyrus, *but some other* Tyre. This argument, I say, is now easily answered, if the famous *Tyre* before its destruction by *Nebuchadnezzar* did stand upon the Continent; for then it might be the old famous *Tyre* still, notwithstanding what *Sanchoniathon* speaks of the first venturing to Sea after *Tyre* was built. So then I conceive these several ages agreeable to the same *Tyre*; the first was when it was a high strong Rock on the Sea-side without many Inhabitants; so I suppose it was when mentioned by *Joshua*, as a bound of the tribe of *Asher*. The second age was, when it was built a great City by the *Sidonians* upon the former place, and grew very populous and famous, which lasted 'till *Nebuchadnezzar*'s time; after this, tho' it were never built upon the Continent again, yet a little farther into the Sea, a new and goodly City was erected, which was *New Tyre*, and the remains on the Continent side *Palætyrus*. Thus far then we have made good *Scaliger*'s opinion against *Bochartus*, that the famous *Sanchoniathon* is not so old as he is pretended to be.

Scalig. Not. in Frag. Græc. p. 40.

Joseph. Ant. l. 8.

Strabo l. 16.

Plin. Hist. Nat. l. 5. c. 19.

Which

Which will be further manifeſt, if that *Abibalus*, to whom *Sanchoniathon* is ſuppoſed to dedicate his Hiſtory, were the father to *Hiram*, contemporary with *Solomon*, as *Joſ. Scaliger* ſuppoſeth, who was 154 years after the deſtruction of *Troy*. In the *Tyrian* Dynaſties produced by *Scaliger* out of the *Phœnician* Annals, this *Abibalus* is the firſt who occurs, and is contemporary with *David*: *Sanchoniathon* then is of no great antiquity, if this were the time he lived in. But *Bochartus* well obſerves, that it is not ſpoken of *Abibalus* King of *Tyre*, but of *Abibalus* King of *Berytus*, whom we may allow to be ſomewhat nearer the time of *Moſes* than the other *Abibalus*, as the *Phœnician* Annals make it appear, as *Porphyry* tells us; but yet we find his antiquity is not ſo great as to be able to conteſt with *Moſes*, as *Porphyry* himſelf confeſſeth; altho' we may freely acknowledge him to be far elder than any of the *Greek* Hiſtorians; which is all *Voſſius* contends for, and ſufficiently proves: but we are far from yielding him contemporary with *Semiramis*, as *Porphyry* would have him, and yet makes him junior to *Moſes*, and to live about the time of the *Trojan* war, which is to reconcile the diſtance of near 800 years: ſuch miſerable confuſion was there in the beſt learned Heathens in their computation of ancient times. V.

Scal. Not. in Euſeb. Chr. p. 12. Scal. Can. Iſag. l. 2.

Voſſ. de Hiſt. Græc. l. 1. c. 1.

Having thus cleared the Antiquity of *Sanchoniathon* and the *Phœnician* Hiſtory, we are next to conſider the Fidelity of it. This *Sanchoniathon* is highly commended for, both by *Porphyry*, and his Tranſlator into *Greek Philo Byblius*, who lived in *Adrian*'s time; and *Theodoret* thinks his name in the *Phœnician* language ſignifies φιλαλήθης, which *Bochartus* endeavours to fetch from thence, and conceives the name to be given him when he ſet himſelf to write his Hiſtory; and he wiſheth, and ſo do we, that he had been then *vir ſui nominis*, and made it appear by his writing that he had been a *Lover of Truth*. *Philo* ſaith he was ἀνὴρ πολυμαθὴς καὶ πολυτρόπως, *a very learned and inquiſitive man*; but either he was not ſo diligent to enquire after, or not ſo happy to light on any certain Records; or if he did, he was not over-much a Lover of truth, in delivering them to the world. How faithful he was in tranſcribing his Hiſtory from his Records, we cannot be ſufficient judges of, unleſs we had thoſe Books of *Taautus*, and the ſacred Inſcriptions, and the Records of Cities which he pretends to take his Hiſtory from, to compare them together. But by what remains of his Hiſtory, which is only the firſt Book concerning the *Phœnician* Theology, extant in *Euſebius*, we have little reaſon to believe his Hiſtory of the World and eldeſt times, without further proof than he gives of it, there being ſo much obſcurity and confuſion in it, when he makes a *Chaos* to be the firſt beginning of all things, and the Gods to come after; makes Αὐτόχθων γήινος to be the ſon of *Chryſor* or *Vulcan*, and again the ſame γήινος, *the man born of earth*, to be ſeveral generations after Αἰὼν and Πρωτόγονος, who were the firſt mortal men; and yet from the two brethren Τεχνίτης and Αὐτόχθων came two Gods, whereof one was called Ἀγρεύς, and the other Ἀγρότης, and this latter was worſhipped with as much veneration as any of their Gods. VI.

Yet from theſe things, as fooliſh and ridiculous as they are, it is very probable the *Gnoſtics* and the ſeveral ſubdiviſions of them might take the riſe of their ſeveral *Æones* and συζυγίαι: for here we find Αἰὼν and Πρωτόγονος made two of the number of the Gods; but the reſt of the names they, according to their ſeveral ſects, took a liberty of altering according to their ſeveral fancies. This is far more probable to me, than VII.

than that either *Hesiod*'s Θεογονία should be the ground of them; or the opinion of a late *German* Divine, who conceives that *Philo Byblius* did in imitation of the *Gnostics*, form his holy story of the *Phœnicians* Theology. For altho' I am far from believing what *Kircher* somewhere tells us, that he had once got a sight of *Sanchoniathon*'s Original History (it being not the first thing that learned men hath been deceived in) yet I see no ground of so much peevishness, as because this History pretends so much antiquity, we should therefore presently condemn it as a figment of the Translator of it. For had it been so, the Antagonists of *Porphyry*, *Methodius*, *Apollinarius*, but especially *Eusebius*, so well versed in antiquities, would have found out so great a cheat. Altho' I must confess they were oft-times deceived with *Piæ Fraudes*; but then it was when they made for the Christians, and not against them, as this did. But besides a fabulous confusion of things together, we have some things delivered concerning their Gods, which are both contrary to all natural notions of a Deity, and those very common principles of Humanity, which all acknowledge. As when Κρόνος or *Saturn*, suspecting his son *Sadidus*, destroyed him with his own hands, and warred against his father *Uranus*, and after destroyed him likewise, and buried his brother *Atlas* alive in the earth; which being taken, as *Philo Byblius* contends they ought to be, in the literal sense, are such incongruities to all notions of a divine nature, that it is the greatest wonder there should be any that should believe there was any God, and believe these were Gods together.

Joh. Ursinus Exerc. 3. sect. 1.

But altho' there be so many gross Fables and Inconsistencies in this *Phœnician* Theology, that are so far from meriting belief in themselves, that it were a sufficient forfeiture of reason to say they were credible; yet when we have a greater light in our hands of divine revelation, we may in this dungeon find out many excellent remainders of the ancient tradition, tho' miserably corrupted; as, concerning the Creation, the Original of Idolatry, the Invention of Arts, the Foundation of Cities, the Story of *Abraham*, of which in their due place. That which of all seems the cleerest in this Theology, is the open owning the original of Idolatry to have been from the consecration of some eminent persons after their death, who had found out some useful things for the world while they were living: which the subtiler *Greeks* would not admit of, *viz.* that the persons they worship'd were once Men; which made them turn all into Allegories and Mystical Senses to blind that Idolatry they were guilty of the better among the ignorant: which makes *Philo Byblius* so very angry with the *Neoteric Græcians*, as he calls them, ὡς ἂν βιασμένως καὶ ἐκ ἀλη θῶς τὰς περὶ θεῶν μύθους ἐπ' ἀλληγορίας καὶ φυσικὰς διηγήσεις τε καὶ θεωρίας ἀνάγουσι: *That with a great deal of force and straining they turned all the stories of the Gods into Allegories and Physical Discourses.* Which is all the ingenuity that I know is to be found in this *Phœnician* Theology, that therein we find a free acknowledgment of the beginning of the Heathen Idolatry: and therefore *Sanchoniathon* was as far from advancing *Porphyry*'s Religion, as he was in the least from overthrowing the credibility of Christianity.

Philo Bybl. ap. Euseb. Præp. l. 1. c. 6. p. 23.

VIII. The next we come to then, are the *Ægyptians*; a people so unreasonably given to Fables, that the wisest action they did, was to *conceal* their Religion; and the best offices their Gods had, was to *hold their fingers in their mouths*, to command silence to all that came to worship them. But we design not here any set discourse concerning the vanity of the *Ægyptian* Theology, which yet was so monstrously ridiculous, that

that even those who were over-run with the height of Idolatry themselves, did make it the object of their scorn and laughter. And certainly had we no other demonstration of the greatness of Man's apostasy and degeneracy, the *Ægyptian* Theology would be an irrefragable evidence of it: for who could but imagine a strange lowness of spirit in those, who could fall down and worship the basest and most contemptible of creatures? Their Temples were the best Hieroglyphics of themselves, fair and goodly structures without, but within some deformed creatures enshrined for veneration. But tho' the *Ægyptians* had lost their credit so much as to matter of Religion; yet it may be supposed, that they who were so famed for wisdom and antiquity, should be able to give a full and exact account of themselves thro' the ages of the world. And this they are so far from being defective in, that if you will believe them, they will give you an account of themselves many thousands of years before ever the world was made, but the peculiar vanity of their Chronology will be handled afterwards: That we now enquire into, is, what certain Records they had of their own antiquity, which might call for assent from any unprejudiced mind; whether there be any thing really answering that loud and unparallell'd cry of antiquity among the *Ægyptians*, whereby they will make all other Nations in comparison of them, to be but of yesterday, and to know nothing. We question not now their pretence to wisdom and learning, but are the more in hopes to meet with some certain way of satisfaction concerning ancient times, where learning is supposed to have flourished so much, even when *Greece* it self was accounted barbarous.

IX. The great basis of all the *Ægyptian* History depends on the credit of their ancient *Hermes*, whom out of their veneration they called *Trismegistus*; for to him they ascribe the first invention of their Learning, and all excellent Arts; from him they derive their History; their famous historian *Manetho* professing to transcribe his Dynasties from the Pillars of *Hermes*. We shall therefore first see of what credit and antiquity *Hermes* himself was, and of what account particularly those Pillars were which uphold all the Fabric of *Manetho* his Dynasties. For *Hermes* himself the story concerning him is so various and uncertain, that some have from thence questioned whether ever there were such a person or no, because of the strangely different account that is given of him. *Cotta* in *Tully*, in order to the establishing his Academical doctrine of with-holding Assent, mentions no fewer than five *Mercuries*, of which, two he makes *Ægyptian*, one of them the *Hermes* we now speak of, whom the *Ægyptians* call *Thoyth*, and was the Author both of their Laws and Letters. The *Ægyptians*, as appears by *Diodorus*, make him to be a sacred Scribe to *Osiris*, and to have instructed *Isis*; and when *Osiris* went upon any warlike expedition, he committed the management of affairs to him for his great wisdom. The *Phœnicians* preserve his memory among them too: for *Philo Byblius* saith, That *Sanchoniathon* described his Theology from the Books of *Taautus*, whom the *Ægyptians* call *Thoyth*, who was the first inventor of Letters, and was a Counsellor to *Saturn*, whose advice he much relied on. What now must we pitch upon in so great uncertainties? How come the *Phœnician* and *Ægyptian* Theology to come both from the same person, which are conceived so much to differ from each other? If we make the stories of *Osiris* and *Isis* to be fabulous, and merely allegorical, as *Plutarch* doth, then *Mercury* himself must become an

Cicero de Nat. Deor.

Allegory,

Allegory, and the Father of Letters must be an Hieroglyphic. If we admit the *Ægyptian* narrations to be real, and seek to reduce them to truth, and thereby make *Osiris* to be *Mitsraim* the son of *Cham*, who first ruled in *Ægypt*: All that we can then affirm of *Hermes* is, That he might be some useful person, who had a great influence both upon the King and State, and did first settle the Nation in a politick way of government, whose memory on that account the *Ægyptians* might preserve with the greatest veneration; and when they were once fallen into that idolatry of consecrating the memories of the first contributors to the good of mankind, they thought they had the greatest reason to adore his memory, and so by degrees attributed the invention of all useful things to him. For so it is apparent they did, when *Jamblichus* tells us, The *Ægyptians* attributed all their Books to *Mercury*, as the Father of them: because he was reputed the father of wit and learning, they made all the off-springs of their brains to bear their father's name. And this hath been the great reason the world hath been so long time imposed upon with varieties of Books going under the name of *Hermes Trismegistus*. For he was not the first of his kind, who in the early days of the Christian World obtruded upon the World that *Cento* or confused mixture of the *Christian*, *Platonic*, and *Ægyptian* Doctrines, which is extant still under the name of *Hermes Trismegistus*; whose vanity and falshood hath been sufficiently detected by learned men. There were long before his time extant several *Mercurial* Books, as they were called, which none of the wiser Heathens did ever look on as any other than fables and impostures, as appears by *Porphyry*'s letter to *Anebo* the *Ægyptian* Priest, and *Jamblichus* his answer to it in his Book of the *Ægyptian* Mysteries.

Jamblic. de Myst. l. 1.

X. We have then no certainty at all, notwithstanding the great fame of *Hermes*, of any certain records of ancient times, unless they be contained in those sacred Inscriptions from whence *Manetho* took his History. It must be acknowledged that the most ancient way of preserving any monuments of learning in those elder times, was by these Inscriptions on Pillars, especially among the *Ægyptians*, as is evident from the several testimonies of *Galen*, *Proclus*, *Jamblichus*, and the Author of the Book called *Sapientia secundum Ægyptios*, adjoyned to *Aristotle*; who all concur in this, that whatever laudable invention they had among them it was inscribed on some Pillars, and those preserved in their Temples, which were instead of Libraries to them. *Manetho* therefore to make his story the more probable, pretends to take all his relations from these sacred Inscriptions; and as *Eusebius* tells us, translated the whole *Ægyptian* History into *Greek*, beginning from their Gods, and continuing his History down near the time of *Darius Codomannus*, whom *Alexander* conquered: for in *Eusebius* his *Chronica* mention is made of *Manetho* his History, ending the xvith year of *Artaxerxes Ochus*, which, saith *Vossius*, was in the second year of the 107th *Olympiad*. This *Manetho Sebennyta* was High Priest of *Heliopolis* in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, at whose request he writ his History, which he digested into three Tomes, the first containing the 11 Dynasties of the Gods and Heroes; the second, 8 Dynasties; the third 12; all containing, according to his fabulous computation, the sum of 53535 years. These Dynasties are yet preserved, being first epitomized by *Julius Africanus*, from him transcribed by *Eusebius* in his *Chronica*, from *Eusebius* by *Georgius Syncellus*, out of whom they are produced by *Jos. Scaliger*, and may be seen both in his *Eusebius*, and his *Canones Isagogici*. Now

Gal. l. 1. c. Jul. c. 1. Procl. in Tim. p. 31. Jamb. de Myst. c. 2. sect. 1. Sap. Sec. Ægypt. c. 1. s. 1.

Vossius de Hist. Græc. l. 1. c. 14.

Now *Manetho*, as appears by *Eusebius*, voucheth this as the main testimony of his credibility, that he took his History, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῇ Σηριαδικῇ γῇ κειμένων τηλῶν, ἱερᾷ διαλέκτῳ καὶ ἱερογραφικοῖς γράμμασι κεχαραγμένων ὑπὸ Θωὺθ τοῦ πρώτου Ἑρμοῦ, καὶ ἑρμηνευθεισῶν μετὰ τὸν Κατακλυσμὸν ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα φωνὴν γράμμασιν ἱερογλυφικοῖς, καὶ ἀποτεθεισῶν ἐν βίβλοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγαθοδαίμονος τοῦ δευτέρου Ἑρμοῦ, πατρὸς δὲ τοῦ Τάτ, ἐν τοῖς ἀδύτοις τῶν ἱερῶν Αἰγυπτίων; *from some Pillars in the Land of* Seriad, *in which they were inscribed in the Sacred Dialect by the first* Mercury Thoyth, *and after the flood were translated out of the Sacred Dialect into the Greek Tongue in Hieroglyphic Characters, and are laid up in Books among the Revestries of the* Ægyptian *Temples, by* Agathodæmon, *the second* Mercury, *the Father of* Tat. Certainly this fabulous Author could not in fewer words have more manifested his own impostures, nor blasted his own credit more than he hath done in these; which it is a wonder so many learned Men have taken so little notice of, which have found so frequent occasion to speak of *Manetho* and his Dynasties. This I shall make appear by some great Improbabilities, and other plain Impossibilities which are couched in them. The improbabilities are, *first*, such Pillars, being in such a place as *Seriad*, and that place no more spoken of either by himself or by any other *Ægyptians*, nor any use made of these Inscriptions by any other but himself. As to this *terra Seriadica* where it should be, the very learned and inquisitive *Joseph Scaliger* plainly gives out, and ingenuously professeth his ignorance. For in his Notes on the Fragments of *Manetho* in *Eusebius*, when he comes to that ἐν γῇ τῇ Σηριαδικῇ, he only saith, *Quæ nobis ignota quærant studiosi.* But *Isaac Vossius*, in his late Discourses *De ætate mundi*, cries Εὕρηκα, and confidently persuades himself that it is the same with *Seirah*, mentioned *Judges* 3. 16. Indeed were there nothing else to be considered but affinity of names, it might well be the same: but that פסילים, which we render the *stone-quarries*, should signifie the Pillars of *Mercury*, is somewhat hard to conceive. The *Seventy* render it, as himself observes, τὰ γλυπτὰ, by which they understand *graven Images*: So the word is used 2 *Chron.* 33. 19. *Deut.* 7. 5. *Isai.* 10. 19. The vulgar *Latin* renders it, *ad locum Idolorum*; which were the certain interpretation, if *Chytræus* his conjecture were true, that *Eglon* had lately set up Idols there; but if it be meant of Pillars, I cannot but approve of *Junius* his interpretation, which I conceive bids fairest to be the genuine sense of the place, *viz.* that these Stones here were the Twelve stones pitched by *Joshua* in *Gilgal* after the *Israelites* passed over *Jordan*; and these Stones are said to be by *Gilgal*, *Judges* 3. 19. So that notwithstanding this handsome conjecture, we are as far to seek for the Pillars of *Mercury* as ever we were, and may be so to the world's end.

Scalig. Not. in gr. Euseb. p. 408.

Is. Voss. de æt. mund. c. 10.

Josh. 4. 19, 20, 21.

Secondly, the standing of these Pillars during the Floud, which must be supposed certainly to have some singular virtue in them to resist such a torrent of Waters, which overthrew the strongest built Houses, and most compacted Cities. The plain Impossibilities are, *first*, that *Manetho* should transcribe his Dynasties from the beginning of the History of *Ægypt*, to almost the time of *Alexander*, out of the sacred Inscriptions of *Thoyth*, who lived in the beginning of the very first Dynasty according to his own computation. Sure this *Thoyth*, was an excellent Prophet, to write an History for above 50000 years to come, as *Manetho* reckons it. *Secondly*, it is as well still, that this History after the Floud should be tanslated into Hieroglyphic Characters. What kind of Translation

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is that? we had thought Hieroglyphics had been repreſentations of Things, and not of Sounds and Letters, or Words: How could this Hiſtory have at firſt been written in any tongue, when it was in Hieroglyphics? Do Hieroglyphics ſpeak in ſeveral Languages, and are they (3.) capable of changing their Tongues? But *thirdly*, it is as good ſtill, that the ſecond *Mercury* or *Agathodæmon* did tranſlate this Hiſtory ſo ſoon after the Floud into *Greek*: Was the *Greek* Tongue ſo much in requeſt ſo ſoon after the Floud, that the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory for the ſake of the *Greeks* muſt be tranſlated into their Language? Nay, is it not evident *Herod. l. 2. Diod. l. 1. c. 67.* from *Herodotus* and *Diodorus*, that the *Grecians* were not permitted ſo much as any commerce with the *Ægyptians*, till the time of *Pſammetichus*, which fell out in the 26th Dynaſty of *Manetho*, and about a Century after the beginning of the *Olympiads*. We ſee then how credible an Author *Manetho* is, and what truth there is like to be in the account of ancient times given by the *Ægyptian* Hiſtorians, when the chief of them ſo lamentably and ominouſly ſtumbles in his very entrance into it.

And yet as fabulous as this account is, which *Manetho* gives of his taking his Hiſtory from theſe Pillars before the Floud, I cannot but think that *Joſephus*, an Author otherwiſe of good credit, took his famous ſtory of *Seth*'s Pillars, concerning Aſtronomical obſervations before the Floud, from this ſtory of *Manetho*; and therefore I cannot but look upon them with as jealous an eye as on the other, altho' I know how fond the world hath been upon that moſt ancient monument, as is pretended, of learning in the world. *Du Bartas* hath writ a whole Poem on theſe Pillars, and the truth is, they are fitter ſubjects for Poets than any elſe, as will appear on theſe conſiderations. *Firſt*, how ſtrangely improbable is it, that the poſterity of *Seth*, who, as is pretended, did foreknow a deſtruction of the world to be by a Floud, ſhould buſie themſelves to write Aſtronomical obſervations on Pillars, for the benefit of thoſe who ſhould live after it? Could they think their Pillars ſhould have ſome peculiar exemption above ſtronger ſtructures, from the violence of the rough and furious waters? If they believed the Floud abſolutely univerſal, for whom did they intend their obſervations? if not, to what end did they make them, when the perſons ſurviving might communicate their inventions to them? But, *Secondly*, if either one or both theſe Pillars remained, whence comes it to paſs that neither the *Chaldæans*, nor any of the eldeſt pretenders to Aſtronomy, ſhould neither mention them, nor make any uſe of them? Nay, *Thirdly*, whence came the ſtudy of Aſtronomy to be ſo lamentably defective in thoſe ancient times, if they had ſuch certain obſervations of the heavenly bodies gathered by ſo much experience of the perſons who lived before the Floud? *Fourthly*, How comes *Joſephus* himſelf to neglect this remarkable teſtimony of the Scripture-hiſtory in his Books againſt *Appion*, if he had thought it were ſuch as might be relyed on? *Fifthly*, How comes *Joſephus* ſo careleſly not to ſet down the place in *Syria* where theſe Pillars ſtood, that inquiſitive Perſons might have ſatisfy'd themſelves with the Sight of the Pillar at leaſt, and what kind of characters thoſe obſervations were preſerved in? But now, if we compare this of *Joſephus* with *Manetho* his ſtory, we ſhall find them ſo exactly reſemble each other, that we may judge all thoſe Pillars to have been taken out of the ſame Quarry. Two things make it yet more probable: *Firſt*, The name of the place wherein they ſtood, which *Euſtathius* in *Hexaemeron* takes out of *Joſephus*, and calls Σηριάδ, the very

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same place with that in *Manetho*. The other is the common use of the name of *Seth* among the *Ægyptians*, as not only appears by *Plutarch de Iside & Osiride*, but by this very place of *Manetho*; where it follows, ἐν βίβλῳ Σώθεως a book of his bearing the Title, which *Vettius Valens Antiochenus* tells us is not called Σῶθις but Σήθ. Now therefore *Josephus*, who frequently useth the testimony of Heathen Writers, and frequently of this *Manetho*, endeavoured to bring this fabulous relation of *Manetho* as near the truth as he could; therefore instead of *Thoyth* he puts *Seth*, and instead of the fabulous history of *Ægypt*, the inventions of the Patriarchs, and *Syria* instead of *Seriadica*, a Country too large to find these pillars in. *Vettius Val. apud Scal. not. Gr. p. 438.*

CHAP. III.

Of the *Chaldæan* History.

I. *The contest of Antiquity among Heathen Nations, and the ways of deciding it.* II. *Of the* Chaldæan *Astrology, and the foundation of Judicial Astrology.* III. *Of the* Zabii, *their Founder, who they were; no other than the old* Chaldees. IV. *Of* Berosus *and his History.* V. *An account of the fabulous Dynasties of* Berosus *and* Manetho; VI. *From the Translation of the Scripture-history into Greek in the time of* Ptolemee. VII. *Of that Translation and the time of it.* VIII. *Of* Demetrius Phalereus. Scaliger's *arguments answered.* IX. Manetho *writ after the Septuagint, proved against* Kircher; *his arguments answered. Of Rabbinical and Arabic Authors, and their little credit in matter of History.* X. *The time of* Berosus *enquired into; his Writing contemporary with* Philadelphus.

THE next whom our Enquiry leads us to, are the *Chaldæans*, a Nation of great and undoubted Antiquity, being in probability the first formed into a National Government after the Floud, and therefore the more capable of having these Arts and Sciences flourish among them, which might preserve the memory of eldest times to the view of posterity. And yet even among these who enjoyed all the advantages of ease, quiet, and a flourishing Empire, we find no undoubted or credible Records preserved, but the same vanity as among the *Ægyptians*, in arrogating Antiquity to themselves beyond all proportion of reason or satisfaction from their own History, to fill up that vast measure of time with: which makes it most probable, what *Diodorus* observes of them, *That in things pertaining to their Arts, they made use of Lunar years of 30 days*; so they had need, when *Tully* tells us that they boasted of observations of the Stars for 470000 years. It had been impossible for them to have been so extravagant in their accounts of themselves, had they but preserved the History of their Nation in any certain Records. For want of which, the Tradition of the eldest times varying in the several families after their dispersion, and being gradually corrupted by the I. *Diodor. Bibliothl. l. 1.* *Cicero de Divin. l. 1.*

policy of their Leaders, and those corruptions readily embraced by the predominancy of self-love in the several Nations, thence arose those vain and eager contests between the *Chaldæans*, *Scythians*, *Ægyptians*, and *Æthiopians*, concerning the antiquity of their several Nations: which may be seen in *Diodorus*, and others: by which it most evidently appears that they had no certain history of their own Nations, for none of them insist upon any Records, but only upon several probabilities from the nature of their Country, and the Climates they lived under. Neither need *Psammetichus* have been put to that ridiculous way of deciding the controversy by his two Infants bred up without any converse with Men, concluding the language they spake would manifest the great antiquity of the Nation it belonged to: Whereas it is more than probable they had spoken none at all, had they not learned the inarticulate voice of the Goats they had more converse with than Men. The making use of such ways to decide this controversy doth not only argue the great weakness of those times as to natural knowledge; but the absolute defect and insufficiency of them, as to the giving any certain account of the state of ancient times.

II. Of which the *Chaldæans* had advantages above all other Heathen Nations, not only living in a setled Country, but in or near that very place where the grand Ancestours of the world had their chief abode and residence. Whereby we see how unfaithful a thing Tradition is, and how soon it is corrupted or fails, where it hath no sure records to bottom its selfupon. But indeed it is the less wonder that there should be a confusion of Histories, where there had been before of Tongues; and that such whose design and memory God had blasted before, should afterwards forget their own original. But as if the *Chaldæans* had retained something still of their old aspiring mind to reach up to Heaven; the only thing they were eminent for, and which they were careful in preserving of, was Some Astronomical observations, which *Tully* tells us *they had a great conveniency for, by reason of the plain and even situation of their Country*; whereby they might have a larger prospect of the heavenly bodies, than those who lived in mountainous Countries could have. And yet even for this (which they were so famous for, that the name *Chaldæans* passed for *Astrologers* in the *Roman* Empire) we have no great reason to admire their excellency in it, considering how soon their skill in Astronomy dwindled into that which by a great *Catachresis* is called *Judicial* Astrology. The original of which is most evident among Them, as all other Heathen Nations, to have been from the Divinity which they attributed to the Stars; in which yet they were far more rational than those who now admire that Art: For, granting their Hypothesis, that the Stars were Gods, it was but reasonable they should determine contingent effects; but it is far from being so with Them who take away the foundation of all those celestial Houses, and yet attribute the same effects to them, which they did, who believed a Divinity in them. The *Chaldæans*, as *Diodorus* relates, set 30 Stars under the Planets; these they called Βουλαίους Θεοὺς; Others they had as Princes over these, which they called τῶν Θεῶν Κυρίους; the former were as the privy Counsellours, and these the Princes over them, by whom in their courses they supposed the course of the Year to be regulated. See then what a near affinity there was between Astrology and Divinity of the Stars, which makes *Ptolemee* call them *Atheists* who condemned Astrology, because thereby they destroyed the main of their Religion, which was the

Diodor. l. 2. Biblioth.

Ptolem. Tetrab. l. 1.

the worshipping the Stars for Gods. But it seems by *Strabo*, that one of the Sects of the *Chaldæans* did so hold to Astronomy still, that they wholly rejected *Genethlialogy*: which caused a great division among the *Orchoëni* and *Borsippeni*, two Sects among them, so called from the places of their habitations. *Strabo Geograph. l. 16.*

III. And if we reckon the *Zabii* among the *Chaldæans*, as *Maimonides* seems to do, we have a further evidence of the Planetary Deities so much in request among the *Chaldæans*; for the description he gives of them is to this purpose, *That they had no other Gods but the Stars to whom they made Statues and Images, to the Sun Golden, to the Moon Silver, and so to the rest of the Planets of the Metals dedicated to them. Those Images derived an influence from the Stars to which they were erected, which had thence a faculty of foretelling future things*; which is an exact description of the Στοιχεῖα or *Talismans* so much in request among the Heathens; such as the *Palladium* of *Troy* is supposed by learned men to have been. These *Talismans* are by the *Jews* called *David's bucklers*, and are much of the same nature with the ancient *Teraphim*, both being accurately made according to the positions of the Heavens; only the one were to foretel future things, the other for the driving away some calamity. Concerning these *Zabii*, *Maimonides* tells us, *That the understanding their Rites would give a great deal of light to several passages of Scripture which now lie in obscurity:* but little is supposed to be yet further known of them than what *Scaliger* hath said, That they were the more Eastern *Chaldæans*; which he fetcheth from the signification of the word. Several of their Books are extant, saith *Scaliger*, among the *Arabians*, but none of them are yet discovered to the *European* world. *Salmasius* thinks, these *Zabii* were the *Chaldæans* inhabiting *Mesopotamia*, to which is very consonant what *Maimonides* saith, that *Abraham had his education among them. Saïd Batricides*, cited by Mr. *Selden*, *attributes the original of their Religion to the time of* Nahor, *and to* Zaradchath *the Persian as the Author of it*; who is conceived to be the same with *Zoroaster*, who in all probability is the same with the *Zertoost* of the *Persees*, a Sect of the ancient *Persians* living now among the *Banyans* in the *Indies*. These give a more full and exact account concerning the original, birth, education, and enthusiasms or revelations of their *Zertoost*, than any we meet with in any *Greek* Historians; three books they tell us of, which *Zertoost* received by Revelation, or rather one book consisting of three several tracts, whereof the first was concerning Judicial Astrology, which they call *Astoodeger*; the second concerning *Physic*, or the knowledge of Natural things; the third was called *Zertoost*, from the bringer of it, containing their Religious rites; the first was committed to the *Jesopps* or *Magi*, the second to *Physicians*, the third to the *Darooes* or Churchmen, wherein are contained the several precepts of their Law; we have likewise the rites and customs of these *Persees* in their worship of Fire, with many other particular rites of theirs, published some time since by one *Mr. Lord*, who was a long time resident among them at *Surat*; by which we may not only understand much of the Religion of the ancient *Persians*, but, if I mistake not, somewhat of the *Zabii* too. My reasons are, because the ancient *Zaradcha* or *Zoroaster* is by *Saïd Batricides* made the Author of the *Zabii*, as we have seen already, who was undoubtedly the founder of the *Persian* worship, or rather a promoter of it among the *Persians*; for *Ammianus Marcellinus* tells us, that he was instructed in the rites of the *Chaldæans*, which he added to the *Persian* rites. Besides *Maimon. More Nevo. p. 3. c. 29.* *v. Scaliger Ep. ad Casaubon. & Ep. Gallic. Selden de Diis Syris, l. 1. c. 2. Salmas. de An. Clim. p. 578.* *Selden de jure nat. & gent. l. 2. c. 7.* *Am. Marc. Hist. l. 23.*

their agreement in the chief point of Idolatry, the worſhip of the Sun, and conſequently the Πυραιθεῖα or Symbol of the Sun, the eternal Fire, is evident; which, as far as we can learn, was the great and moſt early Idolatry of the Eaſtern Countries. And further we find God in *Leviticus* 26. 30. threatning to deſtroy their חמנים *their Images of the Sun*, ſome render it; but moſt probably by that word is meant the Πυραιθεῖα, *the Hearths* where they kept their perpetual Fire, for thoſe are חמנים from חמה, which is uſed both for the *Sun* and *Fire*. Now hence it appears that this Idolatry was in uſe among the Nations about *Palæſtine*; elſe there had been no need of ſo ſevere a threatning againſt it: and therefore moſt probably the rites of the *Zabii* (which muſt help us to explain the reaſons of ſome particular poſitive precepts in the *Levitical* Law relating to Idolatry) are the ſame with the rites of the *Chaldæans* and *Perſians*, who all agreed in this worſhip of the Sun and Fire; which may be yet more probable from what *Maimonides* ſaith of them, *Gens Zabiæ erat gens quæ implevit totum orbem*; it could not be then any obſcure Nation, but ſuch as had the largeſt ſpread in the Eaſtern Countries, which could be no other than the ancient *Chaldæans*, from whom the *Perſians* derived their worſhip. It may not ſeem altogether improbable that *Balaam* the famous Southſayer was one of theſe *Zabii*, eſpecially if according to *Salmaſius* his judgment, they inhabited *Meſopotamia*; for *Balaam*'s Country ſeems to be there; for it is ſaid, *Num.* 22. 5. *that he dwelt in Pethor by the river*, i. e. ſaith the *Chaldee* Paraphraſt, *in Peor of Syria by Euphrates*, which in Scripture is called *the river*, Eſa. 8. 7. But from this great obſcurity as to the hiſtory of ſo ancient and ſo large a people as theſe *Zabii* are ſuppoſed to be, we have a further evidence to our purpoſe of the defectiveneſs and inſufficiency of the Eaſtern Hiſtories as to the giving any full account of themſelves and their own original.

V. Voſſ. Idol. l. 2. c. 9.

IV. We are told indeed by ſome, that *Nabonaſſar* did burn and deſtroy all the ancient Records of the *Chaldæans* which they had diligently preſerved among them before, on purpoſe to raiſe the greater reputation to himſelf, and blot out the memory of his uſurpation, by burning the Records of all their own ancient Kings. Which is a conceit I ſuppoſe hath no other ground than that the famous *Æra* ſo much celebrated by Aſtronomers and others, did bear the name of *Nabonaſſar*. Which (if we ſhould be ſo greedy of all empty conjectures, which tend to our purpoſe, as to take them for truths) would be a very ſtrong evidence of the falſhood and vanity of the *Chaldæans* in their great pretences to Antiquity. But as the caſe ſtands in reference to their Hiſtory, we find more evidence from Scripture to aſſert their juſt antiquity, than ever they are able to produce out of any undoubted Records of their own. Which yet hath been endeavoured by an Author both of ſome credit and antiquity, the true *Beroſus*, not the counterfeit of *Annius*, whoſe vizard we ſhall have occaſion to pull off afterwards. This *Beroſus* was, as *Joſephus* and *Tatianus* aſſure us, *a Prieſt of* Belus, *and a* Babylonian *born, but afterwards flouriſhed in the Iſle of* Cos, *and was the firſt who brought the* Chaldæan *Aſtrology in requeſt among the Greeks*; in honour to whoſe name and memory, the *Athenians* (who were never backward in applauding thoſe who brought them the greateſt News, eſpecially if ſuitable to their former Superſtition) erected a Statue for him with a gilded tongue. A good Emblem of his Hiſtory, which made a fair and ſpecious ſhew, but was not that within, which it pretended to be: eſpecially where he pretends

Joſeph. c. App. l. 1. Tatian. c. Græcos.

to

to give an account of the most ancient times, and reckons up his two Dynasties before the time of *Belus*: but of them afterwards. It cannot be denied but some Fragments of his history, which have been preserved from ruin by the care and industry of *Josephus*, *Tatianus*, *Eusebius* and others, have been very useful, not only for proving the truth of the history of Scripture to the Heathens; but also for illustrating some passages concerning the *Babylonian* Empire: as making *Nabopolassar* the Father of *Nebuchadonosor*, of which *Scaliger* hath fully spoken in his Notes upon those Fragments. *Scaliger Append. ad l. de Emend. Temp.*

V. Far be it from me to derogate any thing even from prophane Histories, where they do not interfere with the Sacred History of Scripture; and it is certainly the best improvement of these to make them *draw water to the Sanctuary*, and to serve as smaller Stars to conduct us in our way, when we cannot enjoy the benefit of that greater Light of Sacred History. But that which I impeach these prophane histories of, is only an insufficiency as to that account of ancient times: wherein they are so far from giving light to sacred Records, that the design of setting of them up seems to be for casting a cloud upon them. Which may seem somewhat the more probable in that those monstrous accounts of the *Ægyptian* and *Chaldæan* Dynasties did never publickly appear in the world in the *Greek* Tongue 'till the time that our sacred Records were translated into *Greek* at *Alexandria*. For 'till that time when this authentic history of the world was drawn forth from its privacy and retirement into the public notice of the world about the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, [being as it were lockt up before among the *Israelites* at *Judæa*] these vain pretenders to antiquity thought not themselves so much concerned to stand up for the credit of their own Nations. For 'till that time the credulous world, not being acquainted with any certain report of the creation and propagation of the world, was apt to swallow any thing that was given forth by those who were had in so great esteem as the *Chaldæan* and the *Ægyptian* Priests were. Because it was supposed that those persons, who were freed from other avocations, had more leisure to inquire into these things; and because of their mysterious hiding what they had from the vulgar, they were presumed to have a great deal more than they had. But now when the *Sun of Righteousness* was approaching this Horizon of the world, and in order to that the Sacred Histories like a Day-star was to give the world notice of it, by which the former shadows and mists began to fly away, it concerned all those whose interest lay in the former ignorance of mankind, as much as they could, to raise all their *Ignes Fatui*, and whatever might tend to obscure that approaching Light, by invalidating the credit of that which came to bespeak its acceptance.

VI. It is very observable, what gradations and steps there were in the world to the appearance of that Grand light, which came down from Heaven to direct us in our way thither; how the world not long before was awakened into a greater inquisitiveness than ever before, how knowledge grew into repute, and what methods divine providence used to give the inquisitive world a taste of truth at present to stay their stomachs, and prepare them for that further discovery of it afterwards. In order to this that Nation of the *Jews* which was an inclosed garden before, was now thrown open, and many of the plants removed and set in foreign Countries, not only in *Babylon* (where even after their return were left three famous Schools of Learning, *Sora*, *Pombeditha*,

and

and *Neharda*) but in *Ægypt* too, where multitudes of them by *Alexander*'s favour were ſettled at *Alexandria*, where they had opportunity to ſeaſon thoſe two great Fountains, whence the current of knowledge ran into the reſt of the world. And now it was not in *Jewry only that God was known*, but *He whoſe name was great in Iſrael* did make way for the knowledge of himſelf among all the Nations of the earth. And that All-wiſe God who directed the *Magi* by a ſtar to Chriſt, making uſe of their former skill in Aſtronomy to take notice of that Star which came now on a peculiar errand to them to lead them to their Saviour (the great God condeſcending ſo far to mankind, as to take advantage of particular inclinations, and to accommodate himſelf to them; for which purpoſe it is very obſervable that he appeared in another way to the Wiſe-men, than to the poor Shepherds) the ſame God made uſe of the curioſity and inquiſitiveneſs after knowledge, which was in *Ptolemæus Philadelphus* (which he is ſo much applauded for by *Athenæus* and others) to bring to light the moſt advantageous knowledge, which the world ever had before the coming of Chriſt in the fleſh. And that great Library of his erecting at *Alexandria* did never deſerve that title 'till it had lodged thoſe ſacred Records, and then it did far better than the old one of *Oſymanduas*, of which Hiſtorians tells us this was the Inſcription' Ἰατρεῖον ψυχῆς, *The ſhop of the Soul's Phyſic.*

V. Caſaub. ad Athenæum, l. 5. c. 9.

VII. But this being a matter of ſo much concernment in order to our better underſtanding the original of the vaſt accounts of time among the *Chaldæans* and *Ægyptians*, and a ſubject not yet touched by any, we ſhall a little farther improve the probability of it, by taking a more particular account of the time when the Scriptures were firſt tranſlated, and the occaſion might thereby be given to theſe *Ægyptians* and *Chaldæans* to produce their fabulous account into the view of the world. Whether the Scriptures had been ever before tranſlated into the *Greek* language, (tho' it be aſſerted by ſome ancient Writers of the Church,) is very queſtionable, chiefly upon this account, that a ſufficient reaſon cannot be aſſigned of undertaking a new tranſlation at *Alexandria* if there had been any extant before. Eſpecially if all thoſe circumſtances of that tranſlation be true, which are commonly received and delivered down to us, with almoſt an unanimous conſent of the perſons who had greater advantages of knowing the certainty of ſuch things, than we can have at this great diſtance of time. And therefore certainly every petty conjecture of ſome modern, tho' learned men, ought not to bear ſway againſt ſo unanimous a tradition in a matter of fact, which cannot be capable of being proved, but by the teſtimony of former ages. And it is ſomewhat ſtrange that the ſingle teſtimony of one *Hermippus* in *Diogenes Laertius* (whoſe age and authority is ſomewhat doubtful) concerning only one Particular referring to *Demetrius Phalereus*, ſhould be thought of force enough among perſons of judgment as well as learning, to infringe the credibility of the whole ſtory delivered with ſo much conſent, not only by *Chriſtian*, but *Jewiſh* Writers; the teſtimony of one of which (every whit as conſiderable as *Hermippus*) viz. *Ariſtobulus Judæus* a *Peripatetical* Philoſopher, in an epiſtle to *Ptolemee Philometor*, doth plainly aſſert that which was ſo much queſtioned concerning *Demetrius Phalereus*.

Diog. Laer. Vit. Demetrii.

Apud Euſeb. præp. Ev. l. 13.

VIII. But whatever the truth of all the particular circumſtances be, which I here enquire not after, nor the authority of that *Ariſtæus* from whom the ſtory is received, nor whether this Tranſlation was made by *Jews*

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sent out of *Judæa*, or by *Jews* residing at *Alexandria*; it sufficeth for our purpose that this Translation was made before either the *Chaldæan* Dynasties of *Berosus*, or the *Ægyptian* of *Manetho*, were published to the world. In order to which it is necessary to shew in what time this Translation was effected; and herein that chanel of Tradition, which conveys the truth of the thing in one certain course, runs not with so even a stream concerning the exact time of it; all indeed agree that it was about the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, but in what years of his reign, is very dubious. *Joseph Scaliger* who hath troubled the waters so much concerning the particular circumstances of this Translation, yet fully agrees that it was done in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; only he contends with *Africanus* that it should be done in the 132^d *Olympiad*, which is in the 33^d year of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; but *Eusebius* and *Jerom* place it in the very beginning of his reign, which I think is far more probable, and that in the time when *Ptolemæus Philadelphus* reigned with his Father *Ptolemæus Lagi*: for so it is most certain he did for two years before his fathers death. By which means the great difficulty of *Scaliger* concerning *Demetrius Phalereus* is quite taken off; for *Hermippus* speaks nothing of *Demetrius* his being out of favour with *Philadelphus* during his father's life, but that upon his father's death, he was banished by him, and died in his banishment, so that *Demetrius* might have the oversight of the Library at *Alexandria*, and be the main instrument of promoting this Translation, and yet those things be after true which *Hermippus* speaks, viz. when *Ptolemæus Lagi* or *Sotor* was now dead. For it stands not to reason that during his father's life *Philadelphus* should discover his displeasure against *Demetrius*, it being conceived upon the advice given to his father for preferring the sons of *Arsinoe* to the Crown before the son of *Berenice*. Most likely therefore it is that this Translation might be begun by the means of *Demetrius Phalereus* in the time of *Philadelphus* his reigning with his father; but, it may be, not finished till after the death of *Soter*, when *Philadelphus* reigned alone. And by this now we can perfectly reconcile that difference which is among the Fathers concerning the time when this Translation was made. For *Irenæus* attributes it to the time of *Ptolemæus Lagi*; *Clemens Alexandrinus* questions whether in the time of *Lagi* or *Philadelphus*; the rest of the Chorus carry it for *Philadelphus*; but the words of *Anatolius* in *Eusebius* cast it fully for both; for there speaking of *Aristobulus*, he saith, *He was one of the Seventy who interpreted the Scriptures to* Ptolemæus Philadelphus *and his father, and dedicated his Commentaries upon the Law to both those Kings.* *Hæc sane omnem scrupulum eximunt*, saith * *Vossius* upon producing this testimony, *this puts it out of all doubt*; and to the same purpose speaks the learned *Jesuit Petavius* in his Notes on *Epiphanius*.

Scaliger Animad. ad Num. Eus. 1734.

V. Scaliger ib. Theocr. Schol. ad Idyl. 17. *Just. l.* 16. *Eus. Chro. Gr.*

Euseb. Hist. Eccl. l. 7. *c.* 26.

* *Vossius de Hist. Græc. lib.* 1. *c.* 12. *Petav. ad Epiph. pag.* 380.

IX. Having thus far cleared the time when the translation of the Scriptures into *Greek* was made, we shall find our conjecture much strengthened, by comparing this with the age of the forementioned Historians, *Manetho* and *Berosus*. *Manetho* we have already made appear to have lived in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, and that, saith *Vossius*, after the death of *Soter*. It is evident from what remains of him in *Eusebius* his *Chronica*, that he not only flourished in the time of *Philadelphus*, but writ his history at the special command of *Philadelphus*, as manifestly appears by the remaining Epistle of *Manetho* to him, still extant in *Eusebius*. This command of *Philadelphus* might very probably be occasioned upon the view of that account, which the holy Scriptures, being then translated

Eus. Chro. Gr. p. 6.

ſlated into *Greek*, did give of the World, and the propagation of Mankind; upon which, we cannot imagine but ſo inquiſitive a perſon as *Philadelphus* would be very earneſt to have his curioſity ſatisfyed, as to what the *Ægyptian* Prieſts (who had boaſted ſo much of antiquity) could produce to confront with the Scriptures. Whereupon the task was undertaken by this *Manetho*, High-Prieſt of *Heliopolis*, whereby thoſe things which the *Ægyptian* Prieſts had to that time kept ſecret in their Cloiſters, were now divulged and expoſed to the judgment of the learned world; but what ſatisfaction they were able to give inquiſitive minds, as to the main Ζητέμενον, or *matter enquired after*, may partly appear by what hath been ſaid of *Manetho* already, and by what ſhall be ſpoken of his Dynaſties afterwards.

But all this will not perſuade *Kircher*; for, whatever *Scaliger*, nay, what *Manetho* himſelf ſaith to the contrary, He with theconfidence and learning of a *Jeſuite* affirms, that this *Manetho* is elder than *Alexander* the Great. For theſe are his words, *Frequens apud priſcos hiſtoricos Dynaſtiarum Ægyptiacarum ſit mentio, quarum tamen alium Authorem non habemus niſi Manethonem Sebennytam, Sacerdotem Ægyptium, quem ante tempora Alexandri, quicquid dicat Scaliger, in Ægypto floruiſſe comperio.* Certainly ſome more than ordinary evidence may be expected after ſo confident an affirmation; but whatever that perſon be in other undertakings, he is as unhappy a perſon in Philology, as any that have pretended ſo much acquaintance with it. One would think, he that had been twenty years, as he tells us himſelf, courting the *Ægyptian* Myſteries for compaſſing his *Oedipus*, ſhould have found ſome better arguments to prove an aſſertion of this nature, than meerly the teſtimony of *Joſephus*, the *Hebrew* book *Juchaſin*, and ſome *Arabic* Writers, not one of all which do mention the thing they are brought for, *viz. that* Manetho *was elder than* Alexander. All the buſineſs is, they quote him as an ancient Writer; but what then? The Author of the book *Juchaſin* was *Abraham Zachuth*, a *Jew* of *Salamanca*, who writ in the year of our Lord 1505. and this book was firſt printed at *Conſtantinople* 1556. Might not this man then well mention *Manetho* as an ancient Writer, if he flouriſhed above 1600 years before him, in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus?* And what if ſome *Arabic* Writers mention him? Are they of ſo great antiquity and credit themſelves, that it is an evidence *Manetho* lived in *Alexander*'s time to be praiſed by them? It would be well, if *Kircher*, and other learned men, who think the world is grown to ſo great ſtupidity, as to believe every thing to be a jewel which is far fetched, would firſt aſſert and vindicate the antiquity and fidelity of their *Arabic* Authors, ſuch as *Gelaldinus*, *Abenephi*, and many others, before they expect we ſhould part with our more authentic Records of Hiſtory for thoſe fabulous relations which they are ſo full fraught withal. Were it here any part of my preſent buſineſs, it were an eaſy matter ſo to lay open the ignorance, falſity, and fabulouſneſs of thoſe *Arabians* whom that author relies ſo much upon, that he could not be freed from a deſign to impoſe upon the world, who makes uſe of their teſtimony in matter of ancient times without a *Caveat*. I know none fit to believe theſe *Arabick* Writers as to theſe things, but thoſe who have faith enough to concoct the *Rabbins* in matter of Hiſtory; of whom *Origen* ſaith, Πάντα μὲν τῶν Ἰουδαίων τῶν νῦν μῦθοι καὶ λῆροι. who are, as *Grotius* truly ſaith, *peſſimi hiſtoriæ Magiſtri; nam ex quo patria expulſi ſunt, omnis apud illos hiſtoria craſſis erroribus & fabulis eſt inquinata, quibus*

Oedip. Ægypt. To. 1. Syn. c. 9.

Origen. C. Celſ. l. 2.

Grotius Annot. in Matth. 24. 24.

quibus & proinde nihil credendum eſt, niſi aliunde teſtes acceſſerint. And *Iſ. Caſaubon* paſſeth this ſharp, but due cenſure upon them, *Rabbinis, ubi de lingua Hebraica agitur & vocis alicujus proprietate, vel aliquo Talmudico inſtituto merito à Chriſtianis tribui non parum; ubi vero à verbis venitur ad res, aut ad hiſtoriam, vel rerum antiquarum veteris populi explicationem, niſi falli & decipi volumus, nihil admodum eſſe illis fidei habendum. Sexcentis argumentis hoc facile probarem, ſi id nunc agerem.* And in reference to their Ancient Rites as well as Hiſtory *Joſeph Scaliger* hath given this verdict of them, *Manifeſta eſt Judæorum inſcitia, qui cum uſu veterum rituum etiam eorum cognitionem amiſerunt, ut multa quæ ad eorum ſacra & hiſtoriam pertinent, longe melius nos teneamus quam ipſi.* The ſame which theſe very learned perſons ſay of *Rabbinical*, may with as much truth be ſaid of theſe *Arabic* Writers, in matters of ancient hiſtory, which I have here inſerted, to ſhew the reaſon why I have thought the teſtimony of either of theſe two ſorts of perſons ſo inconſiderable in the matter of our future diſcourſe; which being hiſtorical, and that of the greateſt antiquity, little relief is to be expected from either of them in order thereto. But to return to *Kircher*. It is freely granted, that *Joſephus*, an Author of credit, and age ſufficient to give his opinion in this caſe, doth very frequently cite *Manetho* in his *Ægyptian* Hiſtory; particularly in his learned books againſt *Appion*; but where he doth give the leaſt intimation of *Manetho* being elder than *Alexander*, I am yet to ſeek. But *Kircher* will not yet leave the matter ſo, but undertakes to give an account of the miſtake; which is, That there were two *Manetho*'s beſides, and both *Ægyptians*, mentioned by *Suidas*; one a *Mendeſian*, who writ of the Preparation of the *Ægyptian* Κῦφι, a kind of Perfume uſed by the *Ægyptian* Prieſts. The other a *Dioſpolitan*, who writ ſome Phyſiological and Aſtronomical Treatiſes, whoſe works he hears are preſerved in the Duke of *Florence* his Library; and this was he (ſaith he) who lived in the times of *Auguſtus*, whom many by the equivocation of the name have confounded with the ancient Writer of the *Ægyptian* Dynaſties. Is it poſſible ſo learned a *Jeſuite* ſhould diſcover ſo little judgment in ſo few words? For, *firſt*, who ever aſſerted the writer of the Dynaſties to have lived in the time of *Auguſtus*? Yet, *ſecondly*, if that *Manetho*, whom *Suidas* there ſpeaks of, lived in *Auguſtus* his time according to *Kircher*, then it muſt neceſſarily follow, that the Compiler of the Dynaſties did: for it is evident to any one that looks into *Suidas*, that he there ſpeaks of the ſame *Manetho*, for theſe are his words: Μανεθὼς ὁ Διοσπολεὼς ὁ Αἰγύπτιος, ἢ Σεβεννύτης, φυσιολογικὰ, *&c.* Can any thing be more plain than that he here ſpeaks of *Manetho Sebennyta*, who was the Author of the Dynaſties, tho' he might write other things beſides, of which *Suidas* there ſpeaks? But *Kircher* very wiſely, in tranſlating *Suidas* his words, leaves out Σεβεννύτης, which decides the controverſy, and makes it clear, that he ſpeaks of the ſame *Manetho* of whom we have been diſcourſing. Thus it ſtill appears that this *Manetho* is no elder than the time of *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, which was the thing to be proved.

Caſaub. Exercit. ad Baron. 16. S. 8.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 6.

Now for *Beroſus*, altho' the *Chaldæans* had occaſion enough given them before this time to produce their Antiquities by the *Jews* converſe with them in *Babylon*; yet we find this Author the firſt who durſt adventure them abroad, ſuch as they were, in *Greek*. Now that this *Beroſus* publiſhed his Hiſtory after the time mentioned, I thus prove. *Tatianus Aſſyrius* tells us that he writ the *Chaldaïc* Hiſtory in three Books, and dedi- X.

cated them to *Antiochus*, τῷ μετὰ Σέλευκον τέτῳ, as it is read in the fragment of *Tatianus*, preserved in *Eusebius*; but it must be acknowledged that in the *Paris* edition of *Tatianus*, as well as the *Basil*, it is thus read, καὶ Ἀλέξανδρου γεγονὼς, Ἀντίοχῳ τῷ μετ' αὐτὸν τέτῳ, here it relates to the *third* from *Alexander*, in the other, to the *third* from *Seleucus*; Now if we reckon the *third* so as to take in the person from whom we reckon for the *first*, according to the reading in *Eusebius*, it falls to be *Antiochus* called Θεὸς; according to the other reading it falls to be *Antiochus Soter*; for *Seleucus* succeded *Alexander* in the Kingdom of *Syria*; *Antiochus Soter*, *Seleucus*; *Antiochus* Θεὸς, *Antiochus Soter*. But according to either of these readings, our purpose is sufficiently proved. For *Antiochus Soter* began to reign in *Syria* in the *sixth* year of *Ptol. Philadelphus* in *Ægypt*; *Antiochus* Θεὸς succeded him in the 22d year of *Philadelphus*; now the soonest that the history of *Berosus* could come forth, must be in the reign of *Antiochus Soter*, which according to our accounts is some competent time after the translation of the Scripture into *Greek*. But if it were not till the time of *Antiochus* Θεὸς, we cannot but imagine that the report of the account of ancient times in the Scriptures was sufficiently divulged before the publishing of this history of *Berosus*; and, it may be, *Berosus* might somewhat sooner than others understand all transactions at *Alexandria*, because the place of his chief residence was where *Ptolemee Philadelphus* was born, which was in the Isle of *Cos*. But *Vossius* goes another way to work, to prove the time of *Berosus*, which is this. He quotes it out of *Pliny* that *Berosus* recorded the history 480 years, which, saith he, must be reckoned from the Æra of *Nabonassar*. Now this began in the second year of the 8th *Olympiad*, from which time if we reckon 480 years, it falls upon the latter end of *Antiochus Soter*; and so his History could not come out before the 22d of *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, or very little before. Thus we have made it evident, That these two great Historians are younger even than the translation of the Bible into *Greek*, by which it appears probable that they were provoked to publish their fabulous Dynasties to the world. And so much to shew the insufficiency of the *Chaldæan* History, as to the account of ancient times: Which we shall conclude with the censure of *Strabo*, a grave and judicious Author, concerning the antiquities of the *Persians*, *Medes*, and *Syrians*; *which*, saith he, *have not obtained any great credit in the world*, διὰ τὴν τῶν συγγραφέων ἁπλότητα καὶ φιλομυθίαν, *because of the simplicity and fabulousness of their Historians*. From hence we see then that there is no great credibility in those Histories, which are impeached of falshood by the most grave and judicious of Heathen Writers.

Euseb. præp. Evang. l. 10. p. 289. ed. R. Steph.

V. Scal. de Emend. Temp. l. 5. p. 392.

Vossius de Hist. Græc. li. 1. c. 13. Plin. hist. nat. l. 7. c. 57.

Strab. l. 11.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

The defect of the *Grecian* History.

I. *That manifested by three evident arguments of it.* (1) *The fabulousness of the Poetical age of* Greece. *The Antiquity of Poetry.* II. *Of* Orpheus *and the ancient Poets. Whence the Poetical Fables borrowed.* III. *The advancement of Poetry and Idolatry together in* Greece. IV. *The different censures of* Strabo *and* Eratosthenes *concerning the Poetical age of* Greece; *and the reasons of them.* V. (2.) *The eldest Historians of* Greece *are of suspected credit. Of* Damastes, Aristeus, *and others*; VI. *of most of their eldest Historians we have nothing left but their Names, of others only the Subjects they treated of, and some Fragments.* VII. *The highest Antiquity of the* Greeks *not much older than* Cyrus *or* Cambyses. VIII. (3.) *Those that are extant either confess their ignorance of eldest times, or plainly discover it. Of the first sort are* Thucydides *and* Plutarch. IX. *Several evidences of the* Grecians *ignorance of the true original of Nations.* X. *Of* Herodotus *and his mistakes.* XI. *The* Greeks *ignorance in Geography discovered, and thence their insufficiency as to an account of ancient History.*

I. DEscend we now to the History of *Greece*; to see whether the Metropolis of Arts and Learning can afford us any account of ancient times, that they may be able to make us in the least question the account given of them in sacred Scriptures. We have already manifested the defect of *Greece* as to letters and ancient Records, but yet it may be pretended that her Historians, by the excellency of their wits and searching abroad into other Nations, might find a more certain account of ancient times, than other Nations could obtain. There is no body, who is any thing acquainted with the *Grecian* humour, but will say they were beholding to their Wits for most of their Histories; they being some of the earliest Writers of Romances in the world, if all fabulous narrations may bear that name. But laying aside at present all their Poetic *Mythology*, as it concerns their Gods, (which we may have occasion to enquire into afterwards) we now examine only their credibility, where they pretend to be most historical. Yet how far they are from meriting belief even in these things, will appear to any that shall consider; *first*, That their most ancient Writers were Poetical and apparently fabulous; *secondly*, That their eldest Historians are of suspected credit even amongst themselves; *thirdly*, That their best Historians either discover or confess abundance of ignorance as to the history of ancient times. *First*, That their first Writers were poetical, and apparently fabulous. *Strabo* undertakes to prove that Prose is only an imitation of Poetry, and so Poetry must needs be first written. *For*, saith he, *at first Poetry only was in request; afterwards in imitation of that*, Cadmus, Pherecydes, *and* Hecatæus *writ their histories, observing all other laws of Poetry, but only the measures of it; but by degrees Writers began to take greater liberty, and so* Strabo lib.

brought it down from that lofty strain it was then in, to the form now in use: as the Comical strain is nothing else but a depressing the sublimer style of Tragedy. This he proves, because ἄδειν did anciently signify the same with φράζειν; for Poems were only λόγοι μεμελισμένοι, Lessons fit to be sung among them: thence, saith he, is the original of the Ῥαψῳδίαι, &c. for these were those Poems which were sung ἐπὶ ῥάβδῳ, when they held a branch of Laurel in their hands, as *Plutarch* tells us they were wont to sing *Homer*'s *Ilias*; others were sung to the Harp, as *Hesiod*'s Ἔργα: besides, saith *Strabo*, that Prose is called ὁ πεζὸς λόγος, argues that it is only a bringing down of the higher strain in use before. But however this were in general; as to the *Grecians*, it is evident that Poetry was first in use among them; for in their elder times when they first began to creep out of Barbarism, all the Philosophy and Instruction they had was from their Poets, and all couched in Verse; which *Plutarch* not only confirms, but particularly instanceth in *Orpheus*, *Hesiod*, *Parmenides*, *Xenophanes*, *Empedocles*, and *Thales*; and hence *Horace de arte Poëtica* says of the ancient Poets before *Homer*,

Plutarch. Sympos.

Plutarch. de Pyth. Orac. p. 403.

——fuit hæc sapientia quondam
Publica privatis secernere, sacra prophanis:
Concubitu prohibere vago: dare jura maritis:
Oppida moliri: leges incidere ligno.
Sic honor & nomen divinis vatibus atque
Carminibus venit.

From hence, as *Heinsius* observes, the Poets were anciently called Διδάσκαλοι; and the ancient speeches of the Philosophers containing matters of Morality, were called Ἄσματα καὶ Ἀδόμενα, of which many are mentioned in their Lives by *Diogenes Laertius*; in the same sense were *Carmina* anciently used among the *Latines* for Precepts of Morality, as in that collection of them, which goes under the name of *Cato*, (which some think to be an ancient piece, but with a false inscription, but *Boxhornius* thinks it to be of some Christians doing in the decay of the *Roman* Empire,) *Si Deus est animus, nobis ut Carmina dicunt. Carmina*, saith *Heinsius*, i. e. *dicta Philosophorum*; *causa est, quia dicta illa brevia, quibus sententias suas de Deo deque reliquis includebant*, ἀδόμενα *dicebant*, i. e. *Carmina.*

Heins. Diss. in Hes. cap. 6.

Boxhorn. Qu. Rom. c. 14.

II. When Poetry came first into request among the *Grecians*, is somewhat uncertain; but this is plain and evident, that the intention of it was not meerly for instruction, but, as *Strabo* expresseth it, δημαγωγεῖν καὶ στρατηγεῖν τὰ πλήθη, *the more gently to draw the people on to idolatry.* For as he saith, *it is impossible to perswade women and the promiscuous multitude* ‘*to religion by meer dry reason or philosophy*, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ διὰ δεισιδαιμονίας, ‘τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἄνευ μυθοποιίας καὶ τηρατείας; *but for this*, saith he, *there is need* ‘*of superstition, and this cannot be advanced without some fables and wonders.* ‘For, saith he, *the Thunderbolts, Shields, Tridents, Serpents, Spears at-* ‘*tributed to the Gods are meer fables, and so is all the ancient Theology; but* ‘*the Governours of the Commonwealth made use of these things the better to* ‘*awe the silly multitude, and to bring them into better order.* I cannot tell how far this might be their end, since these things were not brought in so much by the several Magistrates, as by the endeavour of particular Men, who thought to raise up their own esteem among the vulgar by such things, and were imployed by the great Deceiver of the world as his grand instruments to advance Idolatry in it. For which we are to consider, that altho' there were gross Ignorance; and consequently Superstition

Strabo l. 1. p. 13.

perſtition enough in *Greece* before the Poetic age of it, yet their ſuperſtitious and idolatrous worſhip was not ſo licked and brought into form, as about the time of *Orpheus*, from whom the Poetic age commenceth: who was as great an inſtrument of ſetting up Idolatry, as *Apollonius* was afterwards of reſtoring it, being both perſons of the higheſt eſteem and veneration among the heathen. Much about the ſame time did thoſe live in the world who were the firſt great promoters of Superſtition and Poetry, as *Melampus*, *Muſæus*, *Arion Methymnæus*, *Amphion* of *Thebes*, and *Eumolpus Thrax*, none of whom were very diſtant from the time of *Orpheus*. Of whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* thus ſpeaks, Πρόσχημα μουσικὴς λυμηνάμενοι τὸν βίον ἐντέχνῳ τινὶ γοητείᾳ—τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὅτι τὰ εἴδωλα χειραγωγοῦσι προέτοι. *Theſe under a pretence of Muſick and Poetry corrupting the lives of men, did by a kind of artificial Magic firſt draw them on to the practice of Idolatry.* For the novelty and pleaſingneſs of Muſic and Poetry did preſently inſinuate it ſelf into the minds of men, and thereby drew them to a venerable eſteem both of the Perſons and practices of thoſe who were the Authors of them. So *Conon* in *Photius* tells us that *Orpheus* was exceedingly acceptable to the people for his skill in Muſic, which the *Thracians* and *Macedonians* were much delighted with: From which aroſe the fable of his drawing trees and wild beaſts after him, becauſe his Muſic had ſo great an influence upon the civilizing that people, who were almoſt grown rude thro' Ignorance and Barbariſm: and *Horace explains it*,

Clem. Al. Protreptic. p. 3.

Phot. Bibl. Cod. 186. ſect 45.

Horat. Ep. ad Piſon.

> *Sylveſtres homines ſacer interpreſque Deorum*
> *Cædibus & victu fœdo deterruit* Orpheus,
> *Dictus ab hoc lenire Tigres rabidoſque Leones.*

This *Orpheus* by *Mythologiſts* is uſually called the ſon of *Calliope*, but may with better reaſon be called the Father of the whole Chorus of Muſes, than the Son of one of them; ſince *Pindar* calls him Πατέρα ἀοιδᾶς, and *John Tzetzes* tells us he was called the ſon of *Calliope*, ὡς καλλιλογίας ποιητικῆς εὑρέτης καὶ ὕμνων τῶν εἰς τοὺς θεούς, *as the inventor of poetical elegancy, and the ſacred Hymns which were made to the Gods:* (which the old *Romans* called *Aſſamenta*) and *Juſtin Martyr* calls him ὁ πολυθεότητος πρῶτον διδάσκαλον, *the firſt teacher of Polytheiſm and Idolatry.*

Schol. in Heſiod. p. 1.

Paræneſ. 1.

For this *Orpheus* having been in *Ægypt*, as *Pauſanias*, *Diodorus*, and *Artapanus* in *Euſebius* all confeſs, he brought from thence moſt of the Magical rites and ſuperſtitious cuſtoms in uſe there, and ſet them up among the *Grecians*; ſo *Diodorus* acknowledgeth in the ſame place; and it is likewiſe evident by what *Ariſtophanes* ſaith in his Βάτραχοι, III.

Pauſ. Eliac. 2. Diod. Bibl. lib. 1. Euſ. Præp. l. 10.

> Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετὰς θ' ἡμῖν κατέδειξε, φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι.

Ariſtoph. Ran. Act. 4. ſc. 2.

Orpheus *firſt inſtructed them in the ſacred myſteries, and to abſtain from ſlaughter*, which is to be underſtood of the Θυσίαι, *the killing of beaſts in ſacrifice*, which probably was in uſe among them before, as a remainder of ancient tradition, till *Orpheus* brought his *Ægyptian* doctrine into requeſt among them. The myſteries of *Oſiris*, ſaith *Diodorus*, were tranſplanted into *Greece* under the name of *Dionyſius* or *Bacchus*, and *Iſis* under *Ceres* or *Magna Mater*, and the puniſhment and pleaſures after this life from the rites of Sepulture among them; *Charon*'s wafting of Souls, from the lake *Acheruſia* in *Ægypt*, over which they were wont to ſend the

the dead bodies. *Pausanias* tells us, that the *Spartans* derived the worship of *Ceres Chthonia* from *Orpheus*, and the *Æginetæ* the worship of *Hecate*. Besides which he instituted new rites and mysteries of his own, in which the initiated were called Ὀρφεωτελεσταί: and required a most solemn oath from all of them never to divulge them, which was after observed in all those prophane mysteries which in imitation of these were set up among the *Greeks*. *Strabo* thinks the mysteries of *Orpheus* were in imitation of the old *Cotyttian* and *Bendidian* mysteries among the *Thracians*; but *Herodotus* with more probability parallels them and the *Dionysian* with the *Ægyptian*, from which we have already seen that *Orpheus* derived His; who is conceived by *Georgius Cedrenus* and *Timotheus* in *Eusebius*, to have lived about the time of *Gideon* the Judge of *Israel*; but there is too great confusion concerning his age, to define any thing certainly about it. Which ariseth most from the several persons going under this name, of which, besides this, were in all probability two more; the one an Heroic Poet, called by *Suidas*, *Ciconæus*, or *Arcas*, who lived two ages before *Homer*, and he that goes under the name of *Orpheus*, whose Hymns are still extant, but are truly ascribed to *Onomacritus* the *Athenian*, by *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Tatianus Assyrius*, *Suidas*, and others; who flourished in the times of the *Pisistratidæ* at *Athens*. We are like then to have little relief for finding out of truth in the Poetic age of *Greece*, when the main design of the Learning then used was only to insinuate the belief of Fables into the people, and by that to awe them into Idolatry.

Pausan. Lac. p. 95. Corinth. p. 72. Vide Cæl. Rhod. Ant. Lect. l. 15. p. 9.

Stab. l. 10. Herod. Euterp. p. 134. Ed. H. St.

Suid. in Ὀρφ.

IV. If we come lower down to the succeding Poets, we may find Fables increasing still in the times of *Homer*, *Hesiod*, and the rest, which made *Eratosthenes*, a person of great judgment and learning (whence he was called *alter Plato*, and Πένταθλος, and τὸ Βῆτα, because he carried, if not the *first*, yet the *second* place in all kind of Literature) condemn the ancient Poetry as γραώδη μυθολογίαν, *a company of old Wives tales*, which were invented for nothing but to please silly people, and had no real learning or truth at all in them: For this, tho, he be sharply censured by *Strabo*, in his first book, who undertakes to vindicate the Geography of *Homer* from the exceptions of *Eratosthenes*; yet himself cannot but confess that there is a very great mixture of old fables in all their Poets, *which is*, saith he, *partly to delight the people, and partly to awe them. For the minds of men being always desirous of novelties, such things do hugely please the natural humours of weak people; especially if there be something in them that is* θαυμαστὸν καὶ παράδοξος, *very strange and wonderful, it increaseth the delight in hearing it;* ἥπερ δὴ τὸ μανθάνειν φίλτρον, *which draws them on to a desire of hearing more of it. And by this means*, saith he, *are children first brought on to learning, and all ignorant persons are kept in awe; nay, and the more learned themselves* (partly for want of reason and judgment, and partly from the remainder of those impressions which these things made upon them when they were children) *cannot shake off that former credulity which they had as to these things.* By which discourse of *Strabo*, tho' intended wholly by him in vindication of poetic Fables, it is plain and evident what great disservice hath been done to Truth by them, by reason they had no other Records to preserve their ancient History but these fabulous Writers. And therefore supposing a mixture of truth and falshood together, which *Strabo* contends for; yet what way should be taken to distinguish the true from the false, when they had no other certain Records? And besides, he himself

himself acknowlegeth how hard a matter it is even for wise men to excuss those fabulous narrations out of their minds, which were insinuated unto them by all the advantages which prejudice, custom and educacion could work upon them. Granting then there may be some truth at the bottom of their fabulous narrations;

Ὡς δ' ὅτε τις χρυσὸν περιχεύεται ἀργύρῳ ἀνήρ, *Homer. Odyss. 3.*

which may be gilded over with some pleasant tales, as himself compares it; yet how shall those come to know that it is only gilded, that never saw any pure metal, and did always believe that it was what it seemed to be? Had there been any Κριτήριον, or Touch-stone to have differenced between the one and the other, there might have been some way for a separation of them; but there being none such, we must conclude, that the fabulous narrations of Poets instead of making truth more pleasant by their fictions, have so adulterated it, that we cannot find any credibility at all in their narrations of elder times, where the truth of the story hath had no other way of conveyance but thro' their fictions.

V. But tho' Poets may be allowed their liberty for representing things to the greatest advantage to the palates of their Readers, yet we may justly expect, when men profess to be Historical, they should deliver us nothing but what upon strictest examination may prove undoubted truth. Yet even this were the *Greeks* far from; for *Strabo* himself confesseth of their eldest Historians, Καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι δὲ ἱστορικοὶ καὶ ῥητορικοὶ μυθογράφοι, *their first Historians both of persons and things were fabulous.* *Diodorus* particularly instanceth in their eldest Historians, as *Cadmus Milesius*, *Hecatæus*, and *Hellanicus*, and condemns them for fabulousness. *Strabo* condemns *Damastes Sigeensis* for vanity and falshood, and wonders at *Eratosthenes* for making use of him; yet this man is of great antiquity among them, and his testimony used by Authors of good credit, as *Dionysius Halicarnassensis*, *Plutarch*, and others. Nay, *Pliny* professeth to follow him, and so he doth *Aristeas Proconnesius* in his *Arimaspia*, which may render the credit of his History very suspicious; with whom it was a sufficient ground of credibility to any story, That he found it in some *Greek* Authors. *Strabo* reckons *Damastes* with *Euhemerus Messenius* and *Antiphanes Bergæus*; which latter was so noted a lyar, that from him, as *Stephanus* tells us, Βεργαίζειν was used as a proverb for *to speak never a word of truth.* *Aristeas Proconnesius* lived in the time of *Cyrus*, and writ a History of the *Arimaspi*, in three Books, who seems to have been the Sir *John Mandevil* of *Greece*, from his stories of the *Arimaspi* with one eye in their foreheads, and their continual fighting the *Gryphens* for gold; yet the story was taken upon trust by *Herodotus*, *Pliny*, and many others; tho' the experience of all who have visited those northern Climates do sufficiently refute these follies. *Strabo* saith of this *Aristeas*, that he was ἀνὴρ γόης εἴ τις ἄλλος, *one inferior to none for juggling*, which censure was probably occasioned by the common story of him, that he could let his soul out of his body when he pleased and bring it again; yet this Juggler did *Celsus* pitch on to confront with our blessed *Saviour*, as *Hierocles* did on *Apollonius:* so much have those been to seek for Reason, who have sought to oppose the doctrine of Faith.

Strab. l. 1. *V. Casaub. in Strab. l. 1.* *Voss. de hist. Græc. l. 4. c. 5.* *Stephan. in Βέργη.* *Strab. l. 13.*

VI. But further, what credit can we give to those Historians who have striven to confute each other, and lay open one anothers falshood to the world. Where was there ever any such dissonancy in the sacred History of Scripture?

Scripture? doth the Writer of one book discover the weakness of another? do not all the parts so exactly agree, that the most probable suspicion could ever fall into the heart of an Infidel, is, that they were all written by the same person, which yet the series of times manifests to have been impossible? But now, if we look into the ancient *Greek* Historians, we need no other testimony than themselves to take away their credibility. The Genealogies of *Hesiod* are corrected by *Acusilaus*, *Acusilaus* is condemned by *Hellanicus*, *Hellanicus* accused of falshood by *Ephorus*, *Ephorus* by *Timæus*, *Timæus* by such who followed him, as *Joseph. c. Appion. l. 1.* *Josephus* fully shews. Where must we then fix our belief? upon all in common? that is the ready way to believe contradictions: for they condemn one another of falshood. Must we believe one, and reject the rest? but what evidence doth that one give why he should be credited more than the rest? And their eldest Historians are acknowledged to be most fabulous: [which is a most irrefragable argument against the *Grecian* history:] For our only recourse for deciding the controversy among the younger Historians, must be to the elder: and there we are further to seek than ever; for the first ages are confessed to be Poetical, and to have no certainty of truth in them. So that it is impossible to find out any undoubted certainty of ancient times among the *Greek* Historians; which will be yet more evident when we add this, That there are very few extant of those Historians, who did carry the greatest name for Antiquity.

VII. The highest Antiquity of the *Greek* Historians doth not much exceed the time of *Cyrus* and *Cambyses*, as *Vossius* hath fully demonstrated in his learned Book, *De Historicis Græcis*, and therefore I shall spare particular enquiries into their several ages. Only these two things will further clear the insufficiency of the *Greek* History, as to an account of ancient times: *First*, That of many of these old Historians we have nothing left but their mere names, without any certainty of what they treated. Such are *Sisyphus Cous*, *Corinnus*, *Eugeon Samius*, *Deïochus Proconnesius*, *Eudemus Parius*, *Democles Phigaleus*, *Amelesagoras Chalcedonius*, *Xenomedes Chius*, and several others whose names are recorded by several Writers, and listed by *Vossius* among the Historians; but no evidence what subject of history was handled by them. *Secondly*, That of those whose not only memories are preserved, but some evidence of what they writ, we have nothing extant till the time of the *Persian* war. For all that was writ before, is now consumed by time, and swallowed up in that vast and all-devouring Gulph; in which yet their heads still appear above the waters, to tell us what once they informed the world of. It cannot be denied, but if many of those ancient Histories were yet remaining, we might probably have some greater light into some matters of fact in the elder times of *Greece*, which now we are wholly to seek for, unless we think to quench our thirst in the muddy waters of some fabulous Poets. For what is now become of the antiquities of *Ionia* and the city *Miletus* written by *Cadmus Milesius*, supposed to be the first Writer of History? where lie the *Genealogies* of *Acusilaus Argivus?* where is now extant the *History of the Gods* written by *Pherecydes Syrius*, *Pythagoras* his Master? or the *Chronica* of *Archilochus* who flourished about the 20th *Olympiad?* or those of *Theagenes Rheginus?* Where may we hope to meet with *Pherecydes Lerius* his *Attic Antiquities*, or his *Catalogue of Cities and Nations?* or *Hecatæus* his *Description* of *Asia*, and some suppose of *Libya* and *Europe* too? or the *Originals of Nations and Founders*

Founders of Cities written by *Hellanicus?* How may we come by the *Perſic*, *Greek* and *Ægyptian* Hiſtory of *Charon Lampſacenus*; the *Lydian* Hiſtory of *Xanthus Lydius*; the *Samian* Antiquities of *Simmias Rhodius*; the *Corinthian* Hiſtory of *Emelus Corinthius*; *Panyaſis* his Antiquities of *Greece*; the *Scythian* Hiſtory of *Anacharſis*; the *Phrygian* of *Diagoras*; the *Chaldaïc* and *Perſian* of *Democritus*; the *Sicilian* and *Italian* of *Hippys Rheginus*; the *Telchiniac* Hiſtory of *Teleclides?* All theſe are now buried with many more in the rubbiſh of time, and we have nothing but meer skeletons of them left, to tell us, that once ſuch perſons were, and thought themſelves concerned to give the world ſome account of their being in it. Whereby may be likewiſe ſeen the remarkable providence of God, concerning the Sacred Hiſtory, which tho' of far greater antiquity than any of theſe, hath ſurvived them all, and is ſtill preſerved with us with as much purity and incorruption as a Book paſſing thro' ſo many hands was capable of. But of that in its due place.

VIII. But yet if the *Greek* Hiſtorians that are yet extant, were of more undoubted credit than thoſe that are loſt, we might eaſily bear with our loſing ſome old Stories, if we gained ſome authentick Hiſtory by it accompliſhed in all its parts: but even this we are far from in the *Greek* Hiſtory; for the Hiſtorians themſelves do either confeſs their own ignorance of ancient times, or do moſt palpably diſcover it, which was the *third* and laſt conſideration touching the credibility of the *Grecian* Hiſtory. That moſt grave and accurate Hiſtorian *Thucydides* than whom ſcarce ever any *Grecian* diſcovered more an impartial love to the truth in what he writ, doth not only confeſs, but largely prove the impoſſibility of an exact account to be given of the times preceding the *Peloponneſian* War, in the entrance into his Hiſtory: *For*, ſaith he, *the matter preceding that time cannot now through the length of time be accurately diſcovered or found out by us.* All that he could find in the ancient ſtate of *Greece* was a deal of confuſion, unquiet ſtations, frequent removals, continual piracies, and no ſettled form of Commonwealth. What certain account can be then expected of thoſe times, when a moſt judicious Writer, even of *Athens* its ſelf, acknowledgeth ſuch a *Chaos* in their ancient Hiſtory? And *Plutarch*, a later Author indeed, but ſcarce behind any of them, if we believe *Taurus* in *A. Gellius*, for learning and prudence, dares not, we ſee, venture any further back than the time of *Theſeus*; for before that time, as he compares it, as Geographers in their Maps, when they have gone as far as they can, fill up the empty ſpace with ſome unpaſſable Mountains, or frozen Seas, or devouring Sands; ſo thoſe who give an account of elder time, are fain to inſert τερατώδη καὶ τραγικὰ, ſome wonderful and tragical Stories, which (as he ſaith) have neither any truth nor certainty in them. Thus we ſee thoſe who were beſt able to judge of the *Greek* Antiquities, can find no ſure footing to ſtand on in them; and what baſis can we find for our Faith, where they could find ſo little for their Knowledge? And thoſe who have been more daring and venturous than theſe perſons mentioned, what a labyrinth have they run themſelves into? how many confuſions and contradictions have they involved themſelves in? Sometimes writing the paſſages of other Countries for thoſe of *Greece*, and at other times ſo confounding times, perſons and places, that one might think they had only a deſign upon the underſtandings of their Readers, to make them play at Blind-mans-buff in ſearching for the Kings of *Greece*.

IX. But as they are ſo confuſed in their own Hiſtory, ſo they are as ignorant and fabulous when they dare venture over their own threſholds and look abroad into other Countries; we certainly owe a great part of the lamentable ignorance of the true original of moſt Nations to the pitiful account the *Greek* Authors have given of them; which have had the fortune to be entertained in the world with ſo much eſteem and veneration, that it hath been thought learning enough to be acquainted with the account which they give of Nations. Which I doubt not hath been the great reaſon ſo many fabulous relations, not only of Nations but Perſons and ſeveral Animals never exiſting, have met with ſo much entertainment from the leſs inquiſitive world. The *Greek* Writers, it is evident, took up things upon truſt as much as any people in the world did, being a very weak and inconſiderable Nation at firſt: and afterwards the knowledge they had was generally borrowed from other Nations, which the wiſe men only ſuited to the temper of the *Greeks*, and ſo made it more fabulous than it was before. As it was certainly the great defect of the Natural Philoſophy of the *Greeks*, (as it hath been ever ſince in the world) that they were ſo ready to form Theories upon ſome Principles or Hypotheſes, which they only received by tradition from others, without fetching their knowledge from the experiments of Nature; and to theſe they ſuited all the phænomena of nature; and what was not ſuitable was rejected as monſtrous and anomalous; ſo it was in their Hiſtory, wherein they had ſome fabulous Hypotheſes they took for granted without enquiring into the truth and certainty of them, and to theſe they ſuit whatever light they gained in after-times of the ſtate of foreign Nations, which hath made Truth and Antiquity wreſtle ſo much with the corruption which eat into them thro' the pride and ignorance of the *Greeks*. Hence they have always ſuited the Hiſtory of other Nations with the account they give of their own; and where nothing could ſerve out of their own Hiſtory to give an account of the Original of other Nations, they (who were never backward at fictions) have made a Founder of them ſuitable to their own language. The truth is, there is nothing in the world uſeful or beneficial to mankind, but they have made ſhift to find the Author of it among themſelves. If we enquire after the original of Agriculture, we are told of *Ceres* and *Triptolemus*; if of Paſturage, we are told of an *Arcadian Pan*; if of Wine, we preſently hear of a *Liber Pater*: if of Iron inſtruments, then who but *Vulcan?* if of Muſic, none like to *Apollo*. If we preſs them then with the Hiſtory of other Nations, they are as well provided here: if we enquire an account of *Europe*, *Aſia*, or *Libya*; for the firſt we are told a fine ſtory of *Cadmus*'s Siſter; for the *ſecond* of *Prometheus*'s Mother of that name, and for the *third* of a Daughter of *Epaphus*. If we are yet ſo curious as to know the original or particular Countries; then *Italy* muſt find its name from a Calf of *Hercules*, becauſe Ἰταλὸς in *Greek* will ſignifie ſome ſuch thing; *Sardinia* and *Africa* muſt be from *Sardos* and *Afer* two ſons of *Hercules*; but yet if theſe will not ſerve, *Hercules* ſhall not want for children to people the world; for we hear of *Scythes*, *Galatas*, *Lydus*, ſome other ſons of his, that gave names to *Scythia*, *Lydia*, and *Galatia*; with the ſame probability that *Media* had its name from *Medea*, and *Spain* and *Luſitania* from *Pan* and *Luſus*, two companions of *Bacchus*. If *Perſia* want a founder, they have one *Perſeus* an *Argive* ready for it; if *Syria*, *Babylonia*, and *Arabia* want reaſons of their names, the prodigal *Greeks* will give *Apollo* three ſons, *Syrus*,

rus, *Babylon* and *Arabs*, rather than they ſhall be heretical *Acephaliſts*. This vanity of theirs was univerſal, not confined to any place or age, but as any Nation or People came into their knowledge, their Gods were not ſo decrepit, but they might father one ſon more upon them, rather than any Nation ſhould be *filia Populi*, and want a father. Only the grave *Athenians* thought ſcorn to have any Father aſſigned them; their only ambition was to be accounted *Aborigines & genuini Terræ*, to be the eldeſt ſons of their *teeming mother the Earth*, and to have been born by the ſame equivocal generation that Mice and Frogs are, from the impregnated ſlime of the earth. Are we not like to have a wonderful account of ancient times from thoſe who could arrogate to themſelves ſo much knowledge from ſuch ſlender and thin accounts of the Originals of people which they gave, and would have the world entertain with the greateſt veneration upon their naked words? Have we not indeed great reaſon to hearken to thoſe who did ſo frequently diſcover their affection to Fables, and manifeſt their ignorance when ever they venture upon the hiſtory of other Nations?

X. The truth is, *Herodotus* himſelf (whom *Tully* calls the *Father of Hiſtory*, which title he deſerves at leaſt in regard of antiquity, being the eldeſt of the extant *Greek* Hiſtorians) hath ſtood in need of his Compurgators, who yet have not been able to acquit him of fabulouſneſs, but have ſought to make good his credit by recrimination, or by making it appear that *Herodotus* did not fully believe the ſtories he tells, but took them upon truſt himſelf, and ſo delivers them to the world. Some impute it to the ingenuity of *Herodotus*, that he calls his Books of Hiſtory by the name of the *Muſes*, on purpoſe to tell his Readers they muſt not look for meer Hiſtory in him, but a mixture of ſuch relations, which tho' not true, might yet pleaſe and entertain his Readers. Tho' others think they were not ſo inſcribed by himſelf, but the names were given to them by the *Greeks* from the admiration his Hiſtory had among them. However this were, this we are certain, that *Herodotus* was not firſt ſuſpected of falſhood in theſe latter Ages of the world, but even among the *Greeks* themſelves there have been found ſome that would undertake to make good that charge againſt him. For ſo *Suidas* tells us of one *Ælius Harpocration*, who writ a Book on purpoſe to diſcover the falſhood of *Herodotus*, Περὶ τῆς καταψεύδους τῶν Ἡροδότου ἱστοριῶν. *Plutarch* his Books are well known *Of the ſpight or malignity* of *Herodotus*, but the occaſion of that is ſufficiently known likewiſe, becauſe *Herodotus* had given no very favourable character of *Plutarch*'s Country. *Strabo* likewiſe ſeems to accuſe *Herodotus* much of nugacity and mixing prodigious fables with his Hiſtory; but, I confeſs, obſerving the grounds on which *Plutarch* inſiſts againſt *Herodotus*, I am very prone to think that the ground of the great pique in ſome of the *Greek* Writers againſt *Herodotus*, was, that he told too many tales out of School, and had diſcovered too much of the Infancy of *Greece*, and how much the *Grecians* borrowed of the *Ægyptian* ſuperſtitions: which *Plutarch* expreſly ſpeaks of, that *Herodotus* was too much led aſide, τοῖς Αἰγυπτίων ἀλαζονείαις καὶ μυθολογίαις τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ ἁγνότατα τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἱερῶν ἀνατρέπων. Altho' therefore *Herodotus* may not be much to blame in the things which the *Grecians* moſt charge him with, yet thoſe who favour him moſt cannot excuſe his palpable miſtakes in ſome things, and ignorance in others. *Joſephus* thinks he was deceived by the *Ægyptian* Prieſts in things relating to the ſtate of their affairs, of which *Joſ. Scaliger* gives many

Strabo l. 17.

Plutarch. de Herod. Mal. p. 857.

Joſeph. c. App. l. 1.

Scal. Can. Iſagog. l. 3.

many accounts; *Either*, saith he, *the persons who gave him his intelligence were ignorant themselves*; *or else*, *like true* Ægyptians, *they were cunning enough and imposed upon* Herodotus *being a stranger and unacquainted with their artifices*; *or else he did not understand his Interpreter*, *or was deceived by him*; or lastly, Herodotus *might have so much of a* Grecian *in*, *as to adulterate the true History with some fables of his own*; wherefore he rather adheres to *Manetho* than *Herodotus* as to the *Ægyptian* History: who yet elsewhere (I will not say with what constancy to himself) vouchsafes him this high *Elogium*, that he is, *Scrinium originum Græcarum & Barbararum*, *auctor à doctis nunquam deponendus*.

Idem ad num. Eus. 1572.

XI. It cannot be denied but a great deal of very useful History may be fetched out of him; yet who can excuse his ignorance, when he not only denies there is an Ocean compassing the Land, but condemns the Geographers for asserting it? Unless this might be any plea for his ignorance in Geography, that he had so many great names besides him guilty of the same: Witness *Aristotle*'s suspicion that the *Indies* should be joyned to *Europe* about the *Streights*, where they feigned *Hercules* his Pillars to be. And the *Theræans* ignorance where any such place as *Libya* was, when the Oracle bid them plant a Colony there. Would it not have been worth one's while to have heard the great noise the Sun used to make every night when he doused his head in the Ocean, as none of the most ignorant *Greeks* imagined? And to have seen the Sun about *Hercules* his Pillars to be a hundred times bigger than he appeared to them, as they commonly fansied. Was not *Alexander*, think we, well tutored in his Cosmography by his Master *Aristotle*, when he writ word to his Mother, he had found out the head of *Nilus* in the *East Indies?* as *Arrian* relates the story. No wonder then his Souldiers should mistake the mountain *Paropamisus* in the *Indies* for *Caucasus* near *Colchis*, when even their learned men thought *Colchis* the utmost boundary of the world on that side, as *Hercules* his Pillars on this. What a lamentable account then were they able to give of the most ancient times, who were so ignorant of the state of the world in their own time, when Learning was in its height in *Greece*, and frequent discoveries daily made of the world, by the wars which were made abroad? *Eratosthenes* confesseth the *Grecians* were ignorant of a great part of *Asia* and the Northern parts of *Europe* before *Alexander*'s expedition; and *Strabo* confesseth as much of the Western parts of *Europe* till the *Roman* expeditions thither. *Palus Mæotis* and *Colchis*, saith he, were not fully known till the time of *Mithridates*, nor *Hyrcania*, *Bactriana*, and *Scythia*, till the *Parthian* wars. *Eratosthenes* mentions some who thought the *Arabian* Sea to be only a Lake. And it further argues their ignorance in Geography, that the later Geographers always correct the errors of the elder, as *Ptolemee* doth *Marinus*, *Eratosthenes* those before him, *Hipparchus Eratosthenes*, and *Strabo* not only both them, but *Eudoxus*, *Ephorus*, *Dicæarchus*, *Polybius*, *Posidonius*, and almost all that had writ before him. I insist on these things, not that I would destroy the credibility of any Humane History, where the Authors are guilty of any mistakes (for that were to take away the credit of all Humane History) but to shew how insufficient those Historians are to give us a certain account of the original of Nations, who were so unacquainted with the state of those Nations which they pretend to give an account of. For where there is wanting Divine Revelation (which was not pretended by any *Greek* Historians; and if it had, had been easily refuted) there

Herod. l. 2. c. 5.

Arrian. Hist. Alex. l. 6.

Strabo l. 1.

there must be supposed a full and exact knowledge of all things pertaining to that which they pretend to give an account of; and if they discover apparent defect and insufficiency (which hath been largely manifested as to them, in the precedent discourse) we have ground to deny the credibility of those Histories upon the account of such defect and insufficiency. So much then will abundantly suffice for the making good the first argument against the credibility of Profane Histories, as to the account which they give of Ancient times, different from the Word of God.

CHAP. V.

The general uncertainty of Heathen Chronology.

I. *The want of credibility in Heathen History further proved from the uncertainty and confusion in their accounts of Ancient times. That discovered by the uncertain form of their Years.* II. *An enquiry into the different forms of the Ægyptian Years; the first of thirty Days,* III. *The second of four Months; of both Instances given in the Ægyptian history.* IV. *Of the Chaldæan accounts, and the first Dynasties mentioned by* Berosus, *how they may be reduced to probability.* V. *Of the Ægyptian Dynasties of* Manetho. *Reasons of accounting them fabulous, because not attested by any credible authority, and rejected by the best Historians.* VI. *The opinion of* Scaliger *and* Vossius, *concerning their being contemporary, propounded,* VII. *and rejected with reasons against it.* VIII. *Of the ancient division of* Ægypt *into* Nomi *or Provinces, and the number of them, against* Vossius *and* Kircher.

THE next thing to manifest how little there is of credibility in the account of ancient times, reported by the Histories of Heathen Nations, is, the uncertainty, confusion and ambiguity in the account they give of those times. If we suppose them not defective as to their records, if yet we find the account given so perplexed, ambiguous and confused, that we can find no certainty of the meaning of it, we have very little reason to entertain it with any certain assent unto it. Now this will be made evident by these things. 1. The uncertainty of their Chronology, whereon their whole account depends. 2. The multitude of Impostures taken from ancient Histories. 3. The uncertain meaning of those Characters wherein their ancient histories were preserved. I begin with the great uncertainty of the heathen Chronology. which will be manifested by two things: *First*, the uncertain form of their years: *Secondly*, the want of certainty of their ἀδιαπήγματα, or certain fixed *Epocha's* from which to derive their account of ancient times. *First*, the uncertain form of their years; this of it self is sufficient to destroy the credibility of their accounts of antiquity, if it be manifested that they had different forms of years in use among them; and it be uncertain to which to refer their accounts they give; for if I. years

years be sometimes lunar, sometimes solar, and sometimes but of thirty days, sometimes of four months, sometimes of three hundred and sixty days, sometimes three hundred and sixty five, sometimes four times three hundred sixty five in their *tetraëteris*, sometimes eight times in their *octaëteris*, sometimes more, what certainty can we possibly have which of them to fix their accounts to? Especially when they only give them in general, and never tell us which of them they mean, which may make them shrewdly suspicious, that their intent is only to impose on our understandings, and not to deal fairly and truly with us. We shall therefore so much explain the different form of their years, as thereby to shew what uncertainties we are left to by them: Where we meddle not with their Tropical and Astronomical years, but chiefly those which were in civil use among the several Nations we speak to. A year is nothing else but a System of days, and is therefore capable of as great variety, as days are in being joyned together; but usually there were some other lesser Systems of days than those which are called years, out of which the other doth result. Such is the ἑπταήμερον, or the week, which, as *Joseph Scaliger* saith, was *res omnibus Orientis populis ab ultima usque antiquitate usitata, a thing in continual use among the Eastern Nations*, tho' it be but of late reception into the parts of *Europe*, and no elder than Christianity among them. Among the *Romans* was used an ὀκταήμερον, which was for the sake of *Nundinæ*; returning every ninth day. The *Mexicans*, as *Scaliger* tells us, reckon all by a τεσσαρεσκαιδεκαήμερον, *a System of thirteen days.* Next to these were their Months; which were either Lunar or Solar. The Lunar were either from the Moon's return to the same point of the Zodiac again, called περίοδος σελήνης, which was less than twenty eight days; but this was of no use in civil computations; or else from one conjunction of the Moon with the Sun to another, which was called σύνοδος σελήνης; or else from the first phasis of the Moon, the second day after its *coïtus*, called φάσις and ὑπόκρισις σελήνης; some, as the *Grecians*, reckoned their Lunar Months from the *coïtus*, as *Scaliger* proves out of *Vitruvius*; others from the *phasis*, as some Eastern Nations did; as the *Jews* began their observation of the New Moons from the first *phasis* or appearance of her after the *coïtus*. The Solar Months were either natural, such as were defined by the Sun's passage from one sign of the *Zodiac* to another; or civil, whereby the Months were equally divided into 30 days apiece, as in the *Grecian* and *Ægyptian* year.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 1.

II. Having thus far seen of what the year consists, we now proceed to shew that the ancient Nations did not observe one constant form of year among them, but had several in use, to which their accounts may be referred. And because the *Ægyptians* are supposed to have been best skilled as to the form of the year, according to that of *Macrobius*, *Anni certus modus apud solos semper Ægyptios fuit:* We shall particularly demonstrate the variety of years in use among them: By which we shall see what great uncertainty there is in their accounts of their Dynasties. For first it is evident that the time of 30 days was among the ancient *Ægyptians* accounted a year, for which we have the testimony of *Plutarch* in *Numa.* Αἰγυπτίοις ἦν μηνιαῖος ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς, εἶτα πεντάμηνος; *The Ægyptians had at first a year consisting of one month, and after of four:* So *Varro* in *Lactantius* gives an account of the great Age of some men in ancient times, who are supposed to have lived 1000 years; *Ait enim apud Ægyptios pro annis menses haberi, ut non Solis per 12 signa circuitus faciat*

Macrob. Saturn. l. 1. c. 12.

Lactant. de Origin. l. 2. c. 12.

faciat annum, sed Luna quæ orbem illum signiferum 30 dierum spacio illustrat. It is then evident that this year of thirty days was in use among the *Ægyptians*; the only scruple is whether it was used in their sacred accounts or no; and that it was, we have a pregnant testimony in *Plutarch* in the forecited place; speaking of the *Ægyptians* great pretence to antiquity, he gives this account of it; πλῆθος ἀμήχανον ἐτῶν ὅτι τοῖς γενεαλογίαις καταφέρουσιν, ἅτε δὴ τοὺς μῆνας εἰς ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν τιθέμενοι. *They reckon an infinite number of years in their accounts, because they reckon their months instead of years.*

According to this computation, it will be no difficult matter to reduce the vast accounts of the *Ægyptian* antiquity to some proportion, and to reconcile their exorbitant Dynasties with sobriety and truth, especially as to the account given of them by *Diodorus Siculus*; for so *Diodorus* gives in their accounts, that the Gods and Hero's reigned in *Ægypt* for the space of near 18000 years, and the last of them was *Orus* the son of *Isis:* From the reign of Men in *Ægypt* he reckons about 9500 years to the time (if we admit of *Jacob Capellus* his correction of πενταχοσίων for πενταχιλίων in *Diodorus*) of his entrance into *Ægypt*, which was in the 180 *Olympiad*. Now as the aforesaid learned Author observes, *Diodorus* came into *Ægypt*, *A. M.* 3940. *V. C.* 694. the mortal Men then had reigned in *Ægypt* 9500 years, which taking it for these Lunar years of 30 days, makes of *Julian* years 780. the Hero's and Gods 18000 months, that is of *Julian* years 1478; from these two summs together are gathered 2258 years, which being deducted from the year of the world 3940, falls in the year of the world 1682 about which time *Misraim*, who was the great historical *Osiris* of *Ægypt* (so called by a light variation of his former name) might be well supposed to be born; for that was in the year of *Noah* 630; and so *Orus* might be born, who was the son of *Osiris*, about the year of the world 1778. Between whose time and *Alexander* the great his Conquest of *Ægypt*, the *Ægyptians*, as the same *Diodorus* tells us, reckon little less than 23000 years: Now according to this computation of 30 days for a year, we may reconcile this to truth too; for from 1778 to 3667 of the world, which falls upon the 417 year of *Nabonassar*, there is an interval of 1889 years, which makes of these Lunar years of 30 days, saith *Capellus*, 22996 and 15 days, which comes very near, if not altogether up to the *Ægyptian* Computation: So when the *Ægyptians*, according to *Diodorus*, makes no less than 10000 years distance between their *Hercules* and *Hercules Bœotius*, the son of *Alcmena*, it must be understood of these Lunar years; for granting what the *Ægyptians* say, that *Hercules Bœotius* lived but one generation before the *Trojan* war, and so his time to fall out about 2783; reckoning now backward from thence, and deducting from that year of the world 10000 months of 30 days, or *Julian* years 831, and 130 days, the time of the *Ægyptian Hercules* will fall about the year of the world, 1962, about which time we may well suppose him to live or die. And according to this computation we are to understand what the *Ægyptians* told *Herodotus*, that from their first King or Priest of *Vulcan*, till the time of *Sethos* (in whose time *Sennacherib* attempted the conquest of *Ægypt*) there had been passed 341 *Generations*, and as many Kings and High-Priests, and 11340 years, reckoning three Generations to make up a Century. But now, if we understand this prodigious computation according to this form of years, we may suspect the *Ægyptians* of an intention to deceive

Herodotus

Diodor. lib. 1.

Hist. sacr. & Exot. A. M. 1682.

Herodotus and the credulous *Greeks*, but yet not impeach them of direct falſhood, it being thus reconcilable to truth. For according to this account 100 years makes 3000 days, and a Generation 1000; ſo many days the Kings or Prieſts of *Vulcan* may be allowed to reign; ſo 340 Generations of 1000 days apiece, make up 340000 days, to which, if we add the 200 days which *Sethos* had now reigned upon *Sennacherib*'s invaſion, we have 340200 days, which makes up of theſe years of 30 days apiece 11340, which is the number aſſign'd by *Herodotus*. *Jacobus Capellus* thinks the *Epocha* from whence theſe years are to be reckoned, is from *A. M.* 2350, when *Mephres* began to reign in *Ægypt*, from whence if we number theſe 340200 days, or 11340 monthly years, which makes up of *Julian* years 931, and 152 days, the number falls *A. M.* 3282; about which time in probability *Sennacherib* invaded *Ægypt*. Thus we ſee by making uſe of thoſe Lunar years, that it is poſſible to reconcile ſome of the *Ægyptian* extravagant accounts to ſome probability and conſiſtency with truth; but however we owe very little thanks to the *Ægyptians* for it, who deliver theſe things in groſs, without telling us which years they mean, and thereby evidence their intent to deceive all who have ſo little wit as to be deceived by them.

Capell. Hiſt. ſacr. & Exot. p. 198.

III. The next kind and form of the *Ægyptian* year, was that which conſiſted of four equal Months, amounting to 120 days; the uſe of this kind of year among them is atteſted by *Plutarch* in the fore-cited place, and by *Diodorus*, who gives an account of this kind of year among the *Ægyptians*. *Solinus* ſeems to mention this as the only year in requeſt among the *Ægyptians*: and ſo S. *Auguſtin*, *Perhibentur Ægyptii quondam tam breves annos habuiſſe ut quaternis menſibus finirentur*. This renders then the *Ægyptian* accounts yet more uncertain, and only leaves us to gueſs with the greateſt probability of reaſon, what form of year was meant by them in their computations. So when *Diodorus* ſpeaks ſo much in favour of the old *Ægyptian* Kings and Laws, and produceth this from the *Ægyptian* Prieſts, as the beſt evidence of the excellent temper of their Government, that they had Kings of their own Nation for the ſpace of 4700 years, till the time of *Cambyſes* his inroad into *Ægypt*, which was in the third year of the 63 *Olympiad*. Now beſides the apparent contradiction of theſe accounts to the other already explained, if we take them in groſs, as the *Ægyptians* give them, it is evident this can be no otherwiſe true, than by taking theſe accounts in that form of years now mentioned by us. For theſe 4700 years, taking them for 120 days apiece, make up of *Julian* years 1544, which being deducted from the year of the World 3475, which was the time when *Cambyſes* invaded *Ægypt*, the remainder is *A. M.* 1931, about which time we may fix the death of *Orus*, from whom their proper Kings commenced. And of theſe years, *Voſſius* tells us, we are to underſtand what they report of the long lives of their ancient Kings, when they attribute to each of them the ſpace of 300 years: as when they attribute 1000, and more to their eldeſt Kings, we are to underſtand them of ſimple Lunar years of 30 days, by which theſe *Gigantic* meaſures of the term of their lives, may without the help of *Procruſtes* be cut ſhort according to the proportion of Men's ordinary age in thoſe eldeſt times. So when *Diodorus* reckons from the death of *Proteus* to his own time *A. M.* 3940, 3400 years, it muſt be underſtood of theſe years of four equal months; for ſo thoſe 3400 years make up of *Julian* years 1117, which being deduced from 3940 the remainder is 2823, about

Solin. Polyhiſt. c. 3. Auguſt. de Civ. Dei, l. 12. c. 10.

Diod. l. 1.

Voſſius de Idolat. l. 1. c. 28.

bout which year of the world *Proteus* may be ſuppoſed to live, which was about the time of the *Judges* in *Iſrael*.

Neither was this only the *Ægyptians* way, but in probability the ancient *Chaldæans* obſerved the ſame, which may be a ground likewiſe of thoſe unmeaſurable accounts among them in their firſt Dynaſties, as is evident in the Fragments of *Abydenus* and *Apollodorus* out of *Beroſus*, where the times of their firſt Kings are reckoned not by years, but Σάροι, Νέροι, and Σῶσοι, now according to them every Σάρος contained 3600 years, Νῆρος 600, Σῶσος 60. Now who can imagine that *Alorus* and the ten Kings from him to *Xiſuthrus* ſhould reign 120 *Sari* as their computation is, which reckoning for every *Saros* 3600 years, makes up 432000 years? A very fair ſum for the *Chaldæan* Dynaſties before the time of *Xiſuthrus*, by whom in probability *Noah* was by them underſtood. There have been only two ways thought on of dealing with theſe computations; either rejecting them as wholly fabulous, and founded on no evidence or records of Hiſtory, as we have ſeen already; only they might retain (being ſo near the place of the ſettlement of *Noah* and his poſterity after the floud) the memory not only of the floud (of which it is evident they had ſeveral remainders preſerved in their Traditions) but likewiſe of the ages of men preceding the floud, wherein they were right, reckoning from *Alorus* the firſt to *Xiſuthrus*, i. e. from *Adam* to *Noah*, ten Generations; but as to the names of thoſe ten perſons, and the times they lived in, being wholly ignorant thro' the unfaithfulneſs of tradition, they took their liberty not only of coyning names, but of ſetting what age to them they pleaſed themſelves. And to this purpoſe *Scaliger* obſerves that ſome of their firſt Kings are reckoned before the floud, which ſaith he, is denied by *Georgius Syncellus* without any ſhew of reaſon. Thus far then we may admit of the *Chaldæan* Dynaſties as to ſome part of the Tradition, but rejecting their names and computations as fabulous. The other way of explaining theſe Dynaſties, is by the ſeveral ways of computation among them: For the learned Monks, *Panodorus* and *Anianus*, underſtand thoſe vaſt ſums, not of years, but days, and ſo make a *Saros* to contain 120 months of 30 days apiece, which, ſaith *Scaliger*, make ten *Chaldee* years, and a *Nirus* 20 equal months, and a *Soſos* two: according to which computation the 100 *Sari* make but 1200 years. But this computation of theirs is rejected by *Georgius Syncellus*, becauſe he ſuppoſeth *Euſebius* ſo well verſed in theſe things, that he would never have ſet them down for years, if the *Chaldæans* had not underſtood them ſo, and therefore he would not trouble himſelf in reducing Fables to true Hiſtory, as he expreſſeth it, whoſe words are at large produced by *Scaliger* in the fore-cited place. And it will appear more neceſſary to reject thoſe *Chaldæan* Computations, if we take the ſums of their years in the ſenſe which *Salmaſius* gives of them in the Preface to his Book, *De annis Climactericis* (from whom *Pyrerius* the Author of the *Præadamites* hath borrowed moſt of his Arguments as to theſe things.) According to him then, every Σάρος contained no leſs than 6000 years, as the *Toman* among the *Perſians* contained 10000: but becauſe that learned man hath only given us his *reperi Scriptum*, without any certain foundation for ſo large an account of thoſe ſums, we ſhall take them in as favourable a ſenſe as we can. In order to which a very learned man of our own hath found a third interpretation of the Σάρος in the *Chaldee* accounts, from a correction of *Suidas* by the MS. in the *Vatican* Li-

IV.

Scal. Not. in Gr. Euſeb. p. 406.

D. Pearson on the Creed, p. 115. 1. edit. brary, according to which he thus reads the words, Οἱ γὰρ σάροι ποιοῦσιν ἐνιαυτοὺς βσκβ' κατὰ τὴν Χαλδαίων ψῆφον, εἴπερ ὁ σάρος ποιεῖ μῆνας Σελήνιακῶν σκβ', οἷοι γίνονται ἰὴ ἐνιαυτοὶ καὶ μῆνες ἕξ: *And so the sense*, saith he, *is clear*; Σάρος *according to the* Chaldee *account comprehends* 222 *months, which come to eighteen years and six months*; *therefore* 120 Σάροι *make* 2220 *years, and therefore* (he adds) *for* βσκβ', *I read, leaving out the last* β, βσκ'. Now according to this sense of 120 *Sari* to comprehend the summ of 2220 years, it will be no difficult matter to reduce the fragment of *Berosus* concerning the ten Kings before the floud reigning 120 *Sari*, to some degree of probability: as to which I shall only suppose these two things. *First*, that the ancient *Chaldæans* had preserved among them some Tradition of the number of the chief persons before the flood; for we find them exactly agreeing with the Scriptures as to the number, tho' differing as to the names of them, which may be seen in the Euseb. p. 5. Fragments of *Africanus*, preserved in *Eusebius* his *Greek Chronica*. *Secondly*, that *Berosus* from whom *Apollodorus* and *Alexander Polyhistor* deliver these computations, might, as to the account of the times of those persons, follow the translation of the *Septuagint*. For I have already made it evident that *Berosus* did not publish his History till after the *Septuagint* was abroad; now according to the computation of the *Septuagint* of the ages before the floud, these 120 *Sari* of the ten Kings will not much disagree from it. For these make 2220 years of these ten persons, and the *Septuagint* in all make 2242; so that if instead of βσκβ' in *Suidas*, we only read it βσμβ', we have the exact computation of the *Septuagint* in these 120 *Sari*; but of this let the learned judge.

V. We now come to the *Ægyptian* Dynasties of *Manetho*, as to which I doubt we must be fain to take the same course that *Eusebius* did with the *Chaldæan*, μὴ συμβιβάζειν τὸ ψεῦδος τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, *not to trouble our selves overmuch in seeking to reconcile fables to truth*. Great pains is taken by some very learned men to reduce the disorderly Dynasties of *Manetho* to some probable account; but I must confess upon an impartial Examination of them, that I think they have striven, if not to make an *Æthiopian* white, yet an *Ægyptian* to speak truth concerning his own Country, which are almost of an equal impossibility. *Joseph Scaliger* who first in this latter age of the world produced them into the light out of *Georgius Syncellus*, hath a more favourable opinion of them, than of the *Ægyptian* History of *Herodotus*, *Diodorus* and others, but upon what account I cannot imagine. Is it because four Dynasties, according to his own computation, exceed the Creation of the world according to the true account? for which he is fain to make use of his *Tempus prolepticum* and *Julian* period, which reacheth 764 years beyond the age of the world, and was invented by him from the multiplication of the great *Cycle* into the *Indiction*, i. e. of 532 into 15. Or is it because forsooth *Manetho* hath digested all into better order, and reckoned up the several Dynasties which lay confused in other Authors? but this only shews him a more cunning impostor who saw the former accounts given by others would not serve the turn, and therefore pretends to more exactness and diligence, that he might more easily deceive his Readers. But setting aside those things which have been said already concerning *Manetho*, I have these things which make me reject his Dynasties as fabulous: *First*, the vast difference between *Manetho* his accounts and all others who have written the *Ægyptian* History, in the order and names of Dynasties. Where do we ever read of the several Dynasties of the

Thinites,

Thinites, *Memphites*, *Soïtes*, *Dioſpolitans* and many others, but in himſelf? It is very ſtrange that neither *Herodotus*, nor *Eratoſthenes*, nor *Diodorus*, who have all written a ſucceſſion of the *Ægyptian* Kings, ſhould neither by their own induſtry, nor by all the intereſt they had in *Ægypt*, get any knowledge of theſe methodically digeſted Dynaſties. Beſides, had there been any hiſtorical certainty in theſe Dynaſties of *Manetho*, whence comes it to paſs that they ſhould be ſo ſilently paſſed over by thoſe who were *Ægyptian* Prieſts themſelves, and undertook to write the Hiſtory of *Ægypt?* Such were *Chæremon*, who was an Ἱερογραμματεὺς, *a ſacred Scribe*, and *Ptolemæus Mendeſius* who was an *Ægytian* Prieſt, as *Euſebius* tells us, and comprehended the Hiſtory of *Ægypt* in three Books. Now had this Hiſtory been ſo authentical as is pretended, whence come ſo many and great contradictions between them? inſomuch that **Joſephus* ſaith, *If that which they report were true it were impoſſible they ſhould ſo much differ; but they labour in the invention of lyes, and write neither agreeably to the truth, nor to one another.* So that it is next to a miracle almoſt to ſee how prodigiouſly fond of theſe Dynaſties *Kircher* is, and what pains he hath taken to no purpoſe about them; *ſcio multos eſſe*, ſaith he, *qui hujuſmodi Dynaſtias meras nugas & commenta putant*; very true; but why is not he of the ſame mind too? he confeſſeth himſelf to have been ſo once; but ſince he hath converſed more with the Oriental Traditions, he hath found them not to be ſo fabulous as many make them. It ſeems then the *Baſis* of the *Ægyptian* Dynaſties as well before the floud as after, muſt lie in this Oriental Tradition; a thing, which ſome, to ſhew their great skill in thoſe Eaſtern Languages, are grown very fond of. But as far as I can yet ſee, they ſail to *Ophir*, not for *Gold*, but *Peacocks*; and the next Legend the world hath ſhould be called *Legenda Orientalis*. For can any thing be more irrational, abſurd and fabulous, than thoſe *Arabic* Traditions which that Author ſcrapes as much for, as *Æſop*'s Cock did on the dunghil? but there is no jewel to be found among them; Unleſs we ſhould take thoſe fifteen hard names of men for ſuch which by the *Arabic* Writers are ſaid to have ſucceeded each other in *Ægypt* before the floud, *viz. Nacraus*, *Nathras*, *Meſram*, *Henoah*, *Arjak*, *Haſilim*, *Huſal*, *Tatraſan*, *Sarkak*, *Schaluk*, *Surith*, (who they ſay built the Pyramids) *Hugith*, *Manaus*, *Aphrus*, *Malinus*, *Abn Ama Pharaun*, in whoſe time they ſay the floud came. But ſhould we be ſo little befriended by reaſon as to grant all this, what advantage will this be to *Manetho*, who ſpeaks not of Kings, but whole Dynaſties? ſo that it ſtill appears theſe Dynaſties are fabulous, not being atteſted by any credible witneſſes. *Secondly*, All thoſe who profeſs to follow *Manetho*, differ ſtrangely from one another, as *Joſephus*, *Africanus*, *Euſebius*, *George the Syncellus* of the Patriarch *Taraſius:* and *Scaliger*, who hath taken ſo much pains in digeſting of them, yet he is condemned by others ſince; and *Iſaac Voſſius* gives a particular caution to his Reader, *In his Dynaſtiis compingendis nequaquam eſſe ſequendum ordinem & calculum* Scaligeri. What ſhould be the reaſon of this diverſity, but that they thought them not ſo authentic, but they might cut off, alter and tranſpoſe, as they ſaw occaſion? which is moſt plain and evident in *Euſebius*, who makes no difficulty of cutting off one whole Dynaſty, and dividing another into two, only to reconcile the diſtance between *Thuoris* the Ægyptian King, and *Teutamus*, the Aſſyrian Emperor, and the deſtruction of *Troy*; and therefore leaves out four Aſſyrian Kings, and a

* *Joſeph. c. App. l. 1.*

Kircher. Oed. Ægyp. To. 1. Synt. 1. c. 9.

Is. Voſſius de æt. ate Mundi, cap. 10.

whole Dynasty of the Ægyptians, to make a *synchronism* between those three.

VI. But yet there hath been something very fairly offered to the world, to clear the truth, if not *Manetho*, in order to his Dynasties, *viz.* that the subtile *Ægyptian*, to inhance the antiquity of his own Country, did take implicite years for solid, and place those in a succession which were contemporary one with another; This indeed is a very compendious way to advance a great sum of years with a very little charge: Wherein he hath done, saith *Capellus*, as if a *Spaniard* in the *Indies* should glory of the antiquity of the Dynasties of *Spain*, and should attribute to the Earls of *Barcelona* 337 years, to the Kings of *Arragon* 498, to the Kings of *Portugal* 418, to the Kings of *Leon* 545, of *Castile* 800 years, and yet all these Dynasties rise from the year of our Lord 717, when the *Saracens* first entred *Spain*. There are very few Nations, but will go near to vie antiquity with the *Ægyptians*, if they may thus be allowed to reckon successively all those petty Royalties which anciently were in most Nations; as might be particularly instanced in most great Empires, that they gradually rise from the subduing and incorporating of those petty Royalties into which the several Nations were cantonized before. And there seems to be very strong ground of suspicion that some such thing was designed by *Manetho*, from the 32[d] Dynasty which is of the *Diospolitan Thebans*; for this Dynasty is said to begin from the tenth year of the 15th Dynasty of the *Phœnician* Pastors in the time of *Saïtes:* now, which is most observable, he that begins this Dynasty, is of the very same name with him who begins the very first Dynasty of *Manetho*, who is *Menes*, and so likewise his Son *Athothis* is the same in both: Which hath made many think, because *Menes* is reckoned first, not only in both these, but in *Diodorus*, *Eratosthenes* and others, that this *Menes* was he who first began the Kingdom of *Ægypt*, after whose time it was divided into several Dynasties. Which makes *Scaliger* say, *Illa vetustissima regna fuerunt instar latrociniorum; ubi vis, non lex aut successio aut suffragia populi reges in solio regni collocabant.* This opinion of the co-existence of these Dynasties is much embraced by *Vossius* both Father and Son, and by the Father made use of to justifie *Scaliger* from calumniators, who made as tho' *Scaliger* did in effect overthrow the authority of the Scriptures by mentioning with some applause the Dynasties of *Manetho.*

Capell. Hist. sacr. & exot. A. M. 3308.

Scalig. can. Isag. l. 3.

Ger. Voss. Idol. l. 1. *c.* 28. *Is. Voss. de æt. mund. c.* 10.

VII. But to this opinion, how plausible soever it seems, I offer these exceptions. *First*, As to that *Menes* who is supposed to be the first Founder of the Ægyptian Kingdom, after whose death it is supposed that *Ægypt* was divided into all these Dynasties; I demand who this *Menes* was; was he the same with him whom the Scripture calls *Misraim*, who was the first Planter of *Ægypt?* this is not probable, for in all probability His name must be sought among the Gods, and not the Mortals that reigned. If we suppose him to be any other after him, it will be hard giving an account how he came to have the whole power of *Ægypt* in his hands, and soon after him it should be divided. For Kingdoms are oft-times made up of those petty Royalties before; but it will be very hard finding instances of one person's enjoying the whole power, and so many Dynasties to arise after his decease, and to continue coexistent in peace and full power so long as these several Dynasties are supposed to do. Besides, is it not very strange, that no Historian should mention such a former distribution of several Principalities so

anciently

anciently in *Ægypt?* But that which to me utterly overthrows the coexistence of these Dynasties in *Ægypt*, is, by comparing with them what we find in Scripture of greatest antiquity concerning the Kingdom of *Ægypt*; which I cannot but wonder that none of those learned men should take notice of. When the Ægyptian Kingdom was first founded, 'tis not here a place to enquire; but it is evident that, in *Abraham*'s time, there was a *Pharaoh* King of *Ægypt* (whom Archbishop *Usher* thinks to have been *Apophis*) not *Abimelech* the first King of *Ægypt*, as *Constantinus Manasses* reports in his Annals (by a ridiculous mistake of the King of *Gerar* for the King of *Ægypt*.) This *Pharaoh* was then certainly King of all the Land of *Ægypt*, which still in Scripture is called *the Land of Misraim* from the first Planter of it: and this was of very great antiquity; and therefore *Funccius* (tho' improbably) thinks this *Pharaoh* to have been *Osiris*, and *Rivet* thinks *Misraim* might have been alive till that time; here then we find no Dynasties coexisting, but one Kingdom under one King. If we descend somewhat lower, to the times of *Jacob* and *Joseph*, the evidence is so undoubted of *Ægypt*'s being an entire Kingdom under one King, that he may have just cause to suspect the eyes either of his body or his mind that distrusts it. For what more evident, than that *Pharoah* who preferred *Joseph*, was *King of all the land of* Ægypt? *Were not the seven years of famine over all the land of* Ægypt? *Gen.* 41. 55. *Was not* Joseph *set by* Pharaoh *over all the land of* Ægypt? *Gen.* 41. 41, 43, 45. *And did not* Joseph *go over all the land of* Ægypt *to gather Corn?* Gen. 41. 46. *Nay did he not buy all the land of* Ægypt *for* Pharaoh? *Gen.* 47. 20. Can there possibly be given any fuller evidences of an entire Kingdom, than these are, that *Ægypt* was such then? Afterwards we read of one King after another in *Ægypt* for the space of nigh two hundred years, during the children of *Israel*'s slavery in *Ægypt*; and was not he, think we, King over all *Ægypt*, in whose time the children of *Israel* went out thence? And in all the following History of Scripture, is there not mention made of *Ægypt* still as an entire Kingdom, and of one King over it? Where then is there any place for these contemporary Dynasties in *Ægypt?* No where that I know of, but in the Fancies of some learned men. Gen. 12.

VIII. Indeed there is one place that seems to give some countenance to this opinion; but it is in far later times than the first Dynásties of *Manetho* are suppos'd to be in, which is in *Isai.* 19. 2. Where God saith, *He would set the* Ægyptians *against the* Ægyptians, *and they shall fight every one against his brother, city against city, and kingdom against kingdom.* Where it seems that there were several Kingdoms then existent among the *Ægyptians*; but the *Septuagint* very well renders it νομὸς ἐπὶ νομόν. Now νομὸς among the *Ægyptians*, as *Epiphanius* and others tell us, notes τὰ ἐκάστης πόλεως περιοικίδα ἤτοι περίχωρον, *the precincts of every great City*, such as our Counties are, and therefore *Pliny* renders νομοὶ by *præfecturæ*; these were the several Provinces of *Ægypt*, of which there were thirty six in *Ægypt*, ten in *Thebais*, ten in *Delta*, the other sixteen in the midland parts; so that by kingdom against kingdom, no more is meant than one Province being set against another. *Isaac Vossius* thinks the number of the ancient *Nomi* was twelve, and that over every of these was a peculiar King; and that this number may be gathered from the Dynasties of *Manetho*, setting aside the Dynasties of the *Persians*, *Æthiopians*, and *Phœnicians: viz.* the *Thinites*, *Memphites*, *Elephantines*, *Heracleopolitans*, *Diospolitan Thebans*, the lesser *Diospolitans*, *Xoites*, *Tanites*,

nites, *Bubaſtites*, *Saïtes*, *Mendeſians*, and *Sebennytes*: and ſo that *Ægypt* was anciently a *Dodecharchy*, as *England* in the *Saxons* time was a *Heptarchy*. But as it already appears, there could be anciently no ſuch *Dodecharchy* in *Ægypt*; ſo it is likewiſe evident that this diſtribution of *Ægypt* into *Nomi* is a later thing, and by moſt Writers is attributed to *Seſooſis* or *Seſoſtris*, whom *Joſephus* ſuppoſed to be *Seſack* King of *Ægypt*, contemporary with *Rehoboam*. Indeed if we believe *Gelaldinus* the *Arabic* Hiſtorian cited by *Kircher*, the moſt ancient diſtribution of *Ægypt* was into four parts. *Miſraim* held one part to himſelf, and gave his Son *Copt* another, *Eſmun* a third, and *Atrib* a fourth part; which diviſion the ſame Author affirms to have continued till the time of *Joſeph*, who made a new diſtribution of the whole Land: After him *Seſoſtris* divided the whole into thirty ſeveral *Nomi*; ſo *Kircher* will needs have it, that of the three ſeveral parts of *Ægypt*, each might have for ſome myſtical ſignification its ten *Nomi*, of which every one had its diſtinct and peculiar God it worſhipp'd, and a particular Palace in the Labyrinth, and a peculiar *Sanhedrin* or Court of Juſtice belonging to it. But it evidently appears by that vain-glorious *Oedipus*, that it is a far eaſier matter to make new Myſteries, than to interpret old ones, which as it might be eaſily diſcovered is the main foundation whereon that ſtructure ſtands, ſo we have ſome evidence of it in our firſt entrance into it, in this part of the *Chorography* of *Ægypt*. For from whence had he this exact diviſion of *Ægypt* into thirty *Nomi*, ten of which belonged to the upper *Ægypt*, or *Thebais*, ten to *Delta*, or the lower *Ægypt*, and the ten remaining to the midland Country? Hath he this from *Ptolemee*, whoſe Scheme of the ſeveral *Nomi* he publiſheth? No, *Ptolemee* and *Pliny*, by his own confeſſion, afterwards add many others to theſe, as *Omphile*, *Phanturites*, *Tanites*, *Phatnites*, *Neut*, *Heptanomos*, &c. Hath he it from *Strabo*, whoſe authority he cites for it? No ſuch matter. For *Strabo* ſaith expreſly, that *Thebais* had ten *Nomi*, *Delta* ten, and the midland ſixteen; only ſome are of opinion, ſaith he, that there were as many *Nomi* as Palaces in the Labyrinth, which were toward thirty; but yet the number is uncertain ſtill. We ſee by this, how ominous it is for an *Oedipus* to ſtumble at the threſhold, and how eaſie a matter it is to interpret Myſteries, if we may have the making of them. We ſee then no evidence at all for theſe contemporary Dynaſties of *Manetho*; which yet if we ſhould grant, would be a further argument of the uncertainty of heathen *Chronology*, when among them implicit years are given out to the world for ſolid; ſo that which way ſoever *Manetho* his Dynaſties be taken, they will prove the thing in hand, whether we ſuppoſe them at leaſt moſt part fabulous, or ſhould grant he had taken thoſe in ſucceſſion to each other, which were coexiſtent with one another.

Vid. Boch. Geogr. p. 1. l. 4. c. 4. Kircher Oedip. Ægypt. To. 1. Syntag. 1. c. 4.

Idem Synt. 1. c. 2. p. 7.

Strab. l. 17.

CHAP. VI.

The uncertain Epocha's of Heathen Chronology.

I. *An account of the defect of Chronology in the eldeſt times. Of the Solar Year among the* Ægyptians, *the original of the Epacts, the antiquity of Intercalation among them. Of the ſeveral Canicular Years; the difference between* Scaliger *and* Petavius *conſidered. The certain Epocha's of the* Ægyptian *Hiſtory no elder than* Nabonaſſar. II. *Of the* Grecian *accounts. The fabulouſneſs of the Heroical age of* Greece. III. *Of the ancient* Grecian *Kingdoms. The beginning of the* Olympiads. IV. *The uncertain Origins of the Weſtern Nations. Of the* Latin *Dynaſties. The different* Palilia *of* Rome. *The uncertain reckoning* Ab Urbe condita. V. *Of impoſtures as to ancient Hiſtories. Of* Annius, VI. Inghiramius, *and others.* VII. *Of the characters uſed by Heathen Prieſts.* VIII. *No ſacred characters among the* Jews. IX. *The partiality and inconſiſtency of heathen Hiſtories with each other. From all which the want of credibility in them as to an account of ancient times is clearly demonſtrated.*

THE next thing to evidence the uncertainty of the heathen *Chronology*, is the want of certain *Parapegmata*, or ſome fixed periods of time, according to which the account of times muſt be made. For if there be no certain *Epocha's* by which to reckon the ſucceſſion of ages, the diſtance of intervals, and all intervening accidents, we muſt of neceſſity fluctuate in continual uncertainties, and have no ſure foundation to bottom any account of ancient times upon. The great reaſon of this defect, is, the little care which thoſe who lived in the eldeſt times had to preſerve the memory of any ancient tradition among themſelves, or to convey it to poſterity in ſuch a way as might be leaſt liable to impoſture. Of all kinds of Learning, *Chronology* was the moſt rude in eldeſt times; and yet that is well called by *Scaliger*, *The life and ſoul of Hiſtory*, without which *Hiſtory* is but a confuſed lump, a mere *Mola*, an indigeſted piece of fleſh, without life or form. The ancient accounts of the world were merely from year to year, and that with abundance of obſcurity, uncertainty and variety: ſometimes going by the courſe of the Moon; and therein they were as mutable as the Moon her ſelf, how to conform the year regularly to her motion: and it was yet greater difficulty to regulate it by the courſe of the Sun, and to make the accounts of the Sun and Moon meet. There was ſo much perplexity and confuſion about the ordering of a ſingle year, and ſo long in moſt Nations before they could bring it into any order, that we are not to expect any fixed periods by which to find out the ſucceſſion of ages among them. Among the *Ægyptians* who are ſuppoſed moſt skilful in the account of the year, it was a long time before they found out any certain courſe of it. It is agreed by moſt, that when the Ægyptian Prieſts had found out the form of the year by the courſe of the Sun which is attributed I.

Diodor. l. 1. c. 50. tributed by *Diodorus* to the *Heliopolitan* Priests) yet the year in common use was only of 360 days, which in any great period of years must needs cause a monstrous confusion, by reason that their Months must of necessity by degrees change their place, so that in the great Canicular year of 730 *Thoyth*, which was the beginning of the Summer *Solstice* in the entrance into that period, would be removed into the midst of Winter, from whence arose that Ægyptian fable in *Herodotus*, that in the time of their eldest Kings, the Sun had twice changed his rising and setting; which was only caused by the variation of their Months, and not by any alteration in the course of the Sun. Which defect the Ægyptian Priests at last observing, saw a necessity of adding five days to the end of the year wch thence were called ἐπαγόμεναι, which implies they were not anciently in use among them, being afterwards added to make up the course of the year. Which the *Ægyptians* give an account of, as *Plutarch* tells us under this fable: *Mercury being once at dice with the Moon, he got from her a 72^d part of the year, which he after added to the 360 days which were anciently the days of the year, which they called* ἐπαγομένας, *and therein celebrated the Festivals of their Gods.* Thence the names of the several ἐπαγόμεναι were taken from the Gods; the first was called Ὀσίρις, it being celebrated in honor of him; the second Ἀρσῆρις, by which *Scaliger* understands *Anubis*, but *Vossius* more probably the senior *Orus*; the third to *Typho*; the fourth to *Isis*; the fifth to *Nephtha* the wife of *Typho*, and sister to *Isis*. This course of the year *Scaliger* thinks that the *Ægyptians* represented by the Serpent called Νεώς, being described in a round circle biting some part of his tail in his mouth; whereby, saith he, they would have it understood that the form of the year was not perfect without that adjection of five days to the end of the year: For to this day, saith he, the *Coptites* and ancient *Ægyptians* call the end of the year Νεώς. It seems that afterwards they understood likewise the necessity of intercalation of a day every fourth year, for the sake of the redundant quadrant each year above 365 days; which course of four years they called Canicular year, because they observed its defect in that time one whole day from the rising of the Dog-star: and besides that they called it Ἡλιακὸν ἔτος, and Ἔτος Θεᾶς, *& Instrum Sothiacum*, from Σῶθις the Dog-star: but *Censorinus* denies any use of intercalation among the *Ægyptians* in their civil year, altho' their Sacred and Hieroglyphical years might admit of it. And upon this ground, I suppose the controversy between those two learned persons, *Scaliger* and *Petavius*, concerning the antiquity of Intercalation among the *Ægyptians* may be reconciled. For on the one side it is apparent, that the ordinary or civil year did want intercalation, by this testimony of *Censorinus*; *Eorum annus civilis solos habet dies* 365 *sine ullo incercalari*; *itaque quadriennium apud eos uno circiter die minus est quam naturale quadriennium*; and thence, saith he, it comes to pass, that in 1461 years, which was the great *Heliacal* year, it returns to the same beginning; for then the Dog-star ariseth again upon the first day of the month *Thoyth*, as it did at the beginning of this great Canicular year; and that this kind of civil year did continue among them in the time of *Censorinus* (which was of the *Dionysian* account 238) appears by this, that he saith in the year wherein he wrote his book the *New-moon* of *Thoyth* was before the seventh day of the Calends of *July*, whereas a hundred years before, it was before the 12 of the Calends of *August*; whence it is evident, that the *Julian* year, whatever some learned men pretendt o the contrary, was not in ordinary

Herod. Euterp. Vide Scaliger. de Emend. Temp. l. 3. p. 195.

Plutarch de Iside & Osiride.

Voss. de Idol. l. 1. c. 28.

Censorin. de die Nat. c. 18.

V. Petav. de doctr. Temp. l. 3. c. 2.

ordinary use among the *Ægyptians* in that time; and that *Sosigenes* when he corrected the *Roman* Account, and brought in the form of the *Julian* year, did not take his pattern from the Ægyptian year, but from the *Grecians* of *Alexandria*, who did make use of the Quadrant added to the 365 years, which the *Ægyptians* did not, as appears further by the Golden circle in the monumnet of *Osimanduas* (which *Diodorus* speaks of out of *Hecatæus Milesius*) which was of 365 cubits compass, and divided into so many segments for every day with the observations of the rising and setting of the several Stars, and the effects portended by them. And the reason why this year continued in civil use among the *Ægyptians*, is well assigned by *Geminus*, that the *Ægyptians* according to a superstitious observation they had, would needs have their Festivals run through every day in the year. But now on the other side, it is as evident that by continual observation the wisest of the Ægyptian Priests did discern the necessity of intercalation, and that there wanted six hours in every year to make it compleat, which every four years would make the intercalation of a day necessary; so much by *Diodorus* is affirmed of the *Theban* Priests, who were the best Astronomers; and by *Strabo* both of the *Theban* and *Heliopolitan*; and so likewise *Horapollo*, whose work was to interpret the more abstruse learning of the Ægyptian Priests: *When* (saith he) *the* Ægyptians *would express a year, they name a Quadrant, because from one rising of the star* Sothis *to another the fourth part of a day is added, so that the year consists of* 365 *days*; (and a quadrant must be added, because of the antecedents and consequents) therefore every fourth year they reckon a supernumerary day. How unjustly *Petavius* hath charged *Scaliger* with falshood in reference to this testimony of *Horapollo*, meerly because the citation did not appear in that Chapter mentioned by *Scaliger* in the Book which *Petavius* used, hath been already observed by learned men. Whereupon *Vossius* condemns *Petavius* of strange incogitancy, because in three Editions mentioned by him, *Scaliger*'s citation was right: but *Conringius* hath since pleaded in behalf of *Petavius*, that he might make use of the Edition of *Causinus* distinct from the other three; whereby we see how small a matter will beget a feud between learned men, especially where prejudice hath lodged before; as is too evident in *Petavius* his rough dealings on all occasious, with that very deserving person *Joseph Scaliger*. But to return, from hence by degrees the *Ægyptians* proceded to make greater periods of years (as *Eudoxus* carried his *Octaeteris* into *Greece* from the Canicular year of the *Ægyptians*) they framed from this a great Canicular year, which had as many years as the *Julian* hathdays; and lastly, the greatest Canicular year, which comprehended four of the greater, and consisted of a period of 1461 years. But thus we see, that the great periods of years among them rise gradually, as they grow more skilful in the understanding the nature of the year; and that they had anciently no certain periods to govern themselves by in their computation of ancient times. Nay the *Ægyptians* have not, as appears, any certain *Epocha* to go by, elder than the Ægyptian years of *Nabonassar*, and afterwards from the death of *Alexander*, and *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, and *Augustus* his Victory at *Actium*.

Kircher Oed. Ægyp. To. 3. Class. 7. c. 2.

Diod. l. 1. c. 49.

Geminus de sphæra cap. 6.

Diodor. l. 1. c. 50. Strab. l. 17. Horapollo. Hieroglyp. l. 1. c. 5.

Voss. de Idol. l. 1. c. 28.

Conring. de Hermet. Med. c. 12.

If from the *Ægyptians* we remove our discourse unto the *Grecians*, we are still plunged into greater uncertainties, it being acknowledged by themselves that they had no certain succession of time before the *Olympiads*. To which purpose the testimony of *Varro* in *Censorinus* is generally II.

taken notice of, diſtributing time into three parts, reckoning two of them to be unknown and fabulous, and the hiſtorical part of time to begin with the firſt *Olympiad*. Indeed *Scaliger* and ſome others are loath to reject all that ſecond part of time as fabulous, which was in the interval between *Deucalion*'s flood and the *Olympiads*; and therefore they had rather call it Heroical, tho' much corrupted with fables, and to think that it was hiſtorical as to perſons, but fabulous as to the actions of thoſe perſons. But granting this; yet we are wholly to ſeek for any certain account of the ſucceſſion of time and perſons for want of ſome certain *Epocha*'s, which like the Pole Star ſhould guide us in our paſſage thro' that vaſt Ocean of the *Grecian* Hiſtory. It muſt be confeſſed that ſome of the learned Heathens have taken a great deal of pains this way to find out ſome certain Periods to fix on in the time before the *Olympiads*; as *Philochorus*, *Apollodorus*, and *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſenſis*, and others, who out of their skill in Aſtronomy ſought to bring down ſome certain intervals between the deſtruction of *Troy*, and the firſt *Olympic* games of *Pelops*, reſtored by *Hercules* and *Atreus*. But granting that their *Epocha*'s were fixed and certain, that the deſtruction of *Troy* was upon the 23 of *Thargelion*, the 11th month of the *Attic* account, and that the *Olympic* game fell out anſwerably to the ninth of our *July*, and theſe things were evidently proved from Aſtronomical obſervations; yet how vaſt an account of time is loſt quite beyond the ſiege of *Troy*? And beſides that, as to all other accidents in the Intervals between theſe two *Epocha*'s which could not be proved by Celeſtial obſervations concurrent with them, they were left at a very great uncertainty ſtill; only they might gueſs whether they approached nearer to one *Epocha* than the other by the ſeries of Families and their Generations (three of which made a Century of years) whereby they might come to ſome conjectures, but could not arrive at any certainty at all.

Scalig. not in Can. Iſagoge. l. 3.

III. But that which is moſt to our purpoſe is, that all the Hiſtory of the original of *Greece*, the foundations of their ſeveral Kingdoms, the ſucceſſion of their firſt Kings, and all that comes under the name of the Hiſtory of their ancient times, is clearly given over by their own moſt skilful Chronologers, as matters out of the reach of any clear evidence. Thence comes ſuch great differences concerning the antiquity of their ancient Kingdoms; the *Argolic* Kingdom by *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſ.* is ſuppoſed to be the eldeſt, and the *Attic* younger than it by 40 Generations, which according to their computation comes to 1000 years, which is impoſſible; and yet the *Arcadians*, who gave themſelves out to be elder than the Moon, are ſuppoſed to be younger by him than the Graſhoppers of *Athens* by nine Generations; and the *Phthiotica*, under *Deucalion*, younger than *Arcadica* by 42 Generations, which *Scaliger* might well ſay were impoſſible and inconſiſtent. The *Sicyonian* Kingdom is by moſt ſuppoſed to be of greateſt antiquity among the *Grecians*, from which *Varro* began his Hiſtory, as S. *Auſtin* tells us; and yet as to this, *Pauſanias* only reckons the names of ſome Kings there, without any ſucceſſion of time among them; and yet as to thoſe names *Africanus* (and *Euſebius* from him) diſſent from *Pauſanias*; and which is moſt obſervable, *Homer* reckons *Adraſtus*, who is the 23d in the account of *Africanus*, to be the firſt that reigned in *Sicyon*, whoſe time was after the inſtitution of the *Olympic* Game by *Pelops*: of him thus *Homer*,

Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, l. 16. c. 2.

Homer. Iliad. 2.

Καὶ Σικυῶν ὅθ' ἄρ' Ἀδρῆστος πρῶτ' ἐμβασίλευεν.

whereby

whereby he expresseth *Adrastus* to be the first King of *Sicyon*; and not as *Scaliger* would interpret it, that *Adrastus* was first King of the *Sicyonians*, before he was of the *Argives*; for in the time of *Adrastus* at *Sicyon*, either *Atreus*, or *Thyestes* was King of the *Argives*: for in the second year of *Phæstus* and *Adrastus* his supposed predecessor in *Sicyon*, *Atreus* restored the *Olympic* Game of *Pelops*, in the 41 year of their reign, and they reigned at *Argi* 65 years: Now that *Phæstus* at *Sicyon* is supposed to reign but eight years; and therefore the reign of *Adrastus* at *Sicyon* falls in with that of *Atreus* and *Thyestes* at *Argi* or *Mycenæ*. Thus we see now, how uncertain the account of times was before the beginning of the *Olympiads* among the *Grecians*, which is fully acknowledged by *Diodorus*, and the very reason given which we here insist on, Διὰ τὸ μηδὲν παράπηγμα παρειληφθῆναι περὶ τούτων πιστευόμενον, *That there was no certainty in the ancient Grecian history, because they had no certain term* (which he calls *parapegma*, as others *Epocha*; and *Censorinus*, *Titulus*) *from whence to deduce their accounts.* But now from the time of the *Olympiads* (i. e. from the first of them after their restoration by *Iphitus*, wherein the names of the Conquerors were ingraven in brass Tablets for the purpose) the succession of time is most certain and historical among the *Grecians*; by which account we have from thence a certain way of commensurating the sacred and prophane History. All the difficulty is in what year of sacred History the *Olympiads* began, which *Scaliger* thus finds out. *Censorinus* writes (in the year of *Christ* 238 which was of the *Julian* period 4951.) that, that year was from the first *Olympiad* of *Iphitus* 1014, the first *Olympiad* was of the *Julian* period 3938. which was according to our learned Primate *A. M.* 3228, and the 35 of *Uzziah* King of *Judah*, or the 34, as *Capellus* thinks: So that from henceforward we have a clear account of times, which we have demonstrated to have been so uncertain before.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 5.

IV. If we come to the *Greeks* further into these *European* parts, we shall find as much darkness and obscurity as to ancient times, if not more, than in those already discours'd of. For the truth is, the account of times before the *Romans* in *Italy*, *Germany*, old *Gallia* or *Britain*, are scarce fit to be discoursed of under any head than that of imposture. Not that I think those Nations had lain in a perpetual sleep, till the *Romans* waked them into some kind of civility but that they had no certain way of conveying down the transactions of their own and former times to the view of posterity. On which account we may justly reject all those pretended successions of Kings here in *Britain* from *Gomer* and *Brute* as fabulous. And it will be the less wonder it shou'd be so in those then accounted barbarous Nations, when even among those who were the Planters of knowledge and civility among others, the account of their ancient times is so dark, confused and uncertain. As it would sufficiently appear to any that would take the pains to examine the succession of the two first Dynasties among the *Latines*; the first before *Æneas* his coming into *Italy*; and the second of the *Æneadæ* after. And certainly it will be sufficient ground to question the account of times before; if in the third Dynasty, when the succession seems so clear, and so certain an *Epocha* as the building of *Rome*, to deduce their accounts from their Chronology be uncertain, which I shall briefly speak to. For altho' *Porcius Cato* have in *Dionysius* the honour of finding out the first *Palilia* of the City of *Rome* (which was the Feast observed to the honour of the Goddess *Pales* in the time of which, the foundations of

Rome were laid) yet there appears no great certainty in his undertaking; for therein he was after contradicted by the learned *Roman*, *Varro*. *Dionysius* tells us that *Cato* found by the *Censors* Tables the exact time from the expulsion of the Kings, to the time of the City's being taken by the *Gauls*; from which time to his own, he could not miss of it from the *Fasti Consulares*; so that it cannot be denied but that *Cato* might have a certain account of times from the *Regifugium* to the time he writ his *Origines*. But what certainty *Cato* could have from the first *Palilia* of the City to the expulsion of *Tarquin*, we cannot understand. For the succession of Kings must needs be very uncertain, unless it be demonstrated from some public monuments, or certain records, or some public actions certainly known to have fallen out precisely in such a year of their several Reigns. Now none of these do occurr in the *Roman* History, in all that interval from the *Palilia* to the *Regifugium*; so that not only the whole interval, but the time of every particular King's Reign, are very uncertain. And therefore *Varro* being destitute of any demonstration of that time, had recourse to *L. Tarrutius Firmanus*, to see if by his skill in Astronomy he could certainly find out the first *Palilia* of *Rome*: His answer was, that he found that the City was built in the time of an Eclipse of the Sun, which was in the third year of the sixth *Olympiad*; according to which account *Varro* proceded, and thence arose the difference between the *Palilia Catoniana* and *Varroniana*; the latter falling out in the 23^{d} of *Iphitus*, the other in the 24th. But if we believe *Joseph Scaliger*, there could not be an Eclipse of the Sun, at the time affirmed by *Tarrutius*: But yet granting an Eclipse of the Sun then, what certainty can we have of the succession of the several Kings afterwards without which there can be no certain computation *ab Urbe condita?* If then the *Romans*, who had so great advantage of knowing times, and were withal so inquisitive concerning the building of their city (which was a thing of no very remote distance) could attain to no absolute certainty about it, what certainty can we expect as to an accounnt of far ancienter times, either from them or others, when they had no Censors Tables, nor *Fasti Consulares* to be guided by? And thus much may serve to shew the great uncertainty of heathen Chronology, as to the giving an account of ancient times.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 5. p. 358.

V. And yet were it only an uncertainty as to Chronology, we might better bear with it; for the mistake meerly in computation of times were not so dangerous (any further than the credibility of the History depends on the computation, as in point of antiquity) if we were but certain that the persons and actions related of them were such as they are reported to be. But that which adds much to the confusion and uncertainty of heathen History, is, the frequency of impostures, which are more hard to be discovered, in that there are no authentic Histories of those times extant, which hath both given occasion to variety of impostures, and much hindred their discovery. For the curiosity of men leading them back into a search after ancient times, it makes them exceeding credulous in embracing whatever pretends to give them any conduct thro' those dark and obscure paths of ancient History. And the world hath never been wanting of such as would be ready to abuse the simple credulity of well-meaning, but less wary men; but those ages have been most *feracious* in the production of such persons, which have pretended to more learning than they had. The pretence of Learning made such persons appear, and the want of it made them not be discovered. Thus

it

it was not only of old among the *Chaldæan* and *Ægyptian* Prieſts, and the *Grecian* Poets, and Hiſtorians, of whom we have ſpoken already; but even among thoſe who might have learned more truth from the Religion they profeſſed, than to think it ſtood in need of their lyes. For there can be no greater diſparagement offered to truth, than to defend it with any thing but it ſelf, nothing laying truth ſo open to ſuſpicion, as when falſhood comes to be his advocate. And a falſe teſtimony diſcovered, doth more prejudice to a good cauſe, than it could any ways advantage it, were it not diſcovered. And therefore their labours have been as ſerviceable to the world who have diſcovered Impoſtures, as thoſe who have directly maintained truth againſt its open oppoſers; thoſe being ſo much more dangerous, in that they appear in the diſguiſe of truth, and therefore are with more difficulty diſcovered. Such a one was that *Ignis fatuus* that appeared in a kind of twilight in the *Chriſtian* world between the former darkneſs of Barbariſm, and the approaching light of knowledge: I mean *Annius Viterbienſis*, who like *Hannibal* in paſſing the *Alps*, not finding a way ready to his mind, ſets himſelf to burning the woods and firing the rocks, and diſſolving them with vinegar to make a paſſage thro' them: So *Annius* being beſet in thoſe ſnowy and gray-headed *Alps* of ancient Hiſtory, and finding no way clear for him according to his fancy, he labours to burn down all certain Records, to eat thro' the credit of undoubted Authors, to make a more free paſſage for his own Hiſtory, which he deduceth ſuitably to Scripture from the concurrent teſtimony of the eldeſt Hiſtorians. To which purpoſe, a new *Beroſus*, *Manetho*, *Philo*, *Metaſthenes* (as he miſtook for *Megaſthenes*) and *Xenophon* muſt put on a grave diſguiſe, and walk abroad the world with a mantle of Antiquity about their ſhoulders, altho' they wear nothing elſe but airy Phantaſms, covered over with the *Cowl* of the Monk of *Viterbo*. For being himſelf ſomewhat more verſed in the Hiſtory of thoſe elder times than generally perſons were in the age he lived in, he made that unhappy uſe of his skill, to play the Mountebank with his Learning; and to abuſe the credulity of thoſe who have better ſtomachs than palates, and ſooner ſwallow down the compoſitions that are given them, than find out the ingredients of them. Thus *Annius* puts a good face on his New-old Authors, bids them be bold and confident, and they would fare the better. And the truth is, they tell their ſtory ſo punctually in all circumſtances, in thoſe things which had no certain conveyance to poſterity, that that were ſufficient ground to any intelligent perſon to queſtion their authority. But leſt his Authors ſhould at any time want an Interpreter to make out their full meaning, he ſets himſelf a large Commentary upon them, and certainly he was the fitteſt perſon in the world to do it; for, *cujus eſt condere, ejus eſt interpretari*; none ſo fit to explain *Annius*, as *Annius* himſelf. The whole ſtory of this impoſture, how he made the Inſcriptions himſelf, and hid them under ground, how they were digged thence and brought to *Annius*; how *Annius* cauſed them to be ſent to the Magiſtrates, and after publiſhed them in the equipage they are in, is at large related by that learned Biſhop * *Antonius Auguſtinus*, from *Latinus Latinius*.

* *Anton. Auguſt. Dialog.* II.

From a like quarry to this, came out thoſe other famous Inſcriptions, VI. walking under the ſpecious title of *Antiquitatum Etruſcarum fragmenta*, wherein, beſides many palpable incongruities to the cuſtoms of thoſe eldeſt times, diſcovered partly by *Leo Allatius* in his Diſcourſe concerning them,

them, there are so many particular stories and circumstances related concerning *Noah*'s being in *Italy*, and other things so far beyond probability of Reason, that it is a wonder there are yet any persons pretending to Learning, who should build their discourses upon such rotten and sandy foundations as these Inscriptions are. But tho' *Ixion* might, *Jupiter* would never have been deceived with a *Cloud* instead of *Juno*; so, tho' persons unacquainted with the lineaments of Truth, may be easily imposed on with appearances instead of her: yet such persons who have sagacity enough to discern the air of her countenance from the paint of forgeries, will never suffer themselves to be over-reached by such vain pretenders. But these Impostors are like the Astrologers at *Rome*, ever banished, and yet ever there; and so these are ever exploded by all lovers of truth, yet always find some to applaud and entertain them. Altho' it be more difficult to do so now in the present light of Knowledge, and all advantages for Learning, than it was in those elder times, when the heathen Priests pretended to the Monopoly of Learning among themselves, and made it one of their great designs to keep all others in dependance on themselves, thereby to keep up their veneration the better among the people. And therefore all the Records they had of Learning or History, were carefully lockt up, and preserved among the Priests; and least at any time others might get a view of them, they were sure to preserve them in a peculiar Character distinct from that in civil and common use. By which means the heathen Priests had all imaginable opportunities and conveniences for deceiving the silly people, and thereby keeping them in an obsequious ignorance, which is never the Mother of any true Devotion, but of the greatest Superstition.

VII. It is well known of the *Ægyptian* Priests, that the sacred Characters of their Temples were seldom made known to any but such as were of their own number and family, (the Priesthood being there hereditary) *Diod. l. 3.* or such others as by long converse had insinuated themselves into their society, as some of the *Greek* Philosophers and Historians had done. And yet we have some reason to think they were not over-free and communicative to some of them, by the slender account they give of several things, which are supposed to be well known among the *Ægyptians*. That the *Phœnician* Priests had their peculiar and sacred Characters too, is evident from the words of *Philo Byblius* concerning *Sanchoniathon*, if we take *Bochartus* his Exposition of them: He tells us that his History *Euseb. præpar. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.* was compared, τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδύτων εὑρεθεῖσιν, ἀποκρύφοις Ἀμμωνέων γράμμασιν ἃ ἐκ ἦν πᾶσι γνώριμα, *with the Inscriptions in the Temples written in the Ammunean letters, which are known to few: Literæ Ammuneorum* (saith *Bochartus*) *sunt literæ Templorum, literæ in sacris exceptæ.* For חמה is *Bochart. Geogr. sac. p. 2. l. 2. c. 17.* the Sun, thence חמן the *Temple of the Sun*, whom the *Phœnicians* worship'd as their principal Deity, under the name of *Beel-samen, the Lord of Heaven.* The same Author tells us out of *Diogenes Laertius*, of a Book of *Democritus*, περὶ τῆς ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἱερῶν γραμμάτων. by which it is evident that the *Babylonian* Priests had their sacred Characters too: And of a Testimony of *Theodoret* of all the *Grecian* Temples, *Quæst. in Gen. 1.* Ἐν τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς νάοις ἴδιοι τινὲς ἦσαν χαρακτῆρες γραμμάτων, ἃς ἱερατικὰς προσηγόρευον, *That they had some peculiar Characters which were called sacred.* But that learned Author thinks there is no necessity of understanding it peculiarly of the *Grecians*, because the *Greek* Fathers called all Heathens by the name of *Greeks*: but if so, the testimony is the larger

larger, and amounts to an universal testimony of the heathen Temples.

VIII. Neither was this only peculiar to them, if we believe some persons of greater Learning than Judgment, who attribute this distinction of sacred and vulgar Characters to the *Jews* as well as others, but without any probability of reason. For these learned men being strongly possessed with the opinion of the modern *Jews* concerning the antiquity of the present *Hebrew* Characters, and finding themselves pressed not only with the testimony of some ancient *Rabbins*, but with the stronger evidence of the ancient *shekels* about *Solomon*'s time, inscribed with the *Samaritan* letters, have at last found this Evasion, that the *Samaritan* letters were in vulgar use; but the present Characters were then sacred and not made common till after the time of the Captivity. But this seems to be a meer shift, found out by some modern *Jews*, and greedily embraced by their followers, because thereby they are in hopes to evade the strength of the contrary arguments, which otherwise they can find no probable solution of. And a meer shift it will appear to be, to any one that considers on how little ground of reason it stands: For none of those reasons which held for such a distinction of Characters among the Heathens, can have any place among the *Jews*. For it was never any part of God's design to have the Law kept from the peoples view. Truth is never so fearful of being seen abroad; it is only falshood that walks under disguises, and must have its hiding-places to retreat to: Nay, God expressly commanded it as a duty of all the *Jews*, to search and study his Law, which they could not do, if it were locked up from them in an unknown Character. Did not God himself promulge it among the people of *Israel* by the ministry of *Moses?* Did he not command it to be *as frontlets between their eyes*, and *signs upon their hands*: not that *Phylacteries* should be made of the Law to wear, as the *Pharisees* interpreted it, and others from them have mistaken; but that they should have the Law in continual remembrance, as if it were always between their eyes, and engraven upon their hands. Again, if we suppose the Law to be among the people, but in the vulgar character, I would fain know, what sanctity, majesty, and authority there was in that character more than in the words and matter? and if there were, how comes the vulgar use of it to be no where forbidden? and how durst *Ezra*, as is supposed, after the Captivity, prophane so sacred a thing by exposing it to common use? But granting them yet further, that it was lawful, but not useful, to make use of that sacred Character; I demand then how comes that disuse to continue so punctually till the time of *Ezra*, and that it should never be divulged before? when there was so great reason to make it common, since the square letters are less operose, more expedite and facile, than the *Samaritan*, which is, when time serves, used as a plea for their great antiquity. But yielding yet more, that the sacred Character was only used for the authentic copy of the Law, which was to decide all differences of other copies (which some run to as their last shift) I appeal to any man's reason, whether this be not the most improbable of all? For how could such a copy be the judge of all others, which could not be read or understood by those who appealed to it? Or was the knowledge and reading of this Character peculiar to the High-Priest, and conveyed down as a *Cabala* from one to another? but how many incongruities would follow hence, in case one High-Priest should die before his Son was capable of understanding the Letters, and so that sacred Treasure must needs be lost;

Exod. 13. 16. Deut. 6. 8.

loſt; or had they it all by inſpiration, and underſtood the ſacred Character by *Urim* and *Thummim*? Thus every way, this opinion among the *Jews* is preſſed with inconveniences, but it was moſt ſuitable to the heathen Prieſts to maintain a *Meum* and *Tuum* between their own Character and the vulgar. For hereby they prohibited all prying into their myſteries by any, but thoſe who had the ſame intereſt with themſelves, and therefore were unlikely to diſcover any thing that might leſſen their reputation. Whereas, had there been nothing but truth in their Records, or that truth had been for their intereſt, what need had there been of ſo great reſervedneſs and privacy? but when the diſcovery of truth would undeceive the world, it was their intereſt to lock it up, and to give out ſuch things to the vulgar, which might advance themſelves and pleaſe them; which artifices of theirs give no ſmall ground to queſtion the credibility of their Hiſtories.

IX. Eſpecially if we add what we promiſed in the laſt place, to ſhew the want of credibility in the report of ancient times among them, which was not only defectiveneſs, and uncertainty, but apparent partiality to themſelves, and inconſiſtency with each other. How evident is it in all theſe Nations we have ſpoken to, how much they ſtrive to inhance the reputation of their own Nation, and to that end blend the Hiſtory of other Nations with their own, to make theirs ſeem the greater? How much do the *Ægyptians* tell us of the excellency of their ancient Laws and Government? and yet how evident is it, from their own Hiſtories, that no ſuch Laws were obſerved by their Kings as they ſpeak of? Can we think that ſuch Kings as *Chemmis* and the reſt of them, who built thoſe vaſt ſtructures of the Pyramids, and employed Myriads of men for ſo many years for the doing of them, would be content to be ſo dieted by their Laws, as *Hecatæus* and *Diodorus* tell us they were to be? Nay it ſeems to be very ſuſpicious, that the great enterprizes of their famous *Seſooſis* are meerly fabulous; and ſome think, an attributing to themſelves, what was done by the *Aſſyrian* Emperor in his time. By which we may gueſs, what to think of the great conqueſts of *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, and their ſubduing almoſt the whole world to them. And it is moſt evident how partial the *Ægyptians* are in diſſembling their greateſt loſſes; as is clear in the ſtory of the conqueſt of *Pharaoh Necho* by *Nebuchadnezzar*, Jer. 46. 12. of which there is not the leaſt mention in *Herodotus* or *Diodorus*. But on the contrary, *Herodotus* tells us this *Necos*, as he calls him, conquered the *Syrians* at *Magdalos*, and the ſtory of *Vaphres* and *Amaſis* in him ſeems to be only a diſguiſe of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s conqueſt; only leſt men ſhould think them conquered by a Foreigner, they make *Amaſis* to be an *Ægyptian Plebeian*. Again, what a vaſt number of Cities doth *Diodorus* tell us of, that were in *Ægypt* in their eldeſt times? no leſs than 18000, when yet himſelf confeſſeth in the time of *Ptolemæus Lagi*, there were reckoned but ſomewhat above 3000 Cities, and then *Ægypt* was the moſt populous that ever it had been. How probable doth this ſound, that in thoſe eldeſt times ſuch vaſt multitudes of Cities ſhould be erected? But the truth is, it is not unſuitable to their opinion of the production of the firſt men; which were cauſed, they ſay, by the heat of the Sun, and the mud of *Nilus*; and it is certain then they might be the moſt populous Nation in the world: for there could be no defect as to either efficient or material cauſe, there being mud enough to produce Myriads, and the Sun hot enough to impregnate it. The partiality of other Nations hath been already diſcourſed of in our paſſage;

Herodot. lib. 2.

Diodor l. 1.

and

and ſo likewiſe hath their mutual repugnancy to, and inconſiſtency with, each other: Which yet might be more fully manifeſted from the contradictions in reference to the Ægyptian Hiſtory between *Manetho*, *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Dicæarchus*, *Eratoſthenes*, and all who have ſpoken of it: as to the *Aſſyrian* Empire between *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, and *Julius Africanus*: as to the *Perſian* Empire between *Herodotus* and *Cteſias*, and thoſe in no inconſiderable things, as is evident in *Photius* his *Excerpta* out of him. Among the *Grecians* we have already diſcover'd it as to their Hiſtory and Geography; and if we ſhould enter into their *Theology*, and the Hiſtory of that, we ſhould find their other differences inconſiderable, if compared with theſe. Of which we may partly make a conjecture by the incredible ſpite that is born by the graveſt *Greek* Authors, as *Strabo*, *Plutarch*, and others, towards *Euhemerus Siculus*, for offering to deliver the hiſtory of *Jupiter*, which he ſaith, he tranſcribed from the *Golden Pillar in the Temple of* Jupiter Triphyllius *in* Panchotis.

But I ſuppoſe enough hath been diſcovered already, to prove that there is no credibility in any of thoſe Heathen Hiſtories, which pretend to give an account of ancient times; there being in all of them ſo much defect and inſufficiency, ſo great uncertainty and confuſion, ſo much partiality and inconſiſtency with each other. It remains now that I proceed to demonſtrate the credibility of that account of ancient times, which is reported in the Sacred Scriptures, which will be the ſecond part of our Task.

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

The certainty of the Writings of *Moſes*.

In order to the proving the truth of Scripture-hiſtory, ſeveral Hypotheſes laid down. I. *The firſt concerns the reaſonableneſs of preſerving the ancient Hiſtory of the World in ſome certain Records, from the importance of the things,* II. *and the inconveniencies of meer Tradition or conſtant Revelation.* III. *The ſecond concerns the certainty that the Records under* Moſes *his name, were undoubtedly his. The certainty of a matter of fact enquired into in general, and proved as to particular,* IV. *by univerſal conſent,* V. *and ſettling a Common-wealth upon his Laws.* VI, VII. *The impoſſibility of an Impoſtor as to the Writings of* Moſes *demonſtrated. The pleas to the contrary largely anſwered.*

I. HAVING ſufficiently demonſtrated the want of credibility in the account of the ancient times, given by thoſe Nations who have made the greateſt pretence to Learning and Antiquity in the World, we now proceed to evince the credibility and certainty of that account which is given us in Sacred Scriptures: In order to which I ſhall premiſe theſe following Hypotheſes.

Hypoth. I. *Firſt, It ſtands to the greateſt reaſon, that an account of things ſo concerning and remarkable, ſhou'd not be always left to the uncertainty of an Oral Tradition; but ſhou'd be timely entred into certain Records, to be preſerv'd to the memory of poſterity.* For it being of concernment to the World, in order to the Eſtabliſhment of Belief, as to future things, to be ſettled in the Belief, that all things paſt were manag'd by Divine Providence; there muſt be certain Records of former Ages, or elſe the mind of Man will be perpetually hovering in the greateſt uncertainties: Eſpecially where there is ſuch a mutual dependance and concatenation of one thing with another, as there is in all the Scripture-hiſtory. For take away but any one of the main Foundations of the *Moſaical* Hiſtory, all the Superſtructure will be exceedingly weakned, if it doth not fall quite to the ground. For Man's obligation to Obedience unto GOD, doth neceſſarily ſuppoſe his Original to be from him; his hearkning to any propoſals of favour from GOD, doth ſuppoſe his Apoſtaſie and Fall; GOD'S deſigning to ſhew mercy and favour to fallen Man, doth ſuppoſe that there muſt be ſome way whereby the Great Creator muſt reveal himſelf as to the Conditions on which fallen Man may expect a recovery; the revealing of theſe Conditions in ſuch a way whereon

whereon a ſuſpicious (becauſe guilty) Creature may firmly rely, doth ſuppoſe ſo certain a recording of them, as may be leaſt liable to any ſuſpicion of impoſture or deceit. For altho' nothing elſe be in it ſelf neceſſary from God to Man, in order to his Salvation, but the bare revealing in a certain way the Terms on which he muſt expect it; yet conſidering the unbounded Nature of Divine Goodneſs, reſpecting not only the good of ſome particular Perſons, but of the whole Society of Mankind, it ſtands to the greateſt reaſon that ſuch a Revelation ſhou'd be ſo propounded, as might be with equal certainty convey'd to the community of Mankind. Which cou'd not with any ſuch evidence of credibility be done by private and particular Revelations (which give ſatisfaction only to the inward Senſes of the partakers of them) as by a public recording of the matters of Divine Revelation by ſuch a Perſon who is enabled to give the World all reaſonable ſatisfaction, that what he did was not of any private deſign of his own head; but that he was deputed to it by no leſs than Divine Authority. And therefore it ſtands to the higheſt reaſon, that where Divine Revelation is neceſſary for the certain requiring of Aſſent, the matter to be believ'd ſhou'd have a certain uniform conveyance to Mens minds, rather than that perpetually new Revelations ſhou'd be requir'd for the making known of thoſe things; which being once recorded, are not liable to ſo many impoſtures, as the other way might have been under pretended Revelations. For then Men are not put to a continual Trial of every Perſon pretending Divine Revelation, as to the evidences which he brings of Divine Authority, but the great matters of concernment being already recorded and atteſted by all rational evidence as to the truth of the things, their minds therein reſt ſatisfy'd without being under a continual heſitancy, leſt the Revelation of one ſhou'd contradict another.

II. For ſuppoſing that God had left the matters of Divine Revelation unrecorded at all, but left them to be diſcover'd in every Age by a Spirit of Prophecy, by ſuch a multitude as might be ſufficient to inform the World of the truth of the things; we cannot but conceive that an innumerable company of croaking *Enthuſiaſts* wou'd be continually pretending Commiſſions from Heaven, by which the minds of Men wou'd be left in continual diſtraction, becauſe they wou'd have no certain infallible Rules given them, whereby to difference the good and evil Spirit from each other. But now ſuppoſing God to inſpire ſome particular Perſons, not only to reveal, but to record Divine Truths, then whatever evidences can be brought atteſting a Divine Revelation in them, will likewiſe prove the undoubted certainty and infallibility of thoſe Writings, it being impoſſible that Perſons employ'd by a God of truth, ſhou'd make it their deſign to impoſe upon the World; which gives us a rational account, why the wiſe God did not ſuffer the Hiſtory of the World to lie ſtill unrecorded, but made choice of ſuch a Perſon to record it, who gave abundant evidence to the World that he acted no private deſign, but was peculiarly employ'd by God himſelf for the doing of it, as will appear afterwards. Beſides, we find by our former Diſcourſe, how liable the moſt certain Tradition is to be corrupted in progreſs of time, where there are no ſtanding Records, tho' it were at firſt deliver'd by Perſons of undoubted credit. For we have no reaſon to doubt, but that the Tradition of the old World, the Flood and the conſequences of it, with the nature and worſhip of the true God, were at firſt ſpread over the greateſt part of the World in its

first Plantations; yet we see how soon for want of certain conveyance, all the ancient Tradition was corrupted and abus'd into the greatest Idolatry. Which might be less wonder'd at, had it been only in those parts which were furthest remote from the seat of those grand Transactions; but thus we find it was even among those Families who had the nearest residence to the place of them, and among those Persons who were not far of in a lineal descent from the Persons mainly concern'd in them; as is most evident in the Family out of which *Abraham* came (who
Josh. 24. 2. was himself the tenth from *Noah*) yet of them it is said, *That they served other Gods.* How unlikely then was it, that this Tradition shou'd be afterwards preserv'd entire, when the People God had peculiarly chosen to himself, were so mixed among the *Ægyptians*, and so prone to the Idolatries of the Nations round about them, and that even after God had given them a written Law attested with the greatest Miracles? What wou'd they have done then, had they never been brought forth out of *Ægypt* by such Signs and Wonders, and had no certain Records left to preserve the memory of former Ages? Thus we see how much it stands to the greatest reason, that so memorable things shou'd be digested into Sacred Records.

Hypoth. 2. Secondly, *We have as great certainty that* Moses *was the Author of the Records going under his name, as we can have of any matter of fact done at so great a distance of time from us.* We are to consider that there are two very distinct questions to be thought of, concerning a Divine Revelation, to any Person at a considerable distance of time from us; and those are what evidences can be given that the matters recorded are of a true Divine Revelation; and what evidence we have of the truth of the matter of fact, that such things were recorded by such Persons. They who do not carefully distinguish between these two Questions, will soon run themselves into an inextricable Labyrinth, when they either seek to understand themselves, or explain to others the grounds on which they believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. The first step in order to which, must be the proving the undoubted certainty of the matter of fact, or the truth of the History, that such Persons were really existent, and did either do or record the things we speak of: After this succeeds the other, to prove not only the real existence of the things, but that the Persons who recorded the things were assisted by an Infallible Spirit; then there can be no reason at all to doubt, but those Records are the Word of God. The first of these, is, that which at present we enquire after, the certainty of the matter of fact, that the Records under the name of *Moses* were undoubtedly his. And here it will be most unreasonable for any to seek for further evidence and demonstration of it, than the matter to be prov'd is capable of. But if they shou'd, I suppose we have sufficient reason to demonstrate the folly of such a demand, and that on these accouuts.

1. Whoever yet undertook to bring matters of fact into Mathematical demonstrations, or thought he had ground to question the certainty of any thing that was not prov'd in a Mathematical way to him? who wou'd ever undertake that *Archimedes* was kill'd at *Syracuse*, by any of the Demonstrations he was then about? or that *Euclide* was the undoubted Author of the *Geometry* under his name? or do Men question these things for want of such Demonstrations? Yet this is all we at present desire, only the same liberty here which is us'd in any thing of a like nature.

2. I demand of the Person who denies this Moral certainty to be sufficient

cient for an assent, whether he doth question every thing in the World, which he was not present at the doing of himself? If he be peremptorily resolv'd to believe nothing but what he sees, he is fit for nothing but a Voyage to *Anticyræ*, or to be soundly purg'd with *Hellebore*, to free him from those cloudy humours that make him suspect the whole World to be an imposture. But we cannot suppose any Man so destitute of Reason, as to question the truth of every matter of fact which he doth not see himself; if he doth then firmly believe any thing, there must be suppos'd sufficient grounds to induce him to such a belief. And then what ground can there be to question the certainty of such things, which have as great evidence as any of those things have, which he most firmly believes? and this is all we desire from him.

3. Do we not see that the most concerning and weighty actions of Mens lives, are built on no other foundation than this Moral certainty? yet Men do not in the least question the truth of the thing they rely upon: As is most evident in all Titles to Estates deriv'd from Ancestors, either by Donation or Purchase: In all Trading, which go's upon the Moral certainty, that there are such places as the *Indies*, or *France* or *Spain*, &c. In all Journeyings, that there is such a place, as that I am going to, and this is the way thither; for these we have but this Moral certainty; for the contrary to both these are possible, and the affirmatives are indemonstrable. In eating and drinking there is a possibility of being poisoned by every bit of meat, or drop of drink; do we therefore continually doubt, whether we shall be so or no? Chiefly this is seen in all natural affection and piety in Children towards Parents, which undoubtedly suppose the truth of that, which it was impossible they cou'd be witnesses of themselves, their coming out of their Mothers wombs. And doth any one think this sufficient ground to question his Mother, because the contrary is impossible to be demonstrated to him? In short then, either we must destroy all Historical Faith out of the World, and believe nothing (tho' never so much attested) but what we see our selves, or else we must acknowledge, that a Moral certainty is a sufficient foundation for an undoubted assent, not such a one *cui non potest subesse falsum*, but such a one *cui non subest dubium*, *i. e.* an *Assent undoubted*, tho' not infallible. By which we see what little reason the *Atheist* on one side can have to question the truth of the Scriptures, as to the History of it; and what little ground the *Papists* on the other side have to make a pretence of the necessity of Infallibility, as to the proposal of such things where Moral certainty is sufficient, that is, to the matter of fact.

IV. Which I now come to prove, as to the subject in hand; *viz.* That the Writings of *Moses* are undoubtedly his. Which I prove by a two-fold Argument: 1. *An universal consent of Persons, who were best able to know the truth of the things in question.* 2. *The settling of a Commonwealth upon the Laws delivered by* Moses. 1. The universal consent of Persons most capable of judging in the case in hand. I know nothing the most scrupulous and inquisitive mind can possibly desire in order to satisfaction, concerning any matter of fact, beyond an Universal Consent of such Persons who have a greater capacity of knowing the truth of it than we can have: And those are all such Persons who have liv'd nearest those times when the things were done, and have best understood the Affairs of the times, when the things were pretended to be done. Can we possibly conceive that among the People of the *Jews*, who were so exceedingly

ceedingly prone to tranſgreſs the Law of *Moſes*, and to fall into Idolatry, but if there had been any the leaſt ſuſpicion of any falſity or impoſture in the Writings of *Moſes*, the ring-leaders of their revolts wou'd have ſufficiently promulged it among them, as the moſt plauſible plea to draw them off from the worſhip of the true God? Can we think that a Nation and Religion ſo maligned as the *Jewiſh* were, cou'd have eſcaped diſcovery, if there had been any deceit in it, when ſo many lay in wait continually to expoſe them to all contumelies imaginable? Nay, among themſelves in their frequent Apoſtaſies, and occaſions given for ſuch a pretence, how comes this to be never heard of, nor in the leaſt queſtioned, whether the Law was undoubtedly of *Moſes* his writing or no? What an excellent plea wou'd this have been for *Jeroboam*'s Calves in *Dan* and *Bethel*: for the *Samaritans* Temple on Mount *Gerizim*, cou'd any the leaſt ſuſpicion have been rais'd among them, concerning the authenticneſs of the fundamental Records of the *Jewiſh* Commonwealth? And which is moſt obſervable, the *Jews* who were a people ſtrangely ſuſpicious and incredulous, while they were fed and cloathed by Miracles, yet cou'd never find ground to queſtion this. Nay, and *Moſes* himſelf, we plainly ſee, was hugely envied by many of the *Iſraelites* even in the Wilderneſs, as is evident in the conſpiracy of *Corah* and his complices, and that on this very ground, That he took too much upon him; how unlikely then is it, that amidſt ſo many enemies he ſhou'd dare to venture any thing into public Records, which was not moſt undoubtedly true; or undertake to preſcribe a Law to oblige the People to poſterity? Or that after his own Age any thing ſhou'd come out under his name, which wou'd not be preſently detected by the Emulators of his glory? What then, is the thing it ſelf incredible? ſurely not, that *Moſes* ſhou'd write the Records we ſpeak of. Were not they able to underſtand the truth of it? What? not thoſe who were in the ſame Age, and convey'd it down by a certain Tradition to poſterity? Or did not the *Iſraelites* all conſtantly believe it? What? not they, who wou'd ſooner part with their Lives and Fortunes, than admit any variation or alteration as to their Law?

V. Well, but if we ſhou'd ſuppoſe the whole *Jewiſh* Nation partial to themſelves, and that out of honor to the memory of ſo great a Perſon as *Moſes*, they ſhou'd attribute their ancient Laws and Records to him: Which is all that Infidelity it ſelf can imagine in this caſe; yet this cannot be with any ſhadow of Reaſon pretended. For,

1. Who were thoſe Perſons, who did give out this Law to the *Jews* under *Moſes* his name? Certainly they, who undertake to contradict that which is receiv'd by common conſent, muſt bring ſtronger and clearer Evidence, than that on which that conſent is grounded; or elſe their Exceptions deſerve to be rejected with the higheſt indignation. What Proof can be then brought, that not only the *Jewiſh* Nation, but the whole Chriſtian World hath been ſo lamentably befool'd to believe thoſe things with an undoubted aſſent, which are only the contrivances of ſome cunning Men?

2. At what time could theſe things be contriv'd? Either while the memory of *Moſes* and his actions were remaining, or afterwards. Firſt, How cou'd it poſſibly be, when his memory was remaining? for then all things were ſo freſh in their memories, that it was impoſſible a thing of this univerſal nature cou'd be forged of him. If after, then I demand, whether the People had obſerv'd the Law of *Moſes* before or no? if not,

not, then they must certainly know it at the time of its promulgation to be counterfeit; for had it been from *Moses*, it wou'd have been observ'd before their times; if it was observ'd before then either continually down from the time of *Moses*, or not? If continually down, then it was of *Moses* his doing, if we suppose him to have had that Authority among the People, which the Objection supposeth; if not, then still the nearer *Moses* his time, the more difficult such a counterfeiting cou'd be; because the Constitutions which *Moses* had left among them, wou'd have remain'd in their memories, whereby they wou'd easily reject all pretences and counterfeits.

3. How can we conceive the Nation of the *Jews* wou'd have ever embraced such a Law, had it not been of *Moses* his enacting among them in that state of time when he did? For then the People were in fittest capacity to receive a Law, being grown a great People, and therefore necessary to have Laws; newly delivered from bondage, and therefore wanting Laws of their own; and entring into a settled state of Commonwealth, which was the most proper season of giving Laws.

VI. These considerations make it so clear; that it is almost impossible to conceive the Nation of the *Jews* cou'd have their Laws given to them but at the time of their being in the Wilderness, before they were settled in *Canaan*. For suppose we at present, to gratify so far the Objection, that these Laws were brought forth long after the constitution of the Government and the National settlement, under *Moses* his name; how improbable, nay how impossible is it to alter the fundamental Laws of a Nation after long settlement? what confusion of interests doth this bring? what disturbance among all sorts of People, who must be disseis'd of their rights and brought to such strange unwonted customs, so seemingly against their interests, as many of the Constitutions among the *Jews* were? For can we imagine, that a People always devoted to their own interest, wou'd after it had been quietly settled in their Land, by Constitutions after the customs of other Nations, presently under a pretence of a copy of Laws found (that were pretended to be given by one in former Ages of great esteem, call'd *Moses*) throw open all their former inclosures, and part with their former Laws, for these of which they have no evidence, but the words of those that told it them? We have a clear Instance for this among the *Romans*; altho' there were great evidence given of the undoubted certainty, that the Books found in *Numa*'s grave by *Petilius* were his, yet because they were adjudg'd by the Senate to be against the present Laws, they were without further enquiry adjudg'd to be burnt. Was not here the greatest likelihood that might be, that these shou'd have taken place among the *Romans*, for the great veneration for wisdom which *Numa* was in among them, and the great evidence that these were certain remainders of his, wherein he gave a true account of the superstitions in use among them? yet lest the state shou'd be unsettled by it, they were prohibited so much as a public view, when the *Prætor* had sworn they were against the establish'd Laws. Can we then conceive the *Jewish* Nation wou'd have embraced so burdensome and ceremonious a Law as *Moses*'s was, had it been brought among them in such a way as the Books of *Numa*, tho' with all imaginable evidence, that it was undoubtedly his, especially when they were engag'd to the observation of some Laws or Customs already, by which their Commonwealth had been establish'd? And withal these Laws of *Moses* seeming so much against the interest and good husbandry of a Nation, as all the neighbour Nations

Nations thought, who for that accuſed them to be an idle and ſlothful People, as they judged by their reſting wholly one Day in ſeven, the great and many ſolemn Faſts they had, the repairing of all the Males to *Jeruſalem* thrice a Year; the Sabbatical Years, Years of *Jubilee*, &c. Theſe things were apparently againſt the intereſt of ſuch a Nation, whoſe great ſubſiſtence was upon paſturage and agriculture. So that it is evident theſe Laws reſpected not the outward intereſt of the Nation, and ſo cou'd not be the contrivance of any Politicians among them, but did immediately aim at the honor of the God whom they ſerv'd, for whom they were to part even with their civil intereſts: The doing of which by a People generally taken notice of for a particular love of their own concernments, is an impregnable argument theſe Laws cou'd not take place among them, had they not been given by *Moſes* at the time of their unſettlement, and that their future ſettlement did depend upon their preſent obſervation of them; which is an evidence too that they cou'd be of no leſs than Divine original: Which was more than I was to prove at preſent.

VII. Were not theſe Writings undoubtedly *Moſes*'s; whence ſhou'd the neighbour Nations about the *Jews*, notwithſtanding the hatred of the *Jewiſh* Religion, retain ſo venerable an opinion of the wiſdom of *Moſes*? The *Ægyptians* accounted him one of their *Prieſts* (which notes the eſteem they had of his learning) as appears by the teſtimonies produced out of *Chæremon* and *Manetho* by *Joſephus*. *Diodorus Siculus* ſpeaks of him with great reſpect among the famous Legiſlators, and ſo doth *Strabo*, who ſpeaks in commendation of the Religion eſtabliſh'd by him. The teſtimony of *Longinus* is ſufficiently known, that *Moſes was no man of any vulgar wit* (ὁ τυχὼν ἀνήρ.) *Chalcidius* calls him *ſapientiſſimus Moſes* (altho' I muſt not diſſemble that *Chalcidius* hath been, I think, undeſervedly reckoned among heathen Writers, tho' he comments on *Plato*'s *Timæus*, it being moſt probable that he was a Chriſtian *Platoniſt*, which might more probably make *Vaninus* call him *circumforaneum blateronem*) but tho' we exempt *Chalcidius* out of the number of thoſe Heathens, who have born teſtimony to the wiſdom of *Moſes*, yet there are number enough beſides him produced by *Juſtin Martyr*, *Cyril*, and others, whoſe evidence is clear and full to make us undoubtedly believe, that there cou'd never have been ſo univerſal and uninterrupted a Tradition concerning the Writings and Laws of *Moſes*, had they not been certainly his, and convey'd down in a continual ſucceſſion from his time to our preſent age. Which will be yet more clear, if we conſider in the ſecond place, That the National Conſtitution and ſettlement of the *Jews*, did depend on the truth of the Laws and Writing of *Moſes*. Can we have more undoubted evidence, that there were ſuch Perſons as *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, and *Numa*, and that the Laws bearing their names were theirs, than the Hiſtory of the ſeveral Commonwealths of *Athens*, *Sparta*, and *Rome*, who were governed by thoſe Laws? When Writings are not of general concernment, that may be more eaſily counterfeited; but when they concern the Right, Privileges, and Government of a Nation, there will be enough whoſe intereſt will lead them to prevent impoſtures. It is no eaſy matter to forge a *Magna Charta*, and to invent Laws; Men's caution and prudence is never ſo quick-ſighted as in matters which concern their Eſtates and Freeholds. The general intereſt of Men lies contrary to ſuch impoſtures, and therefore they will prevent their obtaining among them. Now the Laws of *Moſes* are incorporated into the very

Joſeph. c. App. l. 1. *Diod. l. 1.* *Strab. Geograph. 16.* *Longin. de ſublim.* *V. Voſſ. de Idol. l. 2. c. 45.* *V. Grot. de Ver. Relig. Chr. l. 2.*

very Republic of the *Jews*, and their Subsistence and Government depends upon them, their Religion and Laws are so interwoven one with the other, that one cannot be broken off from the other. Their Right to their temporal possessions in the land of *Canaan* depends on their owning the Sovereignty of God who gave them to them; and on the truth of the History recorded by *Moses* concerning the Promises made to the Patriarchs. So that on that account it was impossible those Laws shou'd be counterfeit on which the welfare of a Nation depended, and according to which they were governed ever since they were a Nation. So that I shall now take it to be sufficiently proved, that the Writings under the name of *Moses* were undoubtedly his; for none, who acknowledge the Laws to have been his, can have the face to deny the History, there being so necessary a connexion between them; and the Book of *Genesis* being nothing else but a general and very necessary introduction to that which follows. I deny not but the History of *Moses* might, according to the Tradition of the *Jews*, and the Belief of others, be revised by *Ezra*, or the Men of the great Synagogue after the *Jew*'s return from Captivity, as appears by the names of Places, and other passages not suitable to the time of *Moses*; but I utterly deny that the *Pentateuch* was not of *Moses* his penning, or that it was only a Collection out of the Diaries and Annals of the Nation: For throughout the Scripture the very historical passages are attributed to *Moses*, and in all probability the *Samaritan Pentateuch* bears date before the Captivity; by which it still appears that those Books are truly the Books of *Moses*.

CHAP. II.

Moses his certain knowledge of what he writ.

I. *The third Hypothesis concerns the certainty of the matter of* Moses *his History, that gradually proved: First,* Moses *his knowledge cleared, by his education, and experience, and certain information.* II. *His education in the wisdom of* Ægypt; *what that was.* III. *The old* Ægyptian *learning enquired into;* IV. *the conveniences for it.* V. *Of the* Ægyptian *Priests,* Moses *reckoned among them for his knowledge.* VI. *The Mathematical, Natural, Divine, and Moral learning of* Ægypt. VII. *Their Political wisdom most considerable.* VIII. *The advantage of* Moses *above the Greek Philosophers, as to wisdom and reason.* Moses *himself an eye-witness of most of his history:* IX. *The certain uninterrupted tradition of the other part among the* Jews, *manifested by rational evidence.*

HAving thus far cleared our way, we come to the third *Hypothesis*, which is, *There are as manifest proofs of the undoubted truth and certainty of the History recorded by* Moses, *as any can be given concerning any thing which we yield the firmest assent unto.* Here it must be considered, that we proceed in a way of rational evidence to prove the truth of the thing in hand, as to which, if in the judgment of impartial Persons the I. *Hypoth.* 3.

arguments produced be ſtrong enough to convince an unbyaſſed mind: It is not material, whether every wrangling *Atheiſt* will ſit down contented with them. For uſually perſons of that inclination, rather than judgment, are more reſolved againſt light than inquiſitive after it, and rather ſeek to ſtop the chinks at which any light might come in, than open the Windows for the free and cheerful entertainment of it. It will certainly be ſufficient to make it appear, that no Man can deny the truth of that part of Scripture which we are now ſpeaking of, without offering manifeſt violence to his own faculties, and making it appear to the World, that he is one wholly forſaken of his own Reaſon: which will be ſatisfactorily done, if we can clear theſe things: *Firſt*, That it was morally impoſſible *Moſes* ſhou'd be ignorant of the things he undertook to write of, and ſo be deceived himſelf. *Secondly*, That it was utterly impoſſible he ſhou'd have any deſign in deceiving others in reporting it. *Thirdly*, That it is certain from all rational evidence, that he hath not deceiv'd the World, but that his Hiſtory is undoubtedly true. *Firſt*, That it was morally impoſſible *Moſes* ſhou'd be deceiv'd himſelf, or be ignorant of the things which he writ of. Two things are requiſitive to prevent a Man's being deceiv'd himſelf. *Firſt*, That he be a perſon of more than ordinary judgment, Wiſdom, and Knowledge. *Secondly*, That he have ſufficient information concerning the things he undertakes to write of. If either of theſe two be wanting, it is poſſible for a Man of integrity to be deceiv'd; for an honeſt Heart hath not always an *Urim* and *Thummim* upon it; nor is Fidelity always furniſh'd with the acuteſt intellectuals. The ſimplicity of the Dove is as liable to be deceiv'd its ſelf, as the ſubtilty of the Serpent is to deceive others; but where the wiſdom of the Serpent is, to prevent being deceiv'd, and the Dove's innocency in not deceiving others, there are all the qualifications can be deſir'd in any one who undertakes only to tell the truth. *Firſt* then, that *Moſes* was a Perſon of a great Underſtanding, and ſufficiently qualify'd to put a difference between Truth and Falſhood, will appear, *Firſt*, from the ingenuity of his Education, *Secondly*, from the ripeneſs of his Judgment, and greatneſs of his Experience when he penned theſe things.

Firſt, We begin with his education. And here we require at preſent no further aſſent to be given to what is reported concerning *Moſes* in Scripture, than what we give to *Plutarch*'s Lives, or any other relations concerning the actions of Perſons who lived in former Ages. Two things then we find recorded in Scripture concerning *Moſes* his Education; *That he was brought up in the Court of* Ægypt, and *that he was skilled in all the learning of the* Ægyptians; and theſe Two will abundantly prove the ingenuity of his Education, *viz.* That he was a Perſon both converſant in civil Affairs, and acquainted with the abſtruſer parts of all the *Ægyptian* Wiſdom.

Heb. 11. 25. Act. 7. 22.

II. And I confeſs there is nothing to me which doth advance ſo much the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning, as that the Spirit of God in Scripture ſhou'd take ſo much Notice of it, as to ſet forth a Perſon (otherwiſe renowned for greater accompliſhments) by his skill in this. For if it be below the wiſdom of any ordinary Perſon, to ſet forth a Perſon by that which in its ſelf is no matter of commendation; how much leſs can we imagine it of that infinite wiſdom which inſpired *Stephen* in that Apology which he makes for himſelf againſt the *Libertines*, who charged him with contempt of *Moſes* and the Law? And therefore certainly this was ſome very obſervable thing, which was brought in

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as a ſingular commendation of *Moſes*, by that perſon whoſe deſign was to make it appear how high an eſteem he had of him. And hence it appears that Learning is not only in its ſelf a great accompliſhment of human nature, but that it ought to be looked upon with veneration, even in thoſe who have excellencies of a higher nature to commend them. If a Pearl retains its excellency when it lies upon a dunghil, it can certainly loſe nothing of its luſtre by being ſet in a Crown of gold; if Learning be commendable in an *Ægyptian*, it is no leſs in *Moſes*, where it is enamell'd with more noble perfections, than of it ſelf it can reach unto. All the queſtion is, Whether the ancient Learning of the *Ægyptians* was ſuch as might be ſuppos'd to improve the reaſon and Underſtanding of Men to ſuch an height, as thereby to make them more capable of putting a difference between Truth and Falſhood? Whether it were ſuch an overflowing *Nilus* as wou'd enrich the Underſtandings of all thoſe who were in a capacity to receive its Streams? The truth is, there want not grounds of ſuſpicion, that the old *Ægyptian* Learning was not of that elevation which the preſent diſtance of our Age makes us apt to think it was. And a learned Man hath in a ſet Diſcourſe endeavoured to ſhew the great defects that there were in it: Neither can it, I think, be deny'd, but according to the reports we have now concerning it, ſome parts of their Learning were frivolous, others obſcure, a great deal Magical, and the reſt ſhort of that improvement, which the acceſſion of the parts and induſtry of after Ages gave unto it. But yet it is again as evident, that ſome parts of Learning were invented by the *Ægyptians*, others much improved, and that the *Greeks* did at firſt ſet up with the ſtock they borrow'd out of *Ægypt*, and that Learning chiefly flouriſh'd there, when there was (I had almoſt ſaid) an *Ægyptian* darkneſs of Ignorance overſpreading the face of *Greece* as well as other Nations.

Conring. de Hermet. Medic. c. 10, 11, 12.

III. Which will appear by theſe conſiderations, The great antiquity of their repute for Learning, the great advantages they had for promoting it, and the parts of Learning moſt in uſe among them. This tho' it may ſeem a digreſſion here, will yet tend to promote our deſign, by ſhewing thereby how qualify'd and accompliſh'd *Moſes* was to deliver to the World an Hiſtory of ancient times. If we believe *Macrobius*, there was no people in the World cou'd vye for Learning with the *Ægyptians*, who makes *Ægypt* in one place, *the Mother of all Arts*, and in another, the *Ægyptians*, *omnium Philoſophiæ diſciplinarum parentes*, *The fathers of all the Philoſophic Sciences*; he derives elſewhere the original of all *Aſtronomy* from them, *quos conſtat primos omnium cœlum metiri, & ſcrutari auſos:* tho' it be more probable that the Nativity even of Aſtronomy it ſelf was firſt calculated by the *Chaldæans*, from whom it was convey'd to the *Ægyptians*. He likewiſe appropriates all divine knowledge to them, where he ſaith they were *Soli rerum divinarum conſcii*, and after calls *Ægypt divinarum omnium diſciplinarum compotem*. It is ſufficiently notorious what great repute the *Ægyptian* Learning hath been in, with ſome in our latter times, in that our Chymiſts look upon it as the greateſt honour to their profeſſion, that they think they can claim kindred of the old *Ægyptian* Learning, and derive the pedigree of their Chymiſtry from the old *Ægyptian Hermes*. But that vain pretence is ſufficiently refuted by the fore-mentioned learned Man *Conringius*, in his Tract on this ſubject, *de Hermetica Medicina*. *Franciſcus Patricius* profeſſeth himſelf ſo great an admirer of the old *Ægyptian* Learning, that he thought it wou'd be no bad exchange, if the *Peripatetic* Philoſo-

Macrob. Saturn. l. 1. cap. 15. in Somn. Scip. lib. 1. c. 19.

Ibid. c. 21.

Id. Saturn. l. 1. c. 14. l. 7. c. 13.

phy were extruded, and the old *Ægyptian* received inſtead of it. But the World is now grown wiſer, than to receive his *Hermes Triſmegiſtus* for the Author of the old *Ægyptian* Philoſophy, the credit of his Author being for ever blaſted, and the doctrine contained in the Books under his name, manifeſted to be a mere *Cento*, a confus'd mixture of the *Chriſtian*, *Platonic*, and *Ægyptian* doctrine together. So that we cou'd hardly maintain the juſtneſs of the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning from any thing now extant of it; but yet we ſee no reaſon to queſtion it, eſpecially ſince it is ſo honourably ſpoken of in Sacred Writ, and ſeems in it to have been made the ſtandard and meaſure of humane Wiſdom. For which we have this obſervable teſtimony, that when the Wiſdom of *Solomon* is ſpoken of with the greateſt advantage and commendation, it is ſet forth with this character, *that it exceeded the wiſdom of all the children of the Eaſt Country, and all the wiſdom of* Ægypt. Whence it is moſt natural and eaſy to argue, That certainly their learning muſt be accounted the greateſt at that time in the World; or elſe it cou'd not have been inferred, that *Solomon* was wiſer than all men, becauſe his wiſdom excelled theirs, unleſs we ſuppoſe their wiſdom to have been the greateſt in that Age of the World, when the wiſdom of *the Græcians* (altho' in that time *Homer* is ſuppoſed to flouriſh) was not thought worthy the taking notice of. We ſee from hence then, as from an irrefragable teſtimony, that the wiſdom of the *Ægyptians* anciently was no trivial *Pedantry*, nor mere ſuperſtitious and Magical Rites, but that there was ſomething in it ſolid and ſubſtantial, or it had not been worth triumphing over by the wiſdom of *Solomon*: It being true of that, what *Lipſius* ſaith of the *Roman* Empire, *Quicquid dignum vinci videbatur, vicit; cætera non tam non potuit quam contempſit*; it was an argument of ſome great worth, that it was overtopp'd and conquer'd by it.

1 King. 4. 29. 30, 31.

Lipſius de Magnitud. Rom. l. 1 c. 3.

IV. Thus we ſee how juſt the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning is from teſtimony, and we ſhall find as great reaſon for it, when we conſider the great advantages the *Ægyptians* had for promoting of Learning among them. Two ways Men come to knowledge, either by Tradition from others, or by Obſervation of their own; what the *Ægyptians* had the firſt way, will be ſpoken to afterwards; we now conſider the latter of theſe. All Knowledge ariſing from Obſervation, muſt be either of thoſe Sciences which immediately conduce to the benefit of Men's lives, or ſuch whoſe end is to improve Men's rational faculties in the knowledge of things. The former neceſſity will put men upon the finding out, the latter require *feceſſum & otia*, freedom from other imployments, a mind addicted to them, and induſtry in the ſtudy of them, and a care to preſerve their inventions in them. The ſtudy of *Geometry* among the *Ægyptians*, ow'd its original to Neceſſity; for the river *Nile* being ſwell'd with the ſhowers falling in *Ethiopia*, and thence annually overflowing the Country of *Ægypt*, and by its violence overturning all the marks they had to diſtinguiſh their Lands, made it neceſſarry for them upon every abatement of the floud to ſurvey their Lands, to find out every one his own by the quantity of the ground upon the ſurvey. The neceſſity of which put them upon a more diligent enquiry into that ſtudy, that thereby they might attain to ſome exactneſs in that, which was to be of ſuch neceſſary, conſtant and perpetual uſe. Thence we find the invention of Geometry particularly attributed by *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Strabo* and others, to the *Ægyptians*. This skill of theirs they after improved into a greater benefit, *viz.* the conveying the water of *Nile* into thoſe places where it had

Vid. Ariſt. Metaph. 1. l. c. 1.

Herodot. lib. 2. Diodor. l. 1. Strabl 17. Cæl. Rhod. l. 18. c. 34.

had not overflown to so great a height, as to give them hopes of an ensuing plenty; which they did by the artificial cutting of several Channels for that end, wherein, saith *Strabo*, the *Ægyptians Art and Industry out-went Nature it self.* By this likewise they observ'd the height of the overflowing of the river, whereby they knew what Harvest to expect the following year; which they did by a Well near *Memphis* (from the use of it called Νειλομέτριον) upon the walls of which were the marks of several cubits, which they observe and publish it to all, that they might provide themselves accordingly. We see what grounds there are, even from profit and advantage, to make us believe that the *Ægyptians* were skill'd in Geometry, and the knowledge relating thereto.

And for the promoting of all other knowledge, whose end is Contemplation, the very constitution of their Commonwealth did much conduce thereto: For thereby it was provided that there shou'd always be a sufficient number of persons freed from all other Employments, who might devote themselves to a sedulous enquiry into the natures of things. Such were the Ægyptian Priests, who by the peculiar nature of the Ægyptian superstitions, were freed from that burdensome service of sacrificing beasts, which the Priests of other Nations were continually employ'd about, and so they enjoy'd not only an easie but a very honourable employment; for they were the persons of the greatest honour, esteem, and authority among the *Ægyptians*, of which rank, as far as I can find, all were accounted, who were not Souldiers, Husbandmen, or Artificers. For *Strabo* mentions no Nobility at all in *Ægypt* distinct from the Priests; for he divides the whole Commonwealth into Souldiers, Husbandmen and Priests. And telling us that the other two were employ'd about matters of War, and the King's revenues in Peace, he adds, οἱ δ' ἱερεῖς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἤσκησν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ὁμιληταί τε τῶν βασιλέων ἦσαν, *The Priests minded the study of Philosophy and Astronomy, and convers'd most with their Kings:* And after, speaking of their Kings being study'd in their Arts, as well as others of the Priests, he adds, μεθ' ὧν ὡς αὐτοῖς πλείων ὁ βίος, *with whom they spent most of their lives.* Agreeable to this, *Plutarch* tells us, that the Kings themselves were often Priests; and adds out of *Hecatæus*, that the Kings us'd to drink Wine by measure, ἱερεῖς ὄντες, *because they were Priests*; for as he saith, the Kings of *Ægypt* were chosen, either out of the rank of Priests or Souldiers, τῶ μὲν δι' ἀνδρείαν, τῶ δὲ διὰ σοφίαν γένος ἀξίωμα καὶ τιμὼ ἔχοντε· *those two orders being of the greatest honour, the one for valour, and the other for wisdom*; and if the King were chosen out of the Souldiers, he was presently entred among the Priests, to learn their Mystical Sciences. *Diodorus* seems to reckon some great persons after the Priests, and distinct from the Souldiery; but if he means by these any other than some of the other two professions, I must say, as *Casaubon* doth in another case of *Diodorus*, *Sane* Strabonis *auctoritas multis Siculis apud me prævalet.* Diodorus *his testimony not to be weighed with* Strabo's. From whence we may understand the reason why that *Potipherah*, whose Daughter *Joseph* married, is called כֹּהֵן, which some render the Priest, others the *Prince of On*; but these two we see are very consistent, their Priests being their great Princes; and *Heliopolis*, or *On*, of which *Potipherah* was Prince or Priest, being the chief Seat and University of the Priests of *Ægypt.* Now it is evident from *Clemens Alexandrinus*, that the *Ægyptians* did not communicate their Mysteries promiscuously to all, but only to such as were in succession to the Crown, or else to those of the Priests and their Children,

V.

Strab. l. 17.

Plutarch. de Isid. & Osir.

Diod. l. 1.

Casaub. Not. in Strab. l. 17.

Gen. 41. 45.

Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 5.

dren, who were moſt apt and fit for them, both by their diet, inſtruction, and family. For this was unalterably obſerved among them, that there was a continued ſucceſſion of a profeſſion in their ſeveral families, both of Prieſts, Souldiers, and Husbandmen, whereby they kept their ſeveral orders without any mixture or confuſion, which is confeſs'd both by *Herodotus* and *Diodorus:* So that by this Conſtitution Learning was among them confin'd to the Prieſts, which highly advanceth the probability of that Tradition, preſerv'd among the *Ægyptians* concerning *Moſes* (which likewiſe ſtrongly proves our preſent deſign) *viz. Manetho*'s Records, as *Joſephus* tells us, that *Moſes* was one of the Prieſts at *Heliopolis*, and that his name among them was *Oſarſiphus*, who changing his name, was called *Moſes*; and in the time of *Amenophis* conducted the leprous people out of *Ægypt* (ſo the *Ægyptians* out of their hatred of the *Iſraelites* call them.) And *Chæremon* another Ægyptian Prieſt in the ſame Author, calls *Moſes* a Scribe, and *Joſeph* (by whom probably he means *Joſhua*) a ſacred Scribe, and ſaith, that the Ægyptian name of *Moſes* was *Tiſithen*, and of *Joſeph*, *Poteſeph*. Now this tradition did in all probability ariſe from the repute of *Moſes* his learning and wiſdom; which being among them proper to their Prieſts, they thence aſcrib'd that name to him, altho' probably he might come to the knowledge of all their Myſteries, from the relation he had to *Pharaoh*'s Daughter.

Herodot. l. 1. *Diod. l. 1. c. 71.* *Joſeph. l. 1. C. App.*

VI. We come now to conſider the parts of the Ægyptian Learning, in which the Scripture tells us *Moſes* was skill'd: This by *Philo Judæus* is branched into *Arithmetic*, *Geometry*, *Muſic*, and *Hieroglyphical Philoſophy:* But *Sixtus Senenſis* more comprehenſively from *Diodorus*, *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, divides it into four parts, *Mathematical*, *Natural*, *Divine* and *Moral*. Their skill in the Mathematical parts of Learning hath been partly ſhew'd already, and might be more largely from that skill in them, which the *Grecians* gain'd from the *Ægyptians*, as both *Jamblichus* and *Porphyry* ſpeak of *Pythagoras*, that he gain'd his skill in Geometry chiefly from the *Ægyptians:* for theſe as *Porphyry* ſaith, of a long time had been very ſtudious of Geometry, as the *Phœnicians* of Arithmetic, and the *Chaldæans* of Aſtronomy. But *Jamblichus* (and I think deſervedly) takes notice of the τὸ δυσπερίληπτον, the *difficult acceſs* of the Ægyptian Prieſts, eſpecially as to acquaintance with their Myſteries; and ſo *Strabo* calls them, μυστικὸς καὶ δυσμεταδότους, ſuch who concealed their learning under many Symbols, and were not eaſily drawn to unfold it. And yet we might think the two and twenty years time which *Pythagoras* is thought to have ſpent among them, had been enough to have inſinuated himſelf into their utmoſt acquaintance, and to have drawn from them the knowledge of their greateſt Myſteries; but yet we have no great reaſon to think he did, if we believe the ſtory in *Diogenes Laertius* of his ſacrificing an *Hecatomb* for the finding out that Demonſtration, which is now contain'd in the 47 propoſition of the firſt of *Euclide*. Yet this did not abate the *Græcians* eſteem of the *Ægyptians* Mathematical Learning; for in *Plato*'s time, *Eudoxus Cnidius* went into *Ægypt* on purpoſe to acquire it; and *Democritus* his boaſt, that none of the *Arſepedonaptæ* in *Ægypt* (ſo their Prieſts were call'd, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* and *Euſebius* tell us, who relate the ſtory) exceded him in the Mathematics, proves, at leaſt inferred, that they were then in greateſt eſteem for them. Their great skill in Aſtronomy is atteſted by *Diodorus*, *Strabo*, *Herodotus*, and others, and by their finding out the courſe of the year by the motion of the Sun, which was the

Philo Jud. de vita Moſis. *Sixt. Senen. l. 2. p. 39.* *Jambl. de vitæ Pyth. l. 1. 29.* *Porphyr. de vit. Pyth. p. 182.* *Strab. l. 17.* *Clem. Al. Strom. l. 1.* *Euſ. Præp. l. 10. c. 2.* *Diodor. l. 1. c. 49, 50.* *Strab. l. 17.* *Herodot. l. 2.*

invention

invention of the *Heliopolitan* Priests. How much they valued Geography, appears from *Clemens* his description of the Ἱερογραμματεύς, or *sacred Scribe*, in the solemn procession; for he was requir'd to be skilful in Hieroglyphics, Cosmography, Geography, the motions of the Planets, the Chorography of *Ægypt*, and description of the *Nile*. *Eustathius* in his Notes on *Dionysius*, attributes the invention of Geographical Tables to *Sesostris*, who caused the Lands he had conquered to be described in Tables, and so communicated to the *Ægyptians*, and from them to others. Their skill in Natural Philosophy cou'd not be very great, because of their Magic and Superstition, whereby they were hindred from all experiments in those Natural things, which they attributed a Divinity to; but they seem to have been more exact and curious in Natural History; for any prodigies, or any thing that was anomalous in Nature, they did, saith *Strabo*, φιλοθεαμονέστερον ἀναφέρειν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ γράμματα, *with a great deal of curiosity insert in their sacred Records*; and *Herodotus* adds, *that more things of that nature are observed by them than by any other Nation*; which, saith he, they not only diligently preserve, but frequently compare together, and from a similitude of prodigies gather a similitude of events. But that which gained the *Ægyptians* the greatest repute abroad, seems to have been their early skill in *Physic*, which is so much spoken of by *Homer*, *Plato*, *Herodotus*, *Plutarch*, *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, that it were impertinent troubling a Reader's patience with the proof of that which is so generally confess'd. A great evidence of the antiquity of this study among them is (if *Manetho* may be so far credited) that *Athotis*, the second King of the first Dynasty of the *Thinites*, was a Physician himself, and writ some Books of *Anatomy*; and the second King of the third Dynasty of the *Memphites*, was, for his skill in *Physic*, honoured among them by the name of *Æsculapius*. *Pliny* affirms it to have been the custom of their Kings to cause dead bodies to be dissected, to find out the nature of Diseases; and elsewhere tells us, that the original of *Physic* among them was from the relation of those who by any remedy were cured of any Disease, which for a memorial to posterity were recorded in their Temples. Their Hieroglyphical and Mystical Learning hath made the greatest noise in the world and the least of Substance in it; which whoever will not be convinced of without perusal of *Kircher*'s *Oedipus Ægyptiacus*, will at last find it fully done to his hand by the successless endeavours of that otherwise learned Man. I cannot think any rational Man cou'd think that study worth his pains, which at the highest can amount but to a conjecture; and when it is come to that with a great deal of pains, it is nothing but some ordinary and trivial observation. As in that famous Hieroglyphic of *Diospolis*, so much spoken of by the Ancients, where was a Child to express coming into the World, an old Man for going out of it, an Hawk for God, an *Hippopotamus* for Hatred, and a Crocodile for Impudence; and all to express this venerable *Apophthegm*, *O ye that come into the World, and that go out of it, God hates impudence.* And therefore certainly this kind of Learning deserves the highest form among the *difficiles Nugæ*; and all these Hieroglyphics put together, will make but one good one, and shou'd be for *Labour lost.*

Clemens Strom. l. 6. p. 631. ed. Par.

Plin. Nat. hist. l. 19. c. 5. l. 29. c. 1.

There is yet one part of Learning more among them, which the *Ægyptians* are esteemed for, which is the Political and Civil part of it, which may better be called Wisdom, than most of the foregoing; two things VII.

things ſpeak much the wiſdom of a Nation, good Laws, and a prudent management of them: their Laws are highly commended by *Strabo* and *Diodorus*; and it is none of the leaſt commendations of them, that *Solon* and *Lycurgus* borrowed ſo many of their Conſtitutions from them; and for the prudent management of their Government, as the continuance of their State ſo long in peace and quietneſs, is an invincible demonſtration of it; ſo the report given of them in Scripture adds a further teſtimony to it; for therein the King of *Ægypt* is called the Son of
Iſa 19.11, 12. the Wiſe, as well as the Son of ancient Kings; and his Counſellors are called *wiſe Counſellors of* Pharaoh, and the *wiſe Men*; whereby a more than ordinary prudence and policy muſt be underſtood. Can we now imagine ſuch a perſon as *Moſes* was, bred up in all the ingenuous Literature of *Ægypt*, converſant among their wiſeſt perſons in *Pharaoh*'s Court, having thereby all advantages to improve himſelf, and to underſtand the utmoſt of all that they know, ſhou'd not be able to paſs a judgment between a mere pretence and Impoſture, and real and important Truths? Can we think that one who had intereſt in ſo great a Court, all advantages of raiſing himſelf therein, ſhou'd willingly forſake all the pleaſures and delights at preſent, all his hopes and advantages, for the future, were he not fully perſuaded of the certain and undoubted truth of all thoſe things which are recorded in his Books? Is it poſſible a Man of ordinary wiſdom ſhou'd venture himſelf upon ſo hazardous, unlikely and dangerous employment, as that was *Moſes* undertook, which could have no probability of ſucceſs, but only upon the belief that God who appeared unto him, was greater than all the Gods of *Ægypt*, and cou'd carry on his Deſign by his power, maugre all the oppoſition which the Princes of the world cou'd make againſt it? And what poſſible ground can we have to think that ſuch a perſon, who did verily believe the truth of what God reveal'd unto him, ſhou'd dare to write any otherwiſe than as it was revealed unto him? If there had been any thing repugnant to common Reaſon in the Hiſtory of the Creation, the Fall of Man, the univerſal Deluge, the propagation of the World by the Sons of *Noah*, the Hiſtory of the *Patriarchs*, had not *Moſes* rational faculties as well as we? nay, had he them not far better improved than any of ours are? and was not he then able to judge what was ſuitable to Reaſon, and what not? and can we think he wou'd then deliver any thing inconſiſtent with Reaſon or undoubted Tradition then, when the Ægyptian Prieſts might ſo readily and plainly have triumphed over him, by diſcovering the falſhood of what he wrote? Thus we ſee that *Moſes* was as highly qualify'd as any of the acuteſt heathen Philoſophers cou'd be, for diſcerning Truth from Falſhood; nay, in all probability he far excelled the moſt renowned of the *Græcian* Philoſophers in that very kind of Learning wherewith they made ſo great noiſe in the World, which was originally Ægyptian, as is evident in the whole ſeries of the *Græcian* Philoſophers, who went Age after Age to *Ægypt*, to get ſome ſcraps of that Learning there, which *Moſes* cou'd not have but full meals of, becauſe of his high place, great intereſt, and power in *Ægypt*. And muſt thoſe hungry Philoſophers then become the only Maſters of our Reaſon, and their Dictates be receiv'd as the ſenſe and voice of Nature, which they either receiv'd from uncertain Tradition, or elſe deliver'd in oppoſition to it, that they might be more taken notice of in the World? Muſt an αὐτὸς ἔφα be confronted with, *Thus ſaith the Lord?* and a few pitiful Symbols

bols vye authority with Divine Commands? and *Ex nihilo nihil fit* be ſooner believ'd than, *In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth?* What irrefragable evidence of Reaſon is that ſo confident a preſumption built upon, when it can ſignifie nothing without this *Hypotheſis*, That there is nothing but Matter in the World? and let this firſt be prov'd, and we will never ſtick to grant the other. I may confidently ſay, the great gullery of the world hath been, taking philoſophical Dictates for the ſtandard of Reaſon, and unprov'd *Hypotheſes* for certain Foundations for our diſcourſe to rely upon. And the ſeeking to reconcile the Myſteries of our Faith to theſe, hath been that which hath almoſt deſtroy'd it, and turn'd our Religion into a mere philoſophical Speculation. But of this elſewhere. We ſee then that inſiſting merely on the accompliſhment and rational perfections of the perſons who ſpeak, we have more reaſon to yield credit to *Moſes* in his Hiſtory, than to any Philoſophers in their Speculations.

VIII. And that which in the next place ſpeaks *Moſes* to be a perſon of wiſdom, and judgment, and ability to find out truth, was his Age and Experience when he deliver'd theſe things to the World. He vented no crude and indigeſted conceptions, no ſudden and temerarious fancies, the uſual iſſues of teeming and juvenile Wits; he liv'd long enough to have experience to try, and judgment to diſtinguiſh a mere outſide and varniſh, from what was ſolid and ſubſtantial. We cannot then have the leaſt ground of ſuſpicion, that *Moſes* was any ways unfit to diſcern Truth from Falſhood, and therefore was capable of judging the one from the other.

But tho' perſons be never ſo highly accompliſh'd for parts, learning, and experience, yet if they want due information of the certainty of the things they deliver, they may be ſtill deceiv'd themſelves; and if they preſerve it for poſterity, be guilty of deceiving others. Let us now therefore ſee whether *Moſes* had not as great advantages for underſtanding the truth of his Hiſtory, as he had judgment to diſcern it. And concerning all thoſe things contained in the four laſt Books of his, to his own death, it was impoſſible any ſhou'd have greater than himſelf, writing nothing but what he was *pars magna* himſelf of, what he ſaw and heard, and did; and can any teſtimony be deſired greater than his whoſe actions they were, or who was preſent at the doing of them; and that not in any private way, but in the moſt public capacity? For altho' private perſons may be preſent at great actions, yet they may be guilty of miſ-repreſenting them, for want of underſtanding all circumſtances precedent, and ſubſequent, or for want of underſtanding the deſigns of the chief inſtruments of action: but when the perſon himſelf, who was the chief in all, ſhall undertake to write an exact Hiſtory of it, what evidence can be deſired more certain than that is, that there cou'd be no defect as to information concerning what was done? The only ſcruple then that can be made, muſt be concerning the paſſages of former times which *Moſes* relates. And here I doubt not but to make it appear, that inſiſting only on all that can be deſired in a bare Hiſtorian (ſetting aſide Divine Revelation) he had as true and certain information of the Hiſtory of thoſe former Ages, as any one can have of things at that diſtance from themſelves; and that is, by a certain uninterrupted tradition of them, which will appear more clear and evident in that Nation of which *Moſes* was, than in any other Nation in the World: and that on theſe two accounts: Firſt, *The undoubted lineal deſcent from Fa-*

ther to Son in the Jewiſh Nation. Secondly, *Their intereſt lying ſo much in the preſerving this Tradition entire.*

IX. First, *That there was a certain unmixed lineal deſcent from Father to Son in the Jewiſh Nation:* the great cauſe of moſt of the confuſion in the Tradition of other Nations, was the frequent mixing of ſeveral Families one with another; now that God might as it were on purpoſe ſatisfie the World of the *Iſraelites* Capacity to preſerve the Tradition entire, he prohibited their mixture by Marriages with the People of other Nations and Families. So that in *Moſes* his time it was a very eaſie matter to run up their lineal deſcent as far as the Flood, nay, up to *Adam*; for *Adam* converſed ſometimes with *Lamech*, *Noah*'s Father; for *Lamech* was born *A. M.* 874. *Adam* died 930. ſo that 56 years, according to that computation, were *Adam* and *Lamech* contemporary. Can we then think *Noah* ignorant of the ancient Tradition of the World, when his Father was ſo long *coævous* with *Adam*; and *Mathuſelah* his Grand-father, who was born *A. M.* 687. died not till *A. M.* 1656. according to our moſt learned *Primate* of *Armagh*, *i. e.* was 600 years contemporary with *Noah*. *Sem* his Son was probably living in ſome part of *Jacob*'s time, or *Iſaac*'s at leaſt; and how eaſily and uninterruptedly might the general Tradition of the ancient Hiſtory be continued thence to the time of *Moſes*, when the number of Families agreeing in this Tradition was increaſed, and withal incorporated by a common ligament of Religion? I demand then, where can we ſuppoſe any ignorance or cutting off this general Tradition in ſo continued a ſucceſſion as here was? Can we imagine that the Grand-children of *Jacob* cou'd be ignorant of their own pedigree, and whence they came into *Ægypt?* can we think a thing ſo late and ſo remarkable as the account of their coming thither, ſhou'd be forgotten, which was attended with ſo many memorable circumſtances, eſpecially the ſelling and advancement of *Joſeph*, whoſe memory it was impoſſible ſhou'd be obliterated in ſo ſhort a time? Cou'd *Jacob* be ignorant of the Country whence his Grand-father *Abraham* came? eſpecially when he liv'd ſo long in it himſelf, and married in that branch of the Family that was remaining there, when he had ſerved his Uncle *Laban?* Cou'd *Abraham*, when he was contemporary with *Sem*, be ignorant of the truth of the Floud, when *Sem*, from whom he derived himſelf, was one of the perſons who eſcaped it in the Ark? Cou'd *Sem* be ignorant of the actions before the Floud, when *Adam*, the firſt Man, lived ſo near the time of *Noah?* and, cou'd *Noah* then be ignorant of the Creation and the fall of Man? Thus we ſee it almoſt impoſſible, that any age among them then cou'd be ignorant of the paſſages of the precedent, which they were ſo few Generations removed from, that they cou'd with eaſe derive themſelves from the Firſt Man. What then can we ſay? that any of theſe had a deſign of deceiving their Poſterity, and ſo corrupted the Tradition? beſides, that it cou'd be hardly poſſible at that time, when there were ſo many remaining teſtimonies of former times; what end can we imagin that any Parents ſhou'd have in thus deceiving their Children, or what advantage ſhou'd come to them by ſuch a deceit? Nay, I ſhall now manifeſt in the ſecond place, That the whole intereſt of their Children lay in preſerving this Tradition certain and entire. For their hopes of poſſeſſing *Canaan* and title to it, depended upon the promiſe made unto *Abraham* 400 years before; which wou'd not only keep awake their ſenſe of the Divine Providence, but wou'd make them careful

ful during their Bondage to preſerve their Genealogies, becauſe all the Right they cou'd plead to their poſſeſſions in *Canaan*, was from their being of *Abraham*'s Seed. And beſides this, on purpoſe to be a memorial to them of paſſages between God and *Abraham*, they had in their fleſh a badge of Circumciſion, which wou'd ſerve to call to mind thoſe tranſactions which had been between God and their Fore-fathers. Theſe things then do fully demonſtrate, that inſiſting only on Rational Evidence, the *Iſraelites* were the moſt certain conſervators of the ancient Hiſtory of the World; and can we think, that *Moſes* who was the Ruler among them, ſhou'd not fully underſtand thoſe things which every *Iſraelite* cou'd ſcarce be ignorant of, and might correct the miſtakes of *Moſes* in his Hiſtory, if he had been guilty of any ſuch? Theſe things I ſuppoſe have made the firſt Propoſition evident, That it was morally impoſſible *Moſes* ſhou'd be deceived himſelf, or be ignorant of the things which he reports to others, both becauſe he had abilities ſufficient to diſcover Truth from Falſhood, and ſufficient information of the paſſages of former times.

CHAP. III.

Moſes his fidelity proved.

I. Moſes *conſidered as an Hiſtorian, and as a Law-giver; his fidelity in both proved; clear evidences that he had no intent to deceive in his Hiſtory, freedom from private intereſt, impartiality in his relations, plainneſs and perſpicuity of ſtile.* II. *As a Law-giver he came armed with Divine Authority, which being the main thing, is fixed on to be fully proved from his actions and writings.* III. *The power of Miracles the great evidence of Divine Revelation. Two grand Queſtions propounded. In what caſes Miracles may be expected, and how known to be true. No neceſſity of a conſtant power of Miracles in a Church:* IV. *Two caſes alone wherein they may be expected. When any thing comes as a Law from God, and when a Divine Law is to be repealed. The neceſſity of Miracles in thoſe caſes as an evidence of Divine Revelation aſſerted.* V. VI. VII. *Objections anſwered. No uſe of Miracles when the Doctrine is ſettled and owned by Miracles by the firſt Revelation. No need of Miracles in reformation of a Church.*

THe ſecond Propoſition contains the proof of *Moſes* his fidelity, That he was as far from having any intent to deceive others, as he was from being deceived himſelf. Two ways *Moſes* muſt be conſidered, as an Hiſtorian, and as a Law-giver; the only inducement for him to deceive as an Hiſtorian, muſt be ſome particular intereſt which muſt draw him aſide from an impartial delivery of the truth; as a Law-giver, he might deceive, if he pretended Divine Revelation for thoſe Laws which were only the iſſues of his own Brain, that they might be re- I.

ceived with a greater veneration among the People, as *Numa Pompilius* and others did. Now if we prove that *Moſes* had no intereſt to deceive in his Hiſtory, and had all rational evidence of Divine Revelation in his Laws, we ſhall abundantly evince the undoubted fidelity of *Moſes* in every thing recorded by him. We begin then with his fidelity as an Hiſtorian; and it being contrary to the common intereſt of the World to deceive and be deceived, we have no reaſon to entertain any ſuſpicions of the veracity of any perſon where we cannot diſcern ſome peculiar intereſt that might have a ſtronger byaſs upon him than the common intereſt of the World. For it is otherwiſe in Morals than in Naturals; for in Naturals, we ſee that every thing will leave its proper intereſt to preſerve the common intereſt of Nature; but in Morals, there is nothing more common than deſerting the common intereſt of Mankind, to ſet up a peculiar intereſt againſt it: It being the trueſt deſcription of a Politician, that he is one who makes himſelf the centre, and the whole World his circumference; that he regards not how much the whole World is abuſed, if any advantage doth accrue to himſelf by it. Where we ſee it then the deſign of any perſon to advance himſelf or his poſterity, or to ſet up the credit of the Nation whoſe Hiſtory he writes, we may have juſt cauſe to ſuſpect his partiality, becauſe we then find a ſufficient inducement for ſuch a one to leave the common road of Truth, and to fall into the paths of deceit. But we have not the leaſt ground to ſuſpect any ſuch partiality in the Hiſtory of *Moſes*; for nothing is more clear than that he was free from the ambitious deſign of advancing himſelf and his poſterity, who notwithſtanding the great honour he enjoy'd himſelf, was content to leave his poſterity in the meaneſt ſort of attendance upon the Tabernacle. And as little have we ground to think he intended to flatter that Nation, which he ſo lively deſcribes, that one wou'd think he had rather a deſign to ſet forth the frowardneſs, unbelief, unthankfulneſs, and diſobedience of a Nation towards a gracious God, than any ways inhance their reputation in the world, or to ingratiate himſelf with them by writing this Hiſtory of them. Nay, and he ſets forth ſo exactly the leſſer failings and groſſer enormities of all the Anceſtors of this Nation, whoſe acts he records, that any impartial Reader will ſoon acquit him of a deſign of flattery, when after he hath recorded thoſe faults, he ſeeks not to extenuate them, or bring any excuſe or pretence to palliate them. So that any obſerving Reader may eaſily take notice, that he was carried on by a higher deſign than the common people of Hiſtorians are; and that his drift and ſcope was to exalt the goodneſs and favour of God, towards a rebellious and obſtinate people. Of which there can be no greater nor more lively demonſtration, than the Hiſtory of all the tranſactions of the *Jewiſh* Nation, from their coming forth of *Ægypt*, to their utter ruin and deſolation. And *Moſes* tells them as from God himſelf, *it was neither for their number, nor their goodneſs, that God ſet his love upon them, but he loved them, becauſe he loved them*, *i. e.* no other account was to be given of his gracious dealing with them, but the freeneſs of his own bounty, and the exuberancy of his goodneſs towards them. Nay, have we not cauſe to admire the ingenuity as well as veracity of this excellent perſonage, who not only lays ſo notorious a blot upon the ſtock of his own Family *Levi*, recorded ſo punctually the inhumanity and cruelty of him, and *Simeon* in their dealings with the *Sechemites*; but likewiſe inſerts that curſe which was left upon their memory

Deut. 7. 7, 8.

Gen. 34. 25.

Gen. 49. 5, 6, 7.

memory for it, by their own Father at his deceaſe! And that he might not leave the leaſt ſuſpicion of partiality behind him, he hath not done as the Statuary did, (who engraved his own name ſo artificially in the Statue of *Jupiter*, that one ſhou'd continue as long as the other,) but what the other intended for the praiſe of his skill, *Moſes* hath done for his ingenuity, that he hath ſo interwoven the Hiſtory of his own failings and diſobedience with thoſe of the Nation, that his ſpots are like to continue as long as the whole web of his Hiſtory is like to do. Had it been the leaſt part of his deſign to have his memory preſerved with a ſuperſtitious veneration among the *Jews*, how eaſy had it been for him to have left out any thing that might in the leaſt intrench upon his reputation? but we find him very ſecure and careleſs in that particular; nay, on the other ſide, very ſtudious and induſtrious in depreſſing the honour and deſarts of Men, and advancing the power and goodneſs of God. And all this he doth, not in an affected ſtrain of *Rhetoric*, whoſe proper work is *impetrare fidem mendacio*, and as *Tully* ſomewhere confeſſeth, *To make things ſeem otherwiſe than they are*; but that innate ſimplicity and plainneſs, and yet withal with that *Imperatoria brevitas*, that Majeſty and Authority, that it is thereby evident he thought not to court acceptance, but to demand belief: Nor had any ſuch pitiful deſign of pleaſing his Readers with ſome affected phraſes, but thought that Truth it ſelf had preſence enough with it, to command the ſubmiſſion of our Underſtandings to it.

Eſpecially when all theſe were delivered by ſuch a one who came II.
ſufficiently armed with all motives of credibility and inducements to aſſent, by that evidence which he gave, that he was no pretender to Divine Revelation, but was really imploy'd as a peculiar inſtrument of State under the God and Ruler of the whole World. Which if it be made clear, then all our further doubts muſt preſently ceaſe, and all impertinent diſputes be ſilenced, when the Supreme Majeſty appears impowering any perſon to dictate to the World the Laws they muſt be governed by. For if any thing be repugnant to our Rational Faculties, that is, that God ſhou'd dictate any thing but what is moſt certainly true, or that the Governour of the World ſhou'd preſcribe any Laws, but ſuch as were moſt juſt and reaſonable. If we ſuppoſe a God, we cannot queſtion veracity to be one of his chiefeſt Attributes, and that it is impoſſible the God of truth ſhou'd imploy any, to reveal any thing as from him, but what was undoubtedly true. So that it were an argument of the moſt groſs and unreaſonable incredulity, to diſtruſt the certainty of any thing which comes to us with ſufficient evidence of Divine, Revelation, becauſe thereby we ſhew our diſtruſt of the veracity of God himſelf. All that we can deſire then, is only reaſonable ſatisfaction concerning the evidence of Divine Revelation in the perſon whoſe words we are to credit, and this our gracious God hath been ſo far from denying Men, that he hath given all Rational Evidence of the truth of it. For it implying no incongruity at all, to any notions of God or our ſelves, that God ſhou'd, when it pleaſes him, ſingle out ſome inſtrument to manifeſt his will to the World; our enquiry then leads us to thoſe things which may be proper Notes and Characters of ſuch a perſon who is employ'd on ſo high an Embaſſy. And thoſe are chiefly theſe two, If his actions be ſuch as cou'd not flow from the power of mere Natural Cauſes; and, If the things he reveals be ſuch as cou'd not proceed from any created Underſtanding. *Firſt* then, for his Actions,

theſe

theſe ſtriking moſt upon our outward Senſes, when they are any thing extraordinary, do tranſmit along with the impreſſions of them to the Underſtanding, an high opinion of the perſon that doth them: whereas the mere height of knowledge, or profoundneſs of things diſcovered, can have no ſuch preſent power and influence upon any, but ſuch as are of more raiſed and inquiſitive minds. And the World is generally more apt to ſuſpect its ſelf deceived with Words, than it can be with Actions; and hence Miracles, or the doing of things above the reach of Nature, hath been always embraced as the greateſt teſtimony of Divine Authority and Revelation. For which there is this evident Reaſon, That the courſe of Nature being ſettled by Divine Power, and every thing acting there by the force of that Power it receiv'd at firſt, it ſeems impoſſible that any thing ſhou'd really alter the ſeries of things, without the ſame power which at firſt produced them. This then we take for granted, That where-ever ſuch a Power appears, there is a certain evidence of a Divine Preſence going along with ſuch a Perſon who enjoys it. And this is that which is moſt evident in the actions of *Moſes*, both as to the Miracles he wrought both in *Ægypt* and the Wilderneſs, and his miraculous deliverance of the *Iſraelites* out of *Ægypt*, this latter being as much above the reach of any merely Civil Power, as the other above Natural.

We therefore come to the Rational Evidence of that Divine Authority whereby *Moſes* acted, which may be gathered from that Divine Power which appeared in his Actions, which being a matter of ſo great weight and importance (it being one of the main Baſes whereon the Evidence of Divine Revelation, as to us, doth ſtand) and withal of ſo great difficulty and obſcurity, (cauſed thro' the preferring ſome Parties in Religion above the common intereſt of it) it will require more care and diligence to ſearch what influence the Power of Miracles hath upon the proving the Divine Commiſſion of thoſe who do them. Whether they are ſuch undoubted Credentials, that where-ever they are produced, we are preſently to receive the Perſons who bring them, as Extraordinary Embaſſadors from heaven, employ'd on ſome peculiar Meſſage to the Sons of Men? For the full ſtating of this Important Queſtion, two things muſt be cleared: *Firſt*, in what caſes Miracles may be expected as Credentials to confirm an immediate Commiſſion from Heaven? *Secondly*, What Rational Evidences do attend thoſe Miracles, to aſſure us they are ſuch as they pretend to be?

III. *Firſt*, For the cauſes wherein theſe Miracles are to be expected as inducements to, or confirmations of our Faith, concerning the Divine imployment of any perſons in the World. And here I lay down this as a certain Foundation, That a power of Miracles is not conſtantly and perpetually neceſſary in all thoſe who manage the affairs of Heaven here on Earth, or that act in the name of God in the World. When the Doctrine of Faith is once ſettled in Sacred Records, and the Divine Revelation of that Doctrine ſufficiently atteſted, by a Power of Miracles in the Revealers of it, What imaginable neceſſity or pretext can there be contrived for a power of Miracles, eſpecially among ſuch as already own the Divine Revelation of the Scriptures? To make then a power of working Miracles to be conſtantly reſident in the Church of God, as one of the neceſſary Notes and Characters of it, is to put God upon that neceſſity which common Nature is freed from, *viz.* of multiplying things without ſufficient cauſe to be given for them; and to leave Men's Faith

Faith at a ſtand, when God hath given ſufficient teſtimony for it to rely upon. It is a thing too common and eaſy to be obſerved, that ſome perſons out of their eagerneſs to uphold the intereſt of their own party, have been fain to eſtabliſh it upon ſuch grounds, which when they are ſufficiently ſearched to the bottom, do apparently undermine the common and ſure Foundations whereon the Belief of our common Chriſtianity doth mainly ſtand. It were eaſy to make a large Diſcourſe on this Subject, whereby we may rip open the wounds that Chriſtianity hath receiv'd, thro' the contentions of the ſeveral parties of it; but this imputation cannot with ſo much reaſon be faſtn'd on any party, as that which is nailed to a pretended Infallible Chair; for which we need no other inſtance, than this before us. For while the leaders of that party make a Power of Miracles to be a neceſſary Note of the true Church, they unavoidably run Men upon this dangerous precipice, not to believe any thing as a matter of Faith, where they find not ſufficient Miracles to convince them that is the true Church which propounds it to them. Which neceſſarily follows from their acknowledg'd principles; for it being impoſſible, according to them, to believe any thing with a Divine Faith, but what is propounded by the Church as an infallible Guide; and it being impoſſible to know which is this infallible Guide, but by the Notes and Characters of it, and one of thoſe Notes, being a Power of Miracles, I cannot find out my Guide but by this Power; and this Power muſt be preſent in the Church, for nothing of former Ages concerning Faith, as the Miracles of *Chriſt*, his Reſurrection, &c. is to be believ'd, but on the Church's account) and therefore where Men do not find ſufficient conviction from preſent Miracles, to believe the Church to be an infallible Guide, they muſt throw off all Faith concerning the Goſpel; for as good never a whit, as never the better. And therefore it is no wonder *Atheiſm* ſhou'd be ſo thriving a plant in *Italy*; nay under, if not within the walls of *Rome* it ſelf, where inquiſitive Perſons do daily ſee the jugglings and impoſtures of Prieſts in their pretended Miracles, and from thence are brought to look upon Religion its ſelf as a mere impoſture, and to think no *Pope* ſo infallible, as he that ſaid, *Quantum nobis profuit hæc de Chriſto fabula?* Such horrid conſequences do Men drive others, if not bring themſelves, to, when they employ their parts and induſtry rather to uphold a corrupt intereſt, than to promote the Belief of the acknowledg'd principles of Chriſtian Faith. But as long as we aſſert no neceſſity of ſuch a power of Miracles to be the Note of any true Church, nor any ſuch neceſſity of an infallible Guide, but that the Miracles wrought by *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles, were ſufficient evidences of a Divine Spirit in them; and that the Scriptures were recorded by them to be an infallible Rule of Faith; here we have more clear reaſon as to the primary motives and grounds of Faith, and withal the infallible veracity of God in the Scriptures, as the laſt reſolution of Faith. And while we aſſert ſuch an infallible Rule of Faith, delivered to us by ſuch an unanimous conſent from the firſt delivery of it, and then ſo fully atteſted by ſuch uncontroulable Miracles, we cannot in the leaſt underſtand to what end a power of Miracles ſhou'd now ſerve in the Church, eſpecially among thoſe who all believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. Indeed before the great harveſt of Converts in the primitive times were brought in, both of *Jews* and *Gentiles*, and the Church fully ſettled in receiving the Canon of the Scriptures univerſally, we find God did continue this power among them; but after

ter the Books of the New Teſtament were generally embraced as the Rule of Faith among Chriſtians, we find them ſo far from pretending to any ſuch Power, that they reject the pretenders to it, ſuch as the *Donatiſts* were, and plead upon the ſame accounts, as we do now againſt the neceſſity of it. We ſee then no reaſon in the world for Miracles to be continued where the Doctrine of Faith is ſettled, as being confirmed by Miracles in the firſt Preachers of it.

IV. There are only theſe two caſes then, wherein Miracles may juſtly and with reaſon be expected. *Firſt*, When any perſon comes as by an extraordinary commiſſion from God to the World, either to deliver ſome peculiar meſſage, or to do ſome more than ordinary ſervice. *Secondly*, When ſomething that hath been before eſtabliſh'd by Divine Law, is to be repealed, and ſome other way of worſhip eſtabliſh'd inſtead of it. *Firſt*, When any comes upon an extraordinary meſſage to the World, in the name of, and by commiſſion from God, then it is but reaſon to require ſome more than ordinary evidence of ſuch Authority. Becauſe of the main importance of the duty of giving credit to ſuch a perſon, and the great ſin of being guilty of rejecting that Divine Authority which appears in him. And in this caſe we cannot think that God wou'd require it as a Duty to believe, where he doth not give ſufficient arguments for Faith, nor that he will puniſh perſons for ſuch a fault, which an invincible ignorance was the cauſe of. Indeed God doth not uſe to neceſſitate Faith, as to the act of it, but he doth ſo clearly propound the object of it, with all arguments inducing to it, as may ſufficiently juſtify a Believer's choice in point of reaſon and prudence, and may leave all Unbelievers without excuſe. I cannot ſee what account a Man can give to himſelf of his Faith, much leſs what Apology he can make to others for it, unleſs he be ſufficiently convinced in point of the higheſt reaſon, that it was his duty to believe; and in order to that conviction, there muſt be ſome clear evidence given, That what is ſpoken hath the impreſs of Divine authority upon it. Now what convictions there can be to any ſober mind concerning Divine Authority in any perſon without ſuch a Power of Miracles going along with him, when he is to deliver ſome new Doctrine to the World to be believ'd, I confeſs I cannot underſtand. For altho' I doubt not but where-ever God doth reveal any thing to any perſon immediately, he gives demonſtrable evidence to the inward ſenſes of the Soul, that it comes from himſelf; yet this inward ſenſe can be no ground to another perſon to believe his Doctrine Divine, becauſe no Man can be a competent judge of the actings of the Divine Spirit from ſtrong impreſſions of fancy by the force and energy of them. If it be ſaid, *That we are bound to believe thoſe, who ſay they are fully ſatisfy'd of their Divine Commiſſion.* I anſwer *Firſt*, This will expoſe us to all deluſions imaginable; for if we are bound to believe them becauſe they ſay ſo, we are bound to believe all which ſay ſo; and none are more confident pretenders to this than the greateſt deceivers, as the experience of our Age will ſufficiently witneſs. *Secondly*, Men muſt neceſſarily be bound to believe contradictions; for nothing is more ordinary, than for ſuch confident pretenders to a Divine Spirit, to contradict one another, and it may be, the ſame perſon in a little time contradict himſelf: and muſt we ſtill be bound to believe all they ſay? If ſo, no Philoſophers wou'd be ſo much in requeſt, as thoſe *Ariſtotle* diſputes againſt in his *Metaphyſics*, who thought a thing might be, and not be, at the ſame time. *Thirdly*, The ground of Faith at laſt will

Object. *Anſw.*

be

be but a mere humane teſtimony, as far as the perſon who is to believe is capable of judging of it. For the Queſtion, being, Whether the perſon I am to believe hath Divine Authority for what he ſaith, What ground can I have to believe that he hath ſo? Muſt I take his bare affirmation for it? If ſo, then a mere humane teſtimony muſt be the ground of Divine Faith, and that which is laſt reſolved into: If it be ſaid, *That I am to believe the Divine Authority by which he ſpeaks, when he ſpeaks in the name of God:* I anſwer, The Queſtion will again return, how I ſhall know he ſpeaks this from Divine Authority? and ſo there muſt be a progreſs *in infinitum*, or founding Divine Faith on a mere humane teſtimony, If I am to believe Divine Revelation merely on the account of the perſon's affirmation who pretends to it. For in this caſe it holds good, *Non apparentis & non exiſtentis eadem eſt ratio*; if he be divinely inſpired, and there be no ground inducing me to believe that he is ſo, I ſhall be excuſed, if I believe him not, if my wilfulneſs and lazineſs be not the cauſe of my unbelief.

V. If it be ſaid, *That God will ſatisfy the minds of good Men concerning the truth of Divine Revelation.* I grant it to be wonderful true; but all the Queſtion is *de modo*, how God will ſatisfy them? whether merely by Inſpiration of his own Spirit in them, aſſuring them that it is God that ſpeaks in ſuch perſons; or by giving them Rational Evidence, convincing them of ſufficient grounds to believe it. If we aſſert the former way, we run into theſe inconveniences: *Firſt*, We make as immediate a Revelation in all thoſe who believe, as in thoſe who are to reveal Divine Truths to us; for there is a new Revelation of an object immediately to the mind; *viz. That ſuch a perſon is inſpired of God*; and is not after the common way of the Spirit's illumination in Believers, which is by enlightning the faculty, without the propoſition of any new object, as it is in the work of Grace: So that according to this opinion, there muſt be immediate Inſpiration as to that act of Faith, whereby we believe any one to have been divinely inſpired, and conſequently to that whereby we believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. *Secondly*, Doth not this make the faireſt plea for Men's unbelief? For, I demand, Is it the duty of thoſe who want that immediate Illumination to believe or no? If it be not their duty, Unbelief can be no ſin to them; if it be a duty, it muſt be made known to be a duty; and how can that be made known to them to be a duty, when they want the only and neceſſary means of Inſtruction in order to it? Will God condemn them for that, which it was impoſſible they ſhou'd have, unleſs God gave it them? And how can they be left inexcuſable, who want ſo much as rational inducements to Faith? for of theſe I now ſpeak, and not of efficacious perſuaſions of the Mind, when there are rational arguments for Faith propounded. But, *Laſtly*, I ſuppoſe the caſe will be clear'd, when we take notice what courſe God hath always taken to give all rational ſatisfaction to the minds of Men, concerning the perſons whom he hath imploy'd in either of the foremention'd caſes. *Firſt*, for thoſe who have been imploy'd upon ſome ſpecial meſſage and ſervice for God, he hath ſent them forth ſufficiently provided with manifeſtations of the Divine Power whereby they acted; as is moſt clear and evident in the preſent caſe of *Moſes*, *Exodus* 4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. where *Moſes* puts the caſe to God which we are now debating of. Suppoſing, ſaith he, that I ſhou'd go to the *Iſraelites* and tell them, God had appeared to me, and ſent me to deliver them, and they ſhou'd ſay, God had not appear'd unto me;

how shou'd I satisfy them? God doth not reject this objection of *Moses* as savouring of unbelief, but presently shews him how he shou'd satisfy them, by causing a Miracle before his face, *turning his rod into a serpent*; and God gives this as the reason of it, *vers.* 5. *That they may believe that the Lord God of their Fathers, the God of* Abraham, *the God of* Isaac, *and the God of* Jacob, *hath appeared unto thee.* It seems God himself thought this wou'd be the most pregnant evidence of God's appearing to him, if he wrought Miracles before their faces. Nay, lest they shou'd think one single Miracle was not sufficient, God in the immediate following verses adjoyns two more, which he shou'd do in order to their satisfaction; and further, *vers.* 21. God gave him a charge to do all those wonders before *Pharaoh*, which he had put into his hand: and accordingly we find *Pharaoh* presently demanding a Miracle of *Moses*, *Exodus* 7. 9. which accordingly *Moses* did in his presence, tho' he might suppose *Pharaoh*'s demand not to proceed from desire of satisfaction, but from some hopes that for want of it, he might have rendred his credit suspected among the *Israelites*.

VI. Indeed after God had delivered his people, and had settled them in a way of serving him according to the Laws delivered by *Moses*, which he had confirm'd by unquestionable Miracles among them, we find a caution laid in by *Moses* himself against those which shou'd pretend signs and wonders to draw them off from the Religion establish'd by the Law of *Moses*. And so likewise under the Gospel, after that was establish'd by the unparallell'd Miracles of our Saviour and the Apostles, we find frequent cautions against being deceiv'd by those who came with pretences of doing great Miracles. But this is so far from infringing the credibility of such a Testimony which is confirm'd by Miracles, that it yields a strong confirmation to the truth of what I now assert. For the Doctrine is suppos'd to be already establish'd by Miracles, according to which we are to judge of the spirits of such pretenders. Now it stands to the greatest reason, that when a Religion is once establish'd by uncontrouled Miracles, we shou'd not hearken to every whiffling Conjurer that will pretend to do great feats, to draw us off from the truth establish'd. In which case, the surest way to discover the Imposture is, to compare his pretended Miracles with those true and real ones which were done by *Moses* and *Christ*; and the ground of it is, because every person is no competent judge of the truth of a Miracle; for the Devil, by his power and subtilty, may easily deceive all such as will be led by the nose by him in expectation of some wonders to be done by him. And therefore as long as we have no ground to question the certainty of those Miracles which were wrought by *Christ* or *Moses*, I am bound to adhere to the Doctrine establish'd by those Miracles, and to make them my rule of judging all persons who shall pretend to work Miracles: Because, 1. I do not know how far God may give Men over to be deceiv'd by lying wonders, who will not receive the truth in the love of it; *i. e.* those that think not the *Christian Religion* sufficiently confirm'd by the Miracles wrought at the promulgation of it. God in justice may permit the Devil to go further than otherwise he cou'd, and leave such persons to their own credulity, to believe every imposture and illusion of their senses for true Miracles. 2. That Doctrine which was confirm'd by undoubted Miracles, hath assur'd us of the coming of Lying Wonders, whereby many shou'd be deceiv'd. Now this part of the Doctrine of the Gospel is as certainly true as any of the rest

Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3.

for

for it was confirm'd by the ſame Miracles that the other was; and beſides that, the very coming of ſuch Miracles is an evidence of the truth of it, it falling out ſo exactly according to what was fore-told ſo many hundred years ſince. Now if this Doctrine be true, then am I certain the intent of theſe Miracles is to deceive, and that thoſe are deceiv'd who hearken to them; and what reaſon then have I to believe them? 3. To what end do theſe Miracles ſerve? Are they to confirm the truths contain'd in Scripture? But what need they any confirmation now, when we are aſſur'd by the Miracles wrought by *Chriſt* and his *Apoſtles*, that the Doctrine by them preach'd came from God? and ſo hath been receiv'd upon the credit of thoſe Miracles ever ſince. Were theſe truths ſufficiently prov'd to be from God before or no? If not, then all former Ages have believ'd without ſufficient ground for Faith; if they were, then what ground can there be to confirm us in them now? Certainly God, who never doth any thing but for very great purpoſes, will never alter the courſe of Nature, merely for ſatisfaction of Men's vain curioſities.

But it may be it will be ſaid, It was ſomething not fully reveal'd in Scripture which is thus confirm'd by Miracles: but where hath the Scripture told us, that any thing not fully reveal'd therein, ſhou'd be afterwards confirm'd? Was the Scripture an infallible rule of Faith, while this was wanting in it? Did *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles diſcharge their places, when they left ſomething unreveal'd to us? Was this a Duty before theſe Miracles or no? if it was, what need Miracles to confirm it? if not, *Chriſt* hath not told us all neceſſary conditions of Salvation. For whatever is required as a Duty, is ſuch, as the neglect of it runs Men upon damnation. *Laſtly*, Men's Faith will be left at continual uncertainties; for we know not according to this principle, when we have all that is neceſſary to be believ'd, or do all that is neceſſary to be practis'd in order to Salvation. For if God may ſtill make new Articles of Faith, or conſtitute new duties by freſh Miracles, I muſt go and enquire what Miracles are wrought in every place, to ſee I miſs nothing that may be neceſſary for me, in order to my happineſs in another World. VII.

If Men pretend to deliver any Doctrine contrary to the Scripture; then it is not only neceſſary that they confirm it by Miracles, but they muſt manifeſt the falſity of thoſe Miracles on which that Doctrine is believ'd, or elſe they muſt uſe another Miracle to prove that God will ſet his Seal to confirm both parts of a contradiction to be true. Which being the hardeſt task of all, had need be prov'd by very ſufficient and undoubted Miracles, ſuch as may be able to make us believe thoſe are Miracles, and are not, at the ſame time, and ſo the ſtrength of the Argument is utterly deſtroy'd by the *medium* produc'd to prove it by.

By this Diſcourſe theſe Two things are clear; *Firſt*, That no pretences of Miracles are to be hearkn'd to, when the Doctrine we are to believe is already eſtabliſh'd by them if thoſe miracles tend in the leaſt to the derogation of the truth of what was eſtabliſh'd by thoſe former Miracles. *Secondly*, That when the full Doctrine we are to believe is eſtabliſh'd by Miracles, there is no neceſſity at all of new Miracles, for confirmation of any of the truths therein deliver'd. And therefore it is a moſt unreaſonable thing to demand Miracles of thoſe to prove the truth of the Doctrine they deliver, who do firſt ſolemnly profeſs to deliver nothing but what was confirm'd by Miracles in the firſt delivery of it, and is contain'd in the Scriptures of the Old and New Teſtament; and

ſecondly do not pretend to any immediate Commiſſion from Heaven, but do nothing but what in their Conſciences they think every true Chriſtian is bound to do; much more all Magiſtrates and Miniſters, who believe the truth of what they profeſs, which is in their places to reform all Errors and Abuſes which are crept into the Doctrine or Practice of *Chriſtianity*, thro' the Corruption of Men or Times. And therefore it is a moſt unjuſt and unreaſonable demand of the *Papiſts*, when they require Miracles from our Firſt Reformers, to prove the truth of their Doctrine with. Had they pretended to have come with an immediate Commiſſion from Heaven to have added to the Doctrine of the Goſpel, there had been ſome plea for ſuch a demand; but it was quite otherwiſe with them: Their only deſign was, *to whip the buyers and ſellers out of the Temple*, to purge the Church from its abuſes: And altho' that by *Jerome* was thought to be one of our Saviour's greateſt Miracles, yet this by us is conceiv'd to be no other than the duty of all Magiſtrates, Miniſters, and private Chriſtians; theſe by their Prayers, Miniſters by their Doctrine, and Magiſtrates by their juſt Authority.

CHAP. IV.

The fidelity of the Prophets ſucceeding *Moſes*.

I. *An order of Prophets to ſucceed* Moſes, *by God's own appointment in the Law of* Moſes. II. *The Schools of the Prophets.* III. *The original and inſtitution of them.* IV. *The Cities of the Levites. The occaſion of their firſt inſtitution.* V. *The places of the Schools of the Prophets, and the tendency of the inſtitution there to a prophetical office.* VI. *Of the Muſic us'd in the Schools of the Prophets.* VII. *The Roman Aſſamenta, and the Greek Hymns in their ſolemn worſhip.* VIII. *The two ſorts of Prophets among the* Jews, *Leiger and extraordinary. Ordinary Prophets taken out of the Schools, prov'd by* Amos *and* Saul.

I. BUt altho' now under the Goſpel (the Revelation of God's Will being compleated by *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles) we have no reaſon either to expect new Revelations, or new Miracles for confirming the Old; yet under the Law, God training up his People by degrees till the coming of *Chriſt*, there was a neceſſity of a new ſupply of Divine Meſſengers (call'd *Prophets*) to prepare the People, and make way for the coming of *Chriſt*. As to whom theſe two things are conſiderable.

Firſt, Thoſe Prophets whoſe work was to inform the People of their duties, or to reprove them for their ſins, or to prepare them for the coming of the *Meſſias* (which were their chief tasks) had no need to confirm the truth of their doctrine or commiſſion from Heaven by the working of Miracles among them. And that on theſe two accounts.

Firſt, Becauſe God did not conſummate the Revelation of his Mind and Will to the *Jews* by the Miniſtry of *Moſes*, but appointed a ſucceſſion of Prophets to be among them, to make known his Mind unto them. Now, in this caſe, when the prophetical office was eſtabliſh'd among

among them, what neceſſity was there that every one that came to them upon an Errand from God, ſhou'd prove his Teſtimony to be true by Miracles, when in the diſcharge of his Office he deliver'd nothing diſſonant from the Law of *Moſes?* It is one argument God intended a ſucceſſion of Prophets, when he laid down ſuch Rules in his Law for the judging of them, whether they were truly inſpir'd or no, *Deut.* 18. 21, 22. And in that ſame place God doth promiſe a ſucceſſion of Prophets, *Deut.* 18. 15, 18. *A Prophet will the Lord God raiſe up unto thee like unto me; to him ſhall ye hearken.* Which words, tho' in their full and compleat ſenſe they do relate to *Chriſt* (who is the great Prophet of the Church) yet who ever attends to the full ſcope of the words, will eaſily perceive that the immediate ſenſe of them doth relate to an order of Prophets, which ſhou'd ſucceed *Moſes* among the *Jews*; between whom and *Moſes* there wou'd be a great ſimilitude as to their Birth, Calling, and Doctrine, tho' not a juſt equality, which is excluded, *Deut.* 34. 10, 11. and the chief reaſon why it is ſaid there that the other Prophets fell ſo much ſhort of *Moſes* is, in regard of the Signs and Wonders which he wrought, as is there largely expreſs'd. Nor may it ſeem ſtrange, that by a Prophet ſhou'd be underſtood an order or ſucceſſion of Prophets when it is acknowledg'd by moſt *Proteſtants*, that by ὁ Ἀντίχριστος, *the Antichriſt*, is underſtood a Rank and Succeſſion of ſeveral Perſons in the ſame name and function: And that it is to be underſtood in thoſe words concerning a ſucceſſion of Prophets, will appear by the occaſion of their being brought in; for ver. 14. God prohibits them to hearken after the manner of their Neighbour-nations, to Obſervers of times and Diviners, and then brings in the following words, *ver.* 15. as to the reaſon of that Prohibition, that *God would raiſe up a Prophet among themſelves like unto* Moſes, *and to him ſhould they hearken.* Now let any rational Man judge whether it were ſo probable an Argument to keep them from hearkening to Diviners of other Nations, that there ſhou'd be a Prophet ariſe 2000 years after like unto *Moſes*, as that he wou'd raiſe up a continued ſucceſſion of Prophets among themſelves, to whom they ſhou'd hearken. Thus *Origen* in his excellent Book againſt *Celſus*, ſhews the neceſſity of the Prophetical Office among the *Jews* from hence; *For*, ſaith he, *it being written in their Law that the Gentiles hearkened unto Oracles and Divinations; but God would not ſuffer it to be ſo among them, it preſently follows, A Prophet will the Lord God raiſe up in the midſt of thee*, &c. *Therefore*, ſaith he, *when the Nations round about them had their Oracles, and ſeveral ways of Divination, all which were ſtrictly prohibited among the* Jews, *if the* Jews *had no way of foreknowing things to come, it had been almoſt impoſſible, conſidering the great curioſity of humane nature, to have kept them from deſpiſing the Law of* Moſes, *or apoſtatizing to the heathen Oracles, or ſetting up ſomething like them among themſelves.* Which Interpretation of his ſeems to have a great deal of Reaſon, not only from the Coherence of the words here, but from the *Analogy* of many other Precepts of the Law of *Moſes*, which it is moſt certain have a reſpect to the cuſtoms of the Idolatrous Nations round about them. Another reaſon why it is moſt probable, that by this is underſtood a ſucceſſion of Prophets, is the charge which follows againſt falſe Prophets, and the Rules to diſcover them, *ver.* 20, 21, 22. which had not been ſo pertinent and coherent, if the oppoſition did not lie between the order of true Prophets among the *Jews*, and the falſe Prophets, which ſhou'd riſe up in the midſt of them.

V. Arabic. verſ. & Calv. in loc. P. Fagium, Pet. Mart. Loc. Com. Claſſ. 1. cap. 3. Sect. 12. Origin. con. Celſum, lib. 1. Deut. 18. 14.

And

And that which yet further justifies this Interpretation, is, that there is no other place in the whole *Pentateuch* which doth expresly speak of a succession of Prophets, if this be not understood of it; and is it any ways probable a matter of so great moment and consequence shou'd be wholly pretermitted? Especially when we find it so exactly perform'd in the succeeding Ages of the Jewish Commonwealth; their immediate Ruler like Dictators at *Rome*, after *Moses*'s death, being most rais'd up by immediate incitation and impulse from God, and many of them inspir'd with a Spirit of Prophecy. How shou'd the *Jews* have expected these, or obey'd them when they appear'd, had not God foretold it to them, and provided them for it by the Law of *Moses*.

II. Neither did these Prophets arise singly among them, like blazing Stars, one in an Age, to portend future Events, but whole Constellations of them sometimes united together; yea, so many smaller Prophets were sometimes united together, as made a perfect *Galaxy*, when they were entred into Societies, and became Schools of the Prophets; for such we frequently read of in Scripture. The Original and Institution of which may cast a further light into our present design, and shew us the little reason the *Jews* cou'd have to expect Miracles from them to confirm their Doctrine, who were brought up in the knowledge of their Law, and were call'd out of their several Societies into the prophetical office by the immediate incitation of God himself. Which being so commonly known among them, there needed no such extraordinary proofs to manifest the Divine Authority by which they were employ'd. Two things then we shall endeavour to clear: *First*, The Original and Institution of these Schools of the Prophets; and *Secondly*, That it was the ordinary course for the Prophets by employments to be taken forth of these Societies wherein they were educated. *First*, for the Original and Institution of these Schools of the Prophets. The first Seminaries, or places of Institution among the *Jews*, were the Cities of the *Levites*, which were dispersed up and down in the several Tribes of *Israel*; God thereby turning that into a Blessing, which Gen. 49.7. was pronounc'd as a curse upon *Levi* by his Father *Jacob*, viz. *that he should be divided in* Jacob, *and scattered in* Israel. But tho' the fulfilling of that Prophecy might be the primary ground of that scattering, yet it is evident that God aim'd at some further good in it, both in reference to the *Levites* and the *Israelites*. *Lyra* undertakes to assign four Josh. 21. reasons of this Distribution of the Cities of the *Levites* among the Tribes. (1) Because if they had liv'd but in one Tribe, the Worship of God wou'd have seem'd to have been confin'd to that Tribe. (2.) Because they wou'd have been a burden to that Tribe they had their habitations in. (3.) From the equity of being maintain'd by all who serv'd for all. (4.) Because it was their office to teach the People, and therefore it was necessary they shou'd live among them. These Reasons are *Abulensis in Josh. 21. c. 7 & 8.* most of them oppos'd by *Abulensis*, but defended by others. The last is that which most insist on, it being the peculiar office of the *Levites* to *V. Sherlog. Antiq. Hebraic. l. 2. c. 3. s. 4.* teach the People; so 2 *Chron.* 35. 4. *And said unto the Levites, qui erudiebant omnem Israelem*, as *Vatablus* renders it, *who taught all Israel*; and *Masius* insists on that as the great reason of their dispersion, to be *Masius in Josh. c. 14.* ready to teach the Law among the *Israelites*. But yet all those who are agreed that Teaching the Law was the Duty of the *Levites*, are not yet agreed of the manner of that Teaching; for there being two parts of their Law, the one Ceremonial and Judicial, and the other Moral and Spiritual,

Spiritual, the Queſtion is, Whether of theſe two did belong to, or was perform'd by the *Prieſts* and *Levites*. There are many who underſtand all that Office of Teaching, which belong'd to the *Prieſts* and *Levites* to be merely concerning the Ceremonial Law, *i. e.* deciding all Caſes and Controverſies which ſhou'd ariſe concerning their Ceremonial Worſhip, which in *Levit.* 10. 10. is call'd *putting a difference between holy and unholy, and between clean and unclean.* But it ſeems ſomewhat ſtrange that God ſhou'd take ſo great care about the Shell and Outſide of his Worſhip, and none at all for the Moral and Spiritual part of it, eſpecially when he had ſet apart a whole Tribe merely for his own ſervice, and freed them from all other employments, that they might have a greater liberty to attend upon the things relating to his ſervice; eſpecially when it is mention'd as the Duty of the *Prieſts* and *Levites*, *to teach all the ſtatutes which the Lord had ſpoken to them by the hand of* Moſes, and that *they ſhall teach* Jacob *thy ſtatutes, and* Iſrael *thy law.* Which notwithſtanding what *Abarbinel* and others ſay, muſt certainly comprehend as well the Moral as the Ceremonial part of *Moſes* his Law. And the *Prieſts lips are ſaid to preſerve knowledge: and God ſaith they ſhould ſeek the law at his mouth; for he is the meſſenger of the Lord of Hoſts.* Do theſe things import no more than mere deciding the caſes of the Ceremonial Law? But whatever God's intention in the inſtitution of the *Levites* was, we find not much in Scripture of what they did for the promoting the Moral and Spiritual part of Divine Worſhip; but it is no news to hear that Societies inſtituted for good and pious ends, ſhou'd degenerate from the firſt intention of the Founders of them; and thus it is probable it was with the *Levites*, who finding the moſt of their benefit and advantage to come in by the Ceremonial Caſes, might grow more negligent of the Moral part of Divine Service, which brought no ſecular emolument to them.

Lev. 10. 10. Deut. 33. 10. Mal. 2. 7.

III. And thence we read not of theſe Schools of the Prophets, which were Societies in order to Spiritual Inſtruction, till about the time of *Samuel*; and many think him to have been the firſt Author of them. For it is evident, that about his time the Prieſthood was grown to a great degeneracy, and Men thereby eſtranged from the Worſhip of God, ſo that there ſeem'd almoſt a neceſſity then of reſtoring ſome Societies, who might have a ſpecial eye to the Spiritual part of God's Worſhip and Service. The occaſion of the Inſtitution of them, ſeems to have been from the reſort which the People had to the high places for ſacrificing, during the captivity or uncertain abode of the *Ark of God*, after the deſolation of *Shiloh*: now the People reſorting to theſe places to perform their Solemnities, it was ſo ordered, that a company of Prophets ſhou'd be there preſent to *bleſs the Sacrifices*, and inſtruct the People. Two of theſe places with the Societies in them we find mention'd in the time of *Samuel*. The *firſt* mention'd 1 *Sam.* 10. 5, 10. which cannot be *Ramah*, altho' the *Syriac* and *Arabic* Verſions ſo render it. For *Samuel* had his own reſidence in *Ramah* whither *Saul* went to him, 1 *Sam.* 9. 18, 19. but in this Chapter we find *Samuel* ſending *Saul* on a journey from him beyond *Bethel*, and the plain of *Tabor*, and there tells him he ſhou'd meet with the *company of the Prophets upon the hill of God*, ver. 5. Some think it was called the *Hill of God*, becauſe of its height, as *the Cedars of God*, and *the Mountains of God for the higheſt*; ſo *Tirinus* underſtands it, but *Menochius* far more probably, *quia in ea erat cœtus & veluti ſchola prophetarum.* The *Chaldee* Paraphraſt renders it, *ad collem*

1 Sam. 3. 1. 1 Sam. 9. 12, 13. 1 Sam. 7. 1.

collem in quo arca Domini. *R. Solomon* makes the Hill to be *Kirjah-jearim*, and therefore call'd *the hill of God*; because the *Ark* was there in the *house of* Abinadab *in the hill.* But *Lyra* thinks he hath prov'd, that before this time the *Ark* was remov'd from *Kirjah-jearim* to *Mizpah*; but *Abulensis* more probably conceives it was never remov'd thither, and thinks this hill of God to be no other than *Gibeah* of *Benjamin*, where *Saul* inhabited; and thence the wonder was the greater, to see him prophesie among those who had known his former life and education. The other place is *Naioth* in *Ramah*, where was a *high place*, whither the People came to sacrifice; this *Ramah* seems to have been the place of *Samuel's* nativity, call'd *Ramathaim Sophim*, which the *Syriac* version renders *collis specularum* (some who wou'd be ready to improve every thing for their purpose, wou'd think it was so call'd in allusion to the imployment of the young Students there. So *Heinsius* conceives שרה צפים to be understood, *Numb.* 23. 14. the place of *Watchmen*, from which word saith he, without doubt, the *Greeks* deriv'd their σοφοὶ, who were wont in such high places to observe the course and motions of the Heavens; But to pass by such frivolous conjectures.) It seems a great deal more probable, that this *Ramah* which the *Septuagint* by a light mutation of the initial letters, calls ἀρμαθαὶμ, was the same with *Arimathea*, the Town of *Joseph* mention'd in the Gospel. But the place where the School of the Prophets was, seems to have been, with greatest conveniency, for a place of Education, at some distance from the Town. *Vatablus* conceives it was built in the fields of *Ramah*, and the word *Naioth*, saith *Pet. Martyr*, properly signifies *pastures*, and some *remote places quæ fere sunt studiis aptissima.* The *Chaldee* Paraphrast renders *Naioth* by כית אולבנא, *a College or School of prophetical Education:* Over this College *Samuel* himself was President, as most understand that place, 1 *Sam.* 19. 20. *And when they saw the company of Prophets prophesying, and* Samuel *standing as appointed over them*; *Jonathan* renders it, *Et Samuelem stantem docentem super eos.* To which we may well apply the words of *Philo*, speaking of the *Jewish* manner of Instruction, τοῦ μὲν ἡγεμόνος ὑφηγουμένου καὶ διδάσκοντος, τῶν δὲ ἐπιδιδόντων εἰς καλοκαγαθίαν καὶ βελτιουμένων τάτε ἔθη καὶ τὸν βίον· *The President going before and teaching, the rest increasing in goodness, and improving in life and manners:*

Vid. Jun. in loc.

1 Sam. 19. 18, 20.

1 Sam. 1. 1.

Heins. Exercit. Sacræ l. 1. c. 2.

Phil. Jud. de. v. Mos. l. 3.

IV. Neither can we think so good and useful an Institution shou'd presently degenerate, or be turned into another Chanel; and therefore some conceive that the most noted Prophets to the time of *David* were the Presidents of these Colleges; such as besides *Samuel* were *Helcana*, *Gad*, *Nathan*, *Heman*, and *Jeduthun*; and that they selected out the choicest and most hopeful of the young *Levites*, and here educated them, together with the *Nazarites* which came out of other Tribes. And it seems very probable, that in all the most noted high places whither they went to sacrifice, there were such Schools erected after the first Institution of them. Thence we read of such multitudes of the Prophets together, in the time of *Ahab*, 1 *Kings* 18. 4. for when *Jezabel* cut off the Prophets of the Lord, *Obadiah took an hundred, and hid them in caves*; and certainly their number was very great, when an hundred might be sav'd without missing. The chief places where they resided, seem to have been *Bethel*, 2 *Kings* 2. 3. and *Jericho*, which was a large College; for therein we read of *fifty sons of the Prophets standing together out of their number*, 2 Kings 2. 5, 7, 15. and *Gilgal*, which

which had been *a place of Religion* from the first entrance into *Canaan*; there we find *the sons of the Prophets sitting before Elisha*, 2 Kings 4. 38. It seems most probable that the purity of God's Worship among the ten Tribes after the defection in the time of *Jeroboam* was preserv'd by the Prophets in their *several Schools and places of habitation*; which hath sufficient foundation in that place, 2 *Kings* 4. 23. where the *Shunamite*'s husband asks her, *Wherefore she would go to the man of God that day, seeing it was neither new-moon nor Sabbath.* Whereby it is both evident, that the Prophets did undertake the office of instructing the People on their solemn Festivals, and that it was their custom to resort to them for that end. Thus we see what care God took for the instruction of his People, in a time of so general an Apostasie as that of the ten Tribes was, when the Church of God cou'd not be known by that constant Visibility and outward Glory, which some speak so much of, but was then clouded in obscurity, and shrouded it self under the Mantles of some Prophets which God continued among them, and that not by any lineal succession neither, tho' the *Jews* wou'd fain make the gift of Prophecy to be a kind of *Cabbala* too, and convey'd in a constant succession from one Prophet to another. Neither were these Schools of the Prophets only in *Israel*, but in *Judah* likewise was God known, and his Name was great among these Schools there. In *Jerusalem* it self there was a College where *Huldah* the Propheteſs liv'd, 2 *Kings* 22. 14. some render *Mishna in secunda urbis parte*; for *Jerusalem* was divided into the Upper and Nether part of the City. *Abulensis* and *Lyra* will have it refer to the three Walls of the City in which the three chief parts of it were compriz'd; in the *first*, the Temple and the King's Palace; in the *second*, the Nobles and the Prophets Houses; and in the *third*, the common People. *Josephus* seems to favour the division of the City into three parts; but *Pineda* thinks the *second* part of the City was most inhabited by Artificers, and that the Prophets, and the Wise Men, and such as frequented the Temple most, dwelt in the City of *David* within the first Wall; and therefore he conjectures that the College was upon Mount *Sion*, (and so properly call'd *Sion* College) and he explains that *House*, which *Wisdom is said to have built, and hewn out her seven pillars*, Prov. 9. 1. by this College, which he supposeth was built by *Solomon* in Mount *Sion*, and thence *ver.* 3. *she is said to cry upon the highest places of the City.* Thus much may serve concerning the Original and Institution of these Schools of the Prophets.

V. Manass. Ben Israel. Concil. in Exod. 9. 35.

Joseph. de bell. Jud. l. 6. *c.* 6. *Pineda de reb. Solom. l.* 3. *c.* 28.

I now come to the *Second* thing promis'd concerning the Schools of the Prophets, which is, *That it was God's ordinary Method to call those persons out of these Schools, whom he did employ in the discharge of the Prophetical Office.* Two things will be necessary for the clearing of this: *First*, What Tendency their Education in those Schools had towards the fitting them for their Prophetical Office. *Secondly*, What Evidence the Scripture gives us that God called the Prophets out from these Colleges. The *first* of these is very requisite to be clear'd, because the Prophetical Office depending upon immediate Inspiration, it is hard to conceive what influence any antecedent and preparatory dispositions can have upon receiving the Prophetical Spirit. It is commonly known how much the generality of *Jewish* Writers do insist on the necessity of these qualifications antecedent to a Spirit of Prophecy. 1. An excellent Natural Temper. 2. Good Accomplishments both of Wit and Fortunes. 3. Separation from the World. 4. Congruity of place V.

which they make proper to *Judæa.*) 5. Opportunity of time. 6. And Divine Inſpiration. Theſe are ſo largely diſcours'd of by many Learned Men from *Jewiſh* Writers, that it will be both tedious and impertinent to recite much of their Opinions concerning them: who, ſince they have loſt the gift of Prophecy, ſeem to have loſt too that Wiſdom and Natural Underſtanding, which they make one of the moſt neceſſary qualifications of a Prophet. It is not eaſy to imagine what ſubſerviency Riches cou'd have to a prophetical Spirit, unleſs the *Jews* be of *Simon Magus* his Opinion, that theſe gifts of the Holy Ghoſt may be purchas'd with Money; and if ſo, they think themſelves in as likely a way to bid fair for a Prophetical Spirit, as any People in the World. Or is it that they think it impoſſible any without them ſhou'd have that free, cheerful and generous Spirit, which they make ſo neceſſary to a Prophetic Spirit, that it is an Axiome of great Authority with them, *Spiritus ſanctus non reſidet ſuper hominem mœſtum*: and they think *Eliſha* his fit of paſſion did excuſs his Prophetic Spirit from him, which he was fain to retrieve again with a fit of Muſic. There are only two ſorts of thoſe antecedent diſpoſitions which ſeem to bear any affinity with the Prophetic Spirit: And thoſe are ſuch as tended to the improvement of their Natural Faculties, and ſuch as tended to their advancement in piety, and conſequently to the ſubduing all irregular motions in their Souls: Not that either of theſe did concur by way of efficiency to the production of a Spirit of Prophecy (which is an opinion *Maimonides* ſeems very favourable to) but that God might make choice particularly of ſuch perſons, to remove all prejudices againſt them in thoſe they were ſent unto. For nothing cou'd poſſibly diſſatisfy them more concerning Divine Inſpiration, than if the perſon who pretended to it were of very weak and ſhallow intellectuals, or known to be of an irregular converſation. In order therefore to the fuller ſatisfaction of Men concerning theſe two qualifications, this Inſtitution of them in the Schools of the Prophets was of great ſubſerviency, becauſe therein their only Employment was to improve in knowledge, and eſpecially in true piety. This latter being the moſt neceſſary diſpoſition, ſince the Apoſtle hath told us that the Prophets were *Holy men, who ſpake as they were moved by the Holy Ghoſt.* And in order to this, the greateſt part we can find of the exerciſes of thoſe who were educated in theſe Schools of the Prophets, were Inſtructions in the Law, and the ſolemn celebration of the praiſes of God: Which appears in Scripture to have been their chief employment as Prophets, and by which they are ſaid to propheſie: So at *Gibeah* at the Oratory there, *we find a company of Prophets coming down from the high place with a Pſaltery, a Tabret and Pipe, and a Harp before them, and propheſying.*

V. G. Vor. in Maim. in lam. leg. c. 7. Sect. 1. Mr. Smith of Prophecy, c. 8.

Maimon. More Nev. l. 2. c. 36.

2 Pet 1.21.

1 Sam. 10. 5.

VI. It may ſeem ſomewhat ſtrange to conſider what relation theſe Muſical Inſtruments had to the propheſying here mention'd. Are Muſical Notes like ſome Seeds Naturaliſts ſpeak of, which will help to excite a prophetic Spirit? Or do they tend to elevate the Spirits of Men and ſo put them into a greater capacity of *Enthuſiaſm?* Or is it becauſe Muſic is ſo excellent for allaying the tumults of inward paſſions; and ſo fitting the Soul for the better entertainment of the Divine Spirit? Or was all this propheſying here ſpoken of nothing elſe but Vocal and Inſtrumental Muſic? So ſome indeed underſtand it, that it was only the praiſing God with Spiritual Songs and Melody; wherein one as the *Præcentor* began a Hymn, which the reſt took from him and carry'd on. I confeſs it car-

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ries the faireſt probability with it, that this propheſying with Muſical Inſtruments was at their places and times of ſacrifice, an adjunct, if not a part of the ſolemn ſervice of God: which was manag'd chiefly by the Choire of the Sons of the Prophets which were reſident there, and were train'd up in all exerciſes of piety and devotion. But yet I cannot ſee any reaſon to think that all this propheſying was merely ſinging of Hymns, and playing upon their Muſical Inſtruments to them, as ſome imagine, becauſe there ſeems to be implied ſome immediate impulſes of a prophetic Spirit, by what *Samuel* ſaid to *Saul*, that when he came among the Prophets, *the Spirit of the Lord would come upon him, and he ſhould propheſy with them, and be ſhould become another man.* What ſtrange impulſe and wonderful transformation was this merely for *Saul* to joyn with the Prophets in their praiſes of God? And this needed not ſo much admiration as follow'd there upon this action of *Saul*'s, that it ſhou'd become a Proverb, *Is* Saul *alſo among the Prophets?* Certainly *Saul* was a very great hater of all ſpiritual Muſic before, if it became a Proverb merely for his being preſent at, or joyning with this company in ſinging their Hymns. Therefore others think that thoſe who are ſaid particularly to propheſy at theſe Muſic meetings, were ſome perſons as chief among the reſt, who having their ſpirits elevated by the Muſic, did compoſe Hymns upon the place by a Divine Energy inwardly moving their Minds. So that there were properly Divine Raptures in ſome of them, which tranſported them beyond the ordinary power of Fancy or Imagination, in dictating ſuch Hymns as might be ſuitable for the deſign of celebrating the honour of God.

1. Sam. 10. 6.

1 Sam. 10. 12.

VII. Neither may it ſeem ſtrange that ſuch an *Enthuſiaſtic* Spirit ſhou'd ſeize on them only at ſuch ſolemn times, ſince we read in the New Teſtament of a like exerciſe of ſuch gifts in the Church of *Corinth*, 1 *Cor.* 14. 26. where we ſee in *coming together every one had a Pſalm, a Doctrine, a Tongue, a Revelation*, &c. Whereby it appears that they were inſpir'd upon the place; *etiam extemporales Hymni ſæpe ab afflatu erant*, as *Grotius* there obſerves; as we ſee it in frequent inſtances in Scripture, of *Simeon* and *Anna*, *Moſes* and *Miriam*, *Deborah* and *Iſaiah*; and in the Chriſtian Church after that Land-flood of Inſpired Gifts was much abated in the Church, they kept up a cuſtom much like to theſe *extemporal* Hymns, as appears evidently by *Tertullian*, *poſt aquam manualem & lumina ut quiſque de Scripturis ſanctis vel de proprio ingenio poteſt, provocatur in medium Deo canere:* After they had ended their Love-Feaſts, they begun their Hymns, which were either taken from the Scriptures, or of their own compoſition. Which *Pliny* takes notice of as a great part of the Chriſtian worſhip, that they did *ſecum invicem carmen Chriſto quaſi Deo dicere, they joyned in ſinging hymns to Chriſt as God.* Nay, we find ſomething very parallel to this preſerv'd among the ruins of the Heathen worſhip; ſuch were the *Aſſamenta* among the old *Romans*, which were peculiarly ſung to the honour of ſome particular God; thence the *Aſſamenta Janualia*, *Junonia*, *Minervia*, which were *privata poemata & carmina in ſingulos eos Deos conſcripta*, as the learned *Joſeph Scaliger* obſerves. So likewiſe the *Greeks* had their ſolemn Hymns to their Gods, ſome to the propitious Gods, which they call'd κλητοὺς ὕμνους, and the *Latins* properly *Indigitamenta*, and *Carmen calatorium*; others they had to their *Vejoves*, or *Læva lumina*, which they call'd ὃ μνους ἀποτροπαίους the *Latins*, *Carmen Averruncale*; but beſides theſe, they had ſome peculiar to the ſeveral Deities, as ὁ ὕπτιος to *Diana*, Παιᾶν to *Apollo*, Ἰὴ Ἰὴ

Tertull. Apol. c. 39.

Plin. Ep. l. 10. Ep. 97.

Scal. conj. in Varr. p. 121.

to *Ceres*, *Dithyrambus* to *Bacchus*, *Adonidia* to *Adonis*, as *Proclus* tells us in his *Chreſtomathia*. And it is withal evident, that the Heathens thought ſome of their Prieſts inſpired while they were performing theſe ſolemn Devotions to the Gods (which probably was by *Satan*, as many other things in Heathen worſhip, taken up in imitation of theſe inſpired Hymns, and Muſic us'd by the Sons of the Prophets) but their Hymns were ſo compos'd, as to be fit rather to tranſport Men beyond the power of their reaſon, than to compoſe and ſweeten it, which was ſuitable to the fanatic *Enthuſiaſm*, which was ſo common among them. So *Proclus* tells us that the *Io-Bacche* was βεβαπτισμένον πολλῷ ϕρυάγματι, *full of noiſe* and *din*; and the *Dithyrambus* was κεκινημένον ἐν πολλῷ τῷ ἐνθουσιώδει, μετ' ὀρχήσεως ἐμϕάσεων, *a kind of extatic Morice-dance*, and their Prieſts were apprehended by them to be under a real *Enthuſiaſm*, at theſe ſolemnities. So the *Corybantes* are deſcrib'd rather like mad Men than mere *Enthuſiaſts* by *Strabo*; they were ἐνθουσιαστικοί τινες ἐν Βακχικοῖ, as he deſcribes them, *dancing about with their cymbals and drums, and arms and pipes*; (as tho' a *Bedlam* had been broke looſe among them) yet this was in high eſteem among them; for, as *Strabo* after ſaith, ὅ τε ἐνθουσιασμὸς ἐπινευσίν τινα θείαν ἔχειν δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μαντικῷ γένει πλησιάζειν, *this Enthuſiaſm ſeemed to have a Divine touch with it, and to come very near to a prophetic ſpirit.*

Proclus ap. Phot. Bibl. Cod. 239.

Strabo l. 10.

But tho' the propheſying with Muſic among the Sons of the Prophets, might be by ſome *Extemporary* Hymns immediately dictated by the *Præcentor* of the Chorus; yet we are not to imagine any ſuch frantic actions among them as were among the *Curetes* and *Corybantes*, it being always the Devil's temper to over-do, when he ſtrives to imitate, and inſtead of ſolemn and ſet devotions, to carry Men beyond all ſenſe and reaſon. The Spirit of God did never dictate any *Io-Bacche*'s or *Dithyrambs* to tranſport and amuſe the ſpirits of Men; but thoſe ſweet Airs which both compoſe and elevate the ſpirits of all that heard them. For in probability the ſpirits of all theſe Prophets were as Lutes tun'd to the ſame height, that when the Spirit of God did ſtrike upon one of them, the reſt preſently anſwer'd to it, and ſo made up an entire Conſort among them. So *Menochius* thinks the Spirit of God not only moved the ſpirit of him who was the *Præcentor*, but the reſt likewiſe who joyn'd with him; and they are ſaid to prophecy, ſaith *Torniellus*, *forte quod non quaſcunque ſed Propheticas duntaxat cantiones præcinerent*; but from hence we clearly ſee what the great Employment was in theſe Schools of the Prophets, which, as the ſame Author expreſſeth it was *ſtatis horis de rebus divinis differere, & divinis laudibus vacare*; and thereby we underſtand what reference this Inſtitution had in order to the prophetical Office, becauſe the Spirit of God did much appear among them, and all their Exerciſes tended to piety, and ſo did remove all prejudices from their perſons, when God did ſend them abroad afterwards.

Torniellii Annal. ad An. Mun. 2945. *Sect.* 14.

VIII. And ſo it is evident he frequently did, not to ſay always, for that were to put too great a reſtraint upon the boundleſs Spirit of God: For ſometimes, as will appear afterwards, God ſent the Prophets upon extraordinary meſſages, and then furniſh'd them with ſufficient Evidence of their Divine Commiſſion, without being beholding to the Teſtimonials of the Schools of the Prophets. But beſides theſe, God had a kind of Leiger-Prophets among his People; ſuch were the moſt of thoſe whom we read of in Scripture, which were no Pen-men of the ſacred Scripture; ſuch

ſuch in *David*'s time we may conceive *Gad* and *Nathan*, and afterwards we read of many other Prophets and Seers among them, to whom the People made their reſort: Now theſe in probability were ſuch as had been train'd up in the prophetic Schools, wherein the Spirit of God did appear, but in a more fixed and ſettled way than in the extraordinary Prophets, whom God did call out on ſome more ſignal occaſions, ſuch as *Iſaiah* and *Jeremiah* were. We have a clear foundation for ſuch a diſtinction of Prophets in thoſe words of *Amos* to *Amaziah*, Amos 7. 14. 15. *I was no Prophet, neither was I a Prophets ſon; but I was a herdſman, and a gatherer of ſycamore fruits: And the Lord took me as I followed the flock; and the Lord ſaid unto me, Go propheſy to my people* Iſrael. Some underſtand the firſt words, *I was no Prophet*, that he was not born a Prophet, as *Jeremiah* was, not deſign'd and ſet apart to it from his Mother's womb; but I rather think by his not being a Prophet, he means he was none of thoſe reſident Prophets in the Colleges or Schools of them, not any of thoſe who had led a prophetic life, and withdrawn themſelves from converſe with the world; nor *was I* (ſaith he) *the ſon of a Prophet, i. e.* not brought up in Diſcipleſhip under thoſe Prophets, and thereby train'd up in order to the prophetic function. *Non didici inter diſcipulos Prophetarum*, as *Pellican* renders it; *nec inſtitutione qua filii Prophetarum quaſi ad donum Prophetiæ à parentibus præparabantur*, ſaith *Eſtius*. *Non à puero educatus in Scholis Propheticis*; ſo *Calvin* and moſt other modern Interpreters underſtand it, as well as *Abarbinel* and the Jewiſh Writers. Whereby it is evident that God's ordinary way for the Prophets, was to take ſuch as had been train'd up and educated in order to that end, altho' God did not tie up himſelf to this method, but ſometimes call'd one from the Court, as he did *Iſaiah*; ſometimes one from the herds, as here he did *Amos*, and bid them *go propheſy to the houſe of* Iſrael. There was then a kind of ſtanding College of Prophets among the *Iſraelites*, who ſhined as fixed Stars in the firmament; and there were others who had a moſt planetary motion, and withal a more lively and reſplendent Illumination from the fountain of prophetic Light. And further it ſeems that the Spirit of Prophecy did not ordinarily ſeize on any, but ſuch whoſe Inſtitution was in order to that end, by the great admiration which was caus'd among the People at *Saul*'s ſo ſudden propheſying, that it became a Proverb, *Is* Saul *alſo among the Prophets?* which had not given the leaſt foundation for an Adage for a ſtrange and unwonted thing, unleſs the moſt common appearances of the Spirit of Prophecy had been among thoſe who were trained up in order to it. Thus I ſuppoſe we have fully cleared the firſt reaſon why there was no neceſſity for the ordinary Prophets, whoſe chief office was inſtruction of the People, to prove their commiſſion by Miracles, becauſe God had promis'd a ſucceſſion of Prophets by *Moſes*, and theſe were brought up ordinarily to that end among them; ſo that all prejudices were ſufficiently remov'd from their perſons without any ſuch extraordinary power as that of Miracles.

1 Sam. 10. 12, 19, 24.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

The tryal of the Prophetical Doctrine.

I. *Rules of trying Prophets eſtabliſhed in the Law of* Moſes. II. *The puniſhment of pretenders. The ſeveral ſorts of falſe Prophets. The caſe of the Prophet at* Bethel *diſcuſſed.* III. *The tryal of falſe Prophets belonging to the great Sanhedrin.* IV. *The particular rules whereby the doctrine of Prophets was judged. The proper notion of a Prophet, not foretelling future contingencies, but having immediate divine Revelation.* V. *Several Principles laid down for clearing the doctrine of the Prophets.* 1. *That immediate dictates of natural light are not to be the meaſure of divine Revelation. Several grounds for divine Revelation from natural light.* VI. 2. *Whatever is directly repugnant to the dictates of nature, cannot be of divine Revelation.* VII. 3. *No divine Revelation doth contradict a divine poſitive Law without ſufficient evidence of God's intention to repeal that Law.* VIII. 4. *Divine Revelation in the Prophets, was not to be meaſured by the words of the Law, but by the intention and reaſon of it. The prophetical office a kind of chancery to the Law of* Moſes.

I. THE ſecond Reaſon why thoſe Prophets whoſe main office was inſtruction of the People, or merely foretelling future events, needed not to confirm their Doctrine by Miracles, is, becauſe they had certain rules of tryal by their Law whereby to diſcern the falſe Prophets from the true. So that if they were deceiv'd by them, it was their own oſcitancy and inadvertency which was the cauſe of it. God in that *Law* which was confirm'd by Miracles undoubtedly divine, had eſtabliſh'd a Court of tryal for prophetic Spirits, and given ſuch certain Rules of procedure in it, that no Men needed to be deceiv'd, unleſs they wou'd themſelves. And there was a greater neceſſity of ſuch a certain way of tryal among them, becauſe it could not otherwiſe be expected but in a Nation where a prophetic Spirit was ſo common, there wou'd be very many pretenders to it, who might much endanger the Faith of the People, unleſs there were ſome certain way to find them out. And the more effectually to deter Men either from counterfeiting a prophetic Spirit, or from hearkning to ſuch as did, God appointed a ſevere puniſhment for every ſuch pretender, *viz.* upon legal conviction, that he be puniſhed with death. Deut. 18. 20. *But the Prophet which ſhall preſume to ſpeak a word in my name which I have not commanded him to ſpeak, or that ſhall ſpeak in the name of other Gods, ſhall ſurely die,* The *Jews* generally underſtand this of ſtrangling, as they do always in the Law, when the particular manner of death is not expreſſed. And therein a falſe Prophet and a Seducer were diſtinguiſhed each from other, that a mere Seducer was to be ſtoned to death under ſufficient teſtimony, *Deut.* 13. 6, 10. But the falſe Prophet is there ſaid in general only to be put to death,

V. Maimon. de Idol. c. 5. ſ. 1. & ib Voſſium.

death, *Deut.* 13. 1, 5. The main difference between the Seducer and falſe prophet was, that the Seducer ſought by cunning perſuaſions and plauſible arguments, to draw them off from the worſhip of the true God; but the falſe Prophet always pretended divine revelation for what he perſuaded them to, whether he gave out that he had that Revelation from the true God, or from Idols and falſe Gods. So that the mere pretence to divine Revelation was that which God wou'd have puniſhed with ſo great ſeverity.

II. The *Jews* tell us of three ſorts of Prophets who were to be puniſhed with death by Men, and three other ſorts who were reſerved to divine puniſhment: Of the firſt rank were theſe; 1. He that propheſied that which he had not heard, and for this they inſtance in *Zedekiah* the ſon of *Chenaanah*, who made him horns of iron, and ſaid, *Thus ſaith the Lord*, this was the Lying Prophet. 2. He that ſpeaks that which was revealed not unto him, but to another, and for this they inſtance in *Hananiah* the ſon of *Azur*, (but how truly I ſhall not determine) this was the Plagiary Prophet. 3. He that propheſied in the name of an Idol, as the Prophets of *Baal* did, this was the Idol Prophet. Theſe three, when once fully convicted, were to be put to death. The other rank of thoſe which were left to God's hand conſiſted of theſe; 1. He that ſtifles and ſmothers his own prophecy, as *Jonas* did, by which it may ſeem that when the Divine Spirit did overſhadow the Underſtanding of the Prophets, yet it offered no violence to their Faculties, but left them to the free determination of their own Wills in the execution of their Office; but this muſt be underſtood of a lower degree of Prophecy for at ſome times their Prophecies were *as fire in their bones*, that they were never at any reſt till they had diſcharged their Office. But withal by the example of *Jonas*, we ſee, that tho' the Spirit of Prophecy, like the Fire, on the Altar, cou'd only be kindled from Heaven, yet it might be deſtroyed when it was not maintained with ſomething to feed upon; or when it met not with ſuitable entertainment from the Spirits of thoſe it fell upon, it might retreat back again to Heaven, or at leaſt lie hid in the embers, till a new blaſt from the Spirit of God doth ἀναζωπυρεῖν, *retrieve* it into its former *heat* and *activity*. Thus it was with *Jonas*. 2. The other was, He that deſpiſed the words of a true Prophet; of ſuch God, ſaith, *Deut.* 18. 19. *And it ſhall come to paſs, that whoſoever will not hearken to my words which ye ſhall ſpeak in my name, I will require it of him.* Which *Maimonides* explains by מיתה בידי שמים, *death by the hands of God*, which he thus diſtinguiſheth from the *Cereth*, that he makes the death *per manus cœli*, to be leſs than the *Cereth*, becauſe this latter continued in the Soul after death, but the other was expiated by death; but generally they interpret it of a ſudden death, which falls upon the perſon. 3. The laſt is, He who hearkens not to the words of his own Prophecy; of which we have a moſt remarkable inſtance in Scripture concerning the Prophet whom God ſent to *Bethel* (whom *Tertullian* calls *Sameas*, the *Jews*, *Hedua*) whom God deſtroy'd in an unuſual manner for not obſerving the command which God had given him, *not to eat bread nor drink water at* Bethel, *nor turn again by the way he came.* Neither was it any excuſe to this Prophet, that the old Prophet at *Bethel told him that an Angel ſpake unto him by the word of the Lord that he ſhould turn back.* For, 1. Thoſe whom God reveals his will unto, he gives them full aſſurance of it, in that they have a clear and diſtinct perception of God upon their own Minds; and ſo they have no doubt,

V. Except. Gem. San. hedr. c. 10. f. 3.

1 King. 22. 11.

Jer 28. 11.

Jer. 20. 9.

Maim. de fundam. legis, c. 9. ſ. 4. V. Abarbinel de Cereth. apud Buxtorf. de ſponſ. & divort. p. 182.

1 King 13. 9. Ver. 18.

doubt, but it is the Word of the Lord which comes unto them; but this Prophet cou'd have no such certainty of the Divine Revelation which was made to another, especially when it came immediately to contradict that which was so specially enjoyn'd him. 2. Where God commands a Prophet to do any thing in the pursuit of his Message, there he can have no ground to question whether God shou'd countermand it or no by another Prophet; because that was in effect to thwart the whole design of his Message. So it was in this action of the Prophet; for God intended his not eating and drinking in *Bethel* to testify how much he loathed and abominated that place since its being polluted with Idolatry. 3. He might have just cause to question the integrity of the old Prophet, both because of his living in *Bethel*, and not openly, according to his office, reproving their Idolatry, and that God shou'd send him out of *Judæa* upon that very errand, which wou'd not have seem'd so probable, if there had been true Prophets resident upon the place. 4. The thing he desired him to do, was not an act of that weight and importance, on which God us'd to send his Word to any Prophets, much less by one Prophet to contradict what he had said by another; and therefore *Tertullian* saith of him, *pœnam deserti jejunii luit*, God punish'd him for breaking his fast at *Bethel*; and therefore that Message of this Prophet seem'd to gratify more Man's carnal appetite, than usually the actions of Prophets did, which were most times matters of hardship and uneasiness to the flesh. 5. However all these were, yet he yielded too soon, especially having so much reason on his side as he had; being well assured that God had commanded him, he had reason to see some clear Evidence of a countermand, before he altered his mind: if he had seen any thing upon tryal which might have staggered his faith, he ought to have made his immediate recourse to God by Prayer for the settlement of his mind, and removal of this great temptation. But so easily to hearken to the words of a lying Prophet, which contradicted his own Message, argued either great Unbelief as to his own Commission, or too great Easiness and Inadvertency in being drawn aside by the old Prophet. And therefore God made that old Prophet himself in the midst of his entertainment, as with a *Hand-writing against the wall*, to tell him *he was weighed in the balance*, and *found too light*; and therefore his Life shou'd be taken from him. Thus we see how dangerous a thing it was either to counterfeit a Spirit of Prophecy, or to hearken to those who did.

Tertullian. de jejuniis, cap. 16.

III. It is the generally received opinion among the Jewish Doctors, that the cognizance and tryal of false Prophets did peculiarly belong to the great *Sanhedrin*. And that this was one end of its Institution. So *Maimonides* after he has largely discoursed of the punishment of a Seducer, and speaking of that of a false Prophet, he lays this down as a standing Rule among them, אין נביא חשקר אלא בבר של עא *No false Prophet was to be judged but in the Court of Seventy one*; which was the number of the great *Sanhedrin*. And there is something looks very like this in the proceedings of the People of *Israel* against the Prophet *Jeremiah*; for the People, the Priests and the Prophets, they laid hold on him; and immediately after we read that the Princes of *Judah* (by whom *Grotius* understands the *Senators* of the great *Sanhedrin*) *they came up from the King's house to the house of the Lord, and sat down in the entry of the new gate of the Lord's house*; which probably was the place where the great *Sanhedrin* sat) where after a particular Examination of *Jeremiah*,

Maimon. de Idolol at. c. 5. f. 11.

Jer. 26. 8.

Ver. 10.

V. Grot. in loc. & Seld. de Syn. l. 2. c. 15. f. 4. & l. 3. c. 6. f. 4.

Jer. 26. 16.

Jer. 3. 6.

ah, they acquit him as a *person not worthy to die* upon a counterfeiting Prophecy, but declare *that he spake unto them in the name of the Lord.* And in this sense *Grotius* likewise understands what is said of *Zedekiah* concerning *Jeremiah* to the Princes of *Judah* afterwards, *Behold he is in your hand; for the King is not he that can do ought against you*; *i. e.* saith *Grotius*, *In manibus Synedrii cujus est judicare de Propheta vero aut falso.* And to this many make those words of our Saviour refer, *That it is impossible a Prophet should perish out of* Jerusalem, because the seat of the great *Sanhedrin* was in *Jerusalem*; and so elsewhere our Saviour saith, *O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the Prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee:* because there it was the true Prophets were destroy'd as tho' they had been false ones, and God's own Messengers punished with the death of Seducers, which was Lapidation. And on this very account many are of opinion that our Saviour was condemned by the *Sanhedrin* at *Jerusalem*; which is supposed to have been assembled in the house of *Caiaphas* the High-Priest, when *Christ* was carried thither for Examination; which some think to have been at his Lodgings in the Temple, others at his Palace in the City. For we read that the Chief Priests, and the Elders, and all the Council were met together at the High-Priests Palace in order to our Saviour's Tryal. The next Morning they were met early together again in order to the further scanning of this business; but they seem not to examine *Christ* concerning a true Spirit of Prophecy, but concerning his being the *Messias*, and calling himself *the Son of God*; and so they would seem rather to proceed upon the Law against Blasphemy, than that against false Prophets.

Luk. 13. 33. Matth. 23. 70. Matth. 26. 59. Matth. 26. 63.

IV. But that which was the greatest security of the People against the Imposture of false Prophets, was the certain Rules of judging them which were laid down in the Law of *Moses*: which may be comprehended under these two Heads, such as concern their Doctrine, or such as concern their Predictions, *First*, such as concerned the Prophets Doctrine, which shou'd especially be looked after, because the main office of a Prophet was to be *interpres & internuncius divinæ voluntatis*, to be *a revealer of God's Will to Men.* For the primary Notion of a Prophet doth not lie in foretelling future events, but in declaring and interpreting to the world the Mind of God, which he receives by immediate Revelation from himself. So that the receiving what he makes known by immediate Revelation, is that which formally constitutes a Prophet; but it is wholly extrinsecal and accidental what time his Prophecy respects, whether past, present, or to come; but because future contingencies are the furthest out of the reach of humane understanding, therefore the predictions of such have been chiefly looked on as the chief Note and Character of a Prophet, as being apprehended to be the strongest evidence of Divine Revelation. And hence it is in Scripture that the Patriarchs as *Abraham* and others are called Prophets, not because of any prediction utter'd by them, but because of the frequency of immediate Divine Revelations among them. And hence likewise those in the New Testament who expounded the Scriptures by immediate Inspiration, are called Prophets; and this was the Ἀποκάλυψις spoken of by the Apostle, the Exposition of the hidden Mysteries of the Old Testament by an immediate Inspiration. And there is no word in the *Hebrew* for a Prophet, which may not equally respect all differences of time, but every one doth import immediate Inspiration; for נביא properly is one *qui revelat abscondita*; ראה a *Seer* chiefly respects the clear represen-

Psal. 105. 15. Gen. 20. 7. 1 Cor. 14. 26.

tation of the intellectual species by the *lumen propheticum* to the understanding, and מן carries an equal indifferency to all circumstances of time.

Vide Alstedii Trifol. proph. p. 53

V. This being then the chief notion of a Prophet, whatever he declared as the Mind and Will of God, must be searched and examined, to see what consonancy it hath thereto. For the question which *Moses* supposeth; is founded upon clear and evident reason, *And if thou shalt say in thine heart, How shall we know the Word which the Lord hath spoken?* For it being plain that there may be false Prophets as well as true, we had need of some certain rules to judge of what is delivered for Divine Revelation. For the clearing of which important Question, I lay down these principles.

Deut. 18. 21.

1. *The immediate dictates of natural light are no sufficient standard to judge of Divine Revelation by.* I mean not in reference to consonancy or repugnancy to natural light, but in reference to the extent and latitude of Divine Revelation, *i. e.* that natural light doth not contain in it whatever may be known of God or of his Will; and that upon these reasons: 1. It implies no repugnancy to any dictate of nature, that God shou'd reveal any thing more of his Mind and Will, than is contained in the light of nature. 2. Nature reacheth, as to matters concerning Religion, no further than the obligation to Duty, but leaves the particular determination of the manner of obedience to divine positive Laws, as is clear in reference to the time, place, and particular duties of worship. 3. Nature owning an universal obligation to the Will of God in whatever he shall command, doth suppose a power in God to command what he pleaseth. 4. Nature is sensible of its own decays; and the imperfection of its own light, and therefore seems rather to require further illumination than to put any bar against it. 5. Man's happiness being a free gift of God's, it stands to the highest reason that he shou'd have the prescribing of the conditions which are in order to it; now these conditions being the results, not of God's nature, but of his arbitrarious Will, it is impossible that natural light cou'd ever reach to the full discovery of them, 6. It hath been the general sense of all Nations in the World, that God may reveal more of his Will than Nature can reach unto; which sense discovers it self in two things. 1. Praying to their several Gods for direction. 2. Hearkening after pretended Oracles, which the Devil cou'd never have had that advantage of deceiving the World by, had it not been for this general sense of Mankind, that there wanted some particular Revelation from God to make Men happy. So then this may be assumed as a principle, That God may reveal more of his Mind and Will to Mankind, than he hath done by the dictates of mere natural light and reason.

2. *Whatever speaks a direct repugnancy to any of the fundamental dictates of nature cannot be of Divine Revelation.* For those being founded, not upon any positive or arbitrary Will, but upon those inward impressions which are derived from the Divine Nature its self, it cannot in reason be supposed that God shou'd commission any to enervate his own Fundamental Law; and so by one Will to contradict another. *Placitum Regis* must never stand against the *Placita Coronæ*: Those things which depend upon Fundamental and Established Laws, hold good against any positive sentence or declaration of a Prince's Will; Because he is supposed to have bound up himself by the established Laws; and therefore any thing else which comes from him, contrary to them, is suppo-

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ſed not to be the Will of the Prince, but of the perſons perſuading him to it. But this now cannot be ſuppoſed in God, that he ſhou'd be any ways drawn to caſſate the Obligation of what is imprinted upon the Souls of Men as his own Law. But yet we muſt diſtinguiſh between nulling the general Obligation, and altering the particular nature of any thing which depends upon that general Law; the *firſt* in any caſe is impoſſible, that any Divine Revelation ſhou'd make it not to be Man's Duty to obey his Maker, or not to be a ſin to commit Murder, to lye, or to ſteal from another; but there may come a particular Revelation from God to alter the reſpects and nature of ſuch things as do immediately depend upon his own dominion; as the lives of perſons and the properties of things are; and thus God did reveal to *Abraham* that he ſhou'd go and Sacrifice his Son, which had been no murder, when done upon God's immediate command, and a ſacrifice to himſelf, and therefore would have been acceptable as a teſtimony of entire obedience (which God did accept without the act) and ſo the *Iſraelites* taking the *Ægyptians* Jewels, and diſpoſſeſſing the *Canaanites*, did depend upon God's immediate diſpoſal of theſe things to them, which otherwiſe had been a ſin in them, and no doubt was ſo to any that were unſatisfy'd whether God had immediately commanded it or no. Or from hence to infer any general rule, is no doubt a breach of Divine Commands, and contrary to his Nature and Will.

VII. 3. *Where God hath eſtabliſhed a poſitive Law, preſcribing a form and manner wherein he will be worſhipped, it is ſufficient evidence of a falſe Prophet, to go about to null the obligation of that Law; unleſs there be as great evidences given, that God did intend the eſtabliſhing a new Law by that Perſon, as he did at firſt the inſtitution of the old by the hand of* Moſes. This latter clauſe is inſerted, to ſhew that the ſucceeding of the Doctrine of *Chriſt*, into the place of the Law of *Moſes*, doth not bear any repugnancy to the *Hypotheſis* laid down, there being greater evidences of God's intending the aboliſhing the Ceremonial Law by the Goſpel of *Chriſt*, than there were of the eſtabliſhment of it by *Moſes*. But of thoſe afterwards. I now only ſpeak of ſuch as upon the mere pretence of Divine Revelation, ſhou'd deſtroy any precept of an eſtabliſhed poſitive Law; and this as far as we can find, was the great Rule the *Jews* went by; if any thing were ſpoken by any Prophet, contrary to the Law of *Moſes*, or tending to the alteration of the worſhip of God eſtabliſhed thereby, he was accounted a falſe Prophet. The modern *Jews* to juſtify themſelves in their own Belief, as to the Doctrine of *Chriſt*, extend this further than the Law doth; for they inlarge it to all the precepts of the Ceremonial Law; whereas God in the Law ſeems to limit it to the Moral Law, and chiefly inſiſts on the three firſt precepts of the *Decalogue*; and therefore condemns ſuch a *one* as *ſpake in the name of the Lord, when he had not commanded them*, Deut. 18. 20. and ſuch *endeavoured to bring in idolatry*, Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3. where tho' the falſe Prophet ſhou'd offer to do ſigns and wonders before them, yet if his intention were to draw them to worſhip falſe Gods, they were not to hearken unto him. And therefore *Maimonides*, where he largely diſputes about the truth of Prophecies, lays this down as a certain Rule: *Si Propheta ſurrexerit, atque magna miracula aut prodigia fecerit, & adlaboraverit falſitatis convincere prophetiam* Moſis *M. N. iſtum non audimus, quia certò novimus prodigium præſtigiis aut incantionibus productum eſſe*, as *Vorſtius* renders him. *If a Prophet do never ſo great Miracles, and ſeeks to convince* Moſes *Maimon. de fund. leg. c. 8. ſ. 7*

of falſhood, we are not to hearken to him; for we know that they are not done by the power of God, but by the illuſion of the Devil. And elſewhere he tells us, that if any pretends to prophecy בשם עבוים *in the name of Idols, they muſt not ſo much as diſpute with him, nor anſwer him, nor deſire any Signs or Miracles from him; and if of himſelf he ſhews any, we are not to regard or mind them; for,* ſaith he, *whoever doth but doubt in his mind concerning them he breaks that Command, And thou ſhalt not hearken to the words of that prophet.* So that the Doctrine once eſtabliſhed, ought to be our moſt certain Rule, according to which we muſt judge of all pretenders to Miracles; if their deſign be to draw Men off from God's Word, we are not to hearken to what they either ſay or do.

Idem de Idololat. leg. c. 5. ſ. 9.

Deut. 13. 3.

VIII. 4. *The Doctrine of thoſe Prophets who ſeek not to introduce Idolatry, muſt not be meaſured by a ſtrict conformity to the words of* Moſes *his Law, but to the main reaſon and intention of it.* The great reaſon of this is, becauſe God did not intend the *Jews* ſhou'd always reſt in the *Pædagogy* of the Ceremonial Law, but ſent them Prophets to train them up by degrees, and to fit them for a ſtate of better perfection; and therefore it wou'd be very unreaſonable to judge whether they were true Prophets or no, exactly by that which they came gradually to wean them from; which were all one, as to try one whether he were grown a Man or no, by the Swadling clouts he wore when he was a Child. God tempered the Ceremonial Law much according to the condition and capacity of the perſons it was preſcribed to, and therefore the Sanctions of it did immediately reſpect their temporary concerns; but we are not to think the end of that diſpenſation was to be merely a Covenant for the Land of Promiſe; but as the Cherubims in the Temple did always look towards the Mercy-ſeat, ſo did this whole *œconomy* look towards the coming of the *Meſſias*. But it was with the generality of the *Jews*, as it is with ignorant people who looking up to the Heavens, cannot fanſie the Stars to be any bigger than they ſeem to them; but *Aſtronomers* by the help of their *Optic-tubes* and *Teleſcopes*, do eaſily diſcern the juſt magnitude of them; ſo the *Jews* ordinarily thought there was no more in theſe Types and Shadows, than was viſibly repreſented to them; but ſuch as had the help of the Divine Spirit (the beſt *Teleſcope* to diſcern the *Day-ſtar* from on high with) cou'd eaſily look thro' thoſe Proſpectives, into the moſt glorious Myſteries of the Goſpel of *Jeſus Chriſt*. Theſe Types being like triangular Priſmes, that muſt be ſet in a due light and poſture, before they can repreſent that great variety of Spiritual Myſteries which was contained in them. Now the great office of the Prophet was to adminiſter this Light to the people, and to direct them in thoſe excellent pieces of Perſpective, wherein by the help of a Prophetic-glaſs, they might ſee the Son of God fully repreſented to their view. Beſides this, the prophetical office was a kind of Chancery to the Moſaic Law, wherein the Prophets did interpret the *Pandects* of the Law *ex æquo & bono*, and frequently ſhewed in what caſes God did diſpenſe with the outward letter of it, to exalt the more the inward ſenſe and reaſon of it. Hence the Prophets ſeem many times to ſpeak contemptibly of the outward preſcribed Ceremonies, when their intent is not to condemn the obſervation of them, but to tell the people there were greater things which God looked at, than the outward obſervation of ſome Ceremonial precepts, and that God would never accept of that by way of commutation for real and internal goodneſs. Hence the Prophets * by their own practice, did frequently ſhew that the Law of *Moſes* did not

* Pſal. 50. 8. 51. 16. Iſa. 1. 11. 13. 66. 3. Jer. 7. 21, 22, 23.

ſo

so indispensibly oblige Men, but that God wou'd accept of those actions which were performed without the regularity required by the Law of *Moses*; and thus he did of sacrificing upon high places, not only before the building of the Temple, but sometimes after, as he accepted of the sacrifice of *Elijah* on Mount *Carmel*, even when high places were forbidden. Which the *Jews* are become so sensible of, that they grant that a true Prophet may sometimes command something to be done in violation of the Law of *Moses*, so he doth not draw people to Idolatry, nor destroy the obligation of Moses his Law. But this they restrain to לפי שעה something done in case of necessity, and that it shou'd not pass into a precedent or a perpetual Law; and therefore their rule is לפי שעה שימענו לו בכל. *The prophet was to be hearkened to in every thing he commanded in a case of necessity.* By this it is clear that the Prophets were not to be try'd by the Letter of the Law of *Moses*, but by the end and the reason of it. Thus much I suppose will make it clear what Rules the people had to try the Prophets Doctrine by, without Miracles.

1 Kings 18. 38.

Vid. Jarchi Deut. 18. 21. *Et Vorst. ad Maim. de fund. c.o. s. 5, 6, 7.*

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

The Tryal of Prophetical Predictions and Miracles.

I. *The great difficulty of trying the truth of prophetical Predictions from* Jer. 18. 7, 8, &c. *Some general* Hypotheſes *promiſed for the clearing of it.* II. *The firſt concerns the grounds why Predictions are accounted an evidence of Divine Revelation. Three Conſectaries drawn thence.* III. *The ſecond, the manner of* God's *Revelation of his Will to the Minds of the Prophets. Of the ſeveral degrees of Prophecy.* IV. *The third is, that* God *did not always reveal the internal purpoſes of his Will unto the true Prophets.* V. *The grand Queſtion propounded, How it may be known when Predictions expreſs* God's *decrees, and when only the ſeries of cauſes. For the firſt ſeveral rules laid down.* 1. *When the Prediction is confirm'd by a preſent Miracle.* 2. *When the things foretold exceed the probability of ſecond cauſes.* VI. 3. *When confirm'd by* God's *oath.* VII. 4. *When the Bleſſings foretold are purely ſpiritual.* VIII. *Three rules for interpreting the Prophecies which reſpect the ſtate of things under the Goſpel.* IX. 5. *When all circumſtances are fortold.* 6. *When many Prophets in ſeveral ages agree in the ſame predictions.* X. *Predictions do not expreſs* God's *unalterable purpoſes, when they only contain comminations of judgments, or are predictions of temporal Bleſſings.* XI. *The caſe of the* Ninevites, Hezekiah, *and others, opened.* XII, XIII. *Of repentance in* God, *what it implies.* XIV. *The Jewiſh objections about predictions of temporal Bleſſings anſwered.* XV. *In what caſes Miracles were expected from the Prophets: when they were to confirm the truth of their Religion. Inſtanced in the Prophet at* Bethel, Elijah, Eliſha *and* Moſes *himſelf*; XVI. *whoſe divine authority that it was proved by Miracles, is demonſtrated againſt the modern* Jews, *and their pretences anſwered.*

I. THE next thing which the Rules of Tryal concerned, was the predictions of the Prophets. Concerning which God himſelf hath laid down this general Rule, *Deut.* 18. 22. *When a Prophet ſpeaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to paſs, that is the thing which the Lord hath not ſpoken, but the Prophet hath ſpoken it preſumptuouſly; thou ſhalt not be afraid of him. Grotius* underſtands this place of the Prophet's telling the people he would do ſome Miracles to confirm his Doctrine; but, if thoſe Miracles were not done as he ſaid, it was an evident demonſtration of a falſe Prophet. It is certain it was ſo; for then his own mouth told him he was a lying Prophet; but theſe words ſeem to refer rather to ſomething future than preſent, and are therefore generally

generally understood concerning the truth of predictions; which was a matter of very difficult tryal, in regard of the goodness or the justice of God, so frequently interposing between the prediction and the event. That place which makes it so difficult to discern the truth of a prediction by the event, is *Jer.* 18.7, 8, 9, 10. *At what instant I shall speak concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy it; If that Nation against whom I have pronounced, turn from evil, I will repent of the evil I had thought to do unto them; And at what instant I shall speak concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdom, to build and to plant it; if it do evil in my sight, that it obey not my voice, then will I repent of the good wherewith I said I would benefit them.* By which place it seems clear, that even after the predictions of Prophets, God reserved a liberty to himself, either to repent of the evil or the good that was foretold concerning any people; how then can the fidelity of a Prophet be discovered by the event when God may alter the event, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet? This being a case very intricate and obscure, will call for the more diligence in the unfolding of it: In order to which, we shall first premise some general *Hypotheses* and then come to the particular resolution of it. The general *Hypotheses* will be concerning the way and method of God's revealing future contingencies to the Prophets, without which it will be impossible to resolve the particular emergent cases concerning predictions.

II.

1. *Hypoth.* *The prediction of future events is no further an argument of a prophetic Spirit, than as the foreknowledge of those things is supposed to be out of the reach of any created understanding*; and therefore God challengeth this to himself in Scripture as a peculiar prerogative of his own, to declare the things that are to come, and thereby manifests the Idols of the *Gentiles* to be no Gods, *because they could not shew to their worshippers the things to come*, Isa. 44. 6, 7. From this *Hypothesis* these three Consectaries follow:

1. That the events that are foretold, must be such as do exceed the reach of any created Intellect; for otherwise it cou'd be no evidence of a Spirit of true Prophecy; so that the foretelling of such events as depend upon the series of Natural Causes, or such as tho' they are out of the reach of Human Understanding, yet are not of the Diabolical, or such things as fall out casually true, but by no certain grounds of prediction, can none of them be any argument of a Spirit of Prophecy.

2. That where there were any other evidences, that the Prophet spake by Divine Revelation; there was no reason to wait the fulfilling of every particular prophecy before he was believed as a Prophet. If so, then many of God's chiefest Prophets cou'd not have been believed in their own Generations because their Prophecies did reach so far beyond them, as *Isaiah*'s concerning *Cyrus*, the Prophet at *Bethel* concerning *Josias*: and all the prophecies concerning the Captivity and Deliverance from it, must not have been believed till fulfilled, that is, not believed at all: for when prophecies are accomplished they are no longer the objects of Faith, but of sense. Where then God gives other evidences of Divine Inspiration, the credit of the Prophet is not suspended upon the minute accomplishment of every event foretold by him. Now it is evident there may be particular Divine Revelation of other things besides future contingencies, so that if a reason may be given, why events once foretold may not come to pass, there can be no reason why the credit of any prophecy shou'd be invalidated on that account; because every event is not exactly correspondent to the prediction. It is most certain that what

what ever comes under Divine Knowledge, may be divinely revealed for the manifeſtation which is cauſed by any light, may extend it ſelf to all things to which that light is extended: but that light which the Prophet ſaw by was a Divine Light, and therefore might equally extend it ſelf to all kind of objects; but becauſe future contingencies are the moſt remote from humane knowledge, therefore the foretelling of theſe hath been accounted the great evidence of a true Prophet; but yet there may be a knowledge of other things in a lower degree than future contingencies, which may immediately depend upon Divine Revelation; and theſe are,

1. Such things which cannot be known by any particular Man, but yet
2 King. 5. 26. are certainly known by other Men; as the preſent knowledge of things done by perſons at a remote diſtance from them: thus *Eliſha* knew what *Gehazi* did, when he followed *Naaman*; and thus the knowledge of the
1 Cor. 14. 25. thought of another's heart depends upon immediate Divine Revelation, whereas every one may certainly know the thought of his own heart; and therefore to ſome thoſe things may be matters of ſenſe or evident demonſtration, which to another may be a matter of immediate Revelation.

2. Such things as relate not to future contingencies, but are matters of Faith exceeding the reach of human apprehenſion; ſuch things as may be known when revealed, but cou'd never have been found out without immediate Revelation; ſuch all the Myſteries of our Religion are, the Myſtery of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Hypoſtatical Union*, the Death of the Son of God for the pardon of the ſins of Mankind. Now the immediate Revelation of either of theſe two ſorts of objects ſpeaks as much a truly Prophetical Spirit, as the prediction of future contingencies. So that this muſt not be looked on as the juſt and adequate rule to meaſure a Spirit of prophecy by; becauſe the ground of judging a prophetical Spirit by that, is common with other things without that, ſeeing other object are out of the reach of humane Underſtanding as well as future events, and therefore the diſcovery of them muſt immediately flow from Divine Revelation.

3. The Revelation of future events to the Underſtanding of a Prophet, is never the leſs immediate, altho' the event may not be correſpondent to the prediction. So that if it be manifeſted that God immeately reveal ſuch future contingencies to a Prophet, he wou'd be nevertheleſs a true Prophet whether thoſe predictions took effect or no. For a true Prophet is known by the truth of Divine Revelation to the perſon of the Prophet, and not by the ſucceſs of the thing, which, as is laid down in the *Hypotheſis*, is no further an evidence of a true Prophet, than as it is an argument *à poſteriori* to prove Divine Revelation by. If then the alteration of events after predictions be reconcilable with the truth and faithfulneſs of God, there is no queſtion but it is with the truth of a prophetical Spirit, the formality of which lies in immediate Revelation.

III. *The Prophets cou'd not declare any thing more to the people than was immediately revealed unto themſelves.* What was preſently revealed, ſo much they knew, and no more, becauſe the Spirit of prophecy came upon them *per modum impreſſionis tranſeuntis*, as the Schools ſpeak, and not *per modum habitus*; the *lumen propheticum* was in them, not as *lumen in corpore lucido*, but as *lumen in aëre*; and therefore the Light of Revelation in their Spirits depended upon the immediate irradiations of the Divine Spirit. The Prophets had not always a power to propheſie when

2. *Hypoth.*

when they wou'd themſelves; and it is ſaid, when they propheſy'd, that the *Word of the Lord came unto them.* And therefore the Schools determine, that a Prophet upon immediate Revelation did not know *omnia prophetabilia* (as they ſpeak in their barbarous language) *all things* which *God might reveal*; the reaſon whereof *Aquinas* thus gives; *The ground,* 2.2.q.171. art.2.—4. ſaith he, *of the connexion of divers objects together is ſome common tie or principle, which joyns them together; as charity or prudence is in moral vertues; and the right underſtanding of the principles of a ſcience, is the ground why all things belonging to that ſcience are underſtood; but now in Divine Revelation; that which connects the objects of Divine Revelation is God himſelf; now becauſe he cannot be fully apprehended by any humane intellect, therefore the underſtanding of a Prophet cannot comprehend all matters capable of being revealed, but only ſuch as pleaſeth God himſelf freely to communicate to the Prophet's underſtanding by immediate Revelation.* This is further evident by all thoſe different degrees of illumination and prophecy, which the *Jews* and other Writers ſpeak ſo much of, *viz.* of Dreams and Viſions, the inſpirations of the Holy Spirit, the *Gradus Moſaicus*, the External Voice, &c. Now in every one of theſe degrees the Prophet cou'd go no further than his preſent Revelation extended; and therefore *Aquinas* determines, That the Underſtandings of the Prophets were *inſtrumenta deficientia reſpectu principalis agentis, i. e.* that in prophetical illumination the Mind of the Prophet was ſo moved by the Spirit of God, as an inſtrument in the hand of an Artificer, which bears no proportion with the skill of the work-man: And therefore the Mind of a Prophet is moved ſometimes only to apprehend the thing repreſented (which they call *Inſtinctus Divinus*, of which they ſay a Prophet may have no certainty whether it comes from God or no) ſometimes it is moved ſo far as to know certainly that this Revelation is from God (this they call *Lumen Propheticum*;) ſometimes a Prophet may be moved to ſpeak thoſe things which he fully underſtands; ſo it was with moſt of the true Prophets; but ſometimes Men may be moved to ſpeak that which they underſtand not, as is plain in *Caiaphas*, and probable in *Balaam.* Sometimes a thing was repreſented to the Fancy of one, without any poſſibility of underſtanding the meaning of thoſe imaginary ſpecies, as in *Pharaoh*'s and *Nebuchadnezzar*'s Dreams; and to another may be given the true judgment of thoſe motions of Fancy without the repreſentation of the things, to them, as in *Joſeph* and *Daniel.* Now in theſe and many other different impreſſions of this prophetical Spirit, the Prophets, to whom the things were revealed, cou'd go no further than the degree of the Revelation made to them did extend. 2.2.q17.3. art. 3.

IV. *God did not always reveal to the Prophets the internal counſels and decrees of his own Will, but often only the method and ſeries of his providence in the adminiſtration of things in the world.* Which is the ground of that threefold diſtinction of prophecy in the Schools, into *Prophetia prædeſtinationis*, *Prophetia præſcientiæ*, and *Prophetia comminationis*; which is taken from the ordinary Gloſs upon *Matth.* 1. where they are thus explain'd; *The Prophecy of Predeſtination* is, when the event depends wholly upon God's Will, without any reſpect to ours, as the prophecy of the *Incarnation of Chriſt*; and the *Prophecy of Preſcience* is of ſuch things as depend upon the liberty of Man's Will; and the *Prophecy of Commination* only denotes God's denunciations of heavy judgments againſt a people. But *Aquinas* doth better reduce the two former to one, and the ground of the difference is to be fetched from the different ways 3. *Hypoth.*

whereby God knows things in the world; which is either as they are in their cauſes, and ſo they note the order and ſeries of things in the world, with the mutual reſpects and dependences they have upon one another, and this refers to God's adminiſtration of things in the world; or elſe God looks upon them as they are in themſelves, or according to his own poſitive determinations of them; and now in this ſenſe they are unalterable; but in the other they are not; but God may alter thoſe reſpects of things when he pleaſeth. Now tho' theſe different manners of knowledge can never be conceiv'd ſeparate from one another in the Divine Uuderſtanding, yet in the Revelation made to the Mind of a Prophet, they may be disjoyn'd from each other, becauſe God doth not always reveal things in the higheſt degree to the Prophets; for no free Agent doth always act as far as he can. And therefore prophetical Revelation is ſometimes a repreſentation of God's internal Decrees, and then they always take effect; and ſometimes only the order of Cauſes and Effects, and they may admit of an alteration, and the prophecy nevertheleſs be true, becauſe then it referr'd only to the ſeries of Cauſes in the world, according to which the Events wou'd follow, if God himſelf did not interpoſe. Theſe things being thus premis'd, we come to particular Reſolutions, which muſt ariſe from the Evidences that may be given when prophetical predictions did expreſs God's internal purpoſe and decree, and when only the order of the Cauſes in the world; for in theſe latter it is apparent that events might not anſwer predictions, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet: which is a matter of greater difficulty, *viz.* to find out the exact differences of theſe two, till the event hath made it apparent which came from God's unalterable purpoſe, and which not. But tho' it be a ſubject little ſpoken to either by *Jewiſh* or *Chriſtian* Writers, yet we are in hopes there may be ſome ſuch clear Notes of diſtinction diſcovered between them, even *à priori*, which may ſufficiently clear God's faithfulneſs, and the Prophet's truth, tho' the event be not always correſpondent to the words of a prediction.

V. I begin then with the evidences that may be given when predictions do flow from internal purpoſe and decree.

1. *Every prediction confirm'd by a preſent Miracle, doth not expreſs merely the order of cauſes, but the determinations of God's will*, becauſe there can be no ſufficient reaſon given why the order of cauſes in Nature ſhou'd be altered to expreſs the dependances of things on each other; for herein a Miracle wou'd rather tend to weaken than ſtrengthen Faith, becauſe the end of the Miracle wou'd be to confirm their Faith as to events following upon their cauſes; but now the *medium* us'd for that end ſeems to prove the contrary, *viz.* That God can alter the ſeries of cauſes when he pleaſes himſelf, by working Miracles, and therein going contrary to the courſe of Nature; and therefore a Miracle ſeems to be a very incongruous argument in this, becauſe it ſelf is an evidence that may be, which it comes to prove ſhall not be. But when Prophets come to declare the internal purpoſes of the Will of God concerning future contingencies, no argument can be more ſuitable to demonſtrate the truth of what is ſpoken, than the working of a preſent Miracle, for this demonſtrates to the ſenſes of Men, that however unlikely the event may be to them which is foretold, yet with God all things are poſſible and that it is very unlikely God wou'd ſend ſuch a Meſſenger to declare a falſhood, whom he entruſted with ſo great a power as that of working Miracles. Thus it was in that remarkable prophecy concerning *Joſias*

sias by the Man of God at *Bethel*, 260 years before his Birth, which tho' it were to come to pass so long after, God confirm'd it by a Sign, which was *the renting of the Altar, and the pouring out of the ashes upon it, and the withering of* Jeroboam's *hand.* We cannot therefore in reason think that God wou'd set so clear a Seal to any Deed which he did intend himself to cancel afterwards. 1 King. 13. 3.

2. *Predictions express God's inward purpose, when the things foretold do exceed all probabilities of second causes*; in which cause tho' those words of *Tertullian* seem very harsh, *credo quia impossibile*; yet taking that Impossibility as relating to second causes, and the ground of Faith to be some divine prediction, we see what reason there may be for them: For the more unlikely the thing is to be effected by second causes, the greater evidence it is, that the Prophets in foretelling it did not respect the mere order of things in the world, but the unalterable counsels of the will of God, which therefore wou'd certainly have their timely accomplishments. When therefore any Prophets did foretel things above the reach of Natural causes, and those things did not come to pass, it was a certain evidence of a false Prophet, as the contrary was of a true one; for none cou'd know so long before-hand such things as were above all humane power, but such to whom God himself, who alone was able to effect them, did reveal and communicate the knowledge of them. And hence we see in Scripture those predictions which have seemed the greatest improbabilities with them, have had the most punctual accomplishments, as the *Israelites* returning out of *Ægypt* at the end of 430 years; their deliverance by *Cyrus* after the Captivity in *Babylon*, which seemed so improbable a thing, that when God speaks of it, he ushers it in with this preface, *That he frustrateth the tokens of the lyers, and maketh the diviners mad, but confirmeth the word of his servant, and performeth the counsel of his messengers that saith to Jerusalem, Thou shalt be inhabited*, &c. The more unlikely then the thing was to come to pass, the greater evidence there was in so clear a prophecy of it so long before (above 100 years) and so exact a fulfilling of it afterwards precisely at the expiring of the LXX years from the first Captivity. Gal. 3. 17. Isa. 44 25, 26, 28.

VI. 3. *Predictions concerning future events, which are confirmed by an oath from God himself, do express the immutable determinations of God's will.* For which we have the greatest assurance we can desire from that remarkable expression of the Apostle to the *Hebrews*, Heb. 6. 17, 18. *Wherein God willing more abundantly to shew to the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath, that by two immutable things in which it was impossible for God to lye, we might have a strong consolation*, &c. Wherein the Apostle obviates and removes all doubts and misprisions, lest God after the declaring of his Will shou'd alter the event foretold in it, and that he doth both by shewing that God had made an absolute promise, and withal to prevent all doubts, lest some tacite condition might hinder performance, he tell us that God had annexed his oath to it, which two things were the most undoubted evidences of the immutability of God's counsel. The word Ψεύδεσθαι here us'd, doth in Scripture often note the frustrating of Mens hopes and expectations; so it is us'd *Heb.* 3. 17. Ψεύσεται ἔργον ἐλαίας, we render it the *labour of the Olive shall fail.* So Hos. 9. 2. ἡ δὲ οἶνος ἐψεύσατο αὐτοῦ, *and the new Wine shall fail in her.* Thus the meaning here is, that by two immutable things in which it is impossible God shou'd frustrate the expectations of Men, or alter the events of things after he had declared them. For God's oath is an evi-

dent demonstration of the immutability of his Will in all predictions to which this is annexed, and doth fully exclude that which the Scripture calls repenting in God, that is, doing otherwise than the words did seem to express, because of some tacite conditions understood in them. So we find *Psal.* 89. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36. *If they break my statutes, and keep not my commandments, then will I visit their transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes; nevertheless my loving kindness will I not utterly take from him, nor suffer my faithfulness to fail; my covenant will I not break; nor alter the thing that is gone out of my lips. Once have I sworn by my holiness, that I will not lye unto* David. *His seed shall endure for ever, and his throne as the Sun before me.* Wherein we see what way God takes to assure us of the immutability of his Covenant with his people, by the oath which he adjoyns to his promises; whereby God doth most fully express the unalterable determinations of his own Will, in that he swears by his own Holiness that he wou'd not lye unto *David*, i. e. that he wou'd faithfully perform what he had promis'd to him. And therefore *Tertullian* well saith, *Beati sumus quorum causa Deus jurat, sed miseri & detestabiles si ne juranti quidem credimus.* It is happy for us believing Creatures, that God stoops so low as to confirm his Covenant with an oath; but it will be sad and miserable for such as dare not venture their Faith upon it, when God hath annex'd his oath unto it. It is thought by Expositors, that there is a peculiar emphasis in those words, אחת נשבעתי *Once have I sworn*, thereby noting the irrevocable nature of God's oath, that there is no need of repetition of it as among Men, because when once God swears by himself it is the highest demonstration that no conditions whatever shall alter his declared purpose. And therefore the Council of *Toledo* well explains the different nature of God's Oath, and his repentance in Scripture; *Jurare namque Dei est à se ordinata nullatenus convellere; pœnitere vero eadem ordinata cum voluerit immutare*; God is said to swear when he binds himself absolutely to performance: and to repent, when things fall out contrary to the declaration of God's Will concerning them; for so it must be understood to be only *mutatio sententiæ*, and not *consilii*, that the alteration may be only in the things, and not in the eternal purpose of God. But since it is evident in Scripture, that many predictions do imply some tacite conditions, and many declarations of God's Will do not express his internal purposes, it seem'd necessary in those things which God did declare to be the irrevocable purposes of his Will, there shou'd be some peculiar mark and character set upon them for the confirmation of his people's Faith, and this we find to be the annexing an oath to his promises. Thus it is in that grand Instrument of peace between God and his people, the covenant of Grace, wherein God was pleas'd so far to strengthen the Faith of his people in it, that he ratifies the articles of peace therein contain'd, but especially the Act of Grace, on his own part with an oath, thereby to assure them it was never his purpose to repeal it, nor to fail of performance in it. For we are not to think that an oath lays any greater obligation upon God for performance, than the mere declaration of his Will; it being a part of immutable justice, and consequently necessarily imply'd in the Divine nature, to perform promises when once made; but God's Oath respects us, and not himself, *viz.* that it might be a testimony unto us that God's Will thereby declar'd is his eternal and unchangeable Will, and so the mercies thereby promis'd are sure mercies; such as are ἀμεταμέλητα, *without any repentance on God's part.*

Concil. Tolet. 8. *c.* 2.

Isa. 55. 3.

4. *Pre-*

4. *Predictions made by the Prophets concerning Bleſſings merely ſpiritual, do expreſs God's internal purpoſe, and therefore muſt have their certain accompliſhment in the time prefix'd by the Prophets.* The grand reaſon of this propoſition, is, that the beſtowing of Bleſſings merely ſpiritual, doth immediately flow from the Grace and Favour of God, and depends not upon conditions on our part, as procuring cauſes of them, and therefore there can be no account given why God ſhou'd ſuſpend the performance of ſuch promiſes, which wou'd not more ſtrongly have held why he ſhou'd not have made any ſuch promiſes at all. And therefore when we ſee that notwithſtanding the higheſt demerits, God made ſuch free promiſes, we can have no reaſon to think that any other demerits interpoſing between the promiſes and performance, ſhou'd hinder the accompliſhment of them: unleſs it be inſerted in the promiſes themſelves, which is contrary to the nature of free promiſes: Upon this ground all the promiſes relating to the Goſpel ſtate, and to the Covenant of Grace therein contain'd, muſt have their due accompliſhment in the time and manner prefix'd by the Prophets: and therefore the *Jews* are miſerably blind when they ſuppoſe the reaſon why the promiſe of the *Meſſias* is yet deferr'd, after ſo long expectation of him, is, the ſins of their people; for this ſeems to ſuppoſe that God's promiſe of the *Meſſias* did depend upon their own righteouſneſs and worthineſs above all other people, which if it doth they are like to be the moſt miſerable and deſperate people the world hath: and beſides, if God's intuition of ſin makes him defer the coming of the *Meſſias*, his foreſight of ſin wou'd have hinder'd him from ever promiſing a *Meſſias* to come: but this was ſo far from being a hindrance of God's promiſe that the main end of the coming of the *Meſſias* was *to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to make an end of ſin, and to bring in everlaſting righteouſneſs.* And we ſee where-ever the Prophets inſiſt on the Covenant of Grace, the promiſe contain'd in it is *the blotting out of tranſgreſſions*, and *remembring ſins no more*, and that merely on the account of God's free Love and for his own Name's ſake: This can be no reaſon then why predictions concerning ſpiritual Bleſſings ſhou'd have their exact accompliſhment, becauſe there can be no bar againſt free Love, and the beſtowing of ſuch Mercies which do ſuppoſe the greateſt unworthineſs of them, as Goſpel Bleſſings do. VII. Dan. 9. 24.

The great difficulty lies in explaining the prophetical phraſes concerning the Goſpel ſtate, which ſeem to intimate a greater advancement and flouriſhing of peace and holineſs therein, than hath as yet been ſeen in the Chriſtian World; which gives the *Jews* the greater occaſion to imagine that the ſtate ſo much ſpoken of by the Prophets, is not yet eſtabliſhed in the World. But all the difficulty herein ariſeth from the want of conſideration of the Idiotiſms of the prophetical language, eſpecially where it reſpects the ſtate of things under the Goſpel, concerning which, we may obſerve theſe following Rules. VIII.

1. *The Prophets under the Old Teſtament, when they ſpeak of things to come to paſs in the New, do ſet them forth by the repreſentation of ſuch things as were then in uſe among themſelves*; thus the ſpiritual Worſhip of the Goſpel is propheſy'd of, under the notion of the legal Worſhip among the *Jews*; the converſion of *Ægypt* to the Goſpel, is foretold *Iſaiah* 19. 19, 21. by the ſetting up an Altar, and *offering ſacrifice to the Lord*: and the *Converſion of the Gentiles* in general, by the *offering up of incenſe*, Mal. 1. 11. and the ſervice of God under the Goſpel, is ſet forth by

going

going up to Jeruſalem, *and keeping the feaſt of Tabernacles there*, Zach. 14. 16. and the *plentiful effuſion of the Spirit of God in the miraculous gifts*, which attended the preaching of the Goſpel, is ſet forth by the Prophet, *Joel* 2. 28. by *propheſying*, *and dreaming dreams*, *and ſeeing viſions*; not that theſe things ſhou'd really be under Goſpel times; but that the Prophets meaning might be the better underſtood by thoſe he ſpake unto, he ſets forth the great meaſure of gifts and Goſpel light under thoſe things which were accounted as the higheſt attainments among themſelves. So the great meaſure and degree of holineſs which was to be under Goſpel times, is ſet forth by the Prophet *Zachary*, Zach. 14. 20. by the placing of the Motto which was among the *Jews* only upon the *High-Prieſt's forehead*, that this ſhou'd be ſo common under the Goſpel, that even *the bells of the horſes ſhould bear it*, *i. e.* thoſe things which ſeem moſt remote from a ſpiritual uſe, ſhou'd be devoted to it, as the Bells were, which were commonly hang'd upon their war-horſes in thoſe mountainous Countries; and in the latter part of that verſe, the height and progreſs of Goſpel holineſs is deſcrib'd under that phraſe, *That the pots in the Lords houſe ſhould be as bowls before the Altar*, *i. e.* ſhou'd be advanc'd from a lower and more ignoble ſervice, to a higher and more ſpiritual degree of holineſs. Now the *Jews* when they obſerve theſe and many other prophetical paſſages relating to the time of the *Meſſias* to run in the old ſtrain of the Law, they preſently conclude that the *Meſſias* muſt not innovate any thing concerning their way or worſhip, but only be ſome great Prince to give them temporal deliverances, and ſo expound all theſe Texts in a literal ſenſe, which were only expreſs'd in ſuch a ſtrain, the better to help the capacities of thoſe they ſpake them to.

2. *Things abſolutely foretold to come to paſs in Goſpel times in a general manner, are to be underſtood comparatively in reference to what was before.* For when the meaſure of their grace or knowledge was ſo far above what was then among the *Jews*, that there was ſcarce any proportion between them, the Prophets made uſe of ſuch expreſſions to ſet it forth by, which might raiſe up the dull apprehenſion of the *Jews* to conceive the juſt meaſure and fulneſs of it. Thus when the Prophets foretel the grand increaſe of ſpiritual knowledge in Goſpel times, they do it in this phraſe, *They ſhall not teach every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, ſaying, Know the Lord, for all ſhall know me from the leaſt to the greateſt*, Jer. 31. 33. Where it was far from the Prophets meaning to exclude all uſe of teaching under the Goſpel, (which is contrary to the end of all the Ordinances of the Goſpel; but becauſe teaching doth commonly ſuppoſe great ignorance, he ſets forth the abundance of knowledge which ſhou'd be then, by the excluſion of that which doth imply it. So when it is ſaid that *they ſhall be all taught of God*, the meaning is not, that every one that lives in the Goſpel ſtate, ſhou'd be thus effectually taught by the Spirit of God; but that the number of ſuch under the Goſpel, ſhou'd ſo far exceed thoſe under the Law, that they cou'd hardly apprehend the diſproportion between them, unleſs it had been ſet forth in ſo large an expreſſion. Which leads me to the next Rule.

3. *Things foretold as univerſally or indefinitely to come to paſs under the Goſpel, are to be underſtood as to the duty of all, but as the event only of God's choſen people.* Thus when there is ſo great peace propheſy'd to be in Goſpel times, that then *men ſhould beat their ſwords into plow-ſhares, and ſpears*

Iſa. 2. 4. 11. 6, 7.

ſpears into pruning-hooks; that the Wolf ſhould lie down with the Lamb, and Leopard with the Kid; that Nation ſhould not lift up ſword againſt Nation, nor learn war any more; with many others to the ſame purpoſe; all theſe ſpeeches are to be underſtood of what the nature and deſign of the Goſpel tends to, and what is the duty of all that profeſs it, and what wou'd effectually be in the Chriſtian world, did all that profeſs the Chriſtian Doctrine, heartily obey the Dictates of it; and ſo far as the Goſpel doth prevail upon any, it ſo far cicurates their wild and unruly natures, that of furious Wolves they become innocent Lambs, and of raging Lions, tender Kids; ſo far from hurting and injuring others, that they dare not entertain any thoughts of ill-will or revenge towards their greateſt enemies. And thus we may ſee, that notwithſtanding the ſeeming repugnancies of the prophecies of the Old Teſtament concerning the ſtate of the New, with the events which have been obſerv'd in it, yet that all thoſe predictions which concern'd the beſtowing of the ſpiritual Bleſſings which concern'd the Goſpel ſtate, have had their punctual accompliſhment in the ſenſe they were intended.

IX. 4. *Predictions concerning future events where not only the thing its ſelf is foretold, but the ſeveral circumſtances of perſons, time, and place enumerated, are to have their due accompliſhment, and conſequently expreſs God's inward purpoſes.* For thoſe promiſes or comminations which are capable of alteration by ſome tacit conditions imply'd in them, do moſt commonly run in general terms; or elſe are ſpoken by way of immediate addreſs to the perſons concern'd in order to the ſtirring them up the more to the duty God aims at by thoſe comminations; as when *Jonas* limited the *Ninevites* deſtruction to forty days. But when prophecies are recorded, not by way of commination but mere prediction, and particular circumſtances ſet down, it ſtands to reaſon that ſuch prophecies muſt have their certain accompliſhment; and that *firſt*, becauſe God by ſetting down the circumſtances would give them greater evidences that the predictions came from himſelf; as when the Prophet at *Bethel* not only foretold the deſtruction of the Altar there, but particularly named the Man that ſhou'd do it: viz. *Joſias*. So when God by *Iſaiah* call'd *Cyrus* by name, it was doubtleſs a great confirmation to them, that the deliverance of the *Jews* ſhould be by that perſon. *Secondly*, becauſe the circumſtances are intended for Land-marks to know the certainty of the accompliſhment of the prophecy. For when they find the circumſtances fall out exactly according to the prediction, they have no ground to queſtion the accompliſhment of the prophecy. And hence it was that in the grand prophecy of the coming of the *Meſſias* all particular circumſtances were ſo long before foretold. The firſt dawning of his day being to *Adam* after his fall, when the nature he ſhou'd be born of was foretold, *viz.* not Angelical but Human, of the Seed of the Woman. To *Abraham* it was further revealed of what Nation of Mankind, *viz.* from his Poſterity; to *Jacob* at what time, when the *Scepter ſhould be departed from* Judah; and from what Tribe, *viz.* his own; to *Iſaiah* of what perſon in that Family, a Virgin; to *Micah* in what place, *viz. Bethlehem*; and to *Daniel* at what preciſe time, toward the expiring of his ſeventy weeks; which according to the moſt probable computation of them did commence from the ſeventh year of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, and ſo the 490 years expired near upon our Saviour's paſſion. Now certainly the particular enumeration of all theſe circumſtances ſpoken of ſo long before, and falling out ſo exactly, cou'd not but give the greateſt conviction

ction and evidence, that our bleſſed Saviour was that perſon ſo much ſpoken of by the Prophets, in whom all theſe ſeveral lines did meet as in their center.

5. Laſtly, *Predictions then expreſs divine purpoſes when many Prophets in ſeveral ages concur in the ſame predictions*; becauſe it is hardly ſeen but all thoſe tacit conditions which are ſuppos'd in general promiſes or comminations may be alter'd in different ages; but when the conditions alter, and the predictions continue the ſame, it is a ſtronger evidence it is ſome immutable counſel of God which is expreſs'd in thoſe predictions. And in this caſe one prediction confirms the foregoing, as the *Jews* ſay of Prophets; *One Prophet that hath the teſtimony of another Prophet, is ſuppos'd to be true*; but it muſt be with this ſuppoſition, that the other Prophet was before approv'd to be a true Prophet. Now both theſe meet in the prophecies concerning our Saviour; for to him bear all the Prophets witneſs; and in their ſeveral ages they had ſeveral things reveal'd to them concerning him; and the uniformity and perfect harmony of all theſe ſeveral prophecies by perſons at ſo great diſtance from each other, and being of ſeveral intereſts and imployments, and in ſeveral places, yet all giving light to each other, and exactly meeting at laſt in the accompliſhment, do give us yet a further and clearer evidence, that all thoſe ſeveral beams came from the ſame Sun, when all thoſe ſcattered Rays were at laſt gathered into one Body again at the appearance of the Sun of Righteouſneſs in the World.

X. Thus have we now cleared when predictions are expreſſive of God's internal purpoſes; by obſervation of which Rules we may eaſily reſolve the other part of the difficulty, when they only expreſs the ſeries and dependencies of things which wou'd have their iſſue and accompliſhment, if God by his immediate hand of Providence did not cut off the entail of effects upon their natural cauſes. Now as to theſe prophecies which concern things conſidered in themſelves, and not preciſely as they are in the counſel of God, we are to obſerve theſe Rules.

1. *Comminations of judgments to come do not in themſelves ſpeak the abſolute futurity of the event, but do only declare what the perſons to whom they are made are to expect, and what ſhall certainly come to paſs, unleſs God by his mercy interpoſe between the threatning and the event.* So that comminations do ſpeak only the *debitum pœnæ*, and the neceſſary obligation to puniſhment; but therein God doth not bind up himſelf as he doth in abſolute promiſes; the reaſon is becauſe comminations confer no right to any, which abſolute promiſes do; and therefore God is not bound to neceſſary performance of what he threatens. Indeed the guilt, or obligation to puniſhment is neceſſary, where the offence hath been committed to which the threatning was annexed; but the execution of that puniſhment doth ſtill depend upon God's arbitrarious Will, and therefore he may ſuſpend or remove it upon ſerious addreſſes made to himſelf in order to it. For ſince God was pleas'd not to take the preſent forfeiture of the firſt grand tranſgreſſion, but made ſuch a relaxation of that penal Law, that conditions of pardon were admittable, notwithſtanding ſentence paſs'd upon the malefactors, there is ſtrong ground of preſumption in Humane Nature that God's forbearance of Mankind notwithſtanding ſin, doth ſuppoſe his readineſs to pardon offenders upon their repentance, and therefore that all particular threatnings of judgments to come, do ſuppoſe incorrigibleneſs in thoſe they are pronounc'd againſt: Upon which the foundation of hope is built, that if timely repentance

pentance do intervene, God will remove those judgments which are threatned against them.

And this was certainly the case of the *Ninevites* upon *Jonas* his preaching among them. For when the threatning was so peremptory, *Yet forty days and* Nineve *shall be destroyed*, all the hope they cou'd have of pardon must be from the general perswasions of Men's Souls of God's readiness to remove judgments upon repentance. For otherwise there had been no place for any thing but despair, and not the least encouragement to supplicate the Mercy of God, which we see they did in a most solemn manner after they were convinc'd these comminations came from God himself by the mouth of his Prophet. Some think that *Jonas* together with the threatning of judgment did intermix exhortations to repentance; but we can find no probability at all for that on these two accounts: First, *Jonas* then wou'd not have been so unwilling to have undertaken this message; for as far as we can see, the harshness of it was the main reason he thought to have avoided it by flying to *Tarshish*. Secondly, *Jonas* wou'd have had no pretence at all for his anger and displeasure at God's pardoning *Nineve*; which is most probably conceiv'd to have been, because the *Ninevites* might now suspect him to be no true Prophet, because the event answer'd not his prediction. Now there had been no reason at all for this, if he had mix'd promises together with his threatnings; for then nothing wou'd have fall'n out contrary to his own predictions. And therefore it seems evident that the message *Jonas* was sent with, was only the commination of their speedy ruin, which God did on purpose to awaken them the sooner, and with greater earnestness to repentance, when the judgment was denounc'd in so peremptory a manner; altho' it seems *Jonas* had before such apprehensions of the *merciful nature of God*, and his readiness to pardon, that he might suppose God's intention by this severe denunciation of judgment, might be only to take occasion upon their repentance, to shew his goodness and bounty to them. But this was no part of his instructions, which he durst not go beyond in his preaching, whatever his private opinion might be; for the Prophets were to utter no more in their preaching or particular messages than was in their commission, and were not to mix their own words with the Word of the Lord. XI. Jonah 3. 4. Jonah 4. 2.

And by this we may further understand the denunciation of death to *Hezekiah* by the Prophet *Isaiah*, *Set thy house in order, for thou shalt die and not live*. I question not but the Prophet reveal'd to *Hezekiah* as much as God had reveal'd to him (for to say as *Molinæus* doth, that the Prophet spake these words of his own head, before he fully understood God's mind, is very harsh and incongruous) but God might at first discover to *Isaiah* not his internal purpose, but what the nature of the disease wou'd bring him to (unless his own immediate hand of Providence interpos'd) which message he wou'd have *Isaiah* carry to *Hezekiah* for the tryal of his Faith, and exciting him to the more lively acts of Grace, and for a further demonstration of God's goodness to him in prolonging his Life beyond humane probability and the course of Second Causes. Now what repugnancy is there to the truth and faithfulness of God, that God shou'd conceal from his Prophets in their Messages the internal purposes of his Will, and in order to the doing good to Men shou'd only reveal what wou'd certainly have come to pass unless himself had otherwise determin'd it. And thus the repentance which is attributed to God XII. Isa. 38. 1. *Molin. Vates, l. 1. c. 26.*

in reference to these denunciations of judgments, is far from importing any real mutation in the internal purposes of God (a rock some have split themselves upon) but it only signifies the outward changing of the Scene towards Men, and acting otherwise than the words of the Prophets did seem to import; and all the alteration is in the outward discovery of his Will, which is certainly far from being any collusion in God: Unless we must suppose God so bound up, that he hath no liberty of using his own methods for bringing Men to repentance, or for tryal of his People's graces, but must in every instance of his Word declare nothing but his own internal purposes, which is contrary to the general method of God's dealing with the World, which is, to govern Men by his own Laws, and thereby to awaken them to duty, and deter from sin by his annex'd threatnings, without revealing any thing of his internal purposes concerning the state and condition of any particular persons at all; which threatnings of his, tho' pronounced with the greatest severity, do not speak God's inward resolutions as to any particular person, but what all must expect if they continue impenitent and incorrigible. For the only conditions imply'd in these threatnings being repentance, it necessarily follows, that where that is wanting, these Hypothetical comminations are absolute predictions of what shall certainly come to pass on all those who are destitute of the condition suppos'd in them.

XIII. So that where any comminations are pronounced by any in a prophetical way concerning any person or people, and no alteration happen at all in them, but they continue impenitent and incorrigible, there the not coming of them to pass may be a token of a false Prophet. For in this case the only tacite condition imply'd in these threatning prophecies is suppos'd to be wanting, and so the comminations must be understood as absolute predictions: Now in those comminations in Scripture, which are absolutely expres's'd, but conditionally understood, we find something interposing, which we may rationally suppose was the very
Gen. 20. 8. condition understood. As *Abimelech's* restoring of *Sarah* was the ground why the sentence of death after it was denounced, was not executed up-
1 King. 21. 19. on him: So *Ahab*'s Humiliation, *Hezekiah* his earnest Prayer, the *Ninevites* Repentance, all interpos'd between sentence and execution, whereby we may be fully satisfy'd of the reason why these denunciations did not take effect: But where the persons continue the same after threatnings that they were before, there is no reason why the sentence shou'd be suspended, unless we shou'd suppose it to be a mere effect of the patience and long-suffering of God, leading Men to repentance and amendment of life: Which is the ground the *Jews* give, why the not fulfilling of denunciations of judgment was never accounted sufficient to prove
Maim. de fund. leg. c. 10 s. 6. a Man a false Prophet; to which purpose these words of *Maimonides* are observable in his *Jesude Thorah*, where he treats particularly on the subject of Prophecies: *If a Prophet foretell sad things, as the death of any one, or famine, or war, or the like; if these things come not to pass, he shall not be accounted a false Prophet; neither let them say, Behold he hath foretold, and it comes not to pass; for our blessed God is slow to anger, and rich in mercy, and repenteth of the evil; and it may be that they repent, and God may spare them, as he did the Ninevites, or defer the punishment, as he did* Hezekiah's. Thus we see that prophetical comminations do not express God's internal purposes, and therefore the event may not come to pass, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet.

2. *Pre-*

2. *Predictions concerning temporal bleſſings, do not always abſolutely ſpeak the certainty of the event, but what God is ready to do, if they to whom they are made continue faithful to him:* For which we have ſufficient ground from that place of *Jeremiah* 18. 9, 10. *At what inſtant I ſhall ſpeak concerning a Kingdom, to build and to plant it; if it do evil in my ſight, that it obey not my voice, then will I repent of the good wherewith I ſaid I would benefit them.* So *Iſaiah* 1. 19, 20. *If ye be willing and obedient, ye ſhall eat the good of the land; but if ye refuſe and rebel, ye ſhall be devoured with the ſword; for the mouth of the Lord hath ſpoken it.* Whereby we ſee it evident, that all promiſes of Temporal Bleſſings are not to be taken abſolutely, but with the condition of obedience. But this the *Jews* can by no means digeſt, whoſe Rule is, that all prophecies of good things to come muſt neceſſarily come to paſs, or he was no true Prophet who ſpake them: For, ſaith *Maimonides*, *Whatever good thing God hath promiſed, altho' it be promiſed under a condition, he never revokes it; and we never find that God repented him of any good thing promis'd, but in the deſtruction of the firſt Temple, when God had promis'd to the righteous, they ſhou'd not die with the wicked; but he repented him of his words.* But it is very plain to any one that conſiders the *Jewiſh* Interpretations of Scripture that in them they have always an eye to themſelves, and will be ſure not to underſtand thoſe Scripture which ſeem to thwart their own intereſt, as is moſt apparent in the preſent caſe; for the grand reaſon why the *Jews* inſiſt ſo much on the punctual accompliſhment of all Promiſes of good to be the ſign of a true Prophet is, to uphold their own intereſt in thoſe Temporal Bleſſings which are propheſy'd of concerning them in the Old Teſtament; altho' one wou'd think the want of correſpondency in the event in reference to themſelves, might make them a little more tender of the honour of thoſe Prophecies which they acknowledge to be divine; and have appear'd to be ſo in nothing more than the full accompliſhment of all thoſe threatnings which are denounced againſt them for their diſobedience, even by the mouth of *Moſes* himſelf, *Deut.* 28. from the 15th to the end. Can any thing be more plain and evident, than that the enjoyment of all the privileges conferr'd upon them, did depend upon the condition of their continuing faithful to God's Covenant? The only place of Scripture produced by them with any plauſibility, is that *Jer.* 28. 9. *The Prophet which propheſieth of peace, when the word of the Prophet ſhall come to paſs, then ſhall the Prophet be known that the Lord hath truly ſent him.* For reconciling of which place with thoſe already mention'd, we are to underſtand that here was a particular conteſt between two Prophets, *Hananiah* and *Jeremiah*; *Jeremiah* he foretold evil to come, tho' unwillingly, *ver. 6. Hananiah* he propheſyed peace. Now *Jeremiah*, according to God's peculiar directions and inſpiration, appeals to the event to determine whoſe prophecy was the trueſt: Now, ſaith *Jeremiah*, if the prophecy of *Hananiah* concerning peace be fulfill'd, then he is the true Prophet, and I the falſe. And in this caſe when two Prophets propheſy contrary things, it ſtands to reaſon that God will not reveal any thing by the mouth of his own Prophet which ſhall not infallibly come to paſs, that thereby the truth of his own Prophet may be fully manifeſted. Beſides *Jeremiah* refers not merely to the event foretold, but gives a ſudden ſpecimen of his own truth in another prophecy concerning the death of *Hananiah*, which was punctually accompliſh'd the ſame year, *ver.* 17. And which is moſt conſiderable to our purpoſe, both theſe Prophets

XIV. *Ibid. f.* 7, 8.

considered the same people under the same circumstances, and with the same conditions; and so *Jeremiah*, because of their incorrigibleness, foretells desolation certainly to come; notwithstanding this, *Hananiah* foretells peace and safety, which was contrary directly to God's method of proceeding, and so the falsity of his prophecy wou'd infallibly be discovered by the event. So that notwithstanding this Instance, it appears evident, that predictions of temporal Blessings do suppose conditions, and so have not always the event fulfilled, when the people do not perform their condition of obedience. And thus we have now laid down the Rules whereby the truth of prophecies was to be judg'd; by which it appears what little need the constant Prophets had to appeal to Miracles to manifest the certainty of Divine Revelation in them. So we have finished our first Proposition concerning the manner of trying Divine Revelation in the Prophets God sent among his people.

XV. 2. *Prop.* We now come to the second general Proposition concerning the Prophets. *Those Prophets whom God did imploy upon some extraordinary message for confirming the truth of the Religion established by him, had a power of Miracles conferred upon them in order to that end.* So that we must distinguish the ordinary imployment of Prophets, which was either Instruction or Prediction of future events among God's own people, from their peculiar messages when they were sent to give evidence to the truth of that way of Religion which was then settled by God's own appointment. Now the Prophets generally did suppose the truth of their Religion as owned by those they were sent to, and therefore it had been very needless imploying a power of Miracles among them to convince them of that which they believed already. For we never read among all the revolts of the people of the *Jews*, that they were lapsed so far as totally to reject the Law of *Moses*, (which had been to alter the constitution of their Common-wealth) altho' they did enormously offend against the precepts of it, and that in those things wherein the honour of God was mainly concerned, as is most plain in their frequent and gross Idolatry: Which we are not so to understand as tho' they wholly cast off the worship of the true God, but they superinduced (as the *Samaritans* did) the worship of Heathen Idols with that of the God of *Israel*. But when the revolt grew so great and dangerous that it was ready to swallow up the true worship of God unless some apparent evidence were given of the falsity of those Heathen mixtures, and further confirmation of the truth of the established Religion, it pleased God sometimes to send his Prophets on this peculiar message to the main instruments of this revolt, as is most conspicuous in that dangerous design of *Jeroboam*, when he out of a politic end set up his two Calves in opposition to the Temple at *Jerusalem*; and therein it was the more dangerous in that in all probability he designed not the alteration of the wor-
1 King. 12. 27. ship it self, but the establishment of it in *Dan* and *Bethel*. For his interest lay not in drawing of the people from the worship of God, but from his worship at *Jerusalem*, which was contrary to his design of cantonizing the Kingdom, and taking the greatest share to himself. Now that God might confirm his peoples Faith in this dangerous juncture of time, he sends a Prophet to *Bethel*, who by the working of present Mi-
1 King. 13. 2. racles there, *viz. the renting the Altar and withering of* Jeroboam's *hand*, did manifest to them that these Altars were displeasing to God, and that
1 King. 18. 38. the true place of worship was at *Jerusalem*. So in that famous *Fire-Ordeal* for trying the truth of Religion between God and *Baal* upon Mount

Carmel

Carmel by *Elijah*, God was pleas'd in a miraculous way to give the most pregnant testimony to the truth of his own worship by causing a *fire* to come down from Heaven and *consume the sacrifice*, by which the Priests of *Baal* were confounded, and the people confirmed in the Belief of the only true God: for presently upon the sight of this Miracle the people fall on their faces and say, *The Lord he is God, The Lord he is God.* 1 King. 18. 39. Whereby we plainly see what clear evidence is given to the truth of that Religion, which is attested with a power of Miracles. Thus the Widow of *Sarepta* which was in the Country of *Zidon*, was brought to believe *Elijah* to be a true Prophet by his raising up her Son to Life. And the Woman said to *Elijah*, *Now by this I know that thou art a Man of God, and that the word of the Lord by thy mouth is truth.* 1 King. 17. 24. So we see how *Naaman* was convinc'd of the true God by his miraculous cure in *Jordan* by the appointment of *Elisha*, *Behold now I know that there is no God in all the earth, but in* Israel; by which instances it is demonstrable that either the Faith of all these persons was built upon weak and insufficient grounds, or that a power of Miracles is an evident confirmation of the truth of that Religion which is establish'd by them. For this we see was the great end for which God did imploy any of his Prophets to work Miracles, *viz.* to be as an evident demonstration of the truth of what was revealed by him. So that this power of Miracles is not meerly a motive of credibility, or a probable inducement to remove prejudice from the person, as many of our Divines speak, but it doth contain an evident demonstration to Common Sense of the truth of that Religion which is confirm'd by them. 2 King. 5. 15.

XVI. And thus we assert it to have been in the case of *Moses*, the truth of whose message was attested both among the *Ægyptians*, and the *Israelites* by that power of Miracles which he had. But herein we have the great Patrons of *Moses* our greatest enemies, *viz.* the present *Jews*; who by reason of their enmity to the Doctrine of CHRIST, which was attested by unparallell'd Miracles, are grown very shy of the Argument drawn from thence: Insomuch that their great Dr. *Maimonides* lays down this for a confident Maxim, משה רבנו לא האמינו בו ישראל מפני האותות; *The Israelites did not believe in* Moses *our Master for the sake of the Miracles which he wrought.* Did they not? the more shame for them: and if they did, the more shame for this great *Rabbi* thus to belye them. But the reason he gives for it is, *Because there may remain some suspicion in ones mind, that all Miracles may be wrought by a power of Magic* or *Incantation:* Say ye so? what, when *Moses* confounded all the Magicians in *Ægypt*, and made themselves who were the most cunning in these things confess it was the finger of God, and at last give out as not able to stand before *Moses?* might one still suspect all this to be done by a Magical power? *Credat Judæus Appella, non ego.* This is much like what another of their Doctors says, whom they call the Divine Philosopher, that *Elisha* his raising the Child to Life, and curing *Naaman*'s Leprosy, and *Daniel*'s escaping the Lions, and *Jonas* out of the Whale's Belly, might all come to pass by the influence of the Stars, or by *Pythonism.* Very probable! but it is most true which *G. Vortius* there observes of the *Jews*, *Nihil non nugacissimi mortalium fingunt ne cogantur agnoscere virtute ac digito quasi ipsius Dei Jesum nostrum effeciisse miracula sua.* All their design in this is, only to lessen the Miracles of our Blessed Saviour, and to derogate all they can from the Belief of them. Hence they tell us, that nothing is so easy to be done as Miracles; the *Maim. de fund. leg. c. 8. f. 14.* *Jos. Alb. l. 1. c. 18.*

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mere recital of the *Tetragammaton* will work wonders, and that by this *Jeremiah* and our Saviour did all their Miracles: It is well yet that he did no more than one of their own Prophets had done before him; but where I wonder do we read that ever the pronouncing of four Letters raiſed one from the dead, who had lain four days in the grave? or by what power did *Chriſt* raiſe himſelf from the dead; (which was the greateſt Miracle of all) cou'd his dead Body pronounce the *Tetragrammaton* to awaken its ſelf with? But *Maimonides* further tells us, that the Miracles which *Moſes* wrought among the *Iſraelites* were merely for neceſſity, and not to prove the truth of his Divine Commiſſion, for which he inſtanceth in dividing the Red ſea, the raining of Manna, and the deſtruction of *Corah* and his complices. But ſetting aſide that theſe two latter were the immediate hand of God, and not Miracles done by *Moſes*; yet it is evident that the intent of them was to manifeſt a Divine Preſence among them: and in the tryal of *Corah Moſes* appeals to God's immediate Providence to manifeſt whether God had immediately imploy'd him or no. For it is evident by the Text, that the main charge they laid againſt *Moſes*, was ambition and uſurpation; *Is it a ſmall thing, ſay they, that thou haſt brought us up out of a Land that floweth with milk and honey, to kill us in the wilderneſs, except thou make thy ſelf altogether a prince over us?* Whereby it is evident they thought that *Moſes* acted out of a private deſign, and aimed at his own honour and authority; which was an imputation of the higheſt nature that cou'd be alledged againſt him. Now ſee how *Moſes* proceeds to clear himſelf, (which is ſufficient to ſtop the mouths of theſe incredulous *Jews*) for he lays the greateſt evidence of his Divine Commiſſion upon a preſent Miracle. And *Moſes* ſaid, *Hereby ſhall ye know that the Lord hath ſent me to do all theſe works; for I have not done them of mine own mind; If theſe men die the common death of all men, then the Lord hath not ſent me*, &c. Can any thing be more plain than that the only intent of this Miracle was to make it appear, that *Moſes* took not his office upon him, but was immediately ſent and imploy'd by God in what he did. But that which will put an end to this controverſy, is God's giving *Moſes* a power to work Miracles for that very end, that the *Iſraelites* ſhou'd believe him, *Exodus* 8. 8, 9. And can we think they wou'd have ever left *Ægypt* as they did, and followed *Moſes* into the wilderneſs, unleſs they had been fully convinced he was a deliverer ſent from God? It is true (that which the *Jews* ſpeak ſo much of) the *ſtatio in monte Sina* was a great confirmation both to their own Faith and to *Moſes* his, according to what God had told him, *Exod.* 3. 12. but yet it follows not hence they had no firm bottom for their Faith to ſtand on before (for then they might have been drowned in the Red ſea as well as the *Egyptians*) but God's knowing their incredulity and readineſs to diſobey his Law, did at the promulgation of it teſtify to their eyes and ears his own preſence in the midſt of them. And this certainly was one of the greateſt Miracles of all: and therefore to oppoſe this to the evidence that is produced by Miracles is only to oppoſe a power of working Miracles to a power of doing them. So vain and empty then, ſo falſe and fallacious, yea ſo directly contrary to Holy Scripture is that *Axiome* of the *Jews*, *Prophetiæ veritas non confirmatur miraculis:* for Miracles are ſufficient evidences of Divine Revelation in any whom God imploys, to all but ſuch as are reſolved not to believe them; and as one well ſaith, *Pertinaciæ nullum remedium poſuit Deus*; *God never works Miracles to convince obſtinate Atheiſts*

Numb. 16. 13.

V. 28, 29.

Exod. 19. 9.

theists and wilful Infidels. This now is the first case wherein Miracles are to be expected, which is, when God imploys any upon an extraordinary message, to be as credentials to confirm their Divine Commission.

CHAP. VII.

The eternity of the Law of *Moses* discussed.

I. *The second case wherein Miracles may be expected, when a Divine positive Law is to be repealed, and another way of worship established instead of it. The possibility in general of a repeal of a Divine Law asserted; the particular case of the Law of* Moses *disputed against the* Jews: II. *the matter of that Law proved not to be immutably obligatory; because the ceremonial precepts were required not for themselves, but for some further end; that proved from* Maimonides *his confession:* III. *the precepts of the Ceremonial Law frequently dispensed with while the Law was in force. Of the Passover of* Hezekiah, *and several other instances.* IV. *It is not inconsistent with the wisdom of* God *to repeal such an established Law.* Abravanel's *arguments answered.* V. *Of the perfection of the Law of* Moses, *compared with the Gospel.* VI. *Whether* God *hath ever declared he wou'd never repeal the Law of* Moses. VII. *Of adding to the precepts.* VIII. *Of the expressions seeming to imply the perpetuity of the Law of* Moses. *Reasons assigned why those expressions are used, tho' perpetuity be not implyed.* IX. *The Law of* Moses *not built upon immutable reason, because many particular precepts were founded upon particular occasions, as the customs of the* Zabii; X. *many ceremonial precepts thence deduced out of* Maimonides; XI. *and because such a state of things was foretold with which the observation of the Ceremonial Law wou'd be inconsistent.* XII. *That largely discovered from the prophecies of the Old Testament.*

I Now come to the second case wherein Miracles may be justly expected, which is, *When something which hath been before established by Divine Law, is to be repealed, and some other way of Worship to be set up instead of it.* Two things are very necessary to be spoken to for the clearing of this Proposition: First, *Whether a Law once established by God himself be capable of a repeal*; Secondly, *What necessity there is of Miracles to manifest God's intention of repealing a former Law.* These two contain the main foundation of the Dispute between the *Jews* and Us, *viz. Whether the Law of* Moses *was ever to be laid aside, and whether the Miracles of our Blessed Saviour were sufficient evidences of God's intention by him to repeal the former Law established by* Moses? I begin with the *first*, Whether a Divine Law in general or the Law of *Moses* in particular 1.

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may be abrogated or repealed, after God himself had made it evident that the promulgation of it was from himself. This must be confessed the strongest and most plausible plea the present *Jews* have for their Infidelity, and therefore the eternity of the Law of *Moses* is made by them one of the fundamental Articles of their present Creed, and is pleaded for with the greatest subtility by their great *R. Abravanel*, who spends his whole 13th Chapter *de capite fidei* upon it, but with what success, will be seen in our clearing of it. There are but three things can be supposed as the grounds why a Law once promulged by God himself, shou'd not be capable of Repeal; and those are either first, *Because the things themselves commanded in that Law are of such nature, that they are not capable of being dispensed with:* Or secondly, *that it is not consistent with the wisdom of God to repeal a Law once established:* Or thirdly, *that the reason of the Law continuing always the same, it would argue mutability in God to revoke that Law, and establish another instead of it:* If we can therefore demonstrate, *That the matter of the Law of* Moses *is of a positive and mutable nature, that is suitable to the wisdom of God to alter it*, and *that sufficient account in reason may be given for the alteration of it*; Then there can be no imaginable necessity that a Law once having God for its Author, must therefore derive from him an eternal and immutable obligation.

II. First then as to the matter of the Law; and here it must be suppos'd, that in the matter of Controversy between us and the *Jews*, the question is not of any of those things which are therefore commanded, because they are intrinsecally good, as the precepts of the Natural or Moral Law; but of those things which are therefore only good, because God commands them, *i. e.* things merely positive, whose worth and value ariseth not from the intrinsic weight of the things, but from the external impress of Divine Authority upon them. Now it is no question on either hand whether God may require these things or no; nor whether these things will be acceptable unto God, so long as he requires them; but whether, when once required, the obligation to them can never cease. Such kind of things among the *Jews* we suppose all the Rites and Ceremonies of the Law to be; *viz.* Circumcision, Distinction of Meats and Days, Customs of sacrificing, and such like, and whatever other Laws respected them as a distinct and peculiar Common-wealth. All these we say are such as do not carry an immutable obligation along with them; and that on these accounts.

1. First, *Because these things are not primarily required for themselves, but in order to some further end.* Things that are required upon their own account, carry an indispensable obligation in them to their performance; but where things are commanded not for themselves, but the Legislator doth express some particular grounds of requiring them, there the end and intention of the Legislator is the measure of their obligation. To which purpose *Maimonides* excellently speaks, when he says, *That the particular manner of worship among the* Jews, *as sacrifices and oblations, were secundum intentionem secundam Dei, God's secondary intention and design; but prayer, invocation, and the like, were nearer God's primary intention: Now,* saith he, *for the first, they are no further acceptable to God, than as all the circumstances of time, place, and persons are observed, which are prescribed by God himself; but the latter are acceptable in any person, time, or place. And for this cause,* saith he, *it is that we find the Prophets often reproving men for their too great sedulity in bringing oblations, and inculcating*

Maimon. More Nev. p. 3. c. 32.

inculcating this to them, that God did not intend these as the principal instances of his worship, and that God did not need any of these things. So 1 *Sam.* 15. 22. *Behold to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken, than the fat of rams:* Isa. 1. 11. *To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord.* And especially *Jerem.* 7. 22, 23. *For I spake not to your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them forth out of the land of Ægypt, concerning burnt-offerings; but this thing I commanded them, saying, Obey my voice and I will be your God, and ye shall be my people.* Of which words *Maimonides* saith, *Scrupulum moverunt omnibus, quos mihi videre aut audire contigit*; For say they, How can it be that God did not command them concerning Sacrifices, when a great part of the Law is about them: But *Maimonides* well resolves the doubt thus, *That God's primary Intention, and that which he chiefly looked at, was obedience; but God's Intention in sacrifices and oblations, was only to teach them the chief thing, which was obedience.* This then is of the number of those things which are spoken absolutely, but to be understood comparatively; as, *I will have mercy and not sacrifice. My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me. It is not you that speak, but the Holy Ghost*, &c. So that we see all the goodness which is in these things, is convey'd into them by that which is morally good, which is obedience; and God did never regard the performance of those Laws any further than as it was an expression of obedience, and it was conjoyn'd with those other moral duties which were most agreeable to the Divine Nature. And in this sense many understood that difficult place, *Ezek.* 20. 25. *And I gave them* חקים לא טובים *statutes that were not good*, i. e. say they, *comparatively with these things which were simply and in themselves good*; to which purpose they give this Rule: *Aliquid negatur inesse alicui, quod alterius comparatione existimatur exiguum.* But I rather think that which the *Chaldee* Paraphrast suggests, and others explain further, to be the meaning of that place; *viz.* that by the Precepts that were not good, is meant the cruel and tyrannical impositions of those enemies God for their sins did deliver them over to, which were far from being acceptable to them, which is frequently the sense of Good in Scripture. Thus we see one reason why the Ceremonial Precepts do not in themselves imply an immutable obligation, because they are not commanded for themselves, but in order to a further end.

III. 2. *Because God hath frequently dispensed with the Ceremonial Precepts when they were in greatest force, if the end of them could be attained without them.* Thus the Precept of Circumcision slept during the *Israelites* travels in the Wilderness. Thus *David* ate of the *Shew-bread*, which is expresly forbidden in the Law; the *Jews* think to evade this by distinguishing between the Bread of Confession in the *Eucharistical* Offering, mentioned *Leviticus* 7. 13. and the proper *Shew-bread:* Exod. 29. Now they say *David* ate only of the First, and not of the Second; but 33. this is *Glossa Aurelianensis*, which overthrows the Text; for it is expresly said, that the ground why the Priest gave him Holy Bread, was because there was none there but לחם הפנים, *the shew-bread*, 1 *Sam.* 21. 6. A like violation of the Law without reproof, is commonly supposed by the *Jews* to have been in the siege of *Jericho*, *viz.* in the case of the *Sabbath.* But it is more plain in that *Anomalous Passover* observed by *Hezekiah*, which many of the *Jews* themselves acknowledge was not observed as the *Second Passover*, provided by the Law to be cele- Numb. 9. brated on the 14 day of the *second month by those who were debarred of* 11.

the first for their legal uncleanness; but they suppose it to have been intended for the *Legal Passover*; only because the fourteenth of *Nisan* was passed before the Sanctification of the *Temple was finished*, lest they should celebrate none at all that year, they tell us that *Hezekiah* with the consent of the Rulers, did make an Interculation that year of a whole Month, and so *Nisan* was reckon'd for the second *Adar*, and *Jiar* for *Nisan*, from whence they say that *Hezekiah* did intercalate *Nisan* in *Nisan*, that is, added another *Nisan* to the first. But where do we read any such thing permitted in the Law as the celebrating the First *Passover* the 14th of the second Month? But granting that it was observed as a second *Passover*, because of the want of Legal Sanctification both in Priests and People; yet we find great irregularities in the observation of it; for it is expressly said, *That a multitude of the people had not cleansed themselves, yet they did eat the Passover otherwise than it was written.* And yet it is said upon *Hezekiah's prayer*, *that the Lord hearkned to* Hezekiah, , *and healed every one.* So that we see God himself did dispense with the strict Ceremonial Precepts of the Law, where Men did look after the main and substantial parts of the worship God required from them. Nay God himself hath expressly declared his own Will to dispense with the Ritual and Ceremonial Law, where it comes to stand in competition with such things as have an eternal Goodness in them, when he saith, *He desired mercy and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God more than burnt-offerings.* Thus we plainly see that the Ceremonial Law, however positive it was, did yield as to its obligation, when any thing that was Moral, stood in competition with it. And so the *Jews* themselves suppose an open violation of the Judicial Law to have been in the hanging up of *Saul's* Sons, a long time together, directly contrary to *Deut.* 21. 23. which they conceive to have been from the 16 of *Nisan* to the 17 of *Marcheshvan*, which is as much as from our *March* to *September*, whereas the Law saith expressly that the *body of one that is hanged shall not remain all night upon the tree, but thou shalt in any wise bury him that day.* One of the *Jewish Rabbies*, as *G. Vorstius* tells us, is so troubled at this, *That he wisheth that place in* Samuel *expunged out of Scripture, that the Name of God might be sanctified.* But whether this were done על פי הביבור, *by the command of the Oracle or no*, or whether only by a general Permission, we see it was *acceptable unto God*; for upon that the *Gibeonites famine* was *removed, and God was intreated for the land.* Thus we have now proved that there is no immutable and indispensable obligation which ariseth from the things themselves.

2 Chron. 29. 17.

Vid. Selden de Anno civili Jud. cap. 9.

2 Chron. 30. 18.

Ver. 20.

Hos. 6. 6.

2 Sam. 21. 9, 10.

Vorst. Not. in Abrav. c. 13.

IV. Secondly, It is no way inconsistent with the Wisdom of God to repeal such a Law when once established. The main argument of that learned *R. Abravanel*, whereby he wou'd establish the eternity of the Law of *Moses*, is fetched from hence, *That this Law was the result of the Wisdom of God, who knows the suitableness of things he appoints to the ends he appoints them for*; *as God hath appointed bread to be the food of Man's body: Now we are not to enquire why God hath appointed bread and no other thing to be the food of Man*; *no more*, saith he, *are we to enquire why God hath appointed this Law rather than another for the food of our Souls*; *but we are to rest contented with the counsels of God, tho' we understand not the reason of them.* This is the substance of that Argument, which he more largely deduceth. To which we answer, that his Argument holds good for Obedience to all God's positive Precepts of what kind or nature soever they be, so long as we know their Obligation to continue; but all the

Abravanel Rosh. Amanana, c. 13.

the queſtion is, whether every poſitive Precept muſt always continue to oblige. And thus far his ſimilitude will hold good, that whatever God doth command, we are to look upon it to be as neceſſary to our Souls, as bread to our Bodies; but hence it follows not that our Souls muſt be always held to the ſame poſitive Precepts, any more than our Bodies to the ſame kind of food. Nay, as in our Bodies we find ſome kind of food always neceſſary, but the kind of it to alter according to age, health, and conſtitutions; ſo we ſay ſome kind of Divine Revelation is always neceſſary; but God is graciouſly pleaſed to temper it according to the age and growth of his People; ſo he fed them as with Milk in their Non-age, with a Ritual and Ceremonial Law, and trained them up by degrees under the Nurſery of the Prophets, till the Church was grown to age, and then God fed it with the ſtrong Meat, which is contained in God's Revelation of his Will by the Goſpel of his Son. And therein was abundantly ſeen God's πολυποίκιλος σοφία, his *variegated Wiſdom*, that he made choice of ſuch excellent and proportionable ways to his People's capacity to prepare them gradually for that full and compleat Revelation, which was reſerved for the time of the appearance of the true *Meſſias* in the World. For can any thing be more plain than the gradual progreſs of divine Revelation from the beginning of the World? That fair reſemblance and portraicture of God himſelf, and his Will upon his Word (if I may ſo expreſs it) had its Ground-work laid upon Man's firſt Apoſtacy in the Promiſe made *Gen.* 3. 15. whereon ſome further lines were drawn in the times of the Patriarchs, but it had its σκιαγραφία, it was ſhadowed out the moſt in the Typical and Ceremonial Law, but was never filled up to the life, nor had its perfect ζωογραφία, 'till the Son of God himſelf appeared unto the World. If then it be inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom of God to add any thing to the Law of *Moſes*, why not to the Revelation made to *Adam* or the Patriarchs? or eſpecially to the ſeven Precepts of *Noah*, which they ſuppoſe to have been given to all Mankind after the Flood? If it were not repugnant to the Wiſdom of God to ſuperadd Rituals and Ceremonials to Morals and Naturals, why ſhall it be to take down the ſcaffolds of Ceremonies, when God's Spiritual Temple the Church of God is come to its full height? Is there not more reaſon that Rituals ſhou'd give place to Subſtantials, than that ſuch ſhou'd be ſuper-induced to Morals?

There are only two things can be pleaded by the *Jews* why it ſhould be more repugnant to the Wiſdom of God to add to the Law of *Moſes*, than to any former Revelation, which are the greater perfection they ſuppoſe to be in this Revelation above others, and that God in the promulgation of it did expreſs that he would never alter it. But both theſe are manifeſtly defective and inſufficient, in order to the end for which they are produced. For *firſt*, what evidence is there that the Law of *Moſes* contained ſo great perfection in it, as that it was not capable of having any additions made to it by God himſelf? We ſpeak not now of the perfection of the Moral Law, which it is granted contained in it the foundation of all poſitive Precepts; for this we never contend for the abrogation of, but the Ritual Law is that we meddle with; and is it poſſible any Men ſhou'd be ſo little befriended by Reaſon as to think this to be the utmoſt pitch of what God cou'd reveal to the World, as to the way of his own Worſhip? Let any indifferent rational perſon take the Precepts of the Goſpel, and lay them in the balance with thoſe of the Ceremonial Law, and if he makes any ſcruple of deciding on V. Pſal. 19. 10.

which side the over-weight lies, we may have cause to suspect him forsaken of that little Reason which gave him the name of Man. Let but the fifth of *Matthew* be laid against the whole book of *Leviticus*, and then see whether contains the more excellent Precepts and more suitable to the Divine Nature? I speak not this to disparage any thing which had once God for the Author of it, but to let us see how far God was from the necessity of Natural Agents to act to the height of his strength in that discovery of his Will. God is wise as well as righteous in all his ways; as he can command nothing but what is just; so he will command nothing but what is good, nay excellent in its kind. But tho' all the Stars be in the same Firmament, *yet one Star differs from another in glory*; though they may be all Pearls, yet some may be more *Orient* than others are; every place of Holy Scripture may have its Crown, but some may have their *Aureolæ*, a greater excellency, a fuller and larger capacity than the other hath; every parcel of Divine Revelation may have some perfection in its kind, yet there may be some *monstra perfectionis* in *Scaliger*'s expression that may far out-vye the Glory and Excellency of the rest. Can we think the mists and umbrages of the Law could ever cast so glorious a Light as the Sun of Righteousness himself in his Meridian Elevation? As well may we think a dark shady passage more magnificent and glorious than the most princely Palace, a Picture drawn in charcoal more exquisite and curious than the lines of *Apelles*, some imperfect rudiments more exact and accurate than the most elaborate work, as go about to compare the Law of *Moses* with the Gospel of *Jesus Christ* in point of excellency and perfection. Let the *Jews* then boast never so much of their *gradus Mosaicus*, and how much it exceeds the degree of Revelation in other Prophets, we know if his light be compar'd with what the Gospel communicates, *Moses* himself saw but as in a glass darkly, and not in *speculo lucido*, as the *Jews* are wont to speak. We honour *Moses* much, but we have learnt to honour him at whose Transfiguration he was present, more; neither can that be thought any disparagement to him, who accounted *the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Ægypt.*

VI. *But it may be, tho' the Law in its self be not so absolutely perfect, yet God may have declared he will never alter it, and then it is not consistent with Divine Wisdom to repeal it.* Very true: God will never alter what he hath said he will not; but where is it that he hath thus bound up himself? Is it in that noted place to this purpose, *Thou shalt not add thereto nor diminish from it?* So indeed *Maimonides* argues; but therein more like a *Jew* than himself; and yet one of his own Nation therein far more ingenuous than he, gives a most sufficient answer to it, which is *R. Jos. Albo*, whose words are thus produced by *Vorstius* and others; *The Scripture only admonisheth us, that we should not add to nor diminish from God's commands according to our own wills; but what hinders*, saith he, *but God himself may according to his own Wisdom add or diminish what pleaseth?* But are they in good earnest when they say God bound up himself by this Speech? whence came then all the Prophetical Revelations among the *Jews?* did these add nothing to the Law of *Moses*, which was as much the Will of God when revealed by them, as any thing was revealed by *Moses* himself? or will they say that all those things were contained for the substance in the Law of *Moses*, as to what concerned practice? Very true; but not in the Ceremonial, but the Moral Law; and so we shall not stick to grant that the whole duty of Man may be reduced

Deut. 12. 32.

Maimon de de fund. leg. c. 9. s. 1.

Ikkarim l. 3. c. 14.

duced to that. But if adding to the Precepts be the doing of God's Commands in another way than he hath preſcribed, and diminiſhing from them be merely not to do what God hath commanded, as ſome conceive, then theſe words are ſtill more remote from the ſenſe affixed on them by the incredulous *Jews*. For why may not God himſelf add to his own Laws, or alter the form of them, altho we are always bound directly to follow God's declared will? May not God enlarge his own Will, and bring his Scholars from Rudiments of their non-age to the higher knowledge of thoſe who are full grown? or muſt the World of neceſſity do that which the old *Roman* ſo much abhorred, *ſeneſcere in elementis, wax gray in learning this A, B, C?* or was the Ceremonial Law like the *China* Characters, that the World might ſpend its Age in conning of them? But it appears that there was no other meaning in that ſtrict prohibition, than that Men ſhou'd not of their own heads offer to find out new ways of worſhip as *Jeroboam* did, but that God's Revelation of his own Will in all its different degrees was to be the adequate Rule of the way and parts of his own worſhip. And I wou'd fain know of the *Jews* whether their own ſevere and ſtrict Prohibitions of things not at all forbidden in the Law of God, and that on a religious account, as סיג לתורה *a boundary to the Law*, come not nearer the adding to God's Law, than God's own further declaration of his Will doth? All the diſpute then muſt be, not whether God may add to his own Law, but whether the Goſpel be a prohibited addition to the Law of *Moſes*; that is whether it be only the invention of Men, or it be the expreſs declaration of the Will of God? As to which controverſy, he is no true Chriſtian who dare not readily joyn iſſue with them, and undertake to prove by all the Arguments by which they believe the Law of *Moſes* to have been of Divine Revelation, that the Goſpel of *Chriſt* is a clear Manifeſtation of the Will of God. But of that afterwards.

VII. From hence it is evident that God hath not by this place tied up himſelf from any further Manifeſtation of his Mind beyond the Law of *Moſes*; but it may be they may put a greater confidence in thoſe expreſſions which ſeem neceſſarily to imply a perpetual and unalterable obligation in the Law of *Moſes*: For, ſaith the late learned *Rabbi Manaſſeh Ben Iſrael*, *If by ſuch expreſſions as thoſe are uſed in Scripture which ſeem to import the perpetuity of the Law of* Moſes, *ſomewhat elſe ſhould be meant than they ſeem to expreſs; what did* Moſes *and the Prophets in uſing them but lay a ſtumbling-block in the ways of Men, whereas they might have ſpoken clearly, and told us there ſhould a time come when the Ceremonial Law ſhould oblige no longer?* This being a charge of ſo high a nature, muſt not be diſmiſt without a particular enquiry into the expreſſions which are the ground and reaſon of it. The places moſt inſiſted on by the *Jews* are *Deut.* 29. 29. *Things which are revealed belong to us and to our Children* עד עולם *for ever*. So *Levit.* 23. 14. the precept of offering the firſt fruits is there called חקת עולם *a ſtatute for ever*; and that of the *Paſſover*, *Exod.* 12. 17. where the ſame expreſſion is uſed. From hence they infer that no alteration can happen as to the Ceremonial Law, ſince God himſelf hath declared that it ſhall continue for ever. To this common argument of the *Jews*, it is in general reply'd, That the word in which the main force of the argument lies, doth not carry with it an abſolute perpetuity, but it ſignifies according to the ſubject it is joyned with. So when it is apply'd to God, it ſignifies Eternity, not

Manaſſ. Concil. in Levit. 9. 7.

not so much from the mere importance of the word, as from the neces-
Maimon. More Nev. p. 2. c. 28. sary existence of the Divine Nature. Thence *Maimonides* himself can say, *Proinde sciendum est quod Olam non necessario significet æternitatem, nisi ei conjungantur Ed* (עד *vel* עד) *idque vel post illud ut Olam vaed, vel ante at Ad Olam.* Altho' this Rule of his hath no certainty at all in it, as appears from his Collection of it, which is because it is said, *Psal.* 10. 16. *The Lord he is King Olam vaed, for ever and ever:* but as I said already, that it is not from the signification of the word, but the nature of the thing. And it is most plain in Scripture that עולם is so far from implying a necessary perpetuity, that it is apply'd to such things as can have no long duration, as *Exod.* 21. 6. *and he shall serve him,* לעולם, that is, (as the *Jews* themselves expound it) *to the next Jubilee, tho' it were near or a far off.* So 1 *Sam.* 1. 22. where *Samuel* is said *to abide before the Lord* ועד־עולם *for ever,* where we find *Maimonides* his *Ad Olam* in a sense very far short of Eternity; this is so plain that the formerly cited *R. Joseph Albo* doth in terms confess it, and produceth a multitude of other places to the same purpose. For which tho' he be sufficiently censured by his Brethren, yet we may see there may be some ingenuity left in a *Jewish Rabbi*, even in the grand dispute concerning the Eternity of the Law of *Moses.*

VIII. All the difficulty now is to assign some rational accounts why such Precepts which God did not intend shou'd be always obligatory, yet shou'd be enforced upon them in such expressions which may seem at least to imply a Perpetuity. Of which these may be given. First, *That these Precepts to which these expressions are annexed, shou'd not be looked on as mere ambulatory Laws that did only concern them in their travels thro' the Wilderness, and not continue obligatory when they were settled in* Canaan. For which purpose we are to observe, That tho' all the Laws were given in one body in the Wilderness, yet the obligation to all of them did not commence at the same time, neither were they to continue for the same duration; these three sorts of Precepts may be observed among them; first such as concerned them only in their present condition, as that about the Tabernacle, which was then a moveable Temple among them, suitable to their condition; but when they were settled, God was to have a settled House too. So that Precept of going without *the camp*, Deut. 32. 12. had an immediate respect to their Peregrination. *Secondly*, Such Precepts as were given them, but they were not bound to perform them 'till their settlement in *Canaan, as driving out the Canaanites*, Numb. 33. 52. *building the Temple in the place which God shou'd choose, erecting Judicatories in their several Cities, choosing a King*, &c. *Thirdly*, There were such Precepts as concern them where-ever they were, whether in the Wilderness or in *Canaan*; now these are the Precepts which are said to be perpetual. This is the ac-
Grot. de Verit. Rel. Christ. l. 5. s. 7. count given of it by *H. Grotius*; but because this may be liable to some Exceptions, I therefore add, *Secondly*, That the reason of those expressions being annexed to the Precepts of the Ceremonial Law, is, *Because they were to continue obligatory 'till such a remarkable period of time came which should alter the state of things among them.* And such a period of time the coming of the *Messias* is by themselves supposed to be, when in their famous computation they make three *Epocha's*, Before the Law, Under the Law, and the Coming of the *Messias*. And it is evident yet by them, that they do still expect a wonderful alteration of the state of things when the *Messias* comes; doth it not therefore stand to reason

that

that לעולם should be added to such things which were to continue 'till so great alteration as should be on the coming of the *Messias*, especially if the Coming of the *Messias* had been deferred so long as they falsly suppose it to be? But however, granting that a new series of times or αἰὼν is to commence from the *Messias*, there is very great reason why that expression should be added to those things which were to continue as long as the αἰὼν did, *i. e.* 'till *Messias* came, which we freely acknowledge. And in this sense is עולם often taken for such a duration of things which had some remarkable period to conclude it, as in the case of the *Jubilee*, in the Servant mentioned, and the special imployment which God called *Samuel* to, in this case, as to the event, or the end of his life in *Hannah*'s designation, when she said he should attend upon the Lord for ever. *Thirdly*, Those Precepts are said *to endure for ever, which would still have continued obligatory, unless God himself had altered the obligatian of them by a new Revelation of his Will.* For in this case it is most certain that all positive Precepts coming immediately from God, do carry with them an unalterable obligation, unless the Legislator himself do in as evident a way repeal them as he did once establish them; that is in such Laws which depend merely upon God's Positive and Arbitrary Will. For in this case God allows none to alter any thing concerning his Law; but indispensable obedience is our duty 'till God himself repeal his former Laws. And this we assert to be the case of the Gospel. So that it appears plainly that it implies nothing inconsistent with the Wisdom of God to repeal an established Positive Law, tho' some expressions to prejudiced minds seem to imply a perpetuity in it.

IX. We come therefore to the third thing which may make a Positive Law unalterable, which is, when the reason of it is immutable; for then, say they, it wou'd argue mutability in God to repeal it. If we can therefore make it evident that the Ceremonial Law was not established on an immutable Reason, and that the Reason on which it was established doth suppose a state of things to come, in which it should expire, then there cannot be the least pretence of mutability in God on the repeal of such a Law. First, *That it was not established upon an immutable Reason:* The immutable Reason of a Law must either be fetched from the nature of the things commanded, or the grounds of the establishing of it; we have already proved that the nature of the Positive Precepts of the Ceremonial Law do not carry in them an intrinsecal goodness. And here the Sophistry of the *Jews* is apparently discovered, that when they are pressed with this, they take sanctuary in the *Decalogue*, or some Spiritual Precepts, which comprehend in them the general foundation of the Law; as *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*, &c. whereas these are very remote from the matter in controversy, which concerns not what Precepts were moral in their Law, but what were purely ceremonial; which were so far from being founded on an immutable Reason, that the particular occasion of the giving of many of them, is particularly assigned them by their own Writers; especially in the main parts of the Ceremonial Worship of God among them, the reasons of which *Maimonides* saith may be deduced from the Customs of the *Zabaists*, the knowledge of whose Opinions and Customs, he tells us, is *porta magna ad reddendas præceptorum causas, gives much light to the Law of* Moses; and particularly of himself, he saith, *Quod multarum legum rationes & causæ mihi innotuerint ex cognitione fidei, rituum*

Maimon. More Nev. l. 3. c. 29.

rituum & cultus Zabiorum; that he came to the right understanding of many of the Laws of *Moses* by his knowledge in the Rites and Customs of these *Zabaists*. Granting therefore the *Hypothesis* of this learned *Rabbi*, that the Precepts of the Law had most of them a particular respect to the idolatrous Customs of these People; what will hence follow but only this, that the reason of the Ceremonial Precepts did respect the Customs in use when they were given, and so are not founded upon an immutable Reason? And the more the Precepts are whose Reason is to be fetched from hence, the more plain and evident is the thing we intended by it, *viz. That the Ceremonial Law is not founded upon an unalterable Reason.*

X. Now from this one head of the idolatrous Customs of those Nations about them hath that learned Author deduced the Reasons of very many of the most obscure Commands of the Ceremonial Law: As that concerning *rounding the corner of their heads*, which *Herodotus* tells us was the Custom of the *Arabians*, and others of the *Babylonian* Priests; by both which the *Zabii* may be meant, the superstition of the *Zabii* being *Chaldæan*, as I have shewed already, and their Name, as some conceive, from *Saba* the Son of *Chus*, whose posterity were seated in *Arabia*, near to the Red Sea; and that which confirms this opinion, is, that the *Sabeans* did as *Philostorgius* saith, *Worship the Sun and Moon*, as the *Zabaists* did in *Maimonides*; and withal *Bochartus* makes it evident from *Strabo*, that some of the *Babylonians* called *Gerrhæi*, possessed themselves of the Country of the *Sabeans*, whereby this originally *Chaldaic* superstition might spread its self in these parts near the confines of *Judæa*, which might be the cause why all those Rites, which were used by these idolatrous People, are so severely forbidden to the *Jews*: God thereby setting up a Wall of Separation between his People and the Nations round about them, by making the Custom of the *Jews* almost *Antipodes* to theirs; as those of *Japan* are to them of *China*. Upon the same ground it is supposed that other Precepts were made against *wearing a garment of linen and woollen*, because the idolatrous Priests *used to go so cloathed*, as *Maimonides* tells us out of their Books, and likewise that prohibition of a *woman's wearing the armour of a man, and a man's wearing the garments of a woman* is very probably supposed to have had its original from that idolatrous Custom mentioned by the same Author, *Ut vir gestet Vestimentum muliebre coloratum quando stat coram stella Veneris; similiter ut mulier induat loricam & arma bellica quando stat coram stella Martis*; but that Author doth not deny a further reason to be couched in it for the preservation of publick honesty. Many other Precepts are drawn from the same fountain by that same Author, as *the sowing of divers seeds in the same ground*; *the forbidding the eating of the fruit of their trees for the first three years after they came to* Canaan; that being the furthest time wherein the trees of their own plantation wou'd begin to bear in that Country. Now it was the Custom of all those idolatrous People, that the first time any tree did bear, part of the fruit was to be burnt up in an offering to the Idol, and the other part eaten in the Idol-Temple; or else they supposed their trees wou'd never prosper: Now in opposition to this, God bids them bring the fruit of the Fourth year to him, and eat of the Fifth themselves, *that it may yield unto you the increase thereof.* So the Idolaters threatned all parents that their Children wou'd never live, unless they *caused them to pass thro' the fire*; from which Custom *Maimonides* saith, *Some even in his time would take the children that were new born*

Levit. 19. 27. *V. Voss. in Maimon. de Idololat. c. 12.*

Bochart. Phaleg l. 4. c. 8.

Levit. 19. 19.

Maimon. More Nev. l. 3. c. 37. Deut. 22. 5.

V. Selden de Diis Syris, Synt. 2. cap. 4.

Lev. 19. 19. Lev. 19. 23.

Levit. 19. 24, 25.

born, and move them up and down over a fire wherein odoriferous smells were cast. Thence comes that strict Prohibition of *giving the children to* Moloch, which was by that Custom of passing through the fire. To this same Head, the same Author refers that of *not eating the member of a living creature*, which we render *flesh with the life thereof*; which was forbidden, as he elsewhere tells us, not only for avoiding cruelty, but because the *Heathen Nations were wont in their idolatrous Feasts to take a member off from a living creature, and eat it afterwards*; and in them likewise he supposeth they used the *boiling the flesh and the milk together, which*, saith he, *besides that it affords a most gross nourishment, savours of their idolatrous practices too*; *and therefore*, saith he, *it is observable that twice where this Precept is mentioned, it follows that of the solemn appearance of the males at* Jerusalem *trice a year, whereby it seems to be imply'd that this action had relation to some great solemnity.* These and several other Precepts of the Law of *Moses* are deduced by that very learned *Rabbi* from idolatrous Customs, as the occasions of them; which seem to have the more reason in them, because that God did in the general so strictly *forbid the Jews to walk after the custom of the Nations about them.* Thence *Origen* takes notice of the τὸ ξενίζον τῶν νόμων. καὶ τῷ ἰδιότροπον καθ' αὑτὰς πολιτείαν; for which he saith, they were διαβεβλημένοι, *reproached by the Heathens, because their Laws and Polity were so different from the Custom of other Nations.* Thus we see then that many Precepts of the Ceremonial Law, were founded neither on the goodness of the things themselves, nor on any unalterable reason, but were enforced on a peculiar reason on the People of the *Jews* at that time, as they were a People separated from the rest of the world for the worship of the true God. And for the other great offices wherein their Religion did so much consist, *viz.* Sacrifices, Distinction of Meats, Observation of Festivals, Circumcision, and such like: The particular account and reason of them is either so evident in the Law its self, or so fully acknowledg'd by their own Writers, that it is here superfluous to insist on them; especially since so many have done that so largely already (particularly *Grotius*) whose labours I intend not to transcribe.

Levit. 20. 2, 3. Gen. 9. 4. *Maimon. More Nev. p. 3. c. 48.* Exod. 23. 17, 19. 34. 26. Levit. 20. 23. *Origen. contra Celsum l. 4.* *Grot. de veritate Rel. Christ. l. 5.*

XI. I come therefore to the second thing, which is, *That the Ceremonial Law was so far from being founded on an immutable reason, that while it was in its greatest force such a state of things was plainly foretold, with which the observation of that Law would be inconsistent.* For which we are to consider, that tho' the Law of *Moses* seemed outwardly to respect the temporal advantages of the People embracing it in the Land of *Canaan*; yet there was a Spring of Spiritual Promises whose head was higher than *Jordan* was, that ran down from the Patriarchs, and was more fully opened to some of them, which tho' it seemed to run under ground in the midst of the Ceremonial Observations of the Law; yet it frequently brake forth and opened its self in the midst of them, and by degrees in the Prophetical Age did make its self a larger Channel, 'till in the time of the *Messias* by its force and violence it overthrew those banks which stood in the way of it, and overspread the face of the whole Earth. It is evident by the whole series of the Scripture of the Old Testament, that God's ultimate intention was not to confine the saving Knowledge of his Will only to the *Jews*; for the great Promise to *Abraham* was, *That in his seed all the nations of the earth should be blessed*; And as *Abraham rejoyced to see that day afar off*; so good *Jacob*, when he leaned on his *Jacob's* Staff, took the height of that *Day-Star*

from on high, which tho' like ſome of the fix'd Stars, might not for ſome time be viſible to the inferior World; yet foretold the time when he ſhou'd deſcend into a lower Orb, and become conſpicuous in our Horizon. And conſequently to his appearance in the World, wou'd be the drawing not ſo much the Eyes as the Hearts of the World to him; for no ſooner is it mentioned that *Shiloh comes when the Scepter departs from Judah*; but it immediately follows, *And to him ſhall the gathering of the people be.* Thus we ſee before ever the Law of *Moſes* came to incloſe the People of the *Jews* as *Gods peculiar people*, there was a deſign on foot, for inlarging the bounds of God's Inheritance, and *making the uttermoſt parts of the earth his Son's poſſeſſion.* Can we then think that the Law which came afterwards, cou'd diſannul the Covenant made 430 years before, as the Apoſtle excellently reaſons? Can we believe the Moſaical diſpenſation was the utmoſt of what God did intend, when God had before promiſed that the Bleſſing of *Abraham* ſhou'd come upon us *Gentiles* alſo? To which purpoſe it is very obſervable, that *Abraham was juſtify'd not in circumciſion, but in uncircumciſion; for he received the ſign of circumciſion, a ſeal of the righteouſneſs of faith, being uncircumciſed, that he might be the father of all them that believe, though they be not circumciſed; that righteouſneſs might be imputed unto them alſo.* Whereby it is evident that the great Bleſſings promiſed to *Abraham*, did not reſpect him merely as Progenitor of the *Iſraelites*, but in a higher capacity, as *Father of the faithful*; and that ground of his acceptance with God did not depend on any Ceremonial Rite, ſuch as Circumciſion was, God imputing his Faith for Righteouſneſs before his being circumciſed. But becauſe the time was not yet come wherein the grand Myſtery of Man's Salvation by the death of the Son of God was to be revealed; therefore when God called the Nation of the *Jews* from their bondage, he made choice of a more obſcure way of repreſenting this Myſtery to them through all the umbrages of the Law: and withall inforced the Precepts with ſuch terrible ſanctions of curſes to *all that continued not in all that was written in that Law to do it*, to make them the more apprehenſive that the ground of their acceptance with God, cou'd not be the performance of the Precepts of that Law, but they ought to breathe after that higher diſpenſation wherein the way and method of Man's Salvation ſhould be fully *revealed when the fulneſs of time was come.* Now therefore God left them under the tutorage and *Pædagogy* of the Law, which ſpake ſo ſeverely to them, that they might not think this was all God intended in order to the happineſs of Men, but that he did reſerve ſome greater thing in ſtore to be enjoy'd by his People when they were come to Age.

Gen. 2. 49. 10.

Gal. 4. 17.

Rom. 4. 10. 11.

XII. So that tho' the Ceremonies of the Law had not a Mouth to ſpeak out *Chriſt*; yet they had a Hand to point to him; for they were the ſhadow or dark repreſentation of that which was to be drawn afterwards to the greateſt life. And this was underſtood by all thoſe whoſe hearts were carried beyond the outward ſapleſs Letter of the Law, to the more inward and ſpiritual meaning of it, (there being an εἰσωτερικὰ and ἐξωτερικὰ in the Law as well as Philoſophy,) theſe Myſteries were too not ſo veiled and hidden, but all that were ἐπόπται, *fully initiated*, might fully underſtand them; which made that true Spiritual *Cabbala*, which was conſtantly preſerved among the *Iſraelites*, which was more largely commented on by the Prophets of ſucceeding Ages; whoſe care it was to unlock this *Cabbala*, and to raiſe up the hearts of the People in a higher

a higher expectation of the great things which were to come. Thence we not only read of the solemn Prayer of the Church of the *Jews*, that the knowledge of God might be *dispersed over all the Nations of the earth*, Psal. 67. 2. but we have many Prophecies *that when the mountain of the Lord's house* Isaiah 2. 2. *shou'd be exalted, all nations should flow unto it: that from the rising of the* Mal. 1. 11. *Sun to the going down thereof, God's name shall be great among the Gentiles, and in every place incense should be offered to his name, and a pure offering, for his name shall be great among the Heathen.* That the Inscription on the High-Priest's Forehead, *Holiness to the Lord*, shou'd by reason of the large diffusion of a Spirit of Holiness in the days of the Gospel, *be set upon the bells of Horses, that the pots in the Lord's house* Zach. 14. *should be as the bowls before the Altar, i. e.* that when the Levitical Service 20. shou'd be laid aside, and that Holiness, which was that appropriated to the Priests and Instruments of the Temple, shou'd be discerned in those things which seemed most remote from it. That a *Priesthood after another order than that of* Aaron *should be established*, viz. *after the* Psal. 110. 4, 5, 6. *order of* Melchisedec; and that he that was the *Priest after this order*, *should judge among the Heathen, and wound the heads over many Countries*; Ver. 3. *that in the day of his power the People* shou'd not be frighted to obedience with thunder-claps and earth-quakes, (as at Mount *Sinai*) but shou'd come and *yield themselves* as a *free-will offering* unto him, and yet their number be as great as the *drops of the dew which distil in the morning.* That *God* Isa. 66. 21. *out of other Nations would take unto himself for Priests and for Levites*; Hag. 2. 7. *that the desire of all Nations should speedily come*; *that the Messenger of the* Mal. 3. 1. *Covenant should come unto his Temple*; nay, that *seventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy City*; *that then the Vision and Pro-* Dan. 9. 24. *phecy should be sealed up*; *that the Sacrifice and Oblation should be caused to* 26. 27. *cease*; *that the City and the Sanctuary should be destroyed, and the end thereof shall be with a flood, and unto the end of the War desolations are determined*; *that after threescore and two weeks* Messias *should be cut off, but not for himself*; *that by him transgression should be finished, and reconciliation for iniquity should be made, and everlasting righteousness should be brought in.* And lest all these things should be apprehended to be only a higher advancing of the Levitical Worship, and the way of external Ceremonies, God expressly saith, *That he would make a new Covenant with the House of* Jer. 31. 31. Israel, *and with the House of* Judah; *not according to the Covenant that I* 32. *made with their Fathers, in the day I took them by the hand to bring them out of the Land of* Ægypt, *which my Covenant they brake, although I was an husband to them, saith the Lord: But this shall be the Covenant that I will make with the House of* Israel *after those days, saith the Lord*; *I will put my Law in their inward parts, and write in their hearts, and will be their God, and they shall be my people.* Can any one that now considers seriously the state of things thus described as it should come to pass, ever imagine that the Levitical Service was ever calculated for this State? Was God's Worship to be confin'd to his Temple at *Jerusalem*, when all the Nations of the Earth should come to serve him? Was the High-Priest to make an Atonement there, when an Order of Priesthood different from the *Aaronical* should be set up? Must the Tribe of *Levi* only attend at the Temple, when God should take the Priests and *Levites* out of all Nations that serve him? What wou'd become of the magnificence and glory of the Temple, when both City and Sanctuary shall be destroyed, and that must be within few prophetical Weeks after the *Messias* is cut off? And must the Covenant of God made with the *Israelites*

continue for ever, when God expreſly ſaith, he wou'd make a New one, and that not according to the Covenant which he made with them then? It is ſo evident then as nothing can well be more, that under the Old Teſtament, ſuch a ſtate of Religion was deſcrib'd and promis'd, with which the Levitical Worſhip wou'd be inconſiſtent; and ſo that the Ceremonial Law was not at firſt eſtabliſhed upon an immutable Reaſon, which was the thing to be proved.

CHAP. VIII.

General *Hypotheſes* concerning the truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST.

I. *The great prejudice againſt our Saviour among* Jews *and Heathens, was the meanneſs of his appearance. The difference of the Miracles at the delivery of the Law and Goſpel.* II. *Some general* Hypotheſes *to clear the ſubſerviency of Miracles to the Doctrine of* CHRIST. 1. *That where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on Evidence, but Authority, the only way to prove the truth of the Doctrine, is to prove the Teſtimony of the Revealer to be infallible. Things may be true which depend not on Evidence of the things. What that is, and on what it depends. The uncertainty of Natural Knowledge.* III. *The Exiſtence of* GOD, *the foundation of all certainty. The certainty of matter of Faith proved from the ſame Principle. Our knowledge of any thing ſuppoſeth ſomething incomprehenſible.* IV. *The certainty of Faith as great as that of Knowledge; the grounds of it ſtronger. The Conſiſtency of Rational Evidence with Faith. Yet objects of Faith exceed Reaſon; the abſurdities following the contrary opinion.* VI. *The uncertainty of that which is called Reaſon.* VII. *Philoſophical Dictates no ſtandard of Reaſon. Of Tranſubſtantiation and Ubiquity,* &c. *why rejected as contrary to Reaſon. The foundation of Faith in matters above Reaſon.* VIII. *Which is infallible Teſtimony; that there are ways to know which is infallible, proved.* 2. Hypoth. *A Divine Teſtimony the moſt infallible. The reſolution of Faith into* GOD's *veracity as its formal object.* IX. 3. Hypoth. *A Divine teſtimony may be known, tho' God ſpeak not immediately. Of Inſpiration among the* Jews, *and Divination among the Heathens.* XII. 4. Hypoth. *The evidence of a Divine Teſtimony muſt be clear and certain.* XIII. *Of the common motives of Faith, and the obligation to faith ariſing from them. The original of Infidelity.*

I. HAving now cleared that the Law of *Moſes* was capable of a repeal, I come to the ſecond Enquiry, *Whether the Miracles of our Saviour did*

did give a sufficient Evidence of his power and Authority to repeal it. I shall not (to prevent too large an excursion) insist on any other Evidences of our Saviour's being the promised *Messias*, but keep close to the matter of our present debate, concerning the Evidence which ariseth from such a power of Miracles as our Saviour had in order to his establishing that Doctrine which he came to publish to the World. The great stumbling-block in reference to our Blessed Saviour among both the *Jews* and learned *Heathens*, was the meanness of his appearance in the World, not coming attended with that state and magnificence, which they thought to be inseparable from so Great a Person. The *Jews* had their senses so possessed with the Thunderings and Lightnings on Mount *Sinai*, that they cou'd not imagine the structure of their Ceremonial Worship cou'd be taken down with less noise and terror than it was erected. And withal collecting all those passages of the Old Testament, which seemed to foretel such glorious things of the days of the *Messias*, (which either refer to his second Coming, or must be understood in a Spiritual sense) they having their Minds oppressed with the sense of their present calamities apply'd them wholly to an external Greatness, whereby they might be delivered from the Tyranny of the *Roman* Power. The *Heathens*, as appears by *Celsus* and others, thought it very strange, that the Son of God shou'd appear in the World with so little Grandeur, and have no greater Train than twelve such obscure Persons as the Apostles were. For, saith *Celsus*, Ὅσπερ ὁ ἥλιος πάντα τὰ ἄλλα φωτίζων πρῶτον αὐτὸν δεικνύς, ὅτως ἐχρὴν πεποιηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ· *As the Sun, which enlightens all other things, doth first discover himself, so it was fitting the Son of God should do when he appeared to the World.* And so we say he did to all such whose Minds were not blinded thro' obstinacy and wilful ignorance. For altho this Son of Righteousness was pleas'd for the better carrying on his design in the World to wrap up himself in a cloud, yet his glory cou'd not be confin'd within it, but did break thro' that dark veil of his Humane Nature, and did discover its self in a most clear and convincing manner. His appearances indeed were not like those upon Mount *Sinai*, because his design was not to amuse Men with the Glory of his Majesty, and to terrify them from Idolatry, (which was a great reason of those dreadful *Phænomena* at the delivery of the Law) but he came to draw all Men to him by the power and Energy of his Grace, and therefore afforded them all Rational Convictions in order to it. And therefore the quality of our Saviour's Miracles was considerable, as well as the greatness of them. The intent of them all was to do good, and thereby to bring the World off from its sin and folly, to the embracing of that holy Doctrine which he came to publish to the World.

Apud Orig. l. 2.

II. Now that such a Power of Miracles in our Saviour had the greatest subserviency to the giving full and convincing Evidence that he was the Person he declared himself to be, and that his Doctrine was thereby so clearly attested, that it was nothing but obstinacy which cou'd withhold assent, will appear by these following *Hypotheses* which I lay down in order to the proving it.

1. *Hypoth.* *Where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on the Evidence of the things themselves, but on the Authority of him that reveals it, there the only way to prove the Doctrine to be true, is to prove the Testimony of him that revealed it to be infallible.* Several things are necessary to be proved for the clearing this Proposition.

1. *That*

1. *That it is not repugnant to Reason, that a Doctrine should be true which depends not upon the Evidence of the thing it self.* By evidence of the thing I understand so clear and distinct a Perception of it, that every one who hath the use of his rational Faculties, cannot but upon the first apprehensions of the Terms yield a certain assent to it; as That the whole is greater than a part; That if we take away equal things from equal, the remainder must be equal. Now we are to observe, that as to all these common Notices of Humane Nature which carry such Evidence with them, the certainty of them lies in the Proposition as it is an act of the Mind abstracted from the things themselves; for these do not suppose the Existence of the things; but whether there be any such things in the World or no as Whole or Parts, the Understanding is assured that the Idea of the whole carries more in its representation than that of a part does. This is the great Reason of the certainty and evidence of *Mathematical* truths, not as some imagine, because Men have no interest, or design, in those things, and therefore they never question them, but because they proceed not upon sensible but abstracted matter, which is not liable to so many doubts as the other is: for that a Triangle hath three Angles no Man questions; but whether such sensible parts of Matter make a Triangle, may be very questionable. Now that the truth of Beings, or the certainty of Existence of things cannot be so certain as *Mathematical* Demonstrations, appears from hence: because the manner of conveyance of these things to my Mind cannot be so clear and certain as in purely Intellectual operations, abstracted from existent Matter. For the highest Evidences of the Existence of things must be either the judgment of Sense, or clear and distinct perception of the Mind: now proceeding in a mere Natural way, there can be no infallible certainty in either of these; For the Perception of the Mind in reference to the existence of things being caused so much thro' those *Ideas* or *Phantasms* which are conveyed to the Understanding thro' the impressions of Sense, if these may be demonstrated to be fallacious, I may well question the certainty of that, which I am certain I have been deceived by; supposing then I shou'd question the truth of every thing which is conveyed in an uncertain way to my Mind, I may soon out go even *Pyrrho* himself in real *Scepticism*. Neither can I conceive how clear and distinct perception of any thing, tho' not coming thro' the senses, doth necessarily infer the existence of the thing; for it only implies a Non-repugnancy of it to our Natural Faculties, and consequently the bare possibility of it. For otherwise it were impossible for us to have a clear perception of any thing any longer than it exists; nay, than we know it to exist; for Existence or Non-Existence is all one to the Understanding, while it is not assured of either. And it is withal evident that things imaginary may clearly affect the Mind as well as real, for I may have as real and distinct Perception of a *Phœnix* in my Mind, as of a *Partridge*; doth it therefore follow that the one is really existent as well as the other? and it will be a very hard matter to assign a certain difference between Imagination and pure Intellection in such things, which tho' not actually existent, yet imply no repugnancy at all to the Faculties of Mens Minds. It is evident then, that there cannot be so great certainty of the existence of things as there may be of *Mathematical* Demonstrations.

III. And if that Principle be supposed as the foundation of all *Physical* certainty as to the Being of things, *viz.* That there is a God, who being

ing infinitely good, will not ſuffer the Minds of Men to be deceived in thoſe things which they have a clear and diſtinct perception of (without which ſuppoſition we cannot be aſſured of the certainty of any operations of the Mind, becauſe we cannot know but we were ſo made, that we might be then moſt deceived, when we thought our ſelves moſt ſure:) If this Principle, I ſay, be ſuppoſed as the foundation of all certain Knowledge, then from it I infer many things which are very much advantageous to our certainty in matters of Faith.

1. *That the foundation of all certainty lies in the neceſſary exiſtence of a Being abſolutely perfect.* So that unleſs I know that there is a God, I cannot be aſſured that I know any thing in a certain manner; and if I know there is a God, I muſt neceſſarily apprehend him to be abſolutely perfect; becauſe the grounds of my Knowledge, that there is a God, are from thoſe abſolute perfections, which there are in him; and if I cou'd ſuppoſe him not abſolutely perfect, I muſt ſuppoſe him not to be God; for that is neceſſarily imply'd in his Definition. Now then if all certainty doth ſuppoſe the exiſtence of a Being ſo abſolutely perfect, I muſt, before I can know any thing certainly, conclude that there is an infinity of Knowledge, Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs in this God; for thoſe are things which all who underſtand them will grant to be perfections; and if they be in God, they muſt be abſolute, *i. e.* infinite. And if they be infinite, it neceſſarily follows that they muſt tranſcend our apprehenſions; ſo that now we have gained this Principle in order to Faith, that we muſt grant ſomething to be unconceivable before we can come certainly to know any thing. From whence it follows that thoſe who will not believe any thing to be true, becauſe it is above their apprehenſions, muſt deny the foundation of all certainty, which (as we have proved) doth ſuppoſe ſomething to be infinite, or above our capacity to comprehend.

2. *That we have as great certainty of whatever is revealed to us from God, as we can have of the truth of any thing which we moſt clearly underſtand.* For the truth of Knowledge depending on this ſuppoſition, That there is a God, whoſe goodneſs will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd in the things we clearly underſtand; there is the ſame foundation for the act of Faith as for that of Knowledge, *viz.* That God will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd in matters which himſelf hath reveal'd to us. Nay, there ſeems to be greater on theſe accounts. *Firſt*, That there is not ſo great danger to be deceiv'd in reference to objects of ſenſe, as there is in reference to objects of Divine Revelation: becauſe objects of ſenſe make a continual impreſſion upon the organs of ſenſe; and as to theſe things we ſee the whole World agrees in them ſo far as they are neceſſary to life, and withal they bear a greater correſpondency to the preſent ſtate of imperfection which the Soul is now in: but now matters of Divine Revelation are of a more ſublime and ſpiritual nature, which Mens Minds on that account are more apt to doubt of, than of things obvious to ſenſe; and withal they call the Mind ſo much off from ſenſe, that on theſe accounts the proneneſs to doubt is greater, and therefore the foundation of Certainty from God's not ſuffering us to be deceiv'd muſt be ſtronger. *Secondly*, There is not ſo great danger in being deceiv'd as to matters of ſenſe or knowledge, as there is in things of Divine Revelation. For we ſee, granting ſenſe to be deceiv'd, and that we have no certainty at all in natural things, yet affairs of Life are managed ſtill; Mens outward welfare depends not on the judgment of ſenſe; IV.

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the Merchant hath never the leſs gold in his Ship, becauſe his ſenſe deceives him in judging that the Earth moves from him, when the Ship moves from it. The Sun doth never the leſs enlighten the World, tho' our Senſes be all of *Epicurus* his Mind, that the Sun is no bigger than he ſeems to be; but now as to Matters of Divine Revelation, they are things of the moſt unſpeakable weight and importance, which depend upon our believing or disbelieving them. And therefore if the Goodneſs of God be ſuch as it will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd in our judgment of material and ſenſible Beings; how much leſs in reference to the foundation of our certainty as to things divinely reveal'd? We ſee then what Rational Evidence there is not only conſiſtent with, but neceſſarily imply'd in the foundation of Faith, even as great as in any thing which we do moſt perfectly know; ſo that the in-evidence, which is ſo much ſpoken of as an ingredient of the nature of Faith, muſt not be underſtood of the foundation whereon the act of Faith doth ſtand, but of the condition of the object, which being a matter of Divine Revelation, is a thing not obvious to our Senſes. In which ſenſe the Apoſtle ſpeaks, that Faith is ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις, πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων, *The firm expectation of things hoped for, and ſtrong conviction of things which are not ſeen:* In which words, as *Eraſmus* obſerves, is contain'd only an high *Encomium* of Faith, and no dialectical Definition of it; *viz.* that Faith ſoars above things of ſenſe or preſent enjoyment; yea, tho' the objects of it be never ſo remote from either, yet where there is ſufficient Evidences of Divine Revelation, Faith boggles at no difficulties, but is firmly reſolv'd that that God who hath reveal'd theſe things, can and will bring them to paſs in his own time. There is not then any ſuch contrariety between the foundation of Faith and Knowledge, as the Schoolmen have perſuaded the World; we ſee both of them proceed on the ſame foundation of certainty; all the difference is, Faith fixeth on the veracity of God immediately in reference to a Divine Teſtimony; Knowledge proceeds upon it, ſuppoſing no Divine Revelation as to the thing it doth diſcover.

V. 3. We hence infer, That if the certainty of our Knowledge depends on this Principle, That God will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd, then we are bound to believe whatever God doth reveal to us, tho' we may not be able to comprehend the nature of the things revealed. For as to theſe things, we have the ſame ground of certainty which we have as to any Natural Cauſes; for as to them, we now ſuppoſe from the former Principles, that ſetting aſide the exiſtence of God, we cou'd have no certainty of them, but that the formal Reaſon of our certainty is reſolv'd into this, That God's Goodneſs will not ſuffer the Underſtanding to be deceiv'd as to theſe things: the ſame I ſay as to Spiritual Myſteries reveal'd by God; the ground of our certainty lies not in the Evidence of the things, but in the undoubted veracity of God, who hath reveal'd them. All that I can imagine poſſible to be reply'd to this, is, That God's veracity aſſures us in Natural Cauſes that we are not deceiv'd, only where we have a clear and diſtinct perception of the things, but now in matters above our Reaſon to comprehend, there can be no clear and diſtinct Perception. To this I anſwer,

Firſt, It is evident in the foundation of all certainty of Knowledge, that there may be a clear and diſtinct Perception of that which we cannot comprehend, *viz.* of a Being abſolutely perfect; for if we have not a clear and diſtinct Perception of God, the foundation of all certainty

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is destroy'd, which is the necessary Existence of such a Being; and he that shall say he cannot have a clear Perception of God without comprehending him, doth contradict himself; for if he be a Being infinite, he must be incomprehensible; therefore there may be a clear Perception, where the object it self is above our capacity. Now whatever foundation there is in Nature for such a Perception without Comprehension; that and much more is there in such things as are reveal'd by God, tho' above our Apprehension: For the Idea of God upon the Soul of Man cannot be so strong an Evidence of the Existence of a Being above our Apprehension, as the Revelation of matters of Faith is, that we shou'd believe the things so reveal'd, tho' our Understandings lose themselves in striving to reach the natures of them, and the manner of their Existence.

Secondly, That which is the only foundation of a scruple in this case is a Principle most unreasonable in it self, That we are to embrace nothing for truth, tho' divinely reveal'd, but what our Reason is able to comprehend as to the nature of the thing, and the manner of its existence; on which account the Doctrine of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Satisfaction*, and consequently the whole Mystery of the Gospel of CHRIST must be rejected as incredible, and that on this bare pretence, because altho' many expressions in Scripture seem to import all these things, yet we are bound to interpret them to another sense, because this is incongruous to our Reason. But altho' *Christianity* be a Religion which comes in the highest way of Credibility to the Minds of Men, altho' we are not bound to believe any thing but what we have sufficient reason to make it appear that it is reveal'd by God; yet that any thing shou'd be questioned whether it be of Divine Revelation, merely because our Reason is to seek, as to the full and adequate conception of it, is a most absurd and unreasonable pretence: And the Assertors of it must run themselves on these unavoidable absurdities.

First, Of believing nothing either in Nature or Religion to be true, but what they can give a full and satisfactory account of, as to every mode and circumstance of it. Therefore let such persons first try themselves in all the appearances of Nature; and then we may suppose they will not believe that the Sun shines till they have by demonstrative Arguments prov'd the undoubted truth of the *Ptolemaic* or *Copernican Hypotheses*; that they will never give credit to the flux and reflux of the Sea, till they clearly resolve the doubts which attend the several opinions of it. That there is no such thing as Matter in the World, till they can satisfactorily tell us how the Parts of it are united; nor that there are any Material Beings, till they have resolv'd all the perplexing difficulties about the several Affections of them; and that themselves have not so much as a rational Soul, till they are bound to satisfy us of the manner of the union of the Soul and Body together. And if they can expedite all these, and many more difficulties about the most obvious things (about which it is another thing to frame handsome and consistent *Hypotheses*, than to give a certain account of them) then let them be let loose to the matters of Divine Revelation; as to which yet (if they cou'd perform the other) there were no reason for such an undertaking; for that were,

Secondly, To commensurate the Perfections of God with the narrow capacity of the humane Intellect; which is contrary to the natural Idea of God; and to the manner whereby we take up our conceptions of

God: for the Idea of God doth ſuppoſe Incomprehenſibility to belong to his Nature; and the manner whereby we form our Conceptions of God, is, by taking away all the imperfections we find in our ſelves, from the Conception we form of a Being abſolutely perfect, and by adding Infinity to all the Perfections we find in our own Natures. Now this method of proceeding doth neceſſarily imply a vaſt diſtance and diſproportion between a finite and infinite Underſtanding. And if the Underſtanding of God be infinite, why may not he diſcover ſuch things to us, which our ſhallow Apprehenſions cannot reach unto? What ground or evidence of Reaſon can we have that an infinite Wiſdom and Underſtanding, when it undertakes to diſcover matters of the higheſt nature and concernment to the World, ſhou'd be able to deliver nothing but what comes within the compaſs of our imperfect and narrow Intellects? And that it ſhou'd not be ſufficient that the matters reveal'd do none of them contradict the prime Reſults or common Notions of Mankind (which none of them do) but that every particular mode and circumſtance, as to the manner of exiſtence in God, or the extent of his omnipotent Power, muſt paſs the ſcrutiny of our Faculties, before it obtains a *placet* for a Divine Revelation?

VI. *Thirdly*, It muſt follow from this Principle, That the Pretenders to it muſt affirm the Rules or Maxims which they go by in the judgment of things, are the infallible ſtandard of Reaſon: Elſe they are as far to ſeek in the judgment of things as any others are. They muſt then, to be conſiſtent with their Principle, affirm themſelves to be the abſolute Maſters of Reaſon: Now Reaſon conſiſting of Obſervations made concerning the natures of all Beings, for ſo it muſt be conſidered, as it is a Rule of judging, (*viz.* as a *Syſtem* of infallible Rules collected from the natures of things) they who pretend to it, muſt demonſtrate theſe general Maxims according to which they judge, to be collected from an univerſal undoubted Hiſtory of Nature, which lies yet too dark and obſcure for any to pretend to the full Knowledge of, and wou'd be only a demonſtration of the higheſt Arrogance after ſo many ſucceſleſs endeavours, of the moſt ſearching Wits, in any ſociety of Perſons to uſurp it to themſelves, eſpecially if ſuch Perſons are ſo far from ſearching into the depths of Nature, that they ſuffer themſelves very fairly to be led by the Noſe by the moſt Dogmatical of all Philoſophers; and that in ſuch Principles which the more inquiſitive World hath now found to be very ſhort, uncertain and fallacious. And upon ſevere enquiry we ſhall find the grand Principles which have been taken by theſe adorers of Reaſon, for almoſt the ſtandard of it, have been ſome *Theories* which have been taken up merely from obſervation of the courſe of Nature by ſuch Perſons, who ſcarce own'd any hand of Providence in the World. Now it cannot otherwiſe be conceiv'd but that theſe *Theories* or Principles formed from ſuch a narrow inſpection into the natures of things, muſt make ſtrange work when we come to apply thoſe things to them, which were never look'd at in the forming of them: Whence came thoſe two receiv'd Principles, That nothing can be produc'd out of nothing; That there is no poſſible return from a privation to a habit, but from thoſe Philoſophers who believ'd there was nothing but matter in the World; or if they did aſſert the Exiſtence of a God, yet ſuppoſed him unconcerned in the Government of the World. Whence come our Maſters of Reaſon to tell us, That the Soul cannot ſubſiſt after death without the Body? from what Philoſophy was this derived? certainly

tainly from that which was very loath to acknowledge the immortality of the Soul of Man: and any one who ſtrictly obſerves the cloſe coherence of the Principles of the *Peripatetic* Philoſophy, will find very little room left for an eternal Being to interpoſe it ſelf in the World; and therefore ſome have ſhrewdly obſerv'd that *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks more favourably of the Being of God in his *Exoterics*, than in his *Acromatics*, which all that know the reaſon of the Names, will gueſs at the reaſon of. I demand then, Muſt the received Principles of Philoſophy, and thoſe ſhort imperfect *Theories* which were formed more from Tradition than Experience, by the ancient *Greeks*, be taken from the ſtandard of Reaſon or no? If they muſt, we may ſoon forſake not only the ſublimer Myſteries of the *Trinity*, *Divinity* of CHRIST, *Reſurrection*, &c. but we ſhall ſoon ſhake hands with *Creation*, *Providence*, if not *Immortality* of *Souls*, and the Being of God himſelf. If theſe things be diſown'd as the ſtandard of Reaſon, let us know what will be ſubſtituted in the room of them; and what Laws our Faith muſt be try'd by. Are they only *Mathematical* Demonſtrations, or the undoubted common Notions of Humane Nature, which whoſoever underſtands aſſents to them? let any of the forementioned Myſteries be made appear to contradict theſe, and we will readily yield up our ſelves captives to Reaſon: But in the mean time let no *jejune* unproved *Hypotheſes* in *Philoſophy*, be ſet as Judges over matters of Faith, whoſe only warrant for that office muſt be *Stat pro ratione voluntas*. Let the Principles we proceed by, be firſt manifeſted to be collected from a moſt certain and univerſal inſpection into the nature of all Beings, let the manner of proceſs be ſhewed how they were collected (leſt they labour with the common fault of the *Chymiſts*, of eſtabliſhing *Hypoſtatical* Principles from the Experiments of ſome particular Bodies, which others do as evidently refute) and laſtly, let it be made appear that theſe Principles, thus collected, will ſerve indifferently for all Beings, ſpiritual as well as material, infinite as well as finite, and when this Task is exactly perform'd, we will make room for Reaſon to ſit upon the Bench, and bring the Scripture as the priſoner to its Bar.

VII. *Fourthly*, According to this Principle, what certainty can we have at all of any thing we are to believe? who hath fixed the bounds of that which Men call Reaſon? how ſhall we know that thus far it will come and no further? If no Banks be raiſed againſt it to keep it in its due Channel, we may have cauſe to fear it may in time overthrow not only the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Reſurrection of the dead*, but all other Articles of the Creed too. What Preſcription can be pleaded by one ſort of Men for Reaſon more than for another? One will not believe this Article of his Faith, becauſe againſt his Reaſon; and why not another reject another Article on the ſame pretence? for whatever the ground of Unbelief be, if it be but baptized by the name of Reaſon, it muſt by this Principle paſs uncontrouled. If a ſullen Philoſopher ſhall tell us, that the Notion of an immaterial ſubſtance contradicts his Reaſon as much as the *Trinity* doth theirs, and that the Univerſe is nothing elſe but a Syſtem of Bodies; by what Artifice will our Maſter of Reaſon purge away all that black Choler, that ſo clouds his Mind, that he cannot ſee the Notion of a Spirit thro' it? And ſuch a one will make a hard ſhift, but he will reconcile his Opinion with Scripture too; and therefore why ſhou'd he be bound up to Mens Explications of Scripture, when there is no neceſſity, that he can ſee, of underſtanding it in any other way

than his own? If another ſhou'd come and tell us, that we muſt be all *Anthropomorphites*, and that otherwiſe the Scripture were not intelligible; ſhall not this Man put in for Reaſon too? Nay, *laſtly*, if another ſhall come and ſpeak out, and tell us Religion is but a device of ſubtle Men, that all things come to paſs thro' chance, that the World was made by a fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, and that all are fools which are not *Atheiſts*, and that it is impoſſible to apprehend the Being of a God, and therefore by the ſame Reaſon that they reject ſome Myſteries of Religion, he rejects the foundation of all; becauſe an infinite Being is incomprehenſible: whither now hath our Reaſon carried us? while we pretend to reject any thing as divinely revealed, merely on that account, that it is above our Reaſon? But it may be reply'd, *On what account then do we reject the Doctrine of* Tranſubſtantiation, *and the ubiquity of the Body of* CHRIST, *as repugnant to Reaſon, if we do not make Reaſon judge in matters of Faith?* I anſwer, 1. We reject theſe opinions not only as repugnant to Reaſon, but as inſufficiently proved from Scripture; whereas we here ſuppoſe (it not being our preſent buſineſs to prove it) that the ſeveral Doctrines of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation Reſurrection of Bodies*, &c. are only rejected on that account, that tho' Scripture ſeems to ſpeak fair for them, yet it is otherwiſe to be interpreted, becauſe ſuppoſed to be repugnant to Reaſon. 2. Thoſe Doctrines before mentioned are eminently ſerviceable to promote the great end of the Goſpel, and are inlaid in the very foundation of it, as that of the *Trinity*, and *Divinity* of CHRIST; but theſe we now mention are no ways conducible to that end, but ſeem to thwart and overthrow it; and *Tranſubſtantiation* eſtabliſheth a Worſhip contrary to the Goſpel. 3. All the foundation of *Tranſubſtantiation* is laid upon ambiguous places of Scripture, which muſt of neceſſity have ſome Tropes and Figures in them; but the Doctrine of the *Trinity* is not only contained in plain Scripture, but is evidenced by viſible appearance, as particularly at the Baptiſm of our Saviour. 4. There is far greater ground why we ſhou'd reject *Tranſubſtantiation* and *Ubiquity*, as inconſiſtent with Reaſon, than that they ſhou'd the *Trinity*, on this account, becauſe the grounds of Reaſon on which we reject thoſe opinions, are fetched from thoſe eſſential and inſeparable properties of Bodies, which are inconſiſtent with thoſe opinions; now theſe are things within the reach of our Underſtandings (in which caſe God himſelf ſometimes appeals to Reaſon) but it is quite another caſe, when we ſearch into the incomprehenſible Nature of God, and pronounce with confidence that ſuch things cannot be in God, becauſe we cannot comprehend them; which gives a ſufficient anſwer to this objection. The ſubſtance then of this Diſcourſe is, that whatever Doctrine is ſufficiently manifeſted to be of Divine Revelation, is to be embraced and believed as undoubtedly true, tho' our Reaſon cannot reach to the full apprehenſion of all the Modes and Circumſtances of it. So that as to theſe ſublime Myſteries our Faith ſtands upon this twofold bottom. *Firſt*, That the Being, Underſtanding, and Power of God doth infinitely tranſcend ours, and therefore he may reveal to us matters above our reach and capacity. *Secondly*, That whatever God doth reveal is undoubtedly true, tho' we may not fully underſtand it; for this is a moſt undoubted Principle, That God cannot and will not deceive any in thoſe things which he reveals to Men. Thus our firſt Suppoſition is cleared, That it is not repugnant to Reaſon, that a Doctrine may be true, which depends not on the evidence of the thing it ſelf.

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The Second is, *That in matters whose truth depends not on the evidence of the things themselves, infallible testimony is the fullest demonstration of them.* For these things not being of *Mathematical* evidence, there must be some other way found out for demonstrating the truth of them. And in all those things whose truth depends on Testimony, the more creditable the Testimony is, the higher Evidence is given to them; but that Testimony which may deceive, cannot give so pregnant an Evidence as that which cannot; for then all imaginable objections are taken off. This is so clear, that it needs no further Proof; and therefore the Third follows.

That there are certain ways whereby to know that a Testimony delivered is infallible; and that is fully proved by these two Arguments. 1. That it is the duty of all those to whom it is propounded to believe it; now how cou'd that be a duty in them to believe, which they had no ways to know whether it were a Testimony to be believed, or no? 2. Because God will condemn the World for Unbelief: In which the Justice of God's proceeding doth necessarily suppose that there were sufficient Arguments to induce them to believe, which cou'd not be, unless there were some certain way supposed whereby a Testimony may be known to be infallible. These three things now being supposed, *viz.* That a Doctrine may be true which depends not on evidence of Reason; that the greatest demonstration of the truth of such a Doctrine, is its being delivered by infallible Testimony; and that there are certain ways whereby a Testimony may be known to be infallible: Our first Principle is fully confirmed, which was, *That where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on Evidence of Reason, but on the Authority of him that reveals it, the only way to prove the Doctrine to be true, is to prove the Testimony of him that reveals it to be infallible.*

The next Principle or *Hypothesis* which I lay down, is, *That there can be no greater evidence that a Testimony is infallible, than that it is the Testimony of God himself.* The truth of this depends upon a common Notion of Humane Nature, which is the Veracity of God in whatever way he discovers himself to Men; and therefore the ultimate Resolution of our Faith, as to its formal object, must be alone into the Veracity of God revealing things unto us; for the *Principium certitudinis*, or foundation of all certain assent can be fetched no higher, neither will it stand any lower than the infallible Verity of God himself; and the *Principium patefactionis*, or the ground of discovery of Spiritual truth to our Minds must be resolved into Divine Testimony, or Revelation. These two then not taken asunder, but jointly, *God, who cannot lye, hath revealed these things*, is the only certain foundation for a Divine Faith to rest it self upon. But now the particular exercise of a Divine Faith lies in a firm assent to such a particular thing as divinely reveal'd; and herein lies not so much the Testimony, as the peculiar energy of the Spirit of God in inclining the Soul to believe peculiar objects of Faith, as of Divine Revelation. But the general ground of Faith, which they call the formal object, or the *ratio propter quam credimus*, is the general infallibility of a Divine Testimony. For in a matter concerning Divine Revelation, there are two great Questions to be resolved: The first is, Why I believe a Divine Testimony with a firm assent? The Answer to that is, Because I am assur'd, that whatever God speaks is true: the other is, Upon what grounds do I believe this to be a Divine Testimony? The resolution of which, as far as I can understand, must be fetch'd from

VIII. 2. *Hypoth.*

from thoſe rational Evidences whereby a Divine Teſtimony muſt be diſtinguiſh'd from one merely Humane and fallible. For the Spirit of God in its workings upon the Mind, doth not carry it on by a brutiſh impulſe, but draws it by a Spiritual diſcovery of ſuch ſtrong and perſuaſive grounds to aſſent to what is reveal'd, that the Mind doth readily give a firm aſſent to that which it ſees ſuch convincing Reaſon to believe. Now the ſtrongeſt reaſon to believe, is the manifeſtation of a Divine Teſtimony; which the Spirit of God ſo clearly diſcovers to a true Believer, that he not only firmly aſſents to the general foundation of Faith, the Veracity of God, but to the particular object propounded, as a matter of Divine Revelation. But this latter Queſtion is not here the matter of our Diſcourſe; our Propoſition only concerns the general foundation of Faith, which appears to be ſo rational and evident, as no Principle in Nature can be more. For if the Teſtimony on which I am to rely be only God's, and I be aſſur'd from Natural Reaſon, that his Teſtimony can be no other than infallible, wherein doth the certainty of the foundation of Faith fall ſhort of that in any *Mathematical* demonſtration? Upon which account a Divine Teſtimony hath been regarded with ſo much veneration among all who have own'd a Deity, altho' they have been unacquainted with any certain way of Divine Revelation. And the reaſon why any rejected ſuch a Teſtimony among the *Heathens*, was either, becauſe they believed not a *Deity*; or elſe that the particular Teſtimonies produced were mere frauds and impoſtures, and therefore no Divine Teſtimony, as it was given out to be. But the Principle ſtill remain'd indiſputable, that on ſuppoſition the Teſtimony were what it pretended to be, there was the greateſt reaſon to believe it, altho' it came not in ſuch a way of probation, as their Sciences proceeded in. From which Principle aroſe that ſpeech of *Tully*, which he hath tranſlated out of *Plato's Timæus*; *Ac difficillimum factu à Diis ortis fidem non habere, quamquam nec argumentis nec rationibus certis eorum ratio confirmetur.* By which we ſee what a preſumption there was of Truth, where there was any evidence of a Divine Teſtimony. And no doubt upon the advantage of this Principle it was the Devil gain'd ſo great credit to his Oracles; for therein he did the moſt imitate Divine Revelation. From hence then we ſee what a firm bottom Faith in the general ſtands upon, which is nothing ſhort of an infallible Divine Teſtimony: other things may conduce by way of ſubſerviency for the diſcovery of this; but nothing elſe can be a ſure foundation for a Divine Faith, but what is a Teſtimony of God himſelf.

Fragm. Cicer.

IX. 3. *Hypoth.* *A Teſtimony may be known to be divine and infallible, tho' God himſelf do not ſpeak in an immediate way.* By being known, I do not mean the firm perſwaſion of a Mind enlightned by the Spirit of God, but that there are ſufficient Evidences *ex parte rei*, to convince Men of it, which are not wilfully blind and obſtinate, *i. e.* that the ground of unbelief in any cannot be imputed to the defect of ſufficient Motives to Faith, but to their own perverſeneſs and prejudice in not diſcerning them. Now that God may reveal and declare his Mind to the World, not in an immediate way, but by ſome Inſtruments he may make uſe of to that end, is not only evident from the great ſutableneſs of ſuch a way to the conditions of the Perſon he ſpeaks to, but from the general perſuaſion of the World concerning the poſſibility of Inſpiration. The *Jews* are ſo far from denying this, that it is the very foundation of their Religion as well as ours; God diſcovering the moſt of his Will to them by the Prophets,

phets, or by Persons divinely inspir'd. And this general consent of all other Nations, that there is such a Principle as Divination in the World, doth make it evident, that it carries no repugnancy at all to Natural Light, supposing that there is a God, that he shou'd reveal his Mind by some particular Persons unto the World. For which purpose the testimony of *Tully* in the entrance of his Books *de Divinatione*, is very considerable. *Vetus opinio est jam usque ab Heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque & populi Romani & omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Græci μαντικὴν appellant*, i. e. *præsensionem & scientiam rerum futurarum*; and soon after adds, *gentem quidem nullam video neque tam humanam atque doctam, neque tam immanem atque barbaram, quæ non significari futura, & à quibusdam intelligi, prædicique posse censeat.* He makes it appear to be an universal sentiment of all Nations in the World, and instanceth particularly in the *Assyrians*, *Ægyptians*, *Cilicians*, *Pisidians*, *Pamphylians*, *Grecians*, *Romans*, *Etrurians*, and others. It is true indeed he after mentions some Philosophers who deny'd it; but they were most part the followers of *Epicurus*, who deny'd any *Providence*, and therefore might well take away *Divination:* but if *Xenophanes Colophonius* had any followers who asserted the one, and deny'd the other (as *Tully* seems to intimate that he was alone in that persuasion) yet we may probably suppose the reason of their rejecting it might be the Impostures which went under the name of *Divination* among them; which are excellently discover'd by that Prince of *Roman* Philosophers as well as Orators, in his second Book of *Divination*: But it is apparent by the same Author, that the generality of Philosophers consented with the People in this persuasion, as the Followers of those three great Sects of *Socrates*, *Pythagoras* and *Aristotle*, were all approvers of it; but of all Persons the *Stoics* were the most zealous contenders for it, especially *Chrysippus*, *Diogenes Babylonius*, *Antipater* and *Possidonius*. Some indeed rejected some ways of *Divination*, yet embraced others, as *Dicæarchus* and *Cratippus*, who rejected all but Dreams and Ecstasies; but in the general we find these two Principles went together among them, the existence of a *Deity*, and the certainty of *Divination*; so that from *Divination* they prov'd a *Deity*, and from a *Deity Divination*. *Si sunt genera divinandi vera, esse Deos; viciſſimque si Dii sint, esse qui divinent*, as *Quintus Cicero* there speaks: and at last thus triumphs in the multitude of his witnesses, *An dum bestiæ loquantur exspectamus, hominum consentiente auctoritate contenti non simus?* It may not be amiss to produce the chief Argument on which the *Stoics* insisted to prove the necessity of *Divination*, supposing the existence of a *Deity*. *If there be Gods*, say they, *and they do not reveal to Men things to come; it either is because they do not love them, or because they do not know themselves what shall come to pass, or they think it is of no concernment to Men to know future things, or that it doth not become their Majesty to reveal them, or that they cannot reveal them to Men if they would: but neither is it true that they do not love Men; for the Gods are of a bountiful nature, and friends to Mankind; neither can they be ignorant of future things, because they are appointed and decreed by them; neither is it of no concernment to Men to know future things; for that makes them more cautious if they know them; neither is it repugnant to their Majesty to reveal them, for nothing is more noble than bounty and doing good; and they must needs know these things; therefore they may make them known to others; and if they do make them known, there must be some way*

Cicero l. 2. de Divin.

way whereby to know that they do so; or else they signifie them to no purpose. If now instead of the knowledge of future contingencies, and the multitude of their Gods, they had insisted on the discovery and revelation by the true God of those ways, which may lead Men to eternal Happiness; that Argument had been strong and convincing, which as it stands is sophistical and fallacious. So that it is very plain, that not only a possibility of *Divination* was acknowledg'd by those who wanted Divine Revelation, but that this *Divination* did not arise from mere Natural Causes, but from an *afflatus Divinus*, and a *concitatio quædam animi*, as they there speak, which imports nothing short of Divine Inspiration. Nay the opinion of this was so common among them, that they thought any extraordinary Persons had something of Divine Enthusiasm in them, as *Tully* elsewhere tells us, *Nemo vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu Divino unquam fuit.* Altho' then these Heathens were greatly mistaken as to those things they took for a Divine *Afflatus* and *Divination*, yet we cannot conceive so general a Sense shou'd be imprinted on the minds of Men of such a thing as that was, were it not a thing highly consonant to Principles of Reason, that God shou'd communicate his mind to the World by the Inspiration of some Persons. And therefore I conceive that *Cicero* and his Brother *Quintus*, who manage that excellent dispute of *Divination* between them, have divided the Truth between them too. For on the one side *Quintus* evidently proves the possibility of the thing, the consequence of it upon the acknowledgement of a Deity, and the general consent of Mankind in the owning of it; and on the other side *Tully* himself excellently lays open the vanity, folly and uncertainty, not only of the common ways of *Divination*, but of the Oracles which were in such great esteem among the Heathens. And altho' *Tully* doth so sharply and sarcastically answer the Argument from the common consent of Men; *quasi vero quidquam sit tam valde, quam nihil sapere, vulgare; as though nothing Men did more generally agree in, than in being Fools:* yet as it is evident that the ground of that Scoff was from the several manners of *Divination* then in use, so it cannot be thought to be a general impeachment of Human Nature in a thing so consequent upon the being of a God, which as himself elsewhere proves, is as clear from reason as from that *Testimonium gentium in hac una re non dissidentium*, as the Christian *Cicero*, *Lactantius* speaks, *The consent of Nations, which scarce agree in any thing else, but that there is a God.* That which we now infer from hence is, That God may make known his Mind in a way infallible, tho' not immediate; for in case of Inspiration of mere Men, it is not They so much which speak, as God by them; and in case that God himself shou'd speak thro' the veil of Humane Nature, the Testimony must needs be infallible, tho' the appearance of the Divinity be not visible.

Cicero l. 2. de Nat. Deorum.

Lactant. de fals. relig. cap. 2.

X. *Hyp. 4.* *Those evidences whereby a Divine Testimony may be known, must be such as may not leave Mens minds in suspence, but are of their own nature convincing proofs of it.* For altho' as to the event some may doubt, and others disbelieve the Testimony so prov'd; yet it is sufficient for our purpose, that in the nature of the things (supposing them to be such as we speak of) they are sufficient for the eviction that the Testimony attested by them is divine and infallible. I know it is a great dispute among many, whether those things, which are usually call'd the common Motives of Faith, do of their own nature only induce a probable persuasion of the truth of the Doctrine as probable which they are join'd with, or

else

elſe are they ſufficient for the producing a firm aſſent to the Doctrine as true? I grant they are not demonſtrative ſo as to inforce aſſent; for we ſee the contrary by the experience of all Ages; but that they are not ſufficient foundation for an unprejudic'd Mind to eſtabliſh a firm aſſent upon, is a thing not eaſie to be granted; chiefly upon this account, that an obligation to believe doth lie upon every one to whom theſe evidences of a Divine Teſtimony are ſufficiently diſcover'd. And otherwiſe of all ſins the ſin of Unbelief, as to God revealing his mind, were the moſt excuſable and pardonable ſin; nay, it wou'd be little leſs than a part of prudence; becauſe what can it be accounted but temerity and imprudence in any to believe a Doctrine as true, only upon probable inducements? and what can it be but wiſdom to with-hold aſſent upon a mere Veriſimilitude? conſidering what the *Lyrick* Poet hath long ſince truly told us;

Pindar Olymp. Od. 1.

καὶ πού τι καὶ βροτῶν Φρένα
ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον
δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις
ἀξαπατῶντι μῦθοι.

That a Falſhood may frequently ſeem truer to common underſtandings than Truth it ſelf: and as *Menander* ſpeaks, τὸ πιθανὸν ἰσὺν τῆς ἀληθείας ἔχει ἐνίοτε μείζω, καὶ πιθανωτέραν ὄχλου, *that a mere veriſimilitude may have more force on vulgar minds than Truth hath.* If therefore there be no evidences given ſufficient to carry the minds of Men beyond mere probability, what ſin can it be in thoſe to disbelieve who cannot be obliged to believe as true what is only diſcover'd as probable? I cannot therefore ſee how an obligation to believe a Divine Teſtimony is conſiſtent with their opinion, who make the utmoſt which any outward evidences can extend to, to be only the bare credibility of the Doctrine atteſted by them. I can very well ſatisfie my ſelf with the ground and reaſon why the more ſubtle Wits of the Church of *Rome* do aſſert this; for if nothing elſe can be produced by all motives of Faith but only a probable perſuaſion of the Truth of Chriſtian Doctrine, then here comes in the faireſt pretence for the Infallibility of their Church: for otherwiſe they tell us we can have no foundation for a Divine Faith; for how can that be a foundation for Divine Faith, which can reach no higher than a Moral Inducement, and beget only a probable perſuaſion of the credibility of the Doctrine of Chriſt? But on what account thoſe who diſown the Infallibility of the Church of *Rome* in the propoſal of matters of Faith, ſhou'd yet conſent with thoſe of it in an *Hypotheſis* taken up in probability, merely out of ſubſerviency to that moſt advantageous piece of the myſtery of Iniquity, is not eaſie to reſolve. Unleſs the over-fondneſs of ſome upon the Doctrine of the Schools, more than of the Goſpel, hath been the occaſion of it. For how agreeable can that opinion be to the Goſpel, which ſo evidently puts the moſt defenſive weapons into the hands of Unbelief? For doubtleſs in the judgment of any rational Perſon, a mere probable perſuaſion of the credibility of the Doctrine of Chriſt, where an aſſent to it as true is requir'd, can never be look'd on as an act of Faith: for if my aſſent to the Truth of the thing be according to the ſtrength of the Arguments inducing me to believe, and theſe Arguments do only prove a probability of Divine Teſtimony, my aſſent can be no ſtronger than to a thing merely probable; which is, that it may be, or not be

true; which is not properly aſſent, but a ſuſpending our judgments till ſome convincing Argument be produced on either ſide. And therefore according to this opinion thoſe who ſaw all the Miracles which Chriſt did, cou'd not be bound to believe in Chriſt, but only to have a favourable opinion of his Perſon and Doctrine, as a thing which tho' not evidenc'd to be true by what he did, yet it was very piouſly credible; but they muſt have a care withal of venturing their Belief too far, only on ſuch Moral Inducements as Miracles were, for fear they ſhou'd go further than the force of the Arguments wou'd carry them. Had not this opinion now, think we, been a very probable way to have converted the World upon the Preaching of Chriſt and his Apoſtles; when Joh. 10. 38. Chriſt ſaith, *though ye believe not me, believe the works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him?* Nay, ſaith this opinion, that is more than we are bound to do; tho' we ſee thy Works we are not bound to believe thy Teſtimony to be Divine and certainly true: but we will do all we are bound to do; we will entertain a favourable opinion of thy Perſon and Doctrine, and wait for ſomewhat elſe, but we do not well know what, to perſuade us to believe. When Heb. 2. 3. 4. the Apoſtles preach the danger of Unbelief, becauſe *the Doctrine of the Goſpel was confirmed by ſigns and wonders, and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghoſt*; what a fair anſwer doth this opinion put into the mouths of Infidels, that notwithſtanding all theſe Signs and Wonders, they were never bound to believe the Goſpel as a certain Truth, and therefore they hope the danger is not ſo great in neglecting the Salvation promis'd by the Goſpel?

XI. I cannot conceive that Men otherwiſe learned and ſober, ſhou'd with ſo much confidence aſſert that the rational evidences of a Divine Teſtimony are inſufficient to prove a Doctrine true, unleſs it be from hence, that they find that notwithſtanding the ſtrongeſt evidences many Perſons continue in Unbelief. For ſay they, *If theſe Arguments were ſcientifical and demonſtrative*, (as they ſpeak) *of the truth of the Doctrine atteſted by them, then all perſons to whom they are propounded, muſt certainly believe.* But this is very eaſily anſwer'd; for we ſpeak not of internal, but outward Evidence; not of that in the Subject, but of the Object, or more fully of the Reaſon of the thing, and not the Event in us; for doubtleſs there may be undoubted Truth and Evidence in many things which ſome perſons either cannot or will not underſtand. If *Epicurus* ſhou'd contend ſtill that the Sun and Stars are no bigger than they ſeem to be, will it hence follow that there can be no rational Demonſtration of the contrary? Nay, if the way of demonſtration be offer'd him, and Teleſcopes put into his hands, yet if he be reſolv'd to maintain his credit, and therefore his Opinion, and will not uſe the Teleſcopes, or ſuſpect ſtill they are intended only to deceive his ſight; what poſſible way will there be of convincing ſuch a Perſon, tho' the thing be in its ſelf demonſtrable? Now if the ſtrength of Prejudice or maintaining of Credit can prevail ſo much in matters of Mathematical evidence, to with-hold aſſent; what power may we think a corrupt Intereſt may have upon the Underſtanding, as to the Arguments which tend to prove the truth of that Doctrine, which is ſo repugnant to that carnal Intereſt which the heart is already devoted to! Our bleſſed Saviour hath himſelf given us ſo full an account of the original and cauſes of Unbelief in the perſons he convers'd with, that that may yield us a ſufficient Anſwer to this Objection. He tells us the ground of it was not want of light, nay,

nay, there was light ſufficient to convince any, but that thoſe to whom the light came *lov'd darkneſs rather than it, becauſe their deeds were evil.* Joh. 3. 19. Joh. 5. 44. *That they could not believe while they received honour one of another, and ſought not the honour which was of God only*, i. e. That they were ſo greedy of Applauſe from each other, that they wou'd not impartially ſearch into the truth of that Doctrine, which did touch their Sores ſo to the quick, that they had rather have them feſter upon them, than go to the trouble of ſo ſharp a cure. That the reaſon ſo few follow'd him was becauſe *the way was narrow and the gate ſtrait which men muſt go in at*; Mat. 7. 14. and therefore no wonder ſo few of the rich and proud Phariſees cou'd get in at it; they were partly ſo ſwell'd with a high opinion of themſelves, and partly ſo loaden with their riches, that they thought it was to no purpoſe for them to think of going in at ſo ſtrait a gate, while they were reſolv'd to part with neither.

That the final ground of the rejection of any, was not want of evidence to bring them to believe, nor want of readineſs in Chriſt to receive them if they did, but it was *a peeviſh, wilful, obſtinate, malicious ſpirit that they would not come to Chriſt*, nor believe his Doctrine (for thoſe import the ſame) but when the moſt convincing Miracles were us'd, they wou'd rather *attribute them to the Prince of Devils than to the power of God.* And tho' our Saviour preſently by rational and demonſtrative Arguments did prove the contrary to their faces; yet we ſee thereby it was a Reſolution not to be convinc'd, or yield to the Truth, which was the cauſe why they did not believe. Now from this very inſtance of our Saviour's proceedings with the *Phariſees* by rational Arguments, I demand, whether theſe Arguments of our Saviour were ſufficient foundations for a Divine Aſſent to that Truth, that our Saviour did not his Miracles by any Diabolical but by Divine power, or no? If they were, then it is evident that rational Evidence may be a foundation for Divine Faith, or that ſome motives to believe may be ſo ſtrong, as to be ſufficient evidence of the Truth and certainty of the Doctrine: If theſe Arguments were not ſufficient proofs of what our Saviour ſpake, then welfare the *Phariſees*; it ſeems they ſaid nothing but what might be thus far juſtify'd, that the contrary to it cou'd not be demonſtrated. And if the evidence of our Saviours Miracles were ſo great, as ſome ſuppoſe, that the *Phariſees* cou'd not but be convinced that they were Divine; but out of their malice and envy they uttered this Blaſphemy againſt the Holy Ghoſt, to keep the people from following Chriſt; then we hence infer two things: *Firſt, How ſtrong an evidence there was in the Miracles of Chriſt*, when it convinced his moſt reſolute enemies that they were Divine. *Secondly, What power a corrupt will may have over a convinced Underſtanding.* For altho the Will may not hinder the conviction, yet it may ſoon ſtifle it, by ſuggeſting thoſe things to the Mind which may divert it from thoſe convictions of Truth; and ſeek to find out any ways to diſgrace it. It wou'd be no difficult task to diſcover in all thoſe inſtances wherein the Unbelief of Men is diſcover'd in the New Teſtament, that the Perſons guilty of it did not proceed like rational Men, or ſuch as deſir'd Truth, but were wholly carried away thro' paſſion, intereſt, prejudice, diſaffection, or ſome other cauſe of that nature, which may give us a ſufficient account why thoſe perſons did not believe, altho' there might be clear and undoubted evidence to perſuade them to it. But altho' I aſſert that theſe rational evidences are ſufficient arguments of the truth of the Doctrine they come to

manifeſt; yet I wou'd not be ſo underſtood, that I thereby reſolve all Religion into a mere act of Reaſon and Knowledge, and that no more power is requir'd in the Underſtanding to believe the Goſpel, than to believe a *Mathematical* Demonſtration: which is another Objection ſome lay in the way of this Opinion; but it is not difficult getting over it. For the ſufficiency which I attribute to rational Evidence, is not abſolute and ſimple, but *in ſuo genere*, as an objective Evidence. Notwithſtanding this the whole work of the Spirit of God in its peculiar energy and way of operation upon the Soul, is left intire to it ſelf: But then when the Spirit works as to the planting of a truly Divine Faith, I do not think that it only perſuades the Soul of the truth of a Divine Teſtimony, but withal repreſents the truths reveal'd by that Teſtimony, with all that excellency and ſuitableneſs that there is in them, that by the moſt agreeable, yet effectual influence of the Spirit upon the Soul, it cheerfully embraceth that Truth which is reveal'd, and cordially yields up it ſelf in obedience to it. This is the Divine Faith which the Scripture acquaints us with, and not ſuch a one as merely believes the truth of a Divine Teſtimony: and as to the production of this Faith, I acknowledge mere rational Evidence to be inſufficient, becauſe they proceed in two very different ways; the one is to ſatisfy Mens Minds in the truth of the Doctrine, the other is to bring them effectually to adhere unto it. The aſſerting of the one therefore doth no more tend to deſtroy the other, than the ſaying that a Teleſcope will help us to diſcover very much of the heavenly Bodies, doth imply that a blind Man may ſee them, if he makes but uſe of them. Altho' therefore the natural Man cannot ſavingly apprehend the things of God; yet there may be ſo much rational Evidence going along with Divine Revelation, that ſuppoſing Reaſon to be pure, and not corrupted and ſteep'd in Senſe as now it is, it wou'd diſcover Spiritual Evidence to be the moſt real and convincing Evidence. Thus far we have prov'd, *That where there is any infallible Teſtimony, there is ſufficient rational Evidence going along with it, to make it appear that it is from God.*

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

The rational Evidence of the truth of Christian Religion from Miracles.

I. *The possibility of Miracles appears from* God *and Providence; the evidence of a Divine Testimony by them.* God *alone can really alter the course of Nature. The Devil's power of working Miracles consider'd. Of* Simon Magus, Apollonius. *The cures in the Temple of* Æsculapius *at* Rome, *&c.* II. God *never works Miracles, but for some particular end. The particular reasons of the Miracles of* Christ. *The repealing the Law of* Moses, *which had been settled by Miracles. Why* Christ *check'd the* Pharisees *for demanding a Sign, when himself appeals to his Miracles. The power of* Christ's *Miracles on many who did not throughly believe.* III. Christ's *Miracles made it evident that he was the* Messias, *because the Predictions were fulfill'd in him. Why* John Baptist *wrought no Miracles.* IV. Christ's *Miracles necessary for the overthrow of the Devil's Kingdom.* V. *Of the Demoniacs and Lunatics in the Gospel, and in the Primitive Church. The power of the Name of* Christ *over them largely prov'd by several Testimonies.* VI. *The evidence thence of a Divine Power in* Christ. VII. *Of counterfeit dispossessions. Of Miracles wrought among Infidels.* VIII. *Of the future state of the Church.* IX. *The necessity of the Miracles of* Christ, *as to the propagation of Christian Religion: that prov'd from the condition of the Publishers, and the success of the Doctrine. The Apostles knew the hazard of their employment, before they entred into it.* X. *The boldness and resolution of the Apostles notwithstanding this, compar'd with heathen Philosophers.* XI. *No motive cou'd carry the Apostles thro' their employment, but the truth of their Doctrine;* XII. *not seeking the honour, profit or pleasure of the World.* XIII. *The Apostles evidence of the truth of their Doctrine lay in being eye-witnesses of our Saviour's Miracles and Resurrection.* XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII. *That attested by themselves; their sufficiency thence for preaching the Gospel.* XIX. *Of the nature of the Doctrine of the Gospel; contrariety of it to Natural Inclinations.* XX. *Strange success of it, notwithstanding it came not with humane power: No Christian Emperour till the Gospel universally preach'd.* XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV. *The weakness and simplicity of the instruments which preach'd the Gospel. From all which the great Evidence of the power of Miracles is prov'd.*

Of

I. 3. Hypoth. *OF all rational Evidences which tend to confirm the truth of a Divine Teſtimony, there can be none greater than a power of working Miracles for confirmation that the Teſtimony which is reveal'd is infallible.* The poſſibility of a power of Miracles cannot be queſtion'd by any who aſſert a *Deity* and a *Providence*; for by the ſame Power that things were either at firſt produced, or are ſtill conſerv'd (which is equivalent to the other) the courſe of Nature may be alter'd, and things caus'd which are beyond the power of inferiour Cauſes: For tho' that be an immutable Law of Nature as to *Phyſical* Beings, that every thing remains in the courſe and order wherein it was ſet at the Creation; yet that only holds till the ſame power which ſet it in that order ſhall otherwiſe diſpoſe of it. Granting then the poſſibility of Miracles, the ſubject of this *Hypotheſis* is: That a power of Miracles is the cleareſt Evidence of a Divine Teſtimony, which will appear from theſe following Conſiderations.

1. God *alone can really alter the courſe of Nature.* I ſpeak not of ſuch things which are apt only to raiſe admiration in us, becauſe of our unacquaintedneſs with the cauſes of them, or manner of their production, which are thence call'd *Wonders*, much leſs of mere juggles and impoſtures, whereby the Eyes of Men are deceiv'd; but I ſpeak of ſuch things as are in themſelves either contrary to, or above the courſe of Nature, *i. e.* that order which is eſtabliſh'd in the Univerſe. The Devil no queſtion may, and doth often deceive the World, and may by ſubtility and the agility of his nature, perform ſuch things as may amuſe the Minds of Men, and ſometimes put them to it, to find a difference between them and real Miracles, if they only make their Senſes judges of them. And ſuch kind of Wonders, tho' they are but ſparingly done, and with a kind of ſecreſy (as tho' they were conſulting with *Catiline* about the burning *Rome*) yet the Devil wou'd have ſome (eſpecially when Ignorance and Superſtition are aſcendants) to keep up his intereſt in the World. Or elſe, when he is like to be diſpoſſeſs'd and thrown out of all, he tries his utmoſt to keep as many to him as may be: Thus when the Spirit of God appear'd in the Miracles of our Saviour and his Apoſtles and the Primitive Church, he then conjur'd up all the infernal Powers to do ſomething parallel, to keep poſſeſſion of his idolatrous Temples, as long as he cou'd. Thus we find *Simon Magus* dogging the Apoſtles (as it were) at the heels, that by his Magic he might ſtagger the People concerning the Miracles wrought by the Apoſtles: After him *Apollonius* appear'd upon the Stage; but his wonders are ſuch pitiful things, compar'd with thoſe wrought by *Chriſt* or his Apoſtles, that it cou'd be nothing but malice in *Hierocles* to mention him in competition with *Chriſt*. But thoſe things which ſeem a great deal more conſiderable than either of theſe, were, The cure of a blind Man by *Veſpaſian* in *Ægypt*, mentioned by *Tacitus* and *Suetonius*, wherein there was a palpable imitation of our Saviour's curing the blind Man in the Goſpel; for the Man told *Veſpaſian*, *Reſtituturum oculos ſi inſpuiſſet*, *That he ſhould receive his ſight by his ſpittle:* So *Spartianus* tells us of a Woman that was cur'd of her blindneſs by kiſſing the knees of the Emperour *Adrian*; and * *Boxhornius* hath produced an old Table in the Temple of *Æſculapius* at *Rome* of ſeveral diſeaſed perſons that were cured there: *A blind Man in the time of* Antoninus *was cured by this Oracle; he muſt come to the Altar, and kneel there; from the right ſide he muſt turn to the left, and put five fingers upon the Altar, and then liſt up his hands and touch his eyes and ſo was cured: Another called* Lucius *cured of the pain of his ſide,*

Sueton. Veſp. cap. 7.

* Boxhorn. Qu. Rom. qu. 7.

ſide, by mixing the aſhes of the Altar with the wine, and applying it to his ſide; another cured of ſpitting of blood by the kernel of a pine-apple and honey, uſed three days; a fourth cured of Blindneſs by the blood of a white cock and honey uſed three days upon his eyes. Theſe are the moſt conſiderable of all the pretended Miracles done about that time, when the noiſe of the Chriſtian Miracles were ſpread ſo far and done ſo frequently, that they challenged the Heathens again and again to bring forth any perſon poſſeſs'd with a Devil; if he did not confeſs to them that he was a Devil, tho' he made the Heathens believe that he was a God, they were contented to leave their blood in the place.

For thus *Tertullian* ſpeaks in his *Apology* to them: *Edatur hic aliquis ſub tribunalibus veſtris, quem dæmone agi conſtet: juſſus à quolibet Chriſtiano loqui ſpiritus ille, tam ſe Dæmonem confitebitur de vero, quam alibi Deum de falſo: æque producatur aliquis ex iis qui de deo pati exiſtimantur, qui aris inhalantes numen de nidore concipiunt, qui ructando curantur, qui anhelando profantur. Iſta ipſa Virgo cœleſtis pluviarum pollicitatrix, iſte ipſe Æſculapius Medicinarum demonſtrator, alias de morituris ſcordii & denatii & Aſclepiadoti ſubminiſtrator, niſi ſe Dæmones confeſſi fuerint, Chriſtiano mentiri non audentes, ibidem illius Chriſtiani procaciſſimi ſanguinem fundite. Quid iſto opere manifeſtius, quid hac probatione fidelius? ſimplicitas veritatis in medio eſt; virtus illi ſua aſſiſtit; nihil ſuſpicari licebit, magia aut aliqua fallacia fieri. Dictis non ſtetis, ſi oculi veſtri & aures permiſerint vobis.* In theſe very daring words, we ſee how the Chriſtians appeal'd to their Senſes, even with the hazard of their own lives, that they wou'd make even *Æſculapius* himſelf confeſs what he was, and by whoſe power all the cures were wrought upon the Dreamers in his Temples. And for the manner of the Devil's cures, the ſame Author explains it thus. *Lædunt primo, dehinc remedia præcipiunt ad miraculum nova, ſive contraria, poſt quæ deſinunt lædere, & curaſſe creduntur.* *They firſt poſſeſs the bodies themſelves* (as Demoniacs were common in thoſe times) *and affect it with various diſtempers, afterwards upon uſing the ſtrange remedies preſcribed by* Æſculapius, *they forſake their ſtation, and the perſon is cured.* And for the cures perform'd by the Emperours, thoſe who conſider what various artifices were about that time uſed to procure an opinion of Divinity in the Emperours, will not much wonder that ſuch reports ſhou'd be ſpread of them, or that any perſons ſhou'd fain theſe diſtempers to give themſelves out to be cured by them. But granting ſomewhat wonderful in theſe, what are they, compar'd with thoſe done by *Chriſtians?* and who ever wou'd lay down his life to atteſt any of them? So that tho' the Devil by his ſubtilty may eaſily impoſe upon Spectators eyes, yet it was impoſſible for him by any power of his own to alter the courſe of Nature, or produce any real Miracle. For every true Miracle is a production of ſomething out of nothing (which cannot be done by leſs than an omnipotent arm) and that either in the thing it ſelf, when it is of that nature that it cannot be produced by any Second Cauſes, as the raiſing of the dead; in the manner of doing it, when tho' the thing lies within the poſſibility of Second Cauſes, yet it is perform'd without the help of any of them, as in the cure of diſeaſes without any uſe of means, *by a word ſpeaking, the touch of a garment*, &c. Now that all thoſe Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of the Chriſtian Doctrine were ſuch true and proper Miracles, will be diſcover'd afterwards.

Tertull. Apol. c. 23.

Ibid. c. 22.

2. God *never alters the courſe of Nature, but for ſome very conſiderable end.* II.

end. For otherwise when he did it, it wou'd not be taken notice of nor thought to be an alteration of the order of Nature, but only some rare contingiences which lie hid in the order of Causes, but only break out at some times: of which sort are all those things which the ignorant World is apt to account as Prodigies. Of all which rare contingences in Nature, I say, as the *Roman* Orator doth, *Si quod raro fit, id portentum putandum est, sapientem esse portentum est; sæpius enim mulum peperisse arbitror, quam sapientem fuisse. If all rare contingences be accounted prodigies, a wise Man is certainly the greatest Prodigy.* But these are quite of another nature from true Miracles, which are immediately produced by a Divine Power, and intended for a confirmation of some Divine Testimony. There are now several weighty Reasons, which might make Miracles necessary in the time of our Saviour, as an Evidence of his Divine Authority and Power.

Cicero de Div. l. 2.

1. *That he came to take down that way of worship, which had been at first settled by a power of Miracles in* Moses. God wou'd not be so much wanting to the Faith of that People, which had receiv'd their Law by Signs and Wonders from Heaven, but that there shou'd be as strong an Evidence given to them, that the fulness of time was come when that dispensation was to have an end, and to give place to one more perfect, which was to be establish'd instead of it. Upon which account the *Jews* might rationally enquire after a Sign, where any new Revelation was discover'd, which might null the obligation of any former Law: and when they enquire so much after a Sign, our Saviour doth not reject the enquiry as in it self unreasonable, but as made in an unreasonable manner; for they wou'd not be contented with the Miracles which our Saviour wrought, which sufficiently manifested a Divine Power; but all that they desired was, *A Sign from Heaven*, i. e. such as were done at the giving of the Law, the Thundring and Lightnings there; or, as the *raining of Manna in the wilderness*: Now our Saviour justly checks this demand as importunate and impudent; partly as knowing upon what account they asked it, merely to tempt him and not out of any real desire of satisfaction; and partly because on that abundant Evidence which was given in the Miraculous cures which were wrought by him, which were more suitable to that design of doing good in the World, than all the Thunder-claps on Mount *Sinai* were: neither were the People in a condition to be fed by *Manna* as they were in the Wilderness, God graciously suiting the discoveries of his Power to the peculiar advantages of the People which they were made to, and the dispensation they usher'd in. Those terrible Signs at Mount *Sinai* being very suitable to the severity and rigor of the Law: and the gracious Miracles of our Saviour to the sweetness and grace of the Gospel. And on this account our Saviour charged the *Jews* with Hypocrisy in requiring a σημεῖον, as something above δύναμις, a *Prodigy* rather than a Miracle; *An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a Sign, and there shall no Sign be given it but that of the Prophet* Jonas, *i. e.* this People which are so far from the Faith of *Abraham*, (and therefore are suppositious Children) that no Miracles which I do, will convince them, but they seek only to have their Humours gratify'd more than their Faith confirm'd by some Prodigy from Heaven, shall not by me be thus gratify'd; but having done enough already to persuade them, if they had any heart to believe, instead of a Sign from Heaven, they shall have only one from the Earth, and that not so much intended for the conversion of

Matth. 12 38. 16. 1.

Matth. 12. 39.

such

such wilful Unbelievers, as for the testifying my innocency to the World, *viz.* his Resurrection from the dead. And so elsewhere when the *Jews*, demand a Sign, it was upon the doing of that, which if they had attended to, had been a sufficient Sign to them, *viz. his driving the buyers and sellers out of the Temple:* Which being a thing permitted by the *Sanhedrin* and the *Priests*, how cou'd they think so mean a Person, in appearance, as our Saviour was, cou'd ever have effected it, had it not been for a Divine Majesty and Power which appear'd in him? It was not then the expectation of Miracles which our Saviour rebuked in the *Jews*, but being unsatisfy'd with the kind and nature of our Saviour's Miracles. It was their Hypocrisy and unbelief which *Christ* condemn'd, notwithstanding the frequent Miracles which he wrought among them: For we plainly find our Saviour very often appealing to his Miracles as the evidences of his Divine Commission: *If I had not done the works among them which no man else did, they had not had sin*, i. e. in not believing me. Whereby *Christ* both sets forth the necessity of his working Miracles, in order to the conviction of the World, and the greatness of the Miracles which he wrought: he did those no Man else had done, no not *Moses* and *Elias*, in curing all manner of diseases by the Word of his Mouth; and those Miracles which they had done, he exceeded them in the manner of doing them. *Moses* fed them with bread from Heaven; but *Christ* multiply'd on Earth some *few loaves* and *fishes*, to the *feeding* of *many thousands*: *Elias* indeed raised one from the dead; but *Christ* raised more, and one after he had been *four days* in the *grave*. And upon this very evidence of our Saviour's Miracles we find many believing on him. And even of those who were not so far wrought upon as to become followers of Christ, as the only *Messias*, yet we find them so far perswaded by the power of his Miracles, that they looked upon him as a great Prophet, or one that was sent from God. So *Nicodemus*, who came first to Christ more as a rational Enquirer than a Believer, yet we see he was *perswaded that he was a teacher come from God, because no man could do the miracles which Christ did unless God were with him.* And before him many of the *Jews* at *Jerusalem believed in his name when they saw the miracles which he did*; yet these persons *Christ would not trust himself with, because he knew their hearts* were not subdued to his Doctrine, tho' their understandings were convinced by his Miracles. And after this other of the *Jews* that looked not on him as the *Messias*, yet it is said they believ'd on him on the account of his Miracles. *And many of the people believed on him, and said, When Christ cometh will he do more Miracles than these which this man hath done?* Altho' herein they were most unreasonable in believing the Evidence, and not the Truth attested by it, in believing Christ to be one sent from God by his Miracles, and yet not believing him to be the *Messias*, which was the thing attested by them. Not that mere Miracles wou'd prove the Person to be the *Messias* who did them, but the Miracles prov'd the Testimony to be Divine; now that which Christ deliver'd to them as a Divine Testimony, was his being the *Messias* and therefore by the same reason they believ'd him to be sent from God, they ought to have believ'd him to be the *Messias*; for one sent from God cou'd never falsifie in the main of his Message, as this was of our Saviour's preaching. And hence it is observable our Saviour did not shew forth his Divine Power till he entred upon his Office of Preaching; thereby making it appear he intended this as the great evidence of the truth of the Doctrine which he preached

Joh. 2. 18.
Joh. 5. 36. 10. 25. Joh. 15. 20.
Joh. 1. 49. 2. 11.
Joh. 3. 2.
Joh. 2. 23.
Joh. 7. 31.

to them. And herein the blind man in the Gospel saw more Truth and Reason than the whole Court of *Sanhedrin*, before which in probability he was convented about his cure by Christ; for when they sought to get something out of him in disparagement of our Saviour's person and miracle, he sharply and roundly tells them, when they said they knew
Joh. 9. 29, 30. God spake to *Moses*, *but for this fellow, we know not from whence he is*; *Why herein*, saith he, *is a marvellous thing, that ye know not from whence*
Ver. 33. *he is, and yet he hath opened mine eyes. If this man were not of God, he could do nothing*; (as tho' he had said) is it not plain that this man is imploy'd by God in the World by the Miracles which he doth? for otherwise God wou'd not so readily assist him in doing such great Works
Ver. 31. *for we know that God heareth not sinners: but if any man be a worshipper of God, and doth his will, him he heareth*; *i. e.* if this man pretended a Commission from Heaven falsly (whereby he wou'd be the greatest of Sinners) can we think God wou'd so miraculously assist him? but we know by our Law, if one comes with a Commission from God, and draw men not to Idolatry, which is meant by a worshipper of God; such a one God is present with, and we are bound to believe him. And for this very miracle, or curing one born blind, was the like ever heard of before? did ever *Moses* or the Prophets do it? Thus we see what strong Rational Evidence there was in this Miracle of Christ in the judgment of this blind man, which he utter'd with so much reason before the Court of *Sanhedrin*, when he knew how like he was to be excommunicated for it; and yet this very person was as yet ignorant that
Ver. 36. Christ was the true *Messias*, as appears by the Sequel of the Chapter;
Ver. 38. but upon Christ's Revelation of himself to him, *he presently believed on him.* How strangely irrational were the *Jews* then in rejecting our Saviour, when his Miracles not only exceeded those of *Moses* both in number and quality; but which was more, they saw themselves the Miracles which Christ did, but they received those of *Moses* only upon the credit of their Fathers! And from the strength of the Evidence arising from the power of Miracles it is that St. *Peter* tells the promiscuous Assembly, *Act.* 2. 22. *That Jesus of* Nazareth *was a man approved of God among them, by miracles, wonders and signs, which God did by him in the midst of them, as they themselves also knew.* He appeals to their own knowledge, which he wou'd not certainly have done, had it not been in a case beyond all dispute among them. Which was a thing so notorious among them, that we find the *Pharisees* themselves confessing it;
Joh. 11. 47. *What do we? For this man doth many miracles:* Now then in a Nation whose Religion had been establish'd by Miracles, and the certainty of the truth of it, among those who then profess'd it, did depend so much upon the constant credit which the report of the Miracles done at the settling of their Law had among them; what cou'd be a more rational and convincing way of proceeding, than for our Saviour to manifest by a greater Power of Miracles in himself the undoubted credentials of his Commission from Heaven; and that he was the true *Messias*, which was foretold by their own most sacred and authentical Records? Which will appear more,

III. *Because the power of miracles did evidently declare that he was the very*
Hyp. 2. *person promised.* For if the exact correspondency of the event to the Predictions in a Nation owning them as Divine, be an undoubted evidence, that they are exactly fulfill'd; our Saviour was most certainly the Person so often spoken of in the Old Testament. For many of the Prophecies

Prophecies of the Old Teſtament concerning the *Meſſias*, if they were not fulfill'd in Chriſt, in the conditions the *Jews* have been in ſince their diſperſion, (which fell out exactly according to the Prediction of Chriſt) it is impoſſible that they ſhou'd be fulfill'd at all. So that either the Predictions muſt loſe their Divine Authority, or they muſt be accompliſhed in our bleſſed Saviour. For as *Tertullian* ſharply ſays to the *Jews*, *Red-de ſtatum Judææ quem Chriſtus inveniat, & alium contende venire*; *Let the people of the Jews be in their former condition, and then plead for a Meſſias to come.* For can any thing be more plain than that the *Meſſias* was to be born in *Bethleheni* of *Judæa?* but where is that now? and how long ſince the *Jews* enjoy'd any civil Polity there? What is become of the ſecond Temple, in the time of which the Deſire of all Nations ſhou'd come. Is not *Jeruſalem* already deſtroy'd, and the Oblation there long ſince ceaſed, which was to come to paſs ſo ſoon after the *Meſſias*, and did accordingly? Is not *the Scepter yet departed from* Judah, and *the Lawgiver from between his feet*, and is not *Shiloh* yet come? What ſtrange unintelligible Weeks were thoſe of *Daniel*, if they were extended to ſo indefinite a period; what certain ground cou'd from hence be gather'd of any time wherein their Accompliſhment was to be expected? But not to Expatiate on thoſe things which are already ſo largely prov'd beyond all poſſibility of contradiction, by the ancient and modern learned Writers the *Jews*: To inſiſt therefore on our preſent buſineſs; are not the Prophecies concerning the Miracles which the *Meſſias* ſhou'd work, exactly fulfill'd in Chriſt? *Then the eyes of the blind ſhall be opened, and the ears of the deaf ſhall be unſtopped; then ſhall the lame man leap as an Hart, and the tongue of the dumb ſhall ſing.* He muſt be a great ſtranger in the Hiſtory of the New Teſtament that is to ſeek for an exact fulfilling of this Prophecy. Nay, and the *Jewiſh Midraſch*, upon *Pſal.* 146. 8. ſaith, that when *Meſſias comes, he ſhould open the eyes of the blind*; and the *Jews* themſelves often ſpeak of the great Miracles which the *Meſſias* ſhou'd do when he appears; and therefore out of their own mouths will they be condemned, when the Miracles of Chriſt make it ſo evident that he was the true *Meſſias*. Hence when *John Baptiſt* ſent his Diſciples to Chriſt for them to be fully ſatisfy'd concerning him; he bids them tell him, *the blind receive their ſight, and the lame walk, and the lepers are cleanſed, and the deaf hear, and the dead are raiſed up*, &c. as tho' the mentioning of theſe Miracles was ſufficient to make it appear to them who he was whom they came to enquire after. And therefore it is obſervable that *John Baptiſt* himſelf, tho' greater than the Prophets, nay, *than whom there was not a greater born of women*, by our Saviour's own Teſtimony; yet of him it is ſaid, *that he wrought no miracle*: of which no account can be given ſo probable and rational, as that God in his infinite Wiſdom was pleas'd ſo to order it, that the Evidence of our Saviour's being the *Meſſias* might be made more clear by the Miracles which he wrought; that the minds of the People might not be diſtracted between *John* and *Chriſt*; he therefore reſerv'd the glory of Miracles wholly to the name of *Chriſt*, that there might be no pretence of Competition between *John* and *him*.

Tertull. C. Judæos, c. 13.

Iſa. 35. 5, 6.

V. Grot. in Joh. 9. 32.

Mat. 11. 5.

Mat. 11. 9, 11. Joh. 10. 41.

Another reaſon of the neceſſity of Miracles in our Saviour by way of Rational Evidence, is, *the overthrowing the power and kingdom of the Devil in the world.* For which purpoſe it is obſervable that the Devil had ſcarce ever greater power over the Bodies of Men as well as their Souls, than at that time; thence we read of ſuch a multitude of *Demoniacs* IV. *Hyp.* 3.

niacs in the Gospel. For it seems very harsh to interpret those merely of Epileptical and Lunatic Persons, both because the δαιμονιζόμενοι, and
Mat. 4. 24. σελήνιαζόμενοι, and παραλυτικοί, are mention'd distinctly, and that it appears by the Primitive Church afterwards how frequent it was to eject the Devil out of possessed persons. Nay, so far am I from thinking that the Demoniacs were mere Lunatics, that I rather think with
Vossius de Idolat. l. 2. c. 19. *Vossius* that the Lunatics were truly Demoniacs, only they were not constantly under the power of the Devil, but as their paroxysms return'd upon them, the Devil loving to Fish in such troubled Waters. And thence
Mat. 17. 14. the same person is called a Lunatic in one place, who is called a Demo-
Luke. 9. 39. niac in another; because he did *ruere in principiis lunationum*, as the *Arabic* version expresseth it; or as *Rusticus Elpidius* more fully explains it,

Rust. Elpid. lib. 5.

Repserat in medium rabies horrenda furoris
Dæmonis afflatu, propria qui peste nocivus
Allidit captas fœdo discrimine mentes,
Menstrua deciduos cum Luna recolligit ignes.

Theophylact is of opinion, that the *Jews* in the time of our Saviour sup-
Mat. 8. 28. pos'd, that the Souls of dead men became Demons, and thence we read in Scripture of the Demoniacs among the Tombs: but it is far more probable which *Grotius* conceives, that the *Jews* were of opinion, that the Souls of dead men did hover up and down about their Bodies, and that these were so long under the Devils power, which many of the *Jews* to this day believe, and make use of the instance of the *Pythoniss* raising *Samuel*; on which account the Devils, to favour an Opinion so advantageous to their interest, might appear with greater terror and fury about their burying places, as we see they did in those possessed persons. But on whatever account it was, we find it evident that about the time of our Saviour's appearance, and some time after, the truly ἐνεργούμενοι were very frequent; whether it were that the Devil by such frequent possessions of persons, and making them to do such strange things, might thereby endeavour to invalidate the evidence of our Saviour's Miracles (from whence it is probable the *Pharisees* raised their Calumny, that Christ did Miracles by *Beelzebub*, because they saw so many strange appearances caus'd by possessed persons) or whether it were thro' the Admirable Providence of God, which might give Satan the greater liberty at that time, on purpose to heighten the glory of our Saviour in dispossessing of him, and thereby to give the highest Rational Evidence, that his Power was of God, which tended so much to the destruction of the Kingdom of Satan.

V. And hence the Primitive Christians did so much triumph, and as it were insult over the Devil where-ever they found him, making him to remove his lodgings from possess'd persons, by a Writ of Ejection from the Name of Christ. Thence *Origen* rationally concludes that Christ had his Power given him from above, because at his very Name the
Orig. c. Cels. l. 3. Devils forsook the bodies which they had possess'd, Εἰ γὰρ μὴ θεόθεν ἦν αὐτῷ δοθεῖσα σύστασις, οὐκ ἂν καὶ δαίμονες τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ ἀπαγγελλομένῳ μόνον εἴκοντες ἀνεχώρουν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν πολεμουμένων. And he elsewhere tells us, that even the meanest sort of Christians without any Ceremony, but merely by their Prayers, did ordinarily eject the Devil out of mens
Lib. 7. bodies: ὡς ἐπίπαν γὰρ ἰδιῶται τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττουσι, παριστάσης τῆς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ χριστοῦ χάριτος τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων εὐτελὲς καὶ ἀσθενὲς, οὐ πάντως δεόμενον πρὸς τὸ

ἡττη-

ἡττηθῆναι καὶ εἶξαν ὑπεξελθεῖν ἀπὸ Ψυχῆς ἀνθρώπου καὶ σώματος σοφοῦ τινὸς καὶ δυνατοῦ ἐν ταῖς λογικαῖς περὶ τῆς πίστεως ἀποδείξεσι. *Ordinary Christians,* saith he, *most commonly do this, the Grace of Christ by its word thereby discovering the contemptibleness and infirmity of the Devils, that in order to their Ejection they did not want any learned or experienced Christian,* And for this they appeal to the Heathens themselves, as appears not only by the challenge of *Tertullian* already mention'd, but by the Testimony of almost all of them who have writ against the Heathens in vindication of the Christian Religion. Thence *Minutius Felix, Hæc omnia sciunt plerique, pars vestrum, ipsos dæmonas de semetipsis confiteri, quoties à nobis tormentis verborum, & orationis incendiis de corporibus exiguntur. Ipse Saturnus, & Serapis, & Jupiter, & quicquid dæmonum colitis, victi dolore quod sunt eloquuntur, nec utique in turpitudinem sui nonnullis præsertim vestrum assistentibus, mentiuntur. Ipsis testibus eos esse Dæmonas, de se verum confitentibus credite; adjurati enim per Deum verum & solum, inviti, miseri corporibus inhorrescunt; & vel exsiliunt statim, vel evanescunt gradatim, prout fides patientis adjuvat, aut gratia curantis aspirat.* Can we now think the Devil shou'd not only forsake his Tyranny over the bodies of men, but let go so advantageous a pillar of his Tyranny over the Consciences of men in Idolatrous worship, as the concealing himself was, had he not been forc'd to it by a Power far greater than his own? So *Cyprian ad Demetrianum,* appeals to him being the Proconsul of *Africa,* about the same thing (who had written sharply against the Christians) for speaking of the Devils whom they worshipped in their Idols, *O si audire eos velles & videre, quando à nobis adjurantur & torquentur Spiritualibus flagris & verborum tormentis de obsessis corporibus ejiciuntur, quando ejulantes & gementes voce humana, & potestate divina flagella & verbera sentientes, venturum judicium confitentur; veni & cognosce vera esse quæ dicimus:* and a little after, *videbis sub manu nostra stare vinctos, & tremere captivos, quos tu suspicis & veneraris ut Dominos.* Did ever any of the Heathen Magicians (of which there were good store) extort such things from the Devils, as the Christians did, merely by their Prayers, and Invocations of the name of God and Christ? did they ever make them confess to be what they were, not only in possess'd bodies but in their Temples too? that was beyond the power of their *Ephesian* Letters, or any of their Magical Incantations. Did the Devils ever dread so much the Name of *Socrates* or *Aristides* as they did that of God and Christ? Of which *Lactantius* thus speaks, *Quo audito tremunt, exclamant, & uri se verberarique testantur, & interrogati qui sint, quando venerint, quando in hominem irrepserint, confitentur sic extorti, & excruciati virtute divini numinis exulant; propter hæc verbera & minas, sanctos & justos viros semper oderunt.* And even *Apollo* himself at the name of Christ trembled as much as ever the *Pythian* Prophetess did in her greatest furies; so *Prudentius* tells us.

Minut. Felix. p. 31. ed. Ouz.

Cyprian. ad Demetr. s. 12.

Lactant. de justitia, lib. 5. c. 21.

Torquetur Apollo
Nomine percussus Christi, nec fulmina verbi
Ferre potest; agitant miserum tot verbera linguæ,
Quot laudata Dei resonant miracula Christi.

Prudent. Apotheos.

To these we may add what *Firmicus* saith to the same purpose, *Ecce Dæmon est quem colis; cum Dei & Christi ejus nomen audierit, contremiscit, & ut interrogantibus nobis respondeat trepidantia verba, vix se colligit; adhærens*

Firmicus de errore prof. relig.

adhærens homini laceratur, uritur, vapulat, & statim de commissis sceleribus confitetur. By which Testimonies it appears what power over Satan, when he was in his Kingdom, the Christians by the power of Christ had; not as tho the bare name of Christ had so great an efficacy in the ejection of Devils, as *Origen* seems to be of opinion (in a discourse about the efficacy of Names, unworthy of so great a Philosopher) but that God might manifest to the World the truth that was contain'd in that Name, he did give a power to such as made use of it, of working Miracles by it. And thence we read in Scripture, that some who were not throughly Christians, but yet profess'd the Truth of the Gospel, and that what they did was for the honour of Christ, *had a power of casting out Devils and doing many wonderful things thro' his name.*

Origen. l. 1. c. Cels.

Matt. 7. 22.

VI. By these and many other Testimonies which might be produced out of the Primitive Church, we find an exact accomplishment of our Saviour's promise to his Disciples when he took his leave of them. *And these signs shall follow them that believe, In my name shall they cast out Devils,* &c. This power then in the Primitive Church had a twofold Argument in it, both as it was a manifestation of the truth of the Predictions of our Saviour, and as it was an Evidence of the Divine Power of *Christ*, when his Name so long after his Ascension had so great a command over all the Infernal Spirits; and that so evidently, that at that time when the *Christians* did as it were tyrannize over *Satan* so in his own territories, yet then the greatest of his *Magicians* had no Power to hurt the bodies of the *Christians*, which is a thing *Origen* takes much notice of. For when *Celsus* saith from *Diogenes Ægyptius* that *Magic* cou'd *only hurt ignorant and wicked Men, and had no power over Philosophers*; *Origen* replies, *first*, that *Philosophy* was no such charm against the power of *Magic*, as appears by *Mæragenes* who writ the Story of *Apollonius Tyanæus*, the famous Magician Philosopher, who therein mentions how *Euphrates* and an *Epicurean* (οὐκ ἀγενεῖς φιλόσοφοι, *no vulgar Philosophers*) were catched by the *Magic* of *Apollonius*, (and altho' *Philostratus* disowns this History of *Mæragenes* as fabulous, yet he that thinks *Philostratus* for that, to be of any greater credit, is much deceived, of whom *Lud. Vives* gives this true Character, that he doth *magna Homeri mendacia majoribus mendaciis corrigere, Mend one hole and make three,*) but saith *Oregen*, as to the *Christians*, this is undoubtedly true: Διαβεβαιούμεθα δὲ ἡμεῖς καὶ τῇ πείρᾳ παραλαβόντες, ὅτι οἱ κατὰ χριστιανισμὸν διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεραπεύοντες θεὸν, καὶ βιοῦντες κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον αὐτοῦ ταῖς προσταχθεῖσαις δὲ εὐχαῖς συνεχέστερον καὶ δεόντως νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας χρώμενοι, οὔτε μαγείᾳ οὔτε δαιμονίοις εἰσιν ἁλωτοί. *This*, saith he, *we are most certain of, and have found it by experience true, that those who according to the Principles of Christianity do worship God over all, thro' Jesus, and do live according to the Gospel, being constant in their solemn Prayers night and day, are not obnoxious to the power of any Magic or Devils whatever.* Now then if the Devil who had then so much power over others, had none upon the true followers of *Christ*; and if instead of that they had so great a commanding Power over the Devil even in things which tended most to his disadvantage, not only dislodging him out of Bodies, but out of his idolatrous Temples; what can be more evident, than that this power which was so efficacious for the overthrowing the Kingdom of *Satan*, must needs be far greater than the power of *Satan* is? For it is an undoubted Maxim in Natural Reason, That *whatever is put out of its former place by force and violence, is extruded by something stronger than*

Mark 16. 17.

Lud. Vives de trad. disc. l. 5.

Origen. contr. Cels. l. 6. p. 302.

than its self; for if the force on either side were equal, there cou'd be no dispossessing of either; if any thing then be cast out of its former possession unwillingly, it is an undeniable proof there was some power greater than his who was dispossessed. Now we cannot conceive, if there be such malignant Spirits, as by many undeniable proofs it is evident there are, that they shou'd willingly quit their possessions to such a Doctrine which tends to the unavoidable ruin of their Interest in the World: if then the power of this Doctrine hath overthrown the Devil's Kingdom in the World, where-ever it hath been truly entertain'd, it must necessarily follow, that this power is far above the power of any damned Spirits. Now what folly and madness was it in the *Heathens* to worship those for Gods, which they cou'd not but see, if they wou'd open their eyes, were under so great slavery to a power above them, which cou'd make them confess what was most to their disadvantage in the presence of their great adorers?

VII. Neither ought the many Counterfeits and Impostures which have been in the World in this kind since the establishment of Christian Religion (among the advancers of particular interests and designs) make us suspect the truth of those things which were done in the first Ages of the Church of *Christ*. For, *first*, it stands to the greatest Reason, that the strongest Arguments for the truth of a Religion ought to be fetched from the Ages of its first appearance in the World; if then the Evidence be undoubted as to those first times, we ought to embrace our Religion as true, whatever the impostures have been among those who have apparently gone aside from that purity and simplicity of the Gospel, which had so great power. Then, *secondly*, if all that hath been done in this kind of ejecting Devils, where Christianity is own'd, be acknowledg'd for impostures; one of these two things must be supposed as the ground of it: either that there was no such thing as a real dispossession by the Devil, or else there was no such thing as a dispossessing him. If the *first*, then hereby will be seen a confirmation of our former Argument, that where Christianity is own'd, by the power of that, the Devil is more curb'd and restrain'd, than where it is not, or else is much over-run with ignorance and superstition. Of the latter, the Ages of the Christian Church, from the 10th Century to the beginning of the 16th Current, are a clear Evidence; Of the *first*, all those who have been conversant in the places where *Paganism* or gross *Idolatry* do yet reign, will bring in their creditable Testimonies, how tyrannical the power of the Devil is yet among them. If it be not so then, where careful endeavours have been used for retrieving the ancient purity of Christian Doctrine and Worship, we ought to impute it to the power of him who is stronger than *Satan*, who where-ever he comes to dwell, doth dispossess him of his former habitations. If the *second* then be entertained as the ground of concluding all things as impostures, which are accounted dispossessions of *Satan*, *viz.* that he never is really dispossessed; then it must either be said, that where he is once seized, there is no possibility of ejecting him; which is to say, that the Devil hath an absolute and infinite power, and that there is no power greater than his, which is to own him for God; or else that God suffers him to tyrannize where and how he will, which is contrary to Divine Providence, and the care God takes of the World, and of the good of Mankind; or else, *lastly*, that those Persons who pretend to do it, are not such Persons who are armed so much with the power of *Christ*, nor

possess

poſſeſſed with ſuch a due Spirit of the Goſpel, which hath command over theſe infernal Spirits. And this in the caſes pretended by the great Juglers and Impoſtors of the Chriſtian World, the *Popiſh* Prieſts have been ſo notorious, that none of their party of any great faith or credit would ſtand to vouch them. And we have this impregnable Argument againſt all ſuch Impoſtures, that the matters which they by ſuch actions would give an Evidence to, being ſo vaſtly different from, if not in ſome things diametrically oppoſite to the firſt delivery and deſign of the Chriſtian Faith, it is inconſiſtent with the way uſed for the confirmation of Chriſtian Religion in the firſt publiſhing of it: to atteſt the truth of ſuch things by any real Miracles: For ſo it would invalidate the great force of the Evidences of the truth of Chriſtianity, if the ſame Argument ſhou'd be uſed for the proving of that which in the judgment of any impartial Perſon was not delivered, when the truth of the Doctrine of *Chriſt* was confirmed by ſo many and uncontrouled Miracles. But hereby we ſee what unconceivable prejudice hath been done to the true primitive Doctrine of the Goſpel; and what ſtumbling-blocks have been laid in the way of conſiderative Perſons, to keep them from embracing the truly Chriſtian Faith, by thoſe who wou'd be thought the infallible Directors of Men in it, by making uſe of the Broad-ſeal of Heaven (ſet only to the truth of the Scriptures) to confirm their unwritten and ſuperſtitious ways of worſhip. For if I once ſee that which I looked on as an undoubted Evidence of Divine Power, brought to atteſt any thing directly contrary to Divine Revelation; I muſt either conclude that God may either contradict himſelf by ſealing both parts of a contradiction, which is both blaſphemous, and impoſſible; or that that Society of Men which own ſuch things is not at all tender of the honour of Chriſtian Doctrine, but ſeeks to ſet up an intereſt contrary to it, and matters not what diſadvantage is done to the grounds of Religion by ſuch unworthy pretences: and which of the two is more rational and true, let every one's Conſcience judge. And therefore it is much the intereſt of the Chriſtian World to have all ſuch Frauds and Impoſtures diſcovered, which do ſo much diſſervice to the Chriſtian Faith, and are ſuch ſecret fomenters of *Atheiſm* and *Infidelity*. But how far that promiſe of our Saviour: *That they which believe in his Name, ſhall caſt out Devils and do many Miracles*, may extend even in theſe laſt Ages of the World to ſuch generous and Primitive-ſpirited Chriſtians, who out of a great and deep ſenſe of the truth of Chriſtianity and tenderneſs to the Souls of Men, ſhou'd go among *Heathens* and *Infidels* to convert them only to Chriſt (and not to a ſecular intereſt, under pretence of an infallible Head) is not here a place fully to enquire. I confeſs I cannot ſee any reaſon why God may not yet for the conviction of *Infidels*, employ ſuch a power of Miracles, altho' there be not ſuch neceſſity of it, as there was in the firſt propagation of the Goſpel, there being ſome Evidences of the power of Chriſtianity now, which were not ſo clear then, (as the overthrowing the kingdom of *Satan* in the World; the prevailing of Chriſtianity, notwithſtanding force uſed againſt it; the recovery of it from amidſt all the corruptions which were mixed with it; the conſent of thoſe parties in the common foundations of Chriſtianity, which yet diſagree from each other with great bitterneſs of Spirit,) tho' I ſay it be not of that neceſſity now, when the Scriptures are convey'd to us in a certain uninterrupted manner; yet God may pleaſe out of his abundant proviſion for the ſatisfaction of the Minds of Men, concerning

Matth. 16. 17.

ning the truth of Christian Doctrine, to employ good Men to do something which may manifest the power of Christ to be above the Devil's, whom they worship. And therefore I shou'd far sooner believe the relation of the Miracles of *Xaverius* and his Brethren employ'd in the conversion *Infidels*, than *Lipsius* his *Virgo Hallensis* and *Asprecollis*, cou'd it but be made evident to me that the design of those Persons had more of *Christianity* than *Popery* in it; that is, that they went more upon a design to bring the Souls of the *Infidels* to Heaven, than to enlarge the Authority and Jurisdiction of the *Roman* Church.

VIII. But what-ever the truth of those Miracles, or the design of those persons were, we have certain and undoubted Evidence of the Truth of those Miracles, whereby Christianity was first propagated, and the Kingdom of Satan over-thrown in the World; Christ thereby making it appear that his Power was greater than the Devil's *who had possession, because he over-came him, took from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divided his spoils*; i. e. dispossess'd him of Mens Bodies, and his Idolatrous Temples, silenced his Oracles, nonplust his Magicians, and at last, when Christianity had overcome by suffering, wrested the worldly Power and Empire out of the Devil's hands, and employ'd it against himself. Neither may we think, because since that time the Devil hath got some ground in the world again by the large spread of *Mahometism*, and the general Corruptions in the Christian world, that therefore the other was no argument of Divine Power; because the truth of Christianity is not tied to any particular places; because such a falling away hath been foretold in the Scripture, and therefore the truth of them is prov'd by it; and because God himself hath threatned that those who will not receive the Truth in the love of it, shall be *given up to strong delusions*. Doth not this then instead of abating the strength of the Argument, confirm it more, and that nothing is fallen out in the Christian world, but what was foretold by those whom God employ'd in the converting of it? But we are neither without some fair hopes even from that Divine Revelation which was seal'd by uncontroul'd Evidence, that there may be yet a time to come when Christ will recover his Churches to their pristine Purity and Simplicity; but withal, I think we are not to measure the future Felicity of the Church by outward Splendor and Greatness (which too many so strongly fansie) but by a recovery of that true Spirit of Christianity which breathed in the first Ages of the Church, what-ever the outward condition of the Church may be: For if worldly greatness, and ease, and riches, were the first Impairers of the purity of Christian Religion, it is hard to conceive how the restoring the Church of Christ to its true Glory, can be by the advancing of that, which gives so great an occasion to Pride and Sensuality, which are so contrary to the design of Christian Religion; unless we suppose Men free from those Corruptions, which continual experience still tells the World the Rulers as well as Members of the Christian Society are subject to. Neither may that be wonder'd at, when such unevenness of parts is now discover'd in the great Luminaries of the World, and the Sun himself is found to have his *Maculæ*, as tho' the Sun had a purple Fever, or as *Kircher* expresseth it, *Ipse Phœbus, qui rerum omnium in universo naturæ Theatro aspectabilium longè pulcherrimus omnium opinione est habitus hoc seculo tandem fumosa facie, ac infecto vultu maculis prodiit; diceres eum variolis laborare senescentem:* I speak not this as tho' an outward flourishing condition of the Church were inconsistent with its Purity; for

Luk. 11. 21, 22.

Kircher. Propyl. Agonist. ad Oedipum, cap. 2.

then the way to refine it, were to throw it into the flames of Perſecution; but that the advancement of the flouriſhing condition of the Church, is not merely by outward Pomp and Grandeur, and that the Purity of the Church is not inconſiſtent with a ſtate of outward difficulties, which the experience of the Primitive Church gives an irrefragable demonſtration of. Thus much may ſerve to ſhew the neceſſity of a Power of Miracles, conjoyned with the Chriſtian Doctrine, to manifeſt the truth of it by overthrowing the Kingdom of that great *Antichriſt* the Devil, who had uſurped ſo much Tyranny over the World.

IX. The laſt Reaſon why a power of Miracles was ſo neceſſary for confirming the Truth of the Goſpel, is, *becauſe the Goſpel was to be propagated over the World without any other rational evidence than was contained in the Miracles wrought for the confirmation of it.* Now the admirable ſucceſs which this Doctrine found in the World, conſidering all the Circumſtances of it, do make it clear what certainty there was that the Miracles which were wrought were true, and they were certain Evidences that the Doctrine atteſted by them was from God. Now this will appear from theſe two things:

1. *That no rational account can be given why the Apoſtles ſhould undertake to publiſh ſuch a Doctrine, unleſs they had been undoubtedly certain that the Doctrine was true, and they had ſufficient Evidence to perſuade others to believe it.*

2. *That no ſatisfactory account can be given, conſidering the nature of the Doctrine of Chriſt, and the manner of its propagation, why it ſhould meet with ſo great acceptance in the World, had there not been ſuch convincing Evidence as might fully perſuade Men of the truth of it.*

I begin with the *firſt, from the Publiſhers of this Doctrine in the World.* All that I here require by way of a *Poſtulatum* or Suppoſition, are only theſe two things, which no Man right in his wits I ſuppoſe will deny: 1. *That Men are ſo far rational Agents, that they will not ſet upon any work of moment and difficulty, without ſufficient grounds inducing them to it*; and ſo much the greater the work is, the more ſure and ſtedfaſt had the grounds need to be which they proceed upon. 2. *That the Apoſtles or firſt Publiſhers of the Chriſtian Doctrine were not men diſtracted, or bereft of their wits, but acted by principles of common ſenſe, reaſon and underſtanding, as other men in the World do:* Which if any one ſhou'd be ſo far beſide his wits as to queſtion, if he have but patience and underſtanding enough to read and conſider thoſe admirable Writings of theirs which are convey'd to us by as certain uninterrupted a Tradition as any thing in the world hath been, by that time he will ſee cauſe to alter his Judgment, and to ſay that *they are not mad, but ſpeak the words of the greateſt Truth and Soberneſs.* Theſe things ſuppoſed, I now proceed to the proving of the thing in hand, which will be done by theſe three things; Firſt, *That the Apoſtles could not but know how hazardous an employment the preaching of the Goſpel would be to them.* Secondly, *That no motive can be conceived ſufficient for them to undertake ſuch an employment, but the infallible Truth of the Doctrine which they preached.* Thirdly, *That the greateſt aſſurance they had themſelves of the truth of their Doctrine, was by being eye-witneſſes of the Miracles of Chriſt.*

Firſt, *That the Apoſtles could not but underſtand the hazard of their employment, notwithſtanding which they cheerfully undertook it.* That Men armed with no external Power, nor cried up for their Wit and Learning, and carrying a Doctrine with them ſo contrary to the general Inclinations of

of the World, having nothing in it to recommend it to Mankind but the Truth of it, shou'd go about to perswade the World to part with the Religion they owned, and was settled by their Laws, and to embrace such a Religion as called them off from all the things they loved in this World, and to prepare themselves by Mortification and Self-denial for another World, is a thing to Humane Reason incredible, unless we suppose them acted by a higher Spirit than Mankind is ordinarily acted by. For what is there so desirable in continual Reproaches and Contumelies? what delight is there in Racks and Prisons? what agreeableness in Flames and Martyrdoms to make Men undergo some, nay all of these, rather than disown that Doctrine which they came to publish? Yet these did the Apostles cheerfully undergo in order to the Conversion of the World to the truth of that Doctrine which they deliver'd to it. And not only so, but tho' they did foresee them, they were not discouraged from this undertaking by it. I confess, when Men are upon hopes of profit and interest in the World, engaged upon a design which they promise themselves impunity in, having Power on their side, tho' afterwards things shou'd fall out contrary to their expectation, such Persons may die in such a Cause, because they must, and some may carry it out with more resolution, partly thro' an innate fortitude of Spirit, heightned with the advantages of Religion, or an Enthusiastic temper. But it is hard to conceive that such persons wou'd have undertaking so hazardous an employment, if before-hand they had fore-seen what they must have undergone for it. But now the Apostles did fore-know that Bonds and Imprisonment, nay Death it self must be undergone in a violent manner, for the sake of the Doctrine which they preached; yet notwithstanding all this, they go boldly and with resolution on with their work, and give not over because of any Hardships and Persecutions they met withal. One of the chiefest of them, St. *Peter*, and as forward as any in preaching the Gospel, had the very manner of his death foretold him by Christ himself, before his Ascension; yet soon after we find him preaching Christ in the midst of those who had Crucify'd him, and telling them to their faces the greatness of their sin in it, and appealing to the Miracles which Christ had done among them, and *bidding them repent and believe in him whom they had crucified, if ever they would be saved:* And this he did, not only among the People who gave their consent to the Crucifying of Christ; but soon after, being convented together with *John*, before the Court of *Sanhedrin* (probably the very same which not long before had sentenced Christ to death) for a Miracle wrought by them, with what incredible boldness doth he to their faces tell them of their Murdering of Christ; and withall, that their was no other way to salvation but by him whom they had Crucified! *Be it known unto you all* (saith *Peter* to the *Sanhedrin*) *and to all the people of* Israel, *that by the name of Jesus Christ whom ye have crucified, whom God raised from the dead, even by him doth this man stand here before you whole. Neither is there salvation in any other: for there is none other name under Heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved.* What an heroic freedom of Spirit appears in these words! what magnanimity and courage was there now in that Person, who durst in the face of this Court tell them of their Murther, and that there was no Salvation but by him whom they had Crucified! Well might they wonder at the boldness of the Men, who fear'd not the same Death which they had so lately brought their Lord and Master to.

Joh. 21. 19. Act. 2. 22, 23, 38. Act. 3. 13. 14, 15, 19. Act. 4. 5. Act 4. 10, 12.

X. Neither was this ſingly the caſe of *Peter* and *John*, but all the reſt of the Apoſtles undertook their work with the ſame reſolution and preparation of Spirit to undergo the greateſt hardſhip in the World for the ſake of the Truths they Preached. And accordingly as (far as Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory can aſcertain us of it,) they did allbut *John* (and that to make good the Prediction of Chriſt) ſuffer violent deaths by the hands of thoſe who perſecuted them merely for their Doctrine. And which is moſt obſervable, when Chriſt deſign'd them firſt of all for this work, he told them before-hand of reproaches, perſecutions, all manner of hardſhips, nay of death it ſelf, which they muſt undergo for his ſake. All that he gave them by way of encouragement, was, that they cou'd only *kill the body* and not the *ſoul*, and therefore *that they ſhould fear him only who could deſtroy both body and ſoul in Hell*; all the ſupport they had, was an expectation in another World, and that animated them to go thro' all the hardſhips of this. Where do we ever read of any ſuch boldneſs and courage in the moſt knowing Philoſophers of the Heathens? with what faintneſs and miſgiving of Mind doth *Socrates* ſpeak in his famous diſcourſe ſuppos'd to be made by him before his death? how uncertainly doth he ſpeak of a State of Immortality? and yet in all probability *Plato* ſet it forth with all advantages imaginable. Where do we ever find that ever any of the great Friends of *Socrates* who were preſent at his death, as *Phædo*, *Cebes*, *Crito* and *Simmias*, durſt enter the *Areopagus*, and condemn them there for the Murther of *Socrates*, tho' this would be far ſhort of what the Apoſtles did? Why were they not ſo charitable as to inform the World better of thoſe grand Truths of the Being of God and Immortality of Souls, if at leaſt they were fully convinced of themſelves? Why did not *Plato* at leaſt ſpeak out, and tell the World the Truth and not diſguiſe his diſcourſes under feigned Names, the better to avoid Accuſation and the Fate of *Socrates?* How doth he mince his excellent matter, and plays as it were at *Bo-peep* with his Readers, ſometimes appearing and then pulling in his Horns again? It may not be an improbable conjecture that the death of *Socrates* was the foundation of the Academy: I mean of that cautelous Doctrine of with-holding Aſſent, and being both *pro* and *con*, ſometimes on this ſide, ſometimes on that: for *Socrates*'s death hath made all his Friends very fearful of being too Dogmatical. And *Plato* himſelf had too much Riches, and withal too much of a Courtier in him to hazard the dear Priſon of his Soul, *viz.* his Body, merely for an *æthereal vehicle*. He had rather let his Soul flutter up and down in *Terreſtrial Matter*, or the Cage it was pent up in, than hazard ſo violent an opening of it by the hands of the *Areopagus*. And the great *Roman* Orator, among the reſt of *Plato*'s Sentiments, had learnt this too; for altho' in his diſcourſes he hath many times ſufficiently laid open the folly of the Heathen Worſhip and Theology, yet he knows not how to bring himſelf off ſafe enough with the People; and will be ſure to be Dogmatical only in this, *That nothing is to be innovated in the Religion of a Commonwealth*, and that the *Cuſtoms of our Anceſtors are inviolably to be obſerved.* Which Principles, had they been true as they were ſafe for the Perſons who ſpoke them, the Chriſtian Religion had never gain'd any entertainment in the World; for where-ever it came, it met with this potent Prejudice that it was look'd on as an Innovation, and therefore was ſhrewdly ſuſpected by the Governours of Common-wealths and

Joh. 21. 22.

Mat. 10. 17,18,21, 22, 28.

Plato in *Phæd.*

and the Preachers of it punished as factious and seditious Persons; which was all the pretext the wise Politicians of the World had for their cruel and inhumane Persecutions of such multitudes of peaceable and innocent Christians. Now when these things were fore-told by the Apostles themselves before their going abroad so plainly, that with the same Faith they did believe the Doctrine they Preached to be true, they must believe that all these things shou'd come to pass, what courage and magnanimity of Spirit was it in them thus to encounter dangers, and as it were court the Flames? Nay and before the time was come that they must die, to seal the truth of their Doctrine, their whole Life was a continual Peregrination, wherein they were as so many *Jobs* in Pilgrimage, encountred with perils and dangers on every side; of which one of the most painful and successful, St. *Paul*, hath given in such a large Inventory of his perils, that the very reading of them were enough to undo a poor *Epicurean Philosopher*, and at once to spoil him of the two Pillars of his Happiness, the quietness of his Mind and ease of his Body. Thus we see what a hazardous imployment that was which the Apostles went upon, and that it was such as they very well understood the difficulty of before they set upon it. 2. Cor. 6. 4, 5, 8, 9.

Secondly, *We cannot find out any rational motive which could carry them through so hazardous an employment, but the full convictions of their minds of the undoubted truth and certainty of the Doctrine which they deliver'd.* We find before that no vulgar motives in the World cou'd carry them upon that design which they went upon; cou'd they be led by Ambition and Vain-glory, who met with such Reproaches where-ever they went; and not only Persecutions of the Tongue, but the sharper ones of the Hands too? We never read of any but the Primitive Christians who were ambitious of being Martyrs, and thought long till they were in the Flames: which made *Arrius Antonius* being Pro-consul of *Asia*, when Christians in multitudes beset his Tribunal and thronged in to be Condemn'd, say to them, ὦ δειλοὶ, εἰ θέλετε ἀποθνήσκειν, κρημνοὺς ἢ βρόχους ἔχετε. *O miserable People, had not ye ways enough to end your lives at home, but ye must croud for an execution!* This was a higher ambition by far than any of those *mancipia gloriæ*, those *Chamæleons* that liv'd on the breath of Applause, the Heathen Philosophers ever reached to, who were, as *Tertullian* expresseth it, *Homines gloriæ & eloquentiæ solius libidinosi, unsatiable thirsters after the honour and eloquence of the world*; but the Spirit of a Christian did soar too high to quarry on so mean a Prey. When the more sober Heathens had taken a stricter notice of the Carriages and Lives of the Preachers of the Gospel and all their genuine Followers, they instead of the common and rude name of Impostures, gave them a more civil title of *Philosophers*, and looked upon their Doctrine as a sublimer kind of Philosophy, *Non utique divinum negotium existimant sed magis Philosophiæ genus*, as *Tertullian* tells us, because the Philosophers pretended so much to Moral Vertues which they saw the Christians so excellent in; but as *Tertullian* there replies, *Nomen hoc Philosophorum Dæmonia non fugat, The Devil was never afraid of a Philosopher's beard*, nor were diseases cured by the touch of a Philosophic *pallium*. There was something more Divine in Christians than in the grave Philosophers; and that not only in reference to their lives, and the Divine Power which was seen in them, but in reference to the truth and certainty of their Doctrine, it being a true Character given of both, by that same excellent Writer in behalf of the Christi- XI. *Tertull. ad Scapul. c. 5.* *Idem. Apolog. c. 47.* *Ibid. c. 46.*

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ans of his time: *Veritatem Philosophi quidem affectant, possident autem Christiani*; *What the Philosophers desired only, the Christians enjoy*, which was *Truth*: and as he elsewhere more fully speaks, *Mimice Philosophi affectant veritatem, & affectando corrumpunt, ut qui gloriam captant; Christiani eam necessario appetunt, & integri præstant, ut qui saluti suæ curant. Truth is the Philosopher's Mistress, which by courting he vitiates and corrupts, looking at nothing but his own glory: but Truth is the Christian's Matron, whose directions he observes and follows, because he regards no glory but that to come.* And to let them further see what a difference there was between a *Christian* and a *Philosopher*, he concludes that discourse with these words. *Quid adeo simile Philosophus & Christianus? Græciæ Discipulus & cœli? famæ negotiator & vitæ? verborum & factorum operator? rerum ædificator & destructor? amicus & inimicus erroris? veritatis interpolator & integrator? furator ejus & custos. As much distance* (saith he) *as there is between* Greece *and* Heaven, *between applause and eternal glory, between words and things, between building and destroying, between truth and error, between a plagiary and a corrupter of truth, and a preserver and advancer of it; so much is there between a Philosopher and a Christian.* The *Heathens* might suspect indeed some kind of affinity between the first Preachers of the Gospel and the ancient Sophists of *Greece*, because of their frequent going from place to place, and pretending a kind of *Enthusiasm* as they did: but as much difference as there is between a *Knight-Errant* and *Hercules*, between a *Mountebank* and *Hippocrates*, that and much greater there is between a *Greek Sophist* and an *Apostle*. *Socrates* in *Plato*'s *Euthydemus* hath excellently discover'd the vanity and futility of those Persons under the Persons of *Euthydemus* and *Dionysodorus*, and so likewise in his *Protagoras*; their intent was only like the *Retiaries* in the *Roman* Spectacles, to catch their adversaries in a Net, to entangle them with some captious Question or other: but how vastly different from this was the design of the Apostles, who abhorr'd those endless Contentions which then were in the heathen World; and came to shew them that *Truth* which was revealed, with an intent of making them better Men!

Idem ad Nationes. l. 1. c. 4.

Idem Apol. c. 46.

XII. We see the Apostles were not carried forth by any mean and vulgar Motives, neither did they drive on any private ends of their own; all that they minded was the promoting of the Doctrine which they preached. Nay they accounted no hazards comparable with the advantage which the World enjoy'd thro the propagation of the Christian Religion. This shewed a truly noble and generous Spirit in them, which wou'd not be hinder'd from doing the World good, tho' they found so bad entertainment from it; yea they rejoyced in their greatest sufferings which they underwent in so good a cause; wherein those Primitive Christians who were the genuine followers of the Apostles, did so far imitate them, that, *etiam damnati gratias agunt*, they gave the *Judges thanks* that they thought them worthy to lose their Lives in a cause which they had reason to triumph in, tho' they died for it. And when any of them were apprehended, they discover'd so little fear of punishment, *Ut unum solummodo quod non ante fuerint pœniteret, That nothing troubled them so much as that they had been Christians no sooner*, as one of their number speaks. And when the *Heathens* usually scoffed at them, and call'd them *Sarmentitii* and *Semaxii*, because they were burn'd upon the Cross, one of them in the name of the rest answers, *Hic est habitus victoriæ nostræ, hæc palmata vestis, tali curru triumphamus*; The Cross was only their Triumphant

Tertullian. Apol. c. 46.

Min. Felix.

Tertullian. Apol. c. 5.

Triumphant-chariot, which carried them ſooner to Heaven. Now this courage and reſolution of Spirit which was ſeen in the firſt Planters of Chriſtianity in the World, made all ſerious and inquiſitive Perſons look more narrowly into thoſe things, which made Men ſlight ſo much the common bug-bears of Humane Nature, ſufferings and death. *Quis enim non contemplatione ejus concutitur, ad requirendum quid intus in re ſit? quis non ubi requiſivit accedit? ubi acceſſit pati exoptat.* Theſe Sufferings made Men enquire; this Enquiry made them believe; that Belief made them as willing to ſuffer themſelves, as they had ſeen others do it before them. Thus it appear'd to be true in them, *Exquiſitior quæque crudelitas, illecebra magis eſt ſectæ; plures efficimur quoties metimur à vobis; ſemen eſt ſanguis Chriſtianorum; The cruelty of their enemies did but encreaſe their number; the harveſt of their pretended juſtice was but the ſeed-time of Chriſtianity, and no ſeed was ſo fruitful as that which was ſteeped in the Blood of Martyrs.* Thence *Juſtin Martyr* ingenuouſly ſaith of himſelf, That while he was a *Platonic* Philoſopher, he derided and ſcoffed at the Chriſtians; but when he conſider'd their great courage and conſtancy in dying for their Profeſſion, he cou'd not think thoſe cou'd poſſibly be Men wicked and voluptuous, who when offers of Life were made them, wou'd rather chooſe death than deny Chriſt. By which he found plainly that there was a higher Spirit in *Chriſtianity* than cou'd be obtain'd by the ſublime Notions and Speculations of *Plato*, and that a poor ignorant Chriſtian wou'd do and ſuffer more for the ſake of Chriſt than any of the Academy in defence of their Maſter *Plato*. Now ſince all Men naturally abhor ſufferings, what is it which ſhou'd ſo powerfully alter the nature and diſpoſition of Chriſtians above all other Perſons, that they alone ſhou'd ſeem in that to have forgot Humanity, that not only with patience, but with joy they endur'd torments and abode the flames? What! were they all poſſeſſed with a far more than *Stoical Apathy*, that no ſenſe of pain cou'd work at all upon them? or were they all beſotted and infatuated Perſons that did not know what it was they underwent? It is true ſome of the more blind and wilful *Heathens* derided them as ſuch; but who were the moſt infatuated, let any ſober Perſon judge: they who ſlighted and rejected a Doctrine of ſo great concernment, which came atteſted with ſo much reſolution and courage in the Profeſſors of it, or they who were ſo far perſuaded of the truth of it, that they wou'd rather die than deny it? *Dicimus & palam dicimus, & vobis torquentibus lacerati & cruenti vociferamur, Deum colimus per Chriſtum.* They were not aſhamed to believe in the Blood of Chriſt, even when their own Blood ran down before their Eyes, and confeſs Chriſt with their Mouths, when their Bodies were upon the rack. Certainly then there were ſome very powerful and convincing Arguments which buoyed up the Spirits of true Chriſtians in that deluge of Suffering which they were to ſwim thro'; it muſt be a ſtrong and well-grounded Faith which wou'd hold out under ſo great Tryals, and they cou'd not be to ſeek for the moſt perſuaſive Motives to Faith, who were ſo ready to give an account to others of the Hope that was in them, and to perſuade all other Perſons to the embracing of it. With what face and confidence otherwiſe cou'd they perſuade Men to embrace a Doctrine ſo dangerous as that was, had there not been Motives ſufficient to bear up againſt the weight of Sufferings, and Arguments perſuaſive to convince them of the undoubted certainty of that Doctrine which they encouraged them to believe?

Id. ib.

Tertullian. Apol. c. 21.

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XIII. Now that which appears to have been the main ground of satisfaction to the Primitive Christians as to the truth and certainty of the Doctrine of Christ, was this, That the Doctrine of the Gospel was at first delivered to the World by those Persons, who were themselves Eye-witnesses of all the Miracles which our Saviour wrought in confirmation of the truth of what he spake. They were such Persons who had been themselves present, not only to hear most of our Saviours admirable discourses when he was in the World, but to see all those glorious things which were done by him, to make it appear that he was immediately sent from God. Let us now appeal to our own Faculties and examine a little what rational Evidence cou'd possibly be desired, that the Doctrine of the Gospel was true, which God did not afford to the World? What cou'd the Persons who were the Auditors of our Saviour desire more as an Evidence that he came from God, than his doing such things which were certainly above any created power, either Humane or Diabolical, and therefore must needs be Divine? What cou'd other Persons desire more who were not present at the doing of these Miracles, but that the report of them shou'd be convey'd to them in an undoubted manner, by those Persons who were Eye-witnesses of them, and made it appear to the World they were far from any intention of deceiving it? Now this makes the Apostles themselves in their own Writings (tho they were divinely inspir'd) appeal to the rational Evidence of the truth of the things, in that they were deliver'd by them who were Eye-witnesses, of
2 Pet. 1. 16 them. There St *Peter* speaks thus to the dispersed *Jews* οὐ γὰρ σεσοφισμένοις μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες ἐγνωρίσαμεν ὑμῖν τὴν τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δύναμιν καὶ παρουσίαν, ἀλλ' ἐπόπται γενηθέντες τῆς ἐκείνου μεγαλειότητος. *For we have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eye-witnesses of his Majesty.* The power and coming of Christ which the Apostle speaks of, was not as some improbably conceive, either his general coming to Judgment upon the World, or his particular coming upon the Nation of the *Jews*; but by an *Hendyadis*, by his power and coming is meant his powerful appearance in the World, whereby he mightily discover'd himself to be the Son of God Now this, saith the Apostle, was no σεσοφισμένῳ μύθῳ, not like the *Heathen Mythology* concerning the παρουσίαι and ἐπιφανείαι of their Gods among them (which were so frequently believed among them, that *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* condemns
Dionys. Halic. l. 2 pag. 128. the *Epicureans*, because they did deride τὰς ἐπιφανείας τῶν θεῶν, *the appearances of their Gods in the World)* now, saith the Apostle, assure your selves, this is no such appearance of a God on Earth as that among the *Heathens* was; for, saith he, we our selves who declare these things were ἐπόπται, we fully understood this μέγα μυστήριον, *this great Mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh*, for we saw his μεγαλειότης, *that great Majesty which attended him in all which he spake or did*; we saw all
Act. 2. 11. those μεγαλεῖα τοῦ Θεοῦ, *the great things of God*, which were manifest in him, all those miraculous operations which were wrought by him. Therefore as this was a great confirmation of the Faith of the Apostles themselves that they saw all these things, so we see it was of great concernment to the World in order to their belief that the Gospel was no cunningly-devised fable, in that it was delivered by such who were ἐπόπται, *Eye-witnesses* of what they declared. To the same purpose St. *John* speaks *ad conciliandam fidem*, to make it appear how true what they delivered was, in the entrance of his Epistle; *That which was from*

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the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our Eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life, (for the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and shew unto you that eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us) That which we have seen and heard, declare we unto you. 1 Joh. 1. 1, 2, 3. We see what great force and weight the Apostle lays upon this, that they delivered nothing but what they had seen and heard; as they heard the Doctrine of Christ, so they saw the Miracles which he wrought in confirmation of it. St. *Luke* likewise in the beginning of his Gospel declares that he intended to write nothing but *what he had perfect understanding of from such persons who had been* αὐτόπται, *Eye-witnesses and instruments themselves in part of what was written*, for that is meant by ὑπηρέται τοῦ λόγου· *and those things which were written*, he saith were πεπληροφορημένα ἐν ἡμῖν πράγματα, *things which are abundantly proved to be true*; for being Matters of Fact, there cou'd be no stronger proof of them, than by such who were eye-witnesses of what they spake. And this we find the Apostles themselves very cautious about, in the choice of a new Apostle in the room of *Judas*, *Wherefore of these Men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord* Jesus *went in and out among us, beginning from the Baptism of* John, *unto that same day that he was taken from us, must one be ordained to be a witness of his Resurrection from the dead*, (as that which was the great Seal of our Saviour's being the Son of God) therefore we find the Apostles so frequently attesting the truth of the Resurrection of Christ, and that themselves were eye-witnesses of it. *This Jesus*, saith *Peter*, *hath God raised up, whereof we all are witnesses.* And again, *And killed the Prince of life, whom God hath raised up from the dead, whereof we are witnesses*; and both *Peter* and *John* to the *Sanhedrin*; *For we cannot but speak the things which we have seen and heard.* And the whole College of Apostles afterwards, *And we are his witnesses of the things, and so is also the Holy Ghost, whom God hath given to them that obey him.* In which they give them that two-fold rational Evidence which did manifest the undoubted truth of what they spake; for they deliver'd nothing but what themselves were witnesses of, and withal was declar'd to be true by the power of the Holy Ghost in the Miracles which were wrought by and upon Believers. Afterwards we read the sum of the Apostles preaching; and the manner used by them to persuade Men of the truth of it, in the words of *Peter* to *Cornelius* and his company, *How God anointed* Jesus *of* Nazareth *with the Holy Ghost and with power, who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed of the Devil, for God was with him: And we are witnesses of all things which he did both in the land of the* Jews *and in* Hierusalem, *whom they slew and hanged on a tree: Him God raised up the third day, and shewed him openly, not to all the people, but unto witnesses chosen before of God, even to us who did eat and drink with him after he arose from the dead. And he commanded us to preach unto the people, that it is he which was ordained of God to be the judge of quick and dead.* By all which we see what care God was pleased to take for the satisfaction of the World in point of rational Evidence, as to the truth of the matters which were discover'd concerning our Saviour *Christ*, because he made choice of such Persons to be the Preachers and Writers of these things who were the best able to satisfy the World about them, *viz.* such as had been eye-witnesses of them.

Luk. 1. 1, 2, 3.

Act. 1. 12, 22.

Act. 2. 32. 3. 15. 4. 20. 5. 32.

10. 39, 40, 41, 42.

Now in order to the making it more fully evident what strength there XIV.

was in this Teſtimony given by the Apoſtles to the Miracles of *Chriſt*, we ſhall more fully manifeſt the rational Evidence which attended it in theſe following Propoſitions.

Prop. 1. *Where the truth of a Doctrine depends upon a matter of fact, the truth of the Doctrine is ſufficiently manifeſted, if the matter of fact be evidently proved in the higheſt way it is capable of.* Thus it is in reference to the Doctrine of *Chriſt*; for the truth of that is ſo interwoven with the truth of the ſtory of *Chriſt*, that if the Relations concerning *Chriſt* be true, his Doctrine muſt needs be Divine and Infallible. For if it be undoubtedly true, that there was ſuch a Perſon as *Chriſt* born at *Bethlehem*, who did ſo many Miracles, and at laſt ſuffered the death of the Croſs, and after he had lain three days in the Grave *roſe again* from the dead; what reaſon imaginable can I have to queſtion, but that the teſtimony of this Perſon was certainly Divine, and conſequently whatever he preached to the World was moſt certain and undoubted truth? So that if we have clear Evidence as to the truth of theſe paſſages concerning our Saviour, we muſt likewiſe believe his Doctrine, which came atteſted with ſuch pregnant Evidences of a Divine Commiſſion which he had from God to the World. No Prince can think he hath any reaſon to refuſe audience to an Embaſſador, when he finds his Credentials ſuch as he may rely upon, altho' himſelf doth not ſee the ſealing of them; much leſs reaſon have we to queſtion the truth of the Doctrine of the Goſpel, if we have ſufficient Evidence of the truth of the matters of fact concerning *Chriſt*, in ſuch a way as thoſe things are capable of being proved.

Prop. 2. *The greateſt evidence which can be given to a matter of fact, is the atteſting of it by thoſe perſons who were eye-witneſſes of it.* This is the foundation whereon the firmeſt Aſſent is built, as to any matter of fact; for altho' we conceive we have reaſon to ſuſpect the Truth of a Story, as long as it is convey'd only in a general way, by an uncertain Fame and Tradition; yet when it comes to be atteſted by a ſufficient number of credible Perſons who profeſs themſelves the eye-witneſſes of it, it is accounted an unreaſonable thing to diſtruſt any longer the Truth of it; eſpecially in theſe two caſes. 1. *When the matter they bear witneſs to is a thing which they might eaſily and clearly perceive.* 2. *When many witneſſes exactly agree in the ſame Teſtimony.*

1. *When the matter it ſelf is of that nature that it may be fully perceived by thoſe who ſaw it: i. e.* if it be a common Object of Senſe. And thus it certainly was as to the Perſon and Actions of Jeſus Chriſt. For he was of the ſame nature with Mankind; and they had as great Evidence that they convers'd with Jeſus Chriſt in the Fleſh, as we can have that we converſe one with another. The Miracles of Chriſt were real and viſible Miracles; they cou'd be no illuſions of Senſes, nor deceits of their Eyes; the Man who was born blind and cured by our Saviour, was known to have been born blind thro' all the Country, and his Cure was after as public as his blindneſs before, and acknowledged by the greateſt Enemies of Chriſt at the time of its being done. When Chriſt raiſed up the dead Man at *Naim*, it was before much People, and ſuch Perſons in probability who were many of them preſent at his Death. But leſt there might be any ſuſpicion as to him, that he was not really dead, the caſe is plain and beyond all diſpute in *Lazarus*, who had been to the knowledge of all perſons thereabouts dead four days; here cou'd be no deceit at all when the Stone was rowl'd away, and *Lazarus* came forth in the preſence of them all. And yet further the Death

Joh. 9. 26. Luk. 7. 12. Joh. 11. 39.

and

and Paſſion of our Saviour was a plain object of ſenſe, done in preſence of his greateſt Adverſaries. The Souldiers themſelves were ſufficient Witneſſes of his being really dead, when they came to break his Bones, and ſpared him becauſe they ſaw he was dead already. At his reſurrection the Stone was rowl'd away from the Sepulchre and no body found therein, altho' the Sepulchre was guarded by Souldiers, and the Diſciples of Chriſt all ſo fearful, that they were diſperſed up and down in ſeveral places. And that it was the ſame real Body which he roſe withal, and no *aëreal vehicle*, appears by *Thomas*'s ſcrupuloſity and unbelief, *who would not believe unleſs he put his hands into the hole of his ſide, and ſee in his hands the print of the nails*; now our Saviour condeſcending ſo far as to ſatisfy the incredulity of St. *Thomas*, hath made it thereby evident that the Body which our Saviour roſe from the grave with, was the ſame individual Body which before was crucified and buried in the Sepulchre. And we find all the Apoſtles together upon our Saviour's appearance to them after his Reſurrection, ſo far from being credulous in embracing a Phantaſm, inſtead of Chriſt, that they ſuſpected that it was either a mere Phantaſm, or an evil Spirit which appeared among them; upon which it is ſaid, *They were terrified and affrighted, and ſuppoſed they had ſeen a ſpirit.* Which our Saviour cou'd not beat them of from, but by appealing to the judgment of their Senſes, *Handle me and ſee; for a ſpirit hath no fleſh and bones as ye ſee me have*; and afterwards more fully to convince them, *he did eat in the midſt of them.* Now the more ſuſpicious and incredulous the Apoſtles themſelves at firſt were, the greater evidence is it how far they were from any deſign of abuſing the World in what they after preached unto it, and what ſtrong convicti on there was in the thing it ſelf, which was able to ſatisfie ſuch ſcrupulous and ſuſpicious perſons.

Joh. 20. 25, 27. Luk. 24. 37. Ver. 39. Ver. 43.

2. *When many witneſſes concur in the ſame Teſtimony.* Nothing can diſparage more the Truth of a Teſtimony, than the counter-witneſs of ſuch who were preſent at the ſame actions; but when all the Witneſſes fully agree not only in the ſubſtance, but in all material circumſtances of the Story, what ground or reaſon can there be to ſuſpect a Forgery or Deſign in it; eſpecially when the perſons cannot by any Fears or Threatnings be brought to vary from each other in it? Thus it is in our preſent caſe, we find no real diſſent at all mention'd either as to the Birth, Miracles, Life, Death, or Reſurrection of Jeſus Chriſt; all the Witneſſes atteſt the ſame things tho' writing in different places, and upon different occaſions; no alteration in any circumſtance of the Story, out of any deſign of pleaſing or gratifying any Perſons by it. Moſt of our Saviour's Miracles, not only his Apoſtles, but the People and his very Enemies were witneſſes of, whoſe poſterity to this day dare not deny the truth of ſuch ſtrange Works which were wrought by him. And for his Reſurrection, it wou'd be very ſtrange that five hundred Perſons ſhou'd all agree in the ſame thing, and that no Torments or Death cou'd bring any of them to deny the truth of it, had there not been the greateſt certainty in it.

XV. Prop. 3. *There can be no reaſon to ſuſpect ſuch a Teſtimony which is given by eye-witneſſes. but either from queſtioning their knowledge of the things they ſpake of, or their fidelity in reporting them.* Now there is not the leaſt ground to doubt either of theſe, in reference to thoſe perſons who gave Teſtimony to the World concerning the Perſon and Actions of our bleſſed Saviour.

For *firſt, they were ſuch as were intimately converſant both with the per-*

ſon and actions of Jeſus Chriſt; whom he had choſen and trained up for that very end, that they might be ſufficiently qualify'd to acquaint the World with the truth of things concerning himſelf after his Reſurrection from the Dead. And accordingly they follow'd him up and down whereſoever he went; they were with him in his Solitudes and Retirements, and had thereby occaſion to obſerve all his Actions, and to take notice of the unſpotted innocency of his Life. Some of his Diſciples were with him in his Tranſfiguration, others in his Agony and bloody Sweat, they heard the Expreſſions which came from his mouth; in all which he diſcover'd a wonderful ſubmiſſion to the Will of God, and a great readineſs of Mind to ſuffer for the good of the World. Now therefore the firſt thing cannot at all be queſtion'd, their means of knowing the truth of what they ſpake.

Neither, *ſecondly*, is there any *reaſon to ſuſpect their fidelity in reporting what they knew:* For, 1. *The truth of this Doctrine wrought ſo far upon them, that they parted with all their worldly ſubſiſtence for the ſake of it.* Altho' their Riches were not great, yet their way of ſubſiſtence in the World was neceſſary; they left their Houſes, their Wives and Children, and all for Chriſt, and that not to gain any higher Preferments in this World (which had they done, it wou'd have rendred their deſign ſuſpicious to the curious and inquiſitive World) but they let go at leaſt a quiet and eaſie life, for one moſt troubleſome and dangerous. So that it is not, how much they parted withal, but how freely they did it, and with what cheerfulneſs they underwent Diſgraces, Perſecutions, nay Death it ſelf for the ſake of the Goſpel. Now can it be imagin'd, that ever Men were ſo prodigal of their Eaſe and Lives, as to throw both of them away upon a thing which themſelves were not fully aſſur'd of the Truth of? It had been the higheſt folly imaginable, to have deceiv'd themſelves in a thing of ſo great moment to them, as the truth of that Doctrine which they preached was; becauſe all their Hopes and Happineſs depended upon the truth of that Doctrine which they preached. And as *Tertullian* obſerves, *Non fas eſt ulli de ſua religione mentiri*; for, ſaith he, *He that ſays he worſhips any thing beſides what he doth, he denies what he doth worſhip, and transfers his worſhip upon another, and thereby doth not worſhip that which he thus denies*; Beſides what probability is there Men ſhou'd lye for the ſake of that Religion, which tells them that thoſe which do ſo will not receive the Reward which is promiſed to thoſe who cordially adhere unto it? Nay, they declar'd themſelves to be the moſt miſerable of all perſons *if their*
1 Cor. 15. 19. *hopes were only in this preſent life.* Can we now think that any who had the common Reaſon of Men wou'd part with all the contentments of this World, and expoſe themſelves to continual hazards, and at laſt undergo death it ſelf for the ſake of ſomething which was merely the Fiction of their own Brains? What ſhou'd make them ſo Sedulous and
1 Cor 9. 16. Induſtrious in preaching ſuch things, that they cou'd *ſay neceſſity was laid upon them, yea, wo was unto them if they preached not the Goſpel*, when they ſaw ſo many Woes attending them in the Preaching of it, had there not been ſome more powerful attractive in the beauty and excellency of the Doctrine which they preached, than any cou'd be in the Eaſe and Tranquility of this preſent World? Thus we ſee the Fidelity of the Apoſtles manifeſted in ſuch a way as no other Witneſſes were ever
Origen. yet willing to hazard theirs. And therefore *Origen* deſervedly condemns
c. Celſum, l. 3. p. 127. *Celſus* of a ridiculous Impertinency, when he wou'd parallel the Relati-

ons

ons of *Herodotus* and *Pindarus* concerning *Ariſteus Proconneſius* with thoſe of the Apoſtles concerning Chriſt; For ſaith he, *Did either of theſe two venture their lives upon the truth of what they writ concerning him, as the Apoſtles did to atteſt the truth of what they preached concerning our Lord and Saviour Jeſus Chriſt?*

2. The Fidelity of the Apoſtles is evident in their *manner of reporting the things which they deliver.* For if there may be any thing gather'd from the manner of Expreſſion, or the τὸ ἦθος τοῦ λόγου, concerning the particular Temper and Diſpoſition of the Perſon from whom it comes, we may certainly read the great Fidelity in the Apoſtles from the peculiar manner of their expreſſing themſelves to the World. Which they do, XVI.

1. *With the greateſt impartiality:* not declaring only what was glorious and admirable to the World, but what they knew wou'd be accounted fooliſhneſs by it. They who had ſought only to have been admir'd for the rare Diſcoveries which they brought to the World, wou'd be ſure to conceal any thing which might be accounted ridiculous; but the Apoſtles fixed themſelves moſt on what was moſt contemptible in the Eyes of the World, and what they were moſt mocked and derided for, that they delighted moſt in the preaching of, which was the Croſs of Chriſt. *Paul* was ſo much in love with this, which was a ſtumbling-block to the *Jews*, and fooliſhneſs to the *Greeks*, *that he valued the knowledge of nothing elſe in compariſon of the knowledge of Chriſt and him crucified.* Nay he elſewhere ſaith, *God forbid that I ſhould glory ſave in the Croſs of Chriſt.* What now ſhou'd be the reaſon that they ſhould rejoyce in that moſt which was moſt deſpicable to the World, had not they ſeen far greater truth and excellency in it, than in the moſt ſublime ſpeculations concerning God or the Souls of Men in the School of *Plato*, or any other *Heathen* Philoſophers? That all Men ſhou'd be bound in order to their Salvation, to believe in one who was crucify'd at *Hieruſalem*, was a ſtrange Doctrine to the unbelieving World: but if the Apoſtles had but endeavour'd to have ſuited their Doctrine to the School of *Plato*, what rare Perſons might they have been accounted among the *Heathen* Philoſophers! Had they only in general terms diſcours'd of the Benignity of the Divine Nature, and the Manifeſtations of Divine Goodneſs in the World; and that, in order to the bringing of the Souls of Men to a nearer participation of the Divine Nature, the perfect Idea of true Goodneſs, and the expreſs Image of the Perſon of God, and the reſplendency of his Glory had veil'd himſelf in Humane Nature, and had every where ſcatter'd ſuch beams of light and Goodneſs, as warm'd and invigorated the frozen Spirits of Men with higher ſentiments of God and themſelves, and raiſed them up above the feculency of this terreſtrial Matter to breath in a freſher air, and converſe with more noble objects, and by degrees to fit the Souls of Men for thoſe more pure illapſes of real Goodneſs, which might always ſatisfy the Soul's deſires, and yet always keep them up 'till the Soul ſhou'd be ſunning it ſelf to all eternity under the immediate beams of Light and Love: And that after this Incarnate Deity had ſpread abroad the wings of his Love for a while upon this lower World, 'till by his gentle heat and incubation he had quickned the more pliable World to ſome degree of a Divine Life, he then retreated himſelf back again into the ſuperiour World, and put off that veil by which he made himſelf known to thoſe who are here confin'd to the priſons of their Bodies:

1 Cor. 1. 2. Phil. 3. 8. Gal. 6. 14.

dies: Thus, I ſay, had the Apoſtles minded applauſe among the admired Philoſophers of the *Heathens*, how eaſy had it been for them to have made ſome conſiderable additions to their higheſt ſpeculations, and have left out any thing which might ſeem ſo mean and contemptible as the death of the Son of God! But this they were ſo far from, that the main thing which they preached to the World, was, the vanity of Humane Wiſdom without *Chriſt*, and the neceſſity of all Mens believing in that *Jeſus* who was crucify'd at *Hieruſalem*.

The Apoſtles indeed diſcover very much, infinitely more than ever the moſt lofty *Platoniſt* cou'd do, concerning the Goodneſs and Love of God to Mankind; but that wherein they *manifeſted the love of God*
Joh. 3. 16. *to the World*, was, *that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whoſoever believeth in him ſhould not periſh but have everlaſting life.* And that *here-*
Rom. 5. 8. *in was the love of God manifeſted, that while we were yet ſinners, Chriſt died for us.* And that *this was the greateſt truth and worthy of all acceptation, that Jeſus Chriſt came into the World to ſave ſinners.* They never
1 Tim. 1. 15. dreamt of any Divine Goodneſs which ſhou'd make Men happy without *Chriſt*: No, it was their deſign to perſuade the World that all the communications of God's Goodneſs to the World were wholly in and thro' *Jeſus Chriſt*; and it is impoſſible that any ſhou'd think otherwiſe, unleſs *Plato* knew more of the mind of God than our Bleſſed Saviour, and *Plotinus* than St. *Paul*. Can we think now that the Apoſtles ſhou'd hazard the reputation of their own Wits ſo much as they did to the World, and be accounted bablers, and fools, and mad-men, for preaching the way of Salvation to be only by a Perſon *crucify'd between two thieves at Hieruſalem*, had they not been convinced not only of the truth but importance of it, and that it concern'd Men as much to believe it, as it did to avoid eternal Miſery? Did St. *Paul* preach ever the leſs the Words of truth and ſoberneſs, becauſe he was told to his face, *that his learning had made him mad?* But if he was *beſides himſelf, it was for Chriſt*; and what wonder was it if the *Love of Chriſt* in the Apoſtle ſhou'd make him willing to loſe his reputation for him, ſeeing *Chriſt made himſelf of no reputation*, that he might be in a capacity to do us good? We ſee the Apoſtles *were not aſhamed of the Goſpel of Chriſt*, becauſe they knew *it was the power of God unto ſalvation*; and therefore neither in their preaching nor their Writings wou'd they omit any of thoſe paſſages concerning our Saviour's death, which might be accounted the moſt diſhonourable to his Perſon. Which is certainly as great an Evidence of their fidelity as can be expected; which makes *Origen* ſay, that the Diſciples of *Chriſt* writ all things Φιλαλήθως καὶ εὐγνωμόνως,
Origen. contr. Celſum, l. 3. *with a great deal of candor and love of truth.* οὐκ ὑποκλέψαντες τῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ παραδόξου ἱστορίας τὸ δοκοῦν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχύνην τῷ λόγῳ τῶν χριστιανῶν φέρειν· *not concealing from the World thoſe paſſages of the Life of Chriſt, which would be accounted moſt fooliſh and ridiculous.*

2. *With the greateſt plainneſs and ſimplicity of ſpeech.* Such whoſe deſign is to impoſe upon the Minds of Men with ſome cunningly-deviſed fables, love as much ambiguity as ever *Apollo* did in his moſt winding *Oracles*, of whom it is ſaid,

Ambage nexa Delphico mos eſt Deo
Arcana tegere.

Servius in 4. Æneid. *Servius* tells us, that *Jupiter Ammon* was therefore pictur'd with Ramshorns,

horns becauſe his anſwers had as many turnings and windings as they had. But the Horns which *Moſes* was wont to be pictur'd with, did only note the light and perſpicuity (from the ambiguity of קרן, which notes *the ſending forth of rays of light like a horn,*) and yet *Moſes* himſelf was veil'd in compariſon of the openneſs and plainneſs of Speech which was in the Apoſtles. Impoſtors caſt a miſt of many dark and cloudy words before them; but when they are once brought into the open light, their vizard falls off, and their deformity appears. Such Perſons delight in ſoaring quite out of the apprehenſions of thoſe who follow them, and never think themſelves better recompenſed for their pains, than when they are moſt admired and leaſt underſtood. But never was Chriſtianity more diſhonoured, than when Men brought it from its native ſimplicity and plainneſs, into a company of cloudy and inſignificant expreſſions, which are ſo far from making Men better underſtand the truth of it, that it was certainly the Devil's deſign by ſuch obſcure terms to make way for a Myſtery to be advanced, (but it was of Iniquity,) and ſoon after, we ſee the effect of it in another *Oracle* ſet up at *Rome* inſtead of *Delphos*; and all the pretence of it, was the obſcurity ſuppoſed in Scripture. What! Darkneſs come by the riſing of the Sun! Or is the Sun at laſt grown ſo beggarly, that he is fain to borrow light of the Earth? Muſt the Scripture be beholding to the Church for its Clearneſs, and Chriſt himſelf not ſpeak intelligibly, unleſs the *Pope* be his Interpreter? Did Chriſt reveal to the World the way of Salvation, and yet leave Men to ſeek which was it, 'till a Guide, never heard of in the Scripture, come to direct them in the way to it? What ſtrange witneſſes were the Apoſtles, if they did not ſpeak the truth with plainneſs? How had Men been to ſeek as to the truth of Chriſtianity, if the Apoſtles had not declar'd the Doctrine of the Goſpel with all evidence and perſpicuity? Whom muſt we believe in this caſe, the *Apoſtles* or the *Roman Oracles?* The *Apoſtles* they tell us *they ſpeak with all plainneſs of ſpeech*, and for that end purpoſely lay aſide *all excellency of words* and *humane wiſdom*, that Men might not be to ſeek for their meaning in a matter of ſo great a moment; that *the Goſpel was hid to none but ſuch as are loſt, and whoſe eyes are blinded by the God of this World*; that the Doctrine reveal'd by them is a Light to direct us in our way to Heaven, and a Rule to walk by; and it is a ſtrange property of Light to be obſcure, and of a Rule to be crooked. But it is not only evident from the *Apoſtles* own affirmations, that they laid aſide all affected Obſcurity, ambiguous Expreſſions, and Philoſophical Terms, whereby the World might have been to ſeek for what they were to believe, but it is likewiſe clear from the very nature of the Doctrine they preached, and the deſign of their preaching of it. What need *Rhetoric* in plain Truths? or affected Phraſes in giving Evidence? How incongruous wou'd obſcure Expreſſions have been to the deſign of ſaving Souls by the fooliſhneſs of preaching? For if they had induſtriouſly ſpoken in their preaching, above the capacities of thoſe they ſpake to, they cou'd never have converted a Soul without a Miracle: for the ordinary way of converſion muſt be by the Underſtanding; and how cou'd that work upon the Underſtanding, which was ſo much above it? But, ſaith the Apoſtle, *We preach not our ſelves but Chriſt Jeſus the Lord, and our ſelves your ſervants for Jeſus ſake.* If they had ſought themſelves or their own Credit and Reputation, there might have been ſome reaſon that they ſhou'd have uſed the way of the *Sophiſts* among the *Greeks*,

2 Cor. 3. 12. 1 Cor. 2. 2, 4. 1 Cor. 4. 3, 4. 2 Cor. 4. 5.

and

and by declamatory Speeches to have inhanced their esteem among the vulgar. But the *Apostles* disown'd and rejected all these vulgar artifices of mean and low-spirited Men; they laid aside all those enticing words
1 Cor. 2. 4. ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας *of the way of the Heathen Sophists*, and declar'd the Te-
2 Cor. 4. 2. stimony of God with Spiritual Evidence; *they handled not the Word of God deceitfully, but by manifestation of the truth, commended themselves to every Man's conscience in the sight of God*: Now what could be so sutable to such a design, as the greatest plainness and faithfulness in what they spake? We find in the Testimony of the *Apostles*, οὐδὲν νόθον καὶ κυ-
Origen. c. Cels. l. 3. p. 135. βευτικὸν καὶ πεπλασμένον καὶ πανοῦργον, as *Origen* speaks, *Nothing that is spurious or counterfeit, nothing savouring of the cunning craftiness of such as lie in wait to deceive; and*, saith he, *it is impossible to think that Men never bred up in the Sophistry of the Greeks, nor experienced in the Rhetorical insinuations used among them, could ever be able so suddenly to perswade the World to embrace that which had been a figment of their own Brains.* The truth is, the *Apostles* speak like Men very confident of the truth of what they speak, and not like such who were fain to fetch in the help of all their *Topics*, to find out some probable Arguments to make Men believe that which it is probable they did not believe themselves; which was most commonly the case of the great *Orators* among the *Heathens*. We find no Pedantic Flourishes, no flattering Insinuations, no affected Cadencies, no such great care of the rising and falling of Words in the several Sentences; which make up so great a part of that which was accounted *Eloquence* in the *Apostles* time. These things were too mean a prey for the Spirits of the *Apostles* to quarry upon; every thing in them was grave and serious, every Word had its due weight, every Sentence brim-full of Spiritual matter, their whole Discourse most becoming the Majesty and Authority of that Spirit which they spake by. And therein was seen a great part of the infinite Wisdom of God in the choice he made of the Persons who were to propagate the Doctrine of Christ in the World, that they were not such who by reason of their great repute and fame in the World, might easily draw whole Multitudes to embrace their Dictates, but (that there might not be the least foundation for an implicit Faith) they were of so mean rank and condition in the World, that in all probability their Names had never been heard of, had not their Doctrine made them Famous. To this purpose
Origen. c. Cels. l. 3. *Origen* excellently speaks, Οἶμαι δὲ τὸν Ἰησοῦν διὰ τοῦτο βεβουλῆσθαι διδασκάλοις τοῦ δόγματος χρῆσθαι τοιούτοις, ἵνα μηδεμίαν μὲν ἔχῃ χώραν ὑπόνοια πιθανῶν σοφισμάτων· λαμπρῶς δὲ τοῖς συνιέναι δυναμένοις ἐμφαίνηται, ὅτι τὸ ἄδηλον τῆς προαιρέσεως τῶν γραψάντων, ἐχούσης πολὺ τὸ ἀφελὲς, ἠξιώθη θειοτέρας δυνάμεως, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἀνυούσης, ἥπερ ἀνύειν δύνασθαι δοκεῖ περιβολὴ λόγων, καὶ λέξεων σύνθεσις, καὶ μετὰ διαιρέσεων καὶ τεχνολογίας Ἑλληνικῆς ἀκολουθία. *I am of opinion*, saith he, *that Jesus did purposely make use of such Preachers of his Doctrine, that there might be no place for suspicion that they came instructed with the art of Sophistry; but that it be clearly manifest to all that would consider it, that there was nothing of design in those who discovered so much simplicity in their Writings, and that they had a more Divine Power which was more efficacious than the greatest volubility of Expressions, or ornaments of speech, or the artifices which were used in the Grecian compositions.*

3. The *Apostles* delivered their *Doctrine with the greatest openness and freedom of spirit*; they did not give out one thing to the World, and another to their private Disciples; but with great freedom and boldness declared

declared their doctrine in the most public places, and before their greatest enemies. They knew they were looked on as deceivers by the World, but yet they knew themselves to be true, ὡς πλάνοι, καὶ ἀληθεῖς. 2 Cor 6. 8. This is the usual requital good Men have from the World, that they are looked on as the greatest deceivers of it; if it be so with others, they have much less cause to wonder at it, when even He, who by one Prophet is stiled *the desire of Nations*, is by another said *to be despised and rejected of Men*; and when Christ was in the World, he was called ὁ πλάνος, *the deceiver*; no wonder then if his Disciples were accounted such, altho' they manifested their veracity by their open carriage and free speaking to the faces of their greatest adversaries. The *Apostles* neither feared the *Jews* skill in their Law, nor the wisdom and subtilty of the *Greeks:* Saint *Paul* preacheth Christ openly among the *Jews* in their Synagogues, and among the *Athenians* he encounters the *Epicureans* and *Stoics*, and preacheth to them Jesus and the *Resurrection*. If the *Apostles* had any thing of deceivers in them, as to the things they related concerning Christ, they wou'd not certainly have spoken with so much confidence concerning Christ in the presence of those who had been his murtherers; but we see they appeal'd to themselves, as to the Miracles which he had wrought among them, and for his Resurrection they were ready to lay down their Lives in giving Testimony to the truth of it. That his body was gone, was evident; that the *Apostles* shou'd take it away was impossible, considering what guard of Souldiers they had set upon it, and how timorous and fearful the *Apostles* were, that they fled upon Christ's being apprehended. Now what cou'd it be, cou'd make such fearful Persons afterwards so courageous and resolute as they were, had there not been some more than ordinary power to convince and encourage them?

Hag. 2. 7. Isa. 53. 3. Matth. 27. 63. Act. 17. 18.

4. The *Apostles* deliver their *Testimony with the greatest particularity as to all circumstances.* They do not change nor alter any of them upon different Examinations before several Persons; they all agree in the greatest constancy to themselves and uniformity with each other. As to matters of Indifferency, we find the *Apostles* very yielding and condescending; but as to any thing which concern'd their Testimony, most constant and resolved. Had the Gospel been some cunningly-contrived fancy, it had been impossible but so many different Persons, in such different places, and under such different conditions, wou'd have varied as to some material circumstance of it: Or else they would have been so wise as to have deliver'd it in general terms, without insisting much upon such particular circumstances, which if they had been false, might have been very easily disprov'd; but with what particular enumeration of circumstances do the *Apostles* preach Christ to the World? *Peter* tells the *Jews* that it was *Jesus of* Nazareth *whom he preached*; and lest they shou'd think it was not the same Person which rose again, with great boldness and freedom of Spirit he saith unto them, *Therefore let all the house of* Israel *know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ.* Yea, that same individual Person who was conversant in the World, and died upon the *Cross*, *is now become a Prince and Saviour, to give repentance to* Israel *and remission of sins.* If there had been any ground of suspicion as to these things, who had been so able to disprove them, or so ready to do it, as those Persons who had crucify'd him? For we cannot conceive but those who had a hand in his death, wou'd endeavour by all possible means to disprove

Act 2. 22. 2. 36. Act. 5. 31, 32.

his Reſurrection from the dead. For what a caſe were they like to be in, if thoſe things which the *Apoſtles* ſo confidently preached were true? If *Chriſt had all power now in his hands*, and *there were ſalvation in no other Name, but only in his whom they had crucify'd*, they were like to be in a moſt deſperate condition; therefore if any Men can be ſuppos'd inquiſitive after the truth of theſe circumſtances, no doubt theſe were: And if they cou'd have found the leaſt flaw in their Teſtimony, the World wou'd ſoon have ring'd of it; and the *Jews* who were then ſo much diſperſed abroad, would have divulg'd it into all parts, the *Apoſtles* wou'd have been told of it as they preached Chriſt in the *Synagogues*. And can we in any reaſon think, but thoſe *Jews* who perſecuted *Paul* as he preached in the *Synagogues* of *Aſia*, and afterwards impeach'd him ſo openly in *Jeruſalem*, wou'd there enquire into all the circumſtances concerning Chriſt, and all the other *Jews* wou'd write to their Friends at *Jeruſalem* to be fully inform'd of thoſe ſtrange things which were told them openly in all places in their *Synagogues* by Men of their own Nation and Language, concerning one *Jeſus* who was crucify'd and *roſe again* from the *dead?* Had there been now any ſo much as plauſible pretext that any of theſe circumſtances were not true, can we think but that a People ſo unmeaſurably given to their own ways and Traditions, wou'd in all places have vented any thing that might have tended to the diſparagement of Chriſt and his *Apoſtles?* But we ſee Malice it ſelf cou'd not find any flaw in the *Apoſtles* Teſtimony; for if it had, we ſhou'd certainly have heard of it, either from the *Jews*, or from the great oppoſers of *Chriſtianity* among the *Heathens*, who pretended to be curious and inquiſitive Perſons, ſuch as *Celſus*, *Julian*, *Hierocles* and *Porphyry* were. What reaſon can we have then in the leaſt to ſuſpect ſuch a Teſtimony, which paſſed ſo uncontrouled in that time when it was alone capable of being diſprov'd, and Mens Intereſt and Deſign wou'd put them ſo much upon it? The ſtrength of which will appear in the next Propoſition, which is,

XVII. Prop. 4. *No Teſtimony ought to be taken againſt a matter of fact thus atteſted, but from ſuch Perſons who had greater knowledge of the things atteſted, and manifeſt greater fidelity in reporting them.* It is eaſy to make it appear, that ſuppoſing any Perſons at that time had contradicted the Teſtimony of the *Apoſtles* concerning our Saviour, yet there had been no reaſon in the world to have hearkned to their Teſtimony in oppoſition to that of the *Apoſtles*; and that on theſe accounts. 1. The *Apoſtles* witneſſed the *Affirmative*, which is more capable of being atteſted than any *Negative* can be. 2. The *Apoſtles* were more converſant with Chriſt than any other Perſons were, becauſe they were choſen for that very end by him to be conſtantly with him: cou'd any therefore be more capable of knowing the truth of all particulars concerning Chriſt than theſe were? Had there been any ground of ſuſpicion concerning the deſign of Chriſt why cou'd not the *Jews* prevail with *Judas* to diſcover it as well as to betray his Perſon? *Judas* had done but a good work, if Chriſt had been ſuch an Impoſtor as the *Jews* blaſphemouſly ſaid he was: what made *Judas* then ſo little ſatisfy'd with his work, that he grew weary of his Life upon it, and threw himſelf away in the moſt horrid deſpair? No Perſon certainly had been ſo fit to have been produced as a witneſs againſt Chriſt, as *Judas* who had been ſo long with him, and had heard his Speeches, and obſerv'd his Miracles; but he had not patience enough to ſtay after that horrid fact to be a witneſs againſt him:

nay

nay he was the greateſt witneſs at that time for him, when he who had betray'd him came to the *Sanhedrin* when conſulting about his death, and told them *that he had ſinned in betraying innocent blood.* What poſ- Mat. 27. 5.
ſible Evidence cou'd have been given more in behalf of our Saviour than that was? When a Perſon ſo covetous as to betray his Maſter for *thirty pieces of ſilver*, was ſo weary of his bargain, that he comes and throws back the Money, and declares the Perſon innocent whom he had betray'd? And this Perſon too was ſuch a one as knew our Saviour far better than any of the Witneſſes whom afterwards they ſuborn'd againſt him, who yet contradicted each other; and at laſt cou'd produce nothing which in the judgment of the heathen Governour cou'd make him judge Chriſt worthy of death. 3. The *Apoſtles* were freer from deſign than any counter-witneſs at that time cou'd be; we have already prov'd the *Apoſtles* cou'd not poſſibly have any other motive to affirm what they did, but full conviction of the truth of what they ſpake; but now if any among the *Jews* at that time had aſſerted any thing contrary to the *Apoſtles*, we have a clear account of it, and what motive might induce them to it; *viz.* the preſerving of their Honour and Reputation with the People, the upholding their Traditions, beſides their open and declar'd enmity againſt Chriſt without any ſufficient reaſon at all for it; now who wou'd believe the Teſtimony of the *Scribes* and *Phariſees* who had ſo great authority among the People, which they were like to loſe, if Chriſt's Doctrine were true, before that of the *Apoſtles* who parted with all for the ſake of Chriſt, and ventur'd themſelves wholly upon the truth of our Saviour's Doctrine? 4. None ever did ſo much to atteſt the *Negative*, as the *Apoſtles* did to prove their Fidelity as to the *Affirmative*. Had ſufficient counter-witneſs been timely produced, we cannot think the *Apoſtles* wou'd have run ſo many continual hazards in preaching the things which related to the Perſon and Actions of Chriſt. Did ever any lay down their Lives to undeceive the World, if the *Apoſtles* were guilty of abuſing it? 5. The number of ſuch Perſons had been inconſiderable in compariſon of thoſe who were ſo fully perſuaded of the truth of thoſe things which concern our Saviour; who were all ready (as moſt of them did) to ſeal the truth of them with their Lives. Whence ſhou'd ſo many Men grow ſo ſuddenly confident of the truth of ſuch things which were contrary to their former Perſuaſions, Intereſt, Education, had they not been deliver'd in ſuch a way, that they were aſſur'd of the undoubted truth of them? which brings me to the laſt Propoſition, which is,

Matters of fact being firſt believ'd on the account of eye-witneſſes, and re- XVIII.
ceiv'd with an univerſal and uncontrouled aſſent by all ſuch perſons who have Prop. 5.
thought themſelves concern'd in knowing the truth of them, do yield a ſufficient foundation for a firm aſſent to be built upon. I take it for granted that there is ſufficient foundation for a firm aſſent, where there can be no Reaſon given to queſtion the Evidence; which that there is not in this preſent caſe, will appear from theſe following conſiderations.

1. *That the multitudes of thoſe perſons who did believe theſe things, had liberty and opportunity to be ſatisfy'd of the truth of them before they believ'd them.* Therefore no Reaſon or Motive can be aſſign'd, on which they ſhou'd be induced to believe theſe things, but the undoubted Evidence of Truth which went along with them. I confeſs in *Mahometiſm* a very great number of perſons have for ſome Centuries of years continu'd in the Belief of the Doctrine of *Mahomet*; but then withal there is a

ſufficient account to be given of that, *viz. the power of the ſword* which keeps them in awe, and ſtrictly forbids all the Followers of *Mahomet* to diſpute their Religion at all, or compare it with any other. Therefore I can no more wonder at this, than I do to ſee ſo great a part of the World under the Tyranny of the great *Turk:* Neither on the other ſide do I wonder that ſuch a multitude of thoſe profeſſing Chriſtianity ſhou'd together with it, believe a great number of erroneous Doctrines, and live in the practice of many groſs Superſtitions, becauſe I conſider what ſtrange prevalency Education hath upon ſofter Spirits and more eaſie intellectuals, and what an awe an Inquiſition bears upon timorous and irreſolv'd Perſons. But now when a great multitude of perſons ſober and inquiſitive, ſhall, contrary to the Principles of their Education, and without fear of any humane Force, (which they beforehand ſee will perſecute them) and after diligent enquiry made into the Grounds on which they believe, forſake all their former Perſuaſions, and reſolvedly adhere to the truth of the Doctrine propounded to them, tho' it coſt them their lives; if this give us not reaſon to think this Doctrine true, we muſt believe Mankind to be the moſt unhappy creatures in the World; that will with ſo much reſolution part with all Advantages of this Life for the ſake of one to come, if that be not undoubtedly certain, and the Doctrine propoſing it infallibly true. It is an obſervable Circumſtance in the propagation of the Chriſtian Religion, that tho' God made choice at firſt of perſons generally of mean rank and condition in the World to be Preachers of the Goſpel, God thereby
1Cor. 2. 5. making it appear that *our faith did not ſtand in the wiſdom of men, but*
1Cor. 1. 27. *in the power of God*, and therefore *choſe the weak things of the world to confound the ſtrong*; yet ſoon after the Goſpel was preached abroad in the World, we find perſons of great place and reputation, of great parts and abilities engaged in the Profeſſion of the Chriſtian Faith. In the Hiſtory of the *Acts* we read of *Sergius* a Proconſul, of *Dionyſius* the *Areopagite* converted to the Faith, and in the following Ages of the Church many perſons of great eſteem for their excellent Learning and Abilities; ſuch was *Juſtin Martyr*, one who before he became a Chriſtian, was converſant with all Sects of *Philoſophers*, *Stoics*, *Peripatetics*, *Pythagoreans*, and at laſt was a profeſs'd *Platoniſt* till he was converted from *Plato* to *Chriſt*, and then found that true which he ſpeaks of in his *Dialogue* with *Trypho*, that after all his enquiries into Philoſophy,
Juſtin. Dialog. cum Tryph. ip. 125. ed. Par. ſpeaking of the Doctrine of Chriſt, ταύτην μόνην εὕρισκον φιλοσοφίαν ἀσφαλῆ τε καὶ σύμφορον, *I found this at laſt to be the only ſure and profitable Philoſophy.* And when *Trypho* after derides him as a Man of very eaſie Faith, who wou'd leave the Doctrine of *Plato* for that of Chriſt, (for it ſeems by him the *Jews* then had a more favourable Opinion of the State of *Platoniſts* than *Chriſtians*) *Juſtin* is ſo far from being mov'd with ſuch Reproaches, that he tells him he wou'd undertake to demonſtrate to him, ὅτι οὐ κενοῖς ἐπιστάσαμεν μύθοις, οὐδὲ ἀναποδείκτοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ μεστοῖς πνεύματος θείου καὶ δυνάμεως βρύουσι, καὶ τεθηλόσι χάριτι: *That the Chriſtians did not give credit to empty Fables, and unprovable Aſſertions, but to ſuch a Doctrine that was full of a Divine Spirit and Power, and flouriſhed with Grace:* The proving of which is the ſubject of that diſcourſe. At *Alexandria* we meet with a ſucceſſion of excellent Perſons, all which were not only Embracers themſelves, but Defenders of the Chriſtian Faith; for ſetting aſide there *Abilius*, *Juſtus*, *Cerdo*, *Eumenes*, *Marcus*, *Celadion*, *Agrippinus*, *Julianus*, *Demetrius*, and others who flouriſhed about the

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second Century, I shall only fix on those persons, who were famous Enquirers after Truth, and noted for excellency in Heathen Learning; yet these persons after all their enquiries found nothing to fix on but the Christian Faith, and valu'd no other discovery of Truth in comparison with that. Such was *Pantænus*, who as *Eusebius* tells us, was an excellent *Stoic* before he became a Christian, and was after so eminent a one, that in imitation of the Apostles he went into *India* to convert the Inhabitants to the Christian Faith, and at his return was made Rector of the School at *Alexandria*; which as the same Author tells us was much frequented by such who were ἐν λόγῳ καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὰ θεῖα σοφίᾳ δυνατοί, *well skill'd in Humane as well as Divine Learning.* How excellent *Pantænus* was in Humane Learning, may appear in that *Origen* and *Hierome* both make his example their plea for their studying of it. After him succeeded *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Pantænus*'s Scholar, a person of great depth of learning and exquisitely skill'd in all Heathen Antiquities, as appears by his remaining Writings. The learning of *Origen* is sufficiently known, which was in such great reputation in his own time, that not only Christians but Philosophers flock'd to his Lectures at *Alexandria*, as *Eusebius* tells us, wherein he read the *Mathematics*, and other parts of Philosophy as well as the Scriptures; and the same Author informs us that the Philosophers did dedicate their Books to him, and sometimes chose him as Arbitrator between them in matters of Dispute; and *Porphyry* himself in his Books against the Christians vouchsafed a high *Encomium* of *Origen* for his excellent Learning. In *Origen*'s time *Heraclas* a Presbyter of *Alexandria* for five years together frequented the Schools of the Philosophers, and put on the Philosophic *pallium* βιβλία τε ἑλλήνων καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν οὐ παύεται φιλολόγων, *and was very conversant in the Books of the Grecian Learning.* Besides these we read of *Pierius* and *Achillas* two Presbyters of *Alexandria*, who were τῇ καθ' ἑλλήνας παιδείᾳ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ δεδεκιμασμένοι, as *Nicephorus Callistus* speaks, *Persons well skilled in the Grecian Learning and Philosophy.* If from *Alexandria* we go to *Cæsarea*, there we not only meet with a School of learning among the Christians, but with persons very eminent in all kinds of learning; such were the famous *Pamphilus* and *Eusebius* so great an admirer of him, that ever since he is called *Eusebius Pamphilus.* At *Antioch* was *Dorotheus* ἀνὴρ παντοίων λόγων καὶ παιδείας ἐλευθερίου, as *Nicephorus* speaks, *a person versed in all kind of ingenuous Literature.* *Anatolius* Bishop of *Laodicea*, one versed in *Geometry*, *Astronomy*, and all kind of *Philosophy*, as well as the Doctrine of Christ. Thus we see how in those early days of the *Greek* Church what excellent persons many of those were who were zealous Professors of Christianity; and concerning those of the *Latin* Church, I shall only mention that speech of St. *Austin* who was himself an instance of the same nature and a Star of the first magnitude among them. *Nonne aspicimus quanto auro & argento & veste suffarcinatus exierit de Ægypto Cyprianus Doctor suavissimus & Martyr beatissimus? quanto Lactantius? quanto Victorinus, Optatus, Hilarius? ut de vivis taceam: quanto innumerabiles Græci? quod prior ipse fidelissimus Dei servus Moses fecerat, de quo scriptum est, quod eruditus fuerit omni sapientia Ægyptiorum.* To whose Catalogue of learned persons, among the *Latin* Christians *Tertullian*, *Arnobius* and several others may be deservedly added. But as St. *Austin* there well observes, *tho' the* Israelites *went rich out of* Ægypt, *yet it was their eating the Passover which saved them from destruction*; so tho' these were accomplished with those perfections and riches of the Soul, the ornaments of Learning, yet it was their eating

Euseb. Hist. Eccl. l. 5. c. 10. *Ibid. l. 6. c. 20.* *Ibid. l. 6. c. 18.* *Ibid. l. 6. c. 20.* *Nicephor. Hist. Eccl. l. 6. c. 35.* *Idem, lib. 6. c. 36.* *S. Augustin. de doctr. Christiana, l. 2. cap. 40.*

ting the true Paſſover which was Chriſt, by their adhering to his Doctrine, was that which wou'd be of more advantage to them, than all their Accompliſhments wou'd be. Now then ſince in the firſt Ages of the Chriſtian Church, we find not only innumerable multitudes of Perſons of great Integrity and Sobriety in their Lives embracing the Doctrine of Chriſt, but ſo many Perſons that were curious enquirers after the truth of things; we can certainly have no reaſon to diſtruſt ſuch a Teſtimony which was receiv'd in ſo unanimous a manner by perſons as able to judge of the truth of things, and as fearful of being deceiv'd in reference to them as any now in the World can be.

XIX. 2. As this Teſtimony was receiv'd by perſons inquiſitive after the Truth of things, ſo *the Doctrine conveyed by it was a matter of the higheſt moment in the world:* and therefore we cannot conceive but perſons ordinarily inquiſitive about other things wou'd be more than ordinarily ſo about this, becauſe their eternal welfare and happineſs did depend upon it. All perſons that are truly Religious, muſt at leaſt be allow'd to be perſons very inquiſitive after the ſtate and condition of their Souls when they ſhall be diſlodged from their Bodies. And if we do but grant this, can we in any reaſon think that ſuch a multitude of perſons in ſo many Ages ſhou'd continue venturing their Souls upon a Teſtimony which they had no aſſurance of the truth of? And that none of all theſe perſons, tho' Men otherwiſe Rational and Judicious, ſhou'd be able to diſcover the Falſity of that Doctrine they went upon, if at leaſt any upon conſideration of it can imagine it to be ſo? It is not reconcilable with the general preſumption of Humane Nature concerning Divine Providence and the Care God takes of the welfare of Men, to ſuffer ſo many perſons who ſincerely deſire to ſerve God in the way which is moſt pleaſing to him, to go on in ſuch a continual Deluſion, and never have it at all diſcover'd to them. If all Men then who have believ'd the Doctrine of Chriſt to be the only way to Salvation have been deceiv'd, either we muſt deny altogether a Divine Providence, or ſay the Devil hath more power to deceive Men than God hath to direct them, which is worſe than the former; or elſe aſſert that there are no ſuch things at all as either God or Devils, but that all things come to paſs by Chance and Fortune: and if ſo, it is ſtill more inexplicable why ſuch multitudes of rational and ſerious Men, and the moſt inquiſitive part of the World as to ſuch things ſhou'd all be ſo poſſeſs'd with the truth and certainty of theſe things; and the more prophane, wicked and ignorant any perſons are, the more prone they are to mock and deride them. If ſuch Men then ſee more into Truth and Reaſon than the ſober and judicious part of Mankind, let us bid adieu to Humanity and adore the Brutes, ſince we admire their judgment moſt who come the neareſt to them.

3. *The multitude of theſe perſons thus conſenting in this Teſtimony, could have no other engagements to this conſent, but only their firm perſuaſion of the truth of the Doctrine conveyed by it*; becauſe thoſe who unanimouſly agree in this thing are ſuch perſons, whoſe other deſigns and intereſts in this World differ as much as any Men's do. If it had been only a conſent of the *Jews*, there might have been ſome probable pretence to have ſuſpected a matter of Intereſt in it; but as to this thing, we find the *Jews* divided among themſelves about it; and the ſtiffeſt deniers of the truth of it, do yet inviolably preſerve thoſe ſacred Records among them, from which the Truth of the Doctrine of Chriſt may be undoubtedly prov'd. Had the Chriſtian Religion been enforced upon the

the World by the *Roman* Emperors at the time of its first promulgation, there wou'd have been some suspicion of particular design in it; but it came with no other strength but the evidence of its own Truth; yet it found sudden and strange entertainment among persons of all Nations and Degrees of Men. In a short time it had eaten into the Heart of the *Roman* Empire, and made so large a spread therein, that it made *Tertullian* say, *Hesterni sumus, & vestra omnia implevimus, urbes, insulas, castella, municipia, conciliabula, castra ipsa, tribus, decurias, palatium, senatum, forum; sola vobis relinquimus Templa. We have but newly appeared*, saith he, *and yet we have filled all places with our Company, but only your Temples*; and before speaking of the Heathens, *Obsessam vociferantur civitatem, in agris, in castellis, in insulis Christianos, omnem sexum, ætatem, conditionem, etiam dignitatem transgredi ad hoc nomen quasi detrimento mœrent. All sorts and conditions of Men in all places, were suddenly become Christians.* What common tye cou'd there be now to unite all these persons together, if we set aside the undoubted truth and certainty of the Doctrine of Christ which was first preached to them by such who were Eye-witnesses of Christ's Actions, and had left sacred Records behind them, containing the substance of the Doctrine of Christ, and those admirable Instructions which were their only certain Guides in the way to Heaven?

Tertull. Apol. c 36.

Ibid. c. 1.

4. *Because many persons do join in this consent with true Christians, who yet could heartily wish that the Doctrine of Christianity were not true.* Such are all those persons who are sensual in their Lives, and walk not according to the Rules of the Gospel, yet dare not question or deny the Truth of it. Such who cou'd heartily wish there were no future State, nor Judgment to come, that they might indulge themselves in this World without fear of another; yet their Consciences are so far convinced of, and aw'd by the truth of these things, that they raise many perplexities and anxieties in their Minds which they wou'd most willingly be rid of; which they can never throughly be, till instead of having the name of Christians, they come to live the Life of Christians, and become experimentally acquainted with the Truth and Power of Religion. And withal we find that the more Men have been acquainted with the practice of Christianity, the greater Evidence they have had of the truth of it, and been more fully and rationally persuaded of it. To such I grant there are such powerful Evidences of the truth of the Doctrine of Christ by the effectual workings of the Spirit of God upon their Souls, that all other Arguments, as to their own satisfaction, may fall short of these. As to which those Verses of the Poet *Dantes*, render'd into *Latin* by *F. S.* are very pertinent and significant: for when he had introduced the Apostle *Peter*, asking him what it was which his Faith was founded on, he answers,

Deinde exivit ex luce profunda
Quæ illic splendebat pretiosa gemma,
Super quam omnis virtus fundatur.

i. e. *That God was pleased by immediate revelation of himself, to discover that Divine Truth to the World whereon our Faith doth stand as on its sure foundation*; but when the Apostle goes on to enquire how he knew this at first came from God, his answer to that is,

——*larga*

—— larga pluvia
Spiritus Sancti, quæ eſt diffuſa
Super veteres & ſuper novas membranas,
Eſt ſyllogiſmus ille qui eam mihi concluſit
Adeo acute, ut præ illa demonſtratione
Omnis demonſtratio alia mihi videatur obtuſa.

i. e. *That the Spirit of God doth fully diſcover it ſelf both in the Old and New Teſtament, that all other Arguments are but dull and heavy if compared with this.* It is true they are ſo to a truly inlightned Conſcience which diſcovers ſo much Beauty and Glory in the Scriptures, that they raviſh the Soul, altho' it be unable to give ſo full an account of this unto others who want the Eyes to ſee that Beauty with, which a Heart truly gracious hath. We ſee ordinarily in the World, that the attraction of Beauty is an unaccountable thing; and one may diſcern that which raviſheth him, which another looks on as mean and ordinary; and why may it not be much more thus in Divine objects which want Spiritual Eyes to diſcover them? Therefore I grant that good Men enjoy that ſatisfaction to their own Conſciences, as to the truth of the Doctrine of Chriſt, which others cannot attain to; but yet I ſay, that ſuch do likewiſe ſee the moſt ſtrong, rational and convincing Evidence which doth induce them to believe; which Evidence is then moſt convincing, when it is ſeconded by the peculiar Energy of the Spirit of God upon the Souls of true Believers. But yet we ſee that the power and force of the truth of theſe things may be ſo great, even upon ſuch Minds which are not yet moulded into the faſhion of true Goodneſs, that it may awe with its light and clearneſs, where it doth not ſoften and alter by its heat and influence. Now whence can it be that ſuch convictions ſhou'd ſtick ſo faſt in the Minds of thoſe who wou'd fain pull out thoſe piercing arrows, but that there is a greater power in them than they are Maſters of, and they cannot ſtand againſt the force whereby they come upon them; nor find any ſalve to cure the wounds which are made within them, but by thoſe weapons which were the cauſes of them? And therefore when wicked perſons under conflicts of Conſcience, cannot eaſe themſelves by direct *Atheiſm*, or finding reaſon to caſt off ſuch convictions by diſcerning any invalidity in the Teſtimony whereon the truth of theſe things depends, it is a certain Argument that there is abundant truth in that Teſtimony, when Men wou'd fain perſuade themſelves to believe the contrary, and yet cannot.

5. The Truth of this conſent appears, *from the unanimity of it among thoſe perſons who have yet ſtrangely differ'd from each other in many controverſies in Religion.* We ſee thereby this unanimity is no forced or deſign'd thing, becauſe we ſee the Perſons agreeing in this, do very much diſagree from each other in other things. And the ſame grounds and reaſons whereon they diſagree as to others things, wou'd have held as to theſe too, were there not greater evidence of the certainty of theſe things, than of thoſe they fall out about. It hath not yet become a Queſtion among thoſe who differ ſo much about the ſenſe of Scripture, whether the Scripture it ſelf be the Word of God, altho' the very accounts on which we are to believe it to be ſo, hath been the ſubject of no mean Controverſies. All the divided parts of the Chriſtian World do yet fully agree in the matters of fact, viz. *That there was ſuch a Perſon*

ſon as Jeſus Chriſt, *and that he did many great Miracles, that he died on the Croſs at* Jeruſalem, *and roſe again from the dead*; now theſe contain the great foundations of *Chriſtian Faith*, and therefore the multitude of other Controverſies in the World ought to be ſo far from weakning our Faith, as to the truth of the Doctrine of Chriſt (which Men of weak judgments and *Atheiſtical* Spirits pretend) that it ought to be a ſtrong confirmation of it, when we ſee Perſons which ſo peeviſhly quarrel with each other about ſome inferior and leſs weighty parts of Religion, do yet unanimouſly conſent in the principal foundations of *Chriſtian Faith*, and ſuch whereon the neceſſity of Faith and Obedience, as the way to Salvation, doth more immediately depend. And this may be one great Reaſon why the infinitely wiſe God may ſuffer ſuch lamentable Contentions and Diviſions to be in the Chriſtian World, that thereby inquiſitive perſons may ſee that if Religion had been a mere Deſign of ſome few politic Perſons, the quarrelſome World (where it is not held in by force) wou'd never have conſented ſo long in the owning ſuch common Principles which all the other Controverſies are built upon. And altho' it be continually ſeen that in divided parties, one is apt to run from any thing which is receiv'd by the other, and Men generally think they can never run far enough from them whoſe Errors they have diſcover'd, that yet this Principle hath not carried any conſiderable party of the Chriſtian World (out of their indignation againſt thoſe great corruptions which have crept into the World under a pretence of Religion) to the diſowning the foundation of *Chriſtian Faith*, muſt be partly imputed to the ſignal hand of Divine Providence, and partly to thoſe ſtrong Evidences which there are of the truth of that Teſtimony which conveys to us the foundations of *Chriſtian Faith*. Thus we ſee now, how great and uncontrouled this conſent is, as to the matters of fact delivered down from the eye-witneſſes of them, concerning the Actions and Miracles of our Bleſſed Saviour, (which are contain'd in the Scriptures as authentic Records of them,) and what a ſure foundation there is for a firm aſſent to the truth of the things from ſo univerſal and uninterrupted a Tradition.

XX. Thus far we have now manifeſted the neceſſity of the Miracles of Chriſt, in order to the propagation of *Chriſtianity* in the World, from the conſideration of the Perſons who were to propagate it in the World; the next thing we are to conſider, is, the admirable ſucceſs which the Goſpel met with in the World upon its being preached to it: Of which no rational account can be given, unleſs the Actions and Miracles of our Saviour were moſt undoubtedly true. That the Goſpel of Chriſt had very ſtrange and wonderful ſucceſs upon its firſt preaching, hath been partly diſcover'd already, and is withal ſo plain from the long continuance of it in theſe *European* parts, that none any ways converſant in the Hiſtory of former Ages, can have any ground to queſtion it. But that this ſtrange and admirable ſucceſs of the Doctine of Chriſt ſhou'd be an Evidence of the truth of it, and the Miracles wrought in confirmation of it, will appear from theſe two Conſiderations. 1. *That the Doctrine its ſelf was ſo directly contrary to the general inclinations of the World.* 2. *That the propagation of it was ſo much oppoſed by all worldly power.*

1. *That the Doctrine it ſelf was ſo oppoſite to the general inclinations of the World.* The Doctrine may be conſider'd either as to its *credenda*, or matters of Faith; or as to its *agenda*, or matters of Life and Practice;

both these were contrary to the inclinations of the World; the former seem'd hard and incredible, the latter harsh and impossible.

1. The matters of Faith which were to be believ'd by the World, were not such things which we may imagine the vulgar sort of Men wou'd be very forward to run after, nor very greedy to embrace. 1. *Because contrary to the Principles of their Education, and the Religion they were brought up in*; the generality of Mankind is very tenacious of those Principles and Prejudices which are sucked in in the time of Infancy. There are some Religions one would think it were impossible that any rational Men should believe them; but only on this account, because they are bred up under them. It is a very great advantage any Religion hath against another, that it comes to speak first, and thereby insinuates such an apprehension of its self to the Mind that it is very hard removing it afterwards. The understanding seems to be of the nature of those things which are *communis juris*, and therefore *primi sunt possidentis*; when an opinion hath once got possession of the Mind, it usually keeps out whatever comes to disturb it. Now we cannot otherwise conceive but all those Persons who had been bred up under *Paganism* and the most gross Idolatry, must needs have a very potent Prejudice against such a Doctrine which was wholly irreconcilable with that Religion which they had been devoted to. Now the stronger the Prejudice is which is convey'd into Mens Minds by the force of Education, the greater strength and power must there needs be in the Gospel of Christ, which did so easily demolish these strong holds, and captivate the Understandings of Men to the obedience of Christ. To which purpose *Arnobius* excellently speaks in these words to the *Heathens*; *Sed non creditis gesta hæc. Sed qui ea conspicati sunt fieri & sub oculis suis viderunt agi, testes optimi certissimique auctores, & crediderunt hæc ipsi, & credenda posteris nobis haud exilibus cum approbationibus tradiderunt. Quinam isti fortasse quæritis? gentes, populi, nationes & incredulum illud genus humanum. Quod nisi aperta res esset, & lucc ipsa quemadmodum dicitur clarior, nunquam rebus hujusmodi credulitatis suæ commodarent assensum. An nunquid dicimus illius temporis homines usque adeo fuisse vanos, mendaces, stolidos, brutos, ut quæ nunquam viderant vidisse se fingerent? & quæ facta omnino non erant falsis proderent testimoniis aut puerili assertione firmarent? Cumque possent vobiscum & unanimiter vivere, & inoffensas ducere conjunctiones, gratuita susciperent odia & execrabili haberentur in nomine? Quod si falsa ut dicitis historia illa rerum est, unde tam brevi tempore totus mundus ista religione completus est? Aut in unam coire qui potuerunt mentem gentes regionibus dissitæ, ventis cœlique convexionibus dimotæ? Asseverationibus illectæ sunt nudis, inductæ in spes cassas, & in pericula capitis immittere se sponte temeraria desperatione voluerunt, cum nihil tale vidissent quod eas in hos cultus novitatis suæ possit excitare miraculo. Imo quia hæc omnia ab ipso cernebant geri & ab ejus præconibus qui per orbem totum missi beneficia patris & munera sanandis animis hominibusque portabant, veritatis ipsius vi victæ, & dederunt se Deo, nec in magnis posuere dispendiis membra vobis projicere, & viscera sua lanianda præbere.* The substance of whose Discourse is, that it is impossible to suppose so many Persons of so many Nations to be so far besotted and infatuated, as not only to believe a Religion to be true which was contrary to that they were educated in, but to venture their Lives as well as Estates upon it, had it not been discover'd to them in a most certain and infallible way by such who had been eye-witnesses of the Actions and Miracles of Christ and his

Arnobius contr. gentes l. 1.

his *Apoſtles*. And as he elſewhere ſpeaks, *Vel hæc ſaltem fidem vobis faciunt argumenta credendi, quod jam per omnes terras in tam brevi tempore & parvo immenſi nominis hujus ſacramenta diffuſa ſunt; quod nulla jam natio eſt tam barbari moris, & manſuetudinem neſciens, quæ non ejus amore verſa molliverit aſperitatem ſuam, & in placidos ſenſus aſſumpta tranquilitate migraverit; quod tam magnis ingeniis præditi Oratores, Grammatici, Rhetores, Conſulti juris ac Medici, Philoſophiæ etiam ſecreta rimantes, magiſteria hæc expetunt, ſpretis quibus paulo ante fidebant, &c.* Will not this perſuade the World what firm foundations the Faith of *Chriſtians* ſtands on, when in ſo ſhort a time it is ſpread over all parts of the World? that by it the moſt inhumane and barbarous Nations are ſoftn'd into more than civility? That men of the greateſt Wits and Parts, *Orators, Grammarians, Rhetoricians, Lawyers, Phyſicians, Philoſophers*, who not? have forſaken their former ſentiments, and adhered to the Doctrine of Chriſt. Now, I ſay, if the power of Education be ſo ſtrong upon the Minds of Men to perſuade them of the truth of the Religion they are bred up under, (which *Atheiſtically* diſpos'd Perſons make ſo much advantage of,) this is ſo far from weakning the truth of *Chriſtianity*, that it proves a great confirmation of it, becauſe it obtain'd ſo much upon its firſt Preaching in the World, notwithſtanding the higheſt prejudices from Education were againſt it. If then Men be ſo prone to believe that to be moſt true, which they have been educated under, it muſt argue a more than ordinary Evidence and Power in that Religion which unſettles ſo much the Principles of Education, as to make Men not only queſtion the truth of them, but to renounce them and embrace a Religion contrary to them. *Ibid. lib. 2. p. 44.*

XXI. Eſpecially when we withal conſider what ſtrong holds theſe Principles of Education were back'd with among the *Heathens*, when the Doctrine of Chriſt was firſt divulg'd among them, *i. e.* what plauſible pretences they had of continuing in the Religion which they were brought up in, and why they ſhou'd not exchange it for *Chriſtianity*; and thoſe were,

1. *The pretended Antiquity of their Religion above the Chriſtian*; the main thing pleaded againſt the *Chriſtians* was *divortium ab inſtitutis majorum*, that they thought themſelves wiſer than their Fore-fathers; and *Symmachus, Libanius*, and others plead this moſt in behalf of *Paganiſm*; *ſervanda eſt tot ſæculis fides, & ſequendi ſunt nobis parentes qui ſecuti ſunt feliciter ſuos*; their Religion pleaded Preſcription againſt any other, and they were reſolv'd to follow the ſteps of their Anceſtors wherein they thought themſelves happy and ſecure. *Cæcilius* in *Minutius Felix* firſt argues much againſt dogmatizing in Religion, but withal ſays it moſt becomes a lover of truth, *Majorum excipere diſciplinam, religiones traditas colere, deos quos à parentibus ante imbutus es timere; nec de numinibus ferre ſententiam, ſed prioribus credere.* So *Arnobius* tells us the main thing objected againſt the *Chriſtians* was *novellam eſſe religionem noſtram, & ante dies natam propemodum paucos, neque vos potuiſſe antequam & patriam linquere, & in barbaros ritus peregrinoſque traduci.* And *Cotta* in *Tully* long before laid this down as the main Principle of *Pagan* Religion, *majoribus noſtris etiam nulla ratione reddita credere, to believe the Tradition of our Fathers, altho' there be no evidence in reaſon for it:* And after he had diſcover'd the vanity of the *Stoical* Arguments about Religion, concludes with this as the only thing he reſolv'd his Religion into, *Mihi unum ſatis erit, majores noſtros ita tradidiſſe, It is enough for me*

Tertull. ad Nat. l. 1. cap. 10. Symmach. Ep. l. 10. ep. 61. Liban. orat. de Templis.

Minutius Felix. p. 6.

Arnob. contra gentes. l. 2. p. 90.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3.

me that it comes by tradition from our Fore-fathers. *Lactantius* fully sets forth the manner of pleading us'd by the *Heathens* against the *Christians*, in point of Antiquity. *Hæ sunt religiones quas sibi à majoribus suis traditas, pertinacissime tueri ac defendere perseverant; nec considerant quales sint, sed ex hoc probatas atque veras esse confidunt, quod eas veteres tradiderunt; tantaque est auctoritas vetustatis, ut inquirere in eam scelus esse dicatur.* The *English* is, They accounted Tradition infallible, and knew no other way whereby to find the truth of Religion but by its conveyance from their Fore-fathers. How like herein do they speak to those who contend for the corruptions crept into the *Christian Church?* who make use of the same pretences for them, *viz.* that they were deliver'd down from their Fathers; *tantaque est auctoritas vetustatis, ut inquirere in eam scelus esse dicatur; who are we who will see further than Antiquity?* But it is no wonder if Antiquity be accompany'd with dimness of sight; and so it was undoubtedly as to the *Pagan* World; and as to the *Christian* too, when such a mixture of *Heathenism* came into it. And the very same Arguments by which the pleaders for *Christianity* did justify the truth of their Religion, notwithstanding this pretended Antiquity, will with equal force hold for a Reformation of such inveterate abuses, which under a pretence of Antiquity, have crept into the *Christian Church.* *Nullus pudor est ad meliora transire*, saith *Ambrose* in his Answer to *Symmachus*, *what shame is it to grow better? Quid facies?* saith *Lactantius*, *majoresne potius an rationem sequeris? Si rationem mavis, discedere te necesse est ab institutis & auctoritate majorum: quoniam id solum rectum est, quod ratio præscribit. Sin autem pietas majores sequi suadet: fateris igitur & stultos illos esse qui excogitatis contra rationem religionibus servierint; & te ineptum qui id colas quod falsum esse conviceris.* Where Reason and mere Authority of Fore-fathers stand in competition, he is more a Child than a Man that knows not on which side to give his Suffrage. But with the greatest strength, and clearest reason *Arnobius* speaks in this case. *Itaque cum nobis intenditis aversionem à Religione priorum, causam convenit ut inspiciatis, non factum; nec quid reliquerimus opponere, sed secuti quid simus potissimum contueri.* *When you charge us*, saith he, *that we are revolted from the Religion of our Fore-fathers, you ought not presently to condemn the fact, but to examine the reasons of it; neither ought you so much to look at what we have left, as what it is we have embraced.* *Nam si mutare sententiam culpa est ulla vel crimen, & à veteribus institutis in alias res novas voluntatesque migrare, criminatio ista & vos spectat, qui toties vitam consuetudinemque mutastis; qui in mores alios, atque alios ritus priorum condemnatione transistis.* If mere departing from the Religion of our Ancestors be the great fault, all those who own themselves to be *Christians*, were themselves guilty of it when they revolted from *Heathenism.* If it be here said that the case is different, because there was sufficient reason for it, which there is not as to the corruptions of the *Christian Church*; if so, then all the dispute is taken off from the matter of fact, or the revolt to the causes inducing to it; and if the *Protestant* be not able as to the causes of our Separation from *Rome* to manifest that they were sufficient, let him then be triumph'd over by the *Romanist*, and not before. I assert then, and that with much assurance of Mind, that the Principles of the Reformation are justifiable upon the same grounds of Reason, which the embracing *Christianity* was, when Men of *Heathens* became *Christians*; and that the Arguments made use of by *Romanists* against our Separation from them, are such as

Lactant. de orig Error. l. 2. c. 6.

Ambros. ep. c. Symmach.

Lactant. de orig. Error. l. 2. c. 6.

Arnobius contr. gent. l. 2.

wou'd

wou'd have juſtify'd a *Pagan* Philoſopher in not embracing *Chriſtianity*. For if it be unlawful for any party of Men, to divide from others in a matter of Religion which pretends Antiquity and Univerſality, it had been unlawful for a Philoſopher to have deſerted *Paganiſm*, as well as for a *Proteſtant* to depart from *Rome*. For according to the Principles of the *Romaniſts*, the judgment in the cauſe of the Separation, and of the truth of Religion lies in that party from which we depart; if we do now but apply this to the old *Roman* Senate or Emperors in the caſe of *Chriſtian Religion*, and dividing from *Heathen* Worſhip, we ſhall quickly ſee how eaſy a matter it will be to make *Chriſtianity* it ſelf a Schiſm and the Doctrine of Chriſt the greateſt Hereſy. But as ſtrong as thoſe pretences were then, or have been ſince, the power of the Doctrine of Chriſt hath been ſo great, as to conquer them and thereby to manifeſt, that it was of God, when ſuch potent Prejudices were not able to withſtand it. Of which *Antiquity* is the firſt.

2. *The large and univerſal ſpread of Pagan Religion*, when *Chriſtianity* came into the World: there was never ſo great *Catholiciſm*, as in *Heathen* Worſhip, when the *Apoſtles* firſt appear'd in the *Gentile* World. *Inde adeo per univerſa imperia, provincias, oppida, videmus ſingulos ſacrorum ritus gentiles habere, & Deos colere municipes*, ſaith *Cæcilius* in *Minutius Felix*. The great charge againſt the *Chriſtians* was *Novelliſm*, that they brought in a ſtrange and unheard of Religion. The common Queſtion was *Where was your Religion before* Jeſus *of* Nazareth? as it has been ſince, *Where was your Religion before* Luther? and the ſame anſwer which ſerv'd then, will ſtand unmoveable, *There, where no other Religion is, in the Word of* God. For this was the weapon whereby the Primitive *Chriſtians* defended themſelves againſt the aſſaults of *Paganiſm*, and the Evidences they brought that the Doctrine preach'd by them, and contain'd in the Scriptures, was originally from God, were the only means of overthrowing *Paganiſm*, notwithſtanding its pretended Univerſality. *Minut in Octa. p. 6.*

3. *Settlement by Laws of Heathen Worſhip.* This was ſo much pretended and pleaded for, that as far as we can find, by the Hiſtory of the Primitive Church, the pretence on which the *Chriſtians* ſuffer'd, was Sedition, and oppoſing the eſtabliſh'd Laws. The *Chriſtians* were reckon'd *inter illicitas factiones*, as appears by *Tertullian*, among *Unlawful Corporations*; the Politicians and Stateſmen were all for preſerving the Laws; they troubled not themſelves much about any Religion, but only That which was ſettled by Law they ſought to uphold, becauſe the acting contrary to it might bring ſome diſturbance to the civil State. There were ſeveral Laws which the *Chriſtians* were then brought under, and condemn'd for the breach of. 1. The Law againſt *Hetæriæ*, or *Conventicles*, as they were pleas'd frequently to ſtile the Meeting of *Chriſtians* together: thence the places where the *Chriſtians* aſſembled for worſhip, were commonly call'd *Conventicula*; *Ita appellabant loca*, ſaith *Heraldus, ubi congregabantur Chriſtiani oraturi, & verbi divini interpretationem accepturi, ac ſacras Synaxes habituri:* but *Elmenhorſtius* more ſhortly; *Conventicula loca ſunt ubi Chriſtiani congregati orare conſueverunt. The places where the Chriſtians did meet and pray together, were called Conventicles: in Baſilica Sicinnini ubi ritus Chriſtiani eſt conventiculum*, ſaith *Ammianus Marcellinus*; *cur immaniter conventicula dirui?* ſaith *Arnobius*; *qui univerſum populum cum ipſo pariter conventiculo concremavit*, as *Lactantius* likewiſe ſpeaks. Now the reaſon of the Name was, becauſe the *Tertull. Apol. c. 38.* *Herald. Obſervat. in Arnob. l. 4.* *Am. Marc. Hiſt. l. 27.* *Arnob. l. 4.* *Lactant. l. 5. c. 11.*

the Heathens judged these Assemblies of Christians to be illegal Societies. For which we are to understand; that in the time of the *Roman* Emperors, when they grew suspicious of their own safety, they severely prohibited all those *Sodalitia*, or Societies and Colleges, which were very much in use in the *Roman* Common-wealth, in imitation of the ἑταιρίαι in the Cities of *Greece*. These were such Societies of Persons, which voluntarily confederated together either for some particular design, or for preserving Love and Friendship among each other, and thence had their frequent Meetings in common together. Now the more numerous these were, and the more closely they confederated, the more jealous Eye the *Roman* Emperours had upon them, because of some Clandestine design, which they suspected might be carried on for disturbance of the public Peace in such suspicious Meetings. Thence came out many particular Edicts of the Emperours against all such kinds of Societies.

Now when the Christians began to be somewhat numerous, and had according to the Principles of their Religion frequent Assemblies for Divine worship, and did confederate together by such Symbols, of being washed with water, and eating and drinking together (which was all the Heathens apprehended by their use of Baptism, and the Lord's Supper) the Proconsuls and other Magistrates in their several Provinces bring the Christians under these Edicts, and so punish'd them for the breach of the Laws. Which as appears by *Pliny*'s Epistle to *Trajan* was the only account on which the wiser Heathens did proceed against the Christians; for we see he troubled not himself much about the Truth and Evidence of the Christian Religion, but such Persons were brought before him; and after he had Interrogated them whether they were Christians, or no, several times, if they persisted, he then punished them, not so much for their Religion, as for their obstinacy and contempt of Authority. For so much is imply'd in those words of his, *Neque enim dubitabam, qualecunque esset quod faterentur, pervicaciam certe, & inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri: That whatever their Religion was their obstinacy and disobedience deserved punishment.* That which the Christians now pleaded for themselves, why they shou'd not be reckon'd among the Factions of the People, was that which they gave to *Pliny*, that all their fault was, *Quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem convenire, carmenque Christo quasi Deo dicere secum invicem; seque sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent, ne depositum appellati abnegarent. That they were wont upon their solemn days to meet together for Divine Worship, and to covenant with each other only for the practice of those things which were as much for the good of Mankind as their own,* viz. *that they would not wrong and defraud others, as to their Bodies or Estates,* And *Tertullian* approves of the Law against Factions, as *de providentia & modestia publica, ne civitas in partes scinderetur,* as wisely intended to prevent Seditions; but withal pleads, that the Society of Christians cou'd not be reckon'd *inter illicitas factiones*; for saith he, *hæc coitio Christianorum merito sane illicita, si illicitis par; merito damnanda si quis de ea queritur eo titulo quo de factionibus querela est. In cujus perniciem aliquando convenimus? Hoc sumus congregati quod & dispersi; hoc universi quod & singuli; neminem lædentes, neminem contristantes; quum probi, quum boni coeunt, quum pii, quum casti congregantur, non est factio dicenda sed curia. If,* saith he, *the Societies of Christians were like others, there might be some*

Plin. Epist. l. 10. ep. 97.

Tertull. Apol. c. 38.

reason

reason to condemn them, under the head of Factions: but as long as we meet together for no Man's injury, that whether divided, or assembled, we are still the same, that we grieve and injure no body; when such a company of good Men meet together, it is rather a Council than a Faction.

2. Another Law the Christians were brought under, was, That against Innovations in Religion; thence it was laid so much to the charge of the Christians, that they did ζῆν παρανόμως, *go contrary to the establish'd Law*; as *Porphyry* said of *Origen*, because he was a Christian, he did χρηστιανῶς ζῆν καὶ παρανόμως; and when he speaks of *Ammonius* revolting from *Christianity* to *Paganism*, εὐθὺς πρὸς τὸν κατὰ νόμους πολιτείαν μετεβάλετο, *he turn'd to the way of Life, which was agreeable to the establish'd Laws.* Now Christianity was every where look'd on as a great Innovation, insomuch that the Christians were accused to be *legum, morum, naturæ inimici*, as *Enemies to Mankind as well as the Laws*, because they drew Men off from that way of Religion which Mankind had generally agreed in. Thence *Æmilianus* the Præfect of *Ægypt*, when he bids the Christians return to Paganism, he us'd these Expressions, ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τρέπεσθαι· ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, *to return to the common sense of Mankind, and to forget what was so much against it*, as he suppos'd Christianity to be. When *Paul* preach'd at *Athens*, his first Accusation was, that *he was a Preacher of strange Deities, because he preached to them Jesus and the Resurrection.* And *Demetrius* at *Ephesus* knew no such potent Argument against *Paul*, as that his Religion *destroyed the worship of* Diana, *whom all* Asia *and the world worship.* So that the Primitive Christians were then accounted the *Antipodes* to the whole World, on which account they were so severely dealt with; most Common-wealths observing the counsel of *Mæcenas* to *Augustus*, in *Dio*, to be sure to have a watchful eye upon all Innovations in Religion, because they tend so much to the disturbance of the Civil State.

Euseb. l. 6. Eccles. hist. cap. 19.

Tertull. Apol. c. 4.

Euseb. Eccl. hist. l. 7. c. 11.

Act. 17. 18. 19. 27.

3. The Law of Sacrilege. Thence *Lactantius* calls their Laws, *Constitutiones Sacrilegæ. Quin etiam sceleratissimi homicidæ contra pios jura impia condiderunt; nam & constitutiones Sacrilegæ, & disputationes Jurisperitorum leguntur injustæ*; and as he tells us, *Domitius Ulpianus* had collected all those *Rescripta nefaria* together, which concern'd the Christians; from hence it was, Christianity by *Pliny*, is called *amentia*, by *Tacitus exitiabilis superstitio*, by *Suetonius superstitio nova & exitiabilis*; so much did these three great Men agree, in condemning the best Religion in the World for madness, and new, and detestable Superstition; the ground of the great *pique* was the enmity declar'd by Christians against the Idolatrous Temples, and Worship of the Heathens.

Lactant. l. 5. c. 11.

Tacit. Ann. l. 15. Sueton in Nerone. Plin. Ep. l. 10. ep. 97.

4. The Law against Treason; for sometimes they proceeded so high, as to accuse the Christians *læsæ Majestatis*, and thence they are commonly called *publici hostes, enemies to all civil Government.* Which they inferred from hence: 1. *Because they would not sacrifice for the Emperour's safety*; *Ideo committimus*, saith *Tertullian*, *in Majestatem Imperatorum, quia illos non subjicimus rebus suis*; *Quia non ludimus de officio salutis eorum, qui eam non putamus in manibus esse plumbatis.* The Accusation for Treason lay in their refusing to supplicate the Idols for the Emperour's welfare. 2. *Because they would not swear by the Emperour's Genius.* Thence *Saturnius* said to the Martyr, *Tantum jura per genium Cæsaris nostri*, if he wou'd but swear by the *Genius* of *Cæsar*, he shou'd be saved. Yet tho' they refus'd to swear by the Emperour's *Genius*, they did not refuse to testify their Allegiance, and to swear by the Emperour's safety.

Tertull. Apol. 27. c. 35.

Ibid. c. 29

Herald. in Tertull. Apol. cap. 29.

Sed

Tertull. Apol c. 32. *Sed & juramus*, ſaith *Tertullian*, *ſicut non per genios Cæſarum, ita per ſalutem eorum quæ eſt auguſtior omnibus geniis.* 3. *Becauſe they would not worſhip the Emperours as Gods*; which was then grown a common Cuſtom.

Ibid. c. 33. *Non enim Deum Imperatorem dicam, vel quia mentiri neſcio, vel quia illum deridere non audeo, vel quia nec ipſe ſe Deum volet dici ſi homo ſit*, as the ſame Author ſpeaks. Nay the Primitive Chriſtians were very ſcrupulous of calling the Emperour *Dominus*, *hoc enim Dei eſt cognomen*, becauſe the name Lord was an Attribute of God's, and apply'd as his name to him in Scripture. The reaſon of this ſcrupuloſity was not, from any queſtion they made of the Sovereignty of Princes, or their obligation to obedience to them, (which they are very free in the acknowledgment of,) but from a jealouſie and juſt ſuſpicion that ſomething of Divine honour might be imply'd in it, when the Adoration of Princes was

Ibid. c. 34. grown a Cuſtom. Therefore *Tertullian* to prevent miſ-underſtandings, ſaith, *Dicam plane Imperatorem Dominum, ſed more Communi, ſed quando non cogor ut Dominum Dei vice dicam.* They refus'd not the name in a common ſenſe, but as it imply'd Divine honour.

5. *Becauſe they would not obſerve the public Feſtivals* of the Emperours in the way that others did, which it ſeems were obſerved with abundance of Looſeneſs and Debauchery by all ſorts of Perſons; and as *Ter-*

Ibid. c. 35. *tullian* ſmartly ſays, *Malorum morum licentia pietas erit; & occaſio luxuriæ religio deputabitur? Debauchery is accounted a piece of Loyalty, and Intemperance a part of Religion.* Which made the Chriſtians rather hazard the reputation of their Loyalty, than bear a part in ſo much Rudeneſs as was then us'd, and then they abhorred all the ſolemn ſpectacles

Tertull. cap. 38. of the *Romans*; *Nihil eſt nobis*, ſaith the ſame Author, *dictu, viſu, auditu, cum inſania Circi, cum impudicitia Theatri, cum atrocitate arenæ, cum Xyſti vanitate. They had nothing to do either with the madneſs of the Cirque, or the immodeſty of the Theatre, or the cruelty of the Amphitheatre, or the vanity of the public Wreſtlings.* We ſee then what a hard Province the Chriſtians had, when ſo many Laws were laid as Bird-lime in their way to catch them, that it was impoſſible for them to profeſs themſelves Chriſtians, and not to run into a *præmunire* by their Laws. And therefore it cannot be conceiv'd that many out of affection of Novelty ſhou'd then declare themſelves Chriſtians, when ſo great hazards were run upon the profeſſing of it. Few ſoft-ſpirited Men, and lovers of their own eaſe, but wou'd have found ſome fine diſtinctions and nice evacuations to have reconcil'd themſelves to the public Laws by ſuch things which the Primitive Chriſtians ſo unanimouſly refus'd, when tending to Prophaneneſs or Idolatry. And from this diſcourſe we cannot but

2 Cor. 10. 4, 5. conclude with the Apoſtle *Paul*, *That the weapons* whereby the Apoſtles and Primitive Chriſtians *encountred* the *Heathen world*, *were not fleſhly or weak*, but exceeding ſtrong and powerful, in that they obtain'd ſo great a conqueſt over the Imaginations and carnal Reaſonings of Men (which were their ſtrong holds they ſecur'd themſelves in) as to make them readily to forſake their Heathen worſhip, and become chearful Servants to Chriſt. Thus we ſee the power of the Doctrine of Chriſt, which prevail'd over the Principles of Education, tho' back'd with pretended Antiquity, Univerſality, and Eſtabliſhment by civil Laws.

XXII. But this will further appear if we conſider that not only the matters of Faith were contrary to the Principles of Education, but becauſe many of them ſeem'd incredible to Men's natural Reaſon; that we cannot think Perſons wou'd be over-forward to believe ſuch things. Every one

one being so ready to take any advantage against a Religion which did so little flatter corrupt Nature either as to its power or capacity; insomuch that those who preached this Doctrine, declar'd openly to the World, that such Persons who wou'd judge of the Christian Doctrine, by such principles which mere natural Reason did proceed upon (such a one I suppose it is whom the Apostle calls Ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος, one that own'd nothing but natural Reason, whereby to judge of Divine Truths) cou'd not entertain matters of Faith, or of Divine Revelation, because such things wou'd seem but folly to him that own'd no higher principle than Philosophy, or that did not believe any Divine Inspiration; neither can such a one know them, because a Divine Revelation is the only way to come to a thro' understanding of them: and a person who doth not believe such a Divine Revelation, it is impossible he shou'd be a competent judge of the truth of the Doctrine of Christ. So that the only ground of receiving the Doctrine of the Gospel is upon a Divine Revelation, that God himself by his Son and his Apostles, hath reveal'd these deep Mysteries to the World, on which account it is we are bound to receive them, altho' they go beyond our reach and comprehension. But we see generally in the Heathen World how few of those did believe the Doctrine of Christ in comparison, who were the great admirers of the Philosophy, and way of Learning which was then cry'd up: the reason was, because Christianity not only contain'd far deeper Mysteries than any they were acquainted with, but deliver'd them in such a way of Authority, commanding them to believe the Doctrine they preached on the account of the Divine Authority of the Revealers of it. Such a way of proposal of Doctrines to the World the Philosophy of the *Greeks* was unacquainted with, which on that account they deried, as not being suited to the exact method which their Sciences proceeded in. No doubt had the Apostles come among the *Greeks* μετὰ πολλῆς φαντασίας, with a *great deal of pomp and ostentation*, and had fed Mens curiosities with vain and unnecessary Speculations, they might have had as many Followers among the *Greeks* for their sakes, as Christ had among the *Jews* for the sake of the Loaves. But the matters of the Gospel being more of inward worth and moment, than of outward pomp and shew, the vain and empty *Greeks* presently find a quarrel with the manner of proposing them; that they came not in a way of clear demonstration, but stood so much upon Faith as soon as they were deliver'd. Thence *Celsus* and *Galen* think they have reason enough to reject the Laws of *Moses* and Christ, because *Celsus* calls them νόμους ἀναποδείκτους, *Galen Christianity* Διατεταγμένω ἀναποδείκτῳ, that they were such Doctrines which require Faith and Obedience, without giving Mens reason an account of the things commanded. As tho' the Authority of a *Legislator* sufficiently manifested, were not enough to inforce a Law, unless a sufficient account were given of the thing requir'd to the purblind Reason of every individual Person acted by passions and private interests, as to the Justice and Equity of it. And so the primary obligation on Man's part to Faith and Obedience, must arise not from the evidence of Divine Authority, but of the thing it self which is reveal'd, to the most partial judgment of every one to whom it is propos'd. Which those who know how short the stock of Reason is at the best in Men, and how easily that which is, is fashion'd and moulded according to prejudices and interests already entertain'd, will look upon only as a design to comply with the carnal desires of Men, in that thereby none

2 Cor. 2. 14.

Orig. l. 1. c. Cels. Gal. de diff. pulf. lib. 2. c. 4.

shall be bound to go any further, than this blind and corrupted Guide shall lead them. Now these being the terms on which the Gospel of Christ must have expected entertainment in the *Gentile* World, how impossible had it been ever to have found any success among Men, had there not been sufficient Evidence giving by a power of Miracles, that however strange and incredible the Doctrine might seem, yet it was to be believ'd, because there was sufficient means to convince Men that it was of Divine Revelation.

XXIII. Neither were the matters of Faith only contrary to the inclinations of the World, but so were the precepts of Life, or those things in Christianity which concern'd practice. These are two things which are the main scope and design of Christianity in reference to Mens Lives, and to take them off from their Sins, and from the World; and of all things these are they which Mens hearts are so bewitch'd with. Now the
Matt. 5. 8. precepts of the Gospel are such which require the greatest *purity of heart*
16, 24. Tit. 2. 12. *and life*, which call upon Men *to deny themselves, and all ungodliness, and*
2 Tim. 2. 19. *worldly lusts, and to live soberly, and righteously, and godly in this present*
2 Cor 7. 1. *world*; that, *all that name the name of Christ must depart from iniquity*; that, *all true Christians must be cleansed from all filthiness of flesh and spirit, and must perfect holiness in the fear of God.* And the Gospel inforceth these precepts of Holiness with the most terrible Denunciations of the
2 Thes. 1. 7, 8. wrath of God on those who disobey them; that, *the Lord Jesus Christ shall be revealed from Heaven with his mighty Angels in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of*
Rom. 1. 18. *Jesus Christ.* That, *the wrath of God is revealed from Heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteous-*
1 Cor. 6. 9. 10. *ness.* That, no persons who live in the habitual practice of any known
Gal. 4. 20. Ephes. 5. 5, 6. sin, *shall inherit the Kingdom of God.* That, *no man should deceive them with vain words, for because of these things comes the wrath of God upon the Children of disobedience*; that Men do but vainly flatter themselves when they seek to reconcile unholy Lives with the hopes of fu-
Heb. 12. 14. ture Happiness; for *without holiness no man shall see the Lord.* And then in reference to the things of this present Life which Men busie themselves
1 Joh. 2. 14. so much about, the Gospel declares, that *they who love this world, the love of the Father is not in them*; that, *the friendship of this world is en-*
Jam. 4. 4. *mity with God*; *and whosoever will be a friend of the world is an enemy to*
Col. 3. 1, 2. *God*: That *Christians must not set their affections on Earth, but on the*
Phil. 3. 20. *things in Heaven*; That *the conversation of true Christians is in Heaven.*
Matt. 6. 20. That we ought not to *lay up our treasure on Earth, but in Heaven*; That,
2 Cor. 4. 18. *we must not look at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen*; *for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.* Now the whole design of the Doctrine of Christ being to persuade Men to lead a Holy and Heavenly Life while they are
Col. 1. 12. in this World, and thereby to *be made meet to be partakers of the inheritance with the Saints in light*, can we think so many Men whose hearts were wedded to Sin, and the World cou'd so suddenly be brought off from both without a Divine Power accompanying that Doctrine which
Rom. 1. 16. was preached to them? And therefore the Apostle saith, οὐκ ἐπαισχύνομαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ, *I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ*; i. e. tho' the Gospel of Christ be the only true Mystery, yet I do not by it as the Heathens are wont to do with their famous *Eleusinian* Mysteries, which were kept so secret by all the *Mystæ* and ἐπόπται; but saith he, *I know no reason I have to be ashamed of any thing in the Gospel, that I*

should

ſhould labour its concealment to advance its veneration; but the more public the Goſpel is, the more it manifeſts its power; for thro' it God is pleas'd mightily to work, in order to the Salvation both of *Jew* and *Gentile*. And of all the ſucceſs of the Goſpel, that upon the Hearts and Lives of Men deſerves the greateſt conſideration.

The great Efficacy and Power of the Goſpel was abundantly ſeen in that great alteration which it wrought in all thoſe who were the hearty embracers of it. The Philoſophers did very frequently and deſervedly complain of the great inefficacy of all their Moral Precepts upon the minds of Men, and that by all their Inſtructions, *politiora non meliora, ingenia fiunt*, Men improv'd more in Knowledge than Goodneſs; but now *Chriſtianity* not only inforced Duties on Men with greater Power and Authority: For the Scriptures do, as Saint *Auſtin* ſpeaks, *Non tanquam ex Philoſophorum concertationibus ſtrepere, ſed tanquam ex oraculis Dei nubibus intonare*, not make ſome obſtreperous clamours, like thoſe *tinkling Cymbals*, the Philoſophers, but awe the Souls of Men with the Majeſty of that God from whom they came. Neither was it only a great and empty ſound which was heard in the Preaching of the Goſpel; but when God thundred therein, he broke down the *ſtately Cedars* and *ſhook the Wilderneſs*, and *made the Hinds to calve*, (as it is ſaid of Thunder, call'd the *Voice of the Lord* in Scripture,) he humbl'd the Pride of Men, unſettled the Gentile World from its former foundations, and wrought great alterations on all thoſe who hearkened to it. The whole deſign of the Goſpel is couched in thoſe words which Saint *Paul* tells us were ſpoken to him by Chriſt himſelf, when he appointed him to be an Apoſtle, *to open Mens eyes, and to turn them from darkneſs to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveneſs of ſins, and inheritance among them which were ſanctified by faith in Chriſt.* And the efficacy of this Doctrine in order to theſe great ends, was abundantly ſeen in the preaching of that Apoſtle, who was ſo inſtrumental in converting the World to piety and ſobriety, as well as to the Doctrine of *Chriſt*. What ſtrange Perſons were the *Corinthians* before they became *Chriſtians!* for when the Apoſtle had enumerated many of the vileſt Perſons of the World, he preſently adds, *And ſuch were ſome of you; but ye are waſhed, but ye are ſanctified, but ye are juſtified in the name of the Lord Jeſus, and by the ſpirit of our God.* The more dangerous the diſtemper is, the more malignant its nature; the more inveterate its continuance, the greater the Efficacy of the remedy which works a cure of it. The power of Grace is the more ſeen in converſion, the greater the ſins have been before it. It is an eaſy matter in compariſon to remove a diſeaſe at its firſt on-ſet, of what it is to cure it when it becomes Chronical. The power of the Goſpel wrought upon all ſorts and kinds of Perſons, to manifeſt to the World there was no diſtemper of Men's Souls ſo great, but there was a poſſibility of a Remedy for it; and not only ſo, but pregnant and viſible inſtances were given of the Power and Efficacy of it. *For they themſelves ſhew of us*, ſaith the Apoſtle, *what manner of entring in we had among you, and how ye turned to God from Idols, to ſerve the living and true God, and to wait for his Son from Heaven, whom he raiſed from the dead, even* Jeſus, *which delivered us from the wrath to come.* Now that which manifeſts the exceeding great power and excellency of the Goſpel, was, that it not only turn'd Men from one way of worſhip to another, which is a matter of no great difficulty, but that it turn'd Men together with that from their Luſts and Senſuality, to a

Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, l. 2. c. 19.

Pſal. 29. 5, 8, 9.

Act. 26. 18.

1 Cor. 6. 10, 11.

1 Theſſ. 1. 9, 10.

holy and unblameable Life. For Men being more in love with their Sins, than with their Opinions, it must needs be a greater Power which draws Men from the practice of habitual Sins, than that which only makes them change their Opinions, or alter the way of worship they were brought up in. This is that which *Origen* throughout his Books against *Celsus* triumphs in as the most signal Evidence of a Divine power in the Doctrine of Christ, that it wrought so great an alteration on all that truly embraced it, that of vicious, debauched, and dissolute, it made them temperate, sober, and religious, ὅτι τοσούτους ἀνθρώπους ἐπιστρέφει ἀπὸ τῆς χύσεως τῶν κακῶν, ἐπὶ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν μετὰ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν βίον. *The Doctrine of Christ did convert the most wicked Persons who embraced it, from all their debaucheries, to a life most sutable to Nature and Reason, and to the practice of all Vertues.* Therefore certainly the Gospel cou'd not want that commendation among all ingenuous Moralists, that it was the most excellent instrument in the World to reform the lives of Men, and to promote real goodness in it. When they cou'd not but take notice of so many Persons continually so brought off from their follies and vain conversations, to a life serious, sober, and unblameable; nay and some of the *Christians* were of so much integrity and goodness, that their greatest Enemies were forced to say that their only fault was, that they were *Christians*. *Bonus vir Caius Sejus, tantum quod Christianus. A very good man, only a Christian.* But one wou'd think this shou'd have made them have a higher opinion of *Christianity*, when it did so suddenly make so many Men good in the World. Especially when this power was so manifest on such Persons who were suppos'd uncapable of being reform'd by Philosophy, young, illiterate, and mean-spirited Persons; therefore it may be justly suppos'd that it was not by the strength of their own Reason that this alteration was wrought within them, but by that Divine power which was able to tame the most unruly; to instruct the most ignorant, to raise up the most sordid Persons to such a Generous temper, as to slight the good things of this life, in comparison with those to come. And so remarkable was the difference of life then between those that were *Christians*, and those who were not (as there is still between true *Christians*, and mere Pretenders) that *Origen* dares *Celsus* to compare them in point of Morality with any other Societies in the World. αἱ γὰρ τοῦ θεοῦ Χριστῷ καθηλευθεῖσαι ἐκκλησίαι, συνεξεταζόμεναι ταῖς ὧν παροικοῦσι δήμων ἐκκλησίαις, ὡς φωστῆρές εἰσιν ἐν κόσμῳ· τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσαι καὶ τοὺς χείρους τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, καὶ συγχρήσει βελτιόνων ἐλάττους, πολλῶν κρείττους τυγχάνειν τῶν ἐν τοῖς δήμοις ἐκκλησιῶν; *For the Churches of* God, *which are discipled to* Christ, *being compared with other Societies, shine among them like lights in the world. For who can but confess, that even the worser part of the Christian Churches exceeds the best of the popular Assemblies? For,* as he goes on, *the Church of* God *which is at* Athens, *that is* πραεῖά τις καὶ εὐσταθὴς, *very quiet and peaceable, because it seeks to approve it self to* God; *but the popular Assembly at* Athens, *that is* στασιώδης, *seditious and quarelsome, and in nothing comparable to the Church of* God *there. So it is, if we compare the Churches of* Corinth *and* Alexandria *with the Assemblies of the People there.* So that any candid Inquirer after Truth will exceedingly wonder (how such fair Islands shou'd appear *nantes in gurgite vasto*, in the midst of such a Sea of wickedness as it was in those Cities) how these *Churches* of God shou'd be planted in such rude and profane places. So the same Author goes on to compare the Church's State with that of the Cities, the Church's Officers with theirs;

Origen. c. Celsum, l. 2. p. 78. 85 lib. 1. p. 21.

Orig. contr. Cels. l. 3. p. 128.

theirs; and appeals to themſelves, that even thoſe among them who were moſt luke-warm in their Office, did yet far exceed all the City-Magiſtrates in all manner of Vertues. From whence he rationally concludes, εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πῶς οὐκ εὔλογον μὲν νομίζειν περὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοσαῦτα συστῆσαι δεδυνημένου, ὅτι οὐκ ἡ τυχοῦσα, θειότης ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ; *If theſe things be ſo, how can it but be moſt rational to adore the Divinity of* Jeſus, *who was able to accompliſh ſuch great things?* And that not upon one or two, but upon ſuch great multitudes as were then converted to the *Chriſtian Faith.* We read of one *Phædon*, and one *Polemon* brought from their debaucheries by *Socrates* and *Xenocrates*, but what are theſe compar'd with thoſe who were turn'd from their Sins to God by the Goſpel of Chriſt! καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, εἷς τις Φαίδων καὶ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ δεύτερος, καὶ εἷς Πολέμων, μεταβαλόντες ἀπὸ ἀσώτου καὶ μοχθεροτάτου βίου, ἐφιλοσόφησαν· παρὰ δὲ τῷ Ἰησοῦ οὐ μόνοι τότε οἱ δώδεκα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καὶ πολλαπλασίους, &c. *The twelve Apoſtles were but the firſt-fruits of that plentiful Harveſt of Converts which followed afterwards.* And altho' *Celſus* (like an *Epicurean*) ſeems to deny the poſſibility of any ſuch thing as Converſion, becauſe cuſtomary ſins become a ſecond Nature, that no puniſhments can reform them; *Yet*, ſaith *Origen*, *herein he not only contradicts us* Chriſtians, *but all ſuch as were* γενναίως φιλοσοφήσαντες, *who own'd any generous principles of Philoſophy, and did not deſpair of recovering vertue, as a thing feaſible by humane nature*; and gives inſtances *ad hominem*, to prove the poſſibility of the thing from the ancient Heroes, *Hercules*, and *Ulyſſes*, from the two Philoſophers, *Socrates* and *Muſonius*, and the two famous Converts to Philoſophy, *Phædon* and *Polemon*. *But yet*, ſaith he, *theſe are not ſo much to be wondred at, that the eloquence and reaſon of the Philoſophers ſhou'd prevail on ſome very few perſons, but that the mean and contemptible language of the Apoſtles ſhou'd convert ſuch multitudes from intemperance to ſobriety, from injuſtice to fair-dealing, from cowardice to the higheſt conſtancy, yea ſo great as to lay down their lives for the ſake of virtue; how can we but admire ſo Divine a Power as was ſeen in it? And therefore*, ſaith he, *we conclude*, ὅτι τῷ θείῳ λόγῳ ἀμείψαι κακίαν φυσιώσασάν ἐστιν οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐ πανὺ χαλεπόν, *That it is ſo far from being impoſſible, that it is not at all difficult for corrupt nature to be chang'd by the Word of* God. *Lactantius* excellently manifeſts that Philoſophy cou'd never do ſo much good in the World as *Chriſtianity* did, becauſe that was not ſuted at all to common capacities, and did require ſo much skill in the Arts to prepare Men for it, which it is impoſſible all ſhou'd be well skill'd in, which yet are as capable of being happy, as any others are. And how inefficacious the Precepts of Philoſophy were, appears by the Philoſophers themſelves, who were far from having command by them over their maſterleſs paſſions, and were fain ſometimes to confeſs that Nature was too head-ſtrong to be kept in by ſuch weak Reins as the Precepts of Philoſophy were: *But*, ſaith he, *what great command Divine Precepts have upon the Souls of Men, daily experience ſhews. Da mihi virum qui ſit iracundus, maledicus, effrenatus; pauciſſimis Dei verbis, tam placidum quam ovem reddam. Da cupidum, avarum, tenacem; jam tibi eum liberalem dabo, & pecuniam ſuam plenis manibus largientem. Da timidum doloris ac mortis; jam cruces, & ignes, & taurum contemnet. Da libidinoſum, adulterum, ganeonem; jam ſobrium, caſtum, continentem videbis. Da crudelem, & ſanguinis appetentem; jam in veram clementiam furor ille mutabitur. Da injuſtum, inſipientem, peccatorem; continuo & æquus, & prudens, & innocens erit.* In which words that elegant Writer doth by a Rhetorical

Origen. l. 1. p. 50.

Origen. l. 3. p. 150.

Lactant. de falſ. ſap. l. 3. c. 25.

Cap. 26.

Rhetorical Scheme ſet out the remarkable alteration which was in any who became true *Chriſtians*, that altho' they were paſſionate, covetous fearful, luſtful, cruel, unjuſt, vicious, yet upon their being *Chriſtians*, they became mild, liberal, courageous, temperate, merciful, juſt and unblameable; which never any were brought to by mere Philoſophy, which rather teacheth the Art of Concealing vices than of healing them. But now when *Chriſtianity* was ſo effectual in the cure of thoſe diſtempers, which Philoſophy gave over as beyond its skill and power, when it cur'd them with ſo great ſucceſs, and that not in a *Paracelſian* way, for then to relapſe afterwards with greater violence, but it did ſo throughly unſettle the *fomes morbi*, that it ſhou'd never gather to ſo great a head again; doth not this argue a power more than Philoſophical, and that cou'd be no leſs than Divine Power which tended ſo much to reform the World, and to promote true goodneſs in it?

XXIV. Thus we have conſider'd the contrariety of the Doctrine of *Chriſt* to Mens Natural Inclinations, and yet the ſtrange ſucceſs it had in the World, which in the laſt place will appear yet more ſtrange, when we add the almoſt *continual oppoſition it met with from worldly power and policy*. Had it been poſſible for a cunningly-deviſed fable, or any mere contrivance of Impoſtors to have prevail'd in the World, when the moſt potent and ſubtile Perſons bent their whole Wits and Deſigns for ſuppreſſing it? Whatever it were in others, we are ſure of ſome of the *Roman* Emperours, as *Julian* and *Diocleſian*, that it was their Maſter-deſign to root out and aboliſh *Chriſtianity*; and was it only the ſubtilty of the *Chriſtians* which made theſe Perſons give over their work in deſpair of accompliſhing it? If the *Chriſtians* were ſuch ſubtile Men, whence came all their Enemies to agree in one common calumny, that they were a company of poor, weak, ignorant, inconſiderable Men? and if they were ſo, how came it to paſs that by their power and wiſdom they cou'd never exterminate theſe Perſons; but as they cut them down, they grew up the faſter, and multiply'd by their ſubſtraction of them? There was ſomething then certainly peculiar in *Chriſtianity*, from all other Doctrines, that it not only was not advanc'd by any civil power, but it got ground by the Oppoſition it met with in the World. And therefore it is an obſervable circumſtance, that the firſt Chriſtian Emperour (who acted as Emperour for *Chriſtianity*) viz. *Conſtantine* (for otherwiſe I know what may be ſaid for *Philippus*) did not appear in the World 'till *Chriſtianity* had ſpread it ſelf over moſt parts of the habitable World. God thereby letting us ſee, that tho' the civil Power, when become Chriſtian, might be very uſeful for protecting *Chriſtianity*, yet that he ſtood in no need at all of it, as to the Propagation of it abroad in the World. But we ſee it was quite otherwiſe in that Religion which had *Mars* its Aſcendant, viz. *Mahometiſm*: For like *Paracelſus* his *Dæmon*, it always ſat upon the pummel of the Sword, and made its way in the World merely by force and violence; and as its firſt conſtitution had much of Blood in it, ſo by it hath it been fed and nouriſh'd ever ſince. But it was quite otherwiſe with the *Chriſtian* Religion, it never thriv'd better than in the moſt barren places, nor triumph'd more, than when it ſuffer'd moſt; nor ſpread it ſelf further, than when it encounter'd the greateſt Oppoſition. Becauſe therein was ſeen the great force and efficacy of the Doctrine of Chriſt, that it bore up Mens Spirits under the greateſt miſeries of Life, and made them with cheerfulneſs to undergo the moſt exquiſite torments

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which the cruelty of Tyrants cou'd invent. The *Stoics* and *Epicureans* Boaſt, that their wiſe Man wou'd be happy in the Bull of *Phalaris*, were but empty and *Thraſonical* words, which none wou'd venture the truth of by an experiment upon themſelves. It was the *Chriſtian* alone, and not the *Epicurean*, that cou'd truly ſay in the midſt of torments, *Suave eſt & nihil curo*, and might juſtly alter a little of that common ſaying of the *Chriſtians*, and ſay, *Non magna loquimur, ſed patimur*, as well as *vivimus*; *The* Chriſtians *did not ſpeak great things, but do and ſuffer them.* And this gain'd not only great reputation of integrity to themſelves, but much advanc'd the honour of their Religion in the World, when it was ſo apparently ſeen, that no force or power was able to withſtand it. Will not this at leaſt perſuade you that our Religion is true and from God, ſaith *Arnobius? Quod cum genera pœnarum tanta ſint a vobis propoſita Religionis hujus ſequentibus leges, augeatur res magis, & contra omnes minas atque interdicta formidinum animoſius populus obnitatur, & ad credendi ſtudium, prohibitionis ipſius ſtimulis excitetur? —— Itane iſtud non divinum & ſacrum eſt, aut ſine Deo, eorum tantas animorum fieri converſiones, ut cum carnifices unci, aliique innumeri cruciatus, quemadmodum diximus, impendeant crediturus, veluti quadam dulcedine, atque omnium virtutum amore correpti, cognitas accipiant rationes, atque mundi omnibus rebus præponant amicitias Chriſti? That no fears, penalties, or torments, were able to make a* Chriſtian *alter his profeſſion, but he wou'd rather bid adieu to his life than to his Saviour.* This *Origen* likewiſe frequently takes notice of, when *Celſus* had objected the Novelty of *Chriſtianity*; *The more wonderful it is* (ſaith *Origen*) *that in ſo ſhort a time it ſhou'd ſo largely ſpread it ſelf in the World; for if the cure of Mens Bodies be not wrought without Divine Providence, how much leſs the cure of ſo many thouſands of Souls which have been converted at once to Humanity and* Chriſtianity, *eſpecially when all the Powers of the World were from the firſt engaged to hinder the progreſs of this Doctrine, and yet notwithſtanding all this oppoſition,* ἐνίκησε, μὴ πεφυκὼς κωλύεσθαι ὡς λόγος Θεοῦ καὶ γενόμενος πασέων ἀνταγωνιστῶν ἰσχυρότερος, πάσης μὲν Ἑλλάδος, ἐπὶ πλεῖον δὲ τῆς βαρβάρου ἐκράτησε, καὶ μετεποίησε ψυχὰς ὅσας ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν καθ' αὐτὸν θεοσέβειαν, *The Word of* God *prevail'd, as not being able to be ſtopt by Men, and became Maſter over all its enemies, and not only ſpread it ſelf quite thro'* Greece, *but thro' a great part of the World beſides, and converted an innumerable company of Souls to the true worſhip and ſervice of* God. Thus we have now manifeſted from all the circumſtances of the propagation of the Doctrine of Chriſt, what evidence there was of a Divine Power accompanying of it, and how uſeful the firſt Miracles were in order to it.

Arnob. l. 2. c. gentes.

Origen. l. 1. c. Celſ. p. 21. Vid. etiam l. 2. p. 110.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

The difference of true Miracles from falſe.

I. *The unreaſonableneſs of rejecting the Evidence from Miracles, becauſe of Impoſtures. That there are certain rules of diſtinguiſhing true Miracles from falſe, and Divine from Diabolical, prov'd from God's intention in giving a power of Miracles, and the Providence of God in the World.* II. *The inconvenience of taking away the rational grounds of Faith, and placing it on ſelf-evidence. Of the ſelf-evidence of the Scriptures, and the Inſufficiency of that for reſolving the queſtion about the Authority of the Scriptures.* III. *Of the pretended Miracles of Impoſtors and falſe Chriſts, as* Barchochebas, David *el*-David *and others.* IV. *The rules whereby to judge true Miracles from falſe.* 1. *True Divine Miracles are wrought to confirm a Divine Teſtimony.* V. *No Miracles neceſſary for the certain conveyance of a Divine Teſtimony: prov'd from the Evidences that the Scriptures cou'd not be corrupted.* VI. 2. *No Miracles Divine which contradict Divine Revelation. Of Popiſh Miracles.* VII. 3. *Divine Miracles leave Divine Effects on thoſe who believe them. Of the Miracles of* Simon Magus. VIII. 4. *Divine Miracles tend to the overthrow of the Devil's power in the World: the Antipathy of the Doctrine of Chriſt to the Devil's deſign in the World.* IX. 5. *The diſtinction of true Miracles from others, from the circumſtances and manner of their operation. The Miracles of Chriſt compar'd with thoſe of the Heathen Gods.* X. 6. *God makes it evident to all impartial judgments, that Divine Miracles exceed Created power. This manifeſted from the unparallell'd Miracles of* Moſes *and our Saviour. From all which the rational evidence of Divine Revelation is manifeſted, as to the Perſons whom God imploys to teach the World.*

I. HAving thus far ſtated the caſes wherein Miracles may juſtly be expected as a rational Evidence of Divine Authority in the Perſons whom God imploys by way of peculiar meſſage to the World, and in the proſecution of this diſcourſe manifeſted the Evidences of Divine Authority in *Moſes* and the Prophets, and in our Saviour and his Apoſtles; the only remaining queſtion concerning this ſubject, is, *How we may certainly diſtinguiſh true and real Miracles from ſuch as are only pretended and counterfeit?* For it being as evident that there have been Impoſtures and Deluſions in the World as real Miracles, the minds of Men will be wholly to ſeek when to rely upon the Evidence of Miracles as an Argument of Divine Authority in thoſe perſons who do them, unleſs a way be found out to diſtinguiſh them from each other. But

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if we can make it appear, that, unleſs Men thro' weakneſs of Judgment or Incogitancy deceive themſelves, they may have certain Evidence of the truth of Miracles, then there can be nothing wanting as to the eſtabliſhment of their Minds in the truth of that Doctrine which is confirm'd by them. There hath been nothing which hath made Men of better Affections than Underſtandings, ſo ready to ſuſpect the ſtrength of the Evidence from Miracles concerning Divine Teſtimony, as the multitude of Impoſtures in the World under the name of Miracles, and that the Scripture it ſelf tells us we muſt not hearken to ſuch as come with lying wonders. But may we not therefore ſafely rely on ſuch Miracles which we have certain Evidence cou'd not be wrought but by Divine Power, becauſe forſooth the Devil may ſometimes abuſe the ignorance and credulity of unwary Men? or is it becauſe the Scripture forbids us to believe ſuch as ſhou'd come with a pretence of Miracles, therefore we cannot rely on the Miracles of Chriſt himſelf? Which is as much as to ſay, becauſe the Scripture tells us that we muſt not believe every Spirit, therefore we muſt believe none at all; or becauſe we muſt not entertain any other Doctrine beſide the Goſpel, therefore we have no reaſon to believe that. For the ground whereby we are aſſur'd by the Scriptures, that the Teſtimony of Chriſt was Divine, and therefore his Doctrine true, is becauſe it was confirm'd by ſuch Miracles as he did; now if that Argument were inſufficient which the Scriptures tell us was the great Evidence of Chriſt's being ſent from God, we cannot give our ſelves a ſufficient account in point of Evidence, on which we believe the Doctrine of the Goſpel to be true and Divine. But the only rational pretence of any ſcruple in this caſe muſt be ſuppos'd uncertainty in our Rules of judging concerning the nature of Miracles; for there be no certain κριτήρια, or notes of difference, whereby to know Divine Miracles from Deluſions of Senſes and the Impoſtures of the Devil. I muſt confeſs that there is an apparent inſufficiency in the Evidence from Miracles; but if there be any certain Rules of proceeding in this caſe, we are to blame nothing but our Incredulity, if we be not ſatisfy'd by them. For the full clearing of this, I ſhall firſt *make it appear that there may be certain Evidence found out, whereby we may know true Miracles from falſe, and Divine from Diabolical.* And, Secondly, *Inquire into thoſe things which are the main notes of difference between them.* Firſt, *That there may be certain Evidence whereby to know the truth of Miracles.* I ſpeak not of the difference *ex parte rei* between Miracles, and thoſe called Wonders, as that the one exceeds the power of created Agents, and the other doth not; for this leaves the Inquirer as far to ſeek for ſatisfaction as ever; for granting that by a Divine Power is ſeen in one, and not in the other, he muſt needs be ſtill diſſatisfy'd, unleſs it can be made evident to him that ſuch things are from Divine Power and others cannot be. Now the main diſtinction being placed here in the natures of the things abſtractly conſider'd, and not as they bear any Evidence to our Underſtandings, inſtead of reſolving doubts it increaſeth more; for, as for inſtance, in the caſe of the *Magicians* Rods turning into Serpents, as well as *Moſes*'s; what ſatisfaction cou'd this yield to any Spectator, to tell him, that in the one there was a Divine Power, and not in the other, unleſs it were made appear by ſome Evidence from the thing, that the one was a mere Impoſture, and the other a real Alteration in the thing it ſelf? Itake it then for granted, that no general diſcourſes concerning the formal difference of Miracles and Wonders conſider'd in them-

ſelves, can afford any rational ſatisfaction to an inquiſitive Mind; that which alone is able to give it, muſt be ſomething which may be diſcern'd by any judicious and conſiderative Perſon. And that God never gives to any a power of Miracles, but he gives ſome ſuch ground of ſatisfaction concerning them, will appear upon theſe two conſiderations.

1. *From God's intention in giving to any this power of doing Miracles.* We have largely made it manifeſt that the end of true Miracles is to be a confirmation to the World of the Divine Commiſſion of the Perſons who have it, and that the Teſtimony is Divine which is confirm'd by it. Now if there be no way to know when Miracles are true or falſe, this power is to no purpoſe at all; for Men are as much to ſeek for Satisfaction, as if there had been no ſuch things at all. Therefore if Men are bound to believe a Divine Teſtimony, and to rely on the Miracles wrought by the Perſons bringing it, as an Evidence of it, they muſt have ſome aſſurance that theſe Miracles cou'd not come from any but a Divine Power.

2. *From the Providence of God in the World*; which if we own, we cannot imagine that God wou'd permit the Devil, whoſe only deſign is to ruin Mankind, to abuſe the credulity of the World ſo far, as to have his lying Wonders paſs uncontroul'd; which they muſt do, if nothing can be found out as a certain difference between ſuch things as are only of Diabolical, and ſuch as are of Divine Power. If then it may be diſcover'd that there is a malignant Spirit which acts in the World and doth produce ſtrange things, either we muſt impute all ſtrange things to him, which muſt be to attribute to him an infinite Power, or elſe that there is a Being infinitely perfect which croſſeth this malignant Spirit in his Deſigns; and if ſo, we cannot imagine he ſhou'd ſuffer him to uſurp ſo much Tyranny over the minds of Men, as to make thoſe things paſs in the more ſober and inquiſitive part of the World for Divine Miracles, which were only Counterfeits and impoſtures. If then the Providence of God be ſo deeply engaged in the diſcovering the deſigns of Satan, there muſt be ſome means of this diſcovery, and that means can be ſuppos'd to be no other in this caſe, but ſome rational and ſatisfactory Evidence, whereby we may know when ſtrange and miraculous things are done by Satan to deceive Men, and when by a Divine Power to confirm a Divine Teſtimony.

II. But how is it poſſible, ſay ſome, that Miracles ſhou'd be any ground on which to believe a Teſtimony Divine when Chriſt himſelf hath told us, *That there ſhall ariſe falſe Chriſts, and falſe Prophets, and ſhall ſhew great ſigns and wonders; inſomuch that if it were poſſible they ſhould deceive the very elect?* and the Apoſtle tells us *that the coming of Antichriſt will be with all power and ſigns, and lying wonders.* How then can we fix on Miracles as an Evidence of Divine Teſtimony, when we ſee they are common to good and bad Men, and may ſeal indifferently either Truth or Falſhood? To this I reply;

Mat. 24. 24.

2 Theſ. 2. 9.

1. Men are guilty of doing no ſmall diſſervice to the Doctrine of Chriſt, when upon ſuch weak and frivolous pretences they give ſo great an advantage to Infidelity, as to call in queſtion the validity of that which yielded ſo ample a Teſtimony to the truth of Chriſtian Religion. For if once the rational grounds on which we believe the Doctrine of Chriſt to be true and Divine, be taken away, and the whole evidence of the Truth of it be laid on things not only derided by Men of Atheiſti-

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cal Spirits, but in themſelves ſuch as cannot be diſcern'd or judg'd of by any but themſelves; upon what grounds can we proceed to convince an Unbeliever that the Doctrine which we believe is true? If they tell him, *That as light and fire manifeſt themſelves, ſo doth the Doctrine of the Scripture* to thoſe who believe it; it will be ſoon reply'd, that Self-evidence in a matter of Faith can imply nothing but either a firm perſuaſion of the Mind concerning the thing propounded; or elſe that there are ſuch clear Evidences in the thing its ſelf, that none who freely uſe their Reaſon can deny it. The firſt can be no Argument to any other perſon any further than the authority of the perſon who declares it to have ſuch Self-evidence to him, doth extend it ſelf over the mind of the other; and to ones ſelf it ſeems a ſtrange way of arguing, *I believe the Scripturers becauſe they are true, and they are true becauſe I believe them*; for Self-evidence implies ſo much, if by it be meant the perſuaſion of the Mind, that the thing is true: But if by ſelf-evidence be further meant ſuch clear Evidence in the matter propounded, that all who do conſider it, muſt believe it; I then further inquire whether this Evidence doth lie in the naked propoſal of the things to the Underſtanding; and if ſo, then every one who aſſents to this Propoſition, that the whole is greater than the part, muſt likewiſe aſſent to this, that the Scripture is the Word of God; or whether doth the Evidence lie, not in the naked Propoſal, but in the efficacy of the Spirit of God, on the minds of thoſe to whom it is propounded. Then, 1. The Self-evidence is taken off from the written Word which was the object, and remov'd to a quite different thing which is the efficient cauſe. 2. Whether then any Perſons who want this efficacious operation of the Spirit of God, are or can be bound to believe the Scriptures to be God's Word? If they are bound, the duty muſt be propounded in ſuch a way as may be ſufficient to convince them that it is their duty; but if all the Evidence of the Truth of the Scripture lie on this Teſtimony of the Spirit, then ſuch as want this, can have none at all. But if, laſtly, by this Self-evidence be meant ſuch an impreſs of God's authority on the Scriptures, that any who conſider them as they ought, cannot but diſcern; I ſtill further inquire, whether this impreſs lies in the poſitive aſſertions in Scripture that they are from God, and that cannot be unleſs it be made appear to be impoſſible that any Writing ſhou'd pretend to be from God when it is not; or elſe in the written Books of Scripture, and then let it be made appear that any one merely by the evidence of the Writings themſelves without any further Arguments can pronounce the *Proverbs* to be the word of God, and not the Book of *Wiſdom*; and *Eccleſiaſtes* to be Divinely inſpir'd, and not *Eccleſiaſticus*: or elſe the Self-evidence muſt be in the excellency of the Matters which are reveal'd in Scripture; but this ſtill falls very ſhort of reſolving wholly the queſtion, whether *the Scripture be the Word of God?* For the utmoſt that this can reach to is, that the things contain'd in Scripture are of ſo high and excellent a nature, that we cannot conceive that any other ſhou'd be the Author of them but God himſelf; all which being granted, I am as far to ſeek as ever what grounds I have to believe that thoſe particular Writings which we call the Scripture are the Word of God, or that God did immediately imploy ſuch and ſuch Perſons to write ſuch and ſuch Books: for I may believe the ſubſtance of the Doctrine to be of God, and yet not believe the Books wherein it is contain'd, to be a divine and infallible Teſtimony; as is evident in the many excellent Devotional Books which are in the World.

But yet further, if the only ground on which we are to believe a Doctrine Divine be the Self-evidencing Light, and power of it, then I suppose there was the same ground of believing a Divine Testimony when the Doctrine was declar'd without Writing, by the first Preachers of it. So that by this method of proceeding, the ground of believing Christ to be sent as the *Messias* sent from God, must be wholly and solely resolv'd into this, that there was so much Self-evidence in this proposition utter'd by Christ, *I am the light of the World*, that all the *Jews* had been bound to have believ'd him sent from God, (for light manifests its self,) altho' our Saviour had never done any one Miracle, to make it appear that he came from God. And we cannot but charge our Saviour on this account with being at a very unnecessary expence upon the World in doing so many Miracles, when the bare naked affirmation that he was the *Messias*, had been sufficient to have convinced the whole World. But is it conceivable then upon what account our Saviour shou'd lay so much force on the Miracles done by himself in order to
Joh. 5. 36. the proving his Testimony to be Divine, that he saith himself, *That he had a greater witness than that of* John, (who yet doubtless had Self-evidencing light going along with his Doctrine too,) *for the works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me that the Father hath sent me?* Can any thing be more plain, or have greater Self-evidence in it, than that our Saviour in these words doth lay the evidence of his Divine Testimony upon the Miracles which he wrought, which on that account he so often appeals to, on this very
Joh. 19 25, 38. 14. 11. 15. 24. Reason, *because they bear witness of him; and if they would not believe him on his own Testimony, yet they ought to believe him for his works sake?* Doth all this now amount only to a removing of Prejudices from the Person of Christ? which yet according to the tenor of the Objection we are considering of, it is impossible the power of Miracles shou'd do, if these Miracles may be so far done or counterfeited by false Christs, that we can have no certain evidence to distinguish the one from the other.

III. Which the objection pretends; and was the great thing wherein *Cel-*
Orig. lib. 2. c. Cels. *sus* the *Epicurean* triumph'd so much, that *Christ should foretell that others should come and do Miracles which they must not hearken to*, and thence wou'd infer as from Christ's own confession that Miracles have in them οὐδὲν θεῖον, *nothing divine but what may be done by wicked Men:* πῶς οὖν οὐ σχέτλιον ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔργων τὸν μὲν θεὸν, τοὺς δὲ γόητας ἡγεῖσθαι; *Is it not a wretched thing*, saith he, *that from the same works one should be accounted a God, and others Deceivers?* Whereby those who wou'd invalidate the Argument from Miracles, may take notice how finely they fall in with one of the most bitter Enemies of Christian Religion, and make use of the same Arguments which he did; and therefore *Origen*'s reply to him, will reach them too. *For*, saith he, *our Saviour in those words of his doth not bid Men beware in general of such as did Miracles*, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῖς ἀναγορεύουσιν ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι τὸν χριστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ πειρωμένοις διὰ τινῶν φαντασιῶν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἐπιστρέφειν τοὺς Ἰησοῦ μαθητάς· *but bids them beware of that when Men gave themselves out to be the true Christ the Son of God, and endeavour'd to draw Christ's Disciples from him, by some mere Appearances instead of Miracles.* Therefore Christ being evidently made appear to be the Son of God, by the powerful and uncontroul'd Miracles which he wrought, what pretence of Reason cou'd there be to hearken to any one who gave themselves out to be Christs, merely from some strange Wonders which they wrought? And from hence, as he further observes

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may be justly inferr'd contrary to what *Celsus* imagin'd, that there was certainly an evidence of Divine Power in Miracles, when these false Christs gave themselves out to be Christs merely from the supposal that they had this power of doing Miracles. And so it is evident in all the false Christs which have appear'd, they have made this their great pretence that they did many Signs and Wonders; which God might justly permit them to do, to punish the great Infidelity of the *Jews*, who wou'd not believe in Christ notwithstanding those frequent and apparent Miracles which he did, which did infinitely transcend those of any such Pretenders. Such among the *Jews* were *Jonathas*, who after the destruction of *Jerusalem*, as *Josephus* tells us, drew many of the People into the Wilderness of *Cyrene*, σημεῖα καὶ φάσματα δείξων ἐπαγγελλόμενος, *promising to shew them many Prodigies and strange Appearances.* Not long after in the times of *Adrian* appear'd that famous Blazing-star *Barchochebas*, who not only portended but brought so much mischief upon the *Jews*; his pretence was that he vomited Flames; and so he did, such as consum'd himself and his Followers: after him many other Impostors arose in *Ægypt*, *Cyprus* and *Crete*, who all went upon the same pretence of doing Miracles. In latter times the famous Impostor was *David el-David*, whose story is thus briefly reported by *David Ganz*. *David el-David pretended to be the true Messias and rebelled against the King of* Persia, *and did many Signs and Prodigies before the* Jews *and the King of* Persia: *at last his head was cut off, and the* Jews *fined an hundred Talents of Gold.* In the Epistle of *Rambam* or *R Moses Maimon.* it is said, *That the King of* Persia *desired of him a Sign, and he told him that he should cut off his Head and he would rise again*; (which he cunningly desir'd to avoid being tormented,) *which the King was resolv'd to try, and accordingly executed him*; but I suppose his Resurrection and *Mahomet*'s will be both in one day, altho' *Maimonides* tells us, *some of the* Jews *are yet such Fools as to expect his Resurrection.* Several other Impostors *Maimonides* mentions in his Epistle *de Australi regione.* One who pretended to be the *Messias* because he cur'd himself of the *Leprosy* in a night; several others he mentions in *Spain*, *France*, and other Parts, and the issue of them all was only a further aggravation of the Miseries and Captivities of the poor *Jews*, who were so credulous in following Impostors, and yet such strange Infidels where there were plain and undoubted Miracles to persuade them to believe in our blessed Saviour as the true *Messias.* We freely grant then that many pretended Miracles may be done in the World, to deceive Men with; but doth it hence follow that either there are no true Miracles done in the World, or that there are no certain Rules to distinguish the one from the other? But as *Origen* yet further replies to *Celsus*, as a Wolf doth very much resemble a Dog, yet they are not of the same kind; nor a Turtle-Dove and a Pigeon; so that which is produced by a Divine Power is not of the same nature with that which is produced by *Magic*; but as he argues, *Is it possible that there should be only deceits in the World and Magical operations? and can there be no true Miracles at all wrought? Is Humane nature only capable of Impostures, or can none work Miracles but Devils? Where there is a worse, there may be a better*; *and so from the Impostures and Counterfeits, we may infer that there are true Miracles, wrought by a Divine Power*; *otherwise it were all one as to say, there are Counterfeits but no Jewels*; *or there are Sophisms and Paralogisms, but no legitimate Demonstrations: if then there be such deceits, there are true Miracles too*; *all the business is*

Tzemach David n. 895.

V. ep. Maimon. in not. Vorstii and Tzem. Dav.

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βεβασανισμένως τὰς ἐπαγγελλομένους τὰς δυνάμεις ἐξετάζειν, *ſtrictly and ſeverely to examine the pretenders to them, and that from the Life and Manners of thoſe that do them, and from the effects and conſequents of them, whether they do good or hurt in the world, whether they correct Mens manners, or bring Men to goodneſs, holineſs, and truth; and on this account we are neither to reject all Miracles, nor embrace all pretences, but carefully and prudently examine the rational evidences whereby thoſe which are true and Divine, may be known from ſuch as are Counterfeit and Diabolical.*

IV. And this now leads us to the main ſubject of this Chapter, *viz. What Rules we have to proceed by, in judging Miracles to be true or falſe* which may be theſe following.

1. *True divine Miracles are wrought in confirmation of ſome Divine Teſtimony.* Becauſe we have manifeſted by all the precedent diſcourſe, that the intention of Miracles is to ſeal ſome Divine Revelation. Therefore if God ſhou'd work Miracles when no Divine Teſtimony is to be confirm'd, God would ſet the Broad-Seal of Heaven to a Blank. If it be ſaid no, *becauſe it will witneſs to us now the truth of that Teſtimony which was deliver'd ſo many Ages ſince*; I anſwer, 1. The truth of that Teſtimony was ſufficiently ſeal'd at the time of the delivery of it, and is conveyed down in a certain way to us. Is it not ſufficient that the Charter of a Corporation had the Prince's Broad-Seal in the time of the giving of it, but that every ſucceſſion of Men in that Corporation muſt have a new Broad-Seal, or elſe they ought to queſtion their Patent? What ground can there be for that, when the original Seal and Patent is preſerv'd, and is certainly convey'd down from Age to Age? So I ſay it is as to us, God's Grand Charter of Grace and Mercy to the World thro' Jeſus Chriſt, was Seal'd by Divine Miracles, at the delivery of it to the World; the original Patent, *viz.* the Scriptures wherein the Charter is contain'd, is convey'd in a moſt certain manner to us; to this Patent the Seal is annex'd, and in it are contain'd thoſe undoubted Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of it; ſo that a new ſealing of this Patent is wholly needleſs, unleſs we have ſome cauſe of ſuſpicion, that the original Patent it ſelf were loſt, or the firſt ſealing was not true. If the latter, then Chriſtian Religion is not true, if the Miracles wrought for confirmation of it were falſe, becauſe the truth of it depends ſo much on the Verity and Divinity of the Miracles which were then wrought. If the firſt be ſuſpected, *viz.* the certain conveyance of the Patent, *viz.* the Scriptures, ſome certain grounds of ſuch a ſuſpicion muſt be diſcover'd in a matter of ſo great moment, eſpecially when the great and many Societies of the Chriſtian World do all conſent unanimouſly in the contrary. Nay it is impoſſible that any rational Man can conceive that the Patent which we now rely upon, is ſuppoſititious or corrupted in any of thoſe things which are of concernment to the Chriſtian World; and that on theſe accounts.

1. *From the watchfulneſs of Divine Providence for the good of Mankind.* Can we conceive that there is a God who rules and takes care of the World, and who to manifeſt his ſignal love to Mankind, ſhou'd not only grant a Patent of Mercy to the World, by his Son Chriſt, and then ſeal'd it by Divine Miracles, and in order to the certain conveyance of it to the World, caus'd it by Perſons imploy'd by himſelf, to be recorded in a Language fitteſt for its diſperſing up and down the World, (all which I here ſuppoſe:) Can we I ſay conceive that this God ſhou'd ſo far have caſt off his care of the World and the good of Mankind, which

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was the original ground of the Grant it self, as to suffer any wicked Men or malignant Spirits to corrupt or alter any of those Terms in it, on which Mens eternal Salvation depends; much less wholly to suppress and destroy it, and to send forth one that is counterfeit and suppositious instead of it, and which shou'd not be discover'd by the Christians of that Age wherein that corrupt Copy was set forth, nor by any of the most learned and inquisitive Christians ever since? They who can give any the least entertainment to so wild, absurd and irrational an Imagination, are so far from Reason, that they are in good disposition to *Atheism*; and next to the suspecting the Scriptures to be corrupted, they may rationally suspect there is no such thing as a God and Providence in the World; or that the World is govern'd by a Spirit most malignant and envious of the good of Mankind. Which is a suspicion only becoming those Heathens (among whom it was very frequent) who worshipped the Devils instead of God.

2. *Because of the general dispersion of Copies in the World upon the first publishing of them.* We cannot otherwise conceive, but that Records containing so weighty and important things wou'd be transcrib'd by all those Churches which believe the truth of the things contain'd in them. We see how far curiosity will carry Men as to the care of transcribing ancient *MSS.* of old Authors, which contain only some History of things past that are of no great concernment to us: Can we then imagine those who ventur'd Estates and Lives upon the truth of the things reveal'd in Scripture, wou'd not be very careful to preserve the authentic Instrument whereby they are reveal'd in a certain way to the whole World? And besides this, for a long time the Originals themselves of the Apostolical Writings were preserv'd in the Church; which makes *Tertullian* in his time appeal to them. *Age jam qui voles curiositatem melius exercere in negotio salutis tuæ; percurre Ecclesias Apostolicas, apud quas ipsæ adhuc cathedræ Apostolorum suis locis præsidentur, apud quas ipsæ authenticæ eorum literæ recitantur, sonantes vocem, & repræsentantes faciem uniuscujusque.* Now how was it possible that in that time the Scriptures could be corrupted, when in some of the Churches the original Writings of the Apostles were preserv'd in a continual succession of Persons from the Apostles themselves, and from these Originals so many Copies were transcrib'd, as were convey'd almost all the World over, thro' the large spread of the Christian Churches at that time? And therefore it is impossible to conceive that a Copy should be corrupted in one Church, when it wou'd so speedily be discovered by another; especially considering these three circumstances. 1. The innumerable multitude of Copies which wou'd speedily be taken, both considering the moment of the thing, and the easiness of doing it; God, probably for that very end, not loading the World with *Pandects* and *Codes* of his Laws, but contriving the whole Instruments of Man's Salvation in so narrow a compass, that it might be easily preserv'd and transcrib'd by such who were passionate admirers of the Scriptures. 2. The great numbers of learned and inquisitive Men who soon sprung up in the Christian Church; whose great care was to explain and vindicate the sacred Scriptures; can we then think that all these Watchmen should be asleep together when the Evil one came to sow his Tares, which it is most unreasonable to imagine, when in the Writings of all these learned Men, which were very many and voluminous, so much of the Scripture was inserted, that had there been corruptions in the Copies themselves, yet comparing them

De præscript. adv. hæret. c. 36.

them with those Writings, the corruptions wou'd be soon discover'd? 3. The great veneration which all Christians had of the Scripture, that they placed the hopes of their eternal Happiness, upon the truth of the things contain'd in the Scriptures: Can we then think these would suffer any material Alteration to creep into these Records without their observing and discovering it? Can we now think when all persons are so exceeding careful of their Deeds, and the Records whereon their Estates depend, that the Christians who valu'd not this World in comparison of that to come, should suffer the *Magna Charta* of that to be lost, corrupted, or imbezzelled away? Especially considering what care and industry was us'd by many Primitive Christians to compare Copies together, as is evident in *Pantænus*, who brought the *Hebrew* Copy of *Matthew* out of the *Indies* to *Alexandria*, as *Eusebius* tells us in *Pamphilus* and the Library he erected at *Cæsarea*, but especially in *Origen*'s admirable *Hexapla*, which were mainly intended for this end.

3. It is impossible to conceive a corruption of the Copy of the Scriptures, because of the great differences which were all along the several ages of the Church, between those who acknowledg'd the Scriptures to be Divine. So that if one party of them had foisted in, or taken out any thing, another party was ready to take notice of it, and wou'd be sure to tell the World of it. And this might be one great reason, why God in his wise Providence might permit such an encrease of *Heresies* in the Infancy of the Church, *viz.* that thereby Christians might be forced to stand upon their guard, and to have a special Eye to the Scriptures, which were always the great Eye-sores of *Heretics*. And from this great wariness of the Church it was that some of the Epistles were so long abroad before they found general entertainment in all the Churches of Christ, because in those Epistles which were doubted for some time, there were some passages which seemed to favour some of the Heresies then abroad; but when upon severe enquiry they are found to be what they pretended, they were receiv'd in all the Christian Churches.

4. Because of the agreement between the Old Testament and the New: the Prophecies of the Old Testament appear with their full accomplishment in the New which we have; so that it is impossible to think the New should be corrupted unless the Old were too, which is most unreasonable to imagine, when the *Jews*, who had been the great Conservators of the Old Testament, have been all along the most inveterate Enemies of the Christians: So that we cannot at all conceive it possible that any material Corruptions or Alterations shou'd creep into the Scriptures, much less that the true Copy shou'd be lost, and a new one forged.

V. Supposing then that we have the same Authentic Records preserv'd and handed down to us by the care of all Christian Churches, which were written in the first Ages of the Church of Christ: what necessity can we imagine that God shou'd work new Miracles to confirm that Doctrine which is convey'd down in a certain uninterrupted way to us, as being seal'd by Miracles undoubtedly Divine in the first Promulgation and Penning of it? And this is the first Reason why the truth of the Scriptures need not now be seal'd by new Miracles. 2. Another may be, because God in the Scripture hath appointed other things to continue in his Church, to be as Seals to his People of the truth of the things contain'd in Scriptures. Such are outwardly, the Sacraments of the Gospel,

ſpel, Baptiſm, and the Lord's Supper, which are ſet apart as Seals to confirm the truth of the Covenant on God's part towards us in reference to the great Promiſes contain'd in it, in reference to pardon of Sin, and the ground of our Acceptance with God by Jeſus Chriſt: and inwardly God hath promis'd his Spirit to be as a Witneſs within them, that by its working and ſtrengthning Grace in the hearts of Believers, it may confirm to them the truth of the Records of Scripture, when they find the Counter-part of them written in their Hearts by the finger of the Spirit of God. It cannot then be with any reaſon at all ſuppos'd, that when a Divine Teſtimony is already confirm'd by Miracles undoubtedly Divine, that new Miracles ſhou'd be wrought in the Church to aſſure us of the truth of it. So *Chryſoſtom* fully expreſſeth himſelf concerning Miracles, ſpeaking of the firſt Ages of the Chriſtian Church: καὶ γὰρ ἦν τότε χρήσιμα ἐγίνετο, ἢ νῦν χρήσιμα ἃ γίνεται, νῦν ἀπὸ τῶν θείων γραφῶν ἢ τῶν τότε σημείων τὴν πίστιν ὧν λέγομεν παρεχόμεθα. *Miracles were very uſeful then, and not at all now; for now we manifeſt the truth of what we ſpeak from the ſacred Scriptures, and the Miracles wrought in confirmation of them.* Which that excellent Author there fully manifeſts in a Diſcourſe on this ſubject, *Why Miracles were neceſſary in the beginning of the Chriſtian Church, and are not now.* To the ſame purpoſe St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks, where he diſcourſeth of the truth of Religion: *Accepimus majores noſtros viſibilia miracula ſecutos eſſe: per quos id actum eſt ut neceſſaria non eſſent poſteris*; becauſe the World believed by the Miracles which were wrought at the firſt preaching of the Goſpel, therefore Miracles are no longer neceſſary. For we cannot conceive how the World ſhou'd be at firſt induced to believe without manifeſt and uncontrouled Miracles. For as *Chryſoſtom* ſpeaks, εἰ σημείων χωρὶς ἔπεισαν, πολλῷ μεῖζον τὸ θαῦμα φάνεται. *It was the greateſt Miracle of all, if the World ſhou'd believe without Miracles.* Which the Poet *Dantes* hath well expreſs'd in the Twenty fourth *Canto* of *Paradiſe.* For when the *Apoſtle* is there brought in, asking the Poet upon what account he took the Scriptures of the *Old and New Teſtament to be the Word of* God; his Anſwer is,

Chryſoſt. in 1 Cor. 2. *Hom.* 6. *p.* 266. *To.* 3. *ed. Æton.*

De ver. Relig. cap. 25.

Probatio quæ verum hoc mihi recludit,
Sunt opera, quæ ſecuta ſunt, ad quæ Natura
Non candefecit ferrum unquam aut percuſſit incudem.

i. e. *The evidence of that is the Divine Power of Miracles which was in thoſe who deliver'd thoſe things to the World.* And when the *Apoſtle* catechiſeth him further, *how he knew thoſe Miracles were ſuch as they pretended to be,* viz *that they were true and Divine*; his Anſwer is,

Si orbis terræ ſeſe convertit ad Chriſtianiſmum,
Inquiebam ego, ſine miraculis: hoc unum
Eſt tale, ut reliqua non ſint ejus centeſima pars.

i. e. *If the World ſhou'd be converted to the* Chriſtian Faith *without Miracles, this wou'd be ſo great a Miracle, that others were not to be compar'd with it.* I conclude this then with that known ſaying of St. *Auſtin*; *Quiſquis adhuc prodigia, ut credat, inquiret, magnum eſt ipſe prodigium qui mundo credente non credit. He that ſeeks for Miracles ſtill to induce him to Faith, when the World is converted to the* Chriſtian Faith, *he needs not*

De Civit. Dei, l. 22. *cap.* 8.

seek for prodigies abroad; he wants only a looking-glass to discover one. For as he goes on, *Unde temporibus eruditis, & omne quod fieri non potest respuentibus, sine ullis miraculis nimium mirabiliter incredibilia credidit mundus? Whence came it to pass that in so learned and wary an Age as that was which the Apostles preach'd in, the World without Miracles shou'd be brought to believe things so strangely incredible as those were which* Christ *and his Apostles preached?* So that by this it appears that the intention of Miracles was to confirm a Divine Testimony to the World, and to make that appear credible which otherwise wou'd have seemed incredible; but to what end now, when this Divine Testimony is believ'd in the World, shou'd Miracles be continu'd among those who believe the Doctrine to be Divine, the Miracles wrought for the confirmation of it to have been true, and the Scriptures which contain both, to be the undoubted Word of God? To what purpose then the huge out-cry of Miracles in the *Roman* Church is, is hard to conceive, unless it be to make it appear how ambitious that Church is of being called by the
2 Thes. 2. 9. 10. name of him, *whose coming is after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish, because they receiv'd not the love of the Truth that they might be sav'd.* For had they not receiv'd the Love of the Truth of the Gospel, they wou'd have believ'd it on the account of those Miracles, and Signs, and wonders which were wrought for the confirmation of it, by Christ and his *Apostles*; and not have gone about by their Juglings and Impostures, instead of bringing Men to believe the Gospel, to make them question the truth of the first Miracles when they see so many Counterfeits; had we not great assurance the *Apostles* were Men of other designs and Interests than *Popish* Priests are, and that there is not now any such necessity of Miracles, as there was then when a Divine Testimony revealing the truth of *Christian Religion* was confirm'd by them.

VI. 2. *Those Miracles cannot be Divine, which are done now for the confirmation of any thing contrary to that Divine Testimony, which is confirm'd by uncontrouled Divine Miracles.* The case is not the same now, which was before the coming of Christ; for then tho' the Law of *Moses* was confirm'd by Miracles; yet tho' the Doctrine of Christ did null the obligation of that Law, the Miracles of Christ were to be look'd on as Divine, because God did not intend the Ceremonial Law to be perpetual; and there were many Prophecies which cou'd not have their accomplishment but under a new State: But now under the Gospel, God hath declar'd this to be the last Revelation of his Mind and Will to the World by his Son, that now the Prophecies of the Old Testament are accomplish'd, and the Prophecies of the New respect only the various conditions of the *Christian Church*, without any the least intimation of any further Revelation of God's Mind and Will to the World: So that now the Scriptures are our adequate Rule of Faith, and that according to which we are to judge all pretenders to Inspiration or Miracles. And according to this Rule we are to proceed in any thing which is propounded to us to believe by any Persons, upon any pretences whatsoever. Under the Law after the establishment of the Law its self by the Miracles of *Moses*, the Rule of judging all pretenders to Miracles, was by the
Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3. worship of the true God. *If there arise among you a Prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign, or a wonder, and the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake to thee, saying, Let us go after other Gods*

Gods (which thou hast not known) and let us serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that Prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your God proveth you to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul. Whereby it is plain, that after the true Doctrine is confirm'd by Divine Miracles, God may give the Devil or false Prophets power to work, if not real Miracles, yet such as Men cannot judge by the things themselves whether they be real or no; and this God may do for the tryal of Mens Faith, whether they will forsake the true Doctrine confirm'd by greater Miracles for the sake of such Doctrines which are contrary thereto, and are confirm'd by false Prophets, by Signs and Wonders. Now in this case our Rule of tryal must not be so much the Wonders consider'd in themselves whether real or no, as the comparing them with the Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of that Doctrine, which is contrary to this, which these Wonders tend to the proving of. Therefore God's People under the Law were to examine the scope and drift of the Miracles; if they were intended to bring them to Idolatry, whatever they were, they were not to hearken to those who did them. So now under the Gospel, as the worship of the true God was then the Standard whereby to judge of Miracles by the Law of *Moses*, so the worship of the true God thro' Jesus Christ, and by the Doctrine reveal'd by him, is the Standard whereby we ought to judge of all pretenders to work Miracles. So that let the Miracles be what they will, if they contradict that Doctrine which Christ reveal d to the World, we are to look upon them as only tryals of our Faith in Christ, to see whether we *love him with our whole hearts* or no. And therefore I think it needless to examine all the particulars of *Lipsius* his Relations of Miracles wrought by his *Diva Virgo Hallensis* and *Asprecollis*; for if I see that their intention and scope is to set up the worship of *Dæmons*, or a middle sort of *Deities* between God and us, which the Scripture is ignorant of, on that very account I am bound to reject them all. Altho' I think it very possible to find out the difference between true Miracles and them, in the manner and circumstances of their operation; but this, as it is of more curiosity, so of less necessity; for if the Doctrine of the Scriptures was confirm'd by Miracles infinitely above these, I am bound to adhere to that, and not to believe any other Doctrine, *though an Angel from Heaven should preach it*, much less, altho' some *Popish* Priests may boast much of Miracles to confirm a Doctrine opposite to the Gospel: which I know not how far God may in judgment give those Images Power to work, or others Faith to believe, because they would not receive the truth in the love of it: and these are now those τέρατα ψεύδους, *lying wonders*, which the Scripture forewarns us that we should not believe, *viz.* such as lead men to the belief of Lyes, or of Doctrines, contrary to that of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. 2 Thes. 2. 9.

VII. 3. *Where Miracles are true and divine, there the effects which follow them upon the Minds of those who believe them, are true and divine, i. e.* the effect of believing of them, is the drawing of men from sin unto God. This the Primitive *Christians* insisted much upon, as an undoubted Evidence that the Miracles of Christ were wrought by a Divine power, because the effect which follow'd them, *was the work of conversion of Souls from sin and Idols to God and Christ, and all true piety and vertue.* As the effect of the Miracles of *Moses* was the drawing a People off from Superstition and Idolatry to the worship of the true God; so the effect

which follow'd the Belief of the Miracles of Christ in the World was the purging Mens Souls from all sin and wickedness to make them New Creatures, and to live in all exactness and holiness of conversation. And thereby *Origen* discovers the great difference between the Miracles of Christ and *Antichrist*, that the intent of all *Antichrist*'s Wonders was *to bring men* εἰς ἀπάτην τ ἀδικίας, *to the deceivableness of unrighteousness, whereby to destroy them*; *but the intent of the Miracles of Christ was* οὐκ ἀπάτη ἀλλὰ σωτηρία ψυχῶν, *not the deceiving but the saving of Souls*; τίς γὰρ ἂν κρείττονα βίον καὶ συμφέρουσαν διαγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄμεινον, εὐλόγως φησὶν ἀπὸ ἀπάτης γένεσθαι; *who can with any probability say that reformation of life and daily progress from evil to good should be the effect of mere deceit?* And therefore he saith, *Christ told his Disciples, that they shou'd do greater works than he had done; because by their Preaching and Miracles the eyes of blind Souls are opened, and the ears of such as were deaf to all goodness are opened so far as to hearken to the Precepts and Promises of the Gospel: and the feet of those who were lame in their inward man, are so healed as to delight to run in the ways of God's Commandments.* Now is it possible that these shou'd be the effects of any evil Spirit? But on the contrary we see the effects of all Impostures, and pretended Miracles wrought by Diabolical power, was to bring men off from God to sin, and to dissolve that strict obligation to duty which was laid upon Men by the Gospel of *Christ*. Thus it was in that early Ape of the *Apostles*, *Simon Magus*, who far out-went *Apollonius Tyanæus* or any other Heathen in his pretended Miracles, according to the report which is given of him by the Primitive Christians; but we see the intent of his Miracles, was to raise an admiration of himself, and to bring men off from all holiness of conversation, by asserting among other damnable Heresies, that God did not at all regard *what Men did, but only what they believed*: wherein the *Gnostics* where his followers. Now when Miracles are wrought to be Patrons of sin, we may easily know from whom they come.

Lib. 2. cont. Cels.

V. Grot. in 2 Thes. 2. 9. in opusc.

VIII. 4. *Those Miracles are wrought by a Divine Power, which tend to the overthrow of the Kingdom of Satan in the World.* This is evident from hence, because all such things as are out of Man's power to effect, must either be done by a Power *Divine* or *Diabolical*: For as our Saviour argues, *Every Kingdom divided against its self is brought to desolation, and every City or House divided against its self cannot stand; and if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself, how shall then his Kingdom stand?* Now *Christ* by his Miracles did not dispossess Satan out of Mens Bodies, but out of his Temples too, as hath been shewn already. And besides, the Doctrine of Christ which was confirm'd by those Miracles, was in every thing directly contrary to the Devils design in the World. For, as The Devil's design was to conceal himself among those who worshipp'd him; the design of the Gospel was to discover him whom the *Gentiles* worshipped, to be an evil and malignant Spirit, that design'd nothing but their ruin. Now it appears in the whole History of *Gentilism*, the grand Mystery of Satan which the Devil us'd among the *Heathens* was to make himself to be taken and worshipp'd for God, and to make them believe that their *Dæmons* were very good and benign Spirits; which made the *Platonists* and other Philosophers so much incensed against the Primitive *Christians*, when they declar'd their *Dæmons* to be nothing else but infernal and wicked Spirits which sought the destruction of Souls.

Matth. 12. 25, 26.

2. *The*

2. *The Devil's great design was to draw men to the practice of the greatest wickedness under a pretence of Religion*; as is very observable in all the *Heathen* Mysteries, which the more *recondite* and hidden they were, the greater wickedness lay at the bottom of them, and so were to purpose *Mysteries of Iniquity:* But now the design of the Gospel was to promote the greatest purity both of Heart and Life; there being in no other Religion in the World either such incomparable Precepts of Holiness, or such incouraging Promises to the practice of it (from eternal Life hereafter as the Reward, and the assistance of God's Spirit to help Men here) or such prevailing motives to persuade men to it, from the *love of God in Christ to the World*, the *Undertakings of Christ for us* in his Death and Sufferings, the excellent Pattern we have to follow in our Saviour's own example: now these things make it plain that the design of *Christ* and the *Devil* are diametrically opposite to each other. 3. The design of the *Devil* is to set God and Mankind at the greatest distance from each other; the design of *Christ* in the Gospel is to bring them nearer together. The *Devil* first tempts to sin, and then from sin he makes Men presume to sin, and to despair because they have sinned. *Christ* first keeps Men from sin, by his Precepts and Threatnings; and then supposing sin, incourageth them to repent with hopes of pardon procur'd by himself for all truly penitent and believing Sinners. Thus in every thing the design of *Christ* and the *Devil* are contrary, which makes it evident that the Miracles wrought in confirmation of the Doctrine of *Christ* cou'd be from no evil Spirit, and therefore must be from a truly Divine Power.

IX. 5. *True and Divine Miracles may be known and distinguished from false and diabolical, from the circumstances, or the manner of their operation.* There were some peculiar Signatures on the Miracles of *Christ* which are not to be found in any wrought by a power less than Divine. Which *Arnobius* well expresseth in these words to the *Heathens*. *Potestis aliquem nobis designare, monstrare ex omnibus illis Magis qui unquam fuere per secula, consimile aliquid Christo millesima ex parte qui fecerit? qui sine ulla vi carminum, sine herbarum aut graminum succis, sine ulla aliqua observatione sollicita sacrorum, libaminum, temporum?* ——*Atqui constitit Christum sine ullis adminiculis rerum, sine ullius ritus observatione, vel lege, omnia illa quæ fecit, nominis sui possibilitate fecisse, & quod proprium, consentaneum, Deo dignum fuerat, vero nihil nocens aut noxium, sed opiferum, sed salutare, sed auxiliaribus plenum bonis potestatis munificæ liberalitate donasse?* He challengeth the *Heathens* to produce any one of all their *Magicians* who did the thousandth part of what our Saviour did: who made use of none of their *Magical* Rites and Observations in whatever he did; and whatever he did was merely by his own power, and was withal most becoming God, and most beneficial to the World. And thence he proceeds to answer the *Heathens* about the Miracles wrought by their Gods, which fell short of those of Christ in three main particulars, the *Manner* of their working, the *Number* of them, and the *Quality* of the things done.

Arnob. c. gentes, l. 1. pag 25, 26, &c.

1. *The manner of their working.* What they did was with a great deal of pomp and ceremony; what Christ did was with a word speaking, and sometimes without it by the touch of his Garment: *Non inquiro, non exigo,* saith he, *quis Deus, aut quo tempore, cui fuerit auxiliatus, aut quem fractum restituerit sanitati; illud solum audire desidero, an sine ullius adjunctione materiæ,* i. e. *medicaminis alicujus ad tactum morbos*

bos jusserit ab hominibus evolare, imperaverit, fecerit, & emori valetudinum causam, & debilium corpora ad suas remeare naturas. Omitting all other circumstances, name me, saith he, *but which of your Gods ever cured a Disease without any adjoined matter, some prescriptions or other; or which of them ever commanded Diseases out of Bodies by their mere touch, and quite remov'd the cause of the Distempers. Æsculapius,* he says, cured Diseases, but in the way that ordinary *Physicians* do, by prescribing some thing or other to be done by the Patients. *Nulla autem virtus est medicaminibus amovere quæ noceant; beneficia istarerum, non sunt curantium potestates. To cure Diseases by Prescriptions argues no power at all in the prescriber, but virtue in the Medicine.*

2. *In the number of the Persons cured.* They were very few which were cured in the *Heathen* Temples; Christ cured whole multitudes, and that not in the Revestries of the Temples where fraud and imposture might be easily suspected, but in the presence of the People who brought to him all manner of Persons sick of all sorts of Diseases, which were cured by him; and these so numerous, that the *Evangelist* who records many of Christ's Miracles which had been omitted by the other, yet tells us at last, the Miracles of Christ were so many, *that the whole World would not contain them.* But now *Arnobius* tells the *Heathens*, *Quid prodest ostendere unum aut alterum fortasse curatos, cum tot millibus subvenerit nemo, & plena sint omnia miserorum infeliciumque delubra? What matter is it to shew one or two cured, when thousands lie continually perishing for want of cure?* yea such as did *Æsculapium ipsum precibus fatigare, & invitare miserrimis votis,* that cou'd not beg a cure of *Æsculapius* with all their earnestness and importunity.

Joh. 21. 25.

3. *In the quality of the Diseases cured.* The cures among the *Heathens* were some slight things in comparison of those performed by Christ; the most Acute, the most Chronical, the most Malignant of Diseases, cur'd by a Touch, a Word, a Thought. A Learned *Physician* hath undertaken to make it evident from the circumstances of the History, and from the received Principles among the most Authentic *Physicians,* that the Diseases cured by our Saviour, were all incurable by the Rules of *Physic*; if so, the greater the power of our Saviour, who cured them with so much facility as he did. And he not only cured all Diseases himself, but gave a power to others, who were not at all versed in matters of Art and Subtilty, that they shou'd do Miracles likewise *sine fucis & adminiculis, without any fraud or assistance: quid dicitis O mentes incredulæ, difficiles, duræ! alicuine mortalium Jupiter ille Capitolinus hujusmodi potestatem dedit?* When did ever the great *Jupiter Capitolinus give a power of working Miracles to any? I do not say,* saith he, *of raising the dead; or curing the blind, or healing the lame; sed ut pustulam, reduviam, populam, aut vocis imperio aut manus contrectatione comprimeret: but to cure a wart, a pimple, any the most trivial thing, with a word speaking, or the touch of the hand.* Upon this *Arnobius* challengeth the most famous of all the *Heathen Magicians, Zoroastres, Armenius, Pamphilus, Apollonius, Damigero, Dardanus, Velus, Julianus,* and *Bæbulus,* or any other renowned *Magician* to give power to any one to make the dumb to speak, the deaf to hear, the blind to see, or bring life into a dead Body. Or if this be too hard, with all their *Magic* Rites and *Incantations,* but to do that *quod à rusticis Christianis jussionibus fictitatum est nudis, which ordinary* Christians *do by their mere words:* So great a difference was there between the highest that cou'd be done by *Magic,*

Gul. Ader. de morbis Evangel.

Magic, and the least that was done by the Name and Power of Christ.

X. 6. *Where Miracles are truly Divine, God makes it evident to all impartial judgments that the things done exceed all created power.* For which purpose we are to observe that tho' Impostures and Delusions may go far, the power of *Magicians* further when God permits them; yet when God works Miracles to confirm a Divine Testimony, he makes it evident that His power doth infinitely exceed them all. This is most conspicuous, in the case of *Moses* and our Blessed Saviour. First *Moses*, he began to do some Miracles in the presence of *Pharaoh* and the *Ægyptians*, *turning his Rod into a Serpent*; but we do not find *Pharaoh* at all amaz'd at it, but sends presently for the *Magicians* to do the same, who did it (whether really or only in appearance, is not material to our purpose,) but Aaron's *Rod swallowed up theirs.* The next time *the waters are turned into blood* by *Moses.* The *Magicians they do so too.* After this, *Moses brings up Frogs upon the land, so do the Magicians.* So that here now is a plain and open contest in the presence of *Pharaoh* and his People, between *Moses* and the *Magicians*, and they try for Victory over each other; so that if *Moses* do no more than they, they wou'd look upon him but as a *Magician*; but if *Moses* do that which by the acknowledgment of these *Magicians* themselves cou'd be only by Divine Power, then it is demonstrably evident that his power was as far above the power of *Magic*, as God is above the *Devil.* Accordingly we find it in the very next Miracle in *turning the dust into Ciniphes* (which we render) *lice*, the *Magicians* are *non-pluſt*, and give out, saying in plain terms, *This is the finger of God.* And what greater acknowledgment can there be of Divine Power than the confession of those who seem'd to contest with it, and to imitate it as much as possible? After this we find not the *Magicians* offering to contest with *Moses*, and in the plague of *Boils*, we particularly read *that they could not stand* before *Moses.* Thus we see in the case of *Moses* how evident it was that there was a power above all power of *Magic* which did appear in *Moses.* And so likewise in the case of our Blessed Saviour; for altho' *Simon Magus*, *Apollonius*, or others might do some small things, or make some great shew and noise by what they did; yet none of them ever came near the doing things of the same kind which our Saviour did, curing *the born-blind*, *restoring the dead to life after four days*, and so as to live a considerable time after; or in the manner he did them, with a Word, a Touch, with that frequency and openness before his greatest Enemies as well as Followers, and in such an uncontroul'd manner, that neither *Jews* nor *Heathens* ever question'd the truth of them. And after all these, when he was laid in the grave after his *Crucifixion*, exactly according to his own prediction, he arose again the third day, and appear'd frequently among his Disciples for forty days together. After which in their presence, he *ascended up to Heaven*, and soon after, made good his promise to them, *by sending his Holy Spirit upon them*, by which they spake with Tongues, wrought Miracles, went up and down preaching the Gospel of Christ with great boldness, cheerfulness and constancy, and after undergoing a great deal of hardship in it, they seal'd the truth of all they spake with their Blood, laying down their Lives to give witness to it. Thus abundantly to the satisfaction of the minds of all good Men hath God given the highest Rational Evidence of the truth of the Doctrine which he hath reveal'd to the World. And thus I have finished the Second

8. 10, 12. Exod. 7. 19, 22. 8. 6, 7. 8. 19. 2. 11.

Part

Part of my Task, which concern'd the *Rational Evidence* of the truth of *Divine Revelation* from the Persons who were imploy'd to deliver God's mind to the World: And therein have, I hope, made it evident that both *Moses* and the *Prophets*, our *Saviour* and his *Apostles*, did come with sufficient *Rational Evidence* to convince the World that they were Persons immediately sent from God.

ORIGINES

ORIGINES SACRÆ.

Book III.

CHAP. I.

Of the Being of God.

I. *The Principles of all Religion lie in the Being of God and Immortality of the Soul: from them the neceſſity of a particular Divine Revelation rationally deduced; the method laid down for proving the Divine Authority of the Scriptures.* II. *Why* Moſes *doth not prove the Being of God, but ſuppoſe it.* III. *The notion of a Deity very conſonant to Reaſon. Of the nature of* Idea's, *and particularly of the* Idea *of God.* IV. *How we can form an* Idea *of an infinite Being.* V, VI. *How far ſuch an* Idea *argues exiſtence.* VII, VIII. *The great unreaſonableneſs of Atheiſm demonſtrated. Of the Hypotheſes of the* Ariſtotelian *and* Epicurean *Atheiſts.* IX. *The Atheiſts pretences examin'd and refuted.* X, XI, XII, XIII. *Of the nature of the Arguments whereby we prove there is a God. Of univerſal conſent and the Evidence of that to prove a Deity and Immortality of Souls.* XIV, XV. *Of neceſſity of Exiſtence imply'd in the notion of God, and how far that proves the Being of God.* XVI. *The order of the World and uſefulneſs of the parts of it, and eſpecially of Man's body an argument of a Deity.* XVII. *Some higher Principle prov'd to be in the World than Matter and Motion.* XVIII. *The nature of the Soul, and poſſibility of its ſubſiſting after Death.* XIX. *Strange appearances in Nature not ſolvable by the power of Imagination.*

HAving in the precedent Book largely given a rational account of the grounds of our Faith, as to the Perſons whom God imploys to reveal his Mind to the World; if we can now make it appear that thoſe ſacred Records which we embrace as Divinely inſpir'd, contain in them nothing unworthy of ſo great a name, or unbecoming Perſons ſent from God to deliver; there will be nothing wanting to juſtify our Religion in point of Reaſon to be True, and of Revelation to be Divine. For the Scriptures themſelves coming to us in the name of God, we are bound to believe them to be ſuch as they pretend to be, unleſs we have ground to queſtion the general Foundations of all Religion as uncertain, or this particular way of Religion as not ſutable to thoſe general foundations. The foundations of all Religion lie in two things; *That there is a God* who rules the World, I.

Heb. 11. 6. and that the *Souls of Men are capable of ſubſiſting after Death; for he that comes unto God, muſt believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that ſeek him*; ſo that if theſe things be not ſuppos'd as moſt agreeable to Humane Reaſon, we cannot imagine upon what grounds Mankind ſhou'd embrace any way of Religion at all. For if there be not a God whom I am to ſerve and obey, and if I have not a Soul of an immortal nature, there can be no ſufficient obligation to Religion, nor motive inducing to it: For all obligation to Obedience muſt ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of ſuch a Being which hath power to command me; and by reaſon of the promiſcuous ſcatterings of good and evil in this Life, the Motives engaging Men to the practice of Religion, muſt ſuppoſe the certainty of a future State. If theſe things be ſure, and the foundations of Religion in general thereby firmly eſtabliſh'd, it will preſently follow as a matter moſt agreeable to reaſon, that the God whom we are to ſerve ſhou'd himſelf preſcribe the way of his own worſhip; and if the right of Donation of that happineſs which Mens Souls are capable of be alone in himſelf, that he alone ſhou'd declare the Terms on which it may be expected: For Man being a Creature endu'd with a free Principle of acting, which he is conſcious to himſelf of, and therefore not being carry'd to his end by neceſſity of Nature or external Violence, without the concurrence of his own Reaſon and Choice, we muſt ſuppoſe this Happineſs to depend upon the performance of ſome Conditions on Man's part, whereby he may demonſtrate that it is the matter of his free choice, and that he freely quits all other Intereſts that he might obtain the enjoyment of it. Which Conditions to be perform'd, being Expreſſions of Man's obedience towards God as his Creatour and Governour, and of his gratitude for the Tenders of ſo great a Happineſs which is the free gift of his Maker, we cannot ſuppoſe any one to have power to preſcribe theſe Conditions, but he that hath power likewiſe to deprive the Soul of her Happineſs upon non-performance, and that muſt be God himſelf. But in order to Man's underſtanding his Duty, and his obligation to Obedience, it is neceſſary that theſe Conditions muſt not be lock'd up in the Cabinet Council of Heaven, but muſt be ſo far declar'd and reveal'd, that he may be fully acquainted with thoſe Terms which his Happineſs depends upon; elſe his neglect of them wou'd be excuſable, and his miſery unavoidable. Had Man indeed remain'd without offending his Maker, he might ſtill have ſtood in his favour upon the general terms of Obedience due from the Creature to his Creator, and to all ſuch particular Precepts which ſhou'd bear the impreſs of his Maker's will upon them; beſide which, the whole Volume of the Creation, without, and his own Reaſon within wou'd have been ſufficient Directors to him in the performance of his duty. But he abuſing his liberty, and being thereby guilty of *Apoſtaſy* from God (as is evident by a continu'd propenſity to Sin, and the ſtrangeneſs between God and the Souls of Men) a particular Revelation is now become neceſſary, that Mankind may thereby underſtand on what terms God will be pleas'd again, and by what means they may be reſtored into his favour. And laſtly, it not agreeing with the free and communicative nature of Divine Goodneſs (which was the firſt Original of the World's creation) to ſuffer all Mankind to periſh in their own folly, we muſt ſuppoſe this way for Man's recovery to be ſomewhere preſcrib'd, and the Revelation of it to be ſomewhere extant in the World. So that from the general Principles of the exiſtence of God, and immortality of the

Soul,

Soul, we have deduced by clear and evident Reaſon the neceſſity of ſome particular Divine Revelation, as the Standard and Meaſure of Religion. And according to theſe Principles we muſt examine whatever pretends to be of Divine Revelation; for it muſt be ſutable to that Divine nature from whom it is ſuppos'd to come, and it muſt be agreeable to the conditions of the Souls of Men; and therefore that which carries with it the greateſt evidence of Divine Revelation, is, a faithful repreſentation of the ſtate of the caſe between God and the Souls of Men, and a Divine diſcovery of thoſe ways whereby Mens Souls may be fitted for eternal Happineſs. A Divine Revelation then muſt be faithful and true in all its Narrations; it muſt be excellent and becoming God in all its Diſcoveries. And therefore all that can with any reaſon be deſir'd for proof of the Divine Authority of the Scriptures, will lie in theſe three things. Firſt, *That the foundations of Religion are of indoubted certainty, or that there is a God, and that Mens Souls are Immortal.* Secondly, *That the Scriptures do moſt faithfully relate the matters of greateſt Antiquity therein contain'd* (which do moſt concern the Hiſtory of the Breach between God and Man.) Thirdly, *that the Scriptures are the only Authentic Records of thoſe terms on which happineſs may be expected in another World.*

II. I begin with the firſt of them, which concerns the Exiſtence of God, and Immortality of the Soul; both which ſeem to be ſuppos'd as general *Prolepſes* in the Writings of *Moſes*, and as things ſo conſonant to Humane nature, that none to whom his Writings ſhou'd come cou'd be ſuppos'd to queſtion them. And therefore he ſpends no time in the operoſe proving of either of theſe, knowing to how little purpoſe his Writings wou'd be to ſuch who deny'd theſe firſt Principles of all Religion. But beſide this, there may be theſe accounts given, why theſe main foundations of all Religion are no more inſiſted on in the firſt Books of the Scripture, which contain the Originals of the World. Firſt, *Becauſe theſe were in the time of the writing of them, believed with an univerſal conſent of Mankind.* In thoſe more early days of the World, when the Tradition of the firſt Ages of it was more freſh and intire, it is ſcarce imaginable that Men ſhou'd queſtion the Being of a God, when the Hiſtory of the Flood, and the Propagation of the World after it by the Sons of *Noah*, and the burning of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah* were ſo freſh in their memories, as having been done ſo few Generations before them. And by what remains of any Hiſtory of other Nations in thoſe elder times, Men were ſo far from *Atheiſm*, that *Polytheiſm* and *Idolatry* were the common practice of the World, as is moſt evident in all Relations of the ancient *Chaldeans*, *Ægyptians*, *Phœnicians*, and other Nations, who all ſuppos'd theſe two Principles, as well as thoſe who ſerv'd the true God. And in all probability, as Men are apt to run from one extreme to another, *Polytheiſm* was the firſt occaſion of *Atheiſm*, and *Idolatry* of *Irreligion*. And thence we find the firſt appearance of *Atheiſts* to be in the moſt blind and ſuperſtitious Age of *Greece*, when the obſcene Poets had ſo debauch'd the common underſtandings of the People, as to make them believe ſuch things concerning their Gods, which were ſo incongruous to Humane Nature, that all who had any ſenſe of goodneſs left, cou'd not but loath and abhor ſuch Deities. And therefore we find all the flouts and jeers of the reputed *Atheiſts* among them, ſuch as *Dionyſius*, *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*, *Euhemerus*, *Meſſenius* and others, were caſt upon their venerable *Deities*, which they ſo ſolemnly wor-

ſhipped, who had been before, as *Euhemerus* plainly told them, poor mortal Men, and thoſe not of the beſt reputation neither: and therefore as the *Epicurean* in *Tully* well ſays, *omnis eorum cultus eſſet in luctu*, the moſt ſutable Devotion for them had been lamenting their Death. Now when theſe common *Deities* were ſo much derided by intelligent Men, and yet the order of the World ſeem'd to tell them there was really a God, tho' thoſe were none; thoſe who had Philoſophical wits, ſuch as *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, ſet themſelves to work to ſee if they cou'd ſolve the *Phænomena* of Nature without a *Deity*; and therefore aſſerted the Origin of the Univerſe to be only by a fortuitous Concourſe of infinite little Particles: but herein they befool'd themſelves and their greedy Followers, who were glad to be rid of thoſe Anxieties of mind which the thought of a *Deity* and an immortal Soul did cauſe within them. And altho' *Lucretius* in a bravado tells us of his Maſter, *that when Mens minds were ſunk under the burden of Religion*,

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 38.

Lucret. l. 1.

Humana ante oculos fœde cum vita jaceret
In terris oppreſſa gravi ſub relligione:
Primum Graius homo mortales tollere contra
Eſt oculos auſus, primuſque obſiſtere contra.

That Epicurus *was the firſt true Gyant who durſt encounter the Gods*, and if we believe him, *overthrew them in open field*;

Quare relligio pedibus ſubjecta viciſſim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cœlo.

Yet *Cotta* in *Tully* reports the iſſue of this Battle quite otherwiſe; for altho' the greateſt triumph in this Victory had been only to become like the Beaſts that periſh; yet if we believe *Cotta*, *Epicurus* was ſo far from gaining any of his belov'd Eaſe and Pleaſure by his Sentiments, that never was School-boy more afraid of a Rod, nor did any Enemy more dread a Conquerour, than *Epicurus* did the thoughts of a God and Death. *Nec quenquam vidi qui magis ea quæ timenda eſſe negaret, timeret; mortem dico & Deos.* So hard it is for an *Epicurean* even after he hath Proſtituted his Conſcience, to ſilence it; but (whatever there be in the Air) there is an Elaſtical power in Conſcience that will bear its ſelf up notwithſtanding the weight that is laid upon it. And yet after all the labours of *Epicurus*, he knew it was to no purpoſe to endeavour to root out wholly the belief of a Deity out of the World, becauſe of the unanimous conſent of the World in it; and therefore he admits of it as a neceſſary *Prolepſis* or Anticipation of Humane Nature, *quod in omnium animis Deorum notionem impreſſiſſet ipſa natura, that nature its ſelf had ſtamp'd an Idea of God upon the minds of Men; cum enim non inſtituto aliquo aut more aut lege ſit opinio conſtituta, maneatque ad unum omnium firma conſenſio, intelligi neceſſe eſt Deos eſſe, quoniam inſitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus; de quo autem omnium natura conſentit, id verum eſſe neceſſe eſt*, as *Velleius* the *Epicurean* argues. Since the belief of a Deity, neither riſes from Cuſtom nor was enacted by Law, yet is unanimouſly aſſented to by all Mankind; it neceſſarily follows that there muſt be a Deity, becauſe the Idea of it is ſo natural to us. If it were thus acknowledg'd in the Philoſophical Age of *Greece*, when Men bent their wits to unſettle the Belief of ſuch things as tended to Reli-

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 86.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 44.

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gion; how much more might it be esteem'd a general Principle of Humane Nature in those elder times, when not so much as one Dissenter appear'd that we read of among the more ancient Nations? But *Secondly*, it was less needful for *Moses* to insist much on the proof of a Deity in his Writings, when his very imployment, and the History he wrote, was the greatest Evidence that there was one. Cou'd any of them question, whether there were a God, or no, who had heard his voice at Mount *Sinai*, and had receiv'd a Law from him, who had been present at so many Miracles which were done by *Moses* in *Ægypt* and the Wilderness? What more evident demonstration of God cou'd be desir'd, than those many unparallell'd Miracles, which were wrought among them? And those who wou'd not be convinced by them that there was a God, wou'd certainly be convinced by nothing. *Thirdly*, It was unsuitable to the purpose of *Moses* to go about to prove any thing he deliver'd by the mere force of Humane Reason, because he writ as a person imploy'd by God; and therefore by the Arguments on which they were to believe his Testimony in whatever he writ, they cou'd not but believe there was a God that imploy'd him. And from hence it is that *Moses* with so much Majesty and Authority begins the History of the Creation, with, *In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth.* There cou'd be no greater Evidence that there was an infinitely wise, good, and powerful God, than that the Universe was produced out of nothing by him; and what reason cou'd there be to distrust his Testimony who relates it, who manifested not only that there was a God, but that he was imploy'd by him, by the Miracles which he wrought? So that all our former discourse concerning the Evidences of Divine Revelation, are a most palpable demonstration of a Deity; for if there be such a power which can alter the course of Nature when he pleases, the Being wherein it is, must needs be infinite; which is the same which we mean by God.

But yet for those whose minds are so coy and squeamish as to any thing of Divine Revelation, we want not sufficient Evidence in point of Reason to prove to them the Existence of a Deity. In order to which, I shall clear these following Propositions. III.

1. *That the true notion of a Deity is most agreeable to the faculties of Mens Souls, and most consonant to Reason and the Light of Nature.*

2. *That those who will not believe that there is a God, do believe other things on far less Reason, and must by their own Principles deny some things which are apparently true.*

3. *That we have a certain Evidence that there is a God, as it is possible for us to have, considering his nature.*

That the true notion of God is most agreeable to the faculties of Mens Souls, and most consonant to Reason and the Light of Nature: i. e. that the Idea of God (or that which we conceive in our minds when we think of God) is so far from being any ways repugnant to any Principle of Reason within us, that it is hard to pitch on any other Notion which hath fewer entanglements in it, to a mind so far *Metaphysical* as to abstract from Sence and Prejudice. I grant it very difficult, nay impossible, for those to have any true settl'd notion of a God, who search for an Idea of him in their Fancies, and were never conscious to themselves of any higher faculty in their Souls than mere Imagination. Such may have *imaginem Jovis*, or *galeatæ Minervæ*, as he in *Tully* speaks, some Idea of an Idol in their minds, but none of a true God. For we Prop. 1.

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may as soon come by the sight of colours to understand the nature of Sounds, as by any corporal Phantasms come to have a true Idea of God. And altho' sometimes an Idea be taken for that impression of things which is lodg'd in the Phantasy, yet here we take it in a more general sence, as it contains the representation of any thing in the Mind; as it is commonly said in the Schools that the Divine Intellect doth understand things by their Ideas, which are nothing else but the things themselves as they are objectively represented to the Understanding. So that an Idea in its general sence in which we take it, is nothing else but the objective Being of a thing as it terminates the Understanding, and is the form of the act of Intellection: that which is then immediately represented to the mind in its perception of things, is the Idea or Notion of it. Now such an Idea as this is, may be either true or false. For better understanding of which we must consider that an Idea in the Soul may be consider'd two ways. 1. As it is a mode of Cogitation, or the act of the Soul apprehending an Object; now this way no Idea can be false; for as it is an act of the Mind, every Idea hath its truth: for whether I imagine a Golden Mountain, or another, it matters not here; for the one Idea is as true as the other, considering it merely as an act of the Mind. For the mind is as really imploy'd about the one as the other; as the Will is about an Object whether it be feasible or no. 2. The Idea may be consider'd in regard of its Objective Reality, or as it represents some outward object; now the truth or falshood of the Idea lies in the Understanding passing judgment concerning the outward Object, as existent, which doth correspond to the Idea which is in the Mind. And the proneness of the Understanding's error in this case ariseth from the different nature of those things which are represented to the Mind; for some of them are general and abstracted things, and do not at all suppose existence, as the nature of Truth, of a Being, of Cogitation; other Ideas depend upon Existence suppos'd, as the Idea of the Sun, which I apprehend in my Mind because I have seen it; but besides these, there are other Ideas in the Mind, which the Understanding forms within its self by its own power, as it is a Principle of Cogitation; such are those which are called *entia rationis*, and have no other Existence at all but only in the Understanding, as *Chimæra's*, *Centaures*, &c. Now as to these, we are to observe, that altho' the composition of these things together by the Understanding, be that which makes these Ideas to be only fictitious, yet the Understanding would not be able to compound such things, were they not severally represented to the Mind; as unless we had known what a Horse and a Man had been, our minds cou'd not have conjoyn'd them together in its apprehension. So that in these which are the most fictitious Ideas we see, that altho' the Idea its self be a mere creature of the Understanding, yet the Mind cou'd not form such an Idea but upon Pre-existent matter, and some objective reality must be suppos'd in order to the intellectual Conception of these Anomalous Entities. By which we see that that strange kind of Omnipotency which some have attributed to Understanding, lies not in a Power of conceiving things wholly impossible, or fansying Ideas of absolute Non-entities, but in a kind of *African* Copulation of such Species of things together, which in Nature seem wholly incompossible, (as the Schools speak) or have no congruity at all in the order of the Universe. So that had there never been any such things in the World as *matter* and *motion*, it is very hard to conceive, how the Understanding

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ing cou'd have form'd within its self the variety of the Species of such things, which are the results of those two grand Principles of the Universe. But because it is so impossible for minds not very Contemplative and Metaphysical to abstract from matter, thence it is we are apt to imagine such a Power in the Understanding, whereby it may form Ideas of such things which have no objective reality at all. I grant those we call *entia rationis* have no external reality as they are such; but yet I say, the existence of matter in the World, and the corporeal Phantasms of outward Beings, are the foundation of the Soul's conception of those Entities, which have no existence beyond the Humane Intellect.

IV. The great inquiry then is, how far this Plastic Power of the Understanding, may extend its self in its forming an Idea of God. That there is such a one in the minds of Men, is evident to every one that consults his own Faculties, and enquires of them, whether they cannot apprehend a setl'd and consistent Notion of a Being which is absolutely Perfect. For that is all we understand by the Idea of God; not that there is any such connate Idea in the Soul, in the Sense which connate Ideas are commonly understood; but that there is a Faculty in the Soul, whereby upon the free use of Reason, it can form within its self a settl'd Notion of such a Being, which is as perfect as it is possible for us to conceive a Being to be. If any difficulty be made concerning the forming such a Notion in ones mind, let the Person who scruples it, only inquire of himself whether he judges all Beings in the World equal; whether a *Mushroom* hath in it all the perfections which Man hath? which I suppose none, who have a Mind within them can question. If then it be granted that Man hath some Perfection in him above inferior Creatures, it will be no matter of difficulty to shew wherein Man exceeds other inferior Beings. For is not Life a greater Perfection than the want of it? Is not Reason and Knowledge, a Perfection above Sense? and so let us proceed to those things, wherein one Man differs from another; for it is evident, that all Men are not of equal Accomplishments; is not then Forecast and Prudence above Incogitancy and Folly? Is not the knowledge of Causes of things better than Stupidity and Ignorance? Is not Beneficence and Liberality more noble than Parsimony and Narrowness of Spirit? Is not true Goodness far above Debauchery and Intemperance? And are not all these far better, when they are joyn'd with such a power as hath no limits or bounds at all? Now then is it not possible for a Man's mind, proceeding in its ordinary way of Intellection, to form a notion of such a Being, which hath Wisdom, Goodness and Power in it, without any limits and bounds at all, or any of those Abatements which any of these Perfections are found with in Man? For it is unconceivable, that the mind of Man can attribute to its self absolute Perfection, when it cannot but see its own defects in those things it excells other Creatures in; and supposing it had Power, Goodness and Knowledge far above what it hath; yet it cannot but say, that these Perfections wou'd be greater if it were always possess'd of them, and it were impossible that it should ever cease to be, or not have been. So that now joyning infinite Goodness, Wisdom and Power, with Eternity and necessity of Existence, the result is the notion of a Being absolutely perfect. So that now whoever questions the tableness of such a Notion or Idea to the faculties of Mens Souls, must question the truth of his own Faculties, and the method they proceed in, in their cleerest Conceptions and Ratiocinations. And the Mind of Man may as well question

queſtion the truth of any Idea it hath within its ſelf, as of this we now diſcourſe of. Nay, it may be far ſooner puzl'd in any of thoſe Ideas, which are tranſmitted into the Phantaſy by the Impreſſions of Corporeal Beings upon the Organs of Senſe, than in this more intellectual and abſtracted Idea, which depends wholly upon the Mind.

V. All the difficulty now is, whether this Idea of ſuch an abſolutely perfect Being, be any thing elſe but the Underſtanding's Plaſtic power, whereby it can unite all theſe Perfections together in one Conception; or doth it neceſſarily imply, that there muſt be ſuch a Being really exiſtent, or elſe I cou'd never have form'd ſuch a ſettl'd Notion of him in my mind? To this I anſwer, 1. It is as much as I deſire at preſent, that the forming of ſuch an Idea in the Mind, is as ſutable and agreeable to our Faculties as the forming the Conception of any other Being in the World. For hereby it is moſt evident that the notion of a God imports nothing incongruous to Reaſon, or repugnant to the Faculties of our Souls; but that the Mind will form as ſettl'd and clear a notion of God, as of any thing which in the judgment of *Epicurus*, his infallible Senſes did the moſt aſſure him of. So that there can be no ſhadow of a pretence, why any ſhou'd reject the Being of a God becauſe of the impoſſibility to conceive any ſuch Being as God is. If to this it be objected, *that ſuch things are imply'd in this Idea, which make it unconceivable, in that all the Perfections in this Being are ſuppos'd to be infinite, and Infinity tranſcends our capacity of apprehenſion.* To this I anſwer, 1. That thoſe who deny Infinity in God, muſt neceſſarily attribute it to ſomething elſe, as to infinite Space, infinity of ſucceſſion of Ages and Perſons, if the World were Eternal; and therefore it is moſt unreaſonable to reject any Notion for that which it is impoſſible, but if I deny that, I muſt attribute it to ſomething elſe, to whoſe Idea it is far leſs proper than it is to God's. 2. Leſt I ſhou'd rather ſeek to avoid the Argument than to ſatisfy it, I ſay, that tho' infinite as infinite cannot be comprehended, yet we may clearly and diſtinctly apprehend a Being to be of that nature, that no limits can be aſſign d to it, as to its Power or Preſence; which is as much as to underſtand it to be infinite. The *ratio formalis* of Infinity may not be underſtood clearly and diſtinctly, but yet the Being which is infinite may be. Infinity its ſelf cannot be on this account, becauſe however Poſitive we apprehend it, yet we always apprehend it in a Negative way, becauſe we conceive it by denying all limitations and bounds to it; but the Being which is infinite we apprehend in a Poſitive Manner, altho' not adequately, becauſe we cannot comprehend all which is in it. As we may clearly and diſtinctly ſee the Sea, tho' we cannot diſcover the bounds of it; ſo may we clearly and diſtinctly apprehend ſome Perfections of God when we fix our Minds on them, altho' we are not able to graſp them altogether in our narrow and confin'd Intellects, becauſe they are infinite. Thus we ſee that God's Infinity doth not at all abate the clearneſs and diſtinctneſs of the Notion which we have of God; ſo that tho' the Perfections of God are without bounds or limits, yet it bears no repugnancy at all to Mens natural Faculties, to have a ſettl'd Idea of a Being infinitely perfect in their Minds.

VI. To the Queſtion, I anſwer, It ſeems highly probable and far more conſonant to Reaſon than the contrary, that this Idea of God upon the mind of Man, is no merely fictitious Idea, but that it is really imprinted there by that God whoſe Idea it is, and therefore doth ſuppoſe a reality in

in the Thing correſpondent to that objective reality which is in the Underſtanding. For altho' I am not ſo well ſatisfy'd that the mere objective reality of the Idea of God doth exceed the efficiency of the mind, as that Idea is nakedly conſider'd in it ſelf, becauſe of the unlimited power of the Underſtanding in conception: Yet I ſay, conſidering that Idea in all the circumſtances of it, it ſeems highly probable that it is no mere *ens rationis*, or figment of the underſtanding; and that will appear on theſe conſiderations. 1. This Idea is of ſuch a Nature as cou'd not be fram'd from the Underſtanding's conſideration of any corporeal Phantaſms. Becauſe whatever hath any thing of Matter in it, involves of neceſſity many imperfections along with it; for every part of Matter is diviſible into more parts. Now it is a thing evident to Natural Light, that it is a greater Perfection not to be diviſible than to be ſo. Beſides, corporeal Phantaſms are ſo far from helping us in forming this Idea, that they alone hinder us from a diſtinct Conception of it, while we attend to them; becauſe theſe bear no proportion at all to ſuch a Being. So that this Idea however muſt be a pure act of Intellection, and therefore ſuppoſing there were no other faculty in Man but Imagination, it wou'd bear the greateſt repugnancy to our Conceptions, and it wou'd be according to the Principles of *Epicurus* and ſome modern Philoſophers, a thing wholly impoſſible to form an Idea of God, unleſs with *Epicurus* we imagine him to be Corporeal, which is to ſay, he is no God. Which was the reaſon that *Tully* ſaid, *Epicurus* did only, *nomine ponere, re tollere Deos*, becauſe ſuch a Notion of God is repugnant to Natural Light. So that if this Idea doth wholly abſtract from corporeal Phantaſms; it thereby appears that there is a higher faculty in Man's Soul than mere Imagination, and it is hardly conceivable whence a faculty which thus extends it to an infinite object, ſhou'd come, but from an infinite Being: eſpecially if we conſider, Secondly, That the Underſtanding in forming this Idea of God, doth not by diſtinct acts firſt collect one Perfection, and then another, and at laſt unite theſe together, but the ſimplicity and unity of all theſe Perfections is as neceſſarily conceiv'd as any of them. Granting then that the Underſtanding by the obſerving of ſeveral Perfections in the World, might be able to abſtract theſe ſeverally from each Being wherein they were, yet whence ſhou'd the Idea of the Unity and Inſeparability of all theſe Perfections come? The Mind may, it is true, knit ſome things together in fictitious Ideas, but then thoſe are ſo far from unity with each other, that in themſelves they ſpeak mutual Repugnancy to one another, which makes them proper *entia rationis*; but theſe ſeveral Perfections are ſo far from ſpeaking repugnancy to each other, that the Unity and Inſeparability of them is as neceſſary to the forming of this Idea, as any other Perfection whatſoever. So that from hence it appears that the conſideration of the Perfections which are in the Creatures, is only an occaſion given to the Mind to help it in its Idea of God, and not that the Idea it ſelf depends upon thoſe Perfections as the cauſes of it: as in the cleareſt *Mathematical* truths the Manner of demonſtration may be neceſſary to help the Underſtanding to its clearer aſſent, tho' the things in themſelves be undoubtedly true. For all minds are not equally capable of the ſame truths; ſome are of quicker apprehenſion than others are; now altho' to ſlower apprehenſions a more particular way of demonſtrating things be neceſſary, yet the truths in themſelves are equal, tho' they have not equal Evidence to ſeveral Perſons.

3. It appears that this is no mere fictitious Idea from the uniformity of it in all persons who have freed themselves from the Entanglements of corporeal phantasms. Those we call *entia rationis*, we find by experience in our Minds that they are form'd *ad placitum*; we may imagine them as many ways as we please; but we see it is quite otherwise in this Idea of God; for in those Attributes or Perfections which by the light of Nature we attribute to God, there is an uniform consent in all those who have divested their Minds of corporeal phantasms in their conceptions of God. For while men have agreed that the object of their Idea is a Being absolutely perfect, there hath been no dissent in the Perfections which have been attributed to it; none have question'd but infinite Wisdom, Goodness, and Power, joyn'd with necessity of Existence, have been all imply'd in this Idea. So that it is scarce possible to instance in any one Idea, no not of those which are most obvious to our Senses, wherein there hath been so great an uniformity of Mens conceptions as in this Idea of God. And the most gross corporeal Idea of the most sensible matter hath been more liable to heats and disputes among *Philosophers*, than this Idea of a Being infinite and purely spiritual. Which strongly proves my present Proposition, That this Idea of God is very consonant to Natural light; for it is hardly conceivable that there shou'd be so universal a Consent of minds in this Idea, were it not a Natural result from the free use of our Reason and Faculties. And that which adds further weight to this Argument is, that altho' Infinity be so necessarily imply'd in this Idea of God, yet Men do not attribute all kind of infinite Things to God; for there being conceivable infinite Number, infinite Longitude, as well as infinite power and knowledge, our minds readily attribute the latter to God, and as readily abstract the other from his Nature, which is an Argument this Idea is not fictitious, but argues Reality in the thing correspondent to our conception of it. So much may suffice to clear the first Proposition, *viz. That the notion of a God is very suitable to the Faculties of Mens Souls, and to that light of Nature which they proceed by in forming the conceptions of things.*

VII. Prop. 2. *Those who deny that there is a God, do assert other things on far less evidence of Reason, and must by their own principles deny some things which are apparently true.* One wou'd expect that such persons who are apt to condemn the whole World of folly in believing the truth of Religion, and wou'd fain be admir'd as Men of a deeper reach, and greater wit and sagacity than others, wou'd, when they have exploded a *Deity*, at least give us some more rational and consistent account of things, than we can give that there is a God. But on the contrary we find the reasons on which they reject a *Deity* so lamentably weak, and so easily retorted upon themselves, and the *Hypotheses* they substitute instead of a *Deity* so precarious, obscure and uncertain, that we need no other Argument to evince the reasonableness of Religion, than from the manifest folly as well as impiety of those who oppose it. Which we shall make evident by these two things: 1. *That while they deny a Deity, they assert other things on far less reason.* 2. *That by those principles on which they deny a Deity, they must deny some things which are apparently true.*

1. 1. *That they assert some things on far less reason than we do that there is a God.* For if there be not an infinitely powerful God who produced the World out of nothing, it must necessarily follow according to the different Principles of the *Aristotelian* and *Epicurean Atheists*, that either the World was as it is from all eternity, or else that it was first made

made by the fortuitous concourse of Atoms. Now I appeal to the Reason of any Person, who hath the free use of it, Whether either of these two *Hypotheses* urged with the same or greater difficulties, *&c.* be not far more weakly prov'd than the existence of a *Deity* is, or the production of the World by Him.

1. *They run themselves into the same difficulties which they wou'd avoid in the belief of a* Deity; and nothing can be a greater evidence of an entangled Mind than this is: To deny a thing because of some difficulty in it, and instead of it to assert another thing which is chargeable with the very same difficulty in a higher degree. Thus when they reject a *Deity*, because they cannot understand what Infinity means; both these *Hypotheses* are liable to the same intricacy in apprehending the nature of something infinite. For according to the *Epicureans*, there must be an infinite Space, and what greater ease to the Mind is there in conceiving an Idea of that than of an infinite Being? And if the World be eternal, there must have been past an infinite succession of Ages, and is not the Understanding as easily lost in this, as in an eternal Being which created the World? For if the course of Generations in the World had no beginning at all, (which necessarily follows upon the eternity of the World) then an infinite number of successions are already past, and if past, then at an end, and so we find an infinite which hath had an end, which is a consequence becoming one who avoids the belief of a *Deity*, because Infinity is an unconceivable thing. Besides, if the number of Generations hath been infinite, these two Consequences will unavoidably follow, which the reason of any one but an *Atheist* wou'd startle at, That one infinite may be greater than another, and that the part is equal to the whole. For let him fix where he please, in the course of Generations, I demand whether in the Great-grand-father's time the succession of Generations was finite or infinite; if finite, then it had a beginning; and so the World not eternal; if infinite, then I ask, whether there were not a longer succession of Generations in the time of his Great-grand-children, and so there must be a number greater than that which was infinite; for the former succession was infinite, and this hath more Generations in it than that had: but if it be said that they were equal, because both infinite, then the successions of Generations to the Grand-father, being but a part of that which extends to his Grand-children and posterity, the part is equal to the whole: And is not the notion of an infinite Being enough to stumble an *Atheist*'s Reason, when he can so nimbly leap over so apparent contradictions? I insist not on this as an evident Demonstration to prove a *Deity*, which possibly it may not amount to, because it may only demonstrate the impossibility of our Understandings comprehending the nature of Infinity. But however it doth most evidently demonstrate the folly and unreasonableness of the *Atheist*, who rejects the Being of God on the account of his infinity, when his Understanding is more lost in apprehending an infinite succession of Generations which follows from his supposition of the eternity of the World. If then it be impossible, as it is, upon any Principles whatsoever, to avoid the conception of somewhat infinite and eternal, either Matter or Space, or some Being, let any one appeal to his own Reason, whether it be not more agreeable to that, to attribute these Perfections to such a Being, to whose Idea they necessarily belong, than to attribute them to this World, in whose conception they are not at all imply'd; but on the contrary they do far more puz-

zle our Understandings than when we conceive them to be in God. If somewhat must have continued duration and be of an unbounded nature, how much more rational is it to conceive Wisdom, Power, and Goodness to be conjoyn'd with Eternity and Infinity, than to bestow these Attributes upon an empty Space, or upon dull and unactive Matter? It cannot be Reason then, but some more base and unworthy Principle which makes the *Atheist* question the Being of God, because his Perfections are unconceivable, when according to his own Principles the most puzzling Attributes of God return upon him with more force and violence, and that in a more inexplicable manner.

VIII. 2. As the *Atheist* must admit those things himself which he rejects the Being of God for; so he admits them upon far weaker grounds than we do attribute them to God. If any thing may be made evident to Man's natural Reason concerning the existence of a Being so infinite as God is, we doubt not but to make it appear that we have great assurance of the Being of God; but how far must the *Atheist* go, how heartily must he beg before his *Hypotheses* either of the fortuitous Concourse of *Atoms*, or Eternity of the World will be granted to him? For if we stay till he proves either of these by evident and demonstrative Reasons, the World may have an end before he proves his *Atoms* cou'd give it a beginning, and we may find it Eternal, *à parte post*, before he can prove it was so *a parte ante*. For the proof of a Deity we appeal to his own Faculties, Reason and Conscience; we make use of Arguments before his Eyes; we bring the universal Sense of Mankind along with us: But for his Principle, we must wholly alter the present Stage of the World, and crumble the whole Universe into little Particles; we must grind the Sun to Powder, and by a new way of Interment turn the Earth into Dust and Ashes, before we can so much as imagine how the World cou'd be fram'd. And when we have thus far begg'd leave to imagine things to be what they never were, we must then stand by in some infinite Space to behold the friskings and Dancings about of these little Particles of Matter, till by their frequent Rencounters and Justlings one upon another, they at last link themselves together, and run so long in a round till they make Whirl-pools enough for Sun, Moon and Stars, and all the Bodies of the Universe to emerge out of. But what was it which at first set these little Particles of Matter in motion? Whence came so great variety in them to produce such wonderful diversities in Bodies as there are in the World? How came these casual Motions to hit so luckily into such admirable Contrivances as are in the Universe? When I once see a thousand blind Men run the point of a Sword in at a Key-hole without once missing; when I find them all frisking together in a spacious Field, and exactly meeting all at last in the very middle of it; when I once find, as *Tully* speaks, the *Annals* of *Ennius* fairly written in a heap of Sand, and as *Kepler*'s Wife told him, a Room full of Herbs, moving up and down fall down into the exact order of Sallets, I may then think the *Atomical Hypothesis* probable, and not before. But what Evidence of Reason or Demonstration have we, that the great Bodies of the World did result from such a Motion of these small Particles? *It is possible to be so*, saith *Epicurus*. What if we grant it possible? Can no things in the World be, which it is possible might have been otherwise? What else thinks *Epicurus* of the Generations of things now? They are such certainly as the World now is, and yet he believes it was once otherwise: Must therefore a bare possibility of the contrary make

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us deny our Reason, silence Conscience, contradict the universal Sense of Mankind by excluding a Deity out of the World? But whence doth it appear possible? Did we ever find any thing of the same nature with the World produced in such a manner by such a concourse of *Atoms?* Or is it because we find in natural Beings, how much these Particles of Matter serve to solve the *Phænomena* of Nature? But doth it at all follow, because now under Divine Providence which wisely orders the World, and things in it, that these Particles, with their several Affections and Motion, may give us a tolerable account of many Appearances as to Bodies, that therefore the Universe had its Original merely by a Concretion of these, without any Divine Hand to order and direct their Motion? But of this more when we come to the Creation of the World; our design now is only to compare the Notion of a Deity, and of the *Atheist*'s *Hypotheses* in point of Perspicuity and Evidence of Reason: of which let any one who hath Reason judge. Thus we see how the *Atheist* in denying a Deity, must assert something else instead of it, which is press'd with the same, if not greater difficulties, and prov'd by far less Reason.

The Atheist by the same principles on which he denies a God, must deny some things which are apparently true. Which will be evident by our running over the most plausible pretences which he insists upon. IX. 2.

1. Because the Being of a God cannot be demonstrated. But how doth the *Atheist* mean it? Is it because God cannot be demonstrated to Sense, that we cannot [*digito monstrari & dicier hic est*] point at him with our Fingers? It is a sign there is little of Reason left, where Sense is made the only Umpire of all kinds of Beings. Must all intellectual Beings be proscrib'd out of the order of Nature, because they cannot pass the scrutiny of Sense? And by the same reason all Colours shall be dash'd out because they cannot be heard; all Noises silenced, because they cannot be seen; for why may not one Sense be set to judge of all objects of Sense with far more Reason, than Sense it self be set as Judge over Intellectual Beings? But yet it is wisely done of the *Atheist* to make Sense his Judge; for if we once appeal to this, he knows our Cause is lost; for as he said of a Physician, when one ask'd him whether he had any experience of him? No, said he, *Si periculum feciſſem, non viverem*; *If I had try'd him, I had been dead e'er now*; so here, If God were to be try'd by the judgment of Sense, he must cease to be God; for how can an infinite and spiritual Being be discern'd by the judgment of Sense? and if he be not an infinite and spiritual Being, he is not God. But it may be the *Atheist*'s meaning is not so gross, but he intends such a *demonstration to reason as That two and two make four, or That the whole is greater than the parts*; with such a demonstration he wou'd sit down contented. But will no less than this serve him? What becomes then of the World's being made by a fortuitous concourse of Atoms? Is this as evident as that two and two make four? And will the Philosophical *Atheist* really believe nothing in Nature, but what is as evident to him in material Beings, as *that the whole is greater than the parts?* By any means let *Atheists* then write Philosophy, that at the last the Clocks in *London* may strike together, and the Philosophers agree; for I suppose none of them question that. But yet it is possible the *Atheist* may in a good humour abate something of this, and mean by demonstration such a proof as takes away all difficulties. If he means as to the Ground of Assent, we undertake it; if as to the Object apprehended, we

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reject it as unreasonable, because it is impossible a Being Infinite shou'd be comprehended by us; for if it cou'd, it were no longer Infinite. But let us try this Principle by other things, and how evident is it, that on this account some things must be deny'd which himself will confess to be true? For instance, that *opprobrium Philosophorum*, the divisibility of Quantity, or extended matter into finite or infinite parts; let him take which side he please, and see whether by the force of these Arguments on either side, if he hold to this principle, he must not be forced to deny that there is any such thing as matter in the World: and then we may well have an infinite empty space, when by force of this one Principle, both God and Matter are banish'd quite out of the World. But if the *Atheist* will but come one step lower, and by his demonstration intend nothing else but such a sufficient proof of it as the nature of the thing is capable of, he will not only speak most consonant to Reason, but may be in some hopes of gaining satisfaction. For it is most evident, that all things are not capable of the like way of proof; and that in some cases the possibility of the contrary must be no hindrance to an undoubted assent. What these proofs are, will appear afterwards. I come to the next ground of the *Atheist*'s opinion which is,

2. *The weakness of some Arguments brought to prove a Deity.* But let us grant that some Arguments will not do it, doth it therefore follow that none can do it? What if some have prov'd the Sun to be the Center of the World; and the motion of the Earth, by very weak Arguments, will the Atheist therefore question it? What if *Epicurus* hath prov'd his *Atomical Hypothesis* by some silly *Sophisms*, will the *Atheist* therefore rather believe the Creation of the World than it? What if the *Atheist* may make himself sport at some Stories of Apparitions insisted on to prove a Deity, doth it therefore follow there is no God, because some Persons have been over-credulous? What if some having more Zeal than Knowledge, may attribute such things to God's immediate hand, which may be produced by natural Causes, doth it thence follow that God hath no hand in governing the World at all? What if Fears, and Hopes, and Persuasions, may depend much on Principles of Education, must Conscience then be resolv'd wholly into these? What if some devout *Melancholist* may embrace the issues of his own Imagination for the impressions of the Divine Spirit, doth it therefore follow, that Religion is nothing but strength of Fancy improv'd by principles of Education? What if some of the numerous proofs of a Deity were cut off, and only those made use of, which are of the greatest force, wou'd the Truth suffer at all by that? I grant, advantage is often taken against a thing more by one weak Argument brought for it, than for it by the strongest Proofs: but I say, it is unreasonable it shou'd be so; and were Men Rational and Ingenuous it wou'd not be so. Many times Arguments may be good in their order, but they are mis-placed; some may prove the thing rational, which may not prove it true; some may shew the Absurdities of the Adversaries, rejecting the thing, which may not be sufficient to prove it; now when Men number and not weigh their Arguments, but give them in the lump to the main question, without fitting them to their several places, they do more disservice to the main of the Battle by the disorder of their Forces, than they can advantage it by the number of them.

3. Another great pretence the *Atheist* hath, is, that Religion is only an invention of Politicians, which they awe People with as they please, and

and therefore tell them of a God, and another World, as Mothers send young Children to School to keep them in better order, that they may govern them with the greater eaſe. To this I anſwer, 1. Religion I grant, hath a great influence upon the well-governing the World, nay ſo great, that were the *Atheiſts* opinion true, and the World perſuaded of it, it were impoſſible the World cou'd be well govern'd. For the Government of the World in civil Societies, depends not ſo much on Force, as the ſacred Bonds of Duty and Allegiance, which hold a Nation that owns Religion as true, in far ſurer Obligations to endeavour the peace and welfare of a Nation than ever Violence can do. For in this caſe only an opportunity is watch'd for to ſhake off that which they account a Yoke upon their Necks; whereas when Mens minds are poſſeſs'd with a ſenſe of duty and obligation to Obedience out of Conſcience, the Reins may be held with greater eaſe; and yet the People be better manag'd by them, than by ſuch as only gall and inrage them. So that I grant true Religion to be the moſt ſerviceable Principle for the governing of civil Societies; but withal, I ſay, 2. It were impoſſible Religion ſhou'd be ſo much made uſe of for the governing of People, were there not a real propenſity and inclination to Religion imprinted on the Minds of Men. For as, did not Men love themſelves, and their Children, their Eſtates and Intereſts, it were impoſſible to keep them in Obedience to Laws; but doth it follow, becauſe Magiſtrates perſuade People to Obedience by ſuting Laws to the general intereſt of Men, that therefore the Magiſtrates firſt made them love themſelves and their own concerns? So it is in Religion, the Magiſtrate may make uſe of this propenſity to Religion in Men for civil ends, but his making uſe of it doth ſuppoſe it and not inſtill it. For were Religion nothing elſe in the World but a deſign only of Politicians, it wou'd be impoſſible to keep that deſign from being diſcover'd at one time or other; and when once it came to be known, it wou'd hurry the whole World into confuſion; and the People wou'd make no ſcruple of all Oaths and Obligations, but every one wou'd ſeek to do others what miſchief he cou'd if he had opportunity, and obey no further than Fear and Force conſtrain'd him. Therefore no Principle can be ſo dangerous to a State as *Atheiſm*, nor any thing more promote its Peace than true Religion; and the more Men are perſuaded of the truth of Religion, they will be the better Subjects, and the more uſeful in civil Societies. As well then may an *Atheiſt* ſay there is no ſuch thing as Good Nature in the World, becauſe that is apt to be abus'd, nor any ſuch thing as Love, becauſe that may be cheated, as that Religion is nothing but a deſign, becauſe Men may make it ſtalk to their private ends. Thus we ſee how the *Atheiſt* by the force of thoſe Principles on which he denies a God, muſt be forced to deny other things, which yet by his own confeſſion are apparently true.

So I come to the third *Propoſition*, which is, *That we have as certain Evidence that there is a God, as we can have, conſidering his Nature.* X. Prop. 3. When we demand the proof of a thing, our firſt eye muſt be to the nature of the thing which we deſire may be prov'd; for things equally true, are not capable of equal evidence, nor have like manners of probation. There is no demonſtration in *Euclide* will ſerve to prove that there are ſuch places as the *Indies*: we cannot prove the Earth is round by the judgment of ſenſe; nor that the Soul is immortal by corporeal Phantaſms. Every diſtinct kind of Being hath its peculiar way of probation;

bation; and therefore it ought not to be at all wondred at, if the ſupreme and infinite Being have his peculiar way of demonſtrating himſelf to the minds of Men. If then we have as evident proofs of the Exiſtence of God, as we can have, conſidering the infinity of his Nature, it is all which in reaſon we can deſire; and of that kind of proofs we have theſe following. For, 1. *If God hath ſtamped an univerſal Character of himſelf upon the minds of Men.* 2. *If the things in the World are the manifeſt effects of infinite Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Power.* 3. *If there be ſuch things in the World which are unaccountable without a Deity,* then we may with ſafety and aſſurance conclude *that there is a God.*

1. *That God hath imprinted an univerſal Character of himſelf on the minds of Men;* and that may be known by two things, 1. *If it be ſuch as bears the ſame importance among all Perſons.* 2. *If it be ſuch as cannot be miſtaken for the Character of any thing elſe.*

1. I begin with the firſt, whereby I ſhall prove this Character to be univerſal, becauſe the whole World hath conſented in it. This Argument we may rely on with the greater ſecurity, becauſe it was the only Argument which retain'd the Deity in the ancient School of *Epicurus*; which cou'd he have thought of as eaſy a way of evading, as he thought he had found out as to the Origin of the Univerſe, he was no ſuch great Friend to the very name of a God, as to have retain'd it as an Anticipation or Prolepſis of Humane Nature. And this Argument from the univerſal conſent of the World, was that which bore the greateſt ſway among the Philoſophers, who went by nothing but Dictates of natural Light, which they cou'd not ſo clearly diſcover in any things, as in thoſe which all Mankind did unanimouſly conſent in. Two things I ſhall make this out by. 1. *That no ſufficient account can be given of ſo univerſal a conſent, unleſs it be ſuppos'd to be the voice of Nature.* 2. *That the diſſent of any particular Perſons is not ſufficient to controul ſo univerſal an Argument.*

1. *That no ſufficient account of it can be given, but only by aſſerting it to be a Dictate of Nature.* In ſo ſtrange a diſſent as there hath been in the World concerning moſt of thoſe things which relate to Mankind in common, as the Models of Government, the Laws they are rul'd by, the particular Rites and Cuſtoms of Worſhip; we have the greateſt reaſon to judge that thoſe common Principles which were the Foundations on which all theſe ſeveral different Cuſtoms were built, were not the effect of any poſitive Laws, nor the mere force of principles of Education, but ſomething which had a deeper root and foundation in the Principles of Nature it ſelf. A common and univerſal Effect muſt flow from ſome common and univerſal Cauſe. So the *Stoic* argues in *Tully,* If there were no God, *non tam ſtabilis opinio permaneret, nec confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis, nec una cum ſeculis ætatibuſque hominum inveterare potuiſſet.* It is ſtrange to think that Mankind in ſo many Ages of the World ſhou'd not grow wiſe enough to rid it ſelf of ſo troubleſome an Opinion as that was, of the Being of God, had it not been true.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

We ſee in all the alterations of the World, other vain Opinions have been detected, refuted and ſhaken off; if this had been ſuch, how comes it to remain the ſame in all Ages, and Nations of the World? *Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia confirmat.* It is a great diſcredit to Time to make it like a River in that ſenſe, that it bears up only lighter things, when matters of greateſt weight are ſunk to the bottom and paſt recovery. This may paſs for a handſome Alluſion, as to the Opinions

Opinions and Writings of particular Persons, but cannot be understood of such things which are founded on the universal consent of the World; for these common Notions of Humane Nature are so suted to the temper of the World, that they pass down the strong current of Time with the same facility that a well built Ship, tho' of good burden, doth furrow the Ocean. So that if we must adhere to the Allegory, it is easily reply'd, that it is not the weight of things which makes them sink, but the unsutableness of their Superficies to that of the water; so we see a small piece of Wood will sink, when a stately Ship is born up; so such things which have not that agreeableness in them to the Dictates of Nature may soon be lost, but such as lie so even upon the superficies of the Soul, will still float above the Water, and never be lost in the swiftest current of Time. Thus we assert this universal consent of Mankind, as to the existence of a Deity, to be a thing so consonant to our Natural reason, that as long as there are Men in the World it will continue

But now it is hardly conceivable, according to the Principles of *Epicurus*, how Mankind shou'd universally agree in some common Sentiments; much less how it shou'd have such an Anticipation as himself grants of the Being of God. For if the Soul be nothing else but some more active and vigorous Particles of Matter (as *Diogenes Laertius* tells us, that his Opinion was, that the Soul was nothing else but a *System* ἐξ ἀτόμων λειοτάτων καὶ σφαιροειδεστάτων, *of the most smooth and round Atoms*) if so, it is very hard apprehending how any such things as Anticipations or common Notions can be lodg'd in the Soul; for if our Souls be nothing else but some small Sphærical Corpuscles which move up and down the Body, as the *Epicurean* Philosophy supposeth, then all our Knowledge and Perception must depend on Motion, which Motion must be by the impression of external Objects: which *Lucretius* acknowledgeth and contends for. XI

Laertius l. 10. in v. Epic. v. Gassend. To. 2d. l. 3. sect. 3.

Invenies primis à sensibus esse creatam
Notitiam veri. *Lucret. l. 4.*

If then our knowledge of Truth comes in by our Senses, and Sensation doth wholly depend upon the impression of outward Objects, what becomes of all common Notions and of the *Prolepsis* of a Deity? unless we suppose the knowledge of a Deity came in by Sense, which *Epicurus* himself denies when he attributes to the Deity not *corpus*, but *quasi corpus*, as *Tully* tells us, and therefore he is not a proper object of Sense. So that it is impossible there shou'd be any such thing as a natural Notion which may be the ground of universal consent among Men, according to the Doctrine of *Epicurus*. And therefore it stands to all reason in the World, that if our Senses be the only competent Judges of Truth, Men shou'd differ about nothing more than such things which cannot be try'd by the judgment of Sense; such as the notion of a God is; (for where shou'd Men be more uncertain in their judgments, than in such things which they have no rule at all to go by in the judging of?) but we are so far from finding it so, that Men are nothing so much agreed about the objects of Sense, as they are about the existence of a Deity; and therefore we see this universal consent of Mankind concerning a God, cannot be salv'd by the Principles of those who deny it; according to which no account at all can be given of any such things as universal or common Notions.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

XII. Neither can this universal consent of Mankind be enervated with any greater probability by those *Atheists* who assert the Eternity of the World, and resolve this consent wholly into mere Tradition, such as the Fables of Poets were convey'd in from one to another. For I demand concerning this Tradition, whether ever it had any beginning or no? If it had no beginning, it cou'd be no Tradition; for that must run up to some Persons from whom it first came; again, if it had no beginning, it was necessary that it shou'd always be, on the same accounts on which they make the World eternal. And if it be necessary, it must be antecedent to any free Act of Man's Will which Tradition supposeth; and so some false Opinion wou'd be found to be as necessary as the World's being eternal, (and by consequence the World's being eternal may be a necessary false Opinion) but if any false Opinion be once granted necessary, it then follows that our Faculties are not true, and that Nature is a necessary cause of some notorious Falsity, which is the highest Impeachment the *Atheist* cou'd have laid upon his only ador'd Nature; which must then have done that, (which *Aristotle* was asham'd to think ever Nature shou'd be guilty of) which is, something in vain; for to what purpose shou'd Man have rational Faculties, if he be under an unavoidable necessity of being deceiv'd? If then it be granted that this Tradition had once a beginning, either it began with Humane Nature, or Humane Nature did exist long before it: if it began with Mankind, then Mankind had a beginning, and so the World was not eternal; if Mankind did exist before this Tradition, I then inquire in what time, and by what means, came this Tradition first to be embraced, if it doth not suppose the existence of a Deity? Can any Age be mention'd in History, wherein this Tradition was not universally receiv'd? and which is most to our purpose, the further we go back in History, the fuller the World was of Deities, if we believe the Heathen Histories; but however no Age can be instanc'd in, wherein this Tradition began first to be believ'd in the World; we can trace the Poetic Fables to their true Original, by the Testimonies of those who believ'd them; we know the particular Authors of them, and what course they took in divulging of them; we find great diversities among themselves in the meaning of them, and many Nations that never heard of them. But all things are quite otherwise in this Tradition; we have none to fix on as the first Authors of it; if the World were eternal, and the belief of a Deity fabulous, we cannot understand by what Artifice a fabulous Tradition cou'd come to be so universally receiv'd in the World, that no Nation of old cou'd be instanced in by the inquisitive Philosophers, but however rude and barbarous it was, yet it own'd a Deity. How cou'd such a Tradition be spread so far, but either by Force or Fraud? It cou'd not be by force, because embraced by an unanimous consent where no force at all hath been us'd, and hath been so rooted in the very Natures of those People who have been most tender of their Liberties, that they have resented no Indignity so highly, as any Affronts they conceiv'd to be offer'd to their Gods. Nay, and where any Persons seem to quit the belief of a Deity, we find what Force and Violence they have us'd to their own Reason and Conscience to bring themselves to *Atheism*, which they cou'd not subdue their Minds to any longer than the Will cou'd command the Understanding; which when it gained but a little liberty to examine it self, or view the World, or was alarmed with Thunder, Earth-quakes or violent Sickness, did bring back again the

the ſenſe of a Deity with greater force and power than they had endeavour'd to ſhake it off with. Now had this tradition come by force into the World, there would have been a ſecret exultation of Mind to be freed from it, as we ſee Nature rejoyceth to ſhake off every thing which is violent, and to ſettle every thing according to its due order. It is only Fraud then which can be with any Reaſon imagin'd in this caſe; and how unreaſonable it is to imagine it here, will appear to any one who doth conſider how extremely jealous the World is of being impoſed upon by the Subtilty of ſuch who are thought to be the greateſt Politicians. For the very Opinion of their Subtilty makes them apt to ſuſpect a Deſign in every thing they ſpeak or do, ſo that nothing doth more generally hinder the entertaining of any motion ſo much among vulgar People, as that it comes from a Perſon reputed very Politic. So that the moſt politic way of gaining upon the Apprehenſions of the Vulgar, is by taking upon one the greateſt appearance of Simplicity and Integrity; and this now cou'd not be done by ſuch Politicians which we now ſpeak of, but by accommodating themſelves to ſuch things in the People which were ſo conſonant to their Natures, that they cou'd ſuſpect no deſign at all in the matters propounded to them. And thus I aſſert it to have been in the preſent caſe, in all thoſe Politic Governours who at firſt brought the World into both Civil and Religious Societies, after they were grown Rude and Barbarous; for as it had been impoſſible to have brought them into Civil Societies, unleſs there had been ſuppos'd an inclination to Society in them, ſo it had been equally impoſſible to have brought them to embrace any particular way of Religion, unleſs there had been a natural propenſity to Religion implanted in them, and founded in the general belief of the exiſtence of a Deity. And therefore we never find any of the ancient Founders of Common-wealths go about to perſuade the People that there was a God, but this they ſuppos'd and made their advantage of it, the better to draw the People on to embrace that way of Worſhip, which they deliver'd to them, as moſt ſutable to their own deſign. And this is plainly evident in the vaſt difference of Deſigns and Intereſts which were carry'd on in the Heathen World upon this general apprehenſion of a Deity. How came the World to be ſo eaſily abus'd into Religions of all ſhapes and faſhions had not there been a natural inclination in Mens Souls to Religion, and an indelible Idea of a Deity on the Minds of Men? Were then this propenſity groundleſs, and this Idea fictitious, it were the greateſt ſlur imaginable, which cou'd be caſt upon Nature, that when the Inſtincts of irrational Agents argue ſomething real in them; only Man the moſt noble Being of the viſible World, muſt be fatally carry'd to the belief of that which never was. Which yet hath ſo great a force and awe upon Man, that nothing creates ſo great Anxieties in his life as this doth; nothing lays him more open to the deſigns of any who have an intent to abuſe him. But yet further, theſe Politicians who firſt abus'd the world, in telling them there was a God, did they themſelves believe there was a God or no? If they did, then they had no ſuch end as abuſing the world into ſuch a belief. If they did not, upon what accounts did they believe there was none, when the People were ſo ready to believe there was one? Was that as certain a Tradition before that there was no God, as afterwards they made it to be that there was? If ſo, then all thoſe People whom they perſuaded to believe there was a God, did before, all believe there was none; and how can it poſſibly

enter into the Reaſon of any Man to think, that People who had been brought up in the belief that there was no God at all, nor any State after this Life, ſhou d all unanimouſly quit the Principles of Education which tended ſo much to their Eaſe and Pleaſure here, to believe there was a God and another Life, and thereby to fill themſelves full of Fears and Diſquietments, merely becauſe their Rulers told them ſo? Again, if theſe Rulers themſelves were ſo wiſe as not to believe a Deity, can we imagine there ever was ſuch an Age of the World wherein it fell out ſo happily, that only the Rulers were Wiſe, and all the Subjects Fools? But it may be, it will be ſaid, *That all who were wiſe themſelves did not believe a Deity, but yet conſented to the practice of Religion, becauſe it was ſo uſeful for the Government of Mankind*; but can it be thought that all theſe wiſe Men, which we muſt ſuppoſe of ſeveral Ranks and Degrees, (for Philoſophers are not always States-men, nor States-men Philoſophers) ſhou'd ſo readily concur in ſuch things which tended moſt to the intereſt of the Prince, and to the abuſe of the World? Wou'd none of them be ready to aſſert the Truth, tho' it were but to make a Party of their own, and diſcover to the People, that it was only the Ambition and Deſign of their Governours which ſought to bring the People to Slavery by the belief of ſuch things, which were contrary to the Tradition of their Fore-fathers, and wou'd make their Lives, if they believ'd them, continually troubleſome and unquiet? Or if we cou'd ſuppoſe things ſhou'd hit thus in one Nation, what is this to the whole World which the *Atheiſt* here ſuppoſeth eternal? What, did all the Rulers of the World exactly agree in one moment of time; or at leaſt in one Age thus to abuſe the World? Did the deſigns of Governours and the credulity of all People fall out to be ſo ſutable together? But on the contrary, we do not find that Governours can have the Judgments of People ſo at their command, that they can make them to believe what they pleaſe; if it were ſo, we may well ſay with that *Atheiſtical* Pope, *Heu quam minimo regitur Mundus*; *What a twine thread will Rule the World!* But granting theſe things, (which any but an *Atheiſt* will ſay are impoſſible) yet whence ſhou'd it come to paſs that the World, which is generally led more by the Opinions of their Fore-fathers, than by Reaſon, ſhou'd ſo cancel that former Tradition that there was no God, that no remaining foot-ſteps of it can be traced in any Hiſtory of thoſe times? Or did the Governours at all conſent to aboliſh all Records of it? Public and Written I grant they might, but not thoſe out of Mens Minds and Memories; which wou'd have been for the eaſe of the Minds of their Poſterity conveyed in ſome ſecret *Cabala* from Fathers to their Children. It may be it will be ſaid, *ſo it was, but Men durſt not profeſs it for fear of the Laws:* but, it is not evident that the Laws of all ancient Common-wealths were ſo ſevere againſt *Atheiſm*; and withal how came ſome of the wiſeſt and moſt philoſophical Men of *Greece* and *Rome* to embrace the exiſtence of a Deity, as a thing far more conſonant to Reaſon than the contrary Opinion, and eſtabliſh'd their belief on ſuch Evidences from Nature it ſelf, that none of their *Antagoniſts* were able to anſwer them? It was not certainly the fear of Laws which made Men rational and inquiſitive into the Natures and Cauſes of things; and yet thoſe who were ſuch amidſt the great Idolatries of the Heathen, and being deſtitute of Divine Revelation, yet freely and firmly aſſented to the exiſtence of a Deity. Had it been only Fraud and Impoſture which brought Men to believe a God, whence came it to paſs that this Fraud

was

was not discover'd by these Philosophers, who were far better able by their nearness to those eldest times and much converse abroad in other Nations (for some Travell'd into *Ægypt*, *Chaldea*, *Persia*, *India*, merely to gain Knowledge) to have found out such an Imposture, had it been such, than any of our modern *Atheists?* Whence come these now in this almost decrepit Age of the World to be the first smellers out of so great a Design? By what Means, what tokens and Evidences came such an Imposture to their knowledge? Because, forsooth, the World is still apt to be abus'd by a pretence of Religion; but he that doth not see how silly and ridiculous a Sophism that is, either by his own Reason, or by what hath gone before; hath Wit and Reason little enough to be an *Atheist*. Some therefore who wou'd seem a little wiser than the vulgar sort of *Atheists* (for it seems there is a *Vulgus* among them too, I wish it be more for their Meanness than Multitude) are so far convinced of the unreasonableness of judging that the belief of a Deity came in by Fraud, that finding it so general and universal, they attribute it to as general and universal a Cause, which is the influence of the Stars. So true still is that of the Poet, *Cœlum ipsum petimus stultitia*; for by what imaginable influence come the Stars to plant Opinions in Mens Minds so deeply and universally? But yet further, is this Opinion which is thus caus'd by the Stars, true or false? If the Opinion be true, we have what we desire; if false, what malignant Influence is this of the Stars, so powerfully to sway Men to the belief of a Falsity? How far are the Stars then from doing good to Mankind, when they are so influential to deceive the World; but then, by what peculiar Influence come some Men to be freed from this general Imposture? If the Cause be so universal, the Effect must be universal too. But if only the nativity and continuance of some particular Religions may be calculated by the Stars, (as *Cardan* and *Vaninus*, Atheistically suppose) whence then comes the general propensity and inclination to Religion in all Ages and Nations of the World? If it be then caus'd by the Heavens in general, it must be produced necessarily and universally, and so to be an *Atheist*, were impossible; if it be caus'd by the influence of some particular Stars, then when that influence ceaseth, the World wou'd universally relapse into *Atheism*. So that there is no possible way of avoiding this universal consent of Mankind, as an Argument that there is a God, when all the Pretences of the *Atheist* against it are so weak, ridiculous and impertinent.

VIII. The only thing then left for him, is, to deny the truth of the thing, *viz.* that there is such an universal consent; because some Persons have been found in the World who have not agreed with the rest of Mankind in this Opinion. To this I answer, (which was the second Particular for clearing this Argument) that the dissent of these Persons is not sufficient to manifest the consent not to be universal, and to arise from a Dictate of Nature: For I demand of the greatest *Atheist*, whether it be sufficient to say, that it is not natural for Men to have two Legs, because some have been born with one, or that it is not natural for Men to desire Life (which the *Atheist* loves so dearly) because there have been so many who have taken away their own Lives? If it be said that these are Monsters and *Anomalies* in Nature, and therefore not to be reckon'd in the regular Account of things, the same I may with as great reason say of *Atheists*, that they are to be dispung'd out of the *Census* of such who act upon free Principles of Reason; because there may

may be some peculiar Reasons given of their Dissent from the rest of Mankind in the denial of a Deity. We see by the old Philosophers how far the Affectation of Novelty, and Ambition, of being cry'd up for no vulgar Wits, may carry Men to deny such things, which are most common and obvious in the World. Is there any thing more plain and evident to Reason, than that it implies a contradiction for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time? and yet if we believe *Aristotle*, who largely disputes against them, εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ αὐτοὶ τοῦτο ἀδύνατα φασι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. *There were some who affirm'd that a thing might be and not be at the same time.* What so evident in Nature as Motion? yet the Philosopher is well known who disputed against it, and thought himself subtile in doing so too. What are Men more assur'd of, than that they live, and yet (if it be not too Dogmatical, even in that to believe the *Sceptics*) it was a thing none cou'd be assur'd of? What are our Senses more assur'd of than that the Snow is white, yet all the Philosophers were not of that Opinion? Is this then sufficient Reason on which to deny an universal consent, because some Philosophers oppos'd it, when it is most undoubtedly true, which *Tully* sharply speaks of the ancient Philosophers, *Nihil tam absurdum quod non dixerit aliquis Philosophorum*; *There was no absurdity so great, but it found a Philosopher to vouch it?* But in this case those Philosophers who question'd the existence of a Deity, tho' they were not for number to be compar'd with those who asserted it, yet were not so inexcusable therein as our modern *Atheists*; because they then knew no other way of Religion, but that which was joyn'd with horrible Superstition, and ridiculous Rites of Worship; they were Strangers to any thing of Divine Revelation, or to any real Miracles wrought to confirm it, and to such a way of serving God which is most agreeable to the Divine Nature, most sutable to our Reason, most effectual for advancing true Godliness in the World. And altho' this most excellent Religion, *viz.* the Christian, be subject to many Scandals by reason of the Corruptions which have been mix'd with it by those who have profess'd it, yet the Religion it self is clear and untainted, being with great Integrity preserved in the sacred Records of it. So that now *Atheism* hath far less to plead for its self than it had in the midst of the Ignorance and Superstition of the Heathen Idolatries. But if we shou'd grant the *Atheist* more than he can prove, that the number of such who deny'd a Deity hath been great in all Ages of the World; is it probable they shou'd speak the Sence of Nature, whose Opinion, if it were embraced, wou'd dissolve all Ties and Obligations whatsoever; wou'd let the World loose to the highest Licentiousness, without check or controul, and wou'd in time overturn all Civil Societies? For as *Tully* hath largely shewn, *Take away the Being and Providence of God out of the World, and there follows nothing but Perturbation and Confusion in it, not only all Sanctity, Piety and Devotion is destroy'd, but all Faith, Vertue and Humane Societies too*; which are impossible to be upheld without Religion, as not only he, but *Plato*, *Aristotle* and *Plutarch*, have fully demonstrated. Shall such Persons then who hold an Opinion so contrary to all other Dictates of Nature, rather speak the Sense of Nature, than they who have asserted the belief of a Deity, which tends so much to advance Nature, to regulate the World, and to reform the Lives of Men? Certainly if it were not a dictate of Nature that there was a God, it is impossible to conceive the World shou'd be so constant in the belief of him, when the thoughts of him

Arist. Metaphys. l. 4. c. 4.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. & de Legib. l. 2.

him breed so many Anxieties in Mens Minds, and withal, since God is neither obvious to Sense, nor his nature comprehensible by Humane Reason. Which is a stronger Evidence it is a Character of himself which God hath imprinted on the Minds of Men, which makes them so unanimously agree that he is, when they can neither see him, nor yet fully comprehend him. For any whole Nation, which have consented in the denial of a *Deity*, we have no evidence at all; some suspicions it is true there were at first concerning some very barbarous People in *America*, but it is since evident, tho' they are grosly mistaken as to the Nature of God, yet they worship something instead of him, such as the *Toupinamboults*, *Caribes*, *Patagons*, *Tapuiæ*, and others; of the last of which *Vossius* from one *Christophorus Arcissewski*, a *Polonian* Gentelman, who was among them, hath given a large account of their Religion, and the manner of their Worshipping of their Gods, both good and bad. And that which among these *Indians* much confirms our present Argument, is, That only those who have been the most barbarous and salvage Nations, have been suspected of Irreligion, but the more civiliz'd they have been, the more evident their sense of Religion. The *Peruvians* worship one chief God, whom they call *Virachocha*, and *Pachacamak*, which is as much as *The Creator of Heaven and Earth.* And of the Religion of the *Mexicans*, *Lipsius* and others speak. So that the nearer any have approach'd to Civility and Knowledge, the more ready they have been to own a Deity, and none have had so little sense of it, as they who are almost degenerated to Brutes; and whether of these two now comes nearer to Reason, let any one who hath it judge.

Vossius Addend. ad l. 1. de Idol. p. 2.

Vid. Acostam, l. 5. c. 3.

Lipsi. Mon: & Exempl. Politic.

Another great Evidence that God hath imprinted a Character or Idea of himself on the Minds of Men, is, *because such things are contain'd in this Idea of God, which do necessarily imply his existence.* The main force of this Argument lies in this, *That which we do clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to the nature and essence of a thing, may be with truth affirmed of the thing*; not that it may be affirm'd with truth to belong to the nature of the thing, for that were an empty *Tautology*, but it may be affirm'd with truth of the thing its self; as if I clearly perceive upon exact enquiry, that to be an Animal doth belong to the nature of Man, I may with truth affirm that Man is a living Creature; if I find it demonstrably true that a Triangle hath three Angles equal to two Right ones, then I may truly affirm it of any Triangle: But now we assume, That upon the most exact search and inquiry, I clearly perceive that necessary existence doth immutably belong to the nature of God; therefore, I may with as much truth affirm, that God exists, as that Man is a living Creature; or, a Triangle hath three Angles equal to two Right ones. But because many are so apt to suspect some kind of *Sophism* in this Argument, when it is managed from the Idea in Mens Minds, because that seems to imply only an objective reality in the Mind, and that nothing can be thence inferr'd as to the existence of the thing whose Idea it is, I therefore shall endeavour to manifest more clearly the force of this Argument, by proving severally the suppositions which it stands upon, which are these three: 1. *That clear and distinct perception of the Mind is the greatest Evidence we can have of the truth of any thing.* 2. *That we have this clear perception that necessary existence doth belong to the nature of God.* 3. *That if necessary existence doth belong to God's nature, it unavoidably follows, that he doth exist.* Nothing can be desir'd more plain or full, to demonstrate the force of this Argument, than by proving every one of these.

XIV. 2.

1. *That*

1. *That the greateſt Evidence we can have of the truth of a thing, is a clear and diſtinct perception of it in our Minds.* For otherwiſe the rational Faculties of Man's Soul wou'd be wholly uſeleſs, as being not fitted for any end at all, if upon a right uſe of them, Men were ſtill liable to be deceiv'd. I grant the imperfection of our Minds in this preſent ſtate is very great, which makes us ſo obnoxious to error and miſtake; but then that imperfection lies in the proneneſs in Man's Mind to be led by intereſt and prejudice in the judgment of things; but in ſuch things as are purely ſpeculative and rational, if the Mind cannot be certain it is not deceiv'd in them, it can have no certainty at all of any *Mathematical* Demonſtrations. Now we find in our own Minds a clear and convincing Evidence in ſome things, as ſoon as they are propounded to our Underſtandings, as that a *thing cannot be and not be at the ſame time*; that a *non-entity can have no proper Attributes*; that *while I reaſon and diſcourſe, I am*; theſe are ſo clear, that no Man doth ſuſpect himſelf deceiv'd at all in them. Beſides, if we had no ground of certainty at all in our judging things, to what purpoſe is there an Idea of true and falſe in our Minds, if it be impoſſible to know the one from the other? But I ſay not, that in all Perceptions of the Mind we have certain Evidence of truth, but only in ſuch as are clear and diſtinct; that is, when upon the greateſt conſideration of the nature of a thing, there appears no ground or reaſon at all to doubt concerning it; and this muſt ſuppoſe the Mind's abſtraction wholly from the Senſes; for we plainly find that while we attend to them, we may judge our ſelves very certain and yet be deceiv'd, as thoſe who have an *Idæriſm* in their Eyes, may judge with much confidence that they ſee things as clearly and diſtinctly as any other doth. Beſides, there are many things taken for granted by Men, which have no Evidence of Reaſon at all in them: Now if Men will judge of the truth of things by ſuch Principles, no wonder if they be deceiv'd. But when we ſpeak of clear and diſtinct Perception, we ſuppoſe the Mind to proceed upon evident Principles of Reaſon, or to have ſuch Notions of things, which as far as we can perceive by the light of Reaſon, do agree with the natures of the things we apprehend; if in ſuch things then there be no ground of certainty, it is as much as to ſay, our Faculties are to no purpoſe; which highly reflects either upon God or Nature. It is a noble Queſtion as any is in *Philoſophy*, What is the certain κριτήριον of the truth of things, or what ground of certainty the Mind hath to proceed upon in its judgment of the truth of ſuch objects as are repreſented to it? Nothing can render the *Philoſophy* of *Epicurus* more juſtly ſuſpected to any rational and inquiſitive Mind, than his making the Senſes the only conveyers of the truth of things to the Mind. The Senſes I grant do not in themſelves deceive any; but if I make the impreſſions of Senſe to be the only rule for the Mind to judge by of the truth of things, I make way for the greateſt impoſtures, and the moſt erring judgments. For if my Mind affirms every thing to be in its proper nature according to that Idea which the Imagination hath receiv'd from the impreſſions upon the organs of Senſe, it will be impoſſible for me ever to underſtand the right natures of things. Becauſe the natures of things may remain the ſame, when all thoſe things in them which affect the organs of Senſe may be alter'd, and becauſe the various Motion and Configuration of the Particles of Matter may make ſuch an impreſſion upon the Senſes, which may cauſe an Idea in us of that in the things themſelves, which yet may be

be only in the manner of Senſation; as ſome Philoſophers ſuppoſe it to be in Heat and Cold. Now if the Mind judgeth of the nature of things according to thoſe Ideas which come from the impreſſions made upon the organs of Senſe; how is it poſſible it ſhou'd ever come to a right judgment of the natures of things? So that in reference even to the groſſeſt material Beings, it muſt be the Perception only of the Mind, which can truly inform us of their proper Nature and Eſſence. Beſides, there are many Ideas of things in the Mind of Man which are capable to have Properties demonſtrated of them, which never ow'd their original to our Senſes; and were never imported to the Mind at the Keys of the Senſes. Such are moſt *Mathematical* Figures, which have their peculiar Properties and Demonſtrations; ſuch are all the mutual reſpects of things to each other, which may be as certain and evident to the Mind as its ſelf is: now it is plain by this, that all certainty of Knowledge is not convey'd by the Senſes; but our trueſt way of certain underſtanding the Nature of any thing, is by the clear and diſtinct Perception of the Mind, which is founded on the truth of our Faculties; and that however we may be deceiv'd when we do not make a right uſe of our Reaſon, becauſe of the imperfection of our preſent ſtate; yet if we ſay our Minds may be deceiv'd when things are evident and clear to them upon plain Principles of Reaſon, it is highly to reflect upon that God who gave Men rational Faculties, and made them capable of diſcerning Truth from Falſhood.

2. *That we have clear and diſtinct Perception that neceſſity of Exiſtence doth belong to the Nature of God.* For which we are to conſider the vaſt difference which there is in our Notion of the Nature of God, and of the Nature of any other Being. In all other Beings, I grant we may abſtract eſſence and Exiſtence from each other; now if I can make it appear, that there is evident Reaſon, *ex parte rei*, why I cannot do it in the Notion of God, then it will be more plain that neceſſity of Exiſtence doth immutably belong to his Nature. It is manifeſt to our Reaſon, that in all other Beings, which we apprehend the Natures of, nothing elſe can be imply'd in the Natures of them beyond bare poſſibility of Exiſtence; no, altho' the things which we do apprehend, do really exiſt; becauſe in forming an Idea of a thing, we abſtract from every thing which is not imply'd in the very Nature of the thing: now Exiſtence being contingent and poſſible, as to any other Being, it cannot be any ingredient of its Idea, becauſe it doth not belong to its Eſſence; for we may fully apprehend the Nature of the thing, without attributing Exiſtence to it. But now in our Conception of a Being, abſolutely perfect, bare poſſibility or contingency of Exiſtence ſpeaks a direct repugnancy to the Idea of him; for how can we conceive that Being abſolutely perfect, which may want that which gives life to all other Perfections, which is *Exiſtence?* The only ſcruple which Mens Minds are ſubject to in apprehending the force of this Argument lies in this, *Whether this neceſſary Exiſtence doth really belong to the Nature of that Being whoſe Idea it is, or elſe it be only a Mode of our Conception in apprehending God?* For clearing of this, we muſt conſider by what certain Rules we can know when the compoſition of things together in the Underſtanding doth depend upon

the mere Operation of the Mind, and when they do belong to the things themſelves and their immutable Nature. For which we have no Rule ſo certain and evident as this is, that in thoſe things which depend merely on the Act of the Mind joyning together, the Underſtanding cannot only abſtract one thing from another, but may really divide them in its Conceptions from each other: but in ſuch things which cannot be divided from each other, but the Eſſence of the thing is quite alter'd, it is a certain evidence that thoſe things were not conjoyn'd by the mere Act of the Mind, but do immutably belong to the Natures of the things themſelves. As for inſtance, when I conceive a Triangle inſcrib'd in a Square, a Man walking, a Horſe with wings, it is evident I may underſtand the Natures of all theſe things without theſe Affections of them, becauſe I can fully apprehend the Nature of a Triangle, without imagining a Square, a Man without walking, a Horſe without wings; thence it neceſſarily follows, that the joyning of theſe things together, was merely an Act of the Mind: But now I cannot conceive a Triangle not to have three Angles equal to two right ones, nor a Man that hath not Rationality belonging to him; for if I divide theſe Attributes from them, I deſtroy their Natures; and therefore the joyning of theſe together is not any mere Act of the Mind; but theſe are ſuch things as are imply'd in the very notion of them, and therefore immutably belongs to them. So now, when I conceive the notion of a Body, I can imagine all Perfections belonging to it, without conceiving it neceſſarily to exiſt; for it may be a Body ſtill, tho' it hath not its Being from it ſelf; but when I conceive a Being abſolutely perfect, it is impoſſible to imagine it ſhou'd have its Being from any other; and if it be from it ſelf, it muſt of neceſſity exiſt. For tho' the Mind ſtill be apt to doubt, whether Exiſtence in this Idea be only a Mode of Cogitation; yet that doubt may be eaſily remov'd, if the Mind doth but attend to this, that at leaſt Poſſibility of Exiſtence doth belong to all thoſe Beings which we have a clear Idea of in our Minds; and the reaſon why we attribute bare poſſibility to them, is becauſe we apprehend ſome Reaſon in our Minds which keeps us from attributing neceſſity of Exiſtence to them, as that it is not imply'd in its Nature, or that it doth depend on ſome other Being, or that it wants infinite Power, &c. Now all theſe Reaſons which make us attribute bare poſſibility of Exiſtence to any Being, are taken away when we conceive a Being abſolutely perfect; for then Exiſtence is imply'd among the number of Perfections; and this Being is independant upon all others, and infinitely powerful; ſo that nothing can hinder its Exiſtence; and therefore we muſt conclude that neceſſity of Exiſtence doth immutably belong to the Nature of God, and is not any Mode only of our Conception; becauſe if we take away neceſſity of Exiſtence from God, we loſe the notion of a Being abſolutely perfect.

The third thing, *That if neceſſary Exiſtence belongs to the Nature of God, he doth exiſt*, not only follows as a neceſſary Concluſion from the other two, as the Premiſſes, but is in its ſelf evident to any one's Reaſon; for it implies no leſs than a Contradiction for a Being to exiſt neceſſarily, and yet it be queſtionable, Whether it doth exiſt or no? Thus much I ſuppoſe may ſuffice here

here to explain and enforce this Argument; if any are yet unsatisfy'd, I refer them to those judicious Authors, who have made it their peculiar business to manage it, and vindicate it from all objections: which falls in only here as an Evidence that God hath imprinted a Character of himself on the Minds of Men, seeing we have so clear and distinct an Idea of such a Being, from whom, if we take away necessity of Existence, we destroy that Notion which our Minds have of an absolutely perfect Being. This is the first way whereby we can conceive an infinite Being may make himself known to Mankind, by imprinting an indelible Character of himself upon the Soul, which can be attributed to none besides himself without doing manifest violence to our own Faculties, and suspecting our selves deceiv'd in things which are most clear and evident to us.

Vid. Des Cartes Metaphys. Medit. & Resp. ad Object. D H. *More* Antidote against Atheism, *l.* 1. *ch.* 8. *Append. ch.* 5, 6, 7.

XV. I come to the second Evidence which God hath given us of his own Existence, which is the mark, and *impression which he hath left of an infinite Wisdom and Counsel, in the appearances which are in Nature.* There needs no great Criticism to find out the true Author of all the Works of Nature; the Works themselves shew the Author as plainly, as if his effigies were drawn upon them. If the great curiosity and contrivance of any artificial Engine speak the excellency of the Mechanical Wit of the Framer of it; what ridiculous folly will it be to impute that rare Mechanism of the Works of Nature to the blind and fortuitous motion of some Particles of Matter? Suppose a multitude of Letters casually thrown together, shou'd fall so handsomely in order, that we might read in them the Names of *Troja, Juno, Æneas, Dido, Turnus, Ascanius* or the like; is it possible for any to imagine that ever they shou'd reach the Grandeur, Stile, Matter and Accuracy of the whole Books of the *Æneids?* So granting, that now Matter being set in Motion by a Divine Power, may by its continual agitation, at last produce some of the appearances of Nature; yet what is this to the whole Universe, or the admirable Contrivance of any one part in it? If these things had been the result of mere Matter and Motion, when once the Particles of Matter had been so united and settled together, as to produce any one species of Animals in the World (which it is almost unconceivable they shou'd) yet we cannot think that if there had been but Symmetry of Parts enough for it merely to subsist it self, and propagate more, there cou'd have been any further Attempt made by those *Atoms*, which had been once settl'd in a determinate figure. How came it then to pass that there is not any one species of Animals in the World, but what hath such an Order, Symmetry and Contrivance of parts, which speaks more than mere necessity of Subsistence, and therefore speaks them to be the Effect of a Supreme Governour of the World, and not the Products of mere Matter? Is it possible, that any who is not before-hand resolv'd to exclude a *Deity*, shou'd imagine that any Particles of Matter shou'd fall into the exact Form, Order, Motion, and serviceableness to the World which the Heavenly Bodies are in, without Divine Counsel and Wisdom disposing of them? *Tully* tells us of a Speech of *Aristotle* to this purpose; *If we cou'd suppose Persons to have liv'd in some caverns of the earth, and to have enjoy'd every thing there of pleasure, and*

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2. *c.* 95.

riches, or whatever it is which we think makes Mens Lives happy, and had never been abroad upon the ſurface of the earth, but had only had ſome obſcure report of an infinite Power and Being; and that afterwards theſe Perſons ſhou'd by an opening of the caverns wherein they were, come abroad into theſe parts of the World, and ſhou'd ſuddenly behold the Earth, Sea, and the Heavens, and obſerve the vaſtneſs of the Clouds, and violence of Winds, and behold the bigneſs, beauty and influence of the Sun, and how the Day depended upon his preſence, and upon his withdrawing ſhou'd view the face of the Heavens again (as it were the *ſecond courſe* of Nature,) *the order and ornament of the Stars, the varieties of the light of the Moon, their riſing and ſetting, and their fixed and immoveable courſes; they cou'd not hold from believing there was a* Deity, *and that theſe were the effects of his Power.* So vaſtly different are the free and natural emanations of our Souls, from that which we force and ſtrain out of our ſelves by diſtorting and wringing thoſe free Principles of Reaſon which God hath given us. When a few ſorry Experiments and ſome arbitrary *Hypotheſes*, muſt make us form other Conceptions of things, than the Majeſty, Order and Beauty of them do naturally ſuggeſt to us: We ſee, when once we can but abſtract our Minds from thoſe prejudices which continual converſation with the World brings upon us, by that Speech of *Ariſtotle*, how readily our Minds will frame an excellent Commentary upon thoſe words of the Royal *Pſalmiſt*, *The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament ſhews his handy-work.* To which purpoſe likewiſe thoſe words of the excellent *Orator* himſelf in another place, are very obſervable; *Quid eſt enim verius quam neminem eſſe oportere tam ſtulte arrogantem, ut in ſe mentem & rationem putet ineſſe, in cælo mundoque non putet? aut ea quæ vix ſumma ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putat? Quem vero aſtrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque viciſſitudines, quem menſium temperatio, quemque ea quæ gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum eſſe cogant, hunc hominem omnino numerare qui dicet? What monſtrous arrogancy wou'd it be in any Man to think there is a Mind and Reaſon in himſelf, and that there is none in the World? Or to think thoſe things are mov'd without Reaſon and Underſtanding, which all that he hath is ſcarce able to comprehend? Neither can he deſerve the name of a Man, from whom the obſervation of the courſes of the Stars, the ſucceſſion and order of Seaſons, and the innumerable benefits which he enjoys in the World, doth not extort gratitude towards that Being which order'd all theſe things.* What a low opinion then had thoſe more refin'd and generous Spirits, who went only upon Principles of pure and undiſtorted Reaſon, of thoſe mean and ignoble Souls, which were inclin'd to *Atheiſm*; eſpecially then, when Religion was ſo abus'd, that it was true of the wiſeſt of them, what one ſaid of *Eraſmus*, *Magis habuit quid fugeret quam quid ſequeretur*, they knew what to avoid, but not what they ſhou'd embrace: And yet when they ſaw ſo much into the Folly and Superſtition of Heathen Worſhip, they ſaw the greateſt reaſon ſtill to adhere to the belief of a Deity, as may be clearly ſeen, eſpecially in the ſecond of thoſe excellent Dialogues of *Tully*, *De Natura Deorum:* Where this particular Argument to prove a Deity from the admirable

Cicero de Legibus, l. 2.

admirable contrivance of the Works of Nature, is manag'd with a great deal of Eloquence and Reaſon, and by particular enumeration of moſt conſiderable parts of the Univerſe. So unbecoming a late Philoſopher was that Reaſon of his, why he wav'd the Argument from the conſideration of the World, to infer a Deity, becauſe the ends of God are unſearchable, as flowing from his Infinite Wiſdom. For what tho' God may conceal ſome things from Men, which he intends, and are of no concernment for Men to know, muſt therefore of neceſſity thoſe ends of his be unſearchable in his works of Creation, which refer ſo immediately to the advantage of Life, and tend ſo much to the veneration of the Deity?

XVI. Nay, the peculiar uſe and ſerviceableneſs of many parts of the Univerſe, eſpecially of Animals, and chiefly of Man, is ſo evident, that this hath been the main Argument which hath induced ſome, otherwiſe *Atheiſtical* enough to acknowledge and adore a Deity. And altho' the *Epicureans* be lamentably puzled to give any tolerable account of many other appearances in Nature, yet they no where diſcover ſo much Weakneſs and Ignorance, as when they come to diſcourſe *De uſu partium*, about the contrivance of the parts of Man's Body. Whoſe Opinion is thus briefly delivered by *Lucretius*;

Nil ideo quoniam natum'ſt in corpore ut uti *Lucret. l. 4.*
Poſſemus; *ſed quod natum'ſt id procreat uſum.*

i. e. *that no parts of Man's body were deſign'd for that uſe which they are imploy'd for, but the parts by chance fell into that form they are in, and Men by degrees brought them to their preſent uſe and ſerviceableneſs.* An Opinion at firſt view ſo ſtrangely unreaſonable, that we cannot think *Epicurus* ſhou'd have ever embraced it, had it not unavoidably follow'd upon his *Hypotheſis* of all things in the Univerſe reſulting only from a fortuitous Concourſe of Atoms: According to which he ſuppos'd in Man a different configuration of Parts wou'd happen from the various Agitation and Concretion of thoſe little Particles which at firſt run together in the faſhion of a Man; and becauſe that Man had in him a more florid and vivacious Spirit, made up of the moſt ſubtle and movable Atoms, thence Motion came into the ſeveral parts futable to the different Conformation of them. And becauſe thoſe Atoms of which the Soul is compos'd, are capable of Senſation, thence it comes to paſs, that it ſees in the Eye, hears in the Ear, and ſmells in the Noſtrils. This is the moſt which is made of the Opinion of *Epicurus* by the late ſedulous Vindicator of him, which yet himſelf calls *intoleranda opinio*; and it will appear to be ſo, not only as contradicting, what God himſelf hath deliver'd concerning Man, but what Reaſon it ſelf will eaſily ſuggeſt from the conſideration of the ſeveral parts of Man's Body. It muſt be confeſs'd there were ſome Philoſophers elder than *Epicurus*, who were much inclin'd to this Opinion, as *Democritus*, *Empedocles*, *Anaxagoras*, and others; yet we find thoſe who more narrowly ſearch'd into the Natures of living Creatures, were thereby brought to acknowledge a Divine Providence, which with a great deal

deal of Wisdom did order the several parts of Animals, and adapted them to their peculiar uses. And altho' *Aristotle* in his Book *de partibus Animalium*, hath said enough to refute the fond Opinion of those Philosophers; yet none hath handled this Argument with more exactness and accuracy, and with a more peculiar reflection on *Epicurus*, than *Galen* hath done in his excellent piece *De-usu partium*. Which *Gassendus* thinks *Galen* writ with a kind of *Enthusiasm* upon him (*adeo totum opus videre conscriptum* ἐνθουσιαστικῶς) and so all those seventeen Books of his on that subject, are a kind of 119th *Psalm* in Philosophy, or a perpetual *Hymn* upon the praise of the great Creator, a just Commentary on those words of the *Psalmist*, Psal. 139. 14. *I am fearfully and wonderfully made; marvellous are thy works, and that my Soul knoweth right well.* In the entrance of those Books, *Galen* first shews the great variety of parts which is in several Animals sutable to their several Natures; the Horse because of his Swiftness and Pride, hath the strongest Hoofs and most curl'd Main; the Lion because of his Fierceness and Courage hath his Strength lying in his Teeth and Paws; the Bull in his Horns; the Boar in his Tusks; the Hart and Hare being timorous Creatures, their parts are made fittest for flight: but Man because he hath a principle of Reason in him, hath no defensive or offensive Weapons in his Body, but he hath Hands to make use of both; which being joyn'd with, and imploy'd by his Reason, far exceed all those advantages which any other Creatures have, being imploy'd not only to defend himself, but to build Houses, make Cloaths, Arms and Nets, whatever is useful for himself, or hurtful to those Creatures which he hath command over; but because Man was made for Society and civil Converse, therefore his hands were not only imploy'd to defend himself or hurt other Creatures, but for the mutual benefit and advantage of Mankind; for by these were Laws written, Temples built, all Instruments of Arts fram'd; by them we enjoy the benefit of others Wits, we can discourse with *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Hippocrates*, and other Ancients, tho' at such a distance from us. Now that the Configuration of Parts is not the cause of the use of them afterwards; as the Lion's paw of his Courage, the Bull's horns of his Fierceness, or the slenderness of the Hart of its Fearfulness; appears by this, because the young Ones of the several kinds of Animals, before their parts are grown up, strive to make the same use of them which the others do. As *Galen* saith, he had often seen a Bull-calf pushing with his Head before any Horns were grown out, and a Colt kicking when his Hoofs were yet tender, and a young Boar defending himself with his Jaws before he had any Tusks, which is an evident Argument that the parts were designed for the use, and not the use to follow the parts. *So*, saith he, *take three Eggs, one of an Eagle, another of a Duck, and a third of a Serpent, and after they are hatch'd thro' a moderate heat, we shall find when they are but newly hatch'd, the two first will be striving to fly before they have Wings, and the third endeavouring to creep away on its Belly; and if you breed them up to greater Perfection, and bring them into the open Air, you will presently see the young Eagle mounting into the Air, the Duck quoddling in a Pool, and the Serpent creep under Ground.*

Gassend. Tom. 2. l. 2. §. 3.

After-

Afterwards he comes particularly to handle the ſeveral parts of Man's Body, and firſt begins with the Hand, and ſhews in each part that it were impoſſible to have fram'd them with greater conveniency for their ſeveral uſes than they have. The uſe of the Hand is to take hold of any thing which Man can uſe; now there being things of ſuch different ſizes which Men may uſe, it had been impoſſible for the Hand, if it had been one intire thing, and undivided, that it cou'd have held things greater or leſſer than its ſelf, but it muſt have been equal to it. But now as the Fingers are placed and divided, they are equally fit for laying hold of Objects of any ſize or quantity; for the leaſt things, as a Barley Corn, are taken up with the Fore-finger and the Thumb, things ſomewhat bigger are taken up by the ſame, but not by the extremities of them as before; things ſomewhat bigger than theſe, with the Thumb, Fore-finger and Middle-finger, and ſo on by degrees, till at laſt the whole Hand is us'd: ſo that the diviſion of the Hand into Fingers is neceſſary. Neither were this enough, but the very poſition of the Fingers as they are, is neceſſary too; for they had been uſeleſs if they had been all divided in a right line; for the firmeſt hold is either circular, or at leaſt in two oppoſite points; but now this is provided for, by the poſition of the Thumb, which may equally joyn with any of the Fingers in taking hold of any thing. After this, he largely ſhews the particular neceſſity of the ſoftneſs, roundneſs of the Fleſh, and Nails on the tops of the Fingers; and the ſpecial uſefulneſs of theſe; and then comes to the Bones of the Fingers, how neceſſary they are for firm-hold, and if there had been but one Bone in each Finger, they wou'd have ſerv'd only for thoſe things which we take up when they are extended; but now ſeeing they have three ſeveral joynts, they are fitted for all kinds of things; for when we bow our Fingers, we uſe them as tho' they had no bones at all, and when we ſtretch them out, as tho' they were all but one intire Bone; and the ſeveral inflections of the Joynts ſerve for all kind of Figures: and then he ſhews the neceſſity of the Fleſh within the Fingers, and on either ſide of them, and upon them; and ſo with wonderful accuracy handles the magnitude, number, figure of the Bones, and nature of the Joynts of the Fingers, and then the Tendons and Muſcles belonging to the ſeveral Fingers, which after he hath diſcours'd on thro' his firſt Book he concludes it with the manifeſt inconveniency which wou'd follow in the hand, were not every thing in it in that exact magnitude, poſition, and figure in which it is. With the ſame exactneſs he goes thro' all the parts of the Body, handling in the ſecond Book all that belongs to the Arm, in the third the Legs, in the fourth and fifth the Organs of Nutrition, in the ſixth and ſeventh the Lungs, in the eighth and ninth the Head, in the tenth the peculiar and admirable Fabrick of the Eyes, in the eleventh the other parts of the Face, in the twelfth the parts of the Back, and ſo in the thirteenth, in the fourteenth and fifteenth the Genitals, in the ſixteenth the Arteries, Veins, and Nerves, and in the laſt the peculiar Diſpoſition and Figure of all theſe Parts, and the uſefulneſs of the whole Deſign: Which is as great as can be in any Work whatſoever, which is for us to take notice of the admirable Wiſdom of God in contriving the ſeveral

parts

parts of the Body of Man: So that, that whole Book contains in it a moſt full and pregnant demonſtration of a Deity, which every Man carries about with him in the Structure of his Body, on which account Men need not go out of themſelves to find proof of a Deity, whether they conſider their Minds or their Bodies, of which it may be more truly ſaid than *Heraclitus* of old did of his Stove, *Etiam hic Dii ſunt.* So that of all Perſons, I ſhou d moſt wonder at thoſe whoſe Imployment particularly leads them to the Underſtanding the parts and nature of Man's Body, if the Proverb be not a great injury to them, ſince they have fuller inſight into this demonſtration of a Deity in the Fabric of Man's Body, than many others who converſe only with ſome jejune and ſapleſs Writings. And certainly, whatever is imagin'd to the contrary by Men of weak Underſtandings, the beſt way to cure the World of *Atheiſm*, is true Philoſophy, or a ſearch into the Natures of things; which the more deep and profound it is, the more impoſſible will it be found to explicate all the *Phænomena* of Nature by mere Matter and Motion. It was wiſely obſerv'd of a great Perſon and Philoſopher, that a narrow and ſlight Inſpection into Nature, inclin'd Men of weak Heads to *Atheiſm*; but a more thorow-inſight into the cauſes of things, made them more evidently ſee the neceſſary dependance of things on the great and wiſe Creator of them. A little knowledge of Philoſophy is apt to make Mens heads dizzy, and then in danger of falling into the Gulf of *Atheiſm*, but a more careful and diligent view of it, brings them into Sobriety and their right Wits again. Such a ſlight Inſpection had the Followers of *Epicurus* into the Nature of things; for when they found how in the preſent State of the World the various Motion and Configuration of the Particles of Matter wou'd handſomely ſalve many appearances of Nature, they, drunk with the ſucceſs, reel preſently into an Infinite Space, and there imagine they behold Infinite Worlds made of the concretion of Atoms, and ever ſince their Eyes have been ſo duſted with theſe little Atoms, that they cou'd ſee nothing elſe in the World but them. Which how groſs and unreaſonable it is, will appear from our preſent ſubject; for who but *Lucretius* or *Epicurus* cou'd ever think that our Noſtrils were at firſt faſhion'd as they are merely by the violent impulſe of the Air within, which wou'd force it ſelf a paſſage out? But how came the Air into the Body before it was forced out? Did it break open the Lips, make all that round cavity in the Mouth, for a paſſage thro' the *aſpera Arteria?* But if when it was in, it wou'd come out again, was not the Mouth wide enough to let it go? Or did the firſt Man ſhut his Mouth on purpoſe to find another vent for the Air? If ſo, how chance the force of the Air did not carry away the *Epiglottis?* Or if it got ſafely up to the Noſe, how came it not to force a paſſage out about the Eyes rather than to go down ſo low firſt? But if we believe theſe rare Contrivers of Man's Body, all the inward Veſſels of the Body were made by the courſe of Water, as Channels are; but how is it poſſible, to imagine, that the *Oeſophagus* and the Stomach ſhou'd be ſo curiouſly contriv'd by the mere force of Water? and that all the *Inteſtines* ſhou'd be made only as Channels, to let it out again when it was once in? but how comes then ſuch a kind of Reciprocation and

Ariſtot. de part. Anim. l. 1.

Peri-

Periſtaltic Motion in thoſe Veſſels? how comes the ſeveral Coats of them to be ſo firm? if it had been only a forced paſſage, it wou'd have been direct and thro' the ſubſtance of the parts, as we find it to be in all forced paſſages in the Body of the Earth. Beſides, if the Water receiv'd into the Stomach forced the paſſage thro' the Guts, how comes it not to run in the channel it had made for it ſelf? or did it not like that paſſage when other things came into it, and therefore found out a more ſecret one into the Bladder? but if that were made by the Water, how came it to be ſo full of Membranes, and ſo ſubject to dilatation? Thus ridiculous will Men make themſelves, rather than ſhew themſelves Men in owning and adoring that infinitely wiſe and powerful God, who *orders all things in the World, according to the counſel of his Will.* What can be more plain and evident than the peculiar uſefulneſs of the ſeveral parts of Man's Body is? What other intent can be imagin'd that Man is form'd with a Mouth, but only for taking in of Nouriſhment, and for receiving and letting forth of Air? or that an Infant is ſo ready to open his Mouth, but that there are Breaſts and Milk for him to ſuck in order to his Nouriſhment? Why ſhou'd the *Oeſophagus* be ſo hollow and the Stomach ſo wide, but that one was provided for the better conveyance of the Meat down, and the other for the Fermentation of it? Whence come all the other Veſſels to be ſo conveniently plac'd, were it not for the diſtribution of Nouriſhment into the ſeveral parts, or for conveying away the Excrements of it? Can any one think that the ſeveral Muſcles and Tendons ſhou'd be plac'd in the more ſolid parts for any other end than for the better Motion of them? or that the Nerves ſhou'd be deriv'd from the Brain into the ſeveral parts of the Body for any other deſign than to be the inſtruments of Senſe and Motion? or that the continual motion of the Heart ſhou'd be for any other purpoſe, than for receiving and diſtributing of the Blood thro' the Arteries into the parts of the Body? or that the Eye with all its curious Fabric ſhou'd be only accidentally imploy'd in ſeeing? Theſe things are ſo plain, that however the *Epicureans* may more eaſily loſe themſelves, and deceive others in explaining the appearances of Nature in ſome inanimate Beings, yet when they come with their blind concourſe of *Atoms* to give an account of the parts of Animals, they miſerably befool themſelves, and expoſe themſelves only to contempt and pity. It were eaſy to multiply examples in this kind, but I ſhall only mention one thing more, which is, If all the parts of Man's Body have no higher original than the concourſe of *Atoms* in the firſt Man and Woman, by what were the Umbilical Veſſels form'd whereby the Child in the Womb receives its Nouriſhment? by what *Atoms* was the paſſage of the *Succus nutritius* fram'd from the Mother to the Child? how come thoſe Veſſels to cloſe up ſo naturally upon the birth of the Child, and it to ſeek its Nouriſhment in quite another way? Will the Particles of Matter which by their concretion form'd the Firſt Pair, ſalve this too? Thus ſtill we ſee how impoſſible it is (to go no further than our ſelves) to give any tolerable account of things without an infinite Power and Being which produc'd all theſe things, and hath left ſo plain an inſcription of Himſelf upon the

works of Nature, that none but those who shut their Eyes can abstain from seeing it.

XVII. 3. I come now to the third Evidence of a *Deity*, which is, *That there are some Beings in the World, which cannot depend upon Matter or Motion, i. e.* that there are some Spiritual and Immaterial Substances or Beings, (for if the thing be acknowledg'd, it is unbecoming a Man to contend about words) the consequence of this for the proving a *Deity*, neither hath been, nor I suppose will be deny'd, by such who question an infinite Being; the same Principles leading to the denying and the Proof of both, and immaterial Beings being the strongest proof that there is something above Matter in the World. If there be then such things in the World, which Matter and Motion cannot be the causes of, then there are certainly spiritual and immaterial Beings, and that I shall make appear both as to the Minds of Men, and some extraordinary effects which are produc'd in the World.

1. I begin with the nature of the Soul of Man. And herein I must confine my self to those Arguments which directly prove my present purpose, and on that account must quit all those common Arguments to prove the Soul's immortality from the Attributes of God; for all these do suppose the existence of a *Deity* as already evident; neither can I rely with safety on the way which some have taken to prove the immortality of the Soul merely from the *Phænomena* of Sensation, which they endeavour to prove, cannot be perform'd by mere Matter and Motion; for granting all this, yet the utmost that can be prov'd by it is no greater immortality in our Souls than in the Souls of Brutes; and in the sense in which that is admitted, I suppose an *Epicurean* will not deny the Soul of Man to be immortal, as *Demonax* in *Lucian* said, when he was ask'd whether the Soul were immortal or no, *It is* (said he) *but as all things else are*; for those who make the Soul to be nothing but some more subtile and active Particles of matter, do not think that upon death they are annihilated, but that only they are dispers'd and dissipated; or in the *Platonists* Phrase, may *return to the Soul of the World*. These ways I cannot think to be sufficient probations of such a spiritual and immaterial Being in Man, which we now inquire for, much less can I make use of so precarious and infirm an *Hypothesis* as *Præ-existence*, which makes Men apt to suspect the cogency of such Reasons which tend to prove the immortality of the Soul, which are link'd with a supposition, not only inevident either to Sense or Reason, but likewise needless and impertinent. For I know no one Argument which doth directly prove the immateriality of the Soul, that doth in the least infer any necessity of *Præ-existence*, but on the same accounts it will prove the Soul's eternity. Being therefore thus at liberty to inquire into the Nature of the Soul consider'd in her self, our only way must be to find out such peculiar properties in the Soul of Man, which cannot be salv'd on supposition, there were nothing else but Matter and Motion in the World. Supposing then that all Sensation in Man doth arise from corporeal Motion which is so strongly asserted by the modern Philosophers, and that the highest Conceptions which depend on Sense, can amount no higher than Imagination,

gination, which is evident; if it can then be prov'd that there is a Principle of Action in Man, which proceeds in a different way of operation than Senſation doth, and that there are ſuch operations of the Soul which are not Imaginations, it will be then clear that there is a Principle in Man higher than Matter and Motion. Now altho' it be a task ſufficiently difficult to explain the manner of Senſation it ſelf in a mere mechanical way, ſuppoſing no higher Principle than mere Matter, yet it will appear far more difficult, nay impoſſible without a ſpiritual or immaterial Being to ſalve ſuch appearances in Man which tranſcend the power of Imagination; which will appear by theſe following Operations of the Mind, which every one who hath it, may find within himſelf.

1. *Correcting the errors of Imagination.* For if all our Perceptions were nothing elſe but the Images of corporeal things left in the Brain, the judgment of the Mind muſt of neceſſity be according to the impreſſions, which are made upon the Organs of Senſe. But now if our Minds can and do form apprehenſions of things quite different from thoſe which are convey'd by Senſe, there muſt be a higher Principle of knowledge in Man than Imagination is. For which the common inſtance of the juſt magnitude of the Sun is very plain; If we judge according to the image which is convey'd to the Brain by our Eyes, we can never imagine the Sun to be bigger than he ſeems to us to be; nay tho the ſight be advantaged by the help of *Teleſcopes*, it cannot receive ſuch an Image or Idea of the Sun which anſwers to its juſt magnitude, *viz.* that it is 160 times bigger than the Earth. From whence now comes this apprehenſion of the bigneſs of the Sun above that proportion which can poſſibly come in at our Senſes? If it be ſaid, *That by the obſervation of the leſſening of objects according to the proportion of diſtance, the Mind may come to underſtand how much bigger the Sun may be than he ſeems*; I grant it, but withal inquire how the Imagination comes to have Proportions and Diſtances which are mere reſpects, and can have no corporeal phantaſms whereby to be repreſented to it; ſo that by this very way of ratiocination it is evident, that there is ſome principle in Man beyond Imagination. Again, when the Mind by ratiocination hath proceeded thus far, and finds the Sun to be ſo great, what Idea is there of this magnitude in the Mind? the Mind cannot fix it ſelf on any thing but it muſt have an Idea of it; from whence comes this Idea? not from corporeal phantaſms; for none of them cou'd ever convey the due magnitude of the Sun to the Mind, and therefore the forming of this Idea muſt be a pure act of Intellection which corrects the errors of Imagination, and is a Principle above it. So in the ſight of a ſtick, when under water, the repreſentation of it by the Senſe to Imagination is as crooked; for corporeal Motion carries things to the Eye, without any judgment upon them; the Eye conveys the Imagination to the Brain; and according to the rules of corporeal Perception muſt preſently take every thing for true which is convey'd thither; now from what Principle is it that this error of our Senſes is corrected? So in many other things wherein our Imaginations are quite puzl'd, and when we go according to them, it is impoſſible to apprehend things as our

Reaſon tells us they are; thus as to the *Antipodes* our Imaginations are wholly of the Mind of the Ancients, that the *Antipodes* to us muſt needs be in danger of knocking their heads againſt the Stars, and if they go upon any thing, it muſt be their Heads, and that that part of the Heavens which is in the other *Hemiſphere* is below us; theſe are pertinacious errors of Imagination while we adhere to that, and are only corrigible by our Reaſon, which makes it evident to be otherwiſe. Beſides, there are many things our Reaſon and Underſtanding inform us that they may be, and yet our Imaginations can form no Idea of them; let an *Epicurean* Philoſopher try the power of his Imagination in his *Inane* or *Infinite empty Space*, and he will ſoon find, that as ſtrong as his Phancy is, it will ſoon tire and retreat, as not being able to courſe thro' ſo unimaginable a Space. So for Eternal Duration our Reaſon tells us the thing is poſſible, but when our Imaginations begin to fardle up ſome Conceptions of it, they are preſently tying both ends together; which will make a ſtrange Idea of Eternity; the caſe is the ſame in the infinite Diviſibility of Quantity, which *Epicurus* was ſomewhat aware of when he deny'd the thing. But how many *Mathematical Problems* are there which will jade our Imaginations preſently, and yet our Reaſon ſtands ſtill and aſſures us of the poſſibility of the things, as in *two lines coming nearer ſtill to each other, and yet never meeting*, and in many other things, which moſt clearly evince that there is a higher Faculty in Man which exceeds Matter and Motion, when it is able thus to correct the faults and to ſupply the defects of Imagination.

XVIII. 2. *Reflex acts of the Mind upon it ſelf, argue a higher Principle than Imagination.* That there are ſuch things is evident to any one who hath any uſe of Cogitation; and if any one doubt of it, his very doubting argues he hath reflex Acts; for he cou'd not doubt whether he had or no, but by Reflection upon himſelf. Now that reflex Acts ſhou'd be caus'd thro' Matter and Motion, or thro' mere Imagination is unconceivable. For we ſee no Matter can act upon it ſelf: indeed one part of extended Matter may act upon another, but not purely upon it ſelf; the extremities of the Fingers can never feel themſelves, tho' they can touch each other; neither can Imagination reflect on it ſelf; for that proceeding upon Corporeal Images, muſt have ſuch a repreſentation from the Senſes of what it acts upon; now what image of it ſelf can be convey'd to the Imagination thro' the external Organs of Senſe? The Eye may ſee thro' the motion of the objects of Sight preſſing upon it; but how can it ſee that it ſees? ſo the Imagination receives the images convey'd to the Brain; but what ſhop hath it to make new ones in of it ſelf, and ſo to be guilty of the greateſt Idolatry or worſhipping its own Image? But tho' the Imagination cannot thus reflect, yet we find ſuch a Principle within us that is very apt to retire into it ſelf, and recollect things which cou'd never have been conſerv'd ſo long in that ſhop of ſhadows, the Imagination. For if Imagination be nothing elſe, but, as a modern * Philoſopher defines it, *Conception remaining, and a little and little decaying from and after the act of Senſe, like the Motion of Water after a ſtone is thrown into it*; how is it poſſible that at ſo great a diſtance of Years, as we commonly find, the image of a thing

* Hobbs's *Humane Nature, ch. 3. ſect. 1.*

a thing may be retriev'd with as much facility and freſhneſs as to circumſtances, as if it were but new done? And that account which he gives of Remembrance is very weak and inſufficient, when he tells us, that *Remembrance is nothing elſe but the miſſing of parts, which every Man expecteth ſhould ſucceed after they have a conception of the whole.* For according to this, it is impoſſible for the Mind to retrieve any object without mutilation of it; and ſo there cannot poſſibly be a recollecting of all circumſtances, when an object is once paſs'd, and the Motion begins to decay. But all this while, we underſtand nothing by what means this decaying Motion ſhou'd continue ſo long as our Memory can fetch things back, or by what means an object when once paſs'd, can be recover'd again, if Memory be nothing elſe but decaying Motion. Such perplexities muſt needs ariſe, when Men will undertake to ſalve the inward operations of the Soul by mere Motion; but is it not evident that many times when the Mind is imploy'd about other things, ſome Phantaſms of things long ago paſt will come and preſent themſelves to the Mind with as much clearneſs as if new done? whereas if Memory were decaying Motion, the longer paſt, the more impoſſible wou'd it be to recover any thing; but, do we not find that many old Men will better remember the circumſtances of many things they did in their Childhood, than a year or two before? Beſides we ſee what quickneſs and vivacity there is in our Intellectual Faculties above Corporeal Motion, with what facility the Mind turns it ſelf from one object to another, how ſuddenly it rangeth the whole World, how it trips over Mountains, croſſeth the Ocean, mounts to the Skies, and at laſt quarries upon it ſelf, and all in the twinkling of an intellectual Eye. As quick as the Eye of the Body is, the Mind far exceeds it, and can withdraw the Imagination from attending the Organs of Senſe; thus do Men who have their Minds much fix'd, fix their Eyes too; and yet afterwards can ſcarce tell themſelves what they have look'd on all that while. Sometimes the Mind fits and compares Phantaſms together, and ſports it ſelf in ſorting them into ſeveral ranks and orders, and making matches between ſuch things which are ſure to have no affinity with each other, which are thence called *entia rationis*, or the Creatures of the Mind. And can all theſe and many other ſuch operations which Men are conſcious to themſelves of, be nothing elſe but the Motion of ſome flegmatic Matter, the Reaction of the Brain, and the mere effects of Imagination?

3. *The profound ſpeculations of the Mind argue a power far above Imagination and Corporeal Motion.* I wonder how *Epicurus* his Soul, when, if we believe him, it was made up of *Atoms*, cou'd ever imagine an *Infinite Vacuity?* Cou'd mere *Atoms* ever diſpute whether they were *Atoms* or no? For I doubt not but *Epicurus* was fain to argue much againſt himſelf, before he cou'd perſuade himſelf to ſo ſtupendious a piece of folly. Were there nothing in Man but mere Corporeal Motion, whence came the diſpute, whether the Soul were Corporeal or no? Can *Atoms* frame *Syllogiſms* in *Mood* and *Figure?* and mere Matter argue *pro* and *con*, whether it be Matter or ſomething elſe? What kind of Aereal Particles were their Souls compounded of, who firſt fanſy'd themſelves to be immaterial? What ſtrange agitations of Matter were thoſe which

which first made Men think of an Eternal state? which thoughts have ever since so stuck upon these little Spherical Bodies, that they cou'd never yet disburthen themselves of them? Whence come such amazing fears, such dreadful apprehensions, such sinking thoughts of their future condition in Minds that wou'd fain ease themselves by believing, that death wou'd put a period both to Soul and Body? Whence on the other side come such incouraging hopes, such confident expectations, such comfortable prepossessions of their future state, in the Souls of good Men, when their Bodies are nearest to the grave? *Seneca*, who was somewhat dubious sometimes as to the future condition of the Soul, yet cou'd tell his dear *Lucilius* with what pleasure he cou'd think of it; and cou'd elsewhere say of the Soul, *Et hoc habet argumentum divinitatis suæ quod illum divina delectant, nec ut alienis interest sed ut suis: The Soul had that mark of Divinity in it, that it was most pleas'd with Divine Speculations, and convers'd with them as with matters which nearly concern'd it.* And when it hath once view'd the dimensions of the Heavens, *contemnit domicilii prioris angustias*, it was asham'd of the Cottage it dwelt in; nay, were it not for these Speculations, *non fuerat operæ pretium nasci*, it had not been worth while for the Soul to have been in the Body; and as he goes on, *detrahe hoc inestimabile bonum, non est vita tanti ut sudem, ut æstuem.* Cou'd there be now so great an *Epicurism* in Contemplation, were the Soul of Man of *Epicurus* his mould, a mere complexion of *Atoms?* wou'd dull and heavy Matter ever have delighted to have search'd so much into the causes of things, to have gone over the World in its Speculations, and found more sweetness in Knowledge, than the little *Epicure*, the Bee, tasts in his choicest Flowers? *Epicurus* his own Philosophy is a demonstration against himself; if his Soul had not been of a purer Nature than he fansy'd, when his Brain had been well heated at his Study, those more vivid and spirituous Particles, like the spirits of Wine, had been in danger of evaporation, and leaving the more lumpish matter to complete his work. Of all Persons, I most admire that Philosophers, who make so much use of their Understandings, shou'd so ungratefully requite them, and serve them like old Horses, when they have made them do all the service they cou'd, turn them into the high-ways, and let them die in a ditch. But yet all Philosophers have not been so unthankful, some have understood the worth of their Souls, and asserted it, if they have not us'd too high, i. e *Platonical* expressions of it, making it a Particle, not of Matter, but of the Divine Nature it self, a little Deity in a Cottage, that stays here a-while, and returns to that upper Region from whence it came. As *Manilius* speaks,

Senec. præf. ad Quæst. Natur.

Manil. l. 4.

An dubium est habitare Deum sub pectore nostro,
In cœlumque redire animas, cœloque venire?

And while the Soul is here in its Cage, it is continually fluttering up and down, and delighteth to look out now at this part, and then at another, to take a view by degrees of the whole Universe, as the same Poet goes on,

Quid

Quid mirum noſcere mundum
Si poſſunt homines, quibus eſt & mundus in ipſis :
Exemplumque Dei quiſque eſt in imagine parva ?

The Soul hath nothing more delightful to it than Knowledge, and no Knowledge ſo pleaſing and ſatisfactory as of him whoſe Image and Superſcription it bears, who makes Himſelf moſt known to ſuch as enquire after him ;

Seque ipſum inculcat & offert
Ut bene cognoſci poſſit.

I conclude this with that of *Seneca*, in that excellent Preface to his *Natural Queſtions*, *O quam contempta res eſt homo niſi ſupra humana ſe erexerit ! What a pitiful thing is Man, were it not that his Soul was apt to ſoar above theſe earthly things ?* And by this Aptneſs to ſoar ſo high above theſe Terrene Objects, and to converſe with ſo much freedom with ſpiritual Beings, as well as abſtracted Notions we may certainly infer that our Rational Souls are of a far more noble and refin'd Nature than that more feculent Principle of Imagination, which always converſes in *fæce Romuli*, and can go no further than our Senſes carry it. And thus I have made good the firſt proof, that there is ſomething above Matter and Motion in the World, which is from that immaterial Being which is in Man.

XIX. 2. The next Evidence which we have of a Being above Matter and Motion, is, from *the extraordinary effects which have been in Nature.* I ſpeak not now merely of ſuch things which by their Natures and Effects are manifeſted to proceed from ſome Beings which bear ill-will to Mankind, multitudes of which are related by Men philoſophical and inquiſitive, with ſuch enumerations of circumſtances, and particular Evidences, that they are not mere impoſtures, that one may on the ſame grounds queſtion any Matter of fact which himſelf did not ſee, as ſuch relations which are deliver'd by Perſons without intereſt or deſign, and ſuch as were able to judge of the truth of circumſtances ; ſuch are both ancient and modern Philoſophers, Phyſicians, States-men, and others. Neither ſhall I inſiſt on ſuch Prodigies, which oft-times preſage revolutions in States, if we believe *Machiavel* himſelf, who in a whole Chapter deſignedly proves it ; and profeſſeth himſelf utterly to ſeek for the cauſes of them, unleſs they may be attributed to ſome Spirits and Intelligences in the Air, which give the World notice of ſuch things to come. But thoſe things which I ſuppoſe have the moſt clear and undoubted Evidence of true and undoubted Miracles (the Matters of fact being affirm'd by Eye-witneſſes, who ſeal'd the truth of them with their Lives) are thoſe recorded in the Holy Scriptures ; which there are only two ways to evade, either by queſtioning the truth of the things, which I ſuppoſe in the precedent Book we have prov'd with as much rational Evidence as any thing of that nature is capable of, or elſe that the things therein recorded might be ſalv'd without a *Deity*. For which only two ways have been excogitated by *Atheiſtical* Spirits, either attributing

Machiav. diſput. l. 1. c. 56.

buting them to the power and influence of the Stars, the foundations of which fond and abſurd Opinion have been taken away by thoſe many Writers, who have rationally confuted the whole Art of *Judicial Aſtrology*, or elſe that they are done by mere power of Imagination, which is the way of *Avicenna* and ſome other *Arabic* Writers, which is ſo wild an effect of the power of Imagination, that nothing doth ſo much demonſtrate the irregular Motions of it, as ſuch an Opinion doth; and is ſufficiently derided and refuted by *Pomponatius* himſelf. Now then, it being an acknowledg'd Principle in Nature, *That every thing continues in the courſe it is in, till ſomething more powerful put it out*, if then ſuch things have been in the World, which have been real alterations of the courſe of Nature, as the *Sun's ſtanding ſtill in the time of* Joſhua, then there muſt be ſomething above Matter and Motion, and conſequently that there is a God.

Vid. D.H. *More's* Myſtery of Godlineſs, *l.* 7. *c.* 14, 15, 16, 17.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the Origin of the Universe.

I. *The necessity of the belief of the Creation of the World, in order to the truth of Religion. Of the several Hypotheses of the Philosophers who contradict* Moses: *With a particular examination of them.* II. *The ancient Tradition of the World consonant to* Moses; *prov'd from the Ionic Philosophy of* Thales, *and the Italic of* Pythagoras. III. *The Pythagoric Cabala rather Ægyptian than Mosaic. Of the fluid Matter, which was the material Principle of the Universe.* IV. *Of the Hypothesis of the Eternity of the World asserted by* Ocellus Lucanus *and* Aristotle. V. *The weakness of the Foundations on which that Opinion is built. Of the manner of forming principles of Philosophy.* VI. *The possibility of Creation prov'd.* [*No arguing from the present state of the World against its beginning, shew'd from* Maimonides.] VII. *The Platonists arguments from the goodness of God for the Eternity of the World, answer'd.* VIII. *Of the Stoical Hypothesis of the Eternity of Matter; whether reconcileable with the Text of* Moses. IX. *Of the Opinions of* Plato *and* Pythagoras *concerning the præ-existence of Matter to the formation of the World.* X. *The contradiction of the Eternity of Matter to the Nature and Attributes of God.* XI, XII, XIII, *Of the Atomical Hypothesis of the Origin of the Universe.* XIV, XV, XVI, XVII. *The World cou'd not be produced by a casual concourse of Atoms prov'd from the nature and motion of* Epicurus's *Atoms, and the Phænomena of the Universe, especially the Production and Nature of Animals.* XVIII. *Of the* Cartesian *Hypothesis, that it cannot salve the Origin of the Universe without a Deity giving Motion to Matter.*

THE Foundations of Religion being thus establish'd in the Being of God, and the Immortality of the Soul, we now come to erect our Superstructure upon them, by asserting the undoubted Truth and Certainty of that account of the World which is given us in the Writings of *Moses*. Which beginning with the World it self, leads us to a particular consideration of the Origin of the Universe, the right understanding of which hath great influence upon our Belief of all that follows in the Word of God. For altho' we shou'd assert with *Epicurus* the Being of a Deity, if yet with him we add, that the World was made by a casual concourse of Atoms, all that part of Religion which lies in obedience to the Will of God is unavoidably destroy'd. All that is left, I.

is only a kind of Veneration of a Being more excellent than our own, which reacheth not to the government of Mens Lives, and so will have no force at all upon the generality of the World, who are only allur'd by Hopes or aw'd by Fears, to that which of their choice they would be glad to be freed from. Besides, what expressions of Gratitude can be left to God for his Goodness, if he interpose not in the Affairs of the World? What dependence can there be on Divine Goodness, if it be not at all manifested in the World? What apprehensions can we have of God's Infinite Wisdom and Power, if neither of them are discernible in the Being of the World? And as the Opinion of *Epicurus* destroys Religion, so doth that of *Aristotle*, which attributes Eternity to the Universe, and a necessary Emanation of it from the first Cause, as Light comes from the Sun; for if so, as *Maimonides* well observes, *The whole Religion of* Moses *is overthrown, all his Miracles are but Impostures, all the Hopes which are grounded on the Promises of God, are vain and fruitless.* For if the World did of necessity exist, then God is no free Agent; and if so, then all instituted Religion, is to no purpose; nor can there be any expectation of Reward, or fear of Punishment from him who hath nothing else to do in the World, but to set the great Wheel of the Heavens going. So much is it our concernment to inquire into the true Original of the World, and on what Evidence of Reason those Opinions are built, which are so contrary to that account given of it in the very entrance of the Books of *Moses*. Wherein we read the true Origin of the World to have been by a Production of it by the Omnipotent Will and Word of God. This being then the plain Assertion of *Moses*, we come to compare it, in point of Reason, with all those several *Hypotheses* which are repugnant to it, which have been embrac'd in several Ages by the Philosophers of greatest esteem in the World. Which may be reduc'd to these four: 1. *Such as suppose the World to have existed as it is from all Eternity.* 2. *Such as attribute the Formation of the World as it is to God; but withal assert the præ-existence and eternity of Matter.* 3. *Such as deny any eternity to the World, but assert the Origin of it to have been by a casual concourse of Atoms.* 4. *Such as endeavour to explain the Origin of the Universe, and all appearances of Nature, merely by the Mechanical Laws of the motions of Matter.*

Maimon. More Nevoch. p. 2. c. 25.

II. I begin with those who assert the eternity of the World as it is, among whom *Aristotle* hath born the greatest name; who seems to have arrogated this Opinion to himself; for when he inquires into the judgment of Philosophers, who had writ before him, he says of them, γενόμενον μὲν ὃν ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν, *all the Philosophers asserted that the World was made*, tho' some one way, some another. And were this true which *Aristotle* saith, it wou'd be the strongest Prejudice against his Opinion; for if the World had been eternal, how shou'd it come to pass, that the eldest Philosophers shou'd so readily and unanimously embrace that Opinion, which asserted the Production of the World? Was it not a strong presumption of the novity of the Universe, that all Nations, to whom the Philosophers resorted, had Memorials left among them of the first Origin of Things? And from hence it is observable, that when the humour of philosophizing began to take the *Greeks* (about the XL *Olympiad*, when we may suppose *Thales* to flourish) the beginning of the World was no matter of Dispute, but, taking that for granted, the inquiry was, out of what material Principle the Universe was form'd; of which *Thales* thus delivers his Opinion in *Tully*;

Aristot. de cœlo, l. 1. c. 10.

aquam

aquam dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret; wherein he plainly distinguisheth the efficient from the material Cause of the World. The prime efficient was God, the material principle, Water. It is a matter of some inquiry, Whether the first principles of Philosophy among the *Greeks*, were not rather some Traditional Things conveyed to them from others, than any certain Theories which they had form'd from their own Experiments and Observations. The former is to me far the more probable on many accounts, but chiefly on this, that the first Principles of the two Founders of the chief Sects of Philosophers, *viz.* the *Ionic* and *Italic* (for all the other were but the various issues of these two) did come so near to that which we have the greatest Reason to believe to have been the most certain account of the Origin of the World. For this Opinion of *Thales* seems to have been part of that Universal Tradition which was continu'd in the World, concerning the first Principles of Things: For I do not see any Reason to aver with so much confidence, as some do, that those Philosophers who spake any thing consonantly to *Moses*, must presently converse with the *Jews*, transcribe their Opinions out of the Scriptures, or have them convey'd to them in some secret *Cabala* of the Creation; as it is affirm'd of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, and may with no less reason of *Thales*. But this, I suppose, may be made evident to any considerative Person, that those Philosophers of *Greece*, who convers'd most abroad in the World, did speak far more agreeably to the true Account of Things, than such who only endeavour'd by their own Wits to improve or correct those Principles which were deliver'd by the other Philosophers. Which I impute not so much to their converse with the *Mosaic* Writings, as to that Universal Tradition of the first Ages of the World, which was preserv'd far better among the *Phœnicians*, *Ægyptians*, *Chaldeans*, and others, than among the *Greeks*. For which we have this evident Reason, that *Greece* was far more barbarous and rude in its elder Times, than those other Nations were, which had means of preserving some Monuments and general Reports of the first Ages of the World, when the *Græcians* wanted them. And therefore we find that *Greece* from its beginning shin'd with a borrow'd Light; and saw not by an extramission of Rays of Knowledg from its self, but by an intromission of those representations of things which were receiv'd from other Nations. Those who form'd *Greece* first into civil Societies, and lick'd it into the shape of well order'd Commonwealths, were such who had been Traders for knowledg into foreign Parts. To which purpose *Diodorus Siculus* informs us, *That* Lycurgus *and* Solon, *as well as the Poets*, Orpheus, Musæus, Melampus *and* Homer, *and the Philosophers afterwards*, Pythagoras, Plato, *and others, had gain'd most of their Knowledg and Wisdom out of* Ægypt; nay, he saith in general, ὅσοι τ παρ' Ἕλλησι δεδοξασμένων ἐπὶ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ παιδείᾳ, παρέβαλον εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις, ἵνα τ ἐνταῦθα νομίμων καὶ παιδείας μεταλάχωσιν. *All those who were renown'd among the* Greeks *for Wisdom and Learning, did in ancient time resort to* Ægypt, *to be acquainted with their Laws and Knowledg.* On this account therefore we are not to seek for the ancient and genuine Tradition of the World from the native and home-bred *Greeks*, such as *Aristotle* and *Epicurus*, but from those who took the Pains themselves to search into those Records which were preserv'd among the elder and more knowing Nations: And altho' the Nations they resorted to, sought to advance their own Reputation in the Histories of their ancient Times, of which we

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 25.

Diodorus, l. 1. V. Euseb. Præp. Evangel. l. 10.

have already given a large Account, yet they were more faithful in the account they gave of the Origin of the whole Universe. For it appears from *Diogenes Laertius*, that the *Ægyptians* did constantly believe, *That the World had a beginning, and was corruptible; that it was Sphærical, and the Stars were of the nature of Fire; that the Soul was of an Immortal nature, and did pass up and down the World.* Which *Laertius* cites from *Hecatæus* and *Aristagoras.* So that we need not make *Pythagoras* acquainted with such a *Cabala* of the Creation, which in all probability neither the *Jews* nor he ever dreamt of; we find a fair account may be given of most of the Opinions of *Pythagoras*, and whence he deriv'd them, without forcing the words of *Moses* into such a sense, which the plainness and perspicuity of the Writings of *Moses*, argue them not capable to admit of. But I will not deny from those concurrent Testimonies of *Hermippus* and *Aristobulus*, besides *Origen*, *Porphyry*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and others, that *Pythagoras* might have had an opportunity of conversing with the *Jews*, (which it is most probable was in *Chaldæa*, after the Captivity, at which time *Pythagoras* was there among them) but that *Pythagoras* shou'd converse with the Successors of *Elisha* on Mount *Carmel*, as *Vossius* thinks; or that *Moschus* the *Sidonian* Philosopher, in *Iamblichus*, shou'd be *Moses*, as others fancy; or that præ-existence of Souls shou'd be part of the *Mosaic Cabala*; or that the *Pythagoric* numbers, as they are explain'd by *Nichomachus Gerasenus* in *Photius*, should be adæquate to the Creation Cabalistically understood, are fancies too extravagant and *Pythagorean*, to be easily embraced. If *Pythagoras* was circumcis'd, it was more for love of the *Egyptians* than the *Jews*, among whom he spent twenty two Years; if præ-existence of Souls be a rational *Hypothesis*, we may thank the *Ægyptians* for it, and not *Moses*; if numbers be so expressive of the Work of Creation, we are beholding to the Arithmetical Hieroglyphics of *Ægypt* for them. But altho' *Pythagoras* might not be acquainted with such a philosophic *Cabala* of the Creation, which none of the *Jews*, as far as we can find, understood, till one more vers'd in *Plato* and *Pythagoras* than in the Learning of his own Nation, *viz. Philo* of *Alexandria*, began first to exercise his Wit on the Text of *Moses*, with *Platonic* Notions; yet I shall easily grant, that *Pythagoras*, by means of his great Industry and Converse with the learned Nations, might attain to far greater knowledg of many mysterious things in Natural Philosophy; and as to the Origin of the Universe, than any of the home-bred Philosophers of *Greece*, or it may be, than any one of the Nations he resorted to, because he had the advantage of comparing the several accounts of them together, and extracting out that which he judg'd the best of them. And hence *Plutarch* tells us, that the first Principles of the World, according to *Pythagoras*, were these two, the one was τὸ ποιητικὸν αἰτίον καὶ εἰδικὸν (ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς ὁ θεὸς) *an active and forming Principle*, and that was God whom he call'd Mind, (as *Anaxagoras* likewise did) the other τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικὸν (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος *passive and material*, which is, *the visible World.*

Diog. Laert. proœm. p. 7.

V. Selden. de jure Nat. & Gen. apud. Ebræos. l. 1. c. 2.

Voss. de Sectis Philosoph. c. 6. sect. 5.

V. Mathem. Hierogl. Kircheri. Tom. 3. Oedip. Ægypt.

Plutarch. de Plat. Philos. l. 1. cap. 3.

III. And thus we see these two renowned Founders of the *Ionic* and *Italic* Societies of Philosophers, both giving their concurrent Testimony with *Moses* as to the true Origin of the World, and not at all differing from each other; for thus *Thales* speaks in *Diogenes Laertius*, πρεσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων, θεός· ἀγένητον κάλλιστον, γὰρ κόσμος· ποίημα γὰρ θεοῦ, *God is the eldest Being, because unbegotten; the World the most beautiful, because it is God's workmanship.*

Diog. Laer. V. Thalet.

ſhip. To which thoſe expreſſions of *Plato*, in his *Timæus*, come very near (whoſe Philoſophy was for ſubſtance the ſame with the *Pythagorean*) when he had before aſcrib'd the Production of the World to the goodneſs of God, which goodneſs of his did incline him to make all other things like himſelf. Θέμις ȣ̓τ' ἦν ȣ̓τ' ἐστὶ τῷ ἀρίστῳ δρᾶν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ κάλλιστον. *For the moſt excellent Being cannot but produce the moſt excellent Effects.* And as to the material Principle out of which the World was made, there appears no great difference between the ὕδωρ of *Thales*, and the ὕλη of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, for *Plato*, when he tells us what a kind of thing the material Principle was, he deſcribes it thus, ȣ̓κ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινȣ́μενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, which as *Calcidius* renders it, is *motu importuno fluctuans neque unquam quieſcens*, it was a *viſible corporeal thing* (πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατόν·) *which was never at reſt, but in continual diſorderly Motion and Agitation:* which is a full Explication, I ſuppoſe, of what *Thales* meant by his Water, which is the ſame with that ἰλὺς or mixture of Mud and Water together which others ſpeak of as the Principle of the Univerſe; as *Orpheus*, in *Athenagoras*, and the Scholiaſt on *Apollonius* cited by *Grotius* and others. Which we have the more reaſon to believe, becauſe the Succeſſors of *Thales*, *Anaximander* and *Anaxagoras*, expreſs themſelves to that purpoſe. *Anaximander* call'd the Sea, τῆς πρώτης ὑγρασίας λείψανον, *the remainder of the primitive moiſture:* and *Anaxagoras* ſays, before the Νȣ̃ς, or God, ſet things in their order, πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμȣ̃ πεφυρμένα, *all things were at firſt confus'd together:* which muſt needs make that which *Chalcidius* tells us *Numenius* attributes to *Pythagoras*, which his Tranſlator calls *Sylvam fluidam*, or *fluid Matter.* Which is the ſame likewiſe with the *Phœnicians* Μὼτ, which as appears by *Euſebius*, ſome call ἰλὺν, others ὑλατώδȣς μίξεως σῆψιν, ſome, *Mud* or *Slime*, others, the *putrefaction of watery Mixtures*, which they ſay was, σπορὰ κτίσεως καὶ γένεσις ὅλων, *the Seed-plot of the Creation and the Generation of things.* Thus we ſee how *Thales* with the *Phœnicians* from whom he was deriv'd, as *Laertius* tells us and *Pythagoras*, with the *Ægyptians* and others, concur with *Moſes*, not only in the production of the World, but in the manner of it, wherein is expreſs'd a fluid Matter which was the material Principle out of which the World was form'd, when we are told that *The Earth was without form and void, and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters, i. e.* that all at firſt was but fluid Matter; for *P. Fagius*, from *R. Kimchi*, renders תהו by ὕλη, which fluid Matter was agitated and mov'd by the Divine Spirit, or the *vis plaſtica mundi*, ſo *Chryſoſtom* calls it, ἐνέργεια ζωτικὴ. And ſo *Druſius* and *P. Fagius* explain רחף by Motion or Agitation. And herein we have likewiſe the conſent of thoſe forenamed excellent Philoſophers, who attribute the Origin of particular things in the World to this Agitation or Motion of the fluid Matter. For *Chalcidius* ſpeaking not only of *Thales*, *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, but of *Anaximenes*, *Heraclitus*, and others, ſays thus of them, *omnes igitur hi---in motu poſitam rerum originem cenſuerunt: they all agreed in this, that the Origin of things was to be aſcrib'd to the motion of the parts of Matter.* So the *Phœnicians* call'd this Motion of the Particles of Matter ἀέρα ζοφώδη καὶ πνευματώδη *a dark and bluſtering Wind.* And how ſutable this Explication of the Origin of things from the motion of fluid Matter is to the Hiſtory of Nature, appears by thoſe many Experiments by which mixt Bodies are ſhew'd to ſpring from no other material Principle than the Particles of fluid Matter. Of which you may read a Diſcourſe of that ingenious

Plato in Tim. p. 1047. ed. Ficini.

Chalcid. Tim. p. 25. ed. Meurſ.

Grot. Annot. in l. 1. de Ver. Chriſt. Rel.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 394.

Euſeb. Præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.

Gen. 1. 2.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 378

Boyle's Sceptical Chymiſt, p. 115. &c.

and learned Gentleman Mr. *Boyle* in his *Sceptical Chymiſt*. Only thus much may here ſuffice to have made it appear, that all thoſe Philoſophers, who were moſt inquiſitive after the ancient and genuine Tradition of the World concerning the firſt beginning of things, did not only concur with *Moſes* in the main thing, that its beginning was from GOD, but in the particular Circumſtances of it, as to the fluid Matter and motion thereof. Concerning which I may yet add, if it be material, the Teſtimony of *Homer* in *Plutarch*.

Homer. Iliad. ξ.

Ωκεανὸς, ὅσπερ γένεσις πάντεσι τέτυκται.

Odyſſ. ε. Chalcid. p. 178. V. Meurſ. in Chal. p. 37.

And in *Chalcidius*: *Inque eadem ſententia Homerus eſſe invenitur, cum Oceanum & Thetin dicat parentes eſſe genituræ; eumque juſjurandum Deorum conſtituat aquam, quam quidem ipſe appellat Stygem, antiquitati tribuens reverentiam, & jurejurando nihil conſtituens reverentius.* To which purpoſe likewiſe *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks in his Metaphyſics, that the reaſon why *Styx* was made the Oath of the Gods, was becauſe Water was ſuppos'd to be the material Principle of things, which he ſaith was ἀρχαία τὶς αὕτη καὶ παλαιὰ περὶ τὴν φύσεως δόξα, *a moſt ancient Tradition concerning the Origin of the Univerſe.* And tells us before, that ſome were of opinion, τὰς παμπαλαιὰς, καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέσεως καὶ πρώτας θεολογήσαντας, *that the moſt ancient and remote Perſons and firſt Writers of Theology held this Opinion of Water being the firſt material Principle of things.*

Ariſtot. Metaphyſ. l. 1. c. 3.

Having thus made it appear what a conſent there was between the ancient Tradition of the World, and the Writings of *Moſes* concerning the Origin of the World; I now come to conſider upon what pretenſe of Reaſon this Tradition came to be contradicted, and the Eternity of the World aſſerted. For which we are to conſider, that the difference of the former Philoſophers of the *Ionic* Sect, after the time of *Thales*, as to the material Principle of the World, one ſubſtituting Air, another Fire inſtead of Water, rendred the Tradition it ſelf ſuſpected among other Philoſophers, eſpecially when the humor of innovating in Philoſophy was got among them, and they thought they did nothing unleſs they contradicted their Maſters; thence came that multiplicity of Sects preſently among them, and that Philoſophy which at firſt went much on the original Tradition of the World, was turn'd into Diſputes and Altercations, which help'd as much to the finding out of Truth, as the fighting of two Cocks on a Dung-hill doth to the finding out the Jewel that lies there. For which, ſcraping and ſearching into the Natures of things had been far more proper, than contentions and wranglings with each other; but by means of this litigious humor, Philoſophy from being a Deſign, grew to be a mere Art, and he was accounted the beſt Philoſopher, not that ſearch'd farther into the Bowels of Nature, but that dreſs'd and trick'd up the Notions he had, in the beſt poſture of defence againſt all who came to oppoſe him. From hence thoſe Opinions were moſt plauſible, not which were moſt true, but which were moſt defenſible, and which like *Des-Cartes* his ſecond Element, had all the Angles cut off, on which their Adverſaries might have an advantage of juſtling upon them, and then their Opinions were accounted moſt pure when they were ſo Sphærical, as to paſs up and down without interruption. From ſuch a degeneracy of Philoſophy as this we have now mention'd, aroſe the Opinion of the Eternity of the World; for the certain Tradition of the World being now loſt

in a crowd of Philoſophers, whoſe main aim was to ſet up for themſelves, and not to Trade with the Common-bank, ſo that there cou'd be no certain and convictive Evidence given to a ſhuffling Philoſopher that things were ever otherwiſe than they are; they found it moſt defenſible to aſſert that the World never had a beginning, nor wou'd have an end, but always did, and wou'd continue in the ſtate they were in. This Opinion, tho' *Ariſtotle* ſeems to make all before him to be of another mind, yet was hatched, as far as we can find, at firſt, under *Pythagoras* his Succeſſors by *Ocellus Lucanus*, as appears by his Book ſtill extant, περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως, *of the nature of the Univerſe*; to whom *Ariſtotle* hath not been a little beholding, as *Ludov. Nogarola* hath in part manifeſted in his Notes on *Ocellus*, altho' *Ariſtotle* had not the Ingenuity of *Pliny*, *agnoſcere per quos profecerit*. From *Ariſtotle* this Opinion together with his Name, ſpread it ſelf much farther, and became the Opinion moſt in vogue among the Heathen Philoſophers, eſpecially after the riſe of Chriſtianity; for then not only the *Peripatetics*, but the modern *Platoniſts*, *Plotinus*, *Apuleius*, *Taurus*, *Iamblichus*, *Alcinous*, *Proclus*, and others, were all engaged in the defence of the Eternity of the World, thinking thereby the better to overthrow Chriſtianity. Hence came the hot and eager Conteſts between *Proclus*, *Simplicius*, and *Philoponus*, who undertook to anſwer *Proclus* his eighteen Arguments for the Eternity of the World, and to charge *Ariſtotle* with ſelf-contradiction in reference to it. But nothing were they more troubl'd about, than to reconcile the *Timæus* of *Plato* with the Eternity of the World, which they made to be a mere *Hypotheſis*, and a kind of *Diagramme* to ſalve Providence withal; altho' the plain words of *Plato* not only there, but elſewhere do expreſs, as far as we can judge by his way of writing, his real Judgment to have been for the production of the World by GOD. For which purpoſe we have this obſervable Teſtimony in his *Sophiſta*, where he divides all manner of Productions of things into *Divine* and *Human*, and oppoſes the Opinion that conceiv'd all things to be produc'd by an eternal Power, to the Opinion of the vulgar, which, ſaith he, was τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ λογισμοῦ φυέσης, *that all things were produc'd by a blind force of Nature, without any Reaſon or Counſel*, to which he oppoſeth the other Opinion, that they are made μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης, *by a Divine Power with Infinite Reaſon and Wiſdom*; and when *Theætetus* expreſſeth himſelf in an Academical way as to either of theſe Opinions, the *Hoſpes Eleatenſis*, who there acts the part of the Philoſopher, tells him, if he thought he were inclinable to the other Opinion, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκάσαι ἐπεχειρεῖμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν. *He wou'd undertake to make him confeſs the contrary by the Evidence of Reaſon which he wou'd bring.* And we ſhall ſee what great reaſon there is for this Opinion, when we conſider what weak and infirm foundations the contrary is built upon. For all the Arguments which either *Ocellus*, or *Ariſtotle*, or the modern *Platoniſts* make uſe of, are built on theſe following Suppoſitions which are all falſe. 1. *That it is unconceivable that things ſhou'd ever have been in any other ſtate than they are.* 2. *That there is no other way of Production but by Generation.* 3. *That* GOD *is no free Agent, but produced the World by neceſſity of Nature.*

Plato Sophiſt. p. 185. ed. Fic.

1. *That it is unconceivable that things ſhou'd ever have been any otherwiſe than they are.* The Reaſon of which ſuppoſition was this, That the general Concluſions of Reaſon, which they proceed upon in *Philoſophy*, were

were taken up from the Obſervation of things as they are at preſent in the World. Which is evident from the ground of *Ariſtotle*'s condemning the Opinion of *Empedocles*, who aſſerted the Production of the World, and yet the Incorruptibility of it, τὸ μὲν ἓν γενέσθαι μὴ ἀίδιον δ' ὅμως εἶναι φάναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, which he acounts impoſſible, and gives this as his Reaſon, μόνα γὰρ ταῦτα θεῖον εὐλόγως, ὅσα ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἢ πάντων ὁρῶμεν ὑπάρχοντα. *For*, ſaith he, *nothing elſe can be rationally aſſerted, but what we find to be in all things or at leaſt in moſt*; now becauſe there cou'd nothing be found in the World which was produc'd (*i. e.* by Generation) and yet was incorruptible, therefore he concludes it impoſſible it ſhou'd be ſo with the Univerſe. By which we evidently ſee what the grand Principles of Reaſon among the Philoſophers were: *viz.* ſuch Obſervations as they had made from the preſent courſe of Nature in the order of the Univerſe. From hence aroſe that ſtrong preſumption among them, which hath been ſo taken for granted, that it hath been look'd on as a common Notion of Human Nature, *viz. Ex nihilo nihil fit*, which was the main Argument us'd by them to prove the Eternity of the World: and by others to prove the *Præ-exiſtence of Matter*. So *Ocellus* argues againſt both the Diſſolution and Production of the World from this Principle; *If the World be diſſolv'd*, ſaith he, *it muſt either be* ἤτοι εἰς τὸ ὄν, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, *either into that which is, or into that which is not*: It cannot *be diſſolv'd into that which is, becauſe then the Univerſe cannot be deſtroy'd; for that which is, is either the Univerſe, or a part of it: neither can it be diſſolv'd into that which is not,* ἀμήχανον γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἀπολέσθαι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντων, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀναλυθῆναι. *For it is impoſſible that a thing ſhou'd be made out of that is not, or be diſſolv'd into nothing.* And *Ariſtotle* ſomewhere tells us, that it is a Principle which all the Writers of *Natural Philoſophy* are agreed in, (περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμολογουμένως τὴν δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ τὴν φύσεως) which is ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γένεσθαι ἀδύνατον, *that it's impoſſible for any thing to come out of nothing.* But now when we obſerve upon what grounds this Principle was took up by theſe Philoſophers, we have no reaſon to admit of it as an univerſal ſtandard of Nature. For we find theſe Naturaliſts, who thus aſſerted this Principle, that when they go about to prove it, it is only from the courſe of Generations in the World, or from the works of *Art*, both which ſuppoſe *Matter Præ-exiſtent*, and from theſe ſhort collections they form this univerſal Maxim. And from hence when they diſcours'd of the manner whereby GOD did produce the World, their Imaginations ran preſently upon that which the *Epicurean* in *Tully* inquires after, *Quæ molitio? quæ ferramenta? qui vectes? quæ machinæ? qui miniſtri tanti operis fuerunt?* they apprehend GOD only as an Artificer that contrives the World firſt into a Platform, and then uſeth inſtruments to erect it, and conſequently ſtill ſuppoſe the Matter ready for him to work upon. So true is that of *Balbus* in *Tully*, when he comes to diſcourſe of the Nature of GOD; *In quo nihil eſt difficilius quam a conſuetudine oculorum aciem mentis abducere; nothing is more difficult than to abſtract our Minds from the obſervations of this viſible World when we ſeek to apprehend the Nature of the Deity.* Thus we ſee upon what general grounds the Philoſophers proceeded, and from what they took them, and how inſufficient any collections from the preſent order of the Univerſe are to determine any thing concerning its Production by. For ſuppoſing a Production of the World, ſeveral things muſt of neceſſity be ſuppos'd in it, different from what the preſent order of the World is; and it is an unreaſonable thing to argue from

Ariſt. de cœlo, l. 1. cap. 10.

Vid. Laert. in vit. Democriti.

Ocellus Lucanus, p. 16. ed. Comm.

Ariſtot. Phyſic. l. 4.

Cicero de Nat. l. 1.

Ibid. l. 2.

from a thing when it is in its greateſt perfection, to what muſt always have been in the ſame thing; for by this means we muſt condemn many things for falſities which are apparently true, and believe many others to be true which are apparently falſe. For which *Maimonides* uſeth an excellent ſimilitude. *Suppoſe*, ſaith he, *one of exquiſite Natural parts, whoſe Mother dies aſſoon as he is born, and his Father brings him up in an Iſland, where he may have no ſociety with Mankind till he be grown up to years of underſtanding, and that he never ſaw any Female of either Man or Beaſt: Suppoſe now this Perſon to enquire of the firſt Man he ſpeaks with, how Men are born, and how they come into the World. The other tells him, that every Man is bred in the Womb of one of the ſame kind with our ſelves, thus and thus form'd; and that while we are in the Womb we have a very little Body, and there move and are nouriſhed, and we grow up by little and little till we come to ſuch a bigneſs, and then we come forth into the World, and yet grow ſtill till we come to ſuch a proportion as we are of. Here preſently this young Man ſtops him and inquires, when we were thus little in the Womb and did live, move and grow, did we not eat and drink, and breath at our Mouth and Noſtrils as we do now? did we not eaſe Nature as we do now? If it be anſwer'd him, No; then he preſently is ready to deny it, and offers to bring demonſtrations that it was utterly impoſſible that it ſhou'd ſo be: For, ſaith he, if either of us ceaſe breathing, but for an honr, our Motion and Life is gone; how is it then poſſible for one of us tho' never ſo little, to live and move in the Womb for ſo many Months, when it is ſo cloſe, and ſhut up, and in the middle of the Body? If one of us*, ſaith he, *ſhou'd ſwallow a little Bird, it wou'd preſently die as ſoon as it came into the Stomach, how much more if it were in the Belly? If we ſhou'd be but for few days without eating and drinking, we cou'd not live; how can a Child then continue ſo many Months without it? Again, if one doth eat and not void the excrement of what he eats, he will be kill'd with it in few days; how can it poſſibly be otherwiſe with a Child? If it be reply'd that there is a paſſage open in the Belly at which the Child receives his nouriſhment, he will preſently ſay that it is as impoſſible as the other; for if our Bellies were ſo open, we ſhou'd be quickly deſtroy'd. And again, if the Child hath all its Limbs perfect and ſound, how comes it not to open its Eyes, uſe the Feet, Mouth and hands, as we do? And ſo concludes it impoſſible that Man ſhou'd ever be born after this manner.* Much after this way, ſaith that excellent Author, do *Ariſtotle* and others argue againſt the Production of the World; for if the World were produc'd, ſay they, it muſt have been thus, and thus; and it is impoſſible that it ſhou'd have been ſo: Why? Becauſe we ſee things are otherwiſe now in the World. Which how infirm a way of arguing, it appears from the conſideration of the former ſimilitude, in which the Arguments are as ſtrong to prove the impoſſibility of that which we know to be true, as in the caſe about which we diſpute.

Maimon. More Nev. l. 2. c. 17.

And this now leads us to the ſecond falſe *Hypotheſis* which the Opinion of the World's Eternity was founded on, which is, *That there is no other way of Production but by Generation.* Moſt of the Arguments which are us'd by *Ocellus* and *Ariſtotle*, againſt the Production of the World, run upon this ſuppoſition, That it muſt be generated as we ſee things are in the World. So *Ocellus* argues, Πᾶν τε τὸ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν εἰληφὸς, καὶ διαλύσεως ὀφεῖλον κοινωνῆσαι, δύο ἐπιδέχεται μεταβολάς· μίαν μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ μείονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον· καλεῖται δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀφ' ὅπερ

VI. 2.

Ocell. Luc. p. 8.

ὅπερ ἂν ἄρξηται μεταβάλλειν γένεσις· τὸ μὲν εἰς ὃ ἀφικνεῖται ἀκμή· διαφέρουσι δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖον, καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον· τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα τῆς μεταβολῆς ταύτης ὀνομάζεται φθορὰ καὶ ἄλυσις. *Every thing that comes into Being, and is subject to diſſolution, hath two obſervable mutations in it; the one is, whereby it grows from leſs to greater, and from worſe to better; and this is called Generation; and the height of this Mutation, Perfection: The other begins from better to worſe, and from bigger to leſs; and the concluſion of this is Corruption, and Diſſolution.* But now, ſaith he, *if the World had a beginning, there wou'd be ſuch a mutation in it, and it wou'd have grown by degrees greater, till it had come to its Perfection, and from thence it wou'd ſenſibly decay till it came to Diſſolution: But no body hath ever obſerv'd ſuch a mutation in the World, neither is there any appearance of it;* ἀλλ' ἀεὶ κατ' αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως διατελεῖ καὶ ἴσον ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ, *but the World is ſemper idem; it varies not, nor alters any thing from it ſelf.* For which he particularly inſtanceth in the Courſes, Symmetries, Figures, Poſitions, Intervals, Proportions of Motion which are in the World, which things all are capable of ſuch a Mutation, yet we ſee no ſuch thing in the Univerſe; from whence he infers, that the Univerſe was always and will be as it is. Upon the ſame Principle doth *Ariſtotle* diſpute for the Eternity of the World, from the Nature of his *materia prima*; becauſe if the Firſt Matter were generated, it muſt be generated of other Matter, and ſo *in infinitum*; and ſo argues from the Nature of the Heavens, that they are not capable of Generation and Corruption as other Bodies are. All which Arguments ſignify no more than this, that the World was not generated as Plants or Animals are; and whoever right in his Wits aſſerted that it was? But do any of theſe Arguments prove it impoſſible, that GOD having infinite Power, ſhou'd produce the Univerſe after another way, than any of thoſe things are produc'd in, which we obſerve in the World? For we aſſert an Infinite and Eternal Being, which was the Efficient Cauſe of the World, who by his Omnipotent Power produc'd it out of nothing, and continues it in its Being; which is well expreſs'd by the Author of the Refutation of *Ariſtotle* in *Juſtin Martyr*'s Works. *We aſſert,* ſaith he, *one* GOD *who is eternal himſelf, that hath nothing elſe co-equal with himſelf, neither by way of ſubjection or oppoſition, whoſe Power is ſo great that nothing can hinder it; by which Power he produc'd the World,* ἀρχὴν ἔχοντα τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ τί εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ πῶς διαμένειν, τῷ ἐκείνου θελήσει· *which hath no other Cauſe, either of its beginning, or of its being, or continuance, but only his Will.* Who fully anſwers in a Philoſophical manner, the particular Allegations out of *Ariſtotle*, concerning the *Eternity of the World*; his deſign being, as he ſaith, to ſhew μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην, καθ' ἣν ἐπαγγέλλονται Ἕλληνες περὶ Θεοῦ τε καὶ κτίσεως τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖν, τοῦτο ποιοῦντας, ἀλλ' εἰκασμῷ τὸ δοκοῦν διορισαμένους. *That the Greek Philoſophers in their Diſcourſes concerning* GOD *and the Creation, were very far from being as good as their word, to obſerve the Laws of Demonſtration, but inſtead of them proceeded only upon Opinions and Conjectures.* And to this particular, of the Poſſibility of another way of Production, beſides that of Generation, he proves it from *Ariſtotle*'s own Opinion, from the equal neceſſity of the Exiſtence of Matter, as of GOD. *For,* ſaith he, *if* GOD *can produce any thing out of Matter, which is as neceſſarily exiſtent as himſelf, he may produce ſomething out of nothing. For the ſame repugnancy that there is in that which is abſolutely nothing, to be produc'd, the ſame muſt there be in that which*

Ariſtot. dogmat. overſ. p. 111.

Juſt. Mar. ep. p. 113.

is neceſſarily exiſtent. How then can God produce ſomething out of Matter which neceſſarily exiſts, and not be able to produce ſomething out of nothing? For if Matter have its Original from it ſelf, how can it be ſubject to the Power of another? And beſides, if we acknowledge God to have his Being from himſelf, and on that account attribute infinite Power to him, by the ſame Reaſon we muſt attribute it to Matter. But whatever hath infinite Power in it ſelf, hath a Power upon ſomething beyond it ſelf; but if God and Matter have it both, they can never have Power upon each other, or without themſelves. Which is a far greater Abſurdity than the mere aſſerting a Power to produce ſomething out of nothing, which is imply'd in the very Notion of infinite Power; for if it be confin'd to any Matter, the Power is not infinite, becauſe we cannot but conceive the bounds of it; for it extends no farther than Matter doth. So that a Power of Creation is imply'd in the very Notion of a *Deity*; and therefore it is a mere *Sophiſm* to argue, becauſe the World cou'd not be generated, therefore it cou'd not be produc'd, unleſs any other way of Production but by Generation, be prov'd impoſſible.

VII. 3. A third falſe *Hypotheſis* they proceeded on was this, *That the Being of the World was no effect of* God's *Will, but of the neceſſity of Nature.* For altho' the Philoſophers we now ſpeak of, did aſſert a *Deity*, which in ſome ſenſe might be call'd the Cauſe of the World, yet they withal aſſerted that the World was co-equal with God himſelf; and ſo tho' there might be ſome priority in order of Cauſes between them, yet there was none in order of Time, or Duration; as we ſee the Light, tho' it flows from the Sun, yet the Sun is never without Light. This *Ariſtotle* proves from the neceſſity of Motion and Time: *For*, ſaith he, *whatever is mov'd, muſt be mov'd by ſomething elſe, and conſequently there muſt be a running, in infinitum:* But this runs on a falſe Suppoſition of the neceſſity of a continual *Phyſical* Motion in Things, which we deny, ſince God by his infinite Power may give Motion to that which had it not before; and ſo all that can be prov'd, is the neceſſity of ſome firſt Cauſe, which we aſſert, but no neceſſity at all of his continual Acting, ſince he may cauſe Motion when he pleaſe. And for Time continually exiſting, it denotes nothing real in it ſelf exiſting, but only our manner of Conception, of the Duration of Things, as it is conceiv'd to belong to Motion; and ſo can argue nothing as to the real Exiſtence of Things from all Eternity. But the latter *Platoniſts* look upon theſe as inſufficient ways of Probation, and therefore argue from thoſe Attributes of God, which they conceive moſt neceſſary and agreeable to God's Nature; and by which the World was produc'd if at all: So that by the ſame Arguments whereby we prove that the World was made by God, they prove it to have been from all Eternity. It was well and truly ſaid in *Plato*, in his *Timæus*, *That the Goodneſs of* God *was the Cauſe of the Production of the World:* From which Speech the more modern *Platoniſts* gather a neceſſity of the World's Eternity; for from hence they infer, That ſince God was always Good, he muſt always have an Object to exerciſe his Goodneſs upon; as the *Sun diſperſeth his light as ſoon as he is himſelf.* True, were God of the Nature of the Sun, it wou'd be ſo with him; or were the Sun of the Nature of God, it wou'd not be ſo with it. But there is this vaſt difference between them, that tho' God be eſſentially and neceſſarily Good, yet the communications of his Goodneſs are the effects of his Will, and not

merely of his Nature: For, were not the Acts of Beneficence and Goodneſs in GOD the free acts of his Will, Man muſt be made as happy as he was capable of being, not only upon his firſt Exiſtence in the World, but as long as it ſhou'd continue, by mere neceſſity of Nature, without any intervention of the Will or Actions of Men. And ſo there cou'd be no ſuch difference as that of good and bad Men in the World; For, if the lettings forth of GOD's Goodneſs to the World be ſo neceſſary, all Men muſt become neceſſarily Good, if GOD's Goodneſs be ſo great as to be able to make Men ſo; which I ſuppoſe will not be queſtion'd. By this then, when we ſee that the communications of GOD's Goodneſs to the World are free, and depend upon the eternal Counſels of his Will, which is a depth too great for us to approach, or look into: By what neceſſity then, if GOD be a free Agent, and of infinite Wiſdom, as well as Goodneſs, muſt we either aſſert the Eternity of the World, or fear to deprive GOD of his eſſential Goodneſs? Whereas to make the communications of GOD's Goodneſs *ad extra* neceſſary, and therefore to make the World from Eternity, that he might have an Object to exerciſe his Goodneſs on, is, to take as much off from the infinite Perfection and Self-ſufficiency of the Divine Nature, as it wou'd ſeem to flatter his Goodneſs. For GOD cannot be himſelf without his Goodneſs; and if his Goodneſs cannot be without ſome Creature to ſhew or diſplay it upon, GOD cannot be perfect nor happy, without his Creatures, becauſe theſe are neceſſary iſſues of his Goodneſs; and conſequently we make the Being of the Creatures neceſſary to his being GOD. Which is the higheſt derogation from the abſolute Perfection of the Divine Nature. We aſſert then ſo much Goodneſs in GOD, as none can be imagin'd greater; we aſſert, that it was from the communication of this Divine Goodneſs which gave Being to the World; but withal we acknowledg GOD to be an Agent infinitely wiſe and free, who diſpenſeth this Goodneſs of his in ſuch a way and manner as is beſt pleaſing to himſelf, tho' ever agreeable to his Nature. As GOD is infinitely good in himſelf, ſo whatever he doth is ſutable to this Nature of his; but the particular determinations of the Acts of GOD's Beneficence belong to the Will of GOD, as he is a moſt free and independent Agent; ſo that Goodneſs, as it imports the neceſſary rectitude of the Divine Nature, implies a Perfection inſeparable from the true Idea of GOD; but as it is taken for the expreſſions of Divine Bounty to ſomewhat without, as the Object of it, it is not imply'd in our conception of GOD, as to his Nature, but belongs to the free determinations of his Will. We cannot then, neither ought we to determine any thing concerning the particular ways of GOD's Bounty towards the whole Univerſe, or any part of it, any farther than GOD himſelf hath declar'd it to us. Now we ſee the World exiſts, we have cauſe to adore that Goodneſs of GOD, which not only gave a Being to the Univerſe, but continually upholds it, and plentifully provides for the Creatures which he hath made in it. Which the *Heathen* was ſo ſenſible of, that the *Stoic* in *Tully* taking notice of the abundant proviſion which is made in the World, not only for Man's neceſſity, but for delight and ornament, cries out, *Ut interdum Pronœa noſtra Epicurea eſſe videatur: God's Providence doth abundantly exceed Man's Neceſſity.* We ſee then from this Diſcourſe, how unſafe and unſatisfactory (that I may not ſay bold and preſumptuous) thoſe Arguments are, which are drawn from a general Conſideration of the Divine Nature and Goodneſs, without regard had to the determinations of his

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

Will,

Will, as to the existence of things in the World. It cannot certainly then be an Argument of any great force with any candid Inquirers after Truth and Reason, which hath been lately pleaded in the behalf of that *Pythagorean Hypothesis*, of the *Præ-existence* of Souls, *viz. That if it be good for Men's Souls to be at all, the sooner they are, the better; but we are most certain that the Wisdom and Goodness of God will do that which is best; and therefore if they can enjoy themselves before they come into these terrestrial Bodies (it being better for them to enjoy themselves than not) they must be before they come into these Bodies. Wherefore the Præ-existence of Souls is a necessary result of the Wisdom and Goodness of God, who can no more fail to do that which is best, than he can to understand it.* I now seriously inquire of such who love Reason above *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, whether if the Eternity of the World were put into the Argument instead of the *Præ-existence* of Souls, this Argument wou'd not hold as strongly for that, as it doth for *Præ-existence*; and if I am bound to believe *Præ-existence* on this ground, I be not likewise bound to believe at least the Souls of Men eternal, if not the Universe? But how reconcilable the Eternity of the World is to the *Pythagoric Cabala* of the Creation, I am yet to understand. But if this Argument doth not at all infer the Eternity of the World, as we have shew'd it doth not, much less doth it *Præ-existence* of Souls.

VIII. We have thus far consider'd the first *Hypothesis*, which is repugnant to *Moses*, concerning the Origin of the Universe, which is that which asserts the *Eternity of the World as it is*; we come now to the second, which attributes the Formation of the World as it is, to GOD, as the efficient Cause; but attributes Eternity to the Matter out of which the World was fram'd. I am not ignorant that some who wou'd be taken for the Masters of Reason, are so far from conceiving this *Hypothesis* to be repugnant to the Text of *Moses*, that they conceive it to be the genuine sense of it, *viz.* That there was a *præ-existent Matter*, out of which GOD form'd the World. But I wou'd willingly understand how *Moses* wou'd have expres's'd that Matter it self was created, supposing it had been his intention to have spoken it; for altho' the word ברא may not of it self imply necessarily the Production of things out of nothing, *i. e.* out of no *præ-existent Matter*; yet it is acknowledg'd by all, that no word us'd by the *Jews* is more proper to that than ברא is; and *P. Fagius* cites it from *R. Nachmani*, *That the Hebrew Language hath no other word to signify such a Production out of nothing but* ברא. It is therefore a very weak manner of arguing, That because ברא is sometimes us'd for no more than עשה, therefore the World was created out of *præ-existent* Matter; all that can rationally be inferr'd, is, that from the mere force and importance of that word the contrary cannot be collected: But if other places of Scripture compar'd, and the evidence of Reason, do make it clear, that there could be no *præ-existent* Matter which was uncreated, then it will necessarily follow, that Creation must be taken in its proper Sense. And in this Sense it is evident, that not only *Jews* and *Christians*, but even the *Heathens* themselves understood *Moses*, as is plain by *Galen*, where he compares the Opinion of *Moses* with that of *Epicurus*, and ingenuously confesseth that of *Moses*, which attributed the Production of Things to GOD, to be far more rational and probable than that of *Epicurus*, which assign'd the Origin of Things to a mere casual concourse of *Atoms*: But withal adds, that he must dissent from both; and sides with *Moses* as to the Origin of such

Volkelius de vera rel. l. 2. c. 4.

Galen. de usu part. l. 11.

such Things as depend on Generation, but asserts the *præ-existence* of Matter, and withal, that *God's power could not extend it self beyond the capacity of the Matter which it wrought upon. Atque id est*, saith he, *in quo ratio nostra ac* Platonis, *tum aliorum qui apud Græcos de rerum natura recte conscripserint, a* Mose *dissidet.* How true these words are, will appear afterwards. *Chalcidius* in his Commentaries on *Plato*'s *Timæus*, where he speaks of the Origin of ὕλη, which in him is still translated *Sylva*, and inquires into the different Opinions of all Philosophers about it, takes it for granted, that according to *Moses*, this ὕλη had its Production from God. *Hebræi Sylvam generatam esse confitentur; quorum sapientissimus* Moyses *non humana facundia, sed Divina, ut ferunt, inspiratione vegetatus, in eo libro, qui de genitura mundi censetur, ab exordio sic est profatus, juxta interpretationem LXX. prudentium; Initio Deus fecit cœlum & terram. Terra autem erat invisibilis & incompta. Ut vero ait Aquila; Caput rerum condidit Deus cœlum & terram; terra porro inanis erat & nihil; velut Symmachus; Ab exordio condidit Deus cœlum & terram. Terra porro fuit otiosum quid, confusumque & inordinatum. Sed* Origenes *asseverat ita sibi ab Hebræis esse persuasum, quod in aliquantum sit a vera proprietate derivata interpretatio. Fuisse enim in exemplari, Terra autem stupida quadam erat admiratione. Omnia tamen hæc in unum aiunt concurrere, ut & generata, sic ea quæ subjecta est universo corpori, sylva, sermonesque ipsos sic interpretantur.* Where we find by the Testimony of *Chalcidius*, an universal consent as to the Production of the Universal Corporeal Matter by God; for that is all which is understood by his term of *generata est.* But this same Author afterwards tells us, that by *Heavens* and *Earth* in the first Verse of *Genesis*, we are not to understand the visible Heavens and Earth: *For*, saith he, *the Heavens, which are called the Firmament, were created after, and on the third Day, when the Waters were separated, the dry Land appeared, which was called Earth. Qui tumultuario contenti sunt intellectu, cœlum hoc quod videmus, & terram qua subvehimur, dici putant; porro qui altius indagant, negant hoc cœlum ab initio factum, sed secundo die.* And therefore by the *Heavens* he understands *Incorpoream Naturam*, and by *Earth*, ὕλη, or the *Primogenial Matter. And this*, saith he, *appears by the following words, The Earth was invisible and without form*; i. e. this Corporeal Matter, before it was brought into order by the Power and Wisdom of God, remain'd a rude and indigested Lump; and that which is so, might well be call'd Invisible and without Form. And therefore it is called *inanis* and *nihil*, because of its capacity of receiving all Forms, and having none of its own. *Symmachus* calls it *otiosa & indigesta*; the former, because of its inability to produce any thing of its self; the latter, because it wanted a Divine Power to bring it into due order. The stupidity and admiration which *Origen* attributes to it, he conceives to relate to the Majesty of God, who was the Orderer and Contriver of it, *siquidem Opificis & Auctoris sui Majestate capta stupuerit.* Thus we see, that according to *Moses*, the first Matter of the World was produced by God, which is largely manifested by *Origen* against the *Marcionists*, a fragment of which is extant in his *Philocalia*; and by *Tertullian* against *Hermogenes*, and others, who from the Opinion of the præ-existence of Matter, are call'd *Materiarii.*

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 372.

Origen. Philoc. c. 24. Tertull. ad Hermog. per tot.

IX. Having thus clear'd the Sense of *Moses*, it is far more difficult to find out the true Opinions of the ancient Philosophers, concerning the production or eternity of Corporeal Matter, there having been so great

dissentions,

diſſentions, not only about the thing it ſelf, but about the Opinions of ſome about it. For it is plain by *Plutarch* his ψυχογονία, as well as the Diſcourſes of the later *Platoniſts*, how eager ſome have been to interpret *Plato*'s *Timæus* in favour of the Eternity, at leaſt of Matter, if not of the World. But altho' *Plato* doth aſſert therein a præ-exiſtence of rude Matter, before the formation of the World, yet I ſee no reaſon why he ſhould be otherwiſe underſtood than in the ſame Senſe that we believe a *Chaos*, to have gone before the bringing the World into the order it is now in. And in that Senſe may thoſe places in *Plutarch* be interpreted, ὃ γὰρ ὂκ ἦν μὴ ὄντως ἡ γένεσις, ἀλλ' ὂκ ἦν τὸ μὴ καλῶς καὶ ἱκανῶς ἔχοντως and ſo likewiſe thoſe following words, ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς ὅτε σῶμα τὸ ἀσώματον, ὅτε ψυχὴν τὸ ἄψυχον ἐποίησεν· for the meaning may be no more, than that *Plato* conceiv'd that all the Productions of the kinds of Things which are in the World, was out of a præ-exiſtent Hyle, the one Spiritual and Intelligible, out of which he ſuppos'd Souls to be form'd, the other Senſible and Corporeal, out of which other Beings which were more groſs and material, were produced. So *Chalcidius* tells us, that both *Pythagoras* and *Plato* look'd upon *conſtitutionem Sylvæ* to be *opus Providentiæ*; which I ſuppoſe relates not only to the bringing of Matter into Form, but to the production of Matter it ſelf. But after this he takes a great deal of Pains to ſearch out the true meaning of *Plato*, concerning the Origin of Hyle; and mentions the great diſſentions among the *Platoniſts* about it, and the obſcurity of the *Timæus* in it. To him therefore I refer the Reader: Who likewiſe brings in *Numenius* largely diſcourſing concerning the Opinion of *Pythagoras* about it, who condemns all thoſe, as not underſtanding *Pythagoras*, who attribute to him the production of the indeterminate Hyle. Theſe are his words, *Numenius ex Pythagoræ Magiſterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens, Pythagoræ dogmate, cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum, ait Pythagoram, Deum quidem ſingularitatis nominâſſe (nomine appellâſſe) ſylvam vero duitatis. Quam duitatem indeterminatam quidem, minime genitam, limitatam vero, generatam eſſe dicere. Hoc eſt, antequam exornaretur quidem, formamque & ordinem nanciſceretur, ſine ortu & generatione; exornatam vero atque illuſtratam, a Digeſtore Deo eſſe generatam. Atque ita quia generationis ſit fortuna poſterior, inornatum illud minime generatum, æquævum Deo, a quo eſt ordinatum, intelligi debeat. Sed nonnullos Pythagoreos, vim ſententiæ non recte aſſecutos, putâſſe, dici etiam illam indeterminatam & immenſam duitatem, ab una ſingularitate inſtitutam, recedente a natura ſua ſingularitate, & in duitatis habitum migrante.* But however theſe *Pythagoreans* might be deceiv'd, who thought the Unity it ſelf became the Deity; yet it is evident by *Numenius*, that he look'd on the undetermin'd and confus'd Matter to have been *co-æval* with GOD himſelf, and not produced by him. And if *Numenius* be as much to be credited in this as when he calls *Plato*, *Moſes Atticus*, then the Creation of Univerſal Matter can be no part of *Pythagoras* his philoſophic *Cabala*. But whatever were the Opinions of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, concerning the firſt Origin of Matter, we are certain that the *Stoics* generally aſſerted the improduction of Matter, and make that to be as neceſſary a paſſive Principle for the Being of the World, as GOD is the active and efficient Cauſe. So *Diogenes Laertius* reports of the *Stoical* Principles concerning the Origin of the Univerſe: Δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τὰ ὅλων δύο· τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὰ ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην· τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν Θεόν· *They make two principles of the Univerſe, one*

Plutarch. de Animæ procreat. e Tim.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 377.

Pag. 401.

Pag. 393.

Laert. V. Zenon.

V. Lipſium in Phyſiol. Sto. l. 1. c. 4.

one active, and the other passive; the passive; an Essence without quality, called Hyle or confused Matter; the active, the Reason which acts on the other, which is God. These two Principles *Seneca* calls *Causa & materia; esse vero debet*, saith he, *aliquid unde fiat; deinde, a quo fiat; hoc causa est, illud materia.* Altho' *Seneca* seems to make a Query of it elsewhere; *quantum Deus possit? materiam ipse sibi formet, an datâ utatur?* But *Zeno* is express in *Stobæus*, Οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσ' ἀΐδιον, οὔτε πλείω γιγνομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω. *The first Essence of all is Matter, which is eternal, and not capable of accession or diminution.* To the same purpose *Chalcidius* speaks, *Stoici ortum sylvæ rejiciunt, quin potius ipsam & Deum, duo totius rei sumunt initia; Deum, ut opificem; Sylvam, ut quæ operationi subjiciatur. Una quidem essentiâ præditos facientem, & quod fit ac patitur, id corpus esse; diversa vero virtute; quia faciat Deum; quia fiat, Sylvam esse.*

Senec. Epist. 65.

Idem Præfat. ad Nat. Quæst.

Stob. Eclog. Physic.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 388.

X. Having now found out the certain Assertors among the Heathen Philosophers of the eternity and improduction of Matter as the passive Principle of things, we come to examin the reason of this *Hypothesis*, and whether there were foundation enough for this matter to subsist upon to all Eternity? It might be sufficient prejudice against this Opinion, that it was built on the same infirm Conclusions which that of the Eternity of the whole World was, *viz.* that Maxim which *Lipsius* attributes to *Democritus*, but was embraced by all those Philosophers who deny'd production of Matter, μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι, *that nothing cou'd be produced out of nothing, nor could return into nothing*; which as we have already said, was only taken up from the established order of the Universe, and the manner of production of material Beings. But this is not all we have to charge this *Hypothesis* with; for,

1. It is repugnant to the natural Notion of a Deity, which must imply in it an Omnipotent Power; For otherwise we degrade him to the imbecillity of finite Creatures, if he cannot produce any thing which doth not imply a contradiction: but what contradiction is there in this, that God shou'd give a Being to that which had none before? For that is all we understand by Creation, *viz.* the producing of something out of nothing, or which had nothing out of which it was produc'd. Now what repugnancy is there to any free Principle of Reason, that a Power infinite shou'd raise an Insect into Being without any passive Principle out of which it was caus'd; and if an Infinite Power can do that, it may as well produce the World out of nothing, else the Power wou'd not be Infinite; for it wou'd have its bounds set, that thus far it cou'd go and no farther. Now if such a Power in God implies no contradiction in it self, I say, the asserting the necessary existence of Matter implies a contradiction to this Power. For, 1. a Power to produce something out of nothing wou'd be to no purpose, if a passive Principle or præ-existent Matter be necessary to the Production of any thing; and so that Being which hath a power to produce something out of nothing, hath only a power to produce something out of something, which is a plain contradiction. 2. If God hath a power to produce something out of nothing, either this power doth extend to the production of this Matter, or not; if it doth, then it depends on him; if not, his power is not Infinite, and so the same power is Infinite and not Infinite; which is another contradiction. So that it is plainly repugnant to

the Notion of a God, to assert the necessary and eternal existence of Matter.

2. If Matter be unproduced, then necessary Existence must belong to it as well as to God; and if necessary Existence belongs to Matter, Infinite Power must belong to it too; for whatever necessarily exists is Self-originated; whatever is Self-originated, cou'd not by any Cause whatsoever be hinder'd from Being; what cannot by any Cause be hinder'd from Being, hath Infinite Power; what hath Infinite Power, may produce any thing, and is God, and so Matter cannot be a mere passive Principle, but must be an active, and must be God himself, or else there must be more Gods than one. To an Argument something of this nature *Hermogenes* in *Tertullian* replies, that Matter wou'd not lose the Name or Nature of Matter, because of its Co-eternity with God, neither cou'd it be God merely on that account, unless it had other things that were agreeable to the Nature of God as well as that. But I have already shew'd that necessary Existence implies other Perfections going along with it: which is likewise thus prov'd by *Tertullian* in answer to *Hermogenes*; The reason of the Imperfections which are to be seen in any Creatures, is from hence, that they derive their Beings from a higher Cause, who creates them in what order he pleases; but that which hath its original from it self, must on that account want those Imperfections which other Creatures in the World have; and therefore if necessary Existence be of the Nature of Matter, all other Perfections must belong to it too: and so there can be no superiority and inferiority between God and Matter, because on both sides there will be necessary Existence. *Divinitas gradum non habet, utpote unica:* and so the eternal existence of Matter, is repugnant to the Unity of God. *Tertull. adverf. Hermog. c. 4.* *Tertul. c. 7.*

3. It is repugnant to the Independency of God: for it makes God subject to Matter, and not Matter to God. For if God cannot produce any thing without præ-existent Matter, the Matter is necessary to his Action, and so God must depend on that which he can do nothing without; and so God's using Matter, is as *Tertullian* speaks, *ex necessitate mediocritatis suæ*, to help him in the production of things. *Nemo non subjicitur ei cujus eget ut possit uti*, as he goes on. Thus Matter at last is crept above the Deity, that God can do nothing without its aid and concurrence; and so as *Tertullian* sharply says, *God is beholding to Matter for every Being known to the World; grande beneficium Deo contulit ut haberet hodie per quam Deus cognosceretur, & omnipotens vocaretur, nisi quod jam non omnipotens, si non & hoc potens ex nihilo omnia proferre.* Thus we see how irreconcilable this *Hypothesis* is with these Attributes of God. *Ibid. c. 8.*

4. It is repugnant to the Immensity of God. For either God did exist separate from this Eternal Matter, or was conjoyn'd with it: if conjoyn'd with it, then both made but one Being, as *Maximus*, or *Origen* argues; if separate from it, then there must be something between them, and so there will be three real improduced things. If it be answer'd that they are neither conjoyn'd nor separate, but God is in Matter as in his proper place, as the *Stoics* asserted, it is easily reply'd, that either then he is in a part of Matter, or the whole Matter; if in a part only, he cannot be immense; if in the whole as his adequate place, how cou'd he then ever frame the World? For either he must then recede from that part in which he was, and contract himself into a narrower compass, that he might fashion that part of the World which he *Orig. Philoc. c. 24.*

was about, or else he might likewise frame part of himself with that part of the World which he was then framing of, which consequence is unavoidable on the *Stoical Hypothesis* of God's being Corporeal and confin'd to the World as his proper place. And so much for this second *Hypothesis* concerning the Origin of the Universe, which supposeth the eternity of Matter as co-existing with God.

XI. I come now to that which makes most noise in the World, which is the *Atomical or Epicurean Hypothesis*; but will appear to be as irrational as either of the foregoing, as far as it concerns the giving an account of the Origin of the Universe. For otherwise supposing a Deity which produc'd the World and put it into the order it is now in, and supremely governs all things in the World, that many of the *Phænomena* of the Universe, are far more intelligibly explain'd by Matter and Motion than by substantial Forms, and real Qualities, few free and unprejudic'd Minds do now scruple. But because these little Particles of Matter may give a tolerable account of many appearances of Nature, that therefore there shou'd be nothing else but Matter and Motion in the World, and that the Origin of the Universe shou'd be from no wiser Principle than the casual concourse of these *Atoms*, is one of the Evidences of the proneness of Mens minds to be intoxicated with those Opinions they are once in love with. When they are not content to allow an *Hypothesis* its due place and subserviency to God, and Providence, but think these *Atoms* have no force at all in them unless they can extrude a Deity quite out of the World. For it is most evident that it was not so much the truth as the serviceableness of this *Hypothesis*, which hath given it entertainment among Men of *Atheistical* Spirits. *Epicurus* himself in his Epistle to *Pythocles* urgeth that as a considerable circumstance in his Opinion that he brought no God down upon the Stage to put things in order, κ) ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμὴ προσαγέσθω, which his Paraphrast *Lucretius* hath thus rendred.

Diog. Laert. l. 10. Lucret. de Nat. l. 5.

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
Naturam rerum.

If this Opinion then be true, the History of the Creation quite falls to the ground; on which account we are oblig'd more particularly to consider the reason of it. The *Hypothesis* then of *Epicurus* is, *that before the World was brought into that Form and Order it is now in, there was an infinite empty Space, in which were an innumerable company of solid Particles or Atoms of different sizes and shapes, which by their weight were in continual motion, and that by the various occursions of these, all the Bodies of the Universe were fram'd into that order they now are in.* Which is fully expres'd by *Dionysius* in *Eusebius*, and very agreeably to the Sence of *Epicurus* in his Epistles to *Herodotus* and *Pythocles*, and to what *Plutarch* reports of the Sence of *Epicurus*, tho' he names him not (if at least that Book be his, which *Muretus* denies) the words of *Dionysius* are these concerning the *Epicureans*, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀτόμους προσαπόντες ἀφθαρτά τινα κ) σμικρότατα σώματα, πληθῷ ἀνάριθμα, κ) τι χωρίον κενὸν, μέγεθος ἀπεριόριστον προβαλλόμενοι, ταύτας δή φασι τὰς ἀτόμους ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐν τῷ κενῷ φερομένας, αὐτομάτως τε συμπεπλέσθαι ἀλλήλαις διὰ ῥύμην ἄτακτον κ) συμπλεκομένας διὰ τὸ πολύσχημον ἀλλήλων ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, κ) ὕτω τόνδε κόσμον, κ) τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ κόσμους ἀπείρους ἀποτελεῖν. So that according to this Opinion, all the account we have of the Origin of the World, is from this general Rendezvous of Atoms in this infinite Space, in which after many encounters and

Euseb. Præp. Evang. l. 14. c. 22. p. 421. R. St. Plutarch. de Placitis Phil. l. 1. c. 4. Muret. Annot. in Senec. de provid.

and facings about, they fell into their ſeveral Troops, and made up that order'd Battalia which now the World is the Scheme of. It was not imprudently done of *Epicurus* to make the Worlds infinite, as well as his Space and Atoms; for by the ſame reaſon that his Atoms wou'd make one World, they might make a thouſand; and who wou'd ſpare for Worlds, when he might make them ſo eaſily? *Lucretius* gives us in ſo exact an account of the ſeveral courſes the Atoms took up in diſpoſing themſelves into Bodies, as tho' he had been Muſter-Maſter General at the Rendezouz; for thus he ſpeaks of his Atoms.

Quæ quia multa modis multis mutata per omne *Lucret. l. 1.*
Ex Infinito vexantur percita plagis,
Omne genus motus & cœtus experiundo,
Tandem deveniunt in taleis diſpoſituras,
Qualibus hæc rerum conſiſtit ſumma creata.

And more particularly afterwards,

Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum *Lucret. l. 5.*
Ex Infinito jam tempore percita plagis,
Ponderibuſque ſuis conſuêrunt concita ferri,
Omnimodiſque coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcunque inter ſe poſſunt congreſſa creare;
Ut non ſit mirum, ſi in taleis diſpoſituras
Deciderunt quoque, & in taleis venêre meatus,
Qualibus hæc rerum genitur nunc ſumma novando.

Thus we ſee the ſubſtance of the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*, that there was an infinite number of Atoms, which by their frequent occurſions did at laſt meet with thoſe of the ſame nature with them, and theſe being conjoyn'd together made up thoſe Bodies which we ſee; ſo that all the account we are able to give according to this *Hypotheſis* of all the *Phænomena* of the Univerſe, is from the fortuitous concourſe of the Atoms in the firſt forming of the World, and the different contexture of them in Bodies. And this was deliver'd by the ancient *Epicureans* not with any Doubt or Heſitation, but with the greateſt Confidence imaginable. So *Tully* obſerves of *Velleius* the *Epicurean*, beginning his Diſcourſe, *fidenter ſane ut ſolent iſti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare de aliqua re videretur; tanquam modo ex Deorum concilio, & ex Epicuri intermundiis deſcendiſſet:* Confidence was the peculiar Genius of that Sect, which we ſhall ſee in them to be accompany'd with very little reaſon.

XII. For thoſe two things which make any principles in Philoſophy to be rejected, this Atomical *Hypotheſis* is unavoidably charg'd with; and thoſe are, *If the principles be taken up without ſufficient ground in reaſon for them; and if they cannot give any ſufficient account of the* Phænomena *of the World.* I ſhall therefore make it appear, *That this Hypotheſis*, as to the Origin of the Univerſe, is *firſt, merely precarious, and built on no ſufficient grounds of Reaſon. Secondly, That it cannot give any ſatisfactory account of the Origin of things.*

1. That it is a precarious *Hypotheſis*, and hath no evidence of Reaſon on which it ſhou'd be taken up; and that will be prov'd by two things. 1. *It is ſuch an Hypotheſis as the* Epicureans *themſelves cou'd have no certainty of according to their own principles.* 2. *That the main*

principles of the Hypotheſis its ſelf are repugnant to thoſe Catholic Laws of Nature which are obſerv'd in the Univerſe.

1. *The* Epicureans *according to their own Principles, cou'd have no certainty of the truth of this Hypotheſis.* And that, 1. *Becauſe they cou'd have no certain Evidence of its Truth.* 2. *Becauſe their way of proving it was inſufficient.*

1. *That they cou'd have no certain evidence of the truth of it,* I prove from thoſe *Criteria,* which *Epicurus* lays down as the only certain Rules of judging the truth of things by; and thoſe were *Senſe, Anticipation* and *Paſſion.* Let Senſe be never ſo infallible a Rule of Judgment, yet it is impoſſible there ſhou'd be any Evidence to Senſe of the truth of this *Hypotheſis*; and let him extend his τὸ προσμύρμυον as long as he pleaſe, which was his great help for correcting the errors of Senſe, *viz.* as it was in the *Roman* Court when the Caſe was not clear, *ampliandum eſt:* So *Epicurus* wou'd have the Object repreſented every way it cou'd be before he paſt his Judgment; yet this prudent Caution wou'd do him no good for this *Hypotheſis,* unleſs he were ſo wiſe as to ſtay till this World were crumbl'd into Atoms again, that by That he might judg of the Origin of it. There is but one way left to find out the truth of Things inevident to Senſe, (as by *Epicurus*'s own Confeſſion all theſe Atoms are, which are now the component Particles of Bodies; much more thoſe which by their fortuitous concourſe gave Being to the World) and that is, if ſomething evident to Senſe doth apparently prove it, which is his way of proving a Vacuity in Nature and Motion: But tho' that be eaſily anſwer'd by Principles different from thoſe of *Epicurus,* and more rational; yet that very way of Probation fails him in this preſent *Hypotheſis.* For what is there evident to Senſe which proves a fortuitous concourſe of Atoms for the production of Things? Nay, if we grant him, that the compoſition of Bodies is nothing elſe but the Contexture of theſe inſenſible Particles, yet this is far from being an evidence to Senſe, that theſe Particles without any wiſe and directing Providence ſhou'd make up ſuch Bodies as we ſee in the World. And here, when we ſpeak of the evidence of Senſe, we may well aſk, as the *Stoic* in *Tully* doth, whether ever *Epicurus* found a Poem made by the caſual throwing of Letters together; and if a concourſe of Atoms did produce the World, *cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem non poteſt? Why did it never produce a Cloyſter, a Temple, a Houſe, a City,* which are far eaſier things than the World? I know *Epicurus* will ſoon reply, *That things are otherwiſe in the World now than when it was produc'd*; I grant it, and from thence prove, that becauſe no ſuch thing ever happens in the World now, as a merely caſual concourſe of Atoms to produce any things, *Epicurus* could have no Evidence from Senſe at all to find out the truth of his *Hypotheſis* by. And as little relief can he find from his ſecond *Criterium,* viz. *Anticipation*; for by his own acknowledgment, all Anticipation depends on the Senſes, and Men have it only one of theſe four ways, 1. By Incurſion, as the Species of a Man is preſerv'd by the ſight of him. 2. By Proportion, as we can enlarge or contract that Species of a Man either into a Gyant or Pigmy. 3. By Similitude, as we may fancy the image of a City by reſemblance to one which we have ſeen. 4. By Compoſition, whereby we may joyn different Images together, as of a Horſe and a Man to make a Centaur. Now tho' it be very queſtionable how ſome of theſe ways belong to a *Criterium* of Truth, yet none of them reach our caſe; for there can be no

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

V. Gaſſend. de Logica Epicuri, Op. To. 1. c. 7. Can. 7.

Incurſion of inſenſible Particles as ſuch upon our Senſes; we may indeed by proportion imagine the parvitude of them: But what is this to the proving the truth of the *Hypotheſis?* Similitude can do no good, unleſs *Epicurus* had ever ſeen a World made ſo: The only relief muſt be from Compoſition, and that will prove the Origin of the World by Atoms to be as true as that there are Centaurs in the World, which we verily believe. Theſe are the only *Criteria* which *Epicurus* wou'd judg of the truth of natural Things by (for the third, Paſſion, relates wholly to things Moral and not Phyſical) and now let any one judg, whether the *Hypotheſis* of the Origin of the Univerſe by Atoms can ever be prov'd true, either by the judgment of Senſe, or by Anticipation.

The way they had to prove this *Hypotheſis* was inſufficient; and that was by proving that the Bodies of the World are compounded of ſuch inſenſible Particles; now, granting the thing, I deny the conſequence; for what tho' the compoſition of Bodies be from the contexture of Atoms, doth it therefore follow, that theſe Particles did caſually produce theſe Bodies? Nay, doth it at all follow, that becauſe Bodies upon their reſolution do fall into inſenſible Particles of different ſize, figure and motion, therefore theſe Particles muſt be præ-exiſtent to all Bodies in the World? For it is plain, that there is now an univerſal Lump of Matter out of which theſe inſenſible Particles ariſe, and whither they return on the diſſolution of Bodies; and all theſe various Corpuſcles may be of the ſame uniform Subſtance only with the alteration of ſize, ſhape and motion; but what then? Doth this prove, that becauſe particular Bodies do now emerge out of the various Configuration and Motion of inſenſible Particles of that Matter which exiſts in the World, that therefore this whole Matter was produc'd by the caſual occurſions of theſe Atoms? It will aſk more Time and Pains than is uſually taken by the Philoſophers either ancient or modern, to prove that thoſe things whatſoever they are, whether Elements or Particles, out of which Bodies are ſuppos'd to be compounded, do exiſt ſeparately from ſuch compounded Bodies, and antecedently to them. We find no *Ariſtotelian* Elements pure in the World, nor any Particles of Matter deſtitute of ſuch a ſize, figure and motion, as doth make ſome Body or other. From whence then can we infer, either the exiſtence of *Ariſtotle*'s *materia prima*, without quiddity, quantity, or quality; or the *Epicurean* Atoms without ſuch a contexture as makes up ſome Bodies in the World? Our profound Naturaliſt, Dr. *Harvey*, after his moſt accurate ſearch into the Natures and Generation of Things, delivers this as his Experience and Judgment concerning the commonly reputed Elements, or Principles of Bodies. For ſpeaking of the different Opinions of *Empedocles*, and *Hippocrates*, and *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*, concerning the compoſition of Bodies, he adds, *Ego vero neque in animalium productione, nec omnino in ulla corporum ſimilarium generatione, (ſive ea partium animalium, ſive plantarum, lapidum, mineralium,* &c. *fuerit) vel congregationem ejuſmodi, vel miſcibilia diverſa in generationis opere unienda præ-exiſtere, obſervare unquam potui.* And after explaining the way which he conceiv'd moſt rational and conſonant to Experience in the generation of Things, he concludes his Diſcourſe with theſe words; *Idemque in omni generatione fieri crediderim; adeo ut corpora ſimilaria miſta, elementa ſua tempore priora non habeant, ſed illa potius elementis ſuis prius exiſtant (nempe Empedoclis atque Ariſtotelis igne, aqua, aere, terra, vel Chymicorum ſale, ſulphure, & mercurio, aut Democriti atomis) utpote natura quoque ipſis perfectiora. Sunt,*

XIII. 2.

Harvey, de Generat. Anim.

Sunt, inquam, mista, & composita, etiam tempore priora elementis quibuslibet sic dictis, in quæ illa corrumpuntur & desinunt; dissolvuntur scilicet, in ista ratione potius quam re ipsa & actu. Elementa itaque quæ dicuntur, non sunt priora istis rebus quæ generantur aut oriuntur; sed posteriora potius, & reliquiæ magis quam principia. Neque Aristoteles ipsemet aut alius quispiam unquam demonstravit, elementa in rerum natura separatim existere, aut principia esse corporum similarium. If then none of these things which Bodies are resolv'd into, and are suppos'd to be compounded of, either have been, or can be prov'd to exist separate from and antecedent to those Bodies which they compound, what then becomes of all our company of Atoms, which are suppos'd by their concourse in an infinite Space to be the Origin of the World? I know not where to find them, unless dancing with the School-men's *Chimera*'s in a *vacuum*, or in a Space as empty as the infinite one, *viz.* some *Epicurean*'s Brains. Neither therein will they be much unlike their great Master *Epicurus*, if we believe the Character which the *Stoic* in *Tully* gives of him, who saith he was *homo sine arte, sine literis, insultans in omnes, sine acumine ullo, sine auctoritate, sine lepore.* But allowing the *Stoic* some of that Passion, (which he disclaim'd so much) in these words; yet we may rather believe what *Tully* himself elsewhere speaks of *Epicurus*'s Sentiments, that they were none of them handsom or becoming a Man. *At ille quid sentit?* saith he of *Epicurus*; and soon replies, *sentit autem nihil unquam elegans, nihil decorum:* And in another place speaking of his Morals, he saith, *nihil generosum sapit atque magnificum, there was nothing Noble and Generous in him.* Which censure of *Epicurus*, all the pains that *P. Gassendus* hath taken in the vindication of the Life and Opinions of *Epicurus*, hath not been able to wipe off. For altho' we shou'd yield what that Learned Man so much contends for, that all the Calumnies which were cast on *Epicurus* arise from the antipathy between *Zeno* and the following *Stoics*, and the School of *Epicurus*; yet all this will not make *Epicurus* to have been comparable with some other Philosophers for Parts and Judgment, whose Principles have somewhat more generous and venerable in them, than the Morals of *Epicurus* had, taking them in their more refin'd Sense.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

Idem de Divinat. l. 1.

Idem de Finibus, l. 1.

XIV. But it is not the Morality of *Epicurus* which we now inquire after; our business is to see how well he acquits himself in rendring an account of the Origin of the Universe without a Deity. And so we come to consider the *Hypothesis* it self, whether it be rational or no, or consistent with the Catholic Laws of Nature which appear in the World. Two things I shall here inquire into, which are the main Principles of *Epicurus*, *viz.* the Motion of these Atoms in the infinite Space, and the manner of the concretion of Bodies by the concourse of these Atoms.

1. I begin with their Motion; which *Epicurus* attributes to his Atoms without any hesitation, and yet never undertakes to give an account of the Origin of that Motion; which argues his whole *Hypothesis* to be extremely precarious. The thing then, (which he must assume as his main Principle, without which all his other do nothing) is, That Motion doth inseparably belong to the least Atom or insensible Particle; for without this there cannot be imagin'd any concourse of Atoms at all, much less any such contexture of Bodies out of them. But for one to say that Atoms move, because it is their nature to move, and give no other account of it, is so precarious, that it will never give the

leaſt ſatisfaction to an inquiſitive Mind. And it will be the leaſt of all pardonable in the exploders of ſubſtantial Forms and occult Qualities, when the Origin of the whole World is reſolv'd into an occult Quality, which gives Motion to Atoms. And herein the *Atomiſts* out-do the moſt credulous *Peripatetics*, ſeeing they lay the prime Foundation of the World and of their own Philoſophy together, in a thing they can give no rational account of at all; which is, the Motion of Atoms in an infinite Vacuity. If it be reply'd, which is all *Epicurus* hath to ſay, *That the Motion of Atoms depends upon their Gravity*; the queſtion returns upon him with the ſame violence, How comes this Gravity to belong to theſe Atoms in ſuch an empty Space, where there can be no impulſion from other Bodies, no attraction from any magnetic Particles which are ſuppos'd to be the Cauſes of the deſcent of heavy Bodies; Nay, *Epicurus* himſelf takes away any center of that Motion of Atoms, and yet attributes a neceſſary deſcent to his Atoms by virtue of their Gravity; and if a Philoſopher may beg ſuch things as theſe are, ſo repugnant to the *Phænomena* of Nature, without aſſigning any other Reaſon for them, but that it is their Nature, let us never venture Philoſophizing more, but ſit down in that contented piece of Ignorance, which attributes the Cauſes of every thing unto ſpecific Forms and occult Qualities. For this is ſo ſhameful a piece of Beggery, that *P. Gaſſendus* doth more than once diſclaim it, and in his Diſcourſe of Motion, doth prove an impoſſibility of Motion in an infinite empty Space. Might not *Epicurus* then have ſav'd his Credit better, by ſitting down with the Opinions of his Fore-fathers, than thus to go a begging for ſuch *Hypotheſes*, which none, who are not reſolv'd to be ignorant, will be ready to grant him?

Gaſſendus Phyſ. ſ. 1. l. 3. c. 7. De appa-rent. magnitud. Solis humilis & ſublimis, ep. 4. ſ. 3. De motu Phyſ. ſ. 1. l. 5. c. 2. V. ep. de motu impreſſo a motore tranſlato. To. 3. op.

But yet this is not all, but according to this fundamental Principle of *Epicurus*, *viz.* That there is a principle of Motion in every inſenſible Particle of Matter, he plainly overthrows another Principle of his, which is, the ſolidity and different Magnitude of theſe Atoms. Theſe Particles are ſuppos'd ſo ſolid, that *Dionyſius* in *Euſebius* tells us the Account given, why they are call'd ἄτομοι was, διὰ τ ἄλυτον σερρότητα, becauſe of their indiſſoluble firmneſs; and the different ſizes of theſe Atoms is ſo neceſſary a Principle, that from thence they undertake to reſolve many *Phænomena* of the Univerſe; let us now ſee how conſiſtent theſe things are with the inſeparable property of Motion belonging to Atoms: For if there be Particles of ſuch different ſizes, then it is plain, that there are ſome Particles which may not only be conceiv'd to be bigger than others, but are really ſo; and ſo there muſt be more parts of Matter imagin'd in this bigger Particle than in another leſs; and if there be more Parts, theſe Parts may be conceiv'd ſeparate from each other, that this Particle may be equal to the other: Now then, I demand, if Motion doth inſeparably belong to the leaſt Particle of Matter, how comes one to be bigger than the other? For herein we ſee, that every Particle is not in diſtinct Motion; for there cannot but be more imaginable Particles in an Atom of a bigger ſize than in a leſs; and if ſo, there muſt be ſome union of thoſe imaginable Particles in that bigger Atom; and how cou'd ſuch an union be without Reſt? And what Reſt cou'd there be if Motion doth inſeparably belong to every Particle of Matter? And ſo it muſt be in all thoſe Atoms which are ſuppos'd to have Angles and Hooks, in order to their better catching hold of each other, for the compoſition of Bodies; how come theſe Hooks and Angles to be annex'd to this Atom? For an Atom may be without them; whence comes this union, if ſuch a

XV.

Euſeb. præp. Evang. l. 14. c. 22.

principle of motion be in each Particle? If it be anſwer'd, *That Motion did belong to all theſe Particles, but by degrees the leſſer Particles hitting together made up theſe angled and hooked Particles*; I ſoon reply, that the difficulty returns more ſtrongly; for if theſe angled and hooked Particles be ſuppos'd neceſſary to the contexture and union of Bodies; how came thoſe leaſt imaginable Particles ever to unite without ſuch Hooks and Angles? And ſo the Queſtion will return *in infinitum.* If then the ſolidity and indiviſibility of theſe angled Atoms, doth depend on the union and reſt of thoſe leſſer imaginable particles joyn'd together, then it is evident that Motion is no inſeparable property of all theſe Particles, but ſome are capable of union, in order to the making of ſuch Hooks and Angles, which are neceſſary for the contexture of Bodies; and where there is union and ſolidity, there is reſt, which is at leaſt accompany'd with it, if it be not one of the great Cauſes of it. And without which the *Atomiſts*, of all other Philoſophers, will be leaſt able to give an account of firmneſs in Bodies, when they make Bodies to conſiſt of an aggregation of Particles, by which it will be very hard finding a ſufficient account of the difference between fluid and firm Bodies, unleſs it be from the quicker motion and agitation of the particles of fluid Bodies, and the reſt of the ſmall and contiguous parts that make up the firm Body, according to that Catholic Law of Nature, whereby things continue in the ſtate they are in till ſome ſtronger force puts them out of it. The only thing which the *Epicurean Atomiſts* have left to give any account of the ſolidity of Particles of ſuch different ſizes, is, the want of Vacuity; for ſay they, *The ground of diviſibility of Bodies is the interſperſion of a diſſeminated Vacuum; now where there is no Vacuity, tho' the particles be of different ſize, yet they may be ſolid and indiviſible.* But this is taken off by the inſtance produced againſt other perſons by that Ingenious and Honorable Perſon Mr. *Boyle* in his *Phyſiological Eſſays*, which is to this purpoſe, *Suppoſe two of theſe preſum'd indiviſible particles, both ſmooth and of a cubical figure, ſhould happen to lie upon one another, and a third ſhould chance to be fitly placed upon the upper of the two; what ſhould hinder but that this Aggregate may by the violent knock of ſome other Corpuſcles be broken in the midſt of the whole Concretion, and conſequently in the middlemoſt Body?* For ſuppoſe them as ſolid as may be, yet ſince Corpuſcles as hard as they, can be made very violently to knock againſt them, why may not thoſe grate or break the middlemoſt Corpuſcle, or any of the others? And if there be a poſſibility of breaking off theſe cubical particles in the middle, then mere want of Vacuity is no ſufficient account of their being indiviſible. By this we ſee how far the *Atomiſts* are from giving any rational account of the Origin of the motion of the Atoms themſelves without a Deity.

V. Deſcartes, princip. p. 2. art. 54, 55, 56.

Hiſtory of Fluid. and Firm. p. 202.

XVI. 2. Suppoſing this Motion to be granted them, yet they *cannot give any ſatisfactory account of the manner of concretion of Bodies by the caſual occurſions of theſe Atoms moving in an infinite empty ſpace.* Which appears from thoſe groſs and extravagant ſuppoſitions of *Epicurus*, in order to the making theſe *Atoms* of his ſo hit together that they make up any Bodies by their Contexture.

1. He ſuppoſeth as it were two Regions, a Superior and Inferior in an infinite empty Space, which hath no center at all in it, nor any Body, from which to meaſure thoſe reſpects of above and below, as appears by his Epiſtle to *Herodotus*, wherein he ſaith, *Theſe terms of* ἄνω

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and κάτω, *or upwards and downwards, muſt be conceiv'd without any bounds or limits at all. So that tho' we conceive ſomething ſuperior, we muſt imagin nothing ſupreme, and ſo on the contrary.* Whereby it is evident, as *Gaſſendus* confeſſeth, that *Epicurus* thought the ſurface of the Earth to be a plain, and this plain to be continued up in a level ſuperficies to the Heavens, and ſo to all that immenſe ſpace of the Univerſe. So that all thoſe heavy Bodies which ſhould fall downwards in any parts of the wideſt diſtance on the Earth, as in *Europe*, *Aſia*, and *Africa*, would never meet (if they continued their Motion) in the center of the Earth, but would continue their Motion ſtill in a parallel line; and ſo he imagin'd that which is ſaid to be above as to us, was really the upper part of the World, and ſo the deſcent of his *Atoms*, muſt neceſſarily be downwards towards the Earth, according to the weight of them. And was not this a worthy *Mathematical* Suppoſition, for one who would undertake to give an Account of the Origin of the Univerſe without a *Deity?* *Gaſſend. Phyſic. ſ. 1. l. 3. c. 7.*

This Motion of deſcent by reaſon of the gravity of *Atoms* would not ſerve his turn; for if the *Atoms* mov'd downwards thus in a parallel line, how was it poſſible for them ever to meet for the contextures of Bodies? Now for this purpoſe he invented a *Motion of declination*; for finding the Motion *ad lineam*, or *ad perpendiculum* as ſome call it, could not poſſibly produce thoſe varieties of Bodies which are in the Univerſe, he ſuppos'd therefore the Deſcent not to be in a perpendicular right line, but to decline a little, that ſo ſeveral Particles in their deſcent might make ſome occurſions one upon another. And this *Epicurus* added to *Democritus*; but therein, as *Tully* obſerves, was very unhappy, that where he adds to *Democritus*, *ea quæ corrigere vult, mihi quidem depravare videatur*; that he marr'd what *Democritus* had ſaid, by mending of it. The reaſon of which Motion of Declination is thus given by *Lucretius*; *Cicero de Fin. l. 1.*

> *Quod niſi declinare ſolerent, omnia deorſum* *Lucret. l. 2.*
> *Imbris uti guttæ caderent per Inane profundum;*
> *Nec foret offenſus natus, neque plaga creata*
> *Principiis, ita nil unquam natura creâſſet,*

It was obvious to object, That, according to the Principles of *Epicurus*, there could have been no concourſe at all of *Atoms* in an infinite ſpace, on the two grounds he went on, which were the Natural Deſcent of *Atoms*, and the *æqui-velocity* of the Motion of all *Atoms* of what ſize ſoever, which he likewiſe aſſerted (altho' one would think, if Gravity were the cauſe of Motion, then the more Gravity, the ſwifter the Motion would be) from hence, I ſay, it were not eaſie to conceive how the *Atoms* ſhould embrace each other in a parallel line, if they fell down, as *Lucretius* expreſſeth it, *like drops of rain*; and therefore they ſaw a neceſſity to make their Motion decline a little, that ſo they might juſtle and hit one upon another. But this oblique Motion of the *Atoms*, tho' it be the only refuge left to ſalve the origin of things by a concourſe of *Atoms*, is yet as precarious and without reaſon as any other Suppoſition of theirs whatſoever. *Tully* chargeth this Motion of Declination with two great faults, *Futility*, and *Inefficacy*, *quæ cum res tota ficta ſit pueriliter, tum ne efficit quidem quod vult.* It is a childiſh Fancy, and to no purpoſe: For, *firſt*, It is aſſerted without any reaſon at all given *Cicero de Fin. bon. & mal. lib. 1.*

for it, which is unworthy a *Philoſopher*; neither is to any purpoſe; for if all *Atoms*, ſaith he, decline in their Motion, then none of them will ſtick together; if ſome decline, and others do not, this is as precarious as any thing can be imagin'd, to aſſign a diverſity of Motion in indiviſible Particles, which yet have all the ſame velocity of Motion; and, as *Tully* ſaith, *Hoc erit quaſi provincias Atomis dare, quæ recte, quæ oblique ferantur*; as tho' *Epicurus* were the General at this *Rendezvous* of *Atoms*, who ſtands ready to appoint every one his Task and Motion. This *Plutarch* tells us was the great charge againſt *Epicurus*, ὡς ἀναίτιον ἐπεισάγοντι κίνησιν ἐκ τῆς μὴ ὄντος, *becauſe he introduced ſuch a Motion of Declination out of nothing, upon no pretence of reaſon.* And *Turnebus* tells us that the ground why they deſir'd ſo ſmall a Declination, was, becauſe they were conſcious to themſelues, that it was founded upon no ground of Reaſon; *Et Epicurei ſibi concii culpæ, timide eam ponebant, & minimam ſibi poſtulabant.* To which purpoſe *Turnebus* cites thoſe Verſes of *Lucretius*,

Plutarch. de Anim. procreat. è Timæo.

Turnebus in Ciceron. de Fato.

Lucret. l. 2.

Quare etiam atque etiam paulum inclinare neceſſe eſt
Corpora, nec pluſquam minimum, ne fingere motus
Obliquos videamur, & id res vera refutet.
Nam hoc in promptu manifeſtumque eſſe videmus,
Pondera quantum in ſe eſt, non poſſe obliqua meare
E ſupero cum precipitant, quod cernere poſſis.
Sed nihil omnino recta regione viai
Declinare quis eſt qui poſſit cernere ſeſe?

But this Argument of *Lucretius* will hold, if at all, farther than this little Declination (for it is no more they deſire than as little as may be imagin'd, *quo nihil poſſit fieri minus*, as *Tully* expreſſeth it) but if they may decline a little, why not a great deal more? nay, it is impoſſible to conceive, but a little oblique Motion at firſt will in an infinite Space grow to be very oblique; for there is nothing to hinder the Motion which way it bends: now if there be never ſo little Motion of Declination, the *Atom* will be inclin'd that way; and what then ſhould hinder, but that the obliquity in a Motion thro' a great Space ſhould at laſt come to be very great; there being no center at all to guide the Motion towards, and the gravity not hindring this little Declination? Therefore *Tully* asks that Queſtion, *Cur declinet uno minimo, non declinet duobus aut tribus? Why only it declines one minim, and not two or three? For*, ſaith he, *it is no impulſion from any other Atom which makes it decline that one minim; neither is there any impediment in the Space to hinder it from declining more; ſo that*, as he well ſaith, *optare hoc quidem eſt, non diſputare*, this is to beg *Hypotheſes*, and not to prove them, which is the thing we have prov'd *Epicurus* to do. Which was the firſt thing premis'd, *viz.* that this *Hypotheſis* of *Epicurus* was very precarious, and is built on no foundation of Reaſon.

Cicero de Fato.

XVII. 2. *It is unſatisfactory and inſufficient, as well as precarious*; for ſhould we grant his two main Principles, *Atoms*, and his *Infinite empty Space*; yet we deny that ever his *Atoms* with all their occurſions would ever produce thoſe things which are in the Univerſe. To run thro' the noted *Phænomena* of the Univerſe, and to ſhew how inſufficient an account the *Epicureans* are able to give of them, from a fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, is a task too large to be here undertaken. There are only three things which I ſhall rather ſuggeſt than inſiſt upon, to ſee what miſe-

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rable shifts the *Epicureans* are driven to for the salving of them, and shall then leave it with the *Reader* to judg, what unmeasurable confidence it is in any to reject the Creation of the World for the sake of the *Epicurean Hypothesis*; and whether it be not the height of credulity, as well as infidelity, to believe the World ever to have been made by a fortuitous concourse of *Atoms*.

1. *The great variety of appearances in Nature*, which are attributed to Particles of the same Nature, only with the alteration of Size, Shape and Motion. That some things in the World should have no other Reason given of them, may not only be tolerable, but rational, as in the Objects and Operations on the Organs of Sense, those Affections which are mistaken for real Qualities, *&c.* But that all those Effects which are seen in Nature should have no other Cause but the different Configuration and Motion of *Atoms*, is the height of Folly as well as impiety. To imagine that the Particles of Matter, as they are in Men, should be capable of Sensation, Memory, Intellection, Volition, *&c.* merely because of a different Shape, Size and Motion from what they have in a piece of Wood, is a Riddle that requires a new Configuration of *Atoms* in us to make us understand. May it not be hoped, that at least one time or other by this casual concourse of *Atoms*, the Particles may light to be of such a Nature in Stones, as to make them fly; in Plants, to make them all Sensitive; and in Beasts to make them Reason and Discourse? What may hinder such a Configuration or Motion of Particles, if all these effects are to be imputed to no higher Principles? We see in other Bodies, what different appearances are caus'd by a sudden alteration of the Particles of the Matter of which they are compounded; why may it not fall out so in the things mention'd? Neither can this be unreasonable to demand. 1. Because the Motion of these Particles of Matter is casual still, according to them; and who knows what Chance may do? For the seminal Principles themselves are, I suppose, according to them, of the same uniform Matter with the rest of the World, and so are liable to different Motion and Configuration. 2. Because all Particles of Matter are suppos'd to be in continual Motion, because of that disseminated Vacuity which is presum'd to be in the World, and because a *Coacervate Vacuity* is not only asserted as possible, but as probably existent: I assume only then (that which is insisted on as probable) *viz.* That that Space which lies between our *Atmosphere* and the *Stars*, is empty of any other thing, but only the Rays of the *Stars* which pass thro' it; I then supposing it a Vacuity, whether would not the Particles of those Bodies which lie contiguous to that Space, presently dislodge from the Bodies wherein they are, and begin a new *Rendezvous* of *Atoms* there? For all *Atoms* are suppos'd to be in perpetual Motion; and the Cause assign'd, why in solid Bodies they do not fly away, is because of the repercussion of other *Atoms*, that when they once begin to stir, they receive such knocks as make them quiet in their places. Now this cannot hold in the Bodies contiguous to this Space; for both those Bodies are more fluid, and so there is no such knocking of Particles to keep them at rest; but which is more, those which are contiguous have nothing at all to hinder them from Motion, and so those Particles will necessarily remove into that empty Space, where there is no impediment of their Motion, and so the next *Atoms* to those must remove, because that Space wherein the other were, is made empty by their removal; and so the next, and so on, till not only the Air, but the whole Mass of the

Earth will, on ſuppoſition of ſuch a Vacuity, be diſſolv'd into its firſt Particles, which will all mutiny in the ſeveral Bodies wherein they are, and never reſt till they come to that empty Space, where they may again *Rendezvous* together. So dangerous is the news of Liberty, or of an empty Space to theſe *Democratical* Particles of the Univerſe. Neither can I ſee how a diſſeminated Vacuity can ſalve the difficulty; for thoſe Particles of the moſt ſolid Bodies being in continual Motion, and the ground of their union being repercuſſion, it thence follows, that towards that part where the diſſeminated *vacuum* is, the Particles meeting with no ſuch ſtrokes may fairly take their leaves of the Bodies they are in, and ſo one ſucceed in the place of another, till the Configuration of the whole be alter'd, and conſequently different appearances and effects may be caus'd in the ſame Bodies, tho' it reſults from ſeminal Principles: So that according to the *Atomical* Principles, no rational Account can be given of thoſe Effects which are ſeen in Nature. This *Dionyſius*, in *Euſebius*, urgeth againſt the *Atomiſts*, that from the ſame Principles, without evident reaſon given for it, they make of the ſame uniform Matter ſome things conſpicuous to Senſe, others not, ſome ſhort-liv'd, others extremely long-liv'd. Τίνα δὲ τρόπον μιᾶς οὖσι καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἁπασῶν οὐσίας, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀφθάρτου φύσεως, πλὴν τῶν μεγεθῶν, ὥς φασι, καὶ τῶν σχημάτων, τὰ μὲν ἐστι θεῖα καὶ ἀκήρατα καὶ αἰώνια, ὡς αὐτοὶ φήσαιεν ἄν, πύματα, ἢ μακραίωνά γε κατὰ τὸν οὕτως ὀνομάσαντα, φαινόμενά τε καὶ ἀφανῆ; *What ground can there be aſſign'd of ſo vaſt a difference between things, if they all be of the ſame Nature, and differ only in Size and Shape?* ſaith that excellent Perſon, who there, with a great deal of Eloquence, lays open the Folly of the *Atomical* Philoſophy, Θαυμαστή γε τῶν ἀτόμων, ἡ δημοκρατία δεξιουμένων τε ἀλλήλας τῶν φίλων καὶ περιπλεκομένων εἰς μίαν τε κατασκηνοῦν συνοικίαν ἐπειγομένων. *It is a rare Democracy of Atoms*, ſaith he, *where the friendly Atoms meet and embrace each other, and from thence forward live in the cloſeſt Society together.*

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 15. c. 24.

2. Not only the variety, but the *exact Order and Beauty of the World* is a thing unaccountable by the *Atomical Hypotheſis*. Were the whole World ſtill a *Heſiod*'s *Chaos* (from the conſideration of which *Diogenes Laertius* tells us, *Epicurus* began to philoſophize) we might probably believe an Agitation of Particles (ſuppoſing Matter created) might ſettle it in ſuch a confus'd manner; but that there ſhould be nothing elſe but a blind *impetus* of *Atoms* to produce thoſe vaſt and moſt regular Motions of the heavenly Bodies, to order the paſſage of the *Sun* for ſo great conveniency of Nature, and for the alternate ſucceſſion of the Seaſons of the Year, which ſhould cut ſuch Channels for the *Ocean*, and keep that vaſt Body of the Water (whoſe Surface is higher than the Earth) from overflowing it, which ſhould furniſh the Earth with ſuch ſeminal and prolific Principles, as to provide Food and Nouriſhment for thoſe Animals which live upon it, and furniſh out every thing neceſſary for the Comfort and Delight of Man's Life; to believe, I ſay, that all theſe things came only from a blind and fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, is the moſt prodigious piece of Credulity and Folly that human Nature is ſubject to. But this part which concerns the Order and Beauty of the parts of the Univerſe, and the Argument thence, that it could be no blind fortuitous Principle, but an infinitely wiſe God, hath been ſo fully and judiciouſly handled by a Learned Perſon already, that I ſhall rather chooſe to refer the Reader to his Diſcourſe, than inſiſt any more upon it.

Laer. l. 10.

D. H. More's Antidote againſt Atheiſm. *part 2.*

3. *The*

3. *The Production of Mankind* is a thing which the *Atomiſts* are moſt ſhamefully puzzled with, as well as the Formation of the internal parts of Man's Body, of which I have already ſpoken in the precedent Chapter. It would pity one to ſee what lamentable ſhifts the *Atomiſts* are put to, to find out a way for the Production of Mankind, *viz. That our teeming Mother the Earth at laſt caſt forth ſome kind of Bags like Wombs upon the Surface of the Earth, and theſe by degrees breaking, at laſt came out Children, which were nouriſh'd by a kind of Juice of the Earth like Milk, by which they were brought up till they came to be Men.* Oh what will not *Atheiſts* believe, rather than a DEITY and *Providence!* But leſt we ſhould ſeem to wrong the *Atomiſts*, hear what *Cenſorinus* ſaith of *Epicurus*; *Is enim credidit limo calefactos uteros neſcio quos radicibus terræ cohærentes, primum increviſſe, & infantibus, ex ſe editis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura miniſtrante præbuiſſe; quos ita educatos & adultos, genus humanum propagâſſe.* But becauſe *Lucretius* may be thought to ſpeak more impartially in the caſe, how rarely doth he deſcribe it? *Cenſor. de die Nat. c. 2.*

Creſcebant uteri terræ radicibus apti,
Quos ubi tempore maturo patefecerit ætas
Infantum, fugiens humorem, auraſque petiſſens,
Convertebat ibi natura foramina terræ,
Et ſuccum venis cogebat fundere apertis
Conſimilem lactis; ſicut nunc fœmina quæque
Quum peperit dulci repletur lacte, quod omnis
Impetus in mammas convertitur ille alimenti:
Terra cibum pueris, veſtem vapor, herba cubile
Præbebat, multa & molli lanugine abundans.

Had *Lucretius* been only a Poet, this might have paſs'd for a handſomely deſcrib'd Fable; but to deliver it for a piece of Philoſophy, makes it the greater Mythology: That Man's Body was form'd out of the Earth we believe, becauſe we have reaſon ſo to do; but that the Earth ſhould caſt forth ſuch *folliculi*, as he expreſſeth it, and then Men ſhould be brought up in ſuch a way as he deſcribes, deſerves a place among the moſt incredible and Poetic Fables. But if Poets muſt be credited, how much more like a Man did he ſpeak, who told us,

Natus homo eſt; ſive hunc divino ſemine fecit
Ille opifex rerum, Mundi melioris origo;
Sive recens tellus, ſeductaque nuper ab alto
Æthere, cognati retinebat ſemina cœli;
Quam ſatus Iapeto miſtam fluvialibus undis,
Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.

Thus have we conſider'd the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*, both as to the Principles on which it ſtands, and the ſutableneſs of it to the *Phænomena* of the Univerſe; and I ſuppoſe now there cannot be the leaſt ſhadow of Reaſon found from the *Atomical Philoſophy*, to make us at all queſtion that Account of the Origin of the Univerſe, which aſcribes it not to the fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, but to the infinite Wiſdom of a DEITY. I conclude then this Diſcourſe of the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*, with the words of *Automedon*, in the *Greek Epigram*:

Ταῦτ'

Anthol. l. 1. c. 15.

Τοῦτ' εἰδὼς σοφός ἴσθι, μάτην δ' Ἐπίκερον ἔασον
Πῦ τὸ κενὸν ζητεῖν, ἢ τίνες αἱ μονάδες.

Learn to be wise; let Epicurus *chase*
To find his Atoms, *and his empty Space.*

XVIII. I come now to the last *Hypothesis* mention'd, which undertakes to give an account of the Origin of the Universe, *from the mere Mechanical Laws of Motion and Matter.* Which is the *Hypothesis* of the late Famous *French* Philosopher Mr. *Des-Cartes.* For altho' there be as much Reason as Charity to believe that he never intended his *Hypothesis* as a foundation of *Atheism*, having made it so much his business to assert the Existence of a DEITY, and Immateriality of the Soul: yet because it is apt to be abus'd to that end by Persons *Atheistically* dispos'd, because of his ascribing so much to the power of Matter; we shall therefore so far consider it, as it undertakes to give an Account of the Origin of the Universe without a DEITY. His *Hypothesis* therefore is briefly this. He takes it for granted, that all the Matter of the World was at first of one Uniform Nature, divisible into innumerable parts, and divided into many, which were all in Motion: from hence he supposeth, 1. *That all the Matter of which the Universe is composed, was at first divided into equal particles of an indifferent size, and that they had all such a Motion as is now found in the World.* 2. *That all those particles were not at first Sphærical, because many such little Globes joyn'd together will not fill up a continued Space, but that of whatever figure they were at first, they would by continual Motion become Sphærical, because they would have various circular Motions; for seeing that at first they were mov'd with so great force that one particle would be disjoyn'd from the other, the same force continuing would serve to cut off all angles which are suppos'd in them, by their frequent occursions against each other; and so when the angles were cut off, they would become Sphærical.* 3. *He supposeth that no Space is left empty, but when those round particles being joyn'd, leave some intervals between them, there are some more subtile particles of Matter, which are ready to fill up those void Spaces, which arise from those angles which were cut off from the other particles to make them Sphærical; which fragments of particles are so little, and acquire thereby such a celerity of Motion, that by the force of that, they will be divided into innumerable little fragments, and so will fill up all those Spaces which other particles could not enter in at.* 4. *That those particles which fill up the intervals between the Sphærical ones, have not all of them the same celerity of Motion, because some of them are more undivided than others are, which fill'd up the space between three globular particles when their angles were cut off, and therefore those particles must necessarily have very angular figures, which are unfit for Motion, and thence it comes to pass that such particles easily stick together, and transfer the greatest part of their Motion upon those other particles which are less, and therefore have a swifter motion; and because these particles are to pass thro' such triangular spaces which lie in the midst of three globular particles touching each other, therefore he supposeth them as to their breadth and depth to be of a triangular figure; but because these particles are somewhat long, and the globular particles thro' which they pass with so swift motion have their rotation about the poles of the Heavens, thence he supposes that those triangular particles come*

Carteſii Princip. p. 3. Art. 46, &c.

to be wreathed. Now from these things being thus suppos'd, *Des Cartes* hath ingenuously and consonantly to his Principles undertaken to give an Account of the most noted *Phænomena* of the World, and those three sorts of particles mention'd, he makes to be his three Elements. The *first* is that subtile Matter which was suppos'd to arise from the cutting off the angles of the greater particles; and of this he tells us the *Sun* and Fix'd *Stars* consist, as those particles of that subtile Matter being in continual motion have made those several *vortices* or *Æthereal Whirlpools*. The *second* Element consists of the *Sphærical* particles themselves, which make up the *Heavens*; out of the *third* Element, which are those *Wreathed Particles*, he gives an Account of the Formation of the *Earth*, and *Planets*, and *Comets*; and from all of them, by the help of those common Affections of Matter, Size, Figure, Motion, *&c.* he undertakes to give an Account of the *Phænomena* of the World. How far his Principles do conduce to the giving Mens Minds satisfaction, as to the particular *Phænomena* of *Nature*, is not here our business to inquire, but only how far these Principles can give an Account of the Origin of the Universe without a DEITY? And that it cannot give a satisfactory account how the World was fram'd without a *Deity*, appears by the two grand Suppositions on which all his Elements depend, both which cannot be from any other Principle but GOD. Those are, 1. *The Existence of Matter in the World*, which we have already prov'd cannot be independent on GOD, and necessarily existent; and therefore supposing that Matter existent and put into Motion, would grind it self into those several particles by him suppos'd, yet this cannot give an Account of the Origin of the Universe without a *Deity*. 2. *The motion of the particles of Matter supposeth a* Deity; for Matter is no self-moving Principle, as hath been fully demonstrated in several places by that judicious Philosopher Dr. *H. More*, who plainly manifests that if Motion did necessarily belong to Matter, it were impossible there should be *Sun*, or *Stars*, or *Earth*, or *Man* in the World; for the Matter being uniform, it must have equal Motion in all its particles, if Motion doth belong to it. For Motion being suppos'd to be natural and essential to Matter, must be alike every where in it, and therefore every particle must be suppos'd in motion to its utmost capacity, and so every particle is alike and mov'd alike: and therefore there being no prevalency at all in any one particle above another in Bigness or Motion, it is manifest that this *Universal Matter*, to whom Motion is so essential and natural, will be ineffectual for the producing of any variety of appearances in Nature; for nothing could be caus'd by this thin and subtile Matter, but what would be wholly imperceptible to any of our Senses: and what a strange kind of visible World would this be? From hence then it appears that there must be an infinitely powerful and wise GOD, who must both put Matter into Motion, and regulate the Motion of it, in order to the producing all those varieties which appear in the World. And this necessity of the Motion of Matter by a power given it from GOD is freely acknowledg'd by Mr. *Des Cartes* himself in these words; *Considero materiam sibi libere permissam, & nullum aliunde impulsum suscipientem, ut plane quiescentem; illa autem impellitur a Deo, tantundem motus sive translationis in ea conservante quantum ab initio posuit.* So that this great improver and discoverer of the Mechanical power of Matter, doth freely confess the necessity not only of GOD's giving Motion in order to the Origin of the Universe, but of his conserving

Dr. *More Antidote b. 2. ch. 1.* Immortality of the Soul, *b. 1. c. 11. s. 3. &c. Ep. 3. ad Cartes. p. 88.*

Cartes. resp. ad ep. 3. H. Mori, p. 104.

ving Motion in it for the upholding it: So that we need not fear from this *Hypotheſis* the excluding of a *Deity* from being the prime efficient cauſe of the World. All the Queſtion then is concerning the particular manner, which was us'd by God as the efficient cauſe in giving Being to the World. As to which I ſhall only in general ſuggeſt what *Maimonides* ſays of it. *Omnia ſimul creata erant, & poſtea ſucceſſive ab invicem ſeparata*; altho' I am ſomewhat inclinable to that of *Gaſſendus*, *Majus eſt mundus opus, quam ut aſſequi mens humana illius molitionem poſſit:* To which I think may be well apply'd that Speech of *Solomon*; *Then I beheld all the work of* God, *that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the Sun: becauſe tho' a man labour to ſeek it out, yea farther, tho' a wiſe man think to know it, yet ſhall he not be able to find it.*

Maimon. More Nev. l. 2. c. 30. Gaſſendi Phyſic. ſ. 1. l. 7. c. 6. Eccl. 8. 17.

CHAP. III.

Of the Origin of Evil.

I. *Of the Being of Providence.* II. Epicurus *his Arguments againſt it refuted. The neceſſity of the belief of Providence in order to Religion.* III. *Providence prov'd from a conſideration of the nature of* God, *and the things of the World. Of the Spirit of Nature.* IV. *The great objections againſt Providence propounded. The firſt concerns the Origin of Evil.* V. God *cannot be the Author of Sin, if the Scriptures be true. The account which the Scriptures give of the fall of Man, doth not charge* God *with Man's fault.* God's *power to govern Man by Laws, tho' he gives no particular reaſon of every poſitive Precept.* VI. *The reaſon of* God's *creating Man with freedom of Will, largely ſhew'd from* Simplicius; *and the true account of the Origin of Evil.* VII. God's *permitting the Fall, makes him not the Author of it.* VIII. *The account which the Scriptures give of the Origin of Evil compar'd with that of Heathen Philoſophers.* IX. *The antiquity of the opinion of aſcribing the Origin of Evil to an evil Principle. Of the judgment of the* Perſians, Ægyptians, *and others about it.* X. *Of Manichæiſm.* XI, XII, XIII, XIV. *The opinion of the ancient Greek Philoſophers; of* Pythagoras, Plato, *the* Stoics; *the Origin of Evil not from the neceſſity of Matter.* XV, XVI. *The remainders of the Hiſtory of the Fall among the Heathens.* XVII, XVIII, XIX. *Of the malignity of* Dæmons. XX, XXI, XXII. *Providence vindicated as to the ſufferings of the good and impunity of bad Men. An account of both from Natural Light, manifeſted by* Seneca, Plutarch, *and others.*

IT being now manifeſted not only that there is a GOD, but that the World had its Being from Him; it thence follows by an eaſy and rational Deduction, that there is a particular Hand of Divine Providence, which upholds the World in its Being, and wiſely diſpoſeth all Events in it. For it is a moſt irrational and abſurd Opinion to aſſert a *Deity*, and deny *Providence:* and in nothing did *Epicurus* more diſcover the weakneſs and puerility of his judgment than in this. Indeed, if *Epicurus* had no other deſign in aſſerting a *Deity*, than (as many ancient Philoſophers imagin'd) to avoid the imputation of direct *Atheiſm*, and yet to take away all foundations of Religion; he muſt needs be ſaid to ſerve his *Hypotheſis* well, tho' he did aſſert the Being of an *Excellent Nature*, which he call'd GOD; while yet he made Him ſit as it were with his Elbows folded up in the Heavens, and taking no cognizance of Human actions. For he well knew, that if the belief of Divine Providence were once rooted out of Mens Minds, the thoughts of an *Excellent Being* above the Heavens, would have no more awe or power upon the Hearts and Lives of Men, than the telling Men that there are Jewels of ineſtimable value in the *Indies*, makes them more ready to pay Taxes to their Princes. For that Philoſopher could not be ignorant, that it is not Worth but Power, nor Speculation but Intereſt that rules the World. The poor Tenant more regards his petty Landlord, than the greateſt Prince in the World that hath nothing to do with him: and he thinks he hath great reaſon for it; for he neither fears puniſhment, nor hopes for reward from him; whereas his Landlord may diſpoſſeſs him of all he hath upon diſpleaſure, and may advantage him the moſt if he gains his favour: Suppoſing then that there were ſuch an *Excellent Being* in the World which was compleatly happy in Himſelf, and thought it an impairing of his happineſs to trouble Himſelf with an inſpection of the World; Religion might then be indeed deriv'd *à relegendo*, but not *à religando*; there might be ſome pleaſure in contemplating his Nature, but there could be no obligation to Obedience. So that *Epicurus* was the firſt founder of a kind of *Philoſophical Antinomianiſm*, placing all Religion in a Veneration of *the Deity*, purely for its own Excellency, without any ſuch mercenary Eye (as thoſe who ſerve GOD for their own ends, as they ſay are apt to have) to reward and puniſhment. And I much doubt that Good-woman whom the Story goes of, who in an *Enthuſiaſtic* poſture ran up and down the Streets with Emblems in her Hands, *Fire* in the one, as ſhe ſaid, to burn up *Heaven*, and *Water* in the other, to quench *Hell*, that Men might ſerve GOD purely for Himſelf, would, if ſhe had compaſs'd her deſign, ſoon have brought *Proſelytes* enough to *Epicurus*, and by burning *Heaven* would have burnt up the Cords of *Religion*, and in quenching *Hell* would have extinguiſh'd the Awe and Fear of a *Deity* in the World. Indeed the incomparable Excellency and Perfection which is in the *Divine Nature*, to Spirits advanc'd to a Noble and Generous height in Religion, makes them exceedingly value their Choice; while they diſregard whatever rivals with GOD for it; but were it not for thoſe Magnetical hooks of Obedience and Eternal Intereſt, there are few would be drawn to a due Conſideration of, much leſs a Delight in ſo Amiable and Excellent a Nature. And it is impoſſible to conceive, why GOD in the Revelation of his Will ſhould ever ſo much as mention a future puniſhment, or promiſe an eternal Reward, were not the Conſideration of theſe things the Sinews of *Religion*. I.

II. Which they whose design was to undermine the very Foundations on which all Religion was built, understood far better, than those weak pretended advancers of Religion, who while in such a way they pretend to advance it, do only blow it up. For if Men ought not to have an Eye and respect to their own future Condition, nor serve God on the account of his Power to make our Souls miserable or happy, much less ought Men to serve God with any regard to his Providence, since the Matters which Providence is employ'd about in this World, are of infinitely less moment, than those which concern our Future State. And if we have no Eye on Divine Providence in the exercise of Religion, we shall scarce be able to understand for what end God should take so much care of Mankind, and manifest so much of his Goodness to them, were it not to quicken them in their search after him, and excite them to the more cheerful Obedience to him. And when once we question to what end God troubles himself with the World, we are come next Door to *Epicurus*, and may in few steps more delight in the Flowers of his Garden. For this was his strongest Plea against Providence, that it was beneath the Majesty and Excellency of the Divine Nature to stoop so low, and trouble himself so far, as to regard what was done on Earth. This being one of his *Ratæ Sententiæ*, or undoubted Maxims, τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, *The blessed and immortal Being, neither hath any Imployment himself, nor troubles himself with others.* Which as *Maximus Tyrius* well observes, is rather a description of a *Sardanapalus*, than a Deity; nay, of a worse than a *Sardanapalus*; for he in the midst of all his Softness and Effeminacy wou'd yet entertain some Counsels for the safety and good of his Empire: But *Epicurus* his Deity is of so tender a nature, that the least thought of Business wou'd quite spoil his Happiness. This Opinion of *Epicurus* made the more raised-spirited Moralists so far contemn the unworthy Apprehensions which he entertain'd of the Divine Nature, that they degraded him from the very title of a Philosopher in it, and rank'd him beneath the most fabulous *Poets*, who had writ such unworthy things of their Gods, as is evident by the Censures which *Tully*, *Plutarch*, and others, pass upon him for this very Opinion. And they tell him, that some of their own Men were of a more noble and excellent Spirit than *Epicurus* his Deity, who abhorr'd Softness and Idleness, and made it their greatest delight to do good to their Countries. But *Epicurus* must needs make his God of his own humour (the usual flattery which Men bear to themselves, to think that most excellent which they delight in most) as *Xenophanes* was wont to say, That if his Horse were to describe a God, it would be with a curl'd Main, a broad Chest, *&c.* and in every thing like himself. Had *Epicurus* himself so little of an *Athenian* in him, as not to make it some part of his delight to understand the Affairs of the World? Or at least, did he take no pleasure in the Walks of his famous Garden, nor to order his Trees, and set his Flowers, and contrive every thing for his own delight? Wou'd *Epicurus* then count this a part of his Happiness? And is it inconsistent with the Happiness of a Deity, to take notice of the World, and order all things in it for his own Glory? Must so excellent a Nature as God's was, by his own acknowledgment, be presently tired with Business; when the more excellent any Nature is, the more active and vigorous it is, the more able to comprehend and dispatch Matters of Moment with the least disturbance to it self? Is it a pleasure to a Nurse to fill the Child with her Milk? Doth

Diog. Laert. l. 10.

Max. Tyr. Dissert. 29.

Cicero de Finib. l. 1. De Nat. Deor. l. 2. Plutarch. adverf. Colot.

the Sun rejoice to help the World with his conſtant Light? And doth a Fountain murmur till it be deliver'd of its Streams, which may refreſh the Ground? And is it no delight to the Divine Nature to behold the effects of his Goodneſs upon the World? We ſee here then the Foundation on which *Epicurus* went, *viz.* that his God muſt be like himſelf, or there muſt be none; and truly he might more ſutably to his Principles, queſtion his Exiſtence, than ſuppoſing his Exiſtence, deny his Providence on ſuch miſerable Accounts as theſe are, which yet are the chief which either *Epicurus* or *Lucretius* cou'd bring againſt it, from the conſideration of the Divine Nature.

The which to any one who conſiders it, doth neceſſarily infer a peculiar Eye and Hand of Providence in the World. For can we imagine, that a Being of Infinite Knowledg ſhou'd be ignorant of what is done in the World? And of Infinite Power, ſhou'd ſtand by and leave things to Chance and Fortune? Which were at firſt contriv'd and brought into Being by the contrivance of his Wiſdom, and exerciſe of his Power. And where the foundation of Exiſtence lies wholly and ſolely in the power of an infinite Being producing, the ground of continuance of that Exiſtence muſt lie in the ſame Power conſerving. When Men indeed effect any thing, the work may continue, whatever become of him that did it; but the reaſon of that is, becauſe what Man doth, is out of Matter already exiſtent, and his work is only ſetting Materials together: But now what GOD effects, he abſolutely gives a Being to, and therefore its duration depends on his Conſervation. What is once in its Being, I grant, will continue till ſome greater force than it ſelf put it out of Being; but withal I add, that GOD's withdrawing his Conſervation is ſo great a force, as muſt needs put that Being which had its Exiſtence from his Power, out of the condition it was in by it. The light of the Sun continues in the Air; and as long as the Sun communicates it, nothing can extinguiſh the Light, but what will put out the Sun: But cou'd we ſuppoſe the Sun to withdraw his Beams, what becomes of the Light then? This is the caſe of all Beings, which come from an infinite Power; their Subſiſtence depends on a continual Emanation of the ſame Power which gave them Being; and when once this is withdrawn, all thoſe Beings which were produced by this Power muſt needs relapſe into nothing. Beſides, what dependence is there upon each other, in the moments of Duration of any created Being? The Mode of Exiſtence in a Creature is but contingent and poſſible, and nothing is imply'd in the Notion of an exiſtent Creature, beyond mere poſſibility of Exiſtence; what is it then which gives actual Exiſtence to it? That cannot be it ſelf, for it wou'd be neceſſarily exiſtent: If another then gives Exiſtence, this Exiſtence muſt wholly depend upon him who gave it; for nothing can continue Exiſtence to it ſelf, but what may give it to it ſelf, (for it gives it for the Moment it continues it) and what gives Exiſtence to it ſelf, muſt neceſſarily exiſt, which is repugnant to the very Notion of a created Being: So that either we muſt deny a poſſibility of Non-exiſtence, or Annihilation in a Creature, which follows upon neceſſity of Exiſtence; or elſe we muſt aſſert, that the duration or continuance of a Creature in its Being, doth immediately depend on Divine Providence and Conſervation, which is with as much reaſon as frequency ſaid to be a continu'd Creation. But yet farther: Was an infinite Wiſdom and Power neceſſary to put things into that Order they are in: And is not the ſame neceſſary for the governing of them? I

III.

cannot see any reason to think, that the Power of Matter when set in Motion, shou'd either bring things into that exquisite order and dependence which the parts of the World have upon each other; much less that by the mere force of that first Motion, all things shou'd continue in the state they are in. Perpetual Motion is yet one of the *desiderata* of the World; the most exquisite *Mechanism* cannot put an Engine beyond the necessity of being look'd after: Can we then think this dull, unactive Matter, merely by the force of its first Motion, shou'd be able still to produce the effects which are seen in the World, and to keep it from tumbling, at least by degrees, into its pristine *Chaos?* It was an infinite Power, I grant, which gave that first Motion; but that it gave Power to continue that Motion till the Conflagration of the World, remains yet to be prov'd. Some therefore, finding that in the present state of the World, Matter will not serve for all the noted and common *Phænomena* of the World, have call'd in the help of a Spirit of Nature, which may serve instead of a Man-midwife to Matter, to help her in her Production of Things. Or, as tho' GOD had a plurality of Worlds to look after, they have taken care to substitute him a Vicar in this, which is the Spirit of Nature. But we had rather believe GOD himself to be perpetually resident in the World, and that the Power which gives Life, and Being, and Motion to every thing in the World, is nothing else but his own Providence; especially since we have learnt from himself, that it is *in him we live, and move, and have our being.*

Acts xvii. 28.

IV. Thus then we see a necessity of asserting Divine Providence, whether we consider the Divine Nature, or the *Phænomena* of the World; but yet the case is not so clear but that there are two grand Objections behind, which have been the continual exercise of the Wits of inquisitive Men almost in all Ages of the World. The one concerns the first Origin of Evil; the other concerns the Dispensations of Providence, whence it comes to pass, that good Men fare so hard in the World, when the bad triumph and flourish. If these two can be clear'd with any satisfaction to Reason, it will be the highest vindication of Divine Providence, and a great evidence of the Divinity of the Scriptures, which give us such clear light and direction in these profound Speculations, which the dim Reason of Man was so much to seek in.

I begin with the Origin of Evil; for, if there be a Hand of Providence which orders all things in the World, how comes Evil then into it, without GOD's being the Author of it? Which is a Speculation of as great depth as Necessity, it highly concerning us to entertain the highest apprehensions of GOD's Holiness, and how far he is from being the Author of Sin: And it is likewise a Matter of some difficulty so to explain the Origin of Evil, as to make it appear that GOD is not the Author of it. I easily then assent to what *Origen* saith on this subject, when *Celsus*, upon some mistaken places of Scripture, had charg'd the Scripture with laying the Origin of Evil upon GOD; εἴπερ ἔν ἄλλῳ τις τόπῳ τῶν ἀνθρώποις ἐξετάσεως δεόμενῳ, δυσθήρατός ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἡμῶν, ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἡ τῶν κακῶν ταχθείη ἂν ζήτησις. *If any thing which calls for our inquiry be of difficult investigation, that which concerns the Origin of Evils is such a thing.*

Orig. c. Cels. l. 4. p. 207.

Simplic. in Epictet. c. 34.

; and as *Simplicius* well begins his Discourse on this Subject; ὁ περὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τῶν κακῶν λόγος μὴ καλῶς διορθωθεὶς καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβείας αἴτιος γέγονε, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἡθῶν διαφωνίας τὰς ἀρχὰς διεβάλλετο, καὶ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀλύτοις ἀπορίαις ἐνέβαλε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αἰτιολογοῦντα αὐτῷ. *The dispute concerning the Nature and Origin of Evil, not being well stated, is the cause of great Impiety towards*

wards God, and perverts the principles of good Life, and involves them in innumerable perplexities who are not able to give a rational account of it. So much then is it our great concernment to fix on ſure grounds in the reſolution of this important queſtion; in which I intend not to lanch out into the depth and intricacies of it, as it relates to any internal purpoſes of God's Will, (which is beyond our preſent ſcope) but I ſhall only take that account of it which the Scripture plainly gives in relating the fall of the firſt Man. For the clearing of which I ſhall proceed in this method:

1. *That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the Author of Sin.*
2. *That the account which the Scripture gives of the origin of Evil, doth not charge it upon God.*
3. *That no account given by Philoſophers of the origin of Evil, is ſo clear and rational as this is.*
4. *That the moſt material circumſtances of this account are atteſted by the Heathens themſelves.*

1. *That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the Author of Sin.* For if the Scriptures be true, we are bound without Heſitation to yield our aſſent to them in their plain and direct affirmations; and there can be no ground of ſuſpending aſſent, as to any thing which pretends to be a Divine Truth, but the want of certain Evidence, whether it be of Divine Revelation or no. No doubt it would be one of the moſt effectual ways to put an end to the numerous controverſies of the Chriſtian World (eſpecially to thoſe bold diſputes concerning the method and order of God's Decrees) if the plain and undoubted aſſertions of Scripture were made the Rule and Standard, whereby we ought to judg of ſuch things as are more obſcure and ambiguous. And cou'd Men but reſt contented with thoſe things which concern their eternal Happineſs, and the means in order to it (which on that account are written with all imaginable perſpicuity in Scripture) and the moment of all other Controverſies be judg'd by their reference to theſe, there wou'd be fewer Controverſies and more Chriſtians in the World. Now there are two grand Principles which concern Mens eternal Condition, of which we have the greateſt certainty from Scripture, and on which we may with ſafety rely, without perplexing our Minds about thoſe more nice and ſubtile Speculations (which it may be are uncapable of all full and particular reſolution) and thoſe are, *That the ruin and deſtruction of Man is wholly from himſelf*; and, *That his ſalvation is from God alone.* If then Man's ruin and miſery be from himſelf; which the Scripture doth ſo much inculcate on all occaſions; then without controverſy that which is the cauſe of all the miſery of Human Nature, is wholly from himſelf too, which is, Sin. So that if the main ſcope and deſign of the Scripture be true, God cannot be the Author of that, by which (without the intervention of the Mercy of God) Man's miſery unavoidably falls upon him. For with what Authority and Majeſty doth God in the Scripture forbid all manner of Sin? With what earneſtneſs and importunity doth he wooe the Sinner to forſake his ſin? With what loathing and deteſtation doth he mention Sin? With what juſtice and ſeverity doth he puniſh Sin? With what wrath and indignation doth he threaten Contumacious Sinners? And is it poſſible, (after all this and much more, recorded in the Scriptures, to expreſs the Holineſs of God's Nature, his hatred of Sin, and his appointing a day of Judgment for the ſolemn puniſhment of Sinners) to imagin that the Scriptures do in the leaſt aſcribe

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the Origin of Evil to God, or make him the Author of Sin? *Shall not the Judg of all the world do right?* will a God of infinite Juſtice, Purity, and Holineſs, puniſh the Sinner for that which himſelf was the cauſe of? Far be ſuch unworthy thoughts from our Apprehenſions of a *Deity*, much more of that God whom we believe to have declar'd his Mind ſo much to the contrary, that we cannot believe that and the Scriptures to be true together.

Taking it then for granted in the general, that God cannot be the Author of Sin, we come to inquire, *Whether the account which the Scripture gives of the Origin of Evil, doth any way charge it upon God?* There are only two ways, according to the Hiſtory of the fall of Man recorded in Scripture, whereby Men may have any ground to queſtion whether God were the cauſe of Man's fall; either *firſt*, by the giving him that poſitive Law, which was the occaſion of his fall; or *ſecondly*, by leaving him to the liberty of his own Will. *Firſt*, The giving of that poſitive Law cannot be the leaſt ground of laying Man's fault on God; becauſe, 1. It was moſt ſuitable to the nature of a rational Creature to be govern'd by Laws, or declarations of the Will of his Maker: for conſidering Man as a free Agent, there can be no way imagin'd ſo conſonant to the nature of Man as this was, becauſe thereby he might declare his obedience to God to be the matter of his free choice. For where there is a capacity of Reward and Puniſhment, and acting in the conſideration of them, there muſt be a declaration of the Will of the Law-giver, according to which Man may expect either his Reward or Puniſhment. If it were ſuitable to God's nature to promiſe Life to Man upon Obedience, it was not unſutable to it to expect Obedience to every declaration of his Will; conſidering the abſolute Sovereignty and Dominion which God had over Man as being his Creature, and the indiſpenſable Obligation which was in the nature of Man to obey whatever his Maker did command him. So that God had full and abſolute Right to require from Man, what he did as to the Law which he gave him to obey; and in the general we cannot conceive, how there ſhou'd be a Teſtimony of Man's Obedience towards his Creator, without ſome declaration of his Creator's Will. *Secondly*, God had full Power and Authority, not only to govern Man by Laws, but to determin Man's general obligation to Obedience to that particular poſitive Precept by the breach of which Man fell. If God's power over Man was univerſal and unlimited, what reaſon can there be to imagin it ſhou'd not extend to ſuch a poſitive Law? Was it, becauſe the matter of this Law ſeem'd too low for God to command his Creature? But whatever the matter of the Law was, Obedience to God was the great end of it, which Man had teſtify'd as much in that Inſtance of it as in any other whatſoever; and in the violation of it were imply'd the higheſt aggravations of Diſobedience; for God's Power and Authority were as much contemned, his Goodneſs ſlighted, his Truth and Faithfulneſs queſtion'd, his Name diſhonour'd, his Majeſty affronted in the breach of that, as of any other Law whatſoever it had been. If the Law were eaſie to be obſerv'd, the greater was the Sin of Diſobedience; if the weight of the matter was not ſo great in it ſelf, yet God's Authority added the greateſt weight to it; and the ground of Obedience is not to be fetch'd from the nature of the thing required, but from the Authority of the Legiſlator. Or was it then becauſe God conceal'd from Man his Counſel in giving of that poſitive Precept? Hath not then a Legiſlator power to require

any thing, but what he satisfies every one of his reason in commanding it? If so, what becomes of Obedience and Subjection? It will be impossible to make any probative Precepts on this account; and the Legislator must be charg'd with the Disobedience of his Subjects, where he doth not give a particular account of every thing which he requires: which as it concerns Human Legislators (who have not that absolute Power and Authority which God hath) is contrary to all Laws of Policy and the general Sense of the World. This *Plutarch* gives a good account of, when he discourseth so rationally of the Sobriety which Men ought to use in their inquiries into the grounds and reasons of God's Actions; *For*, saith he, *Physicians will give prescriptions without giving the Patient a particular reason of every circumstance in them:* οὐδὲ γὰρ οὓς ἄνθρωποι νόμους τίθενται, τὸ εὔλογον ἁπλῶς ἔχουσι καὶ πάντοτε φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖ κομιδῇ γελοῖα τῶν προσταγμάτων. *Neither have Human Laws always apparent reason for them, nay some of them, are to appearance ridiculous*; for which he instanceth in that Law of the *Lacedæmonian Ephori*, μὴ τρέφειν μύσακα; to which no other reason was annex'd but this, καὶ πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις ὡς μὴ χαλεποὶ ὦσιν αὐτοῖς: *They commanded every Magistrate at the entrance of his Office to shave himself, and gave this reason for it, that they might learn to obey Laws themselves.* He farther instanceth, in the *Roman* Custom of *Manumission*, their Laws about Testaments, *Solon*'s Law against Neutrality in Seditions, and concludes thence, καὶ ὅλως πολλὰς ἂν τὶς ἐξείποι νόμων ἀτοπίας, μήτε τὸν λόγον ἔχων τῶν νομοθέτου, μήτε τὴν αἰτίαν συνιεὶς ἑκάστου τῶν γραφομένων. *Any one would easily find many Absurdities in Laws, who doth not consider the intention of the Legislator, or the ground of what he requires.* Τί δὴ θαυμαστὸν, saith he, εἰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὕτως ἡμῖν ὄντων δυσθεωρήτων, οὐκ εὔπορόν ἐστι τὸ περὶ τῶν θεῶν εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τινι λόγῳ τοὺς μὲν ὕστερον, τοὺς δὲ πρότερον τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων κολάζουσιν· *What wonder is it, if we are so puzled to give an account of the Actions of Men, that we shou'd be to seek as to those of the Deity?* This cannot be then any ground on the account of mere reason, to lay the charge of Man's Disobedience upon God, because he requir'd from him the observance of that positive command of not eating of the *forbidden Fruit.*

Plutarch. de his qui sero puniuntur a numine.

VI. The only thing then left, is, *whether God be not liable to this charge as he left Man to the liberty of his Will:* And that may be grounded on two things; *either that God did not create Man in such a condition, in which it had been impossible for him to have sinned; or that knowing his temptation he did not give him power to resist it.* If neither of these will lay any imputation of the Origin of Evil upon God, then God will appear to be wholly free from it. *First, concerning Man's being created a free Agent*; if the determination of the Schools be good, that possibility of Sinning is imply'd in the very notion of a Creature; and consequently that impeccability is repugnant to the nature of a created Being; then we see a necessary reason, why Man was created in a state of Liberty: but endeavouring to shew that the grounds of our Religion are not repugnant to natural Reason, I shall rather make use of the Testimony of such who profess'd to be Followers of nothing else but Reason and Philosophy. Among whom I shall make choice of *Simplicius* both for the Reason he produceth, and because he is farthest from any suspicion of partiality, by reason of his known opposition to the *Mosaic* History of the Creation. He then in his *Commentaries* on *Epictetus* professedly disputes this very subject of the Origin of Evil, and after having rejected that fond Opinion of two Principles, one of Good, and the

Vid. Thom. 1. p. q. 63. art. 1. Estium in sentent. l. 2. dist. 7. sect. 9.

Simplic. Com. in Epict. c. 34. p. 175.

the other of Evil, undertakes to give an account whence Evil came into the World; which becauſe it tends ſo much to the illuſtrating our preſent ſubject, I ſhall give an account of. GOD, ſaith he, *who is the fountain and principle of all Good, not only produced things which were in themſelves good, nor only thoſe things which were of a middle nature, but the extremes too, which were ſuch things which were apt to be perverted from that which is according to nature, to that which we call Evil. And that after thoſe Bodies which were* (as he ſuppoſeth) *incorruptible, others were produced which are ſubject to Mutation and Corruption; and ſo after thoſe Souls which were immutably fixed in Good, others were produced which were liable to be perverted from it; that ſo the riches of* GOD's *goodneſs might be diſplay'd in making to exiſt all Beings which are capable of it; and that the Univerſe might be perfect in having all ſorts of Beings in it. Now,* he ſuppoſeth *that all thoſe Beings which are above this ſublunary World are ſuch as are immutably good, and that the loweſt ſort of Beings which are liable to be perverted to Evil, are ſuch which are here below. Therefore,* ſaith he, *the Soul being of a more noble and immutable Nature, while it is by it ſelf, doth not partake of Evil; but it being of a nature apt to be joined with theſe Terreſtrial Bodies (by the Providence of the Author of the Univerſe, who produced ſuch ſouls, that ſo both extremes might be joyned by the Bonds of vital Union) thereby it becomes ſenſible of thoſe Evils and Pains which the Body is ſubject to; but theſe things are not properly Evils but rather Good, conſidering our Terreſtrial Bodies as parts of the Univerſe which is upheld by the changes and viciſſitudes which are in this lower World:* Which he largely diſcourſes on to ſhew that thoſe particular alterations which are in Bodies, do conduce rather to the perfection and beauty of the Univerſe, than are any real Evils in it. *But now,* ſaith he, *for the Origin of thoſe things which are properly Evils,* viz. *Moral Evils, which are* τὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς πταίσματα, *the lapſes and errors of the Human ſoul, we are to conſider, that there are ſouls of a more excellent nature than ours are, which are immutably good; and the ſouls of Brutes are of a lower kind than ours are, and yet are middle between the rational and vegetative, having ſomething in them parallel both to the Appetites and Evils which are in Men, which will therefore be un-*
Ibid. p. 108. ed. Salmaſ. *derſtood by an account of the other.* Ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ, μέση προελθοῦσα τῶν τε ἀεὶ ἄνω μενουσῶν ψυχῶν, διά τε τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχικῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀκρότητα, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ μέθεξιν, καὶ τῶν ἀεὶ κάτω διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα συγγένειαν τῆς ἀλόγου ζωῆς, καὶ συνδεσμῷ ζωτικὸς γινομένη τῶν τε ἄνω καὶ τῶν κάτω, διὰ τῆς αὐτεξουσίου σχέσεως, ποτὲ μὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα ὁμοιοῦται. *The Soul of Man is nexus utriuſque mundi, in the middle between thoſe more excellent Beings which perpetually remain above, with which it partakes in the ſublimity of its Nature and Underſtanding, and thoſe inferior Terreſtrial Beings with which it communicates thro' the vital Union which it hath with the Body, and by reaſon of that freedom and indifferency which it hath, it ſometimes is aſſimilated to the one, ſometimes to the other of theſe extremes. So that while it aproacheth to the nature of the ſuperior Beings, it keeps it ſelf free from Evil, but becauſe of its freedom it may ſometimes ſink down into theſe lower things,* and ſo he calls *the cauſe of all evil in the Soul* τὴν αὐτοθελῆ κάθοδον εἰς τόνδε θνητὸν τόπον, *its voluntary deſcent into this lower World,* and immerſing it ſelf in the *feculency of Terreſtrial Matter,* Κἂν φύσιν δὲ ἀμφίβολον ἔλαχεν, οὐκ ἀναγκαζομένη κάτεισιν ἢ ἄνεισιν ἀλλ' οὕτως ὑπέστη, ὡς ὅταν αὐτὴ θέλῃ κατιέναι τε καὶ ἀνιέναι. *For tho' the Soul be of a kind of Amphibious Nature, yet it is not forced either upwards or downwards, but acts either way ac-*

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cording to its internal liberty. But, ſaith he, *while the rational ſoul keeps that power which it hath in its hands over the Body, and makes uſe of it only as an inſtrument for its own good, ſo long it keeps pure and free from any ſtain of evil; but when it once forgets the ſimilitude it hath with the more excellent Being, and throws away the Scepter of its power, and drowns it ſelf in the Body and Brutiſh Affections (preferring the pleaſure of Senſe above that of Reaſon) when it ſo far degenerates below the principles of Reaſon, that inſtead of commanding the Brutiſh Faculties it becomes a ſlave to them, then it conceives and brings forth evil; but this it doth not thro' any coaction or neceſſity, but thro' the abuſe of that power and liberty which it hath: For the choice is a proper action of the Soul it ſelf: which he proves from hence, becauſe* GOD, *and the Laws, and all good Men, do not meaſure the good and evil of Actions ſo much by the event, as by the will and intention of the Perſon; and that Puniſhment and Reward have chiefly a reſpect to thoſe. And therefore Men are pardoned for what they do out of conſtraint and force, and the fault is aſcribed,* ὁ τῷ πράττοντι ἀλλὰ βιαζομένῳ, *not to him that did it, but to him that forced him to the doing of it.* And ſo from hence he concludes, *That becauſe of the freedom of the Will of Man, nothing elſe can be ſaid to be the Author of Evil properly, but the Soul of Man;* and concludes that Diſcourſe with this excellent Speech, Ἔχοντες ἐν τῇ αἰτίαν τῷ κακῷ, λαμπρᾷ τε φωνῇ βοῶμεν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς κακίας ἀναίτιός ἐστιν, ὅτι τὸ κακὸν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐνεργεῖ αὐτεξουσίως, καὶ οὐκ ὁ Θεός· εἰ μὲν γὰρ βίᾳ τὸ κακὸν ἔπραττεν ἡ ψυχή. τάχα ἂν τις τὸν Θεὸν αἰτιάσαιτο τῶν ἀναιτίως αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντα βιασθῆναι, καὶ τοι οὐδὲ κακὸν ἦν τὸ βίᾳ πραττόμενον· καὶ δὲ προαίρεσιν αὐτὸ αἱρουμένη αὐτὴ ἂν αἰτία λέγοιτο δικαίως. *Having thus found out the true origin of Evil, let us cry out with a loud voice, that* GOD *is not the Author of Sin, becauſe the Soul freely doth that which is evil, and not* GOD; *for if the Soul were forced to do what it doth, one might juſtly lay the blame on* GOD, *who permits ſuch a force to be offer'd it, neither could it be properly evil which the Soul was conſtrained to; but ſince it acted freely, out of choice, the Soul muſt alone be accounted the Author and Cauſe of Evil.* Thus we ſee that GOD cannot with any ſhadow of Reaſon be accounted the Author of Evil, becauſe he gave the Soul of Man a principle of internal freedom, when the very freedom of acting which the Soul had, put it into a capacity of ſtanding as well as falling. And certainly, he can never be ſaid to be the cauſe of the breaking of a Perſon, who gave him a ſtock to ſet up with, and ſuppos'd him able to manage it when he gave it him. Indeed had not Man had this freedom of Will, he could not have fallen; but then neither had he been a rational Agent, which ſuppoſing no corruption, doth ſpeak freedom of Action. So that while we enquire after the origin of Evil we have no other cauſe to aſſign it to, but Man's abuſe of that free power of acting which he had: but if we will be ſo curious as to inquire farther, why GOD did create Man with a freedom of Will, and not rather fix his Soul immutably on Good; if the order of Beings be no ſatisfactory Reaſon for it, we can give no other than that why he made Man, or the World at all, which was the good pleaſure of his Will.

But ſecondly, *Suppoſing* GOD's *giving Man this freedom of Will, doth not entitle him to be the Author of Evil;* doth not his leaving Man to this liberty of his in the Temptation, make him the cauſe of Sin? I anſwer no, and that on theſe accounts. VII.

1. *Becauſe Man ſtood then upon ſuch terms, that he could not fall but by his own free and voluntary Act:* He had a power to ſtand, in that there

was no principle of Corruption at all in his Faculties, but he had a pure and undefil'd Soul, which could not be polluted without its own consent: Now it had been repugnant to the terms on which Man ſtood (which were the tryal of his Obedience to his Creator) had he been irreſiſtibly determin'd any way. *Simplicius* puts this queſtion after the former diſcourſe, *Whether* GOD *may be called the Author of ſin, becauſe he permits the Soul to uſe her liberty? But*, ſaith he, *he that ſays* GOD *ſhould not have permitted this uſe of its freedom to the Soul, muſt ſay one of theſe two things; either that the Soul being of ſuch a Nature as is indifferent to Good or Evil, it ſhould have been wholly kept from the chooſing Evil, or elſe that it ſhould have been made of ſuch a Nature that it ſhould not have had a power of chooſing Evil. The firſt is irrational and abſurd; for what freedom and liberty had that been, where there was no choice? And what choice could there have been, where the Mind was neceſſitated only to one part? For the ſecond we are to conſider*, ſaith he, *that no Evil is in it ſelf deſirable, or to be choſen; but withal, if this power of determining it ſelf either way muſt be taken away, it muſt be either as ſomething not Good, or as ſome great Evil; and whoever ſaith ſo, doth not conſider, how many things in the World there are, which are accounted good and deſirable Things, yet are no ways comparable with this freedom of Will. For it excels all ſublunary Beings; and there is none would rather deſire to be a Brute or Plant than Man; if* GOD *then ſhew'd his goodneſs in giving to inferior Beings ſuch Perfections which are far below this, is it any ways incongruous to* GOD*'s Nature and Goodneſs, to give Man the freedom of his Actions, and a ſelf-determining power, tho' he permitted him the free uſe of it? Beſides*, as that Author reaſons, *had* GOD, *to prevent Man's ſin, taken away the liberty of his Will, he had likewiſe deſtroyed the Foundation of all Vertue, and the very Nature of Man; for Vertue would not have been ſuch, had there been no poſſibility of acting contrary; and Man's Nature would have been Divine, becauſe impeccable. Therefore*, ſaith he, *tho' we attribute this ſelf-determining Power to* GOD *as the Author of it, which was ſo neceſſary in the order of the Univerſe, we have no reaſon to attribute the Origin of that Evil to* GOD, *which comes by the abuſe of that Liberty. For*, as he farther adds, GOD *doth not at all cauſe that Averſion from Good, which is in the Soul when it ſins, but only gave ſuch a Power to the Soul, whereby it might turn it ſelf to Evil, out of which* GOD *might afterwards produce ſo much Good, which could not otherwiſe have been without it.* So conſonantly to the Scripture doth that Philoſopher ſpeak on this ſubject.

Simplic. in Epictet. p. 186, 187.

2. GOD *cannot be ſaid to be the Author of Sin, tho' he did not prevent the Fall of Man, becauſe he did not withdraw before his Fall, any Grace or Aſſiſtance, which was neceſſary for his ſtanding.* Had there been indeed a neceſſity of ſupernatural Grace, to be communicated to Man for every Moment, to continue him in his Innocency; and had GOD before Man's Fall, withdrawn ſuch Aſſiſtance from him, without which it were impoſſible for him to have ſtood, it would be very difficult freeing GOD from being the Cauſe of the Fall of Man. But we are not put to ſuch difficulties for acquitting GOD from being the Author of Sin; for there appears no neceſſity at all for aſſerting any diſtinction of ſufficient and efficacious Grace in Man before his Fall; that the one ſhould belong only to a radical Power of ſtanding, the other to every Act of good which *Adam* did: For if GOD *made Man upright*, he certainly gave him ſuch a Power as might be brought into Act without the neceſ-

ſity of any ſupervenient Act of Grace, to elicite that habitual Power into particular Actions. If the other were ſufficient, it was ſufficient for its end; and how could it be ſufficient for its end, if notwithſtanding that, there were no poſſibility of ſtanding, unleſs efficacious help were ſuperadded to it? God would not certainly require any thing from the Creature in his Integrity, but what he had a Power to obey; and if there were neceſſary farther Grace to bring the Power into Act, the ſubtracting of this Grace muſt be by way of Puniſhment to Man, which it is hard to conceive for what it ſhould be, before Man had ſinned, or elſe God muſt ſubtract this Grace on purpoſe that Man might fall; which would neceſſarily follow on this Suppoſition, in which caſe Man would be neceſſitated to fall, *Veluti cum ſubductis columnis domus neceſſario corruit*, as one expreſſeth it, *As a Houſe muſt needs fall, when the Pillars on which it ſtood are taken away from it.* But now if God withdrew not any effectual Grace from Man, whereby he muſt neceſſarily fall, then tho' God permit Man to uſe his Liberty, yet he cannot be ſaid to be any ways the Author of Evil, becauſe Man had ſtill a *poſſe ſi vellet*, a Power of ſtanding, if he had made right uſe of his Liberty: And God never took from Man his *Adjutorium quo potuit ſtare, & ſine quo non potuit*, as *Divines* call it, Man enjoying ſtill his Power, tho' by the abuſe of his Liberty he fell into Sin: So that granting God to leave Man to the uſe of his Liberty, yet we ſee God cannot in the leaſt be charg'd with being the Author of Sin, or the Origin of Evil, by the Hiſtory of the Fall of Man in Scripture: Which was the thing to be clear'd.

VIII. We come now in the third place, to compare that account given of the Origin of Evil in Scripture, with that which was embrac'd by Heathen Philoſophers, in point of Reaſon and Evidence. There was no one inquiry whatſoever, in which thoſe who had nothing but natural Light to guide them, were more to ſeek for ſatisfaction in, than this concerning the Origin of Evil. They ſaw by continual Experience, how great a Torrent of both ſorts of Evils, of Sin and Puniſhment, did overflow the World; but they were like the *Egyptians*, who had ſufficient evidence of the overflowing their Banks by the River *Nile*, but could not find out the Spring or the Head of it. The reaſon was, as Corruption increas'd in the World, ſo the means of Inſtruction and Knowledg decay'd; and ſo as the *Phænomena* grew greater, the reaſon of them was leſs underſtood; the knowledg of the Hiſtory of the firſt Ages of the World, thro' which they could alone come to the full underſtanding of the true cauſe of Evil, inſenſibly decaying in the ſeveral Nations: Inſomuch, that thoſe who are not at all acquainted with that Hiſtory of the World, which was preſerv'd in Sacred Records among the *Jews*, had nothing but their own uncertain conjectures to go by, and ſome kind of obſcure Traditions which were preſerv'd among them; which while they ſought to rectify by their Interpretations, they made them more obſcure and falſe than they found them. They were certain of nothing, but that Mankind was in a low and degenerate Condition, and ſubject to continual Miſeries and Calamities; they who cry'd up the moſt the αὐτεξέσιον, or the Self-determining Power of the Soul, could not certainly but ſtrangely wonder, that a Principle indifferent to be carry'd either way, ſhould be ſo almoſt fatally inclin'd to the worſt of them. It was very ſtrange, that ſince Reaſon ought to have the command of Paſſions, by their own acknowledgment, the Brutiſh part

of the Soul ſhould ſo maſter and enſlave the Rational, and the Beaſt ſhould ſtill caſt the Rider in Man, the ſenſitive Appetite ſhould throw off the Power of the τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, of that Faculty of the Soul which was deſign'd for the Government of all the reſt. The Philoſophers could not be ignorant, what Slaves they were themſelves to this *Terreſtrial Hyle*, how eaſily their moſt mettleſome Souls were mir'd in the Dirt, how deep they were ſunk into corporeal Pleaſures, that it was paſt the power of their Reaſon to help them out. Nay, when the Soul begins to be fledg'd again, after her πτεροῤῥύησις, or moulting, at her entrance into the Body, which *Plato* ſpeaks of, and ſtrives to raiſe her ſelf above this lower World, ſhe then feels the weight of ſuch Plummets hanging at her Feet, that they bring her down again to her former fluttering up and down in her Cage of Earth. So *Hierocles* complains, That when Reaſon begins to carry the Soul to the perception of the moſt noble Objects, the Soul with a generous flight would ſoar above this World, ὅταν μὴ τῶν παθητικαῖς ὁλκαῖς ὥσπερ τισὶ μολύβδισιν, ὑποφέρηται πρὸς κακίαν, *Were it not born down to that which is Evil by the force of Paſſions, which hang like Leads upon the Soul's Feet.* What a ſtrange unaccountable thing muſt this needs be to thoſe who beheld the conſtancy of the Effect, but were to ſeek for the Cauſe of it? It could not but be clear to them that the αὐτεξούσιον they were wont to extol ſo high, was (in the ſtate Man was now in) but a more noble name for Slavery; when themſelves could not but confeſs the ῥοπὴ, or inclination in the Soul was ſo ſtrong to the Evil; and could that be an even Ballance, where there was ſo much down-weight in one of the Scales? unleſs they made, as ſome of them did, the voluntary Inclinations of the Soul to evil, an evidence of her Liberty in this moſt degenerate Condition, as tho' it were any Argument that the Priſoner was the freer, becauſe he delighted himſelf in the noiſe of his Shackles. Neither was this diſorder alone at home in the Soul, where there was ſtill a *Xantippe* ſcolding with *Socrates*, *Paſſion* ſtriving with *Reaſon*; but when they look'd abroad in the World, they could not but obſerve ſome ſtrange Irregularities in the converſe among Men. What debaucheries, contentions, rapines, fightings and deſtroying each other, and that with the greateſt Cruelty, and that frequently among Country-men, Friends, nay, Relations and Kindred! And could this Hoſtility between thoſe of the ſame Nature, and under the moſt ſacred Bonds of Union, be the reſult of Nature, when even Beaſts of Prey are not ſuch to thoſe of their own kind? Beſides all this, when they ſummed up the Life of Man together, and took an account of the Weakneſſes and Follies of Childhood, the Heats and Extravagancies of Youth, the Paſſions, Diſquietments and Diſappointments of Men in their ſtrength and height of Buſineſs, the Inquietude, Aches, and Infirmities of old Age, beſides the Miſeries, which thro' every one of theſe, all Men are ſubject to, and few eſcape; into how ſmall a Sum will the ſolid Pleaſure and Contentment of the Life of Man be reduc'd? Nay, if we take thoſe things in the World which Men pleaſe themſelves the moſt in enjoyment of, and conſider but with what Care they are got, with what Fear they are kept, and with what Certainty they muſt be loſt; and how much the Poſſeſſion of any thing fails of the expectation of it, and how near Men are upon the top of *Tenariff* to fall into the depth of the Sea; how often they are precipitated from the height of Proſperity, into the depthof Adverſity; we ſhall find yet much leſs, that by the greateſt *Chymiſtry* can be extracted of real ſatisfaction out of

Hieroc. in aurea carmina, p. 17.

these things. Whence then should it come, that Mens Souls should so delight to feed on these Husks, and to embrace these Clouds and Shadows, instead of that real Good, which is the true Object of the Soul's desire? They could easily see there was no pure, unmix'd Good in the World, but there was a Contemperation of both together, according to that of *Euripides:*

> Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακά,
> Ἀλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις.

There is a kind of continual mixture of Good and Evil in the World; which *Socrates* observ'd upon the rubbing of his Thigh, where the Fetters made it itch, ὡς ἄτοπον, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ; ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐν ἀντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν; *What a strange thing is that which Men are wont to call Pleasure? How near a kin is it to that which seems so contrary to it, Pain?* *Plat. in Phæd.*

Now the observing the strange and sudden vicissitudes of these things, and what near neighbours Pain and Pleasure were to each other, (so that there is frequently a passage out of one into the other) did yet more entangle them to give a clear account of the Origin of both these. Those who believe there was a God who produc'd the World, and order'd all things in it, did easily attribute whatever was good in the World to the Fountain of all Goodness; but that any Evil should come from him, they thought it repugnant to the very Notion of a Deity; which they were so far right in, as it concern'd the Evil of Sin; which we have already shew'd God could not be the Author of: But therein they shew'd their Ignorance of the true cause of *Evil*, that they did not look upon the Miseries of Life as the Effects of God's Justice upon the World, for the evil of Sin. And therefore that they might set the Origin of Evil far enough off from God, they made two different Principles of things, the one of Good, and the other of Evil: This *Plutarch* tells us, was the most ancient and universal account which he could meet with, of the Origin of *Good* and *Evil.* To which purpose we have this ample Testimony of his, in his learned Discourse, *De Iside & Osiride*, Διὸ καὶ παμπάλαιος αὕτη κάτεισιν ἐκ θεολόγων καὶ νομοθετῶν, εἴς τε ποιητὰς καὶ φιλοσόφους δόξα, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδέσποτον ἔχουσα, τὴν δὲ πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ δυσεξάλειπτον, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον, οὐδὲ ἐν φήμαις, καὶ ἀλλὰ ἔν τε τελεταῖς ἔν τε θυσίαις, καὶ βαρβάροις καὶ Ἕλλησι πολλαχοῦ περιφερομένην, ὡς οὔτ' ἄνουν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωρεῖται τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ πᾶν, οὔτε εἷς ἐστιν ὁ κρατῶν καὶ κατευθύνων, ὥσπερ οἴαξιν ἤτισι πειθινοῖς χαλινοῖς λόγος· ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ μεμιγμένα κακοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μηδὲν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἄκρατον ἐνταῦτα τῆς φύσεως φερούσης· οὐ δυεῖν πίθων εἷς ταμίας, ὥσπερ νάματα τὰ πράγματα καπηλικῶς διανέμων ἀνακεράννυσιν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ δυεῖν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν, καὶ δυεῖν ἀνατιπαλῶν δυνάμεων, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ κατ' εὐθείαν ὑφηγουμένης, τῆς δὲ ἔμπαλιν ἀναστρεφούσης καὶ ἀνακλώσης, ὅ τε βίος μικτὸς, ὅ τε κόσμος εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ὁ περίγειος οὗτος καὶ μετὰ σελήνην, ἀνώμαλος καὶ ποικίλος γέγονε, καὶ μεταβολὰς πάσας διχόμενος, εἰ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀναιτίως πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, αἰτίαν δὴ κακοῦ τἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν πράσχοι, δεῖ γένεσιν ἰδίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ κακοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν. *Plutarch. de Iside & Osir. p. 369, ed. Fr.*

Which words I have the more largely cited, because they give us the most full account of the Antiquity, Universality, and Reason of that Opinion, which asserts two different Principles of Good and Evil. *It is a Tradition* (saith he) *of great Antiquity, deriv'd down from the ancient Masters of Divine Knowledg, and Formers of Commonwealths, to the Poets and*

and Philoſophers, whoſe firſt Author cannot be found, and yet hath met with firm and unſhaken Belief, not only in ordinary Diſcourſes and Reports, but was ſpread into the Myſteries and Sacrifices both of Greeks *and others, that the Univerſe did not depend on chance, and was deſtitute of Mind and Reaſon to govern it; neither was there one only Reaſon which ſat at the Stern, or held the Reins, whereby he did order and govern the World: But ſince there is ſo much confuſion and mixture of Good and Evil in the World, that Nature doth not produce any pure untainted Good; there is not any one, who like a Drawer, takes the Liquor out of two ſeveral Veſſels, and mixeth them together, and after diſtributes them; but there are two Principles and Powers contrary to each other, whereof one draws us to the right Hand, and directs us ſtraight forward, the other pulls us back, and turns us the other way; ſince we ſee the Life of Man ſo mixed as it is; and not only that, but the World too, at leaſt ſo much as is ſublunary and terreſtrial, which is ſubject to many Varieties, Irregularities, and Changes. For if nothing be without a Cauſe, and Good cannot be the cauſe of Evil, it neceſſarily follows, that as there is a peculiar Nature and Principle which is the cauſe of Good, ſo there muſt be another, which is the cauſe of Evil.*

But leſt we ſhould think it was only a Sect of a kind of Heathen *Manichees* which held this Opinion, he tells us, to prevent that, ᾗ δοκεῖ τοῦτο τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ σοφωτάτοις, *It was the Opinion of the moſt, and wiſeſt of the Heathen.* Now theſe two Principles ſome (ſaith he) call *Two oppoſite Gods*, whereof the one is the cauſe of *Good*, and the other of *Evil*; him they call Θεὸς, this Δαίμων. By this one would imagine, that this very ancient Tradition was nothing elſe but the true account of the Origin of Evil, a little diſguis'd. For the Scripture making the *Devil* the firſt Author of *Evil* himſelf, and the firſt ſollicitor and tempter of Man to it; who when God directed him ſtraight forward, pull'd Man back, and put him quite out of his way, by which means all the Miſeries of the World came into it: For while Man kept cloſe to his Maker, his Integrity and Obedience were to him what the *vaſa umbilicalia* are to the Child in the Womb; by them he receiv'd whatever tended to his Subſiſtence and Comfort: But Sin cut thoſe Veſſels aſunder, and prov'd the *Midwife* of Miſery, bringing Man forth into a World of Sorrow and Sufferings. Now, I ſay, the Scripture taking ſuch eſpecial notice of one, as the chief of *Devils*, thro' whoſe means Evil came into the World, this gave occaſion to the Heathens, when length of Time had made the Original Tradition more obſcure, to make theſe two, *God* and the *Dæmon*, as two *Anti-gods*, and ſo to be the Cauſes, the one of all *Good*, and the other of all *Evil*. Which at laſt came to that (which was the *Devil*'s great deſign in thus corrupting the Tradition) that both theſe *Anti-gods* ſhould have ſolemn Worſhip by Sacrifices; the one by way of Impetration, for beſtowing of Good; the other by way of Deprecation, for averting of Evil. Such *Plutarch* there tells us, were the *Oromaſdes* and *Arimanius* of *Zoroaſtres*, which were worſhipped by the *Perſians*; the one for doing Good, and the other for avoiding Evil; the one they reſembled to Light (or Fire) the other to Darkneſs and Ignorance: What Animals were good and uſeful they aſcribed to *Oromaſdes*, and all venomous and noxious ones to *Arimanius*; whom *Plutarch* elſewhere calls τὸν πονηρὸν Δαίμονα Περσῶν, *The evil Dæmon of the Perſians.* The ſame *Diogenes Laertius* relates of the *Magi*, the Philoſophers of *Perſia*, that they made two diſtinct Principles, Ἀγαθὸν Δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν, *a good and bad*

Plut. in Alex.

Diog. Laertius in Proem.

bad Dæmon; for which he quotes *Dinon*, *Ariſtotle*, *Hermippus*, *Eudoxus*, and others. The ſame *Plutarch* makes to be the Opinion of the ancient *Greeks*, who attribute the good to *Jupiter Olympius*, the bad to *Hades:* The *Chaldeans*, ſaith he, *make the Planets their Gods*, of which, two they ſuppoſe the cauſe of Good; two more of only a malignant Influence; and other three to be indifferent to either. The ſame he affirms of the *Ægyptians*, That whatever was evil and irregular, they aſcrib'd to *Typho*; what was good, comely, and uſeful, they attributed to *Iſis* and *Oſiris*; to *Iſis* as the paſſive, *Oſiris* as the active Principle.

Thus we ſee how large a ſpread this Opinion of the Origin of Evil had in the *Gentile* World; neither did it expire with *Heatheniſm:* But *Manes* retain'd ſo much of the Religion of his Country, being a *Perſian*, that he made a ſtrange medly of the *Perſian* and *Chriſtian* Doctrine together. For that was his famous Opinion, of which St. *Auſtin* tells us; *Iſte duo principia inter ſe diverſa atque adverſa, eademque æterna, & coæterna, hoc eſt, ſemper fuiſſe, compoſuit; duaſque naturas atque ſubſtantias, boni, ſcilicet, & mali, ſequens alios antiquos hæreticos, opinatus eſt.* St. *Auſtin* thinks that *Manes* had his Opinion, concerning two Principles, from the ancient Hereticks, by whom I ſuppoſe he means the *Marcioniſts* and *Valentinians:* But it ſeems more probable that *Manes* had his Doctrine immediately from his Country-men, tho' it be generally thought that *Scythianus* and *Buddas* were his Maſters in it. But from whomſoever it came, the Opinion was merely *Heathen*, and not more contrary to Scripture than it is to Reaſon; the former I meddle not with, that Opinion being now extinct in the *Chriſtian* World: I only briefly conſider the Unreaſonableneſs of it, to ſhew what a far better account of the *Origin of Evil* the Scriptures give us, than was diſcover'd by the *Heathen* Philoſophers: For on both ſides, that Opinion is repugnant to the Notion of a *Deity*, ſo that while they would make two ſuch *Gods*, they make none at all. For how can the Principle of Good be GOD, if he hath not infinite Power as well as Goodneſs? And how can he have infinite Power, if he hath not the Management of things in the World, And how can he have the Management of things, if they be liable to Evil; which the other GOD, which is the Principle of Evil, may lay upon it; from which, according to this ſuppoſition, the Principle of Good cannot reſcue it? So that they who hold this Opinion cannot, as *Simplicius* tells us, *Give* GOD τὸ ἥμισυ τ ὅλης δυνάμεως, *the half of that infinite Power* which belongs to him: For neither can he keep the good Creatures which he makes, from the power of the evil *Dæmon*; and therefore if he loves them, muſt be in continual fears of the Power of the contrary Principle: Neither can he free them from the Evil which the other lays upon them; for then GOD's Power would be far greater than the evil *Dæmon*, and ſo he could be no *Anti-god.* And on the other ſide, the Notion or Idea of an *infinite evil Being*, is in it ſelf an inconſiſtent Idea; for it is an *infinite Non-entity*, if we ſuppoſe his very Being to lie in *being Evil*, which is only a privation of Goodneſs: And beſides, if he be infinitely Evil, he muſt be infinitely contrary to the good Principle; and how can he be infinitely contrary, which enjoys ſeveral of the ſame Perfections which the other hath, which are *Infinity of Eſſence*, and *Neceſſity of Exiſtence?* Now if this Principle of *Evil* be abſolutely contrary to the other, it muſt be contrary in all his Perfections; for whatever is a Perfection, belongs to that which is good; and now

X.

Auguſt. de Hæreſ. c. 46.

if

if it be contrary in every Perfection, *Infinity of Essence*, and *Necessity of Existence*, being two, it must be as contrary as is imaginable to them, by which this evil Principle must be infinitely defective in Being and Existence, and so it will be an *Infinite Non-entity* which yet exists, which is the height of contradiction. Again, if there be such a contrary Principle, which is the cause of all Evil, then all Evil falls out unavoidably, and by the power of this *Infinitely evil Principle*, by which means not only all *Religion*, but all *Vertue* and *Goodness* will be taken out of the World, if this evil Principle be infinite; and if not infinite, no *Anti-god:* and not only so, but all difference of *Good* and *Evil* will be taken away (and then what need making two such contrary Principles to give an account of the Origin of Evil?) for when once Evil becomes thus necessary, it loseth its Nature as a Moral Evil; for a Moral Evil implies in it a voluntary breach of some known Law; but how can that breach be voluntary, which was caus'd by an Infinite Power in the most proper way of Efficiency? And thus if all freedom of Will be destroy'd (as it is necessarily by this Supposition) then no Government of the World by Laws can be suppos'd, and consequently no Reward or Punishment, which suppose liberty of Action, and by this means all Religion, Law, and Providence are banish'd out of the World, and so this evil *Dæmon* will get all into his own hands, and instead of two contrary Principles, there will be but one *Infinitely evil Dæmon.* Which that there is not, appears by this, that notwithstanding all the Evil in the World, there is so much Good left in it, of which there would be none, if this evil *Dæmon* had Infinite Power. By this we see there cannot be a Principle infinitely evil; for while they go about to make two such contrary Principles infinite, they make neither of them so, and so while they make two *Gods*, they take away any at all. So that this Opinion of the *Origin of Evil*, is manifestly absurd, irrational, and contradictious.

XI. But all the *Heathen* Philosophers were not so gross as to imagin two such *Anti-gods* with infinitely active Power; but yet those who would not in terms assert it, might be driven to it by the consequence of their Opinion concering the *Origin of Evil*, which did suppose a necessity of it in Nature, as flowing from that passive Principle out of which the World was produc'd. Hence it was that *Heraclitus*, as *Plutarch* tells us, attributed the Origin of all things to *Discord* and *Antipathy*, and was wont to say, that when *Homer* wish'd

Plutarch. de Isid. & Osiride.

Ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔριν ἔκτ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπολέσθαι.

That all contention were banish'd out of the World, that he did secretly curse the Origin of things, and wish'd the ruin of the World. So *Empedocles* call'd the active Principle which did good, Harmony and Friendship, but the other

Νεῖκος οὐλόμενον καὶ δῆριν αἱματόεσσαν.

by which he makes it to be a quarelsom, pernicious, and bloody Principle. The same *Plutarch* tells us of these two renowned Philosophers, *Pythagoras* and *Plato.* Thence he tells us the *Pythagoreans* call'd the Principle of Good, τὸ ἕν, πεπαρασμένον, τὸ μένον, τὸ εὐθύ, τὸ περισσὸν, τὸ τετράγωνον, τὸ δεξιὸν, τὸ λαμπρόν. *Unity, finite, quiescent, straight, uneven number, square, right,*

right and splendid; the Principle of Evil, they call'd τὴν δοάδα, τὸ ἀπειρὸν, τὸ φερόμενον, τὸ καμπύλον, τὸ ἄρτιον, τὸ ἑτερόμηκες, τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ ἀριστερὸν, τὸ σκοτεινόν. *The Binary, Infinite, moving, crooked, even, long of one side, unequal, left, obscure.* The Opinion of *Plato*, he tells us is very obscure, it being his purpose to conceal it; but he saith in his old Age, in his Book *de Legibus*, οὐ δὶ αἰνιγμῶν, οὐδὲ συμβολικῶς, *without any ifs or ands*, he asserts the World to be mov'd by more than one Principle, by two at the least, τὴν μὲν ἀγαθουργὸν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν ταύτῃ, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων δημιουργόν. *The one of a good and benign Nature, the other contrary to it both in its Nature and Operations.* *Numenius* in * *Chalcidius* thus delivers the Opinions of *Pythagoras* and *Plato de originibus*, as he speaks; *Igitur Pythagoras quoque, inquit Numenius, fluidam & sine qualitate sylvam esse censet; nec tamen ut Stoici naturæ mediæ, interque malorum, bonorumque viciniam, sed plane noxiam; Deum quippe esse (ut etiam Platoni videtur) initium & causam bonorum, sylvam malorum:* So that according to *Numenius*, both *Plato* and *Pythagoras* attributed the Origin of Evil to the Malignity of Matter, and so they make Evils to be necessarily consequent upon the Being of Things. For thus he delivers expresly the Opinion of *Pythagoras*; *qui ait, Existente providentia, mala quoque necessaria substitisse, propterea quod sylva sit, & eadem sit malitiâ prædita: Platonemque idem Numenius laudat, quod duas mundi animas autumet; Unam beneficentissimam; malignam alteram*, sc. *Sylvam. Igitur juxta Platonem mundo bona sua Dei, tanquam patris liberalitate collata sunt; mala vero, matris sylvæ vitio cohæserunt.* But *Plutarch* will by no means admit, that *Plato* attributes the Origin of Evil merely to Matter, but he makes the Principle of Evil to be something distinct from Matter, which he calls τὴν ἄτακτον, καὶ ἀόριστον, αὐτοκίνητον δὲ καὶ κινητικὴν ἀρχὴν, *A confused, infinite, self-moving, stirring Principle*; which (saith he) he elsewhere calls *Necessity*, and in his *de Legibus*, plainly, ψυχὴν ἄτακτον καὶ κακοποίον, *a disorderly and malignant Soul*, which cannot be understood of mere Matter, when he makes his *Hyle* ἄμορφον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ πάσης ποιότητος καὶ δυνάμεως οἰκείας ἔρημον, *Without form or figure, and destitute of all qualities and power of operation: and it is impossible* (saith he) *that that which is of it self such an inert principle as Matter is, should by* Plato *be suppos'd to be the cause and principle of Evil*, which he elsewhere calls ἀνάγκην πολλὰ τῷ Θεῷ δυσμαχοῦσαν καὶ ἀφηνιάζουσαν, *Necessity which often resisted* God, *and cast off his reins.* So that according to *Plutarch*, *Plato* acquits both *God* and *Hyle* from being the Origin of Evil, τὴν γε ὕλην διαφορᾶς ἁπάσης ἀπαλλάττων, καὶ τῶν Θεοῦ τὴν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν ἀπωτάτω τεθέμενος, and therefore attributes it to that malignant Spirit which moves the Matter, and is the cause of all the disorderly Motions in the World. But what this Spirit should be, neither he or any one else could ever understand: what darkness and ignorance then was there among the wisest of Philosophers concerning the Origin of Evil, when they were so confus'd and obscure in the account which they gave of it, that their greatest admirers could not understand them!

* *Chalcid. in Tim. p. 394.*

Plutarch. de Animæ procreat. è Tim.

But tho' *Plato* seem'd so ambiguous in his judgment of the Origin of Evil, whether he should attribute it to the *Hyle*, or some malignant Spirit in it, the *Stoics* were dogmatical, and plainly imputed the cause of Evil to the perversity of Matter. So *Chalcidius* tells us, that the *Stoics* made Matter not to be evil in it self as *Pythagoras*, but that it was indifferent to either; *perrogati igitur unde mala? perversitatem seminarium malorum causati sunt:* they made the perversity of Matter the Origin of Evil; but as he well observes, *nec expediunt adhuc unde ipsa perversitas, cum juxta ipsos duo sint initia*

XII.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 395.

tia rerum, Deus & ſylva. Deus ſummum & præcellens bonum; ſylva, ut cenſent, nec bonum nec malum. They give no rational account whence this perverſity of Matter ſhould ariſe, when according to the *Stoics*, there are but two Principles of Things, *God* and *Matter*, whereof the one is perfectly good, the other neither good nor evil. But this perverſity they tell us is ſomething neceſſarily conſequent upon the Generation of Things. Ταῦτα γάρ ὅτι πάθη τὰ τῇ γενέσει περιπόμφυα, ὥσπερ ἴος τῷ χαλκῷ, καὶ ὁ ῥυπὸς τῷ σώματι, *theſe are affections, (viz.* the Diſorders in the World) which *follow the Generation of things, as ruſt comes upon braſs, and filth upon the body*, as the counterfeit *Triſmegiſtus* ſpeaks; ſo *Maximus Tyrius* ſaith that Evils in the World are ὁ τέχνης ἔργα, ἀλλ' ὕλης πάθη, *not any works of art, but the affections of Matter.* *Non poteſt artifex mutare materiam*, ſaith *Seneca*, when he is giving an account *Why God ſuffers Evils in the World:* and elſewhere gives this account why Evils came into the World, *non quia ceſſat ars, ſed quia id in quo exercetur inobſequens arti eſt.* So that the Origin of Evil by this account of it lies wholly upon the perverſity of Matter, which it ſeems was uncapable of being put into better order by that God who produc'd the World out of that Matter which the *Stoics* ſuppos'd to be eternal. And the truth is, the avoiding the attributing the cauſe of Evil to God, ſeems to have been the great Reaſon, why they rather choſe to make it matter neceſſary and co-exiſtent with God, and this was the only plauſible pretence which *Hermogenes* had for following the *Platoniſts* and *Stoics* in this Opinion, that he might ſet God far enough off from being the Author of Sin; but I cannot ſee what advantage comes at all by this *Hypotheſis*, but it is chargeable with as many difficulties as any other. For, 1. *It either deſtroys* God's *Omnipotency, or elſe makes him the approver of Evil*; ſo that if he be not *Auctor*, he muſt be *Aſſentator mali*, as *Tertullian* ſpeaks againſt *Hermogenes*, becauſe he ſuffer'd Evil to be in Matter; for, as he argues, *Aut enim potuit emendere ſed noluit; aut voluit quidem, verum non potuit infirmus Deus: ſi potuit & noluit, malus & ipſe, quia malo favit; & ſic jam habetur ejus licet non inſtituerit: quia tamen ſi noluiſſet illud eſſe, non eſſet; ipſe jam fecit eſſe, quod noluit non eſſe: quo quid eſt turpius? ſi voluit eſſe quod ipſe noluit feciſſe, adverſum ſemetipſum egit, cum & voluit eſſe quod noluit feciſſe, & noluit feciſſe quod voluit eſſe.* So that little advantage is gain'd for the clearing the true Origin of Evil by this Opinion; for either God could have taken away Evil out of Matter but would not, or elſe would but could not; this laſt deſtroys God's Omnipotency, the former his Goodneſs; for by that means Evil is in the World by his conſent and approbation; for if God would not remove it when he might, the Being of it will come from him; when if he would have hindred it, it would not have been, and ſo God by not rooting out of Evil, will be found an Aſſertor of it; *Male ſi per voluntatem, turpiter ſi per neceſſitatem: aut famulus erit mali Deus, aut amicus:* if God's Will were the cauſe why Sin was, it reflects on his Goodneſs; if God's Power could not hinder it, it deſtroys his Omnipotency. So that by this Opinion God muſt either be a ſlave or a friend to Evil. 2. *This Principle overturns the foundations of Religion, and all tranſactions between* God *and Mens Souls in order to their welfare*, becauſe it makes Evil to be neceſſarily exiſtent in the World; which appears from hence, in that Evil doth reſult from the Being of Matter, and ſo it muſt neceſſarily be as Matter is ſuppos'd to be; for whatever reſults from the Being of a thing, muſt be coexiſtent with it; and ſo what flows from what doth neceſſarily

Maxim. Tyr. Serm. 25.

Seneca de Provid. c. 5.

Idem præf. ad natur. quæſt.

1.

Tertull. adverſ. Hermogen. c. 10.

2.

rily

rily exiſt, muſt have the ſame Mode of Exiſtence which the Being it ſelf hath; as is evident in all the Attributes of God, which have the ſame immutability with his Nature. Now then, if Evil did exiſt from Eternity together with Matter, it muſt neceſſarily exiſt as Matter doth, and ſo Evil will be invincible and unavoidable in the World; which if once granted, renders Religion uſeleſs, make's God's Commands unrighteous, and deſtroys the Foundation of God's Proceedings in the Day of Judgment. 3. *This Opinion makes* God *not to be the Author of Good,* 3. while it denies him to be the Author of Evil. For either there was nothing elſe but Evil in this eternal Matter, or there was a mixture of Good and Evil; if nothing elſe but Evil which did neceſſarily exiſt, it were as impoſſible for God to produce Good out of it, as to annihilate the neceſſarily exiſtent Matter. If there were a mixture of Good and Evil, they were both there, either neceſſarily or contingently: How could either of them be contingently in that which is ſuppos'd to be neceſſarily exiſtent, and no free Agent? If they be both there neceſſarily, 1. It is hard conceiving how two ſuch contrary things as Good and Evil, ſhould neceſſarily be in the ſame uniform Matter. 2. Then God is no more the Author of Good than of Evil in the World; for he is ſaid not to be the Author of Evil, becauſe it comes from Matter; and ſo it appears Good doth too, and ſo God according to this Opinion, is no more the Author of Good, than he is of Evil. But if it be ſaid *that Good is not in Matter, but* God *produc'd that out of nothing:* Then I reply, 1. If God did produce Good out of nothing, why did he not produce Matter out of nothing too? If he were ſo powerful as to do the one, there could be no defect of Power as to the other. What inſufficiency is there in God's Nature, for producing all Things out of nothing, if he can produce any thing out of nothing? 2. If God did produce Good out of Evil, why could he not have remov'd all Evil out of Matter? For Good could not but be produc'd by the removing of ſome Evil which was before that Good, and ſo God might have remov'd all Evil out of Matter. And ſo by not doing it when he might, this Opinion gives not the leaſt Satisfaction in point of Reaſon, for acquitting God from being the Author of Sin, nor for clearing the true Origin of Evil.

Thus we have now compar'd the account given of it in Scripture, XIII. with that given by the Heathen Philoſophers, and find it in every thing more clear, rational and ſatisfactory than theirs is: Which doubtleſs is the reaſon, why the more modern Philoſophers, ſuch as *Hierocles*, *Porphyry*, *Simplicius*, and others, tho' otherwiſe great oppoſers of Chriſtianity, did yet in this ſide with the Scriptures, and attribute the original of Evil not to Matter, but to the Will of Man. And whoever is ſeriouſly converſant with the writings of thoſe Philoſophers, who were ἐκ τῆ ἱερᾶς γραμμᾶς of the ſacred ſucceſſion out of the School of *Ammonius* at *Alexandria*, ſuch as *Plotinus*, *Porphyrius*, *Iamblichus* and *Hierocles*, will find them write in a higher ſtrain concerning many weighty and important Truths; as of the degeneracy of Mens Souls from God, and the way of the Souls returning to Him, than the moſt ſublime of the ancient Philoſophers had done. Which ſpeculations of theirs no doubt, aroſe not ſo much from the School of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, as of that great reſtorer of Philoſophy *Ammonius* of *Alexandria*, whoſe Scholars *Herennius*, *Origen* and *Plotinus* were. Who living and dying a Chriſtian, as *Euſebius* and *Hierom* aſſure us, whatever *Porphyrius* ſuggeſts to the contrary,

Euſeb. Eccleſ. Hiſt. l. 6. c. 19. Hierom. de Script. Eccl.

trary, did communicate to his Scholars the ſublimer Myſteries of Divine Revelation, together with the Speculations of the ancient Philoſophers; which *Holſtenius* conceives he did with an adjuration of Secrecy, which he tells us *Porphyrius* himſelf acknowledgeth, that thoſe three Scholars of *Ammonius*, *Herennius*, *Origen* and *Plotinus*, were under an Obligation to each other, not to reveal and diſcover, tho' it were after violated by them. It is an eaſy matter to conceive, what an excellent improvement might be made of the ancient *Platonic* Philoſophy, by the advantage of the Scriptures, by one who was ſo well vers'd in both of them, as *Ammonius* is ſuppos'd to have been; and how agreeable and becoming would that Philoſophy ſeem, which had only its riſe from *Plato*, but its height and improvement from thoſe rich and truly Divine Truths which were inlaid with them? The want of obſerving this, *viz.* whence it was that thoſe excellent Diſcourſes in the latter *Platoniſts* had their true Original, hath given occaſion to ſeveral miſtakes among Learned Men: As firſt, the over-valuing of the *Platonic* Philoſophy, as tho' in many of the Diſcourſes and Notions of it, it ſeem'd to ſome (who were more in love with Philoſophy than the Scriptures) to out-go what is diſcover'd therein concerning the ſame things. A moſt groundleſs and unworthy Cenſure! when it is more than probable (and might be largely manifeſted, were it here a fit Opportunity) that whatever is truly generous and noble in the ſublimeſt Diſcourſes of the *Platoniſts*, had not only its primitive Riſe, but its acceſſion and improvement from the Scriptures, wherein it is ſtill contain'd in its native Luſtre and Beauty, without thoſe paintings and impure mixtures which the ſublimeſt Truths are corrupted with in the *Platonic* Writings. The reaſon of which is, tho' theſe Philoſophers grew ſuddenly Rich, thro' the Spoils they had taken out of the Scriptures, yet they were loth to be known from whence they had them, and would ſeem to have had that out of their own Gardens, which was only tranſplanted from the Sacred Writings. Therefore we find them not mentioning the Scriptures, and the Chriſtian Doctrine, without ſome Contempt of its meanneſs and ſimplicity; and whatever improvement they had gain'd by them, they would have it leſs taken notice of, by profeſſing their oppoſition to the Chriſtians, as is notorious in thoſe great Philoſophers, *Porphyrius*, *Iamblichus*, *Hierocles*, *Simplicius*, and others. It being their deſign to take ſo much, and no more, out of the Chriſtian Doctrine as they could well ſuit with their *Platonic* Notions; by which means they ſo diſguis'd the Faces of the Truths they ſtole, that it were hard for the right Owners of them to know them again. Which was the grand Artifice of their great Maſter *Plato*, who doubtleſs by means of his Abode and Acquaintance in *Ægypt*, about the time when the *Jews* began to flock thither, had more certain knowledge of many Truths of grand Importance, concerning the DEITY, the Nature of the Soul, the Origin of the World, than many other *Greek* Philoſophers had; but yet therein lay his great fault, that he wrapt up and diſguis'd his Notions in ſuch a fabulous and ambiguous manner, that partly he might be leſs known from whence he had them, and that they might find better entertainment among the *Greeks*, than they were ever like to do in their plain and native dreſs. Which *Plato* himſelf ſeems ſomewhere to intimate, when he ſaith, That what the *Greeks* receiv'd from the *Barbarians* κάλλιον τοῦτο εἰς τέλος ἀπεργάζονται, *they put it in a better faſhion*, *i.e.* they diſguiſe it, alter and change it as they pleaſe, and put it into a *Greek* Habit, that it might never be ſuſpected

Holſten. de vit. & Script. Porphyr. c. 6.

Plato in Epinom.

ſuſpected to have been a Foreigner. Thence *Tertullian* ſpeaks with a great deal of Truth and Freedom of ſuch Philoſophers, who did *ingenii ſitim de prophetarum fonte irrigare* (as he expreſſeth it) that quench'd their Thirſt after Knowledge with the Waters of *Jordan* (tho' they did not, like *Naaman*, cure the Leproſie of the Head, by waſhing in them) for as *Tertullian* ſaith, they came only *ex negotio curioſitatis*, more to pleaſe the itch of their Curioſity, than to cure it. *Tertul. Apol. c. 47.*

And wherein they ſeem'd moſt to agree with the Scriptures, their difference was beyond their agreement. *Siquidem vera quæque & conſonantia Prophetis aut aliunde commendant aut aliorſum ſubornant, cum maxima injuria veritatis, quam efficiunt aut adjuvari falſis aut patrocinari. Whatever the Philoſophers ſpeak agreeable to the Scriptures, either they do not own whence they had it, or turn it quite another way, whereby they have done the Truth a great deal of injury, by mixing it with their corruptions of it, and making that little Truth a plea for the reſt of their Errors.* Neither was this only among the ancient Philoſophers, but the Primitive Chriſtians began to diſcern the underhand workings of ſuch, who ſought to blend Philoſophy and Chriſtianity together; for *Tertullian* himſelf takes great notice of ſuch, who did, *Veritatis dogmata ad Philoſophicas ſententias adulterare*, ſuborn Chriſtianity to maintain Philoſophy; which makes him cry out, *Viderint qui Stoicum, & Platonicum, & Dialecticum Chriſtianiſmum protulerunt*; by which we ſee what tampering there was betimes, rather to bring Chriſtianity down to Philoſophy, than to make Philoſophy truckle under the truth and ſimplicity of the Scriptures. Whether *Ammonius* himſelf, and ſome others of the School of *Alexandria*, might be guilty in this kind, is not here a place to inquire, tho' it be too evident in the Writings of ſome, that they rather ſeek to accommodate the Scriptures to the Sentiments of the School of *Plato*, than to reform that by the Scriptures: But I ſay, however it were with thoſe who were Chriſtians, yet thoſe who were not, but only Philoſophers, made their great advantage by it. For when they found what was reconcileable with the Doctrine of *Plato* in the Scriptures, done already to their hands, by the endeavours chiefly of *Ammonius* and *Origen*, they greedily embrace thoſe improvements of their Philoſophy, which would tend ſo much to the Credit of it, and as contemptuouſly reject what they found irreconcilable with the Dictates of their Philoſophy. Now what an unreaſonable thing is it, when whatever was noble and excellent in the Heathen Philoſophy was derivative from the Scriptures, as the ſacred Fountain of it; that the meeting with ſuch things ſhould in the leaſt redound to the prejudice of the Scriptures, from whence it was originally deriv'd? When on the other ſide, it ſhould be a great confirmation to our Faith, as to the Scriptures, that they who were profeſs'd Philoſophers, and admirers only of Reaſon, did ſo readily embrace ſome of thoſe grand Truths which are contain'd in the Word of God. *Tertul. de Anima, c. 2.* *Tertul. de Præſcrip. adverſ. hæret. c. 7.*

XIV. For which we need no other inſtance than that before us, concerning the Origin of Evil, the making out of which will tend to the clearing the laſt thing mention'd concerning it; which was, *That the moſt material things in it are atteſted by the Heathens themſelves.* And this Honey which is gain'd out of the Lion's Mouth, muſt needs taſte ſweeter than any other doth. For it is a weak and groundleſs miſtake on the other ſide, which is the ſecond (which ariſeth from meeting things conſonant to the Scriptures, in the Writings of Philoſophers) preſently

to conclude from ſuch things, that they were Chriſtians (as it is ſaid ſome have lately done in the behalf of *Hierocles*.) For there being ſuch clear accounts given in Scripture, of the grand Difficulties and Perplexities which the Minds of Men were troubled with, when theſe came to the knowledge of ſuch who were of Philoſophic and inquiſitive Heads, we cannot but think they would meet with acceptation among them; eſpecially if they might be made conſiſtent with their former Speculations. Thus it was in our preſent Caſe, concerning the Origin of Evil; we have already beheld the lamentable perplexities the ancient Philoſophers were in about it; what *Meanders* they were loſt in, for want of a Clue to guide them thro' them: Now it pleas'd God, after the coming of Christ in the Fleſh, to declare to the World the only way for the recovery of Souls and their eternal Salvation; the News of which being ſpread ſo far, that it ſoon got among the Philoſophers, could not but make them more inquiſitive concerning the State and Condition of their Souls: And when they had ſearch'd what the Philoſophers had formerly diſcover'd of it, their Curioſity would preſently prompt them to ſee what account of Things, concerning the Souls of Men, was deliver'd by the Preachers of this new Doctrine. By this they could not but preſently underſtand, that they declar'd all Mens Souls to be in a moſt degenerate and low Condition, by being ſo continually under the power of the moſt unreaſonable and unruly Paſſions, that they were eſtranged from God, and prone to fix on things very unſutable to their Nature; as to all which, their own inward Senſe and Experience could not but tell them that theſe things were notoriouſly true: And therefore they inquire farther how theſe things came to be ſo; which they receive a full account of in Scripture, that Man's Soul was at firſt created Pure and Holy, and in perfect Friendſhip with God; that God dealt bountifully and favourably with Man; only expected Obedience to his Laws; that Man being a free Agent, did abuſe his Liberty, and diſobey'd his Maker; and thence came the true πτερορρύησις, the Feathers of the Soul, whereby it ſoared up to Heaven, moulted away, and the Soul ſunk below it ſelf, into a degenerate and apoſtate Condition, out of which it is impoſſible to be recover'd without ſome extraordinary Expreſſion of Divine Favour. Now what is there in all this Account, but what is hugely ſutable to Principles of Reaſon, and to the general Experience of the World, as to thoſe things which were capable of being try'd by it? And thoſe Philoſophers who were any thing ingenuous, and Lovers of Truth, could not but confeſs the Truth of thoſe things which we are now ſpeaking of, *viz. That Mens Souls are in a very degenerate Condition; That the moſt rational account of it is, that Man by the act of his own Will, brought himſelf into it; and that in order to the Happineſs of Mens Souls, there was a neceſſity of recovery out of this Condition.*

XV. 1. *As to the degeneracy of the Souls of Men*; this was the common complaint of thoſe Philoſophers, who minded the government of themſelves, and the practice of Virtue, eſpecially of the *Platoniſts* and *Stoics*. *Seneca* in all his Moral Diſcourſes, eſpecially in his Epiſtles, may ſpeak ſufficiently in behalf of the *Stoics*, how much they lamented the degeneracy of the World. And the *Platoniſts* all complain of the ſlavery of the Soul in the Body, and that it is here by way Puniſhment, for ſomething which was done before; and which makes me ſomewhat inclinable to think, that *Plato* knew more of the lapſe of Mankind, than he would openly diſcover; and for that end diſguis'd it after his uſual

manner in that *Hypothesis* of Præ-existence, which taking it Cabalistically (for I rather think the Opinion of Præ-existence is so to be taken, than the History of the Fall of Man) may import only this, *That Mens Souls might be justly suppos'd to be created happy, but by reason of the Apostacy of Man's Soul from* GOD, *all Souls come now into their Bodies as into a kind of Prison, they being enslav'd to the brutish part within them, there having been such a true* πτεροῤῥύησις, *the Soul being now depriv'd of her chiefest Perfections in this her low and degenerate Condition.* And it seems far more rational to me, to interpret those Persons Opinions to a Cabalistical, or an Allegorical Sense, who are known to have writ designedly in a way obscure and ambiguous, than to force those Mens expressings to *Cabala*'s, who profess to write a plain History, and that with the greatest simplicity and perspicuity. But it cannot but seem very strange, that an *Hypothesis* capable of being reconcil'd to the plain literal Sense of the Scriptures (deliver'd by a Person who useth great artifice and cunning to disguise his Opinions, and such a Person withal, who (by such Persons themselves who make use of this Opinion to that end) is suppos'd to have been very conversant with the Writings of *Moses*) should be taken in its literal Sense, as it really imports Præ-existence of each particular Soul in the grossest manner: And this should be made to be a part of the Philosophic Cabala of the Writings of such a Person, who useth not the least Artifice to disguise his Sense, nor gives us any where the least intimation, that he left behind him such plaited Pictures in his History of the beginning of the World, that if you look straight forward, you may see a literal Cabala, on the one side a Philosophical, and on the other a Moral. But now if we remove the Cabala from *Moses* to *Plato*, we may find no incongruity or repugnancy at all either as to *Plato*'s way of Writing, or the consonancy of the Opinion so interpreted to the plain genuine Sense of *Moses*, if by *Plato*'s Opinion of the præ-existence and descent of Souls, be understood by the former, the happy state of the Soul of Man in conjunction with GOD; and by the latter, the low and degenerate Condition which the Soul is in, after Apostacy from him: Which the latter *Platonists* are so large and eloquent in expressing. *Porphyry*, where he speaks of some things he counsels Men to do, hath these words, *But if we cannot do them, let us at least do that which was so much lamented of old,* τὸ θρηνούμενον πρὸς τῶν παλαιῶν, which is, ὡς τοίων ἔκτ' ἐρίδων, ἔκτε νεικέων γενόμεθα, ὅτι τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἀκήρατον, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀβλαβὲς σώζειν οὐ δυνάμεθα. *Let us at the least join with our Fore-fathers in lamenting this, that we are compounded of such disagreeing and contrary Principles, that we are not able to preserve divine, pure and unspotted Innocency.* And *Hierocles* fully expresseth his sense of the Degeneracy of Mankind in these words; Οἱ γὰρ πλεῖστοι κακοὶ καὶ τῆς προσπαθείας ἥττους καὶ πρενοβλαβεῖς ὑπὸ τῆς εἰς γῆν νεύσεως γενόμενοι, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο παρ' ἑαυτῶν τὸ κακὸν ἔχειν, διὰ τὸ βουληθῆναι φυγεῖν ἀπὸ Θεοῦ, καὶ ἀπομερίσαι αὐτοὺς τῆς τούτου ὁμιλίας, ἧς εὐτύχουν ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ ἀλάγοντες· τὴν γὰρ ἀπὸ Θεοῦ χωρισμὸν βλάπτοντα τὰς φρένας ἡ πρὸς γῆν νεῦσις δηλοῖ. *The most of Men in the World are bad, and under the command of their Passions, and grown impotent thro' their propensity to Earth; which great Evil they have brought upon themselves, by their wilful Apostacy from* GOD, *and withdrawing themselves from that Society with him, which they once enjoy'd in pure light: Which departure of Mens Souls from* GOD, *which is so hurtful to the Minds of Men, is evident by their strong inclination to the things of this World.* The same Author mentions, with much approbation, that Speech of *Heraclitus*, speaking of those Souls which

Porphyr. de Abstinent. l. 3. s. 2.

Hieroc. in Pythag. Carm. p. 261.

which are ἁπλῶσι εἰς κακίαν, which I cannot better render than *undeclinably good*, he ſaith, ὅτι ζῶμεν τ ἐκείνων θάνατον, τεθνήκαμεν δ τ ἐκείνων βίον. *We live their Death, and die their Life:* κάτεισι γὰρ ἡ ἀποπίπτη τ εὐδαίμονα χώρας ὁ ἄνθρωπος. *For Man is now fallen down from that bleſſed Region*; and as *Empedocles* the *Pythagorean* ſpeaks,

Φυγὰς θεόθεν κ ἀλήτης
Νείκει μαινομένῳ πίσυνος.

Which words cannot be better rendred, than in the words the Scripture uſeth concerning *Cain*, *And he went from the Preſence of the Lord, and was a fugitive in the Earth*, and under continual perplexities. For the Soul of Man having left τ λειμῶνα τ ἀληθείας (it is *Hierocles*'s own expreſſion) *the pleaſant meadow of Truth* (a fit deſcription of Paradiſe) τῇ ὁρμῇ τ πτερορρύησεως εἰς γένεσιν ἔρχεται σῶμα ὀλβίᾳ αἰῶνος ἀμοιβεῖς, *through the violence of her moulting, or deplumation, ſhe comes into this earthly Body, deprived of that bleſſed Life, which ſhe before enjoy'd.* Which he tells us is very conſonant to *Plato*'s ſenſe of the κάθοδος, or deſcent of Souls, that when by reaſon of their impotency of fixing wholly on GOD they ſuffer συγχύσιν κ πτερορρύησιν, *ſome great loſs, and a depravation of former Perfections*, (which I ſuppoſe is meant by the πτερορρύησις, the Souls impotency of flying up above this earthly World) then they lapſe into theſe Terreſtrial and Mortal Bodies. So *Hierocles* concludes with this excellent and divine Speech, ὥσπερ ἐν ἡ θεόθεν φυγὴ, κ ἡ πτερορρύησις τ κυφιζόντων ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὰ ἄνω εἰς τ τ θνητῶν ἤνεγκε τόπον, οἷς τὰ κακὰ συνέρχεται· ἕτως ἂν ἡ τ θνητῆς προσαθείας ἀποβολὴ, κ ἡ τ ἀρετῶν, οἷ πτερῶν τινῶν ἔκφυσις πρὸς τ τ καλῶν καθαρὸν τόπον, εἰς τ θείαν ἐυζωίαν ἡμᾶς ἀνάξει. *As therefore by apoſtacy from* GOD, *and the moulting of thoſe Feathers of our Souls, whereby we may be rais'd up above this World, we have fallen into this place of Mortals which is compaſſed about with Evils*; *ſo by caſting off carnal Affections, and by the growth of Virtues like new Feathers to the Soul, we ſhall aſcend to the Place of pure and perfect Good, and to the enjoyment of a Divine Life.* So much more becoming Chriſtians do theſe excellent Philoſophers ſpeak of the degeneracy of Mens Souls, and the conſequents of it, than ſome who would be accounted the followers of Reaſon, as well as of CHRIST, who make it ſo much of their buſineſs to extenuate the Fall of Man. Which we find thoſe who were mere Philoſophers, far more rational and ingenuous in, than thoſe who pretend ſo highly to Reaſon; but I think with as little of it as any, ſuppoſing the Scriptures to be of Divine Authority. But it is not here our buſineſs to conſider the Opinions of thoſe who pretend to Chriſtianity, but only of ſuch who pretending only to Reaſon, have yet conſented with the Doctrine of the Scriptures as to the Degeneracy of the Souls of Men, that it lies in an Apoſtaſie from GOD, and having loſt thoſe Perfections which they had before.

Hierocl. in Pythag. p. 254.

XVI. 2. *That Man's Fall is the cauſe of his Apoſtaſie*; this we have already manifeſted at large, from the Teſtimony and Reaſon of *Simplicius*; and *Hierocles* is as large and clear in it as the other, with Expreſſions much of the ſame nature. Μέση γὰρ ἔσα ἡ τ ἀνθρώπου ἐσία τ τε ἀεὶ νοούντων τ θεῶν, κ τ μηδέποτε νοεῖν πεφυκότων, ἄνεσι πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, κ κάτεσι πρὸς ταῦτα, νῦ κλήσει κ ἀποβολῇ, πρὸς τ θείαν ὁμοίωσιν κ τ θήρειον, ἀφ᾽ ὧ τ φύσεως ἀμφίβιον ἀναμέμεικται. *Man's Nature lying between thoſe Beings which perpetually contemplate* GOD, *and thoſe which are uncapable of it, it ſometimes aſcends*

Hierocl. in aur. Carm. p. 258.

to those, and sometimes descends to these, according as it observes or rejects the Dictates of Reason, and so by reason of the indifferency of the Will is liable to take upon it the similitude of GOD *or a Beast.* Τοῦτ' ἔν ὁ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνης ἐγνωκὼς οὐσίας, οἷόν τε πῶς αὐθαίρετα πήματ' ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ πῶς πλήμονες καὶ τάλανες τῇ ἑαυτῶν αἱρέσεσι γίνονται. *And whoever thoroughly considers this will easily understand, how Men are the causes of their own Evils, and become unhappy and miserable thro' their own choice and self-wills.* Which he brings in by way of explication of that truly golden *Pythagorean* Verse,

Γνώσῃ δ' ἀνθρώπους αὐθαίρετα πήματ' ἔχοντας
Πλήμονας.

Men are grown miserable thro' their own fault. And afterwards *Hierocles* excellently describes the nature of Evil in these words, ὧν δὴ συμφυὲς ἅμα καὶ ἐπίκτητον ἡμῖν κακόν, ἡ τῆς αὐτεξουσίου πρὸς φύσιν κίνησις. *Both our natural and contracted pravity, is nothing else but the unnatural motion of our free Wills:* According to which, saith he, ἐναντιοῦσθαι τοῖς θείοις νόμοις περιφρόνως, οὐδὲν ἐπαισθανόμενοι ὅσον ἑαυτοὺς βλάπτομεν, μόνον δὲ τὸ δοκεῖν ἀνιέναι θηρῶ. ἀλλὰ μόνον τοῦτο τυφλῶς ὁρῶντες, ὅτι ἐδυνήθημεν ἀφυιάσαι τὸν ἐκείνου δεσμόν. *We dare to contradict the Laws of* GOD, *not being sensible how much we injure our selves when we do it; and only look at this, that we are able to cast off the reins of* GOD*'s Laws from our necks.* And he truly saith, *That it is the greatest abuse of liberty to offend* GOD, *when we either do what he forbids, or neglect what he requires.* Ἵνα ἑκατέρωθεν τὴν ἀθλιότητα ἑαυτοὺς πληρώσωσιν οἱ τὸ θεῖον νόμον ἐκβαίνοντες, τῷ τε μὴ ποιεῖν τὰ προσταττόμενα καὶ τῷ ποιεῖν τὰ ἀπηγορευμένα. *So that on both sides Men bring misery upon themselves, by transgressing the Divine Law, both by not doing what they are commanded, and by doing what they are forbidden.* So that he fully ascribes the origin of Evil to the τὸ αὐτεξούσιον κίνημα πρὸς φύσιν ἀλλεθὲν, as he calls it, *the irregular motion of the Will of Man,* which we have already shew'd to be the Doctrine of the Scriptures.

As to the necessity of the Soul's recovery from this condition, in order to her felicity, we have these Philosophers expressing their consent with the Scriptures. *Porphyrius,* as St. *Augustine* tells us in the end of his first Book, *De regressu animæ,* doth acknowledge the necessity of a way of recovering Souls, which should be universal. *Cum autem dicit Porphyrius, Nondum receptam unam quandam sectam, quæ universalem viam animæ contineat liberandæ,* ——— *nondumque in suam notitiam eandem viam historiali cognitione perlatam, proculdubio confitetur esse aliquam, sed nondum in suam venisse notitiam.* But the necessity of the purgation of the Soul in order for the Felicity, is so largely and fully discours'd of by all the *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans,* that it will be needless to insist upon it. Thus far then we find the account given of the origin of Evil in Scripture to be embrac'd by the sublimest of the Heathen Philosophers, as most rational and satisfactory; which was the thing to be prov'd. 3. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei, l. 10. c. 32.*

XVII. Neither do we find only the main of this account acknowledged as rational, but we may trace some not obscure foot-steps of the truth of particular Circumstances which concern the fall of Man, among the Heathens: such as the *Devil's envying of Man's happiness, his disguising himself under the form of a Serpent, and Man's being thrown out of Paradise upon his fall.*

D. Casaub. Original of temporal Evils.

1. *The Devil's envying the happineſs of Man.* It hath been truly obſerv'd by a learned Man, that the original of that very ancient Opinion among the Heathen, *de invidia Dæmonis*, had its riſe from the Hiſtory of the fall of Man, which he hath made out ſo fully, that I ſhall the leſs need to prove it. And that there was an undoubted Tradition of ſome malignant Spirits, which envy'd the welfare of Mankind, appears by that ample Teſtimony of *Plutarch*, in his *Dio*, mention'd by the ſame Author; Οὐκ οἶδα, μὴ τ πάνυ παλαιῶν τ ἀποπώταλον ἀναγκαδῶμμ προσδέχεδζ λόγον, ὡς τὰ φαῦλα δαιμόνια κ βάσκανα, προσφθονᾶντα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν κ τ προέξεσιν ἐνισάμμνα, ταραχὰς κ φόβους ἐπάγα, σείοντα κ σφάλλοντα τ ἀρετὼ ὡς μὴ ἀθαμβήτους ἀπλῶτες ἐν τῷ καλῷ κ ἀκέραιοι, βελτίονος κ ἐκείνων μοίρας μετ τ τελευτῶ τύχωσιν. *Plutarch* was much troubl'd to give an account of the Apparitions which *Brutus* and *Dio*, who were learned and philoſophical Men, were haunted withal; and doubts he can give no juſt account of it, unleſs he embrac'd that very ancient Tradition (which yet ſeem'd abſurd and incredible,) viz. *That there are certain wicked and malignant Dæmons, which envy good Men, and withſtand their Enterprizes, by raiſing Fears and Troubles to them, that ſo they might hinder them in their purſuit of Vertue; leſt, if they continue ſtedfaſt and unmoveable in Good, they ſhould be at laſt partakers of greater Felicity than they enjoy.* There being ſo ancient a Tradition of ſuch ὑβρισαὶ δαίμονες, (as the learned Man mention'd hath more fully ſhew'd in his Notes on this place of *Plutarch*,) gives a great confirmation to the truth of what the Scripture reports concerning the Devil's being ſo great an Inſtrument in procuring the fall of Man. To him therefore I refer the inquiſitive Reader, and ſhall not add to the Teſtimonies of him cited, that of *Xenocrates* in *Plutarch, de Iſide & Oſiride*, where he ſaith that the calamities of Life and Misfortunes Men meet with, do not agree with that veneration which we have for the Deity and good Spirits, Ἀλλ' ἔτι φύσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχονλι μεγάλας μ κ ἰσχυρὰς, δυσχερᾶς δὲ κ σκυθρωπὰς, αἳ χαίρουσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. *But that there are in the Air ſome great and potent Beings, which are of a ſurly and malignant nature, and rejoyce to do Men all the miſchief they can.* *Iamblichus*, in his anſwer to *Porphyrius* concerning the *Ægyptian* Myſteries, undertakes to give an account of theſe evil Spirits or Dæmons, and that from them the origin of Evil in the World is; for thus he ſpeaks (as he is tranſlated by *Ficinus*) *Si verum eſt quod de Idolis dicebamus, improbiſque Dæmonibus, hinc ſane exoritur multiplex origo malorum. Simulant enim Deorum præſentiam, Dæmonumque bonorum, ideoque cultorem ſuum jubent eſſe juſtum, ut ipſi videantur boni, ſicut & Dii; quoniam vero natura ſunt mali, rogati mala inferre, libenter inferunt, atque nobis ad injuſta conducunt. Hi ſunt omnino qui & in oraculis mentiuntur & fallunt, & turpia conſulunt atque peragunt.* By which we ſee he acknowledgeth ſome Spirits whoſe natures are wicked, and help Men to do evil; and that theſe very Spirits may ſometimes command that which is good, leſt they ſhould be ſuſpected to be what they are, of a wicked and malignant Nature, which only deſign the ruin of Men. By which we have a good account of whatever was commendable deliver'd by the Heathen Oracles, which yet might come from the Devil ſtill, by this confeſſion of *Iamblicus* himſelf.

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir. p. 361.

Iamblich. de myſter. p. 105.

XVIII. 2. *For the Devil's appearing under the form of a Serpent*, It is very probably conjectur'd, that from hence it was that the Prince of thoſe who contended with *Saturn*, was by that Ænigmatical writer *Pherecydes Syrius* call'd Ὄφιονεύς. *Celſus* who had ſo little skill in Antiquity as to think

think that the History of *Moses* was as to many passages of it taken out of Heathen Fables, insists on this very story of *Ophioneus* as the groundwork of that relation in *Genesis* concering the Fall. But *Origen* well answers him, ὅρα οὖν, εἰ ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν ὡς σφαλλομένοις ἀσεβέστατα, καὶ ἀποπεπλανημένοις, θείων αἰνιγμάτων, αὐτὸς σαφῶς σφάλλεται· μὴ κατανοήσας ὅτι τὰ πολλῷ ἐν μόνον Ἡρακλείτου καὶ Φερεκύδου ἀρχαιότερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ὁμήρου, Μωϋσέως γράμματα εἰσήγαγε τὴν περὶ πονεροῦ τούτου καὶ ἐκπεσόντος τοῦ οὐρανίου λόγον. *See therefore if this rare Antiquary who chargeth us with Impiety in corrupting and altering the Heathen Fables, be not himself more justly chargeable with the same fault, not understanding the far greater Antiquity of the Writings of* Moses, *than either of* Heraclitus, *or* Pherecydes, *or* Homer *himself, which reports the story of that evil one which fell from Heaven.* ὁ γὰρ ὄφις (παρ' ὃν παρὰ τῷ Φερεκύδῃ γέγονεν Ὀφιονεὺς) αἴτιος γενόμενος τοῦ ἐκβληθῆναι τοῦ θείου παραδείσου τὴν ἄνθρωπον τοιαῦτά τινα αἰνίσσεται, ἐπαγγελίᾳ θεότητος καὶ μειζόνων ἀπατήσας τὸ θηλύτερον γένος· ὡς συνακολουθηκέναι λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ. *For the Serpent (from which* Ophioneus *in* Pherycides *deriv'd his name) which was the cause why Man was cast forth of Paradise, doth intimate some such thing, while under a pretence of Divinity, and of a better condition, he first deceiv'd the Woman, and by her means the Man. Cælius Rhodiginus* calls this *Ophioneus Dæmonicum Serpentem, qui antesignanus fuerit agminis a Divinæ mentis placito deficientis.* This *Pherecydes*, as appears by *Eusebius*, had much converse with the *Phœnicians*; where he purposely speaks concerning this *Ophioneus*. Now the *Phœnicians*, as *Eusebius* likewise tells us, worshipped their God under the form of a Serpent; which probably might be occasion'd by the Devil's ambition and tyranny over Men, that would be worshipped among them in that very Form wherein he had done so much mischief to the World. It was very early in the World, when the *Phœnicians* and *Ægyptians* did begin to adore their Gods under the form of Serpents, for the beginning of it is attributed to *Taautus* by *Eusebius*, τὴν μὲν οὖν τοῦ Δράκοντος φύσιν καὶ τοῦ ὄφεων αὐτὸς ἐξεθείασεν ὁ Τάαυτος, καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν αὖθις Φοίνικές τε καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι. Neither was this only among the *Phœnicians* and *Ægyptians*, but where-ever the Devil reign'd, the Serpent was had in some peculiar veneration: thence *Justin Martyr* saith, παρὰ πάντι νομιζομένων παρ' ὑμῖν θεῶν ὄφις σύμβολον μέγα καὶ μυστήριον ἀναγράφεται· *The Serpent was the Symbol of Adoration among them*; and was the proper *Indicium*, or note of a Consecrated Place, as is evident by that of *Persius*.

Orig. c. Celsum, l. 6.

Cæl. Rhodig. Antiq. lect. l. 2. c. 7.

Euseb. de Præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.

Just. Mart. Apolog. 2.

Pinge duos angues: pueri, sacer est locus.

Pers. Satyr. 1.

Thence the Scholiast on *Aristophanes* on that place in *Plutus*, ἐξηξάτην οὖν δύο δράκοντ' ἐκ τοῦ νεώ, observes κοινῶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἥρωσι δράκοντες παρετίθεντο, so that where-ever any God or Hero was to be worshipped, there were Serpents painted to denote so much. So *Orus Apollo* saith of the *Ægyptians*, οὐβαῖον ὁ ἐστὶν ἑλληνιστὶ βασίλισκον χρυσοῦν περιτιθέσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς, *they were wont to put the form of a golden Basilisk to their Gods. Heinsius* conceives that the first worship of *Apollo* at *Delphi* was under the form of a Serpent, whither *Nonnus* tells us that *Cadmus* the *Phœnician* went upon his first coming into *Bœotia*, and from hence he derives the name *Pytho* from the Hebrew פתן which signifies a Serpent. *Ut non dubitandum sit*, saith he, *quin Pythius Apollo, hoc est, Spurcus ille spiritus, quem Hebræi Ob & Abaddon, Hellenistæ ad verbum* Ἀπολλύωνα, *cæteri* Ἀπόλλονα *sub hac forma qua miseriam humano generi invexit, primo cultus sit in Græcia.* And which is farther observable, the Devil was always ambitious to have the

Heins. Aristarch. p. 18. ed. 1627.

World think that the knowledg of Good and Evil was to come by the Serpent ſtill; thence the famous Oracle of *Apollo* here at *Delphi*; thence came the uſe of Serpents ſo much in Divination, thence נחש ſignifies to divine, from נחש a Serpent; and ſo among the *Greeks* οἰωνίζεσθαι, is taken in the ſame Senſe, from οἰωνὸς a Serpent. So that excellent Gloſſographer *Heſychius*; οἰωνὸς, ὄφις· ὑπαικῶς λέγον) ἐς τὰς μαντείας τὰς ὄφεις ἔχειν ὃς καὶ οἰωνὸς ἔλεγον. The Serpent was reckoned among the *pedeſtria auſpicia* by the *Romans*; and *Homer* tells in that ſolemn Divination, concerning the *Greeks* ſucceſs at *Troy* there appears,

Iliad. β'. Δράκων ἐπὶ νῶτα δάφοινῶ.

Which, ſaith *Heinſius*, is an exact deſcription of the *Nachas*; whom they would have ſo call'd from the marks on his Back, which they accurately obſerv'd in Divination. Thus we ſee how careful the Devil was to advance his honour in the World under that form, wherein he had deceiv'd Mankind into ſo much Folly and Miſery.

3. We meet with ſome remainders of Man's being caſt out of Paradiſe, upon his Fall among the *Heathens*. *Origen* thinks that *Plato*, by his converſe with the *Jews* in *Egypt*, did underſtand the Hiſtory of the Fall of Man, which he after his way enigmatically deſcribes in his *Sympoſiacs*. Where he brings in *Porus, the God of Plenty, feaſting with the reſt of the Gods*; *after Supper* Penia *comes a begging to the Door*; Porus *being drunk with Nectar, goes into* Jupiter's *Garden, and there falls aſleep*; Penia *obſerving it, ſteals to him, and by this deceit conceiv'd by him.* In this Fable of *Plato*, *Origen* takes notice what a near reſemblance the Garden of *Jupiter* hath to *Paradiſe*, *Penia* to the *Serpent* which circumvented *Adam*, and *Porus* to *Man*, who was deceiv'd by the *Serpent*. Which he conceives more probable becauſe of *Plato*'s Cuſtom, τὰ μεγάλα ἐαυτῷ φανόμενα δόγματα κρύψαι διὰ τὸν πολλὸν ἐν τῷ τῶ μύθῳ σχήματι, *to wrap up thoſe excellent things he knew under ſome Fables, becauſe of the Vulgar*; for which he after ſpeaks of his Cuſtom, in altering and diſguiſing what he had from the *Jews*, leſt he ſhould too much diſpleaſe the fabulous *Greeks*, if he ſhould adhere too cloſe to the *Jews*, who were ſo infamous among them. Some have thought the ſtory of Paradiſe was preſerv'd among the *Heathens* in the Fable of the Gardens of *Adonis*, which comes near that of *Eden*; but what foot-ſteps may be gather'd of the truth of Scripture Hiſtory in the *Heathen* Mythology, will appear afterwards. Thus much here then may ſerve to have manifeſted the account which the Scripture gives of the Origin of Evil by the Fall of Man to be in it ſelf rational, and atteſted by the conſent of ſuch Perſons who cannot be ſuſpected of any partiality to the Scriptures.

Orig. c. Celſ. l. 4. p. 189.

XX. We come now to conſider the other grand Difficulty which concerns the Origin of Evil, and the Truth of Divine Providence together. Which is, that if Sin be the cauſe of Miſery, and there be a God which Governs the World; *Whence comes it to paſs, that the worſt of Men do ſo frequently eſcape ſufferings, and the beſt do commonly undergo them?* This hath been in all Ages of the World, where Men have been philoſophical and inquiſitive, one of the great Inquiries which the Minds of Men have been perplex'd about. The true and full Reſolution of which Queſtion, depends much upon thoſe Grounds and Principles which are diſcover'd to us by Divine Revelation in the Scriptures, concerning the grounds of God's Patience towards wicked Men, the nature

and

and end of Sufferings which good Men are exercis'd with. And certainly this ſhould very much commend the Scriptures to all ſober and inquiſitive Perſons, that they contain in them the moſt clear and certain grounds of Satisfaction to the Minds of Men, in ſuch things wherein they are otherwiſe ſo irreſolv'd. But of that afterwards. Our preſent buſineſs is to give an account of this difficulty from Natural Reaſon, which will be moſt ſatisfactorily done by the producing thoſe grounds from which they have reſolv'd this Queſtion, *Cur malis bene, & bonis male*, who either have not had, or at leaſt own'd any thing of Divine Revelation. I begin with that which doth concern the Proſperity and Impunity of wicked Men, which Men have with more confidence inſiſted on on this account, becauſe all Men could not but underſtand a general reaſon of Sufferings, by reaſon there were none whoſe Conſciences could wholly acquit them of evil Actions; but why Perſons notoriouſly Wicked ſhould live in Impunity, when others ſuffer, that they were unable to give an account of. And this was the common pretence of *Atheiſm*: And *Simplicius* tells us, Συμβαίνει δέ τινας καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀναποδείκτως πιστεύειν, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν μὲν ἀγαθὸς δυσυχοῦντας, πολὺ δὲ κακὸς ὂν εὐπορεῖν ὧν ἔχουσι περιλήψεων, καὶ χώραν δεδόναι τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ λέγειν, *Simplic. Comment. in Epictet. c.38.p.223.*

Τολμῶ καλεπεῖν μήποτ' ἐκ εἰσὶν Θεοὶ,
Κακοὶ γὰρ εὐτυχοῦντες ὑπλήτθουσί με.

It comes to paſs, that ſuch who have no grounded belief of a DEITY, *when they obſerve the Miſeries of good Men, and the tranquillity and felicity of bad Men, they regard not the common Notions they have of a* DEITY, *and are ready to cry out with the Tragædian,*

Shall I not dare to ſay there are no Gods,
When thoſe do proſper who have injur'd me?

And it is obſervable, that the moſt of thoſe who have taken occaſion amongſt the *Heathens* to queſtion Providence, have done it upon ſome remarkable injury which they have conceiv'd to be done to themſelves, and ſo we have ground to think that it was more Paſſion and Intereſt, than any clear Reaſon which was the inducement to it. So *Diagoras* reſolves to ſet up for an *Atheiſt*, becauſe the perjur'd Perſon was not ſtruck down in the place.

And *Jaſon* in *Seneca*, when he ſees *Medea* fly away after killing his Children, cries out,

Teſtare nullos eſſe qua veheris Deos.

Thou tell'ſt the World there are no Gods that way
Where thou doſt fly.

And ſo *Claudian*, who largely reaſons the caſe on both ſides, for Providence and againſt it, at laſt tells us what it was which was the main cauſe of his doubts, *viz.* the long impunity of *Rufinus*.

Abſtulit hunc tandem Rufini pœna tumultum
Abſolvitque Deos.

Rufinus's

Rufinus's *death doth clear the Gods, and ſet My Mind at eaſe.*

Cicero. l. 3. de Nat. Deor.

But becauſe ſome carry it higher, as *Cotta* in *Tully*, who reaſons the moſt (as became a Stateſman) in reference to ſuch Perſons who had been uſeful or hurtful to the Commonwealths, we may ſuppoſe there might be ſomewhat more of Reaſon than Intereſt in ſuch Argumentations; and yet even in thoſe Diſcourſes we may ſtill find that the main original of this quarrel againſt Providence, was an over-high eſteem of themſelves, that they thought they deſerv'd better from the Gods, than to receive ſuch Injuries, or undergo ſuch Calamities. Therefore *Cotta* cries out on Providence, becauſe ſuch Perſons who were uſeful to the *Roman* Commonwealth, were deſtroy'd, when the enemies to it eſcap'd, as tho' Providence had been only a *Tutelar Deity* of *Rome*, and had nothing to do elſewhere. Thence he cries out, If there be Providence, why were the two *Scipio*'s deſtroy'd in *Spain* by the *Carthaginians?* Why was *Maximus* killed by *Hannibal?* Why were the *Romans* with *Paulus* ruined at *Cannæ?* Why did *Regulus* undergo ſo much cruelty by the *Carthaginians?* Why did not *Africanus* die in his own Bed? Nay, ſaith he, to come nearer home, why is my Uncle *Rutilius* in baniſhment? Why was my friend *Druſus* killed in his own Houſe? On the other ſide, why did *Marius* die in peace, and the moſt cruel *Cinna* enjoy ſo long tranquillity? With many other inſtances of both ſorts. But this is it which I take notice of theſe for, becauſe we hereby ſee how common it is for Men to queſtion Providence, more out of Paſſion and Intereſt, than out of any ſolid grounds of Reaſon.

XXI. Let us therefore appeal from Perſons who were particularly engaged by ſome private intereſt in thoſe Paſſages, from whence they would infer that there was no Providence, to ſuch who ſtood by unconcern'd, and made uſe of the free dictates of their Reaſon in theſe caſes. And ſuch Perſons when they come to reaſon the caſe like Philoſophers, and Men out of paſſion, have given ſatisfactory and rational accounts why God in his wiſe Providence may ſometimes ſuffer the worſt of Men to go on in Impunity, when good Men may go thro' the troubles of this World. As,

1. God *forbears wicked Men, to propound the example of his Goodneſs to their imitation, to teach them not to revenge their Injuries too greedily on each other.* This *Plutarch*, in that admirable Diſcourſe of his on this ſubject, inſiſts on as his firſt reaſon, why God doth not preſently puniſh wicked Men. For, ſaith he out of *Plato*, God *hath ſet forth himſelf in the midſt of the World for our imitation; and true Virtue is nothing elſe but an imitation of the Divine Nature. And therefore* God, ſaith *Plato, gave Man the uſe of ſight, that by the ſight of the heavenly Bodies, and the exact Motions which are in them, Men ſhould learn* τὸ εὔρυθμον καὶ τεταγμένον, *that which was comely and orderly, and hate all diſorderly and irregular Motions:* For as he excellently ſpeaks, Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὅ, τι μεῖζον ἀνθρώπῳ ἀπολαῦσαι θεοῦ παρέφυκεν ἢ τὸ μιμήσει, καὶ διώξει τὸν ἐν ἐκείνῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν εἰς ἀρετὴν καθίσασθαι. *There is no greater benefit Man can receive from* God, *than to attain true Virtue by the imitation and purſuit of thoſe Perfections which are in him.* And thence, ſaith *Plutarch*, God forbears to puniſh wicked Men preſently, not leſt if he ſhould puniſh them he might do that he would repent of afterwards, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν τὸ μὴ τὰς

Plutarch. de his qui ſero puniuntur à numine, p. 550. ed Fr.

τὰς τιμωρίας θηρῶδες καὶ λάβρον ἀφαιρῶν, *but that he might take away the fury and violence of Men, in revenging their injuries on each other*, that they ſhould not do it in Wrath and Anger, with as much eagerneſs as they ſatisfy their Hunger and Thirſt, whereby they do, ὑπηδᾶν τοῖς λελυπηκόσιν, *leap upon them who have injur'd them*, with as much fury as a wild Beaſt upon his Prey: But Men ſhould learn to imitate τὴν ἐκείνου πραότητα καὶ μέλλησιν, GOD's *gentleneſs and patience*, whereby he gives the Offender time to conſider with himſelf what he hath done, before he doth ſeverely puniſh him. As *Plato* when his Boy had angred him, ſtood ſtill a while without ſtriking him, τὸν θυμὸν κολάζων, as he ſaid, *puniſhing himſelf firſt for his Anger*, before he would chaſtiſe the Boy for his fault: And *Archytas* when he ſaw how negligent his Workmen had been, and began to be very angry with them, told them, εὐτυχεῖτε ὅτι ὀργίζομαι ὑμῖν, *It is well for you that I am angry with you.* Now ſaith *Plutarch*, if the conſideration of this forbearance in Men ſhould tend to moderate Mens heat and violence, how much more ſhould the conſideration of the Lenity and Patience of GOD, do it! καὶ θεῖον ἡγεῖσθαι μόριον ἀρετῆς τὴν πραότητα καὶ τὴν μεγαλοπάθειαν, *and to account gentleneſs and forbeaance to be an imitation of Divine Perfections.* Now what can be more rational and agreeable to our Apprehenſions of a Divine Nature than this is, that he ſhould ſhew his Goodneſs to all, and by his Forbearance of ſo many, teach the World more Meekneſs and Gentleneſs towards each other? For if offences riſe by the quality of the Perſon againſt whom they are committed, no Injuries can be ſo great in one Man to another, as thoſe Affronts are which Men put upon GOD by their continual provocations of Him: And if GOD then be of ſo infinite patience to forbear ſuch who have offended him, what juſtice and reaſon is there, but that Men ſhould expreſs more Lenity and Patience towards each other? So *Hierocles* excellently ſpeaks, Μιμεῖται καὶ ἐν τοῖς φιλίας μέτροις τὸν Θεόν, ὃς μισεῖ μὲν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, τὸ δὲ φιλανθρωπίας ἀγαθὸν κοινῇ πᾶσι γένει προτείνων. *A good Man imitates* GOD *in the meaſures of friendſhip, who hates no Man, and extends his loving-kindneſs to all Mankind.* Of which *Seneca* likewiſe ſomewhere ſpeaks: *Ne Deos quidem immortales ab hac tam effuſa benignitate ſacrilegi negligenteſque eorum deterrent; utuntur natura ſua, & cuncta, interque illa ipſos munerum ſuorum malos interpretes, juvant. The Divine Benignity extends it ſelf to all, even to ſuch as affront and diſhonour them, and abuſe the Gifts they beſtow upon them.* And ſince there is ſo much truth and reaſon in that of *Plato*, τέλος τὸ ἀγαθῶν τὸ ὁμοιωθῆναι Θεῷ, *It is the height of goodneſs to be like to* GOD; we ſee what excellent reaſon there is for that Command of our Saviour, *Love your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again; and your reward ſhall be great, and ye ſhall be the Children of the Higheſt; for he is kind unto the unthankful, and to the evil. Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father is merciful.* Luke vi. 35, 36.

2. GOD *forbears preſently to puniſh wicked Men, to give them time to become better.* This the ſame excellent Moraliſt gives as another account of GOD's patience, that thereby he gives them χρόνον πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν, *a ſpace to repent in*, as the Scripture calls it. *For Men*, ſaith *Plutarch*, *in their puniſhments look at nothing farther than mere ſatisfying their revenge and malice, and that makes them purſue thoſe that have offended them with ſo much rage and eagerneſs; but* GOD, ſaith he, *aims at the cure of thoſe who are not utterly incurable*, to ſuch he gives, μεταβολῆς χρόνον, *a time to reform in.* Here he brings in the examples of ſuch who were *Plutarch.* p. 551. Rev. ii. 21.

bad

bad at first, and came afterwards to be chang'd from what they were; for which he instances in *Cecrops*, who was thence call'd Διφυὴς, because from a cruel severe Prince, he became gentle and mild; and so *Gelon* and *Hieron* of *Sicily*, and *Pisistratus* the Son of *Hippocrates*, who, from being Usurpers became excellent Princes. If *Miltiades*, saith he, had been cut off while he acted the part of a Tyrant, and *Cimon* in his Incest, or *Themistocles* in his Debaucheries, what had become of *Marathon*, *Eurymedon*, *Dianium*, by which the *Athenians* got so great Glory and Liberty? and as he well observes, Οὐθὲν γὰρ αἱ μεγάλαι φύσεις μικρὸν ἐνφέρουσιν, *Great Spirits do nothing mean*; Οὐδὲ ἀργεῖ δι' ὀξύτητα τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ δραστήριον, ἀλλ' ἐν σάλῳ (διαφέρον) πρὸν εἰς τὸ μόνιμον καὶ καθεστηκὸς ἦθος ἐλθεῖν. *That sharp and active Spirit that is in them can never lie at rest by reason of its vigor, but they are toss'd up and down, as it were in a tempest, till they come to a settled compos'd life.* But as the multitude of weeds argues the richness and softness of the ground, tho' for the sake of those weeds one not skill'd in Husbandry would not account such ground worth looking after; so, saith he, ἄλοπα πολλὰ καὶ φαῦλα προεξανθοῦσιν αἱ μεγάλαι φύσεις· *Great Spirits usually bring forth no commendable fruits at first; which we considering the danger and hurtfulness of, are presently for cutting them down: but one that more wisely considers the generous nature which may lie under this ill fruit, waits time and leisure, till Reason and Age begin to master these head-strong passions.* And therefore according to the prudent Law of the *Ægyptians*, *The Woman with Child must be repriev'd till the time of her delivery.*

3. God *spares some wicked Men from punishment to make them instruments of his justice in punishing others.* Ἐνίοις γὰρ ἀμέλει καὶ κολασαῖς ἕτερον πονηρὸν, ἅτε δημοκοίνοις, ἀπεχρήσαλο τὸ δαιμόνιον, as *Plutarch* goes on, God *spares some from punishment, that by them he might punish others.* Which he supposeth to be the case of all Tyrants; and thereby *Cotta*'s difficulty concerning *Marius*, *Cinna*, *Sylla*, and those other cruel and tyrannical persons, who usurp'd Authority among them, is clearly taken off: For Divine Providence might let those Trees grow from whence he intended to take his Rods to scourge others withal. God makes the same use of Tyrants (saith *Plutarch*) to Common-wealths, that Physicians do of the Gall of a *Hyæna* and other hurtful Creatures; which may be good for curing some dangerous Diseases; so may the tyrannical severity and sharpness of such persons be continued ἢ τὸ νοσοῦν ἀπαλλάξαι καὶ καθάραι, *till the diseases of the political Body be cur'd by these sharp Medicines.* Such a one was *Phalaris* to the *Agrigentines*, and *Marius* to the *Romans*: and the Oracle told the *Sicyonians* in express terms, μαστιγονόμων σεῖσθε τὴν πόλιν. *The City wanted some severe discipline.* Thence *Totilas*, when he found what strange success he had in his enterprizes, call'd himself *Flagellum Dei*, and thought God rais'd him up on purpose to be a Scourge for the sins of the World. And no doubt those strange passages of the *Roman* Common-wealth (which made *Cato* at least dispute Providence, and say, *Res divinas multum habere caliginis*, when he saw *Pompey* successful as long as he serv'd his Ambition, but presently overthrown when he stood for the Common-wealth) these things, I say, had a higher end than they look'd at, which was to make both *Pompey* and *Cæsar* the Instruments of Divine Justice to punish the *Romans* for their Lusts, Ambition and Cruelty, which were never greater than in that Age. Now then, if God must justly punish Offenders, why may he not spare some to make them his Instruments in the punishing of others, especi-

cially ſince after he hath us'd his Rods, he may caſt them into the fire too? as was evident in the inſtance of *Cæſar*, who, after all his ſlaughters and triumphs, was murthered in the *Senate*, and that by ſome who had been as active as any for him. And herein Divine Juſtice, both as to the puniſhment of the perſons, and the means of it, hath been very remarkable in multitude of Inſtances, which every one's reading may afford him.

4. Therefore, another account why God may ſpare wicked Men a while, is, *That Divine Providence might more remarkably be obſerv'd in the manner of their puniſhment afterwards.* *Plutarch* tells us of *Callippus*, who was ſtabb'd by his Enemies with the ſame Dagger with which he had kill'd *Dion* under a pretence of friendſhip. And when *Mitius* the *Argive* was kill'd in a tumult, afterwards, upon the day of a ſolemn Shew, a braſs Statue in the Market place fell upon his Murtherer, and kill'd him there. But moſt remarkable is the Story of *Belſus* recorded by the ſame Author, who having kill'd his Father, and a long time conceal'd it, goes one night to Supper to ſome Friends, and while he was there, thruſts up his Spear into a Swallow's Neſt, and pulls it down, and kills the young ones; his Friends asking him the reaſon of ſo ſtrange an action: Οὐ γὰρ (ἔφη) μοῦ πάλαι καταμαρτυροῦσιν αὐτῷ ψευδῶς καὶ καταβοῶσιν, ὡς ἀπεκτονότος τὸν πατέρα· *Do not you hear*, ſaith he, *how they falſly accuſe me, and cry out, that I have killed my Father?* Which being by the perſons preſent carry'd to the King, and the truth of it found out, he was executed for it. Such ſtrange ways doth Providence ſometimes uſe to ſhew how vigilant it is, even when we think it ſleeps the moſt.

5. *Tho' God ſpares the perſons of wicked Men, he doth not defer their puniſhment*, when the thoughts of their evil actions is the greateſt torment to them; *Maxima peccati pœna eſt, peccaſſe*, as *Seneca* ſpeaks. Sin bears its own puniſhment along with it. Wickedneſs is δεινή τις βίου δημιουργὸς οἴκτρου, *the moſt exquiſite contriver of miſery*, which fills the Minds of thoſe who commit it with continual conſternations, anxieties and perplexities of Mind. But as that often and deſervedly cited Author on this ſubject, *Plutarch* tells us, moſt Men are in this like Children, who when they behold Malefactors in the Theatres in their Cloth of Gold, and Purple Robes, with their Crowns on their Heads dancing about, they admire them, and imagin them to be moſt happy Men, till they ſee them laſh'd and beaten, and fire come out from their brave Apparel; ſo, ſaith he, as long as Men ſee others in their Pomp and Grandeur, they think them very far from puniſhment, till they behold their execution; which, ſaith he, is not ſo much the entrance of their puniſhment, as the perfection of it. So that the longer the time of their Lives is, the longer is the time of their puniſhment here; Οὐδὲ γηράσαντες ἐκολάσθησαν, ἀλλ' ἐγήρασαν κολαζόμενοι· *They are not puniſhed when they grow old, but are grown old in puniſhments.* Cannot we ſay a perſon is puniſhed while he is in Priſon and hath his fetters upon him, till his execution comes? nor that one that hath drunk Poiſon, is a dying while he walks about till the cold comes to his Heart, and kills him? *If we deny*, ſaith he, *that all the inquietudes, horrors and anxieties of Mind which wicked Men have, are no part of their puniſhment, we may as well ſay that a Fiſh which hath ſwallow'd the hook is not taken, becauſe he is not fry'd, or cut in pieces.* So it is with every wicked Man, he hath ſwallow'd the hook when he hath committed an evil action (τὸ γλυκὺ τῆς

ἀδικίας ὥσπερ δέλεαρ εὐθὺς ἐξεδήδοκε) and this Conſcience within him, as he expreſſeth it,

Θυΐνος βολαῖος πέλαγος ὡς διαστροβεῖ.

Iſa. 57. 21. Which in the Prophet's expreſſion is, *The wicked are like a troubled ſea, which caſts forth nothing but mire and dirt.* As *Apollodorus* dreamt, that he was flea'd and boyl'd by the *Scythians*, and that his Heart ſpake to him out of the Cauldron, Ἐγώ σοι τούτων αἰτία, *I am the cauſe of all this.* God deals by wicked Men, as *Caligula* was wont to ſay of thoſe he commanded to be executed, *Ferit ut ſentiant ſe mori*, he ſo puniſhes them, as to make them ſenſible of their puniſhments. And as *Tacitus* ſpeaks of cruel and wicked perſons, *quorum mentes ſi recludantur, poſſint aſpici laniatus & ictus; quando ut corpora verberibus, ita ſævitia, libidine, malis conſultis animus dilaceretur.* Wickedneſs is the only Fury which continually haunts and laſhes thoſe who delight in it, and leaves ſtill behind it αἰσχρὰ καὶ φοβερὰ πάθη, *loathſome and terrible perturbations*, ſecret gripings of Conſcience and ſelf-condemning thoughts for their folly and wickedneſs; like *Lyſimachus*, who for extreme thirſt offer'd his Kingdom to the *Getæ* to quench it, which when he had done, φεῦ τῆς ἐμῆς κακίας, ὃς δι' ἡδονὴν οὕτω βραχείαν ἐστέρημαι βασιλείας τηλικαύτης. *What a wretch was I* (ſaith he) *to loſe ſuch a Kingdom for ſo ſhort a pleaſure!* And tho' wicked Men be not ſenſible of the loſs of a far more glorious Kingdom than this of *Lyſimachus*, viz. *that of Heaven*, yet they cannot but be ſenſible how much they have loſt that Kingdom which every good Man hath in the tranquillity of his Spirit, and the command of his paſſions.

6. *The time that* God *ſpares wicked Men, is not ſo long as we think for.* It is all one, as *Plutarch* ſaith, as if we ſhould complain, that the Malefactor was puniſhed in the evening, and not in the morning; God's forbearance is but for a very little time, compar'd with his own duration. We meaſure God by the ſhort hour-glaſs of our time, when we are ſo ready to confine him to our meaſures. The time ſeems long to us, but it is as nothing in it ſelf: ἐπεὶ τοῖς τε θεοῖς πᾶν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου διάστημα, τὸ μηδέν ἐστι. *The whole life of Man compared with eternity is nothing.* Beſides, all this time God ſuffers wicked Men to live here, he hath them under ſafe cuſtody; he doth but let them take the air within the Priſon-wall, or it may be they may play and ſport themſelves there, but there is no poſſibility of eſcaping out of the hands of Divine Juſtice.

7. God *forbears wicked Men here, becauſe the time is to come wherein* God *intends to puniſh them.* This is the higheſt vindication of Divine Providence, as to the preſent impunity of wicked Men in the world, becauſe this is not the proper ſeaſon for the open Execution of Juſtice. There are but few in compariſon whom Juſtice cauſeth to be executed in the Priſon, of what are reſerv'd for the General Aſſizes; God reſerves them for a fair and open Trial, for the greater vindication of his honour, and manifeſtation of his Juſtice to the World. And altho' God's Judgments even in this World be ſometimes ſo remarkable, that we cannot but ſee a hand of Providence in them, yet they are but few whom God doth ſo remarkably puniſh here, to make us more firmly believe a day of Judgment to come. Which tho' it be moſt clearly and fully reveal'd in Scripture, yet the *Heathens* themſelves from mere Reaſon have had ſuch a perſuaſion of it, that they have given this as another great reaſon,

reason, why God did forbear to punish wicked Men here, because he did reserve them for future punishment. For, as the same Moralist speaks in the same Discourse concerning the Soul, Ἀγωνίζεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀθλητὴς ἡ βίον, ὅταν ὁ ἀγωνίζεται τότε τυγχάνῃ τῆς προσηκόντων, *This present life is the place of the Soul's combat, which when it hath finish'd, it then receives according to its performance of it.* And as he before speaks, Εἷς λόγος ὁ τῆς Θεοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ ἀθανασίαν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ θάτερον ἂν ἴσιν ἀπολιπεῖν, ἀναιρεῖσθαι θάτερον. *The same reason which confirms Providence, doth likewise confirm the Immortality of the Soul; and if one be taken away, the other follows.* Οὔσης δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ τελευτᾶν, μᾶλλον ἐκὸς ἔστι καὶ τιμὰς ἀποδίδοσθαι καὶ τιμωρίας· *And if the Soul doth subsist after death, it stands to the greatest reason, that it should there receive either reward or punishment.* Thus we see how far Natural Light, and Moral Reason will carry Men in the vindicating of Divine Providence, as to the present impunity of wicked Men. *Plutarch.* p. 561.

XXII. The other part which concerns the *sufferings of good Men*, is not of so great difficulty, because there are none so good as not to have a mixture of evil in them, and as they have a mixture of evil, so they have but a mixture of punishment; none lying under so great miseries here, but withal they have some share in the comforts of this Life. And therefore it is less wonder, that this part of Divine Providence which concerns the sufferings of Men, hath not wanted some among the Heathen Moralists, who have made it their design to vindicate it; which setting aside what *Simplicius* on *Epictetus*, and many others have done, is fully performed by *Seneca* in his Tract on this subject, *Cur bonis male sit, cum sit Providentia* (as *Muretus* restores the title of that Book) wherein these following accounts are given of it.

1. God *brings them up as his Children under sharp discipline for their future benefit.* A good Man in *Seneca*'s language is, *Discipulus Dei, æmulatorque, & vera progenies:* which in the language of the Scriptures is, *one taught of* God, *and a follower of* God, *and one born of him.* Now, saith he, *Parens ille magnificus, virtutum non lenis exactor, sicut severi patres, durius educat.* God, *who is the great Father of good Men, keeps them under discipline while under age, and by hardship fits them for the practice of Vertue.* Thence he bids us take notice of the different indulgence of Fathers and Mothers to their Children; the Father he hastens them to School, suffers them not to be idle on their play-days, makes them toil, and sometimes cry; the Mother she is all for holding them in her lap, keeping them out of the Sun, and from catching cold, would not willingly have them either cry or take pains. *Patrium habet Deus adversus bonos animum, & illos fortius amat.* God *bears the indulgence of a Father towards his Children, and loves them with greater severity.* *Seneca de Provid. c. 1.*

2. *Good Men receive benefit by their sufferings*; *Quicquid evenit in suum colorem trahit*, saith *Seneca* of a good Man, which in the language of the Apostle is, *Every thing works together for his good. The sea loseth nothing*, saith he, *of its saltness by the rivers running into it, neither doth a good Man by the current of his sufferings.* And of all benefits which he receives, that of the exercise and trial of his Vertue and Patience is most discernable. *Marcet sine adversario virtus*, as soon as *Carthage* was destroy'd; *Rome* fell to Luxury: *True Wrestlers desire to have some to try their strength upon them*; *Cui non industrio otium pœna est?* An active spirit hates idleness and cowardise; For, *etiamsi ceciderit, de genu pugnat, tho' his legs he cut off, he will fight on his knees.*

3. *It redounds to* GOD's *honor, when good Men bear up under ſufferings. Ecce par Deo dignum, virtus fortis cum mala fortuna compoſitus.* It is a ſpectacle GOD delights to ſee, a good Man combat with calamities. GOD doth in *Seneca*'s phraſe *quoſdam faſtidio tranſire*, paſſeth them by in a ſlight; *An old wreſtler ſcorns to contend with a Coward*, one who is *vinci paratus*, ready to yield up preſently. *Calamitates ſub jugum mittere proprium magni viri eſt*, It argues a noble ſpirit to be able to ſubdue miſeries.

4. *It tends to the trial and increaſe of their ſtrength. Seneca* highly extols that ſpeech of the Philoſopher *Demetrius, Nihil infelicius eo cui nihil unquam evenit adverſi; non licuit enim illi ſe experiri.* He is the moſt unhappy Man who never knew what miſery meant; for he could never know what he was able to bear. And, as he ſaith, to paſs one's Life away *ſine morſu animi*, without any trouble, it is *ignorare rerum naturæ alteram partem*, not to know what is upon the reverſe of Nature. *Idem licet fecerint qui integri revertuntur ex acie, magis ſpectatur qui ſaucius redit.* Tho' he that comes home ſound, might fight as well as he that is wounded; yet the wounded perſon hath the more pity, and is moſt cry'd up for his valour. The Pilot is ſeen in a Tempeſt, a Soldier in the Battel, and a good Man in Sufferings. GOD doth by ſuch as Maſters do by Scholars, *qui plus laboris ab his exigunt, quibus certior ſpes eſt*; who ſet the beſt Wits the hardeſt taſks.

5. GOD *exerciſeth good Men with ſufferings, to diſcover the indifferency of thoſe things which Men value ſo much in the World, when he denies them to good Men.* Blindneſs would be hateful, if none were blind but ſuch whoſe Eyes were put out; and therefore *Appius* and *Metellus* were blind. Riches are no good things, therefore the worſt as well as the beſt have them. *Nullo modo magis poteſt Deus concupita traducere, quam ſi illa ad turpiſſimos defert, ab optimis abigit.* GOD could not traduce or defame thoſe things more which Men deſire ſo much, than by taking them away from the beſt of Men, and giving them to the worſt.

6. *That they might be examples to others of patience and conſtancy:* For, as *Seneca* concludes, *Nati ſunt in exemplar*, they are born to be patterns to others. If to theſe things we add what the Word of GOD diſcovers concerning the nature, grounds, and ends of afflictions, and that Glory which ſhall be reveal'd, in compariſon with *which exceeding weight of Glory, theſe light and momentany afflictions are not at all to be valu'd*; then we have a clear and full vindication of Divine Providence, as to the ſufferings of good Men, as well as to the impunity of ſuch as are wicked. But however, from hence we ſee how far the mere light of Reaſon hath carried Men in reſolving theſe difficulties concerning GOD's Providence in the World, and what a rational account may be given of them, ſuppoſing evil of puniſhment to ariſe from ſin, and that there is a GOD in the World, who is ready to puniſh the wicked, and to reward the good: Which was the thing to be ſhew'd.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Origin of Nations.

I. *All Mankind deriv'd from* Adam, *if the Scriptures be true.* II. *The contrary ſuppoſition an introduction to Atheiſm.* III. *The truth of the Hiſtory of the Flood. The poſſibility of an univerſal Deluge prov'd.* IV. *The Flood univerſal as to Mankind, whether univerſal as to the Earth and Animals; no neceſſity of aſſerting either.* V. *Yet ſuppoſing the poſſibility of it demonſtrated without creation of new Waters.* VI. *Of the Fountains of the Deep. The proportion which the height of Mountains bears to the Diameter of the Earth. No Mountains much above three Mile perpendicular. Of the Origin of Fountains. The opinion of* Ariſtotle *and others concerning it diſcus'd. The true account of them from the Vapours ariſing from the maſs of ſubterraneous Waters.* VII. *Of the capacity of the Ark for receiving the Animals, from* Buteo *and others.* VIII. *The truth of the Deluge from the Teſtimony of Heathen Nations. Of the propagation of Nations from* Noah's *Poſterity.* IX. *Of the beginning of the* Aſſyrian *Empire. The multiplication of Mankind after the Flood. Of the Chronology of the* LXX. *Of the time between the Flood and* Abraham, *and the advantages of it.* X. *Of the pretence of ſuch Nations, who call'd themſelves* Aborigines. XI. *A diſcourſe concerning the firſt Planters of* Greece: *The common Opinion propounded and rejected. The* Hellens *were not the firſt Inhabitants of* Greece, *but the* Pelaſgi. *The large ſpread of them over the parts of* Greece. XII. *Of their Language different from the* Greeks. XIII. *Whence theſe* Pelaſgi *came; that* Phaleg *was the* Pelaſgus *of* Greece, *and the Leader of that Colony, prov'd from* Epiphanius. XIV. *The Language of the* Pelaſgi *in* Greece *Oriental: Thence an account given of the many Hebrew words in the Greek Language, and the remainders of the Eaſtern Languages in the Iſlands of* Greece, *both which not from the* Phœnicians, *as* Bochartus *thinks, but from the old* Pelaſgi. XV. *Of the ground of the Affinity between the* Jews *and* Lacedæmonians. *Of the Peopling of* America.

THE next thing we proceed to give a rational account of, in the Hiſtory of the firſt Ages of the World contain'd in Scripture, is the peopling the World from *Adam.* Which is of great conſequence for us

us to underſtand, not only for the ſatisfaction of our curioſity as to the true Origin of Nations, but alſo in order to our believing the truth of the Scriptures, and the univerſal effects of the Fall of Man. Neither of which can be ſufficiently clear'd without this. For as it is hard to conceive how the effects of Man's Fall ſhould extend to all Mankind, unleſs all Mankind were propagated from *Adam*; ſo it is unconceivable how the account of things given in Scripture ſhould be true, if there were Perſons exiſtent in the World long before *Adam* was. Since the Scripture doth ſo plainly affirm, *That* GOD *hath made of one Blood all Nations of Men, for to dwell on the face of the Earth*; ſome Greek Copies read it ἐξ ἑνὸς, leaving out αἵματος which the vulgar Latin follows: The *Arabic* Verſion to explain both, reads it *ex homine*, or as *de Dieu* renders it *ex Adamo uno*, there being but the difference of one Letter in the Eaſtern Languages between דם and אדם, the one denoting Blood, and the other Man. But if we take it as our more ordinary Copies read it ἐξ ἑνὸς αἵματος, yet thereby it is plain, that the meaning is not, that all Mankind was made of the ſame uniform Matter, as the Author of the *Præ-Adamites* weakly imagin'd (for by that reaſon, not only Mankind, but the whole World might be ſaid to be ἐξ ἑνὸς αἵματος, of the ſame Blood, ſince all things in the World were at firſt form'd out of the ſame Matter) but αἷμα is taken there in the ſenſe in which it occurs in the beſt *Greek* Authors for the ſtock out of which Men come: So *Homer*,

Acts xvii. 26.

Hom. Odyſſ. ω.

Εἰ ἐτεὸν γ' ἐμὸς ἐσσὶ καὶ αἵματος ἠμετέροιο.

Thence thoſe who are near Relations, are call'd in *Sophocles*, οἱ πρὸς αἵματος, thence the name of Conſanguinity for nearneſs of Relation: and *Virgil* uſeth *ſanguis* in the ſame ſenſe,

Trojano a ſanguine duci.

So that the Apoſtle's meaning is, that however Men now are ſo diſpers'd in their Habitations, and differ ſo much in Language and Cuſtoms from each other, yet they were all originally of the ſame ſtock, and did derive their ſucceſſion from that firſt Man whom GOD created. Neither can it be conceiv'd on what account *Adam* in the Scripture is call'd the firſt Man, and that *he was made a living Soul, and of the Earth, earthy*; unleſs it were to denote that he was abſolutely the firſt of his kind, and ſo was to be the Standard and Meaſure of all that follows. And when our Saviour would reduce all things to the beginning, he inſtanceth in thoſe words which were pronounc'd after *Eve* was form'd. *But from the beginning of the Creation* GOD *made them Male and Female*; *for this cauſe ſhall a Man leave Father and Mother, and cleave unto his Wife.* Now nothing can be more plain and eaſie than from hence to argue thus; thoſe of whom theſe words were ſpoken, were the firſt Male or Female which were made in the beginning of the Creation; but it is evident theſe words were ſpoken of *Adam* and *Eve*: *And* Adam *ſaid, this is now bone of my bone, and fleſh of my fleſh: Therefore ſhall a Man leave his Father and his Mother, and ſhall cleave unto his Wife.* If the Scriptures then of the *New Teſtament* be true, it is moſt plain and evident that all Mankind is deſcended from *Adam*; and no leſs conſpicuous is it from the Hiſtory of the Creation as deliver'd by *Moſes*.

1 Cor. xv. 45, 47.

Mark x. 6, 7.

Gen. ii. 23, 24.

For how neceſſary had it been for *Moſes*, when he was giving an account of the Origin of Things, to have diſcover'd by whom the World was firſt planted, if there had been any ſuch Plantation before *Adam*: but to ſay that all the deſign of *Moſes* was only to give an account of the Origin and Hiſtory of the *Jewiſh* Nation, and that *Adam* was only the firſt of that Stock, is manifeſtly ridiculous, it being ſo clear, that not only from *Adam* and *Noah*, but from *Sem*, *Abraham*, and *Iſaac*, came other Nations beſides that of *Jews*. And by the ſame reaſon that it is ſaid, that *Moſes* only ſpeaks of the Origin of the *Jewiſh* Nation in the Hiſtory of *Adam*, it may as well be ſaid that *Moſes* ſpeaks only of the making of *Canaan*, and that part of the Heavens which are over it, when he deſcribes the Creation of the World in the ſix Days work. For why may not the Earth, in the ſecond Verſe of *Geneſis*, be as well underſtood of the Land of *Judæa*, and the Light and Production of Animals and Vegetables refer only to that, as to underſtand it ſo in reference to the Flood, and in many other paſſages relating to thoſe eldeſt times? But the Author of that *Hypotheſis* anſwers, *That the firſt Chapter of* Geneſis *may relate to the true Origin of the World and the firſt Peopling of it, but in the ſecond* Moſes *begins to give an account of the firſt Man and Woman of the Jewiſh Nation.* Very probable! but if this be not a putting aſunder thoſe which GOD hath joyn'd together, nothing is. For doth not *Moſes* plainly at firſt give an account of the Formation of things in the firſt ſix Days, and of his Reſt on the Seventh? But how could he be ſaid to have reſted then from the Works of Creation, if after this follow'd the Formation of *Adam* and *Eve* in the ſecond Chapter? Beſides, if the forming of Man mention'd, *Gen.* 2. 7. be diſtinct from that mention'd, *Gen.* 1. 27. then by all parity of Reaſon, תולדות השמים והארץ the *Generations* of *Heaven and Earth* mention'd, *Gen.* 2. 4. muſt be diſtinct from the *Creation of the Heaven and Earth* mention'd, *Gen.* 1. 1. And ſo if there were another Creation of Heaven and Earth belonging to the *Jews* in *Gen.* 2. we may likewiſe believe that there was a new Creation of Man and Woman in that Chapter diſtinct from that mention'd in the former. Again farther, if there had been any ſuch Perſons in the World before *Adam*, no doubt *Adam* himſelf was ignorant of them; or elſe it had been a falſe and ridiculous account which he gives of the name of his Wife חוה *becauſe ſhe was* אם כל חי *the Mother of all living.* Not of all living Things, for that had been a more proper deſcription of a *Ceres*, or *Magna Mater*, or *Diana multimammia*, of our Grandmother the Earth, but certainly it extends to all of the kind, that all living Creatures that are of Human Nature came from her. So the *Chaldee* Paraphraſt underſtands it, ſhe was call'd *Hava*, becauſe ſhe was אמא רכל בני אנשא *the Mother of all the Sons of Men.* And ſo the *Arabic* Verſion, *Quia ipſa fuit mater omnis viventis rationalis.* To which purpoſe our Learned *Selden* cites the Verſion of the *Mauritanian Jews*, and the *Perſic* of *Tawaſius.*

II.

Gen. iii. 20.

Selden. de jure natur. & gent. l. 1. c. 5. p. 65.

But whatever the Credit or Authority of theſe Verſions be, this is moſt certain, that *Adam* had no reaſon at all to have given this name to his Wife, as being *the Mother of all living*, if there had been any of Mankind exiſting in the World from other Mothers, which had been long before *Eve* was form'd. So that we find it plain and clear, that if the report given of things in Scripture be true, the *Hypotheſis* of *Præ-Adamites* is undoubtedly falſe. And certainly who ever ſeriouſly conſiders the frequent Reflections on the Authority of the Scriptures, which

were

were caſt by the Author of that Fiction, and his endeavouring on all occaſions to derogate from the Miracles recorded in it, may eaſily ſuſpect the deſign of that Author was not to gain any credit to his Opinion from thoſe Arguments from Scripture, which he makes ſhew of (which are pitifully weak and ridiculous) but having by the help of ſuch Arguments made his Opinion more plauſible, his hope was, that his Opinion would in time undermine the Scriptures themſelves; when he had made it appear that the account given in the Scriptures of the plantation of the World was unſatisfactory, ſince there were Men before *Adam*, which the Scriptures, to pleaſe the *Jewiſh* Nation, take no notice of. So that after he had attempted to proſtitute the Scriptures to his Opinion, his next work had been to have turn'd them out of Doors, as not of credit to be rely'd on by any, when they were ſo common to every Opinion. But how impious, abſurd, and rude that attempt was upon the ſacred and inviolable Authority of the Scriptures, hath been ſo fully diſcover'd by his very many not unlearned Adverſaries, that it might ſeem needleſs ſo much as to have taken notice of ſo weakly grounded, and infirmly prov'd an Opinion, had it not thus far lain in my way in order to the clearing the true Origin of Nations according to the Scriptures. The main foundations of which fabulous Opinion lying chiefly in the pretended Antiquities of the *Chaldæans*, *Ægyptians*, and others, have been fully taken away in our firſt Book, where our whole deſign was to manifeſt the want of credibility in thoſe accounts of ancient Times, which are deliver'd by Heathen Nations in oppoſition to the Scriptures. There is nothing at all in Scripture from the Creation of *Adam* to the Flood, which ſeems to give any countenance to that Figment, but only what may be eaſily reſolv'd from the conſideration of the great conciſeneſs of the *Moſaic* Hiſtory, in reporting that long interval of time which was between the Fall of *Adam*, and the Flood; by means of which conciſeneſs ſuch things are reported as ſpeedily done, becauſe immediately ſucceeding in the Story, which aſked a very conſiderable time before they could be effected; and beſides all things which were done before the Flood, being all quite obliterated by it, and all the numerous Poſterity of *Adam* being then deſtroy'd (only *Noah* and his Family excepted) to what purpoſe had it been any farther to have reported the paſſages before the Flood, otherwiſe than thereby to let us underſtand the certainty of the ſucceſſion of Perſons from *Adam*, and ſuch Actions in thoſe times which might be remarkable diſcoveries of God's Providence and Man's Wickedneſs in it; which being moſt apparent at firſt in *Cain* and his Poſterity, did by degrees ſo ſpread it ſelf over the face of the then inhabited World, that the juſt God was thereby provok'd to ſend a Deluge among them, to ſweep away the preſent Inhabitants, to make room for another Generation to ſucced them.

III. This therefore we now come to conſider, *viz. The Hiſtory of the Flood*, and the certainty of the Propagation of the World, from the Poſterity of *Noah* after the Flood. I begin with the Hiſtory of the Flood it ſelf, as to which two things will be ſufficient to demonſtrate the truth of it. 1. *If there be nothing in it repugnant to Reaſon.* 2. *If we have ſufficient evidence of the truth of it, from ſuch who yet have not believ'd the Scriptures.* There are only two things which ſeem queſtionable to Reaſon concerning the Flood: The *firſt*, is, *concerning the poſſibility of the Flood it ſelf:* The other is, *concerning the capacity of the Ark for preſerving all kinds of Animals.* The only ground of queſtioning the poſſibility

poſſibility of ſuch a Flood, as that is related in Scripture, hath been from hence, that ſome have ſuppos'd it impoſſible, that all the Water which is contain'd in the Air, ſuppoſing it to fall down, ſhould raiſe the ſurface of Water upon the Earth a Foot and a half in height; ſo that either new Waters muſt be created to overflow the Earth, or elſe there muſt be ſuppos'd a Rarefaction of the Water contain'd in the Sea and all Rivers, ſo that it muſt take up at leaſt fifteen times the ſpace that now it doth: But then, they ſay, if the Water had been thus rarefy'd, could neither have deſtroy'd Man nor Beaſt, neither could *Noah*'s Ark have been born up by it any more than by liquid Air. To this therefore I anſwer.

Firſt, I cannot ſee any urgent neceſſity from the Scripture to aſſert, that the Flood did ſpread it ſelf over all the ſurface of the Earth. That all Mankind (thoſe in the Ark excepted) were deſtroy'd by it, is moſt certain according to the Scriptures. When the occaſion of the Flood is thus expreſs'd, *And* GOD *ſaw that the wickedneſs of Man was great upon Earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his Heart was only evil continually. And the Lord ſaid, I will deſtroy Man whom I have created from the face of the Earth.* Gen. 6. 5, 7. It could not be then any particular Deluge of ſo ſmall a Country as *Paleſtine*, which is here expreſs'd, as ſome have ridiculouſly imagin'd; for we find an univerſal corruption in the Earth mention'd as the cauſe; an univerſal threatning upon all Men for this cauſe; and afterwards an univerſal deſtruction expreſſed, as the effect of this Flood. *And all fleſh died that moved upon the Earth, and every Man. And every living ſubſtance was deſtroyed which was upon the face of the Ground, both Man and Cattle, and the creeping things, and the Fowl of the Heaven, and they were deſtroyed from the Earth, and* Noah *only remained alive, and they that were with him in the Ark.* Gen. 7. 21. Ver. 23. So then it is evident, that the Flood was univerſal as to Mankind; but from thence follows no neceſſity at all of aſſerting the univerſality of it, as to the Globe of the Earth, unleſs it be ſufficiently prov'd that the whole Earth was Peopled before the Flood: Which I deſpair of ever ſeeing prov'd. And what Reaſon can there be to extend the Flood beyond the occaſion of it, which was the corruption of Mankind? And it ſeems very ſtrange, that in ſo ſhort an interval in compariſon, as that was from *Adam* to the Flood, according to the ordinary computation, *viz.* 1656 Years, and not much above two thouſand, according to the largeſt, the World ſhould then be fully Peopled, when in ſo much longer a ſpace of time ſince the Flood to this Day, the Earth is capable of receiving far more Inhabitants than now it hath. The only probability then left for aſſerting the univerſality of the Flood, as to the Globe of the Earth, is from the Deſtruction of all living Creatures together with Man; now tho' Men might not have ſpread themſelves over the whole ſurface of the Earth, yet Beaſts and creeping Things might, which were all deſtroy'd with the Flood: For it is ſaid, *That all fleſh died that moved upon the Earth, both of Fowl and of Cattle, and of Beaſt, and of every creeping thing that creepeth upon the Earth, and every Man.* To what end ſhould there be not only a note of univerſality added, but ſuch a particular enumeration of the ſeveral kinds of Beaſts, creeping Things, and Fowls, if they were not all deſtroy'd? To this I anſwer. I grant as far as the Flood extended all theſe were deſtroy'd; but I ſee no reaſon to extend the deſtruction of theſe beyond that compaſs and ſpace of the Earth where Men inhabited: Becauſe the puniſhment upon

the Beasts was occasion'd by, and could not but be concomitant with the destruction of Mankind, but (the occasion of the Deluge being the Sin of Man, who was punish'd in the Beasts, that were destroy'd for his sake, as well as in himself) where the occasion was not, as where there were Animals, and no Men, there seems no necessity of extending the Flood thither. But to what end then, it will be replyed, *Did* God *command* Noah *with so much care to take of all kind of Beasts, and Birds, and creeping Things into the Ark with him, if all these living Creatures were not destroy'd by the Flood?* I answer, because all those things were destroy'd where ever the Flood was. Suppose then the whole Continent of *Asia* was Peopled before the Flood, which is as much as we may in reason suppose, I say, all the living Creatures in that Continent were all destroy'd; or if we may suppose it to have extended over our whole Continent of the anciently known World; what reason would there be that in the opposite part of the Globe, *viz. America*, which we suppose to be unpeopled then, all the living Creatures should there be destroy'd, because Men had sinned in this? And would there not on this supposition have been a sufficient reason to preserve living Creatures in the Ark for future propagation, when all other living Creatures extant had been in such remote places as would not have been accessible by them in many Generations, and those Beasts growing wild for want of Inhabitants, would not have prov'd presently serviceable for the use of Men after the Flood? Which was certainly the main thing look'd at in the preservation of them in the Ark, that Men might have all of them ready for their use after the Flood, which could not have been, had not the several kinds been preserv'd in the Ark, altho' we suppose them not destroy'd in all parts of the World.

IV. All this proceeds on supposition that Animals were propagated much farther in the World than Men were, before the Flood. Which I confess seems very probable to me on this account, because the production of Animals is parallel in *Genesis* with that of Fishes, and both of them
Gen. 1. 20, 21. different from Man; *For* God *saith, Let the waters bring forth every moving Creature that hath life*; viz. *Fish, and Fowl*; and accordingly it is said, *that the waters brought forth abundantly every living Creature after their kind, and every Fowl after his kind.* Accordingly in the pro-
Ver. 24. duction of Beasts, we read, *Let the Earth bring forth the living Creature after his kind, Cattle, and creeping thing, and Beast of the Earth after his kind, and it was so:* But in the production of Man, it is said, *Let us*
Ver. 26. *make Man in our own likeness.* From hence I observe this difference between the production of Animals, and of Man, that in the one God gave a prolific Power to the Earth and Waters for production of the several living Creatures which came from them; so that the seminal principles of them were contain'd in the Matter out of which they were produc'd; which was otherwise in Man, who was made by a peculiar Hand
Gen. 2. 6. of the great Creator himself, who thence is said to have *formed Man of the dust of the ground.* Now therefore altho' there were but one Male and Female of Mankind at first, which had a special formation by God himself; yet there is no reason we should conceive it to be so as to the Production of other living Creatures, whether Fish, or Fowl, or Beasts; but the prolific Virtue being by God's power given to that material principle out of which they were form'd, it may very well be suppos'd that many of the same kind were at first produc'd. For it seems very strange to imagin that in the whole Ocean there should be only two of a kind produc'd; but Fish and Fowl both arising from the Water, we

may

may have just reason to think, that the Waters being separated before this prolific Virtue was communicated to the whole mass of Waters, might in the several parts of the Globe of the Earth, bring forth both Fish and Fowl after their kinds. The same I say of the production of Animals in the sixth days work, which are rank'd into three sorts, Cattle, creeping Things, and Beasts of the Earth after their kinds; now GOD saying, *Let the Earth bring forth her living Creatures*, (and that after the Waters had divided some parts of the Earth from other, so that there could be no passage for the Cattle, creeping Things, and Beasts out of one part into another, without the help of Man,) it seems very probable that at least those parts of the Earth which were thus divided from each other, did bring forth these several living Creatures after their kinds, which did after propagate in those parts without being brought thither by the help of Man. If now this supposition be embrac'd, by it we presently clear our selves of many difficulties concerning the propagation of Animals in the World, and their conversation in the Ark, which many have been so much to seek for satisfaction in. As how the unknown kind of Serpents in *Brasil*, the slow-belly'd Creature of the *Indies*, and all those strange species of Animals seen in the *West-Indies* should either come into the Ark of *Noah*, or be convey'd out of it into those Countries which are divided from that Continent where the Flood was by so vast an Ocean on the one side, and at least so large a tract of Land on the other (supposing any passage out of one Continent into another, which yet hath not been discover'd.) Besides, some kind of Animals cannot live out of that particular Clime wherein they are; and there are many sorts of Animals discover'd in *America*, and the adjoining Island, which have left no remainders of themselves in these parts of the World. And it seems very strange that these should propagate into those remote parts of the World from the place of the Flood, and leave none at all of their number behind them in those parts from whence they were propagated. These things at least make that Opinion very probable which extends the production of Animals beyond that of Mankind in the old World, and that the Flood tho' it destroy'd all Mankind, and every living Creature within that compass wherein Mankind inhabited, yet might not extend it self to those parts, and the Animals therein, in which Men had never inhabited. And by this means we need not make so many Miracles as some are fain to do about the Flood; and all those difficulties concerning the propagation of Animals do of themselves vanish and fall to the ground. This is the first way of resolving the difficulty concerning the possibility of the Flood, by asserting it not to have been over the whole Globe of the Earth, but only over those parts where Mankind inhabited.

V. *Secondly*, Suppose the Flood to have been over the whole Globe of the Earth, yet there might have been Water enough to have over-whelm'd it to the height mention'd in Scripture. For which we are to consider that many causes concurr'd to the making of this Deluge; *first*, the Air was condens'd into Clouds, and those fell down with continu'd force and violence, not breaking into drops, but all in a body (which Sir *Walter Rawleigh* parallels with the spouts of the *West Indies*) which are thence call'd the Cataracts or Flood-gates of Heaven, GOD loosening (as he expresseth it) the power retentive which was in the Clouds, and so the Waters must needs fall in abundance, according to the expression of *Job*, *Behold he with-holdeth the waters, and they dry up, also he sendeth* them Job. 12. 15.

Sir Walter Rawleigh's *History.*

them out, and they overturn the Earth. Now I say, altho' these Waters falling down with so much fury and violence, as well as in so great abundance might quickly destroy all living Creatures; yet this was not all; for GOD who held in the Ocean within its bounds, whereby he saith to it, *Thus far it shall go, and no farther*, might then give it commission to execute his Justice upon the sinful World: and to all this, we have another cause of the Deluge, which was, *That the Fountains* Gen. 7. 11. *of the great Deep were broken up.* By which *Vatablus*, most probably understands, *Immensam illam & profundam aquarum copiam quæ est subter terram*, that vast body of Water which lies in the bowels of the Earth; now when all these Fountains were broken up, and the Waters within the Earth rush out with violence and impetuosity upon it, it must needs cause an Inundation so great as that is mention'd in the Scripture. For *Sir* Walter Rawleigh *Ibid.* as that judicious Historian Sir *W. Rawleigh* observes, Let us consider that the Earth had above 21000 Miles compass, the Diameter of the Earth according to that Circle 7000 Miles, and then from the Superficies to the Center 3500 Miles; take then the highest Mountain of the World, *Caucasus*, *Taurus*, *Teneriff*, or any other, and I do not find, saith he, that the highest exceeds thirty Miles in height: It is not then impossible, answering Reason with Reason, that all those Waters mixed within the Earth, 3500 Miles deep, should be able to cover the space of 30 Miles in height, which 30 Miles upright being found in the depths of the Earth 116 times; for the Fountains of the great Deep were broken and the Waters drawn out of the Bowels of the Earth. But then withal, saith he, if we consider the proportion which the Earth bears to the Air about it, we may easily understand the possibility of the Flood, without any new creation of Waters; for supposing so much Air to be condens'd, and so turn'd into Water which doth encompass the Earth, it will not seem strange to Men of Judgment, yea but of ordinary Understanding, that the Earth (GOD so pleasing) was cover'd over with Waters, without any new Creation. But this will yet appear more probable, if the height of the highest Mountains doth bear no greater proportion to the Diameter of the Earth, than of the 1670 part to the whole, supposing the Diameter of the Earth to be 8355 Miles, as *Gassend. Tom. 2. op. Phys. s. 3. l. 1.* *P. Gassendus* computes both. And it is more than probable, that Men have exceedingly mistaken, as to the height of Mountains, which comes so short of what Sir *Walter Rawleigh* allows to them, that the highest Mountain in the World will not be found to be five direct Miles in height, taking the altitude of them from the Plain they stand upon. *Olympus*, whose height is so extoll'd by the Poets and ancient *Greeks*, that it is said *Plut. in Æmilian. Plin. l. 2. c. 65.* to exceed the Clouds; yet *Plutarch* tells us that *Xenagoras* measur'd it, and found it not to exceed a Mile and half perpendicular and about 70 Paces. Much about the same height *Pliny* saith that *Dicæarchus* found the Mountain *Pelion* to be. The Mount *Athos* is suppos'd of extraordinary height, because it casts its shadow into the Isle of *Lemnos*, which according to *Pliny* was 87 Miles, yet *Gassendus* allows it but two Miles *Voss. in Pomp. Melam, l. 5. c. 2. p. 115. &c.* in height; but *Isaac Vossius* in a learned discourse concerning the height of Mountains in his Notes on *Pomponius Mela*, doth not allow above 10 or 11 Furlongs at most to the height of Mount *Athos*. *Caucasus* by *Ricciolus* is said to be 51 Miles in height: *Gassendus* allowing it to be higher than *Athos* or *Olympus*, yet conceives it not above three or four Miles at most; but yet *Vossius* will not yield it above two Miles perpendicular, for which he gives this very good reason; *Polybius* affirms,

there

there is no Mountain in *Greece* which may not be aſcended in a days time, and makes the higheſt Mountain there not to exceed 10 Furlongs; which, ſaith *Voſſius*, it is ſcarce poſſible for any one to reach, unleſs he be a Mountainer born; any other will ſcarce be able to aſcend above ſix Furlongs perpendicular; for in the aſcent of a Mountain every Pace doth reach but to an hand breadth perpendicular; but if we do allow eight Furlongs to a Days aſcent, yet thereby it will appear that the higheſt Mountains in the World are not above twenty four Furlongs in height, ſince they may be aſcended in three Days time. And it is affirm'd of the top of Mount *Caucaſus*, that it may be aſcended in leſs than the compaſs of three Days, and therefore cannot be much above two Miles in height. Which may be the eaſier believ'd of any other Mountain, when that which is reputed the higheſt of the World, *viz.* the *Pike* of *Teneriff*, which the Inhabitants call *Pica de Terraria*, may be aſcended in that compaſs of time, *viz.* three Days: For in the Months of *July* and *Auguſt* (which are the only Months in which Men can aſcend it, becauſe all other times of the Year Snow lies upon it, altho' neither in the Iſle of *Teneriff* nor any other of the *Canary-Iſlands*, there be Snow ever ſeen) the Inhabitants then aſcend to the top of it in three Days time; which top of it is not Pyramidal but plain, from whence they gather ſome Sulphurous Stones, which are carry'd in great Quantities into *Spain*. So that according to the proportion of eight Furlongs to a days Journey, this *Pike* of *Teneriff* will not exceed the height of a *German* Mile perpendicular, as *Varenius* confeſſeth, than which he thinks likewiſe that no Mountain in the World is higher. For what *Pliny* ſpeaks of the *Alps* being fifty Miles in height, muſt be underſtood not perpendicular, but in regard of the obliquity of the aſcent of it; ſo that he might account ſo much from the foot of the *Alps* to the top of them, and yet the *Alps* in a perpendicular Line not come near the height of a *German* Mile. If then the higheſt Mountains do not exceed much above three Miles in height, (for the *Spaniards* themſelves affirm, that thoſe lofty Mountains of *Peru*, in compariſon of which, they ſay, the *Alps* are but like Cottages, may be aſcended in four Days compaſs,) we ſee from hence then far greater probability, how the Waters in the time of the general Flood might overtop the higheſt Mountains.

V. Varenium Geogr. General. l. 1. c. 10. prop. 3.

VI. Eſpecially if it be made evident that there is ſo great an Abyſs of ſubterraneous Waters, that the breaking open of the Fountains of it may ſo much increaſe the Inundation ariſing from the Clouds, and from the breaking in of the Ocean upon the main Land. And that there is ſuch a maſs of Waters in the body of the Earth, is evident from the Origin of Fountains; for the Opinion of *Ariſtotle* imputing them to the condenſation of Air in the Caverns of the Earth, and that of other Philoſophers aſcribing them to the fall of Rain-water receiv'd into ſuch Ciſterns in the Earth which are capable of receiving it, are both equally unſatisfactory, unleſs we ſuppoſe a maſs of Waters in the Bowels of the Earth, which may be as the common ſtock to ſupply thoſe Fountains with. For it is very hard conceiving, how mere Air ſhould be ſo far condens'd, as to cauſe not only ſuch a number of Fountains, but ſo great a quantity of Water as runs into the Sea by thoſe Rivers which come from them, (as the River *Volga* is ſuppos'd to empty ſo much Water in a Years time into the *Caſpian* Sea, as might ſuffice to cover the whole Earth,) by which likewiſe it is moſt evident that there muſt be ſome ſubterranean paſſages into the Sea, or elſe of neceſſity, by that abundance of Water

Water which continually runs into it from the Rivers, it would over-flow and drown the World. And from this multitude of Waters which comes from Fountains, it is likewise evident, that the Origin of Fountains cannot be merely from such Water which falls from the Clouds, which would never suffice to maintain so full and uninterrupted a Stream as many Fountains have: Especially if that be true which some assert, that Rain-water doth never moisten the Earth above ten Foot deep, for of far greater profundity many Fountains are. And besides, the Rain-water runs most upon the surface of the Earth, and so doth rather swell the Rivers, which thereby run with greater force in their passage to the Ocean, and doth not lodg it self presently in the Earth, especially if it descends in a greater quantity, which alone is able to fill such Cisterns suppos'd to be in the Earth, especially in Mountains, which may keep a Stream continually running. Altho' therefore we may acknowledg that the fall of Rain may much conduce to the over-flowing and continuance of Fountains, as is evident by the greater force of Springs after continu'd Rains, and by the decay of many of them in hot and dry Weather, (which yet I had rather impute to the Sun's exhaling by his continu'd heat those moist Vapours in the Earth, which should continually supply the Springs, than merely to the want of Rain,) and by the rise of most great Rivers from such Fountains which came from the foot of Mountains; where the Ground is suppos'd to be of so hard and consistent a substance, as Stone or Chalk, or something of like nature, which might help to the conservation of Water there, from whence it after ran in Streams to the Ocean, (which was the great Argument of the famous *Peireskius* for his Opinion,) altho' I say, these things may argue thus far, that Rain-water doth much conduce to the preservation of Springs, yet it cannot give a sufficient account of the origin of them: Which with the greatest reason and probability is imputed to those subterraneous Waters which pass up and down thro' the Bowels of the Earth. Some have fancy'd the Earth to be as one great Animal, whose subterraneous passages were like Veins in the Body, which receiv'd Water out of the Sea, as the Veins do Blood out of the Liver; and that there are some kind of Vapours in the Earth which supply the place of vital Spirits, which are diffus'd up and down the Body thro' the Arteries. And that as in an Animal, there are some parts which upon the least prick do send forth Blood, and others are more callous where the incision must be deeper before any Blood appears; so it is in the Earth: When it is open'd in a right Vein we find presently a Spring of Water; but if we chance to hit on a wrong place, we go deep and may find none; not that Water is wanting, but we have not hit on the Veins thro' which it runs. And thence the Blood with equal freedom and velocity ascends into the Head as it runs into the Legs, because it is equally dispers'd into all the parts from the Center of it; so in the body of the Earth it is as natural for the Water to ascend into the tops of Mountains, as it is to fall down into the Center of the Earth. And that it is no more wonder to see Springs issue out of Mountains, than it is to see a Man bleed in the Veins of his Fore-head when he is let Blood there. So in all places of the Earth the parts of it are not disposed for apertion; for some of them are so hard and compact, that there seems to be no passage thro' them, (which is the most probable reason, why there is no Rain neither in those places, because there is no such exsudation of those moist Vapours thro' the surface of

V. Gassend. vit. Peireskii, l. 3. p. 292.

* the

the Earth, which may yield Matter for Rain, as it is in many of the ſandy places of *Africa*;) but uſually Mountainous Countries have more large, and as it were Temple-veins thro' which the moiſt Vapours have a free and open paſſage, and thence there are not only more frequent Springs there, but Clouds and Rains too. Now if this account of the Origin of Springs in the Earth be as rational as it is ingenious and handſome, (and there is not much can be ſaid againſt it, but only that then all Fountains ſhould be ſalt as the Water is from whence they come) then we eaſily underſtand how the Earth might be overflow'd in the univerſal Deluge; for then the Fountains of the Deep were broken up, or there was an univerſal opening of the Veins of the Earth, whereby all the Water contain'd in them would preſently run upon the ſurface of the Earth, and muſt needs according to its proportion, advance it ſelf to a conſiderable height. But becauſe the ſalving the difference of the Water in Springs from what it is in the Sea, is ſo conſiderable a *Phænomenon* in our preſent caſe, I therefore rather take this following as the moſt rational account of the Origin of Fountains, *viz.* That there are great Cavities in the Earth, which are capable of receiving a conſiderable quantity of Water, which continually runs into them from the Sea, (which as it continually receives freſh ſupplies from the Rivers which empty themſelves into it, ſo it diſpatcheth away a like quantity thro' thoſe ſpungy parts of the Earth under the Ocean, which are moſt apt to ſuck in and convey away the ſurpluſage of Water,) ſo that by this means the Sea never ſwells by the Water convey'd into it by the Rivers, there being as continual a circulation in the body of the Earth, of the Water which paſſeth out of the Ocean into the ſubterraneous Caverns, and from thence to the Mountains, and thence into the Sea again, as there is a circulation of Blood in Man's Body from the Heart by the Arteries into the exterior parts, and returning back again by the Veins into the Heart. According to which we may imagine ſuch a place in the Heart of the Earth like *Plato*'s *Baratrum*,

Τῆλε μάλ' ἠχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἔστι βέρεθρον.

As *Plato* in his *Phædrus* deſcribes it out of *Homer*, *A long and deep ſubterraneous Cavity.* εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα ῥυῤῥέουσί τε πάντες οἱ πολλαμοὶ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν πάντες ἐκρέουσι. *Into which Cavity all the Rivers at laſt flow, and from which they again diſperſe themſelves abroad.* Now this Cavity of the Earth thus fill'd with Water, ſupplies the place of the Heart in the body of the Earth, from which all thoſe ſeveral *Aqueducts* which are in the Earth have their continual ſupply; but that which makes thoſe paſſages of Water which we call Springs and Fountains properly, I ſuppoſe, is thus generated; from thoſe Cavities fill'd with Water in the Earth, by reaſon of the hot ſteams which are in the body of the Earth, there are continually riſing ſome Vapours or little Particles of Water, which are disjoyn'd from each other by the heat, by reaſon of which they attain a greater celerity of Motion, and ſo paſs thro' the inner Pores of the Earth till they come near the ſuperficies of it. Which when they have approach'd to, they are beat back again by the cold, which environs the ſurface of the Earth, or at leaſt are ſo arreſted by the cold and condens'd by it, that they loſe the form of Vapours, and become perfect Water again. Which Water being now more groſs, than while it was a mere Vapour, cannot deſcend again thro' the ſame Pores thro' which it aſ-

cended before, becauſe theſe are not now capable of receiving it: And therefore it ſeeks out ſome wider paſſages near the ſurface of the Earth, by which means it moves in an oblique manner, and is ready to embrace any other Vapours which are arreſted in the ſame manner: Now when theſe are grown to a conſiderable body in the ſurface of a Mountain, or a Plain, and find a vent fit for them, there appears a proper Fountain, whoſe ſtreams are ſtill maintain'd by the ſame condenſation of Vapours, which when they are once come abroad, are in continual Motion, whereby Rivers are made, which are ſtill finding a paſſage thro' the declivity of the ſurface of the Earth, whereby they may return to the Ocean again. Now according to this account, that grand *Phænomenon* of the freſhneſs of Fountain-water, when the Water of the Sea is ſalt, whence it originally comes, is ſufficiently reſolv'd. For mere tranſcolation may by degrees take away that which the *Chymiſts* call the fixed Salt; and for the Volatile Salt of it (which being a more ſpiritous thing, is not removable by Diſtillation, and ſo neither can it be by Tranſcolation,) yet ſuch an evaporation as that mention'd, may ſerve to do it, becauſe it is evident that freſh Water will fall from the Clouds, which hath riſen from thoſe Vapours which have come out of the Sea: And beſides theſe Vapours or ſmall Particles of Water in their paſſage through the Earth (eſpecially when they come near the ſurface of it) do incorporate with other ſweet Vapours; as thoſe which come from Rain, and others, by which means they inſenſibly loſe their former acidity and ſharpneſs. But thoſe Fountains which do retain their former ſaltneſs, as there are many ſuch in the World, may very probably be ſuppos'd not to have come from thoſe Vapours condens'd, but to be a kind of breaking of a Vein, in which the Salt Water was convey'd up and down the body of the Earth. Now then, conſidering that maſs of Waters, and multitude of Vapours ariſing thence which are in the Earth, how eaſie is it for us to underſtand what the breaking open the Fountains of the Deep means in Scripture, and how by that means, together with the falling down of the Cataracts of the Clouds, and the letting looſe of the Ocean, the whole Earth might be overſpread with an univerſal Deluge? The poſſibility of which was the thing to be ſhew'd.

VII. The next thing we come to concerning the Flood, is, the capacity of the Ark for receiving the ſeveral Animals which were to propagate the World afterwards. Concerning which, two things are neceſſary to be underſtood; what the meaſure of the Ark was, and what the number of Animals contain'd in it. The meaſure of the Ark muſt be determin'd by the proportion of the Cubit, which there is no reaſon at all to ſuppoſe either with *Origen* and others, to have been the Geometrical Cubit, which contains ſix ordinary Cubits or nine Feet; both becauſe we find no mention at all of any ſuch Cubit in Scripture, and becauſe the Fabric of the Ark would have been of too vaſt a proportion. Neither yet is it probable, what Sir *W. Rawleigh* ſuppoſeth, that this Cubit muſt be of a proportion as much exceeding ours, as the ſtature of a Giant doth ours, both becauſe there is no certain evidence, either from Scripture or Reaſon, that the proportion Men then did generally exceed what is now. And beſides, this tends not in the leaſt to make the thing more plain; for according to that proportion, we muſt then have imagin'd Beaſts to have been as well as Men; for the Horſe muſt have been proportionably as great to have been ſerviceable to Men of that ſtature, and ſo the Animals would have taken up as much more room in the Ark

as

as the Cubit is suppos'd to be bigger. I suppose then that *Moses* speaks of the Cubit most in use in his own time (for he writ so that they for whose use he writ, might be easily able to understand him,) now this Cubit by the consent of Writers contain'd a Foot and a half in length; according to which proportion, supposing the Ark by *Moses*'s description Gen. 6. 15. to have 300 Cubits in length, 50 in breadth, and 30 in height, the whole capacity of the Ark, according to the computation of *Joh. Buteo* comes to 450000 solid Cubits. For the length of 300 Cubits being multiply'd into the breadth of 50 Cubits, and the product by the height of 30 Cubits, makes the whole Concavity 450000. Which *Matheus Hostius* reducing to the *German* measure, makes the Longitude of the Ark to be 31 Perches, 4 Cubits, 5 Fingers; the Latitude 5 Perches, 2 Cubits and 11 Fingers; the Altitude 3 Perches 1 Cubit, 9 Fingers; allowing to every Perch 15 *Roman* feet. So that if we take a Perch to contain 10 *Hebrew* Cubits, which exceeds the former 11 Fingers, the whole capacity of the Ark will be 450 cubical Perches. And as he saith, *Hujusmodi sane ædificii amplitudo capacissima est, & quamlibet magno animantium numero haud dubie sufficere potuit*; the Ark of so large a capacity might easily contain the several kinds of Animals in it. Which will be easily understood, if according to our former supposition, only the Animals of the inhabited part of the World were preserv'd in the Ark; But admitting that all kinds of Animals were there, there would be room enough for them, and for Provision for them. For which Sir *W. Rawleigh* gives a prudent caution, that Men ought not to take Animals of a mixt Nature, as *Mules* and *Hyæna*'s, nor such as differ in size and shape from each other, as the *Cat* of *Europe*, and *Ownce* of *India*, into the several species of Animals. Sir *W. Rawleigh* following *Buteo* reckons 89, or lest any be omitted, 100 several kinds of Beasts; and undertakes to demonstrate from a triple proportion of all Beasts, to the Ox, Wolf, and Sheep, that there was sufficient capacity for them in the Ark. *Hostius* allows 150 several kinds of Animals, yet questions not the capacity of the Ark. But these things are so particularly made out by those Learned Authors, especially by *Buteo*, that I shall rather refer the Reader for farther satisfaction to the Authors themselves, than take the pains to transcribe them.

Buteo de arca Noe. p. 93.

Hostius de fabrica Arcæ Noah. th. 66.

VIII. I come now therefore to the evidence of the truth and certainty of this universal Deluge, of which we have most clear and concurring Testimonies of most ancient Nations of the World. For which purpose *Grotius* and others, have at large produc'd the Testimony of *Berosus* the *Chaldean* out of *Josephus*, concerning the Flood and the Ark, in which *Noah* was preserv'd; of *Abydenus* out of *Cyril* and *Eusebius* concerning *Xisuthrus*, or *Noah*'s sending out of the Birds to see if the Flood were asswag'd; and of *Alexander Polyhistor*, concerning the preservation of Animals in the Ark; of *Plutarch* concerning the sending out of the Dove; of *Lucian de Dea Syria* concerning the whole story, and so of *Molon* and *Nicolaus Damascenus*. Besides, it is manifested by others, how among the *Chaldeans* the memory of *Noah* was preserv'd under the Fable of *Oannes*, which had part of a Fish, and part of a Man, as is evident from the fragments of *Apollodorus*, *Abydenus*, and *Alexander Polyhistor*, preserv'd in *Eusebius*'s Greek Chronica; among the *Chineses*, under the name of *Puoncuus*, who by them is said to have escap'd alone with his Family out of the universal Deluge, saith *Isaac Vossius*, who suppoſeth *Pu* or *Pi* to be only a prefix to the name, and so that *Puoncuus*,

V. Grot. Annot. in l. 1. de Verit. relig. Christ. Voss. Isagog. Chron. dissert. 4. c. 2. & 3. Bochar. Geogr. sacr. l. 1. c. 4. August. de Civit. Dei, l. 18. c. 12. & ibid. Lud. Viv. Euseb. Chr. p. 5. ed. 2. Scaliger. Is. Voss. epist. ad Colvium, p. 409.

Martin. hist. Sinic. l. 1. p. 12. cuus, is the same with ὁ Νῶχος. *Martinius* tells us, *de diluvio multa est apud Sinicos Scriptores mentio*, that the ancient Writers of the *Sinic* History speak much of the Flood. *Johannes de Laet* tells out of *Lescharbotus*, how constant the Tradition of the Flood is among the *Indians*, both in *New-France*, *Peru*, and other parts. This being therefore so fully attested by the evident and apparent consent of so many Writers and Historians, which did not own the Authority of the Scriptures, I shall suppose this sufficiently prov'd, and proceed to the main thing which concerns the Origin of Nations, which is, *The certainty of the propagation of Mankind from the Posterity of* Noah. Of which there is this strong and convincing evidence, that in all that account which the Scripture gives of the propagation of Nations from the Sons of *Noah*, there is some remainder in the History of that Nation, to justifie the reason of the imposition of the name from the names of the Nations themselves, which have preserv'd the original name of their Founder in their own; as the *Medes* from *Madai*; the *Thracians* from *Thiras*; the *Ionians* from *Javan*; the *Sidonians* from *Sidon*; the *Philistins* from *Polesthim*; the *Arcæans*, *Arcadians*, *Elymæans*, *Assyrians*, *Lydians*, from *Arki*, *Arrad*, *Elam*, *Assur* and *Lud*, and many others produc'd by *Grotius*, *Montanus*, *Junius*, and especially *Bochartus*, who with admirable Industry and Learning hath clear'd all this part of sacred History, which concerns the reason of the imposition of the names of the People which were propagated from the Posterity of *Noah*, and given a full and satisfactory account of the several places where the Posterity of *Noah* seated themselves after the Deluge. Instead of that therefore, I shall consider the pretences which can be brought against it, which are chiefly these three. 1. That the *Chaldean* Empire seems to have greater Antiquity than can be attributed to it by the History of *Moses*. 2. That the most learned Heathen Nations pretend to be self-originated, and that they came not from any other Country. 3. That no certain account is given from whence *America* should be Peopled.

Joh. de Laet. de orig. gent. American. l. 1. p. 115.

Grot. Annot. ad l. 1. de Verit. Ari. Montan. Phaleg. Junius in Gen. 10. Bochart. Geogr. sacr. p. 1.

IX. 1. The History of the *Assyrian* Empire seems inconsistent with the propagation of the World from the Sons of *Noah*; for the Reign of *Ninus* and *Semiramis* is plac'd by many *Chronologers* within the first Century after the Flood, which seems a manifest inconsistency with the propagation of Mankind from the Sons of *Noah*; for it seems utterly impossible that the foundations of so great an Empire should be laid in so small a compass of time by the Posterity of three Persons: And besides, *Ninus* and *Semiramis* were not the first who began the *Assyrian* Empire; for *Belus* not only reign'd fifty five Years before *Ninus*, but according to the *Chaldean* Antiquities from *Evechous*, who they say first reign'd among them, are reckon'd 495 Years. But admit that the beginning of the *Assyrian* Empire be plac'd so low as *Petavius* and other Chronologers would have it, *viz.* in the Year after the Flood, 153, yet the difficulty is only somewhat abated, but not remov'd; for it seems yet unconceivable, that from three Persons in 150 Years, such multitudes should spring, as to make so large an Empire as that of *Ninus*, and that within an hundred Years after the Flood there should be such vast multitudes for the building the Tower of *Babel*, and dispersion up and down the World; so that according to the *Hebrew* computation in the compass of 300 Years, *viz.* about *Abraham*'s time, the World was so fully peopl'd, that we read of several Kings encountring one another: By which it is evident the World had been peopl'd some time before, or else there could not

Petav. de doct. temp. l. 9. c. 14. Tom. 2.

not have been such potent Kings as some of them were at that time. This being the grand Difficulty, to it I answer these things.

1. There is no such certainty of the beginning of the *Assyrian* Empire, as for the sake of that, to question the truth of the Propagation of the World by the Sons of *Noah*. I have already largely manifested the want of credibility in the Chronology of the ancient *Chaldeans*, and that we have no certain grounds to rely upon in reference to it. Especially as to these seven first *Babylonian* Kings, which are cited out of *Africanus*, by *Eusebius*, and *Georgius Syncellus*, viz. *Evechous*, *Chomasbolus*, *Porus*, *Nechubes*, *Abius*, *Oniballus*, *Chinziris*, who are said to reign 225 years two Months; and alike fabulous, I suppose, is the other *Dynasty* of six *Arabian* Kings, whose Empire is said to have stood 215 years to the time of *Belus*, who expell'd the *Arabians*, and took the power to himself: And it is much more agreeable to Reason to reject these two *Dynasties*, which had no record of them left in any History of the *Assyrian* Empire, but only in *Berosus*, whose authority in this case hath been discuss'd already; than to follow our late excellent Primate of *Armach*, who punctually sets down the Reign of the Kings of these two *Dynasties*, but cuts off at least eight Ages in the time of the *Assyrian* Empire from *Ninus* to *Sardanapalus*, which times he confines to 496 years, and placeth *Ninus* in the 2737 year of the World, according to the *Hebrew* Computation, and so to live in the time of the *Judges*, and be contemporary with *Deborah*: Which he builds only on a place in *Herodotus*; which relates not to the time between *Ninias* and *Sardinapalus*, but to the time of the defection of the *Medes* from the *Assyrian* Empire, as *Isaac Vossius* hath already shew'd. We cannot then find any certainty in the beginning of the *Assyrian* Empire, which may give us cause to question the Propagation of the World from the Posterity of *Noah*.

Usser. Ann. vet. Test. A. M. 2737.

Castigat. adv. Horn. c. 10.

Gen. 9. 1.

2. We have reason to think that there was a more than ordinary multiplication of the World from the Sons of *Noah* after the Flood. For as God had before punish'd the World by destroying Mankind in it by an extrordinary manner; so after the Flood, he doth in a particular manner bless *Noah* and his Sons, and said unto them, *Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the Earth*, which may well be thought to have then had an extraordinary effect. Several ways have been attempted by Learned Men to make appear, to what a vast number the Posterity of *Noah* would increase in the space of two or three hundred years after the Flood. *Petavius* supposeth that the Posterity of *Noah* might beget Children at seventeen, and that each of *Noah*'s Sons might have eight Children in the eighth year after the Flood, and that every one of these eight might beget eight more; by this means in only one Family, as of *Japhet* in the year after the Flood 238, he makes a *Diagram* consisting of almost an innumerable company of Men. *Johannes Temporarius*, as our most Learned *Primate* tells us, takes this way, that all of the Posterity of *Noah*, when they attain'd twenty years of Age, had every year twins, on which supposition by *Arithmetical* progression he undertakes to make it appear, that in the 102 year after the Flood, there would be of Males and Females 1554420; but taking away the one half, because of the groundless supposition of twins, yet then in that time there would be 388605 Males besides Females. Others suppose that each of the Sons of *Noah* had ten Sons, and by that proportion, in few Generations it would amount to many thousands within a Century. Others insist on the parallel between the multiplication

Petav. de doct. temp. l. 9. c. 14.

Uss. Chron. sacr. c. 5.

of the Children of *Iſrael* in *Ægypt*; that if from 72 Men in the ſpace of 215 years there are procreated 600000, how many will be born of three Men in the ſpace of an hundred years? ſome have ſaid above 23000, but with what ſucceſs in their *Arithmetic*, I ſhall not determin. But whether all or any of theſe ways be ſufficient, and ſatisfactory, we have yet cauſe to believe that there was a more than ordinary multiplication in the Poſterity of *Noah* after the Flood.

Horn. def. diſſert. de ætat. mundi, c. 26.

3. If we embrace the account of thoſe Copies, which the *Septuagint* follow'd in their Verſion, all this difficulty is then ceas'd. For that account doth very much enlarge the times, and makes almoſt a thouſand years between the Flood and *Abraham*, by which means there will be ſufficient ſpace given for the propagation of Mankind, the building the Tower of *Babel*, the diſperſion of Nations, the founding the *Aſſyrian* Empire, the plantation of *Ægypt*, *China*, and other places, all which ſeem to have been in that time, and to concur with that computation, as well as *Joſephus* doth, and the whole Primitive Church before *Hierom*, which certainly ought in no caſe to be diſregarded.

The whole controverſy concerning this part of the Chronology of the World comes at laſt to this; Whether it be more probable that the *Jews* who lived under the ſecond Temple (who then were the Truſtees to whom were committed *the Oracles of* GOD) whom the LXX. follow'd in their Verſion, had the true reading, or the *Talmudic Jews* after their diſperſion and baniſhment from their Countrey, when they were diſcarded by GOD himſelf from being his People, when he broke up houſe among them at the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem* and the Temple. But if the Reader deſire farther ſatisfaction concerning this difference of this Chronology of the LXX. from that of the preſent *Hebrew* Copies, he may conſult the learned diſſertation of the late learned Biſhop of *Cheſter* upon the LXX. and the later Diſcourſes of *Iſaac Voſſius* on this ſubject. Setting aſide then the controverſy between the preſent *Hebrew* Copies and the LXX. in point of integrity and incorruption, which I meddle not with, I cannot but ſubſcribe to the judgment of our judicious Hiſtorian, * Sir *W. Rawleigh: That if we look over all, and do not haſtily ſatisfy our Underſtanding with the firſt things offer'd, and thereby being ſatiated do ſlothfully and drowſily ſit down, we ſhall find it more agreeable rather to follow the reckoning of the LXX. who according to ſome Editions make it above* 1072 *years between the Flood and* Abraham's *Birth, than to take away any part of thoſe* 352 *years given. For if we adviſedly conſider the ſtate and countenance of the World, ſuch as it was in* Abraham's *time, yea before* Abraham *was born, we ſhall find that it were very ill done of us by following opinion without the guide of Reaſon, to pare the time over deeply between* Abraham *and the Flood; becauſe in cutting them too near the quick, the reputation of the whole ſtory might perchance bleed thereby, were not the teſtimony of the Scriptures ſupream, ſo as no objection can approach it; And that we did not follow withal this precept of St.* Auſtin, *that whereſoever any one place in the Scriptures may be conceiv'd diſagreeing to the whole, the ſame is by ignorance of miſ-interpretation underſtood. For in* Abraham's *time all the then known parts of the World were peopled: all Regions and Countries had their Kings.* Ægypt *had many magnificent Cities, and ſo had* Paleſtine *and all bordering Countries; yea all that part of the World beſides as far as* India: *and thoſe not built with ſticks, but of hewn ſtones, and defended with Walls and Rampiers, which magnificence needed a Parent of more antiquity than thoſe other*

Walton. Proleg. ad Bibl. Polyg. c. 9. §. 58, 63, &c. Iſaac Voſſius de LXX. Interpr. & ætat. Mundi.

* Sir *Walt. Rawleigh Hiſt. p. 1. b. 2. c. 1. ſect. 7.*

other Men have ſuppos'd. And therefore where the Scriptures are plaineſt and beſt agreeing with Reaſon and Nature, to what end ſhould we labour to beget doubts and ſcruples, or draw all things into wonders and marvels? giving alſo ſtrength thereby to common cavillers, and to thoſe Mens apiſh brains, who only bend their Wits to find impoſſibilities and monſters in the Story of the World and Mankind. Thus far that excellent Hiſtorian, whoſe words deſerve conſideration. Thus much for the firſt Objection.

The ſecond is, *From the great pretence of ſeveral Nations that they were ſelf-originated*, or came not from any other place. This was the pretence of the *Ægyptians*, *Græcians*, ancient Inhabitants of *Italy*, and others. But how little reaſon we have to give credit to theſe pretences, will appear on theſe accounts. 1. The Impoſſibility in Nature that Mankind ſhould be produc'd in ſuch a way as they imagin'd, which we have manifeſted already in our Diſcourſe of the Origin of the Univerſe. 2. That the Nations which pretended this, were never able to give ſufficient Evidence of it to any other Nation which demanded it; which is manifeſt by their want of any certain Records of their ancient times, which is fully prov'd in our Diſcourſe in the firſt Book of the want of credibility in the *Heathen* Hiſtory. 3. The only probable Reaſon which induc'd theſe Nations to make themſelves *Aborigines*, was, becauſe they ſuppos'd themſelves to be the firſt Inhabitants of the Countries they liv'd in: which altho' I may allow to the *Ægyptians*, and ſome other ancient Nations, yet I cannot do it to the *Hellens* or *Greeks*, who moſt vainly and arrogantly pretend to it. Which becauſe it may give more light into the greateſt Antiquities of *Greece*, and ſome other Nations than hath been yet diſcover'd or taken notice of, and becauſe it may farther tend to clear the truth of the Scriptures, as to the Origin of Nations, I ſhall more particularly inquire into the firſt Plantation of *Greece*. That it was firſt inhabited by ſome of *Noah*'s Poſterity, is out of queſtion with all thoſe who prefer the moſt ancient and undoubted Records of Scripture before the fabulous Impoſtures of Mens Brains. But by whoſe immediate Poſterity the Country of *Greece* was firſt inhabited, is not yet ſo clear as it hath been generally preſum'd to be, by moſt who had rather follow the dictates of others, than ſpend time in ſuch enquiries themſelves: Which yet certainly are ſo far from being unworthy Mens labour and induſtry, that nothing tends more clearly to advance the truth of Scripture-hiſtory, than the reconciling the Antiquities of the elder Nations to what we find deliver'd of the Plantation of the World from the Poſterity of *Noah*. As to this particular therefore of the firſt Plantation of *Greece*, I ſhall firſt propound the opinion generally embraced among Learned Men, and then ſhew how far it is defective, and what other more true account may be given of it. It is evident from *Moſes*, Gen. 10. 5. that the Poſterity of *Japhet* took poſſeſſion of the Iſles of the *Gentiles*, i. e. according to the *Hebrew* Idiom, not only ſuch as are properly ſo call'd, but all thoſe Countries which lay much upon the Sea, being at any diſtance from *Palæſtine*, eſpecially ſuch as lay between the *Ocean* and *Mediterranean* Sea; and ſo both *Greece* and *Italy* come under the name of the *Iſles of the Gentiles*. Among the Sons of *Japhet* none is conceiv'd ſo probable to have firſt peopled *Greece*, as he whoſe name was preſerv'd among the Inhabitants of *Greece* with very little alteration. And ſo as the *Medes* from *Madai*, the *Aſſyrians* from *Aſſur*, the *Thracians* from *Thiras*, by the like Analogy the *Ionians* from

X. 2.

Javan.

Javan. From which it is obſervable, that altho' among the *Greeks* themſelves, the *Ionians* were but as one diviſion of that People which inhabited *Greece*, yet other Nations comprehended all under the name of *Ionians.* For which we have ſufficient evidence from *Heſychius*, and the Scholiaſt on *Ariſtophanes.* Οἱ βάρβαροι τὰς Ἕλλυνας Ἴωνας λέγουσιν, ſaith *Heſychius*; and more to this purpoſe the Scholiaſt ſpeaks. Πάντας τὰς Ἕλλυνας Ἰάονας οἱ βάρβαροι ἐκάλουν. For Ἰάονες with the Inſertion of the *Æolic Digamma* (which is always done when two Vowels meet) is Ἰάφονες i. e. *Javones*; and *Stephanus Byzantius* tells us, that from Ἰάων comes Ἰὼν, and ſo *Homer*,

Heſych. v. Ἴαννι. Acharnen. Schol. in Ariſtoph.

Stephanus de Urb. v. Ἰών.

Hom. Il. v. Ἔνθα δὲ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Ἰάονες ἑλκεχιτῶνες.

And *Dionyſius Periegetes* reckons up Ἰάων as one of the Rivers of *Arcadia*,

Dionyſ. v. 516. Ἔνθα μέλας ὅθι Κρᾶθις ἵνα ῥέει ὕργος Ἰάων.

And which much confirms this opinion, the *Hebrew* word for *Javan* before the points added by the *Maſorites*, *viz.* יון bears a perfect Analogy with the *Greek* Ἰὼν· and ארץ יון in Scripture is taken for *Greece*; and ſo *Dan.* 8. 21. *Alexander* is call'd מלך יון, which the LXX. render Βασιλεὺς ἑλλήνων· and *Joel* 3. 6. *You have ſold my Sons,* לבני היונים *to the Sons of Javan*, i. e. to the *Greeks*, as it is generally underſtood. But as *Javan* cannot be ſuppos'd to have come into theſe parts without his Family, ſo it is generally preſum'd that there are no obſcure foot-ſteps left of *Javan*'s eldeſt Son, *Eliſha*'s ſeating himſelf in *Greece.* For from him *Joſephus* derives the name Αἰωλεῖς, with whom the *Jeruſalem* Paraphraſt concurs. *Montanus* from thence derives the name *Elis*, from whence he ſuppoſeth the *Greeks* are call'd Ἕλλυνες. *Bochartus* finds the cleareſt remainders of *Eliſha* in *Elis*; the ſame with *Peloponneſus*, one part of which by *Homer* is call'd *Aliſium*; thence *Ezeck.* 27. 7. we read of the *purple and ſcarlet from the Iſſes of* Eliſha, which makes it moſt probable to be that part of *Greece* which lay upon the *Ionian* Sea, where the beſt Purple next to the *Tyrian* was found, as the Learned *Bochartus* hath demonſtrated from ſeveral Authors. This is now the ſubſtance of the generally-receiv'd account concerning the plantation of *Greece* from the Poſterity of *Noah.* Which if it be taken as to that People which did at length poſſeſs *Greece*, I ſee no reaſon to diſapprove it; but if it be extended to the firſt plantation of *Greece*, I ſee as little to embrace it. That we may therefore judg more freely of the firſt Inhabitants of *Greece*, it is requiſite we take an account of it from thoſe who profeſs themſelves moſt vers'd in their own Antiquities, who may in a matter of this nature, which is atteſted by the common conſent of the moſt learned Antiquaries of *Greece*, be the more credited, in that what they thus deliver, may be ſuppos'd to come from an ancient and undoubted Tradition.

Ar. Mont. Phaleg. p. 24.

Bochart. Phaleg. l. 3. cap. 10.

XI. It is evident therefore, from the judgment of the moſt learned and judicious, even of the *Greeks* themſelves, that *Greece* was firſt inhabited by a People by them call'd *Barbarous*, i. e. a People different from them in Language and Manners. So *Ephorus*, whom *Polybius* commends as the beſt Writer of the *Greek Antiquities*, ſaith that *Greece* was inhabited by a barbarous People before the *Hellens* came into it. And *Hecatæus Mileſius* cited by *Strabo* concerning *Peloponneſus*, ὅτι πρὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ᾤκηξ

αὐτὴν

αὐτὼ βάρβαροι, which *Strabo* himself not only believes of *Peloponnesus*, but of all *Greece*, that it was κάλοικία βαρβάρων τὸ παλαιον, *anciently a Plantation of Barbarians*; the same is affirm'd by *Aristotle* writing of the Common-wealth of the *Tegeates* concerning *Arcadia*, that before its being possess'd by the *Arcadians*, it was inhabited by a barbarous People, who because they were expulsed their Country before Moon-rising, the *Arcadians* call'd themselves προσέλληνοι. Whether that be the ground of that vain-glorious boast (of which many reasons are given by learned Men) I here dispute not; it is sufficient that we find the *Grecians* were not the first who peopled any of these several places; which is likewise attested by *Herodotus*, *Thucydides*, and others, whose testimonies we shall afterwards produce. It being then evident that the *Grecians* were not the first who inhabited that Country after from them called *Greece*, it follows to be inquir'd what this barbarous People was, and from whence they came. *Strabo* hath given us in a large Catalogue of the names of many of them, as the *Dryopes*, *Caucones*, *Leleges*, besides the *Aones*, *Tembices*, *Hyantes*, and many others; but these seem not to have been that ancient People, but rather some latter Castlings of the *Carians*, who, as *Thucydides* tells us, did very often make inroads upon the quarters of *Greece*. That People which had the largest spread, and greatest Antiquity, was the *Pelasgi*: thence *Peloponnesus* was anciently called Πελασγία. *Stephanus Byzantius* Πελοποννήσου τρεῖς ἐπωνυμίαι, Ἀπία Πελασγία and Ἄργος· and *Apollodorus* saith, that the *Peloponnesians* were anciently called *Pelasgi*; and *Euripides*,

> Πελασγιώτας ὠνομασμένους τὸ πρίν
> Δαναούς.

And elsewhere,

> Πρῶτον Πελασγοί, Δαναΐδαι τὸ δεύτερον.

Strab. l. 7. V. Scholiast. in Apollon. l. 4. v. 262.

These *Pelasgi* were not only in *Peloponnesus*, but in *Attica* too, as appears by *Strabo*, where he saith the Nation of the *Pelasgi* did inhabit, and by the *Athenians* (that is after their mixture) they were called πελαργοί, *Storks*, ἀπὸ τοῦ πλάνου, for their frequent removals from place to place: And *Pausanias* mentions their being under the *Acronoli* at *Athens*: that they were in *Thessaly*, is evident from *Hesychius*. Πελασγοὶ οἱ Θεσσαλοί κατ' ἔνιον τοῦ βαρβάρου, καὶ γένος ἀπὸ Πελασγοῦ τοῦ Ἀρκάδος γεγόμενον πολυπλάνητον· *Arcadia* seems to have the first or chief place of their residence, for the *Arcadians* who were accounted παλαιότατα ἔθνη τῶν ἑλλήνων, do vindicate the Founder of this Nation, whom they call *Pelasgus*, to themselves, and say he was an αὐτόχθων among them, that is, the first who came into that Country; for all those, whose Original they knew not, they called *Terræ filios*, and *Genuinos terræ*. *Pausanias* rightly conjectures that he was the first Man among them, not as tho' he was alone, but because the Chief Ruler and Commander among them, and that brought them into the Country; but tho' they might fix themselves about *Arcadia*, it is evident they spread farther; for *Menecrates Eleates* in his Book of the Founders of Cities, affirms that all the Sea-coasts of *Greece* called *Ionica*, beginning from *Mycale*, were first inhabited by the *Pelasgi*; nay we find them yet much higher in *Epirus*, who were, as *Strabo* tells us, the first Founders of that famous Oracle of *Dodona*; for

Strab. l. 9.

Pausan. in Arcad.

Strab. l. 13.

Idem, l. 7.

so

ſo *Ephorus* in him ſaith it was Πελασγῶν ἵδρυμα, and that theſe were τῶν περὶ τὴν ἑλλάδα δυναστευόντων ἀρχαιότατοι: Thence the Poet,

Ζεῦ ἄνα Δωδωναῖς Πελασγικέ.

And *Heſiod*,

Δωδώνην φυγόντε Πελασγῶν ἕδρανον ἦεν.

Strabo farther makes it evident, that they were a barbarous People which liv'd about *Dodona*, from the deſcription *Homer* gives of them,

Ἀμφὶ δὲ Σελλοὶ
Σοὶ ναίουσ' ὑποφῆται, ἀνιπτόποδες χαμαιεῦναι.

Philoſtr. in Imag. Which *Philoſtratus* beſt interprets, when he ſaith they were αὐτοσχέδιοί τινες καὶ οὔτε κατεσκευασμένοι τὸν βίον, *ſuch that thought the Gods were beſt pleaſed with their ſimplicity and ſeverity of Life*, and therein far different from the *Grecian* humour. *Suidas* in *Theſſalicis* (cited likewiſe by *Strabo*) ſaith, that the Temple of *Dodona* was remov'd from *Scotuſa* in *Pelaſgia* to *Theſſala*, which is confirm'd by *Herodotus* in *Euterpe*, where he largely ſpeaks of the *Temple* and *Oracle* at *Dodona*. Theſe *Pelaſgi* confin'd not themſelves to *Greece* neither, but were diſpers'd into the neighbour Iſlands, as *Chios*, *Crete*, *Leſbos*, *Lemnos*, *Imbro*, *Samos*, as will appear afterwards; and at laſt came into *Italy*, as is well known, and are thought to be the ſame with the *Tyrrhenians*, and by ſome conceiv'd to be the firſt Founders of *Rome*. We ſee what a large ſpread the *Pelaſgi* had over *Greece*, which was divided after the *Hellens* began to appear, into τὸ πελασγικὸν and τὸ ἑλληνικὸν, as *Herodotus* witneſſeth; and ſo theſe two appear to be a very different People from one another, and not the ſame under different names, as is commonly thought.

XII. Which ſufficiently appears from their Language, which was quite different from one another. So *Herodotus*, Ἦσαν οἱ Πελασγοὶ βάρβαρον γλῶσσαν ἱέντες, *they us'd a barbarous Language*; *i. e.* a Language not underſtood by the *Hellens*; who at firſt had their chief Reſidence in *Theſſaly*, from whence by degrees they came forwards into *Greece*, as *Thucydides* ſhews. For altho' the name of *Hellens* at laſt ſpread it ſelf over all the People of *Greece*, yet it was at firſt peculiar to that part of *Theſſaly* called *Pthiotis*, and thence *Homer* calls them properly *Hellens*, which followed *Achilles* from thence: And it appears by *Homer*, that there was a City there called Ἕλλας, which as *Stephanus de Urbibus* tells us, was there built by Ἕλλης, altho' he will not have him to be *Hellen* the Son of *Deucalion*, but the Son of *Pthius*, wherein he is miſtaken: For *Thucydides* plainly ſhews, that it was from *Hellen* the Son of *Deucalion*, that the name Ἕλληνες came, and this *Hellen* liv'd in *Pthiotis*. But altho' they were firſt in *Pthiotis*, yet they daily increaſing in numbers and power, by degrees they got all *Theſſaly* into their hands, of which one part was called Πελασγιῶτις; afterwards under *Dorus* the Son of *Hellen* they conquer'd *Heſtiæctis*, that part of *Theſſaly* which lies under the Mountains *Oſſa* and *Olympus*; from thence they were beaten back by the *Cadmeans* into *Pindus*, where the *Greeks* were firſt called Μακεδνοὶ, as *Herodotus* tells us; from hence they went into *Dryopis*, and thence into *Peloponneſus*, and there had the name *Dorians*: But before their coming hither, they

had first secured themselves of the *Hellens*, lying between *Thessaly* and *Peloponnesus*, and there they dispossest the *Pelasgi* in all the *Attic* Region; who were now forc'd to submit or to fly; they who submitted, as most of them did, were incorporated into the *Greeks*, and became one People with them, and so by degrees lost that former Language which was peculiar to themselves and wholly distinct from the *Greek* Tongue. That the *Hellens* did thus gradually come into *Peloponnesus*, is evident from the names of People and Places common to *Thessaly* and *Peloponnesus*; which came from hence, that tho' the *Greeks* left the Cities behind them, yet they carried most of the names along with them. Thus the *Achæi*, *Ionians*, and *Æolians*, and *Dorians* in *Peloponnesus* came from those of the same names in *Thessaly*; and so likewise the names of these following Regions and Cities were common to both, as *Ellopia*, *Estiæa*, *Eretria*, and *Oropos*, *Graia*, *Lariſſa*, *Psophis*, *Iton*, *Œchalia*, and very many others. *Salmasius* seems to be of opinion, that the *Pelasgi* never us'd any Language distinct from the *Hellens*; but besides that it is directly contrary to the Testimony of *Herodotus*, the Arguments he produceth for it are very weak. The first is, because the *Pelasgi* that went into *Italy*, did use the *Greek* Tongue, from their calling *Agylla Cære*, from χαῖρε, a word pronounc'd from one on the Walls: And because the *Arcades* us'd only the *Greek* Language in the *Æolian* Dialect, which *Evander* carried with him into *Italy*, and from which most of the old *Roman* Language was deriv'd. But doth not *Herodotus* expressly say, that after the mixture between the *Greeks* and *Pelasgi* these by degrees lost their own proper Language, and made use of the common *Greek* Tongue? Yet afterwards too, it is evident from *Herodotus* in some places, as at *Crotona*, they did use a Language different from the *Greek*. His other Argument is, *That the names of the eldest Persons mention'd were originally* Greek; but this is expressly deny'd by *Strabo*, who makes the contrary, one of his strongest Arguments, that the *Barbarians* did anciently inhabit *Greece*; and instanceth in *Cecrops*, *Codrus*, *Æolus*, *Cothus*, *Drymas*, *Crinanus*. Thus we have abundantly prov'd against the common opinion, that *Greece* was not first peopl'd by the *Hellens*, or the Posterity of *Elisa*, altho' these did afterwards come to the full possession of *Greece*. *Salmas. de Hellen. p.* 315.

XIII. It remains that we shew whence these *Pelasgi* came, and of whose Posterity they were, and what the Language was which was us'd by them. He that gave the name to this People according to the *Grecian* Fables, was one *Pelasgus*, which none will wonder at among them, whose constant custom it was, (partly by reason of their Ignorance of the true account of their Names, and partly by their Pride, that they might not seem ignorant of any thing) when they meet with any Names of People, to find out some Person near it who was the Founder of them. Thus *Attica* from *Actæus*, it being anciently called Ἀκτική, and *Cranae* from *Cranaus*, *Ægialea* from *Ægialeus*, *Mauritania* from *Maurus*, *Scythia* from one *Scythes*, *Galatæa* from *Galates*, and thus in multitudes of other Names. But from the name *Pelasgi*, we may probably find out the true Founder of the People, allowing that variation which is usually caus'd thro' the *Greeks* melting the harsher words of the *Eastern* Languages into a sound fit for their more delicate Palates; as is evident in the comparing the Names of the Prophets in *Hebrew*, with what they are in the *Greek* Version. Thus the *Pelasgi* may with great probability be deriv'd from פלג, *Phaleg*; for which we have the concurrent Testi-

Grot. not. in lib. 1. de jure bel. &c. c. 3. Sal. de Hellen.

mony of two Learned Persons, *Grotius* and *Salmasius*, who are contented to mention it, without bringing much evidence of Reason for it. What they only touch at, we shall endeavour to make out more at large; which we shall do by removing the great presumptions against it, and laying down the probabilities for it. The great presumptions lying against it are; for that the Isles of the Nations fell to the Posterity of *Jepheth*, and that *Phaleg* liv'd with *Eber* in *Chaldæa*. For the first, it must be acknowledg'd that the greatest part of the Countries lying upon the *Ocean* and *Mediterranean*, were in the time when *Moses* wrote so inhabited; not that the Habitations of the Sons of *Noah* had their bounds and limits set them either by GOD or *Noah*, but that the Posterity of *Japhet* did chiefly address themselves to those parts which lay towards *Europe*; but yet not so, as to exclude any of the Posterity of *Sem*, if their necessities for farther room made it necessary for them to seek for Habitations farther abroad. For we can have no reason to think, that because the chief of *Sem*'s Posterity did live together, therefore none of them went farther off, which necessity would put them upon because of their great increase; for we read of *Phaleg* and others, that besides those in direct Line to *Abraham*, (whose Genealogy it was *Moses* his great design to recount) they begat many other Sons and Daughters, which would make it necessary for them, to seek their Habitations farther abroad. And that *Phaleg* and *Ragau* did so, we have the express Testimony of *Epiphanius*, Φαλὲγ καὶ Ῥαγαῦ οἵτινες ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς Εὐρώπης κλίμα γενεύκοτες τῷ τῆς Σκυθίας μέρει καὶ τοῖς αὐτῶν ἔθνεσι προσεκρίθησαν, ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Θήρας ἡλικίας καὶ ἐπέκεινα, ἐξ οὗπερ οἱ Θρᾶκες γεγόνασι. *That from the Age of* Therah *and thence forward*, Phaleg *and* Ragau *diverted towards the clime of* Europe, *to part of* Scythia, *and were joyn'd with those Nations from which the* Thracians *arose*. Several things make this not so improbable as some have imagin'd it to be; for first, it is the constant acknowledgment of all sober Inquirers into the Original of the *Greeks*, that *Greece* was first peopled from *Scythia*; and indeed almost all the Nations in *Europe* have come out of that Country: Besides, there is evidence of it, even in the Grecian Fables; for *Prometheus* (from whom the *Greeks* deriv'd themselves) is fancy'd by them to lie bound in Mount *Caucasus*, which must be suppos'd to be the Country from whence he came. Again, it is evident already that the *Hellens* came not into *Greece* before it was peopled by the *Pelasgi*, and that these had different Language and Customs from one another; now then in all probability, altho' the Posterity of *Elisa* might come first down from *Scythia* into those parts, and seat themselves in *Macedonia* and *Thessaly*, where they had in probability more than room enough at first, and a Country to their desire; they might be willing to permit the Posterity of *Phaleg* to pass on farther; for in those first Plantations we cannot otherwise conceive, but that the last comers must be the farthest goers; unless they had strength enough to drive the former Inhabitants out of their Seats whereof they were already possess'd, as the *Scythians* did afterwards, and so the *Hellens*: So then the Posterity of *Phaleg* being forced to quit their own Country, because of the multitude of Inhabitants, must be supposed to take that course, where in probability they might find an empty Seat fit for them to dwell in; thence they come towards *Europe*; for they saw how the Posterity of *Sem* did spread it self Eastwards already, and *Cham* Southwards, and coming to part of that vast Country of *Scythia*, which was both already taken up, and not so convenient an Habitation for them

Gen. 11. 19, 21.

Epiph. de Scythis l. ep. ad Acu. & Paulum.

them, they draw downwards towards *Thracia*; and there the Posterity of *Thiras*, from whom the *Thracians* came, had already possessed themselves: Passing farther into *Thessaly*, they find that already planted by some of the Posterity of *Elisa*, but as yet but scant and thin of Inhabitants; therefore they disperse themselves up and down through some part of *Epirus*, most part of *Ellas*, and some pass into *Peloponnesus*, where they fix themselves chiefly upon *Arcadia*, and thence spread up and down by degrees towards the Sea-side; for we cannot but think that the Maritime parts were the last peopled, partly for fear of another Deluge, partly for want of conveniency of Navigation, most of their Travels being by Land; and partly when Navigation grew more in use for fear of Pirates, who drove a great Trade upon the Coasts of *Greece* in elder times, as is most evident from *Thucydides* in the beginning of his History. Thus we have a reasonable account given of the *Pelasgi* their first coming into *Greece*, and how by degrees the *Hellens* came to possess their Country, and what a fair pretence the *Arcadians* had to boast of the greatest Antiquity, their Country being probably first peopled by the *Pelasgi* of any part of the whole *Chersonese*, and the Seat of the Leader of the whole Company whom they call *Pelasgus*, and the Scriptures *Phaleg*.

Having thus far clear'd the Antiquities of *Greece* as to the first Planters of it, whom we have evidenc'd to have been the *Pelasgi*, and these deriv'd from *Peleg*, it will be no great difficulty to resolve what Language they brought along with them, which must be suppos'd to be the same with that us'd in the Family from whence *Peleg* or *Phaleg* came, as to the substance of it, altho' it might admit as great variation of Dialect from it as the *Chaldee* or *Syriac* doth. But this I will not only suppose, but offer these probabilities for the proof of it: The first is, the agreement of the ancient *Greek* Language with the *Hebrew* in many of its primitive words; and here we have a most rational and probable account given of it; which is, the *Greeks* mixing with the *Pelasgi*, and both coming to be one People, they must needs retain many of the old words us'd by the *Pelasgi* in their *Greek* Language; which are evidently of an Eastern Extraction, the ground of which cannot with such probability be fetch'd from *Cadmus* and the *Phœnicians*, because it is not so easy admission of a foreign Language after the perfection of their own, unless by long tract of Time, or great numbers over-running the former People, neither of which can be so truly affirm'd of *Cadmus* and his Company; for they were soon driven out of *Greece*, he himself ending his days in *Illyricum*; neither was their Spread so large as that of the *Pelasgi*, who were before possessors of the Country; and it is continually seen, how impossible it is for any Conquerors, as the *Greeks* were, to bring their own Language so into a place, where some of the former People are suffered to live, and not to retain many of their old words among them, and so make the Language mixt of both, as it is in all Nations conquer'd by the *Romans*; the *Roman* not being purely spoken by any, but corrupted with a mixture of the former Language in use among them. The second Argument is, from the different Pronunciation and Dialects in use in the *Greek* Language; of which no account so likely can be given, as the mixture with different Languages. This is most evident in the *Doric* Dialect; for the *Dorians* inhabiting probably where most of the *Pelasgi* had been, their Pronunciation and Dialect comes the nearest to the Eastern of any of the *Greeks:* For in the *Doric* Dialect XIV.

the Πλατειασμὸς or *broad pronunciation*, is most taken notice of: So he in *Theocritus* upbraids the *Dorians*, ὅτι πλατειάσδουσιν ἅπωντα, they speak every thing *very broad*; which answers to the pronunciation of the Eastern Languages; besides, the *Doric* Dialect delights much in adding *a* to the end of words, which besides that it is the Custom of Eastern Tongues, especially the *Syriac*, it doth much widen the Pronunciation. The third Argument is from the remainders of the Eastern Tongues in those places, especially where the *Pelasgi* had been. The *Pelasgi* are much taken notice of for their frequent removes and travelling from one place to another; which I suppose was chiefly after the *Hellens* had conquer'd the Country where they dwelt, then they were forc'd to go seek better
Strabo. l. 5. Habitations abroad: Thence *Strabo* calls the Nations of the *Pelasgi* πολύπλανον καὶ ταχὺ τὸ ἔθνος πρὸς ἐπαναστάσεις· And elsewhere, that they
Id. lib. 12. were πολλαχοῦ τῆς Εὐρώπης τὸ παλαίον πλανώμενοι, they went up and down to a great part of *Europe*: But we may suppose them to have made their first and chief resort to the neighbour Islands to *Greece*; where we shall see
Id. lib. 5. what evidence they left of their Language there. The first Island we meet with them in, is *Crete*: So *Strabo* speaking of them, Καὶ γὰρ τῆς Κρήτης ἔποικοι γεγόνασιν, ὡς φησὶν Ὅμηρος; that a Colony of them liv'd in *Crete*, for which he voucheth *Homer*'s Authority:

Hom. Odyss. τ. 175.

Ἄλλη δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσα μεμιγμένη, ἐν μὲν Ἀχαιοὶ,
Ἐν δ' Ἐτεόκρητες μεγαλήτορες, ἐν δὲ κυδῶνες,
Δωριέες τὲ τριχαΐκες, δῖοί τε Πελασγοί.

It is evident then that the *Pelasgi* were in *Crete*. Now most of the *Cretan* words are of an Eastern extraction, if we believe the Learned *Bo-*
Bochart. de Phœn. Col. l. 1. c. 15. *chartus*, who hath promis'd a Discourse on that subject: Besides *Crete*, we find the *Pelasgi* in *Chios*, καὶ Χῖοι δὲ οἰκιστὰς ἑαυτῶν Πελασγοὺς φασι τοὺς ἐκ Θετταλίας, saith *Strabo*, the Inhabitants of *Chios* say, that the *Pelasgi* of *Thessaly* were their first Inhabitants; and here the forenamed Learned Person hath deriv'd the name *Chios*, the Mountain *Pelinæus*, and the Wine *Arvisium*, all from the Eastern Languages. The next we find
Strabo l. 1. c. 9. them in, is *Lesbos*, καὶ γὰρ τὴν Λεσβὸν Πελασγίαν εἰρήκασι, which from them was called *Pelasgia*, saith *Strabo*, whose name is likewise fetched out of
Bochart. Geor. p. 2. l. 1. c. 12. the East. By *Bochartus* farther, we find them in *Lemnos* and *Imbros*: So *Anticlides* in *Strabo*, πρώτους φησὶ Πελασγοὺς τὰ περὶ Λέμνον καὶ Ἴμβρον κτίσαι; concerning whose names, see *Bochartus* 82. I know that Learned Author makes the *Phœnicians* the Authors of all these Names, from no other ground generally, but because they are of an Eastern derivation; but according to what we have laid down, we may yield to the thing it self, and upon clearer grounds; for of some of these Islands he ingenuously confesseth he can find no evidence of the *Phœnicians* being in
Id. lib. 1. c. 9. them. *Phœnices in his Insulis habitasse nusquam legimus*: But we find it very plain, that in those very Islands the *Pelasgi* inhabited; and whether account then be more probable, let the Reader judge. One thing more I shall insist on, which is the Original of the *Samothracian Mysteries*: That these were as to their Names from the Eastern Languages, is now acknowledg'd by all Learned Men, the *Cabiri* being so evidently deriv'd from כביר, which signifies *strength* and *power*, i. e. the *Dii potes*;
Tertull. de spect. c. 8. so *Cabiri* is explain'd by *Varro* and *Tertullian*, and the particular Names
Bochart. ibid. l. 1. c. 12. of the several *Cabiri*, mention'd by the Scholiast on *Apollonius*, Ἀξιερὸς, Ἀξιόκερσα, Ἀξιόκερσος, and Κάδμιλος are very handsomly explain'd by that

that Learned and Excellent *Bochartus* from the Eastern Languages; only he will needs have them deriv'd from the *Phœnicians*, whereas *Herodotus* expresly tells us that they were from the *Pelasgi*, whose words are these; ὅστις δὲ τὰ Καβείρων ὄργια μεμύηται τὰ Σαμοθρήϊκες ἐπιτελέουσι λαβόντες παρὰ Πελασγῶν· And again, τὴν γὰρ Σαμοθρηΐκην οἴκεον πρότερον Πελασγοὶ οὗτοί τοι παρ' Ἀθηναίοισι συνοίκοι ἐγίνοντο, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτον Σαμοθρήϊκες τὰ ὄργια παραλαμβάνουσι. We see evidently by this, that the *Samothracians* deriv'd their Mysteries from the *Pelasgi*; and without all question they had their names from thence, whence they deriv'd their Mysteries: And to this purpose it is farther observable, that as the old *Hetrurians* were certainly a Colony of the *Pelasgi*, upon their removal out of *Greece*; so *Vossius* observes that the old *Hetruscan* language (*fere a Syris habet cuncta sacrorum nomina*) hath almost all the sacred Appellations from the Eastern tongues. For which purpose it is farther observable, which *Grotius* takes notice of, that the *jus pontificum Romanorum* was taken a great part from the *Hetrusci*, and the *Hetrurians* had it *ab Hebræis* out of the Eastern parts.

Herod. l. 2.

Vossius de Idol. l. 2. c. 57.

Grot. Annot. in Mat. 12. 1.

XV. By all which I cannot conceive but this opinion, notwithstanding its novelty, is advanc'd to as high a degree of probability, as any that stands on the like foundations; and not only so, but it is an excellent clue to direct us to the Labyrinth of Antiquities, and give us a fair account whence the *Eastern* Tongues came to be so much us'd among both the ancient *Greeks* and *Hetrurians*. One thing more this will help us to understand far better than any *salvo* hath been yet us'd for it; which is the affinity spoken of by *Arius* King of *Lacedæmon* in his Letters to *Onias*, between the *Jews* and *Lacedæmonians*: εὑρέθη ἐν γραφῇ περί τε τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν καὶ Ἰουδαίων ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀδελφοί, καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶν ἐκ γένους Ἀβραάμ· which is explain'd by *Josephus* thus: ἐντυχόντες γραφῇ τινι, εὑρομεν ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶεν γένους Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀβραὰμ εἰκειότητος· *They had found in a book that the* Jews *and* Lacedæmonians *were of the same stock, from their mutual relation to* Abraham. *Vossius* thinks the original of this was from those of the posterity of *Anak*, who came into *Greece*, and Peopled *Sparta*, and would seem to have been of the posterity of *Abraham*; or that they were partly of the Posterity of *Abraham* by *Agar* or *Ceturah*, and partly of the *Canaanites*, driven out by *Joshua*: But how unlikely a thing is it (supposing *Sparta* Peopled by the *Canaanites*, which yet is not evident) that they should give out themselves to be of that stock which they had been expell'd their Country by? And for the true posterity of *Abraham* coming thither, as we have no ground for it but the bare assertion, so we have this strong evidence against it, that all that came from *Abraham* were Circumcis'd, as the *Ishmaelites*, *Hagarens*, &c. which we never read of among the *Lacedæmonians*. *H. Grotius* differs not much from the opinion of *Vossius* concerning the ground of this kindred between the *Jews* and *Spartans*: For in his Notes on that place in the *Maccabees*, where it is spoken of, he gives this account of it. The *Dorians*, of whom the *Spartans* were a part, came from the *Pelasgi*; the language of the *Pelasgi* was different from that of the *Greeks*, as appears by *Herodotus* in his *Clio*: ἦσθ' οἱ Πελασγοὶ βάρβαρον γλῶττεν ἱέντες. Now the *Pelasgi* (saith he) are פלגי *dispersi*, a *scatter'd Nation*; thence he supposeth these *Pelasgi* or banish'd People, to have come from the Confines of *Arabia* and *Syria*, in which the posterity of *Abraham* and *Ceturah* had plac'd themselves. But, 1. it is uncertain whether the posterity of *Abraham* by *Ceturah* were plac'd so near *Canaan* or no. I know *Junius*

1 Maccab. 12. 21.

Joseph. Antiq. l. 13. c. 9.

Voss. de Idol. l. 1. c. 13.

endeavours to find the ſeat of all the Sons of *Ceturah* in *Arabia*; but *Mercer* gives ſeveral not improbable reaſons why he conceives them plac'd not in the Eaſt of *Canaan*, but in the Eaſtern parts of the World. 2. We have no evidence at all of any remove of theſe Sons of *Abraham* by *Ceturah* out of the parts of *Arabia*, ſuppoſing them plac'd there; nor any reaſon why they ſhould be baniſh'd thence. 3. That which was the badg of *Abraham*'s poſterity, was never that we read of in uſe among the *Spartans*, which was Circumciſion. Indeed in much later Ages than this we ſpeak of, we read of a People among the *Thracians* who were circumcis'd, whom the *Greeks* themſelves judg'd to be *Jews*. So *Ariſtophanes* brings the *Odomantes* in. Τίς τῶν Ὀδομάντων τὸ πέος ἀποτέθρακεν ἄν· ἀποτέθρακεν (ſaith the Scholiaſt) i. e. ἀνέτιλλον, ἐλεαίνοντο δὲ καὶ ἀπετίλλοντο οἱ Θρᾷκες τὰ αἰδοῖα καὶ ἀποσεσυρμένα εἶχον αὐτά. Whereby it is plain that Circumciſion was in uſe among the *Thracians*; for theſe *Odomantes* were (ſaith the Scholiaſt) a People of *Thrace*. Φασὶ δὲ αὐτοὺς Ἰουδαίους εἶναι. It ſeems it was a Tradition among them that they were *Jews*. If ſo, it ſeems moſt probable that they were ſome of the ten Tribes, who were plac'd about *Colchis*, and the adjacent places: For *Herodotus* in *Euterpe* ſaith, that the *Syrians* that liv'd about the Rivers *Thermodoon* and *Parthenius*, learn'd Circumciſion from the *Colchi*, of whom he ſaith, Μοῦνοι πάντων Κόλχοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ Αἰθίοπες περιτέμνονται ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὰ αἰδοῖα. *Only the* Colchi, *and* Ægyptians, *and* Ethiopians *had originally the cuſtom of Circumciſion.* Or elſe the *Odomantes* might be ſome of the diſpers'd *Jews* in *Armenia*, where *Strabo* mentions a Region call'd *Odomantis*, and ſo they retain'd the name of the place from whence they came, after their removal into *Thrace*. But whatever theſe *Odomantes* were, they were far enough from the *Spartans*, who never were thus ſuſpected of *Judaiſm*, nor laught at for Circumciſion. So that this opinion of *Grotius* on that account ſeems not very probable. *Bochartus*, who hath been ſo happy in many other Conjectures, yet here gives out, unleſs it may depend upon the Teſtimony of *Claudius Iolaus* in *Stephanus Bizantius*, who fabulouſly derives the *Jews* from one *Judæus Sparton*, who went from *Thebes* along with *Bacchus* into the Wars; which *Sparton* they might confound with another *Sparton*, the Son of *Phonoreus*, the Founder of *Sparta*; which yet is rejected as a Fable by *Pauſanias* in *Laconicis*. Surely the *Lacedæmonians* were very ambitious of Kindred with the *Jews*, that would claim it upon ſuch grounds as theſe, eſpecially at ſuch a time when the People of the *Jews* were under diſtreſs, and their Kindred might be like to coſt them ſo dear; and if they had never ſuch a mind to have claim'd Kindred with the *Jews*, they would certainly have done it upon a more plauſible Teſtimony than the Fable of one *Claudius Iolaus*, that had neither Senſe nor Reaſon in it; and yet ſuppoſing his Fable true, it had been nothing to the purpoſe, without the linking another Fable to it, which was ſo groſs, that even the *Greeks* themſelves were aſham'd of it, who were always the moſt daring Forgers of Fables in the World. But let us ſee farther what the Divine (as ſome have lov'd to call him) *Joſ. Scaliger* ſaith to it: All that he ſaith, is only a wonder or two at it: *Quid magis mirum quam Lacedæmonios ab Abraham prognatos eſſe*, &c. and a refutation of an abſurd opinion, that *Œbalus* the Father of *Tyndareus*, and Grandfather of *Caſtor*, *Pollux*, and *Helena*, was the ſame with *Ebal*, mention'd *Gen.* 10. 28. which there can be no reaſon for, ſince *Ebal* was the Son of *Joktan*, and ſo of another Race from *Abraham*; and *Joktan*'s Sons were plac'd Eaſtward, but

Ariſtoph. Acharnen. Act. 1. ſc. 4.

Strabo l. 11.

Bochart. de Phœn. Col. l. 1. c. 22.

Scalig. Canon. Iſag. p. 332.

but chiefly *Œbalus* was within an hundred years before the deſtruction of *Troy*; but *Phaleg* Unkle to *Ebal*, died 664 years before *Œbalus* in *A. M.* 1993. Thus far then we cannot find any plauſible account of this claim of Kindred: but tho' it be an endleſs taſk to make good all the claims of Kindred in the World, eſpecially to Perſons of Power and Authority, yet there being no viſible intereſt or deſign which the *Spartans* could have in ſuch a claim, eſpecially at that time with a Nation generally hated and maligned by Heathen Idolaters, we cannot ſuppoſe but there muſt be ſome at leaſt plauſible ground for ſuch a perſuaſion among them. What if we ſhould conjecture that the *Spartans* might find in the *Greek* Verſion of the *Pentateuch*, which was much ſpread abroad at that time among the Sons of *Iſhmael*, one whoſe name makes the neareſt approach to their *Cadmus*, from whom they ſuppoſe themſelves deriv'd; for the youngeſt of *Iſhmael*'s Sons was call'd *Kedemah*, Gen. 25. 15. which the *Syriac* renders *Kedem*, the very name of *Cadmus* in the Eaſtern Tongues. But this being a light conjecture, I paſs it by, and return to the ſubject of our diſcourſe, which gives a plauſible account of the ground of this Kindred. We have already ſhew'd that the *Pelaſgi* were the firſt who Peopled *Greece*, (ἡ τῶν Ἑλλάδα πᾶς ἐπεπόλασε, is *Strabo*'s expreſſion of that Nation, that it ſpread over all *Greece*) and withal it appears that the chief Seat of the *Pelaſgi* was in *Arcadia*, to which next adjoyns *Laconia*; and therefore in all probability was Peopled by them; and beſides, the *Dorians* ſprang from the *Pelaſgi*, and the *Spartans* were a part of the *Dorians*, as appears already out of *Grotius*; ſo that what Kindred the *Pelaſgi* had, was deriv'd down to the *Spartans*; and we have manifeſted that theſe *Pelaſgi* were from *Phaleg*, and the Scripture tells us that *Phaleg* was the Son of *Eber*, from whom *Abraham* came in a direct and lineal ſucceſſion. And thus the *Jews* coming from *Abraham* and the *Spartans* by the *Pelaſgi* from *Phaleg*, they both came out of the ſame ſtock: For ſo *Joſephus* expreſſeth it, not that the *Lacedæmonians* came from *Abraham*, but that the *Jews* and they were both ἐξ ἑνὸς γένους, *out of the ſame ſtock, and both had relation to* Abraham; the *Jews* as coming in a direct line, the *Spartans* as deriving from *Phaleg*, from whom *Abraham* came. And thus much may now ſuffice to clear the firſt Plantation of *Greece*, and to ſhew how conſonant it is to ſacred Scripture; which I have taken the more pains in, becauſe of the ſerviceableneſs of this diſcourſe to that end, and to ſhew what uſe may be made of this kind of Learning, for vindicating the honor of the Sacred Scriptures.

Gen. 11. 17, 28.

The only thing remaining as to the origin of Nations, is the Peopling of that vaſt Continent of *America*, which I cannot think we have yet ſufficient information, either concerning the paſſages thither, eſpecially Eaſt and North, or concerning any Records the *Indians* have among themſelves abſolutely to determin any thing in it. It ſeems moſt probable that the ſeveral parts of it were Peopled at ſeveral times, and from ſeveral parts, eſpecially North and Eaſt; but to go about abſolutely to determin from what Nation, in what Age, by what means they were firſt Peopled, were a piece of as great confidence as ignorance, till we have more certain diſcoveries of it. I chuſe therefore rather to refer the Reader to the bandyings of this Controverſy in the many Writers about it, than to undertake any thing as to the deciſion of it. Only in the general it appears from the remaining Tradition of the Flood, and many Rites and Cuſtoms us'd among them, that they had the ſame

V. Grot. Joh. de Laet. Horn. de Orig. Gent. American.

original

V. Manasse Ben. Israel. Spes Israel. Et Spizzel. de Israel. American.

original with us, and that there can be no Argument brought against it from themselves, since some Authors tell us that the eldest Accounts and Memoirs they have, do not exceed 800 years backward; and therefore their Testimony can be of no validity in a matter of so great Antiquity, as the origin of Nations is.

CHAP. V.

Of the Origin of the Heathen Mythology.

I. *That there were some remainders of the ancient History of the World preserv'd in the several Nations after the dispersion.* II. *How it came to be corrupted: by decay of Knowledg, increase of Idolatry, confusion of Languages.* III. *An inquiry into the cause of that. Difficulties against the common opinion that languages were confounded at* Babel. IV. *Those difficulties clear'd.* V. *Of the fabulousness of Poets. The particular ways whereby the Heathen Mythology arose. Attributing the general History of the World to their own Nation. The corruption of* Hebraisms. *Alteration of names. Ambiguity of Sense in the Oriental languages.* VI. *Attributing the actions of many to one person, as in* Jupiter, Bacchus, *&c.* VII. *The remainders of Scripture-history among the Heathens. The names of* God, Chaos, *formation of Man among the* Phœnicians. *Of* Adam *among the* Germans, Ægyptians, Cilicians. Adam *under* Saturn. Cain *among the* Phœnicians. Tubal-Cain *and* Jubal *under* Vulcan *and* Apollo. Naamah *under* Minerva. VIII. Noah *under* Saturn, Janus, Prometheus *and* Bacchus. IX. Noah's *three Sons under* Jupiter, Neptune *and* Pluto. Canaan *under* Mercury, Nimrod *under* Bacchus, Magog *under* Prometheus. *Of* Abraham *and* Isaac *among the* Phœnicians. X. Jacob's *service under* Apollo's. *The* βαιτύλια *from* Bethel. Joseph *under* Apis. Moses *under* Bacchus. Joshua *under* Hercules. Balaam *under the old* Silenus.

1. THE main particulars contain'd in the Scriptures concerning the History of ancient Times being thus far clear'd, there remains only that Evidence which there is of the truth of the Historical part of those eldest times, in those foot-steps of it which are contain'd in the Heathen Mythology. For we cannot conceive, that since we have manifested that all Mankind did come from the Posterity of *Noah*, that all those passages which concern'd the History of the World, should be presently obliterated and extinguished among them, but some kind of

Tradition

Tradition would be preſerv'd, altho' by degrees it would be ſo much alter'd for want of certain Records to preſerve it in, that it would be a hard matter to diſcover its original, without an exact comparing it with the true Hiſtory it ſelf from whence it was firſt taken. For it far'd with this Tradition of the firſt Ages of the World, as with a Perſon who hath a long time travell'd in foreign Parts, who by the variety of Climes and Countries may be ſo far alter'd from what he was, that his own Relations may not know him upon his return, but only by ſome certain Marks which he hath in his Body, by which they are aſſur'd, that however his Complexion and Viſage may be alter'd, yet the Perſon is the ſame ſtill. Thus it was in this original Tradition of the World; thro' its continual paſſing from one Age to another, and the various humours, tempers, and deſigns of Men, it receiv'd ſtrange diſguiſes and alterations, as to its outward favour and complexion; but yet there are ſome ſuch certain Marks remaining on it, by which we find out its true original. Two things then will be the main ſubject of our inquiry here. 1. *By what means the original Tradition came to be alter'd and corrupted.* 2. *By what marks we may diſcern its true original,* or what Evidences we have of the remainders of Scripture-hiſtory in the Heathen Mythology.

II. 1. Concerning the means whereby the Tradition by degrees came to be corrupted. There may be ſome more general, and others more particular. The general cauſes of it were,

1. The gradual decay of Knowledg and increaſe of Barbariſm in the World, occaſion'd by the want of certain Records to preſerve the ancient Hiſtory of the World in: Which we at large diſcours'd of in our entrance on this ſubject. Now in the decay of Knowledg, there muſt needs follow a ſudden and ſtrange alteration of the Memory of former times, which hath then nothing to preſerve it, but the moſt uncertain report of Fame, which alters and diſguiſeth things according to the Humours, and Inclinations, and Judgments of thoſe whoſe hands it paſſeth thro'. *Book* 1. *c.* 1. *ſect.* 16.

2. The gradual increaſe of Idolatry in the World: Which began ſoon after the diſperſion of Nations, and in whoſe Age, we cannot at ſo great a diſtance, and in ſo great obſcurity, preciſely determine; but as ſoon as Idolatry came in, all the ancient Tradition was made ſubſervient in order to that end; and thoſe Perſons whoſe Memories were preſerv'd in ſeveral Nations, by degrees came to be worſhipped under diverſities of Names; and ſuch things were annexed to the former Traditions as would tend moſt to advance the greateſt Superſtition in the World.

3. The Confuſion of Languages at *Babel,* was one great reaſon of corrupting the ancient Tradition of the World. For in ſo great variety (as ſuddenly happen'd) of Languages in the World, it cannot be conceiv'd but ſuch things which might be preſerv'd in ſome uniform manner, had all Nations us'd the ſame Language, would through the diverſity of Idioms and Properties of ſeveral Tongues be ſtrangely alter'd and diſguis'd, as will appear afterwards. This alteration of Languages in the World upon the confuſion of Tongues at *Babel,* brought as great a confuſion into the original Tradition, as it did among thoſe who were the deſigners of that work.

III. And becauſe this ſubject of the original and cauſe of this diverſity of Languages among Men, doth both tend to explain the preſent ſubject,

and to clear the truth of Scripture-history, I shall a little farther inquire into it. Chiefly on this account, because it is pretended that such a confusion is needless which is deliver'd in Scripture, for the producing such diversities of Languages, which would arise thro' mere length of time, and the varieties of Climes and Customs in the World. But if we only speak concerning the sense of *Moses* about it, the inquiry is of greater difficulty than at first view it seems to be. For it is pretended, that *Moses* no where speaks of a diversity of Languages, as we understand it, but only of a confusion of their Speech who were at *Babel*, which might well be, altho' they all us'd the same Language; that is, there might be a confusion rais'd in their Minds, that they could not understand one another; their Notions of things being disturb'd, so that tho' they heard one word, they had different apprehensions of it; some thinking it signify'd one thing, and some another. As *Julius Scaliger* tells us, that the *Jews* he had convers'd with, did not understand by it a multiplication of Tongues; but only by that confusion their former Notions of things, by the same words, were alter'd. As if one call'd for אבו a Stone, one by that word understands Lime, another Water, another Sand, *&c.* this must needs produce a strange confusion among them, and enough to make them desist from their work. But supposing no such division of Languages there, yet after their dispersion, which might be caus'd by the former confusion, by the different Laws, Rites, and Customs, Commerce, and Trading, and tract of Time, there would have risen a division of their several Tongues. But if there were such a division of Tongues miraculously caus'd there (that as it is commonly said, all those who were of the same Language, went together in their several Companies) whence comes it to pass, that in their dispersion we read of several Families dispersed, which used the same Language after their dispersion; as all the Sons of *Canaan*, mentioned *Gen.* 10. 15, 16, 17, 18. used the *Canaanitish* Tongue: In *Greece*, *Javan* and *Elisa* had the same Language: In *Ægypt*, *Misraim* and *Pathrusim*: In *Arabia* the Sons of *Joktan* and *Chus*: In *Chaldæa*, *Aram* and *Uz*, the Inhabitants of *Syria*, *Mash* of *Mesopotamia*, *Nimrod* of *Babylon*, *Assur* of *Assyria*: Whence comes it to pass if their several Tongues were the cause of their dispersion, that these several Heads of Families should use the same Tongue? Another reason against the common opinion, is this, which seems to have a great deal of force in it. If Tongues were divided at *Babel* as it is imagin'd; whence was it, that the nearer any Nation lay to those who had the primitive Language the *Hebrew*, they did participate more of that Tongue than those who were more remote, as is plain in the *Chaldeans*, *Canaanites*, *Greeks*, and others? Whereas if their Language were divided at *Babel*, they would have retain'd their own Languages as well as others. This very Argument prevail'd so far with the Learned *Is. Casaubon*, as appears by his *Adversaria* on this subject (publish'd by the Learned Doctor his Son) as to make him leave the common opinion, and to conclude the several Tongues to be only some variations from the *Hebrew*, but yet so as many new words were invented too. Hence he observes, that the *Asiatic Greeks* came nearer to the *Hebrew* than the *European*. And if this opinion hold true, it is the best foundation for deriving other Languages from the *Hebrew*; a thing attempted by the same Learned Person, as you may see in the Book fore-cited, and endeavour'd by *Guichardus*, *Avenarius*, and others. Thus we see there is no agreement in Mens minds concerning the division of Tongues at *Babel*.

V. Mer. Casaub. de 4 linguis p. 3, &c.

Scal. Exercit. in Cardan. 259. sect. 1.

Casaub. Diatrib. de L. Heb. p. 17, 18.

P. 47.

But

But having ſet down this Opinion with its Reaſons, I ſhall not ſo leave the receiv'd Opinion, but ſhall firſt ſee what may be ſaid for that, and leave the judgment concerning the probability of either to the underſtanding Reader. And it ſeems to be grounded on theſe Reaſons. 1. That had it been left to Mens own choice, there cannot be a ſufficient reaſon aſſign'd of Languages in the World. For there being one Language originally in the World, whereby Men did repreſent their conceptions to one another; we cannot imagine that Men ſhould of themſelves introduce ſo great an alteration, as whereby to take off that neceſſary ſociety and converſe with each other, which even Nature it ſelf did put Men upon. Hence *Calvin*, and others conclude, That *prodigii loco habenda eſt linguarum diverſitas*; becauſe there having been that freedom of converſe among Men, it is not to be ſuppoſed they ſhould of themſelves cut it off to their mutual diſadvantage. But to this it is ſaid, *That the long tract of Time and diverſity of Cuſtoms might alter the Language.* I grant it much, but not wholly; and they would only therein differ in their Languages, wherein their Cuſtoms differ'd: So that there would remain ſtill ſuch an agreement as whereby they might underſtand each other; which it will be hard to find in many of the eldeſt Languages. As for the length of Time, tho' that doth alter much in reference to Words and Phraſes, in which that of *Horace* holds true, *Multa renaſcentur quæ jam cecidêre, &c.* yet it will be more difficult to find where mere length of Time hath brought a whole Language out of uſe, and another in the room of it. But that which I think deſerves well to be conſider'd, is this, that the greateſt alteration of Languages in the World hath riſen from Colonies of Nations that us'd another Language; and ſo by the mixture of both together the Language might be much alter'd: As the *Hebrew* by the *Chaldees* in *Babylon*; the *Spaniſh*, *Italian* and others by the *Latin*, as *Breerwood* ſhews, our own by the *Normans* and others. So that were there not a diverſity of Languages ſuppos'd, this interfering of People would bring no conſiderable alteration along with it, no more than a Colony from *New-England* would alter our Language here. And as for another cauſe aſſign'd of the change of Languages, the difference of Climates, which *Bodin* gives as the reaſon why the *Northern* People uſe Conſonants and Aſpirates ſo much, eſpecially the *Saxons*, and thoſe that live by the *Baltic* Sea who pronounce thus, *Per theum ferum pibimus penum finum.* And ſo *R. D. Kimchi* obſerves of the *Ephraimites*, Judg. 12. 6. that it was the Air that was the cauſe of their liſping, and calling it *Sibboleth*, as he there obſerves the Men of *Sarphath*, that is, the *French*, that they could not pronounce *Schin*, but pronounc'd it like *Thau Raphe.* But by theſe examples we ſee, that this would cauſe only an alteration as to ſome Letters and Syllables, and rather as to the Pronunciation, than any variety of the Language. So that we ſee that, ſetting aſide the confuſion of Languages at *Babel*, there can be no reaſon ſufficient aſſign'd for the variety of Languages in the World. 2. Tho' it be granted, that a confuſion in their Minds without diſtinct Languages, were enough to make them deſiſt from their work, yet the Context in that place, *Gen.* 11. doth infer a diverſity of Tongues, as will appear from the antecedents and conſequents; as from the firſt Verſe, where it is not conceivable why it ſhould be there taken notice of as ſuch a remarkable circumſtance, that then they had but one Language before they ſet upon this work, if there was not a diverſity of Tongues cauſed by the work they

IV.

Calvin. Annot. in Gen. 11. 1, 2.

Breerwood's Inquiries, c. 5, 6.

Bodin Method. Hiſt. c. 9.

Mayer. Proæm. Chaldaiſm. c. 1.

went about; but especially *ver.* 6. where God takes such notice of this very thing, that they had but one Language, wherein they were so confident to carry on their work: Therefore, *ver.* 7. when he would destroy their work by confounding their Language, it must be by multiplying that Language into many more; for it must be taken in opposition to what is said in the other Verse. And what is there added, *their not understanding one anothers speech*, seems to refer not to their inward Conceptions, as tho' they did not understand one anothers Minds, but to the outward expressions, as שבח doth apparently relate to them: Farther in *ver.* 8. this is set down as the cause of their dispersion, which had the Tongue been the same afterwards as it was before, could have been no reason for it. Again, some argue from the name *Babel* given to the place, from בלל, which signifies to *confound* and mingle things of several kinds together. So us'd *Judg.* 19. 21. *Esay* 30. 24. *Job* 6. 5. &c. thence the name בבל for בלבל the middle ל left out, as in *Golgotha* for *Golgoltha*, *Kigultha* for *Kilkaltha*, and others of a like nature. Besides, there seems to be somewhat in what is said, *That the Families were divided according to their tongues*, Gen. 10. 5, 20, 31. which doth at least imply a diversity of Tongues among them, the cause of which must be assigned by them who will not allow of the confusion and division of Languages at *Babel*. Farther, this seems most agreeable to God's end in making of them thus leave off their work, that there might be not only a present judgment upon them, but that which might remain to Posterity as a note of the folly of their Ancestors. Those who recede from the common opinion, lest they should give advantage to Infidels by attributing that to a Miracle, which might be done without, seem to be more wary than wise in it. For besides that, it is certain that Miracles may be in those things which might be effected otherwise by natural Causes, when they are produced without the help of those Causes, and in a space of time impossible to nature; and that it hath not been as yet prov'd, how such diversity of Tongues as is in the World would have been effected without such a Miracle; it must be granted by them that there was a Miracle in it; and what greater difficulty there should be in the variety of Languages, than in the signification of the same words, I understand not. But I see no necessity of asserting, that every one of the Families had a distinct Language; and the common opinion of 70 or 72, as the Gr. Families and as many Languages, is now taken for a groundless fancy by Learned Men: As is easily prov'd from the dividing Father and Children, whose Families could not certainly be without them: and some suppos'd to be unborn then, as *Joktan*'s 13 Children; especially if we say, as many do, that the confusion was at the birth of *Phaleg*, and *Joktan* was his younger Brother, as the *Jews* generally do. To the last Objection it may be reply'd, That the Agreement of Languages in some radical words, doth not infer the derivation of the one from the other, as is plain in the *Persian* and *German*, in which Learned Men have observ'd so many words alike. And so by *Busbequius*, of the Inhabitants about *Tauric Chersonese*; and so in most of our modern Tongues there may be some words alike, without any such dependence or derivation. Again, tho' it be granted that the Languages of them who were at *Babel* were confounded, yet it is not necessary we should say that all *Noah*'s Posterity were there. It is thought by some, that they were chiefly *Cham* and his Company; if so, then *Sem* and his Posterity might retain the Lan-

Bochart. Geog. l. 1. c. 15. *Buxt. diatr. sect. 54.* *Ibid. sect. 68.* *Lipf. cent. 3. ep. 44.* *Busbeq. ep. 24.* *Mayer. Philol. sacr. p. 2. c. 6.*

guage

guage they had before, only with ſome variations. But this is very uncertain, unleſs we take it for *Heber* and *Phaleg*, from whoſe vicinity other bordering Nations might make uſe of many of their primitive words: And for the *Greeks*, it will be granted, that many of their words, eſpecially the old *Bœotic*, had affinity with the *Hebrew*; but it was from the *Pelaſgi* at firſt, and *Cadmus* the *Phœnician* afterwards: The old *Canaanitiſh* Language being, if not the pure *Hebrew*, yet a dialect of that Tongue, as is prov'd by many Learned Men. But however theſe things be, it is not neceſſary to ſay that all Mother Tongues ſo call'd, were then exiſtent at that confuſion; but the preſent Curſe did divide their Languages who were there, and that all diviſion of Languages ſince, is to be look'd upon as the effect of that Curſe.

It being thus manifeſted what a ſtrange confuſion of Languages was caus'd in the World, we may thereby eaſily underſtand how the ancient Tradition came to be corrupted and alter'd in the World. V. 4.

Another reaſon of the alteration of the ancient Traditions, was the fabulouſneſs of the Poets; for theſe made it their deſign to diſguiſe all their ancient Stories under Fables, in which they were ſo loſt, that they could never recover them afterwards. For the elder Poets of *Greece* being Men of greater learning than generally the People were of, and being converſant in *Ægypt* and other parts, did bring in new reports of the ancient times which they receiv'd from the Nations they went to; and by mixing their own Traditions and others together, and by ſuiting what was remaining of the ancient Tradition to theſe, they muſt needs make a ſtrange confuſion of things together, and leave them much more obſcure and fabulous than they found them. And herein all their cunning and ſubtilty lay, in putting a new face on whatever they borrow'd from other Nations, and making them appear among themſelves in a *Greek* Habit, that the former owners of thoſe Traditions could ſcarce challenge them as theirs under ſo ſtrange a *Metamorphoſis*. For thoſe things which were moſt plain and hiſtorical in the Fountains whence they deriv'd them, they did ſo περιβάλλειν, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſpeaks, (or as *Origen*, περιπλάσαντες ἀνέπλασε) wrapt them up under ſo great *Mythology*, that the original Truths can hardly be diſcerned, becauſe of that multitude of prodigious Fables, with which they have inlaid them. But as great as their Artifice was in the doing this, we may yet diſcern apparently many of thoſe particular courſes which were taken by them to diſguiſe and alter the primitive Tradition. *Clemens Strom. 6. c. Orig. contr. Celſ. l. 4.*

1. Attributing what was done by the great Anceſtors of Mankind to ſome Perſons of their own Nations. Thus the *Theſſalians* make *Deucalion* to be the Perſon who eſcap'd the Flood, and from whom the World was peopled after it. And whoever compares the relation of the Flood of *Deucalion* in *Apollodorus* with that in the Scripture, might eaſily render *Apollodorus* his *Greek* in the Language of the Scriptures, only changing *Greece* into the whole Earth, and *Deucalion* into *Noah*, *Parnaſſus* into *Ararat*, and *Jupiter* into *Jehovah*. On the ſame account the *Athenians* attribute the Flood to *Ogyges*, not that the Flood of *Ogyges* and *Deucalion* were particular and diſtinct Deluges, which many have taken a great deal of needleſs pains to place in their ſeveral Ages: But as *Deucalion* was of the eldeſt memory in *Theſſaly*, ſo was *Ogyges* at *Athens*, and ſo the Flood as being a matter of remoteſt Antiquity, was on the ſame account in both places attributed to both theſe. Becauſe as Mankind was ſuppos'd to begin again after the Flood, ſo they had among them *Apollod. biblioth. l. 1. p. 19.*

them no memory extant of any elder than these two, from whom on that account they suppos'd Mankind deriv'd. And on the same reason it may be suppos'd that the *Assyrians* attribute the Flood to *Xisuthrus*, whom they suppos'd to be a King of *Assyria*; but the circumstances of the Story as deliver'd by *Alexander Polyhistor*, and *Abydenus*, are such as make it clear to be only a remainder of the universal Flood which happened in the time of *Noah*. So the *Thessalians* make *Prometheus* to be the *Protoplast*; the *Peloponnesians Phoroneus*, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* tells us, whom *Phoronides* the Poet calls πατέρα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, *The Father of Mankind*. This may be now the first way of corrupting the ancient Tradition, by supposing all that was convey'd by it to have been acted among themselves; which may be imputed partly to their Ignorance of the state of their ancient times, and partly to their Pride, lest they should seem to be behind others in matters of Antiquity.

Apud Cyr. c. Julian. lib. 21.

Clemens Strom. l. 1.

2. Another fountain of *Heathen Mythology*, was the taking the *Idiom* of the Oriental Languages in a proper Sense. For whether we suppose the ancient Traditions were convey'd to them in the ancient *Hebrew* by the *Pelasgi*, or were deliver'd to them by the *Phœnicians*, or were fetch'd out of the Scriptures themselves (as some suppose, tho' improbably, of *Homer* and some ancient Poets) yet all these several ways agreeing in this, That the Traditions were Oriental, we thereby understand how much of their *Mythology* came by taking the *Hebrew* in a proper and literal sense without attending to the *Idiom* of the Tongue. From hence *Bochartus* hath ingeniously fetch'd many Heathen Fables. Thus when *Noah* is said to be איש האדמה *Gen.* 9. 20. which in the *Idiom* of the *Hebrew* only signifies a *husbandman*, they took it in a proper sense for ὁ ἀνὴρ τῆς γῆς, and thence *Saturn* who was the same with *Noah* (as will appear afterwards) is made by *Mythologists* the husband of *Rhea*, which was the same with the *Earth*. So the Gyants making war against Heaven, was only a Poetical adumbration of the design at the building of *Babel*, whose top in the Scripture is said to reach בשמים, which in the *Hebrew* signifies only a *great height*; but to aggrandize the Story, was taken in the literal Interpretation, that they attempted *Heaven*. So when they are said to fight against the Gods, *Bochartus* thinks it might be taken from that phrase of *Nimrod*, that he was a *mighty hunter*, לפני יהוה *before the Lord* we render it, but it sometimes signifies *against the Lord*. So what *Abydenus* saith of the Gyants, that they were ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀνάχυσις, *those that came out of the earth*, is suppos'd to be taken from that phrase, *Gen.* 10. 11. מן הארץ יצא, *è terra ipsa exiit*. But far more likely and probable is that which Learned Men are generally agreed in concerning *Bacchus* his being born of *Jupiter*'s *Thigh*, which is only an Expression of that *Hebraism* ירכו יצאי, wherein *coming out of the thigh* is a phrase for ordinary Procreation.

Gen. 11. 4.

Ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. 9.

Gen. 46. 26.

3. A third way observable, is, the alteration of the Names in the ancient Tradition, and putting Names of like importance to them in their own Language. Thus *Jupiter* who was the same with *Cham*, was called Ζεὺς θερμὸς τὴν ζέσιν, as חם, from חמם *fervere, incalescere*. Ἄμμωνα γὰρ Αἰγύπτιοι καλέσσι τὸν Δία, saith *Herodotus*; him whom the *Greeks* call Ζεύς, the *Ægyptians* call *Cham*. So *Japheth*, whose memory was preserv'd under *Neptune*, to whose portion the Islands in the Sea fell, was called by the *Greeks* Ποσειδῶν, which comes saith *Bochartus*) from the *Punic* בשיטן, which signifies *large* and *broad*, which is the very importance of the *Hebrew* יפת; thence in allusion to the Name, it is said, *Gen.* 9. 27.

Bochart. Phaleg. l. 1. c. 1.

יפת

אלהים ליפת יפת *God shall enlarge Japhet.* Thence the *Epithets* of *Neptune* are Εὐρύστερνος, Εὐρύοπα, Εὐρυχρείων, all equally alluding to the Name *Japhet.* So Ἀπόλλων, in the *Greek* is of the same importance with the *Heb.* שר, *Dæmon*, from שרר *to destroy.* Thence we read, *Deut.* 32. 17. *they sacrificed* לשדים, *to Devils. Canaan* in the *Hebrew* signifies a Merchant; thence *Mercury*, under whom the memory of *Canaan* the Son of *Cham* was preserv'd is deriv'd, by many from מכר, *to sell. Ceres* which was the Inventress of *Agriculture*, from גרש which imports *Bread-corn.* These and many others are produc'd by *Vossius*, *Heinsius*, *Bochartus* and other Learned Men, which I insist not on, because my design is only *digitos ad fontes intendere*, and to make these handsom and probable conjectures, argumentative to our purpose, and to bind up those loose and scattering observations into some order and method, in which they have not yet appear'd, nor been improv'd to that end which I make use of them for.

When the Oriental phrases were ambiguous and equivocal, they omitted that sense which was plain and obvious, and took that which was more strange and fabulous. From hence the Learned *Bochartus* hath fetch'd the Fable of the *Golden Fleece*, which was nothing else but robbing the Treasury of the King of *Colchis*; but it was disguis'd under the name of the *Golden Fleece*, because the *Syriac* word גוא, signifies both a *Fleece* and a *Treasury.* So the *Bulls* and *Dragons* that kept it, were nothing but the *Walls* and *Brazen-gates*; for שור, signifies both a *Bull* and a *Wall*, and נשח *Brass*, and a *Dragon.* And so the Fable of the *Brass-Bull* in the Mountain of *Tabyrus* which foretold Calamities, arose from the Equivocation of the *Phœnician* or *Hebrew* words אלוף מנחש, which signify either *Doctor*, *Augur*, or *Bos ex æra*, a *Foreteller* of *events* or a *Brazen-Bull.* From the like Ambiguity of the word אלסיא arose the Fable of *Jupiter* stealing *Europa* in the form of a *Bull*, because the word either signifies a *Ship* in which he convey'd her away, or a *Bull*; or it may be the Ship had Σῆμον *bovis*, as the Ship St. *Paul* sailed in had *Castor* and *Pollux*, it being usual to call their Ships by the names of the Signs they carry'd. From the like Equivocation in the *Phœnician* Language doth *Bochartus* fetch many other Heathen Fables, in his Excellent Piece *De Phœnicum Coloniis*, as particularly that of *Arethusa* coming from *Alpheus*, which was from אלפי a *Ship*, because it was not far from an *Excellent Haven.* And so he makes the *Chimæra* to be no more than a mere *ens rationis*; for he takes the *Chimæra* which *Bellerophon* conquered, to be only the People of *Solymi* under the three Generals, *Aryus*, *Trosibis*, and *Arsalus*; ארי that signifies a *Lion*; *Trosibis* was ראש חויא *the head of a Serpent: Arsalus* was אור ויל a *young Kid*, and so the *Chimæra* consisted of *the form of a Lion*, *a Goat*, *and a Serpent.* Thus we see how easy a matter it was to advance the *Heathen Mythology* from the Equivocation of the Oriental Languages, in which their Traditions were convey'd to them.

4. *Bochart. Canaan. l. 1. cap. 28.* *Ibid. l. 1. c. 6.*

But yet a more prolific Principle of *Mythology* was by attributing the Actions of several Persons to one who was the first or the chief of them. Thus it was in the Stories of *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, *Mars*, *Mercury*, *Minerva*, *Juno*, *Bacchus* and *Hercules*, which were a collection of the Actions done by a multitude of Persons, which were all attributed to one Person. So *Vossius* tells us before the time of the *Trojan* Wars, most of their Kings, who were renowned and powerful, were called *Joves.*

VI. 5. *Voss. de Idol. l. 1.*

Now

Now when the Actions of all these were attributed to one *Jupiter* of *Creet*, they must needs swell his Story up with abundance of Fables. *Vossius* hath taken a great deal of pains to digest in an Historical manner the Stories of the several *Jupiters*, whereof he reckons two *Argives*, a third the Father of *Hercules*, a fourth a King of *Phrygia*, and two more of *Creet*; to one of which, without any Distinction, the Actions of all the rest were ascribed, and who was worshipped under the name of *Jupiter*. And so besides the ancient *Neptune*, who was the same with *Japhet*, they sometimes understood any Insular Prince, or one that had great power at Sea; but besides these, there were two Famous *Neptunes* among the *Greeks*, the one of *Athens*, the other the Builder of the Walls of *Troy*: Now the Stories of all these being mixed together, must needs make a strange confusion. So for *Mars*, besides that ancient one they had by the Oriental Tradition, they had a *Spartan*, *Thracian*, and *Arcadian Mars*. What abundance of *Mercuries* are we told of by * *Tully*? and of no less than five *Minervas*? Every angry, scornful, jealous Queen would fill up the Fables of *Juno*, who was equally claim'd by the *Argives* and *Samians*. What contests were there between the *Greeks* and *Ægyptians*, concerning the Country of *Bacchus*, or *Liber Pater*, whose Story was made up of many patches of the Oriental Story, as will appear afterwards. The same may be said of *Hercules*. Now what a strange way was this to increase the number of Fables? when they had one whose memory was anciently preserved among them, they attributed the Actions of all such to him, who came near him in that which his Memory was most remarkable for: And in those things which they did retain of the Eastern Tradition, it was an usual thing to confound Persons Places and Actions together. So the Story of *Enoch* and *Methuselah* is joined together by *Stephanus de Urbibus*, under the Name of Ἄννακ, who is there said to live above 300 years (which agrees with *Enoch* as the Name doth) and that at his death the World should be destroy'd by a Flood; which agrees with *Methuselah*. So *Abraham* by *Orpheus* is called Μονογλώς, which belongs to *Isaac* his Son; so the Actions of *Nimrod*, *Ninus* and *Cham*, are confounded together in their *Mythology*. By these several ways now we understand how the Original Tradition was by degrees corrupted and altered in the Heathen *Mythology*.

* *Cicero l. 3. de Nat. Deor.*

Steph. V. Ἄννακ

I come now to the footsteps of Scripture-history, which notwithstanding these corruptions, may be discern'd in the Heathen *Mythology*, which I shall methodically inquire after according to the series of Scripture-history. That the Names given to GOD in Scripture were preserv'd among the *Phœnicians*, appears sufficiently by the remainders of the *Phœnician Theology*, translated by *Philo Byblius* out of *Sanchoniathon*; wherein we read of the God Ἰάω, which hath the same Letters with יהוה, besides which there we meet with Ἐλιοῦν, the same with עליון, *The most High*, and Ἰλος, which is אל *The strong* GOD; *Beelsamen*, which is, שמין בעל *The God of Heaven*: and Ἐλωείμ, the very Name of GOD us'd in the beginning of *Genesis* so often. Besides in those Fragments we have express mention of the *Chaos*, and the *Evening* following it, or *the Darkness on the face of the Deep*; the *Creation of Angels* under the Ζοφασημίν ציפה שמים those *Beings* which contemplate the Heavens: and the *Creation of Mankind*, Ἐκ τῆ κόλπω ἀνέμω, i. e. קול פי יה, saith *Bochartus*, *The voice of the mouth of* GOD, which is by GOD's Word and Inspiration, when it is express'd that GOD said, *Let us make Man*, and that

I. Scaliger. Not. in Frag. Græc. Selden. de Diis Syr. Bochart. Cana. l. 2. c. 2.

that he *breathed into him the breath of life.* After we read of γήϊνος and αὐτόχθων, which properly agree to *Adam*, who was made out of the *Earth.* *Vossius* conceives that the memory of *Adam* was preserv'd among the old *Germans*, of whom *Tacitus* speaks, *Celebrant antiquis carminibus Tuistonem Deum terra editum, & filium Mannum, originem gentis, conditoresque.* Either by *Tuisto Adam* is understood, who was form'd of the Earth, and by *Mannus*, *Noah:* or by *Tuisto* God may be understood, and by *Mannus*, *Adam*; to which conjecture may be added further that the same Author reports that some of the *Germans* sacrificed to *Isis*, which *Vossius* likewise conceives to be a remainder of the *Hebrew Ischa.* And so among the *Ægyptians* it is with like probability conceiv'd that *Adam* and *Ischa* were preserv'd under *Osiris* and *Isis*, as they were historically taken. In *Cilicia*, the City *Adana* is thought to have some remainder of the Name of *Adam*; for the *Greeks* had no termination in *M*, therefore for *Adam* they pronounced it *Adan*, and that from Ἀδανὸς, and so the City *Adana:* Now that Ἀδανὸς, by *Stephanus de Urbibus*, is said to be the *Son of Heaven and Earth.* Ἔστι δὲ ὁ Ἀδανὸς γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ παῖς. This *Adanus*, he tells us, was otherwise called Κρόνος, or *Saturn*, under whom the *Greeks* preserv'd the memory of *Adam*; for *Diodorus*, *Thallus*, *Cassius*, *Severus*, and *Cornelius Nepos*, do all (as *Tertullian* saith) confess *Saturn* to have been a Man; and according to their Fables he must have been the first of Men. *Saturn* was the Son of *Heaven* and *Earth*, and so was *Adam:* he taught Men Husbandry; and was not *Adam* the first that tilled the ground? Besides, that Power which *Saturn* had, and was deposed from, doth fitly set out the Dominion Man had in the *Golden Age* of Innocency, which he lost by his own folly. And *Adam*'s hiding himself from the presence of the Lord, gave occasion to the Name of *Saturn*, from *Satar* to hide. We find something of *Cain* preserv'd in the *Phœnician* Antiquities, under the Name of Ἀγρούηρος, or Ἀγρότης, the first Countryman or Husbandman, who with his Brother Ἀγρὸς built Houses, and the first foundation of a City is attributed to *Cain:* And on that account *Vossius* conjectures that the memory of *Cain*'s Wife was preserv'd under *Vesta*, both because she was the Daughter of *Saturn*, i. e. of *Adam*, and that she is said τῶν οἰκῶν κατασκευὴν εὑρεῖν, *to find out first the way of building Houses.* That *Tubal-Cain* gave first occasion to the Name and Worship of *Vulcan*, hath been very probably conceiv'd, both from the very great affinity of the Names, and that *Tubal-Cain* is expresly mention'd *to be an Instructer of every Artificer in brass and iron*; and as near relation as *Apollo* had to *Vulcan*, *Jubal* had to *Tubal-Cain*, who was the *Inventer of Music, or the Father of all such as handle the Harp and Organ*; which the *Greeks* attribute to *Apollo.* And if that be true which *Genebrard* and others ascribe to *Naamah*, the Sister of *Jubal* and *Tubal-Cain*, *viz.* that she was the Inventer of Spinning and Weaving; then may she come in for *Minerva.* Thus we see there were some, tho' but obscure foot-steps preserved, even of that part of Scripture-history which preceded the Flood.

Voss. de Idololat. l. 1. cap. 38. *Tacit. de moribus German.* *Stephan. V. Ἀδανα.* *Tertull. Apolog. c. 10.* *Vossius de Idol. l. 1. c. 17.* Gen. 4. 22. 4. 21.

VIII. The memory of the Deluge it self we have already found to be preserved in the Heathen *Mythology*; we come therefore to *Noah* and his Posterity. Many parcels of *Noah*'s memory were preserved in the scattered fragments of many Fables, under *Saturn*, *Janus*, *Prometheus*, and *Bacchus.* *Bochartus* insists on no fewer than 14 Parallels between *Noah* and the Heathen *Saturn*, which he saith are so plain, that there is no doubt but under *Saturn*, *Noah* was understood in the Heathen *Mythology.* *Saturn* was said to be the common Parent of Mankind, so was *Noah*; *Saturn* was

Bochart. Phal. l. c. 1.

a juſt King, *Noah* not only righteous himſelf, but a preacher of Righteouſneſs; The Golden Age of *Saturn* was between *Noah* and the diſperſion of Nations. In *Noah*'s time all Mankind had but one Language, which the Heathens extend under *Saturn*, both to Men and Beaſts: The Plantation of Vines attributed to *Saturn* by the Heathens, as to *Noah* by the Scriptures: The Law of *Saturn* mentioned by the Poets, that none ſhould ſee the nakedneſs of the Gods without puniſhment, ſeems to reſpect the Fact and Curſe of *Cham*, in reference to *Noah*. *Saturn* and *Rhea*, and thoſe with them are ſaid to be born of *Thetis*, or the *Ocean*, which plainly alludes to *Noah* and his companies eſcaping the Flood; thence a Ship was the ſymbol of *Saturn*; and that *Saturn* devoured all his Children, ſeems to be nothing elſe but the Deſtruction of the old World by *Noah*'s Flood. And not only under *Saturn*, but under *Prometheus* too, was *Noah*'s memory preſerved. *Diodorus* ſpeaks of the great Flood under *Prometheus*; and *Prometheus* implies one that hath Forecaſt and Wiſdom, ſuch as *Noah* had, whereby he foretold the Flood, and was ſaved in it, when others were *Epimetheus*'s, that had not Wit to prevent their own deſtruction.

Diod. l. 1.

And no wonder if *Prometheus* were *Noah*, that the forming Mankind was attributed to him, when the World was peopled from him. *Herodotus* his ſaying, that *Aſia* was *Prometheus* his Wife, might relate to the Country *Noah* lived in, and our propagation from thence. Another part of *Noah*'s memory was preſerv'd under *Janus*; the Name of *Janus* is moſt probably derived from יָנַן, becauſe of *Noah*'s planting a Vine, and *Janus* was called *Conſivius*, ſaith *Macrobius*, *à conſerendo, hoc eſt, à propagine generis humani, quæ Jano autore conſeritur*: Now to whom can this be ſo properly apply'd as to *Noah*, from whom Mankind was propagated? And *Janus* his being *bifrons*, or looking πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω, *forward and backward*, is not ſo fit an Emblem of any thing as of *Noah*'s ſeeing thoſe two Ages before and after the Flood. And it is farther obſervable, which *Plutarch* ſpeaks of in his *Roman Queſtions*, that the ancient Coins had on one ſide the Image of *Janus* with his two Faces, on the other πλοίου πρύμναν ἢ πρῷραν ἐγκεχαραγμένην, *the fore or hinder part of the Ship*, by which the memory of the *Ark* of *Noah* ſeems to have been preſerv'd. Thus we ſee what *Analogy* there is in the Story of *Janus* to that of *Noah*: Not that I give credit to thoſe fooleries which tell us of *Noah*'s coming from *Paleſtine* with his Son *Japhet* into *Italy*, and planting Colonies there, for which we are beholding to the ſpurious *Ethruſcan* Antiquities; but all that I aſſert is, that the Story of *Noah* might be preſerv'd in the eldeſt Colonies, tho' diſguiſed under other Names, as here in the caſe of *Janus*. And on the ſame account that the Name of *Janus* is attributed to *Noah*, ſome likewiſe believe him to have been the moſt ancient *Bacchus*, who was, according to *Diodorus*, Εὑρετὴς τῆς ἀμπέλου, *the firſt planter of Vines and inſtructer of Men in making Wines*: And beſides *Bacchus* his being twice born, ſeems only an adumbration of *Noah*'s preſervation after the Flood, which might be accounted a ſecond Nativity, when the reſt of the World was deſtroy'd; and withal, *Philoſtratus* in the Life of *Apollonius* relates, that the ancient *Indian Bacchus* came thither out of *Aſſyria*, which yet more fully agrees with *Noah*. So that from theſe ſcatter'd Members of *Hippolytus*, theſe broken Fragments of Traditions, we may gather almoſt an intire Hiſtory of all the paſſages concerning *Noah*.

V. Mayer. Philol. ſacr. p. 2. c. 5.

Philoſtr. vit. Apoll. c. 4.

As the Story of *Saturn* and *Noah* do much agree, so the three Sons of *Noah* and those of *Saturn*, *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto*, have their peculiar resemblances to each other. Of which *Vossius* and *Bochartus* have largely spoken, and we have touched on already. Besides which, this latter Author hath carry'd the Parallel lower, and finds *Canaan* the Son of *Cham*, the same with *Mercury* the Son of *Jupiter*; as it was the curse of *Canaan* to be a Servant of Servants, so *Mercury* is always described under servile employments; his Wings seem to be the Ships of the *Phœnicians* who were derived from *Canaan*; and his being the God of Trade, noting the great Merchandize of the *Phœnicians*, and *Mercury*'s Thievery noting the Pyracies, or at least the subtilty and craft of the *Phœnicians*; he was the Father of *Eloquence* and *Astronomy*, as *Letters* and *Astronomy* came from the *Phœnicians* into *Greece*. The same Author parallels *Nimrod* and *Bacchus*, and *Magog* and *Prometheus* together. The Name of *Bacchus* is but a light variation of בר כוש, *Bar-chus*, as *Nimrod* was the Son of *Chus*, and *Bacchus* is called *Nebrodes* by the *Greeks*, which is the very Name of *Nimrod* among them, and *Bacchus* is called Ζωγρεὺς, which excellently interprets *Nimrod*'s being a *mighty hunter*. *Bacchus* his Expeditions into *India* were the attempts of *Nimrod*, and the *Assyrian* Emperors. On which account *Vossius* makes *Nimrod* or *Belus* the most antient *Mars*; for *Hestiæus Milesius* speaks of *Enyalius*, which is *Mars*, his being in *Sennaar* of *Babylonia*. That the memory of *Magog* was preserved under *Prometheus*, these things make it probable, that *Magog* was the Son of *Japhet*, as *Prometheus* of *Iapetus*, and that the Posterity of *Magog* was placed about *Caucasus*, where *Prometheus* is feigned to lie: and the eating of *Prometheus* his Heart, is only an Interpretation of מגג, which apply'd to the Heart signifies to *waste away* and *be consum'd*. Thus far *Bochartus*. IX. *Vossius de Idol. l. 1. c. 18.* *Bochart. Phaleg. l. 1. c. 1. cap. 2.* *Vossius de Idol. l. 1. c. 16.*

The *Phœnician* Antiquities seem to have preserved the memory of *Abraham*'s sacrificing his Son *Isaac*, by that place which *Eusebius* produceth out of *Porphyry*'s Book concerning the *Jews*; where he relates, *How* Saturn *whom the* Phœnicians *call* Ifrael, *when he reigned in those parts and had an only son called* Jeoud, *of a Nymph called* Anobret, *being under some great calamity, did sacrifice that son of his, being clothed with a royal habit*. Here we have a Royal Person called *Israel*; and that *Abraham* should be accounted a King in those elder times, is nothing strange considering his wealth, and what petty Royalties there were in those times. But *Grotius*, and from him *Vossius*, do not think that *Abraham* was here called *Israel*, but that the Transcriber of *Eusebius* meeting with ἸΛ, supposed it to be a contraction of Ἰσραὴλ, and so writ at length: it must be acknowledg'd that ἸΛ is used in the *Phœnician Theology* for *Saturn*, but yet the circumstances of the Story make the ordinary reading not improbable; neither is it strange, that *Abraham* should be called by the name of the People which he was the Progenitor of. That *Isaac* should be meant by his only Son called *Jeoud* is most likely; for when God bids *Abraham* go sacrifice him, he saith, *Take thy son*, יחד, *thy only son*; *Jehid* is the same with the *Phœnician Jeoud*. That *Sara* is meant by *Anobret*, the original of the Name implies, which is as *Bochartus* derives it עוברת הן, *Annoberet*, that is, *ex gratia concipiens*, which the Apostle explains, *Through faith* Sara *her self receiv'd strength to conceive seed*. Now all the difference is, that which was only designed and intended by *Abraham*, was believ'd by the *Phœnicians* as really done, that it might be as a precedent to them for their Ἀνθρωποθυσία, *sacrificing* of Men, a thing *V. Scaliger. ad Frag. Græc.* *Grot. in Deut. c. 18. v. 10.* *Vossius de Idol. l. 1. c. 18.* Gen. 22. 1. *Bochart. de Phœnic. col. l. 2. c. 2.* Heb. 11. 11.

ſo much in uſe among the *Phœnicians*, and all the Colonies derived from them, as many Learned Men have at large ſhew'd. But beſides this, there are particular teſtimonies concerning *Abraham*, his age, wiſdom and knowledg, his coming out of *Chaldæa*, and the Propagation of Knowledg from him among the *Chaldæans*, *Phœnicians*, and *Ægyptians*; are extant out of *Beroſus*, *Eupolemus*, and others in **Joſephus* and *Euſebius*, and from thence tranſcribed by many Learned Men, which on that account I forbear tranſcribing, as being common and obvious.

* *Joſeph. Antiq. l. 1. c. 7. Euſ. Præp. Evang. l. 9. c. 16.*

X. Some have not improbably conjectured, that the memory of *Jacob*'s long peregrination, and ſervice with his Uncle *Laban*, was preſerved under the Story of *Apollo* his baniſhment and being a Shepherd under *Admetus*. For *Callimachus* reports that *Love* was the cauſe of *Apollo*'s travels, as it was of *Jacob*'s; and withal mentions a ſtrange increaſe of Cattel under *Apollo*'s care, anſwerable to what the Scripture reports concerning *Jacob*. But it is more certain, that the memory of *Jacob*'s ſetting up the *Stone* he had reſted on for a Pillar, and pouring *Oyl* upon it, and calling the place *Bethel*, was preſerved under the Anointed Stones, which the *Phœnicians* from *Bethel* called Βαιτύλια, as hath been frequently obſerv'd by Learned Men, from whence came the cuſtom of *Anointing ſtones* among the Heathens, of which ſo very many have largely diſcourſed. Thence the Proverb of a ſuperſtitious Man, πάντα λίθον λιπαρὸν περιχυνᾶ, which *Arnobius* calls *lubricatum lapidem, & ex olivi unguine ſordidatum*. It ſeems the anointing the ſtones with oyl, was then the ſymbol of the conſecration of them. The Name Βαιτύλιον for ſuch a ſtone occurs in *Heſychius*, the *Greek Etymologiſts*, *Damaſcius* in *Phocius*, and others. That the memory of *Joſeph* in *Ægypt* was preſerved under the *Ægyptian Apis*, hath been ſhew'd with a great deal of probability by the Learned *Voſſius*, in his often-cited piece of *Idolatry*, from the teſtimonies of *Julius Maternus*, *Rufinus*, and *Suidas*; and from theſe three Arguments: 1. The greatneſs of the Benefit which the *Ægyptians* received by *Joſeph*; which was of that nature that it could not eaſily be forgot, and that no ſymbol was ſo proper to ſet it out as the *Ægyptian Apis*; becauſe the famine was portended by lean Kine, and the plenty by fat; and *Minucius* at *Rome*, for relieving the people in a time of famine, had a Statue of a golden Bull erected to his memory. 2. The *Ægyptians* were not backward to teſtify their reſpect to *Joſeph*, as appears by *Pharaoh*'s rewarding him. Now it was the cuſtom of the *Ægyptians* to preſerve the memories of their great Benefactors by ſome ſymbols to poſterity; which were at firſt intended only for a Civil uſe, altho' they were after abus'd to Superſtition and *Idolatry*. 3. From the Names of *Apis* and *Serapis*. *Apis* he conceives to be the ſacred Name of *Joſeph* among the *Ægyptians*, and is as much as אב, *Father*; ſo *Joſeph* himſelf ſaith, he was a *Father* to *Pharaoh*. And *Serapis*, as *Rufinus* and *Suidas* both tell us, had a *Buſhel* upon his *Head*, and *Serapis* is probably derived from שור, *Sor*, which ſignifies a *Bull*, and *Apis*. So that by this means the Story of *Joſeph* is atteſted by the *Ægyptian* ſuperſtitions, of which they can give no account ſo likely as this is.

Callimach. Hymn. in Apoll.

Gen. 28. 18.

Scalig. not. in Frag. Gr. Bochart. Can. l. 2. c. 2. Seld. de Diis Syris. V. Heinſ. in Clem. Al. Strom. 7. Caſaubon ad Theoph. p. 295. Herald. ad Arnob. l. 1. Colvium ad Apul. Florid. Ouzel. & Elmenhorſt. ad Minuc. de Idol. l. 1. c. 29.

Gen. 45. 8.

XI. Many things concerning *Moſes* are preſerv'd in the Story of *Bacchus*; not that from thence we are to conclude that *Moſes* was the *Bacchus* of the *Greeks*, as *Voſſius* thinks, but they took ſeveral parts of the Eaſtern Traditions concerning him, which they might have from the *Phœnicians* who came with *Cadmus* into *Greece*, while the memory of *Moſes* was yet freſh among the *Canaanites*. In the Story of *Bacchus*, as *Voſſius* obſerves,

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 30.

ſerves, it is expreſly ſaid, that he was born in *Ægypt*, and that ſoon after his birth he was put in an Ark; and expos'd to the River; which Tradition was preſerv'd among the *Braſiatæ* of *Laconica*: and *Bacchus* in *Orpheus* is called Μίσης, and by *Plutarch de Iſide & Oſiride*, *Palæſtinus*: and he is called Βιμάτωρ, which agrees to *Moſes*, who, beſides his own Mother, was adopted by *Pharaoh*'s Daughter: *Bacchus* was likewiſe commended for his Beauty as *Moſes* was, and was ſaid to be educated in a Mount of *Arabia* called *Nyſa*, which agrees with *Moſes* his reſidence in *Arabia* forty years; ſo *Plutarch* mentions Φυγὰς Διονύσου, the *baniſhments* of *Bacchus*; and *Nonnus* mentions *Bacchus* his flight into the *Red-ſea*: *Nonn. Dion. l. 20.* who likewiſe mentions his Battles in *Arabia*, and with the neighbouring Princes there. *Diodorus* ſaith, that *Bacchus* his Army had not only Men *Diod. l. 4.* but Women in it, which is moſt true of the company which *Moſes* led. *Orpheus* calls *Bacchus* Θεσμοφόρον, and attributes to him Δίπλακα Θεσμὸν, whereby we underſtand *Moſes* his being a *Legiſlator*, and that he deliver'd the *Laws* in two Tables. *Moſes* his fetching Water out of a Rock with his Rod, is preſerv'd in the *Orgia* of *Bacchus*, in which *Euripides* relates that *Agave* and the reſt of the *Bacchæ* celebrating the *Orgia*, one of them touched a Rock, and the Water came out; and in the ſame *Orgia Euripides* reports how they were wont to crown their Heads with Serpents, probably in memory of the cure of the fiery Serpents in the Wilderneſs. A Dog is made the companion of *Bacchus*; which is the ſignification of *Caleb*, who ſo faithfully adhered to *Moſes*. To theſe and ſome other circumſtances inſiſted on by *Voſſius*, *Bochartus* adds two *Bochart. Canaan. l. 1. c. 18.* more very conſiderable ones; which are, that *Nonnus* reports of *Bacchus* that he touched the two Rivers *Orontes* and *Hydaſpes* with his *Thyrſus*, or *Rod*, and that the Rivers dried, and he paſs'd thro' them: and that his *Ivy-ſtaff* being thrown upon the ground, crept up and down like a *Serpent*, and that the *Indians* were in darkneſs while the *Bacchæ* enjoy'd light; which circumſtances conſider'd will make every one that hath judgment ſay as *Bochartus* doth; *Ex mirabili illo conſenſu vel cæcis apparebit priſcos fabularum architectos à ſcriptoribus ſacris multa eſſe mutuatos.* From this wonderful agreement of *Heathen Mythology* with the Scriptures, it cannot but appear that one is a corruption of the other. That the memory of *Joſhua* and *Sampſon* was preſerved under *Hercules Tyrius*, *Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 26. p. 118.* is made likewiſe very probable from ſeveral circumſtances of the Stories. Others have deduced the many Rites of *Heathen Worſhip* from thoſe us'd *p. 169.* in the *Tabernacle* among the *Jews*. Several other might be inſiſted on, as the Parallel between *Og* and *Typho*, and between the old *Silenus* and *Balaam*, both noted for their ſkill in *Divination*, both taken by *Water*, *Num.* 22. 5. both noted for *riding* on an *Aſs*: ἐπὶ ὄνου τὰ πολλὰ ὀχέμενον, ſaith *Lucian* of the old *Silenus*; and that which makes it more probable, *Lucian. de Deor. Con. Pauſan. Eliacôn. 2. p. 203.* is that of *Pauſanias*, Ἐν γὰρ τῇ Ἐλεφαίων χώρᾳ Σιλλοῦ μνῆμα, which ſome Learned Men have been much puzled to find out the truth of; and this conjecture which I here propound, may paſs at leaſt for a probable account of it. But I ſhall no longer inſiſt on theſe things, having, I ſuppoſe, done what is ſufficient to our purpoſe, which is, to make it appear what footſteps there are of the truth of Scripture-hiſtory amidſt all the corruptions of *Heathen Mythology*.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Excellency of the Scriptures.

I. *Concerning matters of pure Divine Revelation in Scripture: the terms of Salvation only contain'd therein.* II. *The ground of the diſeſteem of the Scripture is tacite Unbelief.* III. *The Excellency of the Scriptures manifeſted as to the matters which* God *hath reveal'd therein.* IV. *The Excellency of the diſcoveries of* God's *Nature which are in Scripture.* V. *Of the Goodneſs and Love of* God *in* Christ. *The ſutableneſs of thoſe diſcoveries of* God *to our Natural Notions of a* Deity. *The neceſſity of* God's *making known Himſelf to us in order to the regulating our Conceptions of him.* VI. *The Scriptures give the fulleſt account of the ſtate of Mens Souls, and the corruptions which are in them. The only way of pleaſing* God *diſcover'd in Scriptures.* VII. *The Scriptures contain matters of greateſt Myſteriouſneſs, and moſt univerſal ſatisfaction to Mens Minds.* VIII. *The Excellency of the manner wherein things are reveal'd in Scriptures, in regard of Clearneſs, Authority, Purity.* IX. *Uniformity, and Perſuaſiveneſs.* X. *The Excellency of the Scriptures as a Rule of life. The Nature of the Duties of Religion, and the Reaſonableneſs of them. The Greatneſs of the Encouragements to Religion contained in the Scriptures.* XI. *The great Excellency of the Scriptures, as containing in them the Covenant of Grace in order to Man's Salvation.*

I. HAving thus largely prov'd the truth of all thoſe paſſages of ſacred Scripture which concern the Hiſtory of the firſt Ages of the World, by all thoſe Arguments which a ſubject of that nature is capable of, the only thing left in order to our full proving the Divinity of the Scriptures, is, the conſideration of thoſe matters contain'd in it, which are in an eſpecial manner ſaid to be of Divine Revelation. For thoſe hiſtorical paſſages, tho' we believe them as contain'd in the Scripture, to have been divinely inſpir'd as well as others: yet they are ſuch things as ſuppoſing no Divine Revelation, might have been known ſufficiently to the World, had not Men been wanting to themſelves as to the care and means of preſerving them; but thoſe matters which I now come to diſcourſe of, are of a more ſublime and tranſcendent nature, ſuch as it had been impoſſible for the Minds of Men to reach, had they not been immediately diſcover'd by God himſelf. And thoſe are the Terms and Conditions on which the Soul of Man may upon good grounds expect an eternal Happineſs, which we aſſert the Book of Scriptures to be the only authentic and infallible records of. Men might by the improvements of

Reaſon and the ſagacity of their Minds diſcover much, not only of the lapſed condition of their Souls, and the neceſſity of a purgation of them, in order to their Felicity; but might in the general know what things are pleaſing and acceptable to the Divine Nature, from thoſe differences of Good and Evil which are unalterably fix'd in the things themſelves: but which way to obtain any certainty of the Remiſſion of Sins, to recover the Grace and Favor of GOD, to enjoy perfect Tranquillity and Peace of Conſcience, to be able to pleaſe God in things agreeable to his Will, and by theſe to be aſſur'd of eternal Bliſs, had been impoſſible for Men to have ever found, had not GOD himſelf been graciouſly pleas'd to reveal them to us. Men might ſtill have bewildred themſelves in following the *Ignes fatui* of their own imaginations, and hunting up and down the World for a Path which leads to Heaven, but could have found none, unleſs God himſelf taking pity of the wandrings of Men had been pleas'd to hang out a Light from Heaven to direct them in their way thither, and by this *Pharos* of Divine Revelation to direct them ſo to ſteer their courſe, as to eſcape ſplitting themſelves on the Rocks of open Impieties, or being ſwallow'd up in the Quickſands of terrene delights. Neither doth he ſhew them only what Shelves and Rocks they muſt eſcape, but what particular courſe they muſt ſteer, what Star they muſt have in their Eye, what Compaſs they muſt obſerve, what Winds and Gales they muſt expect and pray for, if they would arrive at laſt at eternal Bliſs. Eternal Bliſs! What more could a GOD of infinite Goodneſs promiſe, or the Soul of Man wiſh for? A Reward to ſuch who are ſo far from deſerving, that they are ſtill provoking; Glory to ſuch who are more apt to be aſham'd of their Duties, than of their Offences; but that it ſhould not only be a Glorious Reward, but Eternal too, is that which tho' it infinitely tranſcend the Deſerts of the Receivers, yet it highly diſcovers the infinite Goodneſs of the Giver. But when we not only know that there is ſo rich a Mine of ineſtimable Treaſures, but if the Owner of it undertakes to ſhew us the way to it, and gives us certain and infallible directions how to come to the full poſſeſſion of it; how much are we in love with Miſery, and do we court our own Ruin, if we neglect to hearken to his Directions, and obſerve his Commands!

II. This is that we are now undertaking to make good concerning the *Scriptures*, that theſe alone contain thoſe ſacred diſcoveries, by which the Souls of Men may come at laſt to enjoy a compleat and eternal Happineſs. One would think there could be nothing more needleſs in the World than to bid Men regard their own welfare, and to ſeek to be happy; yet whoever caſts his Eye into the World, will find no counſel ſo little hearkened to as this, nor any thing which is more generally look'd on as a matter trivial and impertinent. Which cannot ariſe but from one of theſe two grounds, that either they think it no great wiſdom to let go their preſent hold as to the good things of this World, for that which they ſecretly queſtion whether they ſhall ever live to ſee or no; or elſe that their Minds are in ſuſpenſe, whether they be not ſent on a *Guiana Voyage* to *Heaven*, whether the certainty of it be yet fully diſcover'd, or the inſtructions which are given be ſuch as may infallibly conduct them thither. The firſt, tho' it hath the advantage of ſenſe, fruition, delight, and further expectation; yet to a rational Perſon who ſeriouſly reflects on himſelf, and ſums up what (after all his troubles and diſquietments in the procuring, his cares in keeping, his diſappointments in his expectations, his fears of loſing what he doth enjoy, and that

vexation

vexation of Spirit which attends all these) he hath gain'd of true contentment to his Mind, can never certainly believe that ever these things were intended for his Happiness. For is it possible that the Soul of Man should ever enjoy its full and complete Happiness in this World, when nothing is able to make it happy, but what is most sutable to its Nature, able to fill up its large Capacity, and commensurate with its Duration? but in this Life the matter of Mens greatest delight is strangely unsutable to the nature of our rational Beings, the measure of them too short for our vast Desires to stretch themselves upon, the Proportion too scant and narrow to run parallel with Immortality. It must be then only a Supreme, Infinite and Eternal Being, which by the free communications of his Bounty and Goodness can fix and satiate the Soul's Desires, and by the constant flowings forth of his own uninterrupted streams of Favor will always keep up Desire, and yet always satisfy it: One whose Goodness can only be felt by some transient touches here, whose Love can be seen but as thro' a lattice, whose constant presence may be rather wish'd for than enjoy'd, who hath reserv'd the full sight and fruition of himself to that future state, when all these dark veils shall be done away, and the Soul shall be continually sunning her self under immediate beams of Light and Love. But how or in what way the Soul of Man in this degenerate condition should come to be partaker of so great a Happiness, by the enjoyment of that God our Natures are now at such a distance from, is the greatest and most important inquiry of Human Nature; and we continually see how successless and unsatisfactory the endeavors of those have been to themselves at last, who have sought for this Happiness in a way of their own finding out: The large volume of the Creation, wherein God hath describ'd so much of his Wisdom and Power, is yet too dark and obscure, too short and imperfect to set forth to us the way which leads to eternal Happiness. Unless then the same God who made Mens Souls at first, do shew them the way for their recovery; as they are in a degenerate, so they will be in a desperate condition: but the same Bounty and Goodness of God, which did at first display it self in giving Being to Mens Souls, hath in a higher manner enlarged the Discovery of it self, by making known the way whereby we may be taken into his Grace and Favor again.

III. Which it now concerns us particularly to discover, thereby to make it appear that this way is of that peculiar excellency, that we may have from thence the greatest evidence, it could come from no other Author but God himself, and doth tend to no other end but our eternal Happiness. Now that incomparable excellency which is in the sacred Scriptures, will fully appear, if we consider the Matters contain'd in them under this threefold capacity. 1. As *Matters of Divine Revelation.* 2. As *a Rule of Life.* 3. As containing *that Covenant of Grace which relates to Man's eternal Happiness.*

1. Consider the Scripture generally, as containing in it Matters of Divine Revelation, and therein the excellency of the Scriptures appears in two things. 1. *The Matters which are revealed.* 2. *The Manner wherein they are revealed.*

1. *The matters which are revealed* in Scripture, may be consider'd these three ways. 1. *As they are matters of the greatest weight and moment.* 2. *As matters of the greatest depth and mysteriousness.* 3. *As matters of the most universal satisfaction to the Minds of Men.*

1. They

1. *They are matters of the greateſt moment and importance for Men to know.* The Wiſdom of Men is moſt known by the weight of the things they ſpeak; and therefore that wherein the Wiſdom of God is diſcover'd, cannot contain any thing that is mean and trivial; they muſt be matters of the higheſt importance, which the ſupreme Ruler of the World vouchſafes to ſpeak to Men concerning: And ſuch we ſhall find the matters which God hath revealed in his Word to be, which either concern the rectifying our apprehenſions of his Nature, or making known to Men their ſtate and condition, or diſcovering the way whereby to avoid eternal Miſery. Now which is there of theſe three, which ſuppoſing God to diſcover his Mind to the World, it doth not highly become him to ſpeak to Men of?

1. What is there which doth more highly concern Men to know than God himſelf? or what more glorious and excellent object could he diſcover than himſelf to the World? There is nothing certainly which ſhould more commend the Scriptures to us, than that thereby we may grow more acquainted with God; that we may know more of his Nature, and all his Perfections, and many of the great Reaſons of his actings in the World. We may by them underſtand with ſafety what the eternal purpoſes of God were as to the way of Man's Recovery by the death of his Son; we may there ſee and underſtand the great Wiſdom of God; not only in the contrivance of the World, and ordering of it, but in the gradual Revelations of himſelf to his People, by what ſteps he train'd up his Church till the *fulneſs of time was come*; what his Aim was in laying ſuch a load of Ceremonies on his People of the *Jews*; by what ſteps and degrees he made way for the full revelation of his Will to the World by ſpeaking in theſe laſt days by his Son, after he had ſpoke *at ſundry times and in divers manners by the Prophets*, &c. *unto the Fathers.* In the Scriptures we read the moſt rich and admirable diſcoveries of Divine Goodneſs, and all the ways and methods he uſeth in alluring Sinners to himſelf; with what Majeſty he commands, with what Condeſcention he intreats, with what importunity he wooes Mens Souls to be reconciled to him, with what Favour he imbraceth, with what Tenderneſs he chaſtiſeth, with what Bowels he pitieth thoſe who have choſen him to be their God! With what Power he ſupporteth, with what Wiſdom he directeth, with what Cordials he refreſheth the Souls of ſuch who are dejected under the ſenſe of his diſpleaſure, and yet their love is ſincere towards him! With what profound humility, what holy boldneſs, what becoming diſtance, and yet what reſtleſs importunity do we therein find the Souls of God's People addreſſing themſelves to him in Prayer! With what cheerfulneſs do they ſerve him, with what confidence do they truſt him, with what reſolution do they adhere to him in all ſtreights and difficulties, with what patience do they ſubmit to his Will in their greateſt Extremities! How fearful are they of ſinning againſt God, how careful to pleaſe him, how regardleſs of ſuffering, when they muſt chooſe either that or ſinning, how little apprehenſive of Mens diſpleaſure, while they enjoy the favor of God! Now all theſe things which are ſo fully and pathetically expreſs'd in Scripture, do abundantly ſet forth to us the exuberancy and *Pleonaſm* of God's Grace and Goodneſs towards his People, which makes them delight ſo much in him, and be ſo ſenſible of his diſpleaſure. But above all other diſcoveries of God's Goodneſs, his ſending his Son into the World to die for Sinners, is that which the Scripture ſets forth with the greateſt Life and IV.

Eloquence. By Eloquence, I mean not an artificial compoſure of Words, but the gravity, weight, and perſuaſiveneſs of the matter contain'd in them. And what can tend more to melt our frozen Hearts into a current of thankful obedience to God, than the vigorous reflection of the beams of God's Love thro' *Jeſus Chriſt* upon us! Was there ever ſo great an expreſſion of love heard of! nay, was it poſſible to be imagin'd, that that God who perfectly hates ſin, ſhould himſelf offer the pardon of it, and ſend his Son into the World to ſecure it to the Sinner, who doth ſo heartily repent of his Sins, as to deny himſelf, and take up his Croſs and follow *Chriſt!* Well might the Apoſtle ſay, *This is a faithful ſaying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Jeſus Chriſt came into the world to ſave ſinners.* How dry and ſapleſs are all the voluminous diſcourſes of Philoſophers, compar'd with this Sentence! How jejune and unſatisfactory are all the Diſcoveries they had of God and his Goodneſs, in compariſon of what we have by the Goſpel of *Chriſt!* Well might St. *Paul* then ſay, *That he determined to know nothing but Chriſt, and him crucified. Chriſt crucified* is the Library which triumphant Souls will be ſtudying in to all eternity. This is the only Library which is the true Ἰατρεῖον ψυχῆς, that which cures the Soul of all its Maladies and Diſtempers: other Knowledg makes Mens Minds giddy and flatulent; this ſettles and compoſes them: other Knowledg is apt to ſwell Men into high Conceits and Opinions of themſelves; this brings them to the trueſt view of themſelves, and thereby to humility and ſobriety: other Knowledge leaves Mens Hearts as it found them; this alters them and makes them better. So tranſcendent an excellency is there in the Knowledg of *Chriſt crucified* above the ſublimeſt ſpeculations in the World.

1 Tim. 1. 15.

1 Cor. 2. 2.

V. And is not this an ineſtimable Benefit we enjoy by the Scripture, that therein we can read and converſe with all theſe expreſſions of God's Love and Goodneſs, and that in his own Language? Shall we admire and praiſe what we meet with in *Heathen Philoſophers*, which is generous and handſom; and ſhall we not adore the infinite fulneſs of the Scriptures, which run over with continued expreſſions of that and a higher nature? What folly is it to magnifie thoſe *Lean Kine*, the Notions of Philoſophers, and contemn the Fat, the Plenty and Fulneſs of the Scriptures? If there be not far more valuable and excellent diſcoveries of the Divine Nature and Perfections; if there be not far more excellent Directions and Rules of Practice in the ſacred Scriptures, than in the ſublimeſt of all the Philoſophers: then let us leave our *full ears*, and feed upon the *thin*. But certainly no ſober and rational Spirit that puts any value upon the Knowledg of God, but on the ſame account that he doth praiſe the Diſcourſes of any Philoſophers concerning God, he cannot but ſet a value of a far higher nature on the Word of God. And as the Goodneſs of God is thus diſcover'd in Scripture, ſo is his Juſtice and Holineſs: we have therein recorded the moſt remarkable judgments of God upon contumacious Sinners, the ſevereſt denunciations of a Judgment to come againſt all that live in Sin, the exacteſt Precepts of Holineſs in the World; and what can be deſir'd more to diſcover the Holineſs of God, than we find in Scripture concerning Him? If therefore acquaintance with the Nature, Perfections, Deſigns of ſo excellent a Being as God is, be a thing deſirable to Human Nature; we have the greateſt cauſe to admire the excellency, and adore the fulneſs of the Scriptures, which give us ſo large, rational and complete account of the Being and Attributes of God. And which tends yet more to commend the

the Scriptures to us, those things which the Scripture doth most fully discover concerning God, do not at all contradict those prime and common Notions which are in our Natures concerning him, but do exceedingly advance and improve them, and tend the most to regulate our Conceptions and Apprehensions of God, that we may not miscarry therein, as otherwise Men are apt to do. For it being natural to Men so far to love themselves, as to set the greatest value upon those excellencies which they think themselves most masters of: thence Men came to be exceedingly mistaken in their Apprehensions of a *Deity*, some attributing one thing as a Perfection, another a different thing, according to their humors and inclinations. Thus imperious self-willed Men are apt to cry up God's absolute Power and Dominion as his greatest Perfection; easy and soft-spirited Men his Patience and Goodness; severe and rigid Men his Justice and Severity: every one according to his humor and temper, making his God of his own Complection: and not only so, but in things remote enough from being Perfections at all; yet because they are such things as they prize and value, they suppose of necessity they must be in God, as is evident in the *Epicureans* Ἀπαράξια, by which they excluded *Providence*, as hath been already observ'd. And withal considering how very difficult it is for one who really believes that God is of a pure, just, and holy Nature, and that he hath grievously offended him by his sins, to believe that this God will pardon him upon true repentance: It is thence necessary that God should make known himself to the World, to prevent our mis-conceptions of his Nature, and to assure a suspicious, because guilty Creature, how ready he is to pardon iniquity, transgression, and sin, to such as unfeignedly repent of their follies, and return unto himself. Tho' the light of Nature may dictate much to us of the Benignity and Goodness of the Divine Nature, yet it is hard to conceive that that should discover further than God's general Goodness to such as please him: but no foundation can be gathered thence of his readiness to pardon offenders, which being an act of Grace, must alone be discovered by his Will. I cannot think the *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Stars*, are such itinerant Preachers, as to unfold unto us the whole Counsel and Will of God in reference to Man's acceptance with God upon repentance. It is not every *Star* in the Firmament can do that which the *Star* once did to the *Wise-men*, lead them unto *Christ*. The *Sun* in the *Heavens* is no *Parelius* to the *Sun of Righteousness*. The best *Astronomer* will never find the *Day-star from on high* in the rest of his number. What St. *Austin* said of *Tully*'s Works, is true of the whole Volume of the Creation: There are admirable things to be found in them: but the Name of *Christ* is not legible there. The work of *Redemption* is not engraven on the works of *Providence*; if it had, a particular Divine Revelation had been unnecessary, and the *Apostles* were sent on a needless errand, which the World had understood without their Preaching, *viz. That God was in Christ reconciling the World unto himself, not imputing to Men their trespasses, and hath committed to them the Ministry of Reconciliation.* How was the word of *Reconciliation* committed to them, if it were common to them with the whole frame of the World? and the *Apostle*'s *Quære* elsewhere might have been easily answer'd, *How can Men hear without a Preacher?* For then they might have known the way of *Salvation*, without any special Messengers sent to deliver it unto them. I grant that *God's long-suffering* and *patience* is intended to lead Men to Repentance, and that some general collections might be made from *Providence* of the

2 Cor. 5. 18, 19.

Rom. 10. 14.

Act. 14. 14. Luke 6. 35. 36. placability of God's Nature, and that *God never left himself without a witness of his Goodness* in the World, being *kind to the unthankful, and doing good, in giving rain and fruitful seasons.* But tho' these things might sufficiently discover to such who were apprehensive of the guilt of sin, that God did not act according to his greatest severity, and thereby did give Men encouragement to hearken out and inquire after the true way of being reconcil'd to God; yet all this amounts not to a firm Foundation for Faith, as to the remission of sin, which doth suppose God himself publishing an Act of Grace and Indemnity to the World, wherein he assures the Pardon of sin to such as truly repent and unfeignedly believe his holy Gospel. Now is not this an inestimable advantage we enjoy by the Scriptures, that therein we understand what God himself hath discover'd of his own Nature and Perfections, and of his readiness to pardon Sin upon those gracious terms of *Faith* and *Repentance*, and that which necessarily follows from these two, hearty and sincere Obedience?

VI. 2. *The Scripture gives the most faithful representation of the state and condition of the Soul of Man.* The World was almost lost in Disputes concerning the Nature, Condition, and Immortality of the Soul, before *Divine Revelation* was made known to Mankind by the *Gospel* of *Christ*; but *Life and Immortality* was *brought to light by the Gospel*, and the future state of the Soul of Man, not discover'd in an uncertain *Platonical* way, but with the greatest light and evidence from that God who hath the supreme disposal of Souls, and therefore best knows and understands them. The Scriptures plainly and fully reveal a Judgment to come, in which *God will judg the secrets of all Hearts*, when *every one must give an account of himself unto God*, and God will call Men to give *an account of their stewardship* here, of all the Receipts they have had from him, and the Expences they have been at, and the Improvements they have made of the Talents he put into their hands. So that the *Gospel* of *Christ* is the fullest Instrument of discovery of the certainty of the future state of the Soul, and the conditions which abide it, upon its being dislodg'd from the Body. But this is not all which the Scripture discovers as to the state of the Soul; for it is not only a Prospective-glass, reaching to its future state, but it is the most faithful Looking-glass, to discover all the spots and deformities of the Soul: And not only shews where they are, but whence they came, what their nature is, and whither they tend. The true Original of all that disorder and discomposure which is in the Soul of Man, is only fully and satisfactorily given us in the Word of God, as hath been already prov'd. The nature and working of this corruption in Man, had never been so clearly manifested, had not the Law and Will of God been discover'd to the World: that is the Glass whereby we see the secret workings of those Bees in our Hearts, the corruptions of our Natures; that sets forth the folly of our Imaginations, the unrulineſs of our Passions, the distempers of our Wills, and the abundant deceitfulness of our Hearts. And it is hard for the Elephantin sinner (one of the greatest magnitude) so to trouble these Waters, as not therein to discover the greatness of his own deformities. But that which tends most to awaken the drowsie, senseless Spirits of Men, the Scripture doth most fully describe the tendency of Corruption, that the wages of *sin* is *death*, and the issue of continuance in sin will be the everlasting misery of the Soul, in a perpetual separation from the presence of God, and undergoing the lashes and severities of Conscience to all eternity.

nity. What a great discovery is this of the faithfulness of God to the World, that he suffers not Men to undo themselves without letting them know of it beforehand, that they might avoid it! God seeks not to entrap Mens Souls, nor doth he rejoice in the misery and ruin of his Creatures; but fully declares to them what the consequence and issue of their practices will be, assures them of a Judgment to come, declares his own future severity against contumacious Sinners, that they might not think themselves surpriz'd, and that if they had known there had been so great danger in sin, they would never have been such fools, as for the sake of it to run into eternal misery. Now God, to prevent this, with the greatest plainness and faithfulness hath shew'd Men the nature and danger of all their sins, and asks them beforehand what they will do in the end thereof; whether they are able to bear his Wrath, and wrestle with everlasting burnings? if not, he bids them bethink themselves of what they have done already, and repent, and amend their Lives, lest *iniquity prove their ruin*, and *destruction overtake them, and that without remedy.* Now if Men have cause to prize and value a faithful Monitor, one that tenders their good, and would prevent their ruin; we have cause exceedingly to prize and value the Scriptures, which give us the truest representation of the state and condition of our Souls.

3. *The Scripture discovers to us the only way of pleasing God, and enjoying his favor.* That clearly reveals the way (which Man might have sought for to all eternity without particular Revelation) whereby Sins may be pardoned, and whatever we do may be acceptable unto God. It shews us that the ground of our acceptance with God, is thro' *Christ*, whom he hath made a *propitiation for the sins of the World*, and who alone is the *true and living way*, whereby we may *draw near to God with a true heart, in full assurance of Faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience.* Thro' *Christ* we understand the terms on which God will shew Favor and Grace to the World, and by him we have ground of a παῤῥησία, *access with freedom and boldness unto God.* On his account we may hope not only for Grace to subdue our sins, resist temptations, conquer the Devil and the World; but having *fought this good fight and finished our course, by patient continuance in well-doing*, we may justly *look for glory, honor, and immortality*, and that *crown of righteousness which is laid up for those who wait* in faith, holiness, and humility, *for the appearance of Christ from Heaven.* Now what things can there be of greater moment and importance for Men to know, or God to reveal, than the Nature of God, and our selves, the state and condition of our Souls, the only way to avoid eternal Misery, and enjoy everlasting Bliss?

VII. 2. The Scriptures discover not only matters of importance, but of the greatest depth and mysteriousness. There are many *wonderful things in the Law of God*, things we may admire, but are never able to comprehend. Such are the eternal Purposes and Decrees of God, the Doctrin of the *Trinity*, the Incarnation of the Son of God, and the manner of the Operation of the Spirit of God on the Souls of Men, which are all things of great weight and moment for us to understand and believe that they are; and yet may be unsearchable to our Reason, as to the particular manner of them. What certain ground our Faith stands on as to these things hath been already shew'd, and therefore I forbear insisting on them. Book II. Ch. 8. Sect. 5, 6, 7.

3. The Scripture comprehends matters of the most universal satisfaction to the Minds of Men; tho' many things do much exceed our Apprehensions, yet others are most suitable to the Dictates of our Nature.

As

Orig. contra Celſ. l. 3. p. 135.

As *Origen* bid *Celſus* ſee, Εἰ μὴ τὰ τ πίστεως ἡμῖν τ κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις ἐχχθὲν σαναγωγιώτερα, μᾶλλον τοῖς ἐυγνωμόνως ἀκούσασι τ λεγομένων, *Whether it was not the agreeableneſs of the Principles of Faith with the common Notions of Human Nature, which prevail'd moſt upon all candid and ingenuous auditors of them.* And therefore as *Socrates* ſaid of *Heraclitus* his Books, What he underſtood was excellent, and therefore he ſuppos'd that which he did not underſtand was ſo too: ſo ought we to ſay of the Scriptures, If thoſe things which are within our capacity be ſo ſutable to our Natures and Reaſons, thoſe cannot contradict our Reaſon which yet are above them. There are many things which the Minds of Men were ſufficiently aſſur'd that they were, yet were to ſeek for ſatisfaction concerning them, which they could never have had without Divine Revelation. As the Nature of true Happineſs, wherein it lay, and how to be obtain'd, which the Philoſophers were ſo puzl'd with, the Scripture gives us full ſatisfaction concerning it. True contentment under the troubles of Life, which the Scripture only acquaints us with the true grounds of; and all the preſcriptions of Heathen *Moraliſts* fall as much ſhort of, as the directions of an *Empyric* do of a wiſe and ſkilful *Phyſician*. *Avoiding the fears of Death*, which can alone be thro' a grounded Expectation of a ſtate of Happineſs which Death leads Men to, which cannot be had but thro' the right underſtanding of the Word of God. Thus we ſee the excellency of the matters themſelves contain'd in this Revelation of the Mind of God to the World.

VIII. As the Matters themſelves are of an excellent Nature, ſo is the manner wherein they are reveal'd in the Scriptures, and that,

2. 1. *In a clear and perſpicuous manner.* Not but there may be ſtill ſome paſſages which are hard to be underſtood, as being either prophetical, or conſiſting of ambiguous Phraſes, or containing matters above our comprehenſion; but all thoſe things which concern the terms of Man's Salvation are deliver'd with the greateſt evidence and perſpicuity. Who cannot underſtand what theſe things mean, *What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do juſtly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God*; that *without Faith it is impoſſible to pleaſe God*; that *without Holineſs none ſhall ſee the Lord*; that *unleſs we be born again, we can never enter into the Kingdom of Heaven?* Theſe and ſuch like things are ſo plain and clear, that it is nothing but Mens ſhutting their Eyes againſt the Light can keep them from underſtanding them: God intended theſe things as Directions to Men; and is not he able to ſpeak intelligibly when he pleaſe? He that made the Tongue, ſhall he not ſpeak ſo as to be underſtood without an infallible Interpreter? eſpecially when it is his deſign to make known to Men the terms of their eternal Happineſs. Will God judg Men at the great day for not believing thoſe things which they could not underſtand? Strange! that ever Men ſhould judg the Scriptures obſcure in matters neceſſary, when the Scripture accounts it ſo great a judgment for Men not to underſtand them. *If our*

2 Cor. 4. 3, 4. *Goſpel be hid, it is hid to them that are loſt; in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, leſt the light of the glorious Goſpel of Chriſt ſhould ſhine unto them.* Sure *Lot*'s door was viſible enough, if it were a judgment for the Men of *Sodom* not to ſee it; and the Scriptures then are plain and intelligible enough, if it be ſo great a judgment not to underſtand them.

2. *In a powerful and authoritative manner*; as the things contain'd in Scripture do not ſo much beg acceptance as command it; in that the

 expreſ-

expreſſions wherein our duty is concern'd are ſuch as awe Mens Conſciences, and pierce to their Hearts and to their ſecret thoughts; *All things are open and naked before this Word of God; every ſecret of the mind and thought of the heart lies open to its ſtroke and force; it is quick and powerful, ſharper than a two-edged ſword, piercing to the dividing aſunder of ſoul and ſpirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a diſcerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart.* The *Word* is a *Teleſcope* to diſcover the great Luminaries of the World, the Truths of higheſt concernment to the Souls of Men; and it is ſuch a *Microſcope* as diſcovers to us the ſmalleſt *Atom* of our Thoughts, and diſcerns the moſt ſecret intent of the Heart. And, as far as this Light reacheth, it comes with Power and Authority, as it comes arm'd with the Majeſty of that GOD who reveals it, whoſe Authority extends over the Soul and Conſcience of Man in its moſt ſecret and hidden receſſes. Heb. 4. 12, 13.

3. *In a pure and unmix'd manner.* In all other Writings how good ſoever, we ſee a great mixture of Droſs and Gold together: Here is nothing but pure Gold, Diamonds without flaws, Suns without ſpots. The moſt current Coins of the World have their Alloys of baſer Metals, there is no ſuch mixture in Divine Truths; as they all come from the ſame Author, ſo they all have the ſame purity. There is a *Urim* and *Thummim* upon the whole Scripture, Light and Perfection in every part of it. In the Philoſophers we may meet, it may be, with ſome ſcattered fragments of purer Metal, amidſt abundance of Droſs and impure Oar; here we have whole wedges of Gold, the ſame vein of purity and holineſs running thro' the whole Book of Scriptures. Hence it is call'd the *form of ſound words:* Here have been no Huckſters to corrupt and mix their own Inventions with Divine Truths. 2 Tim. 1. 13.

4. *In an uniform and agreeable manner.* This I grant is not ſufficient of it ſelf to prove the Scriptures to be Divine, becauſe all Men do not contradict themſelves in their Writings; but yet there are ſome peculiar circumſtances to be conſider'd in the agreeableneſs of the parts of Scripture to each other, which are not to be found in mere human Writings. IX.

1. That this *Doctrine was delivered by perſons who lived in different Ages and Times from each other.* Uſually one Age corrects another's faults, and we are apt to pity the Ignorance of our Predeceſſors, when it may be our Poſterity may think us as ignorant as we do them. But in the ſacred Scripture we read not one Age condemning another; we find Light ſtill increaſing in the ſeries of times in Scripture, but no reflexions in any time upon the Ignorance or Weakneſs of the precedent; the dimmeſt Light was ſufficient for its Age, and was a ſtep to further diſcovery. *Quintilian* gives it as the reaſon of the great uncertainty of *Grammar* Rules, *Quia non analogia dimiſſa cœlo formam loquendi dedit*; that which he wanted as to *Grammar*, we have as to Divine Truths; they are deliver'd from Heaven, and therefore are always uniform and agreeable to each other. *Quint. l. 1. cap. 6.*

2. *By Perſons of different intereſts in the World.* GOD made choice of Men of all ranks to be Inditers of his *Oracles*, to make it appear it was no matter of State-policy or particular intereſt which was contain'd in his Word, which Perſons of ſuch different intereſts could not have agreed in as they do. We have *Moſes*, *David*, *Solomon*, Perſons of Royal Rank and Quality; and can it be any mean thing, which theſe think it their glory to be Penners of? We have *Iſaiah*, *Daniel*, and other Perſons of the higheſt Education and Accompliſhments; and can it be

any trivial thing which these imploy themselves in? We have *Amos*, and other Prophets in the Old Testament, and the Apostles in the New, of the meaner sort of Men in the World, yet all these join in consort together; when God tunes the Spirits, all agree in the same strain of Divine Truths, and give light and harmony to each other.

3. *By persons in different places and conditions:* Some in prosperity in their own Country, some under banishment and adversity, yet all agreeing in the same substance of Doctrine; of which no alteration we see was made either for the flattery of those in power, or for avoiding miseries and calamities. And under all the different dispensations before, under and after the Law, tho' the management of things was different, yet the Doctrine and Design was for Substance the same in all. All the different Dispensations agree in the same common Principles of Religion; the same ground of acceptance with GOD, and obligation to duty, was common to all, tho' the peculiar instances wherein GOD was serv'd might be different, according to the Ages of growth in the Church of God. So that this great uniformity consider'd in these circumstances, is an Argument that these things came originally from the same Spirit, tho' convey'd thro' different Instruments to the knowledg of the World.

5. *In a persuasive and convincing manner:* and that these ways. 1. *Bringing Divine Truths down to our capacity*, clothing spiritual matter in familiar expressions and similitudes, that so they might have the easier admission into our Minds. 2. *Propounding things as our interest which are our duty.* Thence God so frequently in Scripture recommends our Duties to us under all those motives which are wont to have the greatest force on the Minds of Men; and annexeth gracious Promises to our Performance of them; and those of the most weighty and concerning things. Of *Grace*, *Favor*, *Protection*, *Deliverance*, *Audience of Prayers*, and *Eternal Happiness:* and if these will not prevail with Men, what Motives will? 3. *Courting us to Obedience, when he might not only command us to obey, but punish presently for disobedience.* Hence are all those most pathetical and affectionate strains we read in Scripture. *O that there was*
Deut. 5. 29. *such a heart within them, that they would fear me and keep all my commandments always, that it might go well with them, and with their chil-*
Jer. 13. 27. *dren after them. Wo unto thee, O Jerusalem, wilt thou not be made*
Ezek. 33. 11. *clean? when shall it once be? Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways, for why will ye die, O house of Israel? How shall I give thee up,*
Hos. 11. 8. *Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, Israel? how shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? mine heart is turned within me,*
Matth. 23. 37. *my repentings are kindled together. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not.* What Majesty, and yet what sweetness and condescension is there in these expressions? What obstinacy and rebellion is it in Men for them to stand out against God, when he thus comes down from his Throne of Majesty, and wooes rebellious Sinners to return unto him that they may be pardoned? Such a matchless and unparallel'd strain of *Rhetoric* is there in the Scripture, far above the Art and Insinuations of the most admired *Orators*. Thus we see the peculiar excellency of the manner wherein the matters contain'd in Scripture are reveal'd to us. Thus we have consider'd the Excellency of the Scripture, as it is a Discovery of God's Mind to the World.

X. 2. The Scriptures may be considered as a *Rule of Life*, or as a *Law of God*, which is given for the Government of the Lives of Men, and

therein the Excellency of it lies in the Nature of the Duties, and the Encouragements to the Practice of them.

1. In the Nature of the Duties requir'd, which are *most becoming* God *to require*, most reasonable for us to perform.

1. *Most becoming* God *to require*, as they are most suitable and agreeable to the Divine Nature, the imitation of which in our Actions, is the substance of our Religion. Imitation of him in his Goodness and Holiness, by our constant Endeavours of mortifying Sin, and growing in Grace and Piety. In his Grace and Mercy, by our kindness to all Men, forgiving the injuries Men do unto us, *doing good to our greatest enemies.* In his Justice and Equity, by *doing as we would be done by, and keeping a conscience void of offence towards* God *and towards Men.* The first takes in the Duties of the first, the other the Duties of the second Table. *All acts of piety towards* God, are a part of Justice; for, as *Tully* saith, *Quid aliud est pietas, nisi justitia adversus Deos?* and so *our loving* God *with our whole hearts, our intire and sincere obedience to his Will,* is a part of Natural Justice; for thereby we do but render unto God that which is his due from us as we are his Creatures. We see then the whole Duty of Man, *the fearing* God *and keeping his Commandments,* is as necessary a part of Justice, as the rendring to every Man his own is.

2. They are most reasonable for us to perform, in that, 1. *Religion* is not only a service of the reasonable Faculties which are imploy'd the most in it, the commands of the Scripture reaching the heart most in it, and the service requir'd being a spiritual Service, not lying in Meats and Drinks, or any outward Observations, but in a sanctify'd temper of Heart and Mind, which discovers it self in the course of a *Christian*'s Life: But, 2. The Service it self of Religion is reasonable; the Commands of the *Gospel* are such as no Man's Reason which considers them can doubt of the excellency of them. All Natural Worship is founded on the Dictates of Nature, all instituted Worship on God's revealed Will; and it is one of the prime Dictates of Nature, that God must be universally obey'd. Besides, God requires nothing but what is apparently Man's interest to do; God prohibits nothing but what will destroy him if he doth it; so that the Commands of the Scriptures are very just and reasonable.

2. The Encouragements are more than proportionable to the difficulty of Obedience. God's Commands are in themselves easie, and most suitable to our Natures. What more rational for a Creature than to obey his Maker? All the difficulty of Religion ariseth from the corruption of Nature. Now God, to encourage Men to conquer the difficulties arising thence, hath propounded the strongest Motives and most prevailing Arguments to Obedience. Such are the considerations of God's Love and Goodness manifested to the World, by sending his Son into it, to die for Sinners, and to give them an example which they are to follow, and by his readiness thro' him to pardon the sins, and accept the Persons of such who *so receive him as to walk in him*, and by his Promises of Grace to assist them in the wrestling with the enemies of their Salvation. And to all these add that glorious and unconceivable reward which God hath promis'd to all those who sincerely obey him; and by these things we see how much the encouragements over-weigh the difficulties, and that none can make the least pretence that there is not motive sufficient to down-weigh the troubles which attend the exercise of Obedience to the Will of God. Thus we see what a peculiar excellency there is in the

Scriptures as a Rule of Life, above all the Precepts of mere *Moraliſts*; the foundation of Obedience being laid deeper in Man's Obligation to ſerve his Maker, the practice of Obedience being carry'd higher in thoſe moſt holy Precepts which are in Scripture, the reward of Obedience being incomparably greater than what Men are able to conceive, much leſs to promiſe or beſtow.

3. The Excellency of the Scriptures appears, as they contain in them a Covenant of Grace, or the Tranſactions between God and Man, in order to his eternal Happineſs. The more memorable any Tranſactions are, the more valuable are any authentic Records of them. The Scriptures contain in them the *Magna Charta* of Heaven, an Act of Pardon with the Royal Aſſent of Heaven, a Proclamation of Good-will from God towards Men; and can we then ſet too great a value on that which contains all the remarkable paſſages between God and the Souls of Men, in order to their Felicity, from the beginning of the World? Can we think, ſince there is a God in the World of infinite Goodneſs, that he ſhould ſuffer all Mankind to periſh inevitably, without his propounding any means for eſcaping of eternal Miſery? Is God ſo good to Men as to this preſent Life; and can we think if Man's Soul be immortal, as we have prov'd it is, that he ſhould wholly neglect any offer of Good to Men as to their eternal Welfare? Or is it poſſible to imagine that Man ſhould be happy in another World without God's promiſing it, and preſcribing conditions in order to it? If ſo, then this Happineſs is no free gift of God, unleſs he hath the beſtowing and promiſing of it; and Man is no rational Agent, unleſs a Reward ſuppoſe conditions to be perform'd in order to the obtaining it; or Man may be bound to conditions which were never requir'd of him; or if they muſt be requir'd, then there muſt be a Revelation of God's Will, whereby he doth require them: And if ſo, then there are ſome Records extant of the Tranſactions between God and Man, in order to his eternal Happineſs: For what reaſon can we have to imagine that ſuch Records, if once extant, ſhould not continue ſtill, eſpecially ſince the ſame Goodneſs of God is engag'd to preſerve ſuch Records, which at firſt did cauſe them to be indited? Suppoſing then ſuch Records, extant ſomewhere in the World of theſe grand Tranſactions between God and Mens Souls, our buſineſs is brought to a Period; for what other Records are there in the World that can in the leaſt vye with the Scriptures, as to the giving ſo juſt an account of all the Tranſactions between God and Men from the foundation of the World, which gives us all the ſteps, methods and ways whereby God hath made known his Mind and Will to the World, in order to Man's eternal Salvation. It remains only then that we adore and magnifie the Goodneſs of God in making known his Will to us, and that we ſet a value and eſteem on the Scriptures, as on the only authentick Inſtruments of that *Grand Charter of Peace*, which God hath reveal'd in order to Man's eternal Happineſs.

FINIS.

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

OR, A

RATIONAL ACCOUNT

Of the GROUNDS of

NATURAL and REVEAL'D

RELIGION:

WHEREIN

The Foundations of Religion, and the AUTHORITY of the SCRIPTURES, are Asserted and Clear'd.

WITH

An ANSWER to the MODERN OBJECTIONS

OF

ATHEISTS and *DEISTS.*

In FIVE BOOKS.

By the Right Reverend Father in GOD,

EDWARD late Lord Bishop of WORCESTER.

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ORIGINES

5

ORIGINES SACRÆ.

BOOK I.

Discourse I.

CHAP. I.

The General Prejudices againſt Religion in our Age examin'd; and the old Atheiſtical Hypotheſes *conſider'd.*

BEFORE I come to the particular Vindication of the *Truth* and *Authority* of the *Holy Scriptures*, which is my chief Deſign, it will be neceſſary to remove, if poſſible, the common and general Prejudices againſt Religion in this Age, as if it were only a cunning Artifice of ſome crafty Perſons to ſupport their own intereſt by deceiving the reſt of Mankind. If this were the truth of the caſe, none ought to be blam'd for their Contempt of Religion; nor for their endeavors to ſet the Minds of Men free from the uneaſineſs and ſlavery of a ſuperſtitious and groundleſs Fear. For this muſt be all that is imply'd in Religion, if it were at firſt begun, and is ſtill carry'd on by the Craft of ſome Men, and the Folly of the reſt. But ſuch an imputation as this ought to be very well grounded, becauſe it reflects on all Mankind (a very few excepted) and ought in common juſtice to be prov'd by the moſt clear and convincing Evidence; becauſe no Men have any reaſon to preſume ſo far upon their own Wit and Capacity above all others, as to take it for granted, that the reſt of Mankind are either *Fools* or *Knaves*. For this is the meaning of thoſe who go about to perſuade others, that Religion is nothing but *an Impoſture*, that hath appear'd under ſeveral ſhapes and diſguiſes; but ſtill the *Machine* is the ſame, and the ſame Deſign carry'd on by the different Actors, according to the Humor and Inclination of ſeveral Ages.

I could be glad, that all this might juſtly be look'd on as a feign'd caſe, only for a better Introduction to the following Diſcourſes; but none that live in our Age, and underſtand the too great prevalency of Scepticiſm and Infidelity in it, can apprehend it to be ſo. And therefore I ſhall lay down the true ſtate of the preſent Caſe, with reſpect to Religion in general. It cannot be deny'd by the greateſt Enemies to it, that there is ſtill a general Belief of the truth of it among Mankind, however they differ in their particular Notions about it. For this cannot be look'd on as a new Thing, or an Invention of the preſent Age, ſince it is manifeſt by the undoubted Hiſtory of former Times, that the ſame foundations of Religion have been generally receiv'd by Mankind; by which I underſtand the Being of God and Providence, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of a future State; but yet not ſo, but that there have been

in ſeveral Ages ſuch as have gone about to unſettle Mens Minds about them, and to repreſent them as an invention of *Politicians* to keep the World in greater Awe. But they have not met with ſuch ſucceſs as they expected in their Diſcoveries; for they have been oppos'd by the wiſeſt and moſt thoughtful Men in the ſeveral Ages they appear'd in; and the generality of Mankind continu'd in the ſame Belief which they had before. And yet they had then the ſame inclinations to Eaſe and Pleaſure, as they now have, and would have been as willing to be rid of the terrible apprehenſions of God and another World; they had the ſame value and eſteem for themſelves and their own intereſts, and hated all ſuch as deſign'd to cheat them; they fell into warm Diſputes and violent Heats about ſome particular Parts and Modes of Religion, which are apt to make them call all the reſt into queſtion: Yet under all theſe diſadvantages, the Foundations of Religion have been preſerv'd among them; and Mankind cannot be brought to look on them as *an Impoſture*. But thoſe who think ſo, are forc'd in great meaſure to conceal their thoughts, and to put on diſguiſes to the World, that they may appear to be of another Mind than really they are.

Whence then comes it to paſs, that thoſe who are averſe to the Practice of Religion, yet cannot be brought to ſhake off the Principles of it? That thoſe who are otherwiſe ſo fond of their own eaſe and intereſt, ſhould abhor thoſe Atheiſtical Principles, which are ſaid to be very much for the advantage of both? That thoſe Nations which have had no communication with each other, and differ ſo much from one another in Languages, Cuſtoms, and Modes of Religion, yet agree in the ſame common ſenſe of God, and a future ſtate?

It is a ridiculous thing for any to pretend to make our Religion to be *an Impoſture*, unleſs they can firſt give a juſt and ſatisfactory account of theſe things.

All that I can meet with to that purpoſe may be reduc'd to theſe three Heads; which contain the great *Atheiſtical* Pretences of this Age.

I. That the Notions of Religion were firſt ſtarted among rude and barbarous People by *Politicians*, to keep the People in better awe; and that the *Prieſts* found it their intereſt to ſupport them, becauſe they were ſupported by them.

II. That there are ſome *Peculiar Qualities in Mankind*, which join'd with their *Ignorance* and *Fear*, tend to preſerve *that ſeed of Religion which is in Man, and no other living Creature.*

III. That the Conſent of Mankind is not ſo great, as is pretended, there being ſeveral Nations now known by the late diſcoveries, which have no ſenſe or notion of God, or a future ſtate.

Theſe are the things, which I ſhall now make it my buſineſs to inquire into; and thereby ſhew the vanity and folly of theſe general Prejudices againſt Religion.

I begin with the firſt, That Religion was firſt invented and carry'd on by *Politicians* and *Prieſts*, who aim'd only at keeping the World in better awe, and Themſelves in a better condition. This hath been ſuggeſted by Atheiſtical Perſons in all Ages, where they have dar'd to appear; and was thought the moſt plauſible Artifice to draw in the People to their party; for no Men love to be impos'd upon, eſpecially in what concerns their eaſe and intereſt: But they were not able to make out the Perſons, Times, or Places, when the Notions of Religion were firſt ſpread among Mankind. For they could never produce any inſtances of Perſons who

deſign'd

deſign'd to impoſe upon Mankind in matters of Religion, but they found the general Principles of Religion were entertain'd among them before; as will appear by the following Examples of the *Egyptians* and *Greeks*, which are moſt inſiſted upon.

The *Egyptians* are ſaid by *Lucian* to have been the firſt who ſet up *Religious Worſhip*; and *Herodotus* ſeems to be of the ſame opinion. *Plutarch* ſaith it was done by *Oſiris*, and *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith *it was directed by* Hermes, *who was a great Politician, and chief Counſellor to* Oſiris. But all that *Diodorus* ſaith, is, *that he brought the Honors and Services of the Gods into Order*; which ſuppoſes that there was Religion among them before, but he methodiz'd it. And if we believe *Sanchoniathon*, who makes him firſt Counſellor to *Cronus* Father to *Miſor* or *Oſiris*, he began *the Symbolical Images of the Gods*, which caus'd ſuch confuſion in their Worſhip afterwards. *Diodorus* ſaith *that* Oſiris *built* Thebes *or* Dioſpolis, where there was a Temple to *the Immortal God that made the World*, as appears by the Teſtimonies both of *Plutarch* and *Porphyry*. And the former obſerves, *That the moſt ancient, and univerſal and moſt credible Tradition, both of Law-givers and others, Philoſophers, as well as Poets and Divines, was, that the World was not made by chance, without a Mind and Reaſon to order and govern it.* From whence it follows, That before ſuch *Politicians* took upon them to order matters of Religion, there was a generally receiv'd Tradition of a Divine Being, which made and govern'd the World, and was the true foundation on which religious Worſhip was built. And the ſame *Plutarch* in that Diſcourſe affirms it to be *an Impious and Atheiſtical Opinion to attribute the Name of* GOD *to inſenſible Matter*; and adds, *that there is one univerſal Reaſon which governs the World.* *Ammianus Marcellinus* ſaith, *that the firſt beginnings of Religion were in* Egypt *long before they were in other parts.* Here therefore we muſt ſearch out for the firſt laying this deſign by *Politicians*; and here we find it fix'd upon *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*, who by the accounts given of him, was a very great Man, and that in the beginning of the *Egyptian Monarchy*. *Philo Byblius* ſaith, he was call'd by the *Egyptians Thoth*, by the *Phœnicians Taautus*, by the *Greeks Hermes*: He flouriſh'd, he ſaith, *with great reputation for Wiſdom among the* Phœnicians; who it ſeems at that time were under the Government of *Cronus* Father to *Oſiris* (or *Miſor*, as they call'd him from *Miſraim*, the Son of *Ham*, who firſt peopled thoſe Countries.) And ſo far there is nothing improbable in the Story: For the ſame Perſon being of an extraordinary Capacity, might be in favor both with *Cronus* in *Phœnicia*, and with *Oſiris* afterwards in *Egypt*. But he goeth on, and ſaith, That *Taautus* was *the firſt who took the matters of religious Worſhip out of the hands of unſkilful Men, and brought them into due Method and Order.* So that we find plainly there was Religion among the People before: But this wiſe Politician thought he could manage it better, if he appointed the Rites of publick Worſhip, ſo as to be moſt ſerviceable to Government; and for that end he ſet up the worſhip of Princes after their Death (eſpecially of *Oſiris*, after his being cut in pieces by his Brother, and joyn'd their Names with thoſe of the Stars, as viſible Deities; and of ſome Animals, as ſo many living Images of their Gods. And herein, as far as we can find, lay the politick invention of *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*; not in the firſt planting the principles of Religion, but in turning them that way, as he thought would ſerve beſt to the ends of Government, by raiſing a high veneration for deceas'd Monarchs, and deifying ſuch things as they thought moſt uſeful

Lucian. de Deâ Syriâ. *Herodot.* 2. 4. *Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſiride.* *Diod. Siculi.* l. 1. *Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l.* 1. c. 10. *Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſirid.* *Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l.* 3. c. 11. *Plutarch.* ib. p. 369. *Ammian. Marc. l.* 22. *Euſeb. Pr. Ev. l.* 1. c. 10. p. 40.

Πρῶτος τὰ περὶ τὴν θεοσέβειαν ἐκ τῆς χυδαίων ἀπειρίας εἰς ὀπτικὴν ἐμπειρίαν διέταξεν.

to Mankind. This was indeed playing the *Politician* with Religion. But that there was a ſenſe of Religion before among the People, not only appears by the former Saying of *Philo Byblius*, but by another in his *Proem* to *Sanchoniathon*; where he ſaith, *That the* Phœnicians *and* Egyptians *agreed (from whom other Nations took it up) to worſhip thoſe as their chief Gods, which were moſt uſeful to Mankind; and to this purpoſe they turn'd the Temples already ſtanding, and erected Pillars and Statues to their Memories, and made Feſtivals to them.* From whence it appears that there were Rites of publick Worſhip among them before; but that *Hermes* caus'd them to be imploy'd this way, joining the Worſhip of the Stars and their Kings together.

Καὶ εἰς τὸ χρεὼν καταστάντας ναοὺς μετασκευασάμενοι.

But there are two very different accounts concerning that Religion which was firſt ſetled by *Hermes* in *Egypt*. The one is of thoſe who believe there are ſome remainders of the old *Egyptian* Doctrine in the *Triſmegiſtick Books*, tho' with many additions and interpolations. And their Opinion is, that under all the popular Diſguiſes and ſuperſtitious Ceremonies for amuſing the Common People, he did cover the true Principles of Natural Religion, aſſerting the Being and Providence of God, and the Immortality of Souls. And for this, they produce not only divers paſſages in thoſe Books of *Hermes*, which were known in the *Egyptian* times, while their Prieſts were yet in being to have contradicted them, if they had publiſh'd Falſhoods under ſo great a Name; but from the Teſtimonies of *Plutarch* and *Iamblicus*, which cannot be ſuſpected: To which the Opinions of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, who ſojourn'd ſo long among the *Egyptian* Prieſts to learn their Doctrine, may be added. But it is not pretended that in thoſe times this was the common and profeſs'd Religion among the People; but that it was kept up *as a Secret*, not to be communicated but only to ſuch who were prepar'd for it. According to this opinion, the deſign of *Hermes* was not to eſtabliſh any true Religion among the People, but to entertain them with Pomp, and Sacrifices, and Ceremonies; and (as ſome in *Plutarch* and *Diodorus* think) to keep up a difference among them about the ſacred Animals, to ſecure them from an univerſal Conſpiracy againſt the Monarchy. But if the true Notions of God, and Providence, and another World, were preſerv'd among the Prieſts, eſpecially at *Dioſpolis*, or the famous *Thebes*, where the chief of their reſidence was; then it appears, that theſe were not ſcatter'd among the Common People, by *Prieſts* and *Politicians*; but were kept ſecret, as not ſo fit for their capacities, which would go no further than viſible Deities, and a pompous Worſhip. So that the True Principles of Religion were not ſow'd by them to ſerve their ends, but the Corruptions of it, in order to the pleaſing and entertaining the ſenſes and devotions of the Common People, who they knew were moſt affected with what was moſt agreeable to their ſuperſtitious fancies. And there was much more of *Policy* than *Religion*, in keeping the Beſt parts of it from the knowledg of the People: but the *Politicians* knew very well, thoſe would not ſerve their turn ſo well as the fopperies of their Superſtition.

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir. p. 380. Diod. Sic. l. 1.

But there is another opinion which depends moſt upon the credit of *Philo Byblius*, who liv'd about *Hadrian*'s time. This Man being learned, had a mind to make ſome noiſe in the World with the *Antiquities* of his own Country (for *Byblus* was a *Phœnician* Town.) He found the *Jewiſh* Antiquities aſſerted by *Joſephus* and others, and the *Egyptian* by *Apion*; and now he thought was a fit time to vie with them both. To that end,

end, he produces Nine Books of the *Phœnician Antiquities*, written, as he pretended, long ſince by *Sanchoniathon*, and tranſlated by him into *Greek*; which he pretends *to have found after a moſt diligent ſearch into the* Phœnician *Monuments*. And to make it appear how credible this account of *Sanchoniathon* was, he ſaith, *He took it out of the Records of Cities, and the Monuments of Temples; which were kept up in the ſacred Ammonian Letters.* And this Man is very much commended by *Porphyry* writing againſt the *Chriſtians* for his *Antiquity* and *Veracity*. What ground there is for theſe Pretences may be examin'd afterwards; I am now only to conſider the Scheme of Religion, which is produc'd with ſo much pomp; and yet the Author of it, whoever he was, was neither Divine, Philoſopher, nor Politician, for it is one of the rankeſt and moſt inſipid pieces of Atheiſm that is to be found in Antiquity. And *Porphyry* could not but deteſt it, unleſs he had produc'd it in ſpite to the *Chriſtians*. For he doth on all occaſions declare not only his belief of GOD and Providence, but that he was the Maker of the World; as *Holſtenius* hath made it appear in his Life, *cap.* 9. and it is well known that he was a profeſs'd *Platoniſt*. But let us now ſee what an account we have from this *Phœnician Scheme*, about the making of the World. "At firſt there was a dark, "confus'd, reſtleſs Chaos, which was agitated for a long time, and no- "thing came of it. At length a mixture happened, and this was the "firſt principle of making the Univerſe: but it was ignorant of its own "making. From this Mixture came *Môt*, or a ſlimy kind of ſubſtance, "out of which iſſued the Generation of all things. There were ſome "Animals which had no Senſe, out of which came thoſe which had Un- "derſtanding, and were called *Zophaſemin*, i. e. Beholders of the Hea- "vens, and were made in the figure of an Egg: and the *Môt* ſhined "forth, and the Sun and Moon and great Stars appear'd. But it ſeems "thoſe living Creatures were faſt aſleep, till they were awaked by dread- "ful Thunders, and then they began to beſtir themſelves. This is the ſhort account of this matter, which depends not, we are told, on *Sanchoniathon*'s Authority; *but he took it out of the Records of* Taautus *himſelf*. And ſo we have the Original of the World according to this ancient *Hermes*. And if this were his true Doctrine, it is one of the moſt abſurd and ſenſleſs pieces of Atheiſm, and tends directly to overthrow all Religion in the World. For can any thing do it more effectually, than to ſuppoſe that there was nothing originally in the World but ſtupid Matter; which by its own motion, without a GOD to give and direct it, ſhould produce the Heavens and Earth, and all living Creatures; and that Senſleſs Creatures ſhould beget thoſe that had Underſtanding; and theſe not capable of acting, till they were thoroughly awaked by cracks of Thunder? Can we imagin this *Taautus* to have been any deep Philoſopher or Politician, by ſetting down ſuch extravagant and unreaſonable ſuppoſitions as theſe? But let us ſee how it was poſſible for him to advance any thing like Religion upon theſe grounds: He muſt be a Politician indeed, that could do it. The firſt Men, he ſaith, conſecrated the Fruits of the Earth, by which they liv'd, and worſhip'd them, and made oblations to them. This was a very notable beginning of Religion, according to this admirable Politician, for Mankind to worſhip what they devour'd. But *Cotta* in *Cicero* thought **No Man could be ſo mad to worſhip what he did eat.* But he ſaith, *That theſe notions of Worſhip were ſutable to their weakneſs and puſillanimity.* This doth not give any account how they came to have any notions of Divine Worſhip at all. What was there

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 1. c. 9.

Euſeb. l. 10. c. 9.

* *Ecquem tam amentem eſſe putas, ut illud quo veſcatur credat Deum eſſe?* Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3. c. 16.

there in the Plants, which made them give such Reverence and Devotion to them? They saw how they grew out of the Earth, and had no power to help themselves, when they made use of them for food. And how was it possible then to give Divine Worship to them? which must suppose Power at least in what is worship'd, or else it is a most ridiculous folly in Mankind to stoop to things so much below them. Now this original inclination to give Divine Worship to something or other, is that which argues that there is that which some call a Natural Seed of Religion in Human Nature; and must come from some antecedent Cause, since there could be nothing in these Objects of Worship, which should move them to it; if it had been so, as *Sanchoniathon* represents it from the ancient Records of *Taautus*.

The two first Mortals, he saith, *were* Æon *and* Protogonus; *and their Children were* Genus *and* Genea, *who inhabited* Phœnicia; *and when they were scorched with the heat, they lift up their hands to the Sun, whom they believ'd to be the Lord of Heaven, and called him* Beel-samen, *the same*, saith he, *whom the Greeks call Ζεύς*. But how came they to imagin any Lord of Heaven, if they knew that the Sun was made out of senseless Matter, as well as themselves? It may be said, *That they being weak and ignorant, did not know it.* But how then came their posterity to know it, if the very first Race of Mankind were ignorant of it? By what means came *Taautus* to be so well inform'd? Revelation cannot be pretended, for that supposes what they deny, *viz.* a Supreme Being, above Matter, which hath Understanding, and gives it to Mankind. But here Mankind come to be understanding Creatures, by being born of Animals that had no Sense: which is a most unreasonable Supposition. They could not have it by original Tradition; for that fails in the Fountain-head, if the first pair of Mortals knew nothing of it. Then they must find it out by Reason: and how was that possible, if there was no Maker of the World, that there should be *a Lord of Heaven?* It is a remarkable Saying of *Aristotle* observ'd by *Cicero*, (who saw several of his pieces which we have not, after they were brought to *Rome* by *Sylla*, and put into order by *Andronicus Rhodius*) That if there were Men bred under ground, and had there all conveniencies of Life, without coming upon the surface of the Earth; but should only hear that there was a God and a Divine Power; and afterwards these Persons should come out of their Caves, and behold the Earth, Sea, and the Heavens, the greatness of the Clouds, the force of the Wind, the bulk, and beauty, and influence of the Sun, with the orderly motions and courses of the heavenly Bodies: they could not but think, not only that there was a Divine Power, but that these things were the effects of it. And why should there not have been the same thoughts in this first Race of Mankind, unless we can suppose that they had never heard of any such thing as God, or a Divine Power in the World? But then I ask, How they should come to think of worshipping this *Beel-samen* or Lord of the Heavens? for so he confesses they did, and *lift up their hands to the Sun.* What could the lifting up their hands signify to a senseless mass of Fire, which lately happened to be united together by chance in one body? If he had made Mankind wholly devoid of Religion, till they had been instructed in it by some crafty Politician, it had been much more agreeable to this *Hypothesis*; but to suppose them to pray to the Heavenly Bodies so early, and without any Instructor, must imply some natural apprehension of a Deity, altho' they were so much mistaken in the Object of

De Nat. Deor. l. 2. 37.

Divine Worſhip. But it is not reaſonable to believe this ſhould have been ſo early and ſo univerſal, but that they preſum'd the Sun, Moon, and Stars to have been the viſible Deities appointed to govern the viſible World; and that the Supreme Mind was to be worſhip'd in a way ſutable to his own Excellency, by acts of the Mind; which was the opinion of many Nations, and ſome of the greateſt Philoſophers.

Then he proceeds to relate, how after ſome of their poſterity had found out ſome uſeful Inventions as to the conveniences of Life; after their death their Children erected Statues and Pillars to their Memories, and worſhip'd and kept annual Feſtivals at them: and that after the death of *Uranus*, and *Cronus*, and *Dagon*, and the reſt, *Taautus* made Symbolical Images of them, being made King of *Egypt* by *Cronus*; and theſe things he ſaith, the *Cabiri*, by *Taautus* his own command, enter'd into Records, from whence we are to believe that *Sanchoniathon* took them, and *Philo Byblius* tranſlated them out of the *Phœnician* Language. And *Euſebius* ſeems not to queſtion the antiquity of them, but prefers this plain and ſimple Story far before the Inventions of Poets, or the Allegories of the Philoſophers. If theſe things were recorded by the *Cabiri*, the Sons of *Sydyc*, Brother to *Miſor*, the Father of *Taautus*, they do not ſeem to have conſulted the honour of *Taautus*; for they make him not barely to be chief Counſellor to *Cronus*, in the deſign againſt his Father *Uranus*, but that he made uſe of Magical Arts againſt him, (but they do not tell us who invented them, nor upon what principles they could be founded, if there were nothing but Matter in the World) and beſides this, he adviſ'd *Cronus*, having a ſuſpicion of his Brother, to bury him alive in the Earth. And one would think ſo great a Politician as *Hermes*, would never have commanded the *Cabiri* to have preſerv'd theſe Stories of himſelf and his Anceſtors.

However, this is the account given by *Philo Byblius*, out of *Sanchoniathon*, about the firſt planting Religion by *Hermes*, who was after worſhipped himſelf as a God by the *Egyptians*. And now let any one conſider, whether this be a reaſonable or tolerable account of the firſt *ſowing the ſeeds of Religion among Mankind*. And yet this was the foundation of that ſort of Religion which came out of *Phœnicia* and *Egypt* into *Greece*: For they pretend to give an account of *Uranus* and *Cronus*, or *Saturn* and his Sons, and of *Minerva* at *Athens*, to whom *Sanchoniathon* ſaith, *Saturn gave the dominion of it*; but the *Greeks*, as *Philo Byblius* complains, *confounded all with their Fables and Allegories*: but this, he ſaith, is the true foundation which they rais'd their *Mythology* upon.

It is evident by what is ſaid by *Herodotus*, *Diodorus Siculus* and others, that there were ſeveral Colonies that went out of *Egypt* into *Greece*, in the times of *Cecrops*, *Cadmus*, *Danaus*, and *Erectheus*; and it is very probable that they carry'd the *Egyptian* Superſtitions along with them: but the Perſon who is pretended to have ſetled Religion among the *Greeks*, was *Orpheus*, who is ſaid to have reduc'd them firſt from Barbariſm, and then to have model'd Religion among them, and to have brought out of *Egypt* the Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of a Future State.

This muſt therefore be more particularly inquired into. *Orpheus* is reported to have been a Man of Quality in his own Country of *Thrace*, his Father having a Command over a ſmall Territory there, called *Sithonia*, * ſaith *Pliny*, near the Mountain *Rhodope*, whence he had his Title *Rhodopeius Orpheus*. But † *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, *That when he had accompliſhed*

* *Plin. l. 4. c. 11.* † *Diod. Sic. l. 1. & 4.* *Euſeb. Pr. Evang. l. 2. c. 1.*

compliſhed himſelf at home, he went into Egypt; *and from thence brought the greateſt part of the* Egyptian *Myſteries into* Greece, *only changing the Names from* Oſiris *and* Iſis, *to* Bacchus *and* Ceres; and ſo he did, *as to* L. 10. c. 8. *the ſtate of the Good and Bad after death.* For, ſaith he, *The* Elyſian *Fields for the Good, and the Torments of* Hades *for the Bad, were both of* Egyptian *original.* I do not queſtion but the *Egyptian* Superſtition was in great meaſure the foundation of the *Greek*; but it is hard to determin any thing concerning *Orpheus*, ſince *Ariſtotle*, who was born in *Macedonia*, *knew nothing of him*, as *Cicero* informs us, and *that the Verſes under his* De Nat. Deor. l. 1. *Name were written by a* Pythagorean. Which is not at all improbable. But not only *Diodorus* ſpeaks poſitively about him, but *Strabo* and *Pauſanias* ſeem not at all to queſtion him; and *Diogenes Laertius* mentions an Epitaph upon him at *Dios* in *Macedonia*: But I lay no weight on the Verſes under his Name; for *Suidas* mentions ſeveral antient Poets of that Name; and it is allow'd on all hands, that there have been at leaſt great Additions and Interpolations in the Verſes that bear the Name of *Orpheus*. The *Argonautics*, *Suidas* ſaith, were written by one *Orpheus* of *Crotone*, one well acquainted with *Piſiſtratus*: Others ſay, the true Author of the *Orphic Poems* was *Onomacritus*, who liv'd about that time; and the *Deſcent into Hades* was written by one *Orpheus* of *Camarine*, ſaith *Suidas*. The moſt probable Opinion is that of *Ariſtotle*, that his Sacred Poems were written by a *Pythagorean*; and therefore the *Platoniſts Syrianus* and *Proclus* might well boaſt of the agreement of the *Orphic* and *Pythagorean* Doctrines. It is no Objection, that there is no ſuch thing now to be found in *Ariſtotle*; for I think *Cicero* may be truſted, who ſaw more of *Ariſtotle* than we now have. But I confeſs if *Diodorus* were not deceiv'd by the *Egyptian* Prieſts, their mentioning him with *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Eudoxus*, and *Democritus*, who were certainly in *Egypt*, makes it very credible, that *Orpheus* had been there too, and carry'd many of the *Egyptian* ſuperſtitions with him: and he might the eaſier ſettle them in *Greece*, becauſe, as *Diodorus Siculus* obſerves, he had a particular intereſt in the Colony which *Cadmus* brought, and was much eſteem'd by them; and *Cadmus* himſelf was originally of *Thebes* or *Dioſpolis*; altho' *Cadmus* himſelf might call it after his own Name; or at leaſt the Caſtle, which long continued it, when the City was called *Thebes*.

But that *Orpheus* did not find thoſe parts ſo barbarous, as to be deſtitute of all Religion before, will appear from the account *Diodorus Siculus* himſelf gives of him, *viz. That he was very well inſtructed in the Theology of his Country before he went into* Egypt. How could this be, if they were a wild and barbarous People, without any ſenſe of GOD and Religion, till he return'd and planted it among them? It's true, he calls it a *Mythology*; and what elſe were the *Egyptian* Doctrines about *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, or about *Bacchus* and *Ceres*, as *Orpheus* chang'd them? But whether it were a *Mythology* or not, he calls it a *Theology*; ſuch as was then known and thought to be true Doctrine, and I am apt to think, more decent and agreeable to their natural notions of Religion, than the Myſteries which *Orpheus* brought among them from the *Egyptians*. Some have obſerv'd, that the very Name of Religion among the *Greeks* was deriv'd from the *Thracians* (Θρησκεία) and ſuch Religion they had among them, before *Orpheus* was born, as *Diodorus* himſelf confeſſes. Whether *Zamolxis* had inſtructed them in Religion before the time of *Orpheus*, we cannot determin, unleſs his time had been better fix'd: The *Greeks*, who write *Pythagoras* his Life in favor to themſelves, make *Zamolxis* his

Καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Θεολογίας μυθολογούμενα μαθὼν, ἀπεδήμησε πρὸς τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους. l. 4. p. 232.

Servant; and that he went from them to inſtruct the *Getæ*, among whom he was honor'd as a God. But *Herodotus*, who extols them *as the moſt valiant and juſt of the* Thracians, after he had told the *Greek* Story about *Zamolxis* being *Servant to* Pythagoras, he concludes, *That he thought him long before* Pythagoras. And he ſaith, *that the* Thracians *had that opinion of his Doctrine, that they deſpis'd Death, ſaying, they only went to* Zamolxis. From whence it is plain, that the *Thracians* then believed the Immortality of the Soul: and *Pomponius Mela* ſaith, *that Belief continu'd among them to his time.* But whereas *Diodorus Siculus* affirms, that Orpheus *brought all the Mythology about* Hades, *and the ſtate of the Dead, out of* Egypt, *and the cuſtoms of Burial there; for the Body was to be convey'd over the Lake* Acheron *by* Charon, *where on one ſide were pleaſant Fields, and not far off the Temple of* Hecate, *and* Cocytus, *and* Lethe: I do not deny that *Orpheus* might add particular circumſtances from what he had obſerv'd in *Egypt*; but that the whole Tradition concerning a Future State came from thence, is ſo ſo far from being true, that the *Thracians*, the *Getæ*, and *Hyperborei* had the like Tradition among them; as appears by the *Gothic Edda*'s, where we read *of the Judgment* of another World, and that the Good ſhall dwell with *Odin* in a happy ſtate, and the Bad go to *Hellen* and *Thiffulheim*: and a large account is given of the manner of Judicature in the other World, from the Braſs Tables of the *Hyperborei* in the Iſland of *Delos*, which are mention'd in the Dialogue *Axiochus* in *Plato*'s Works. And however it be not genuine, it is ſufficient to our purpoſe that all this Tradition came not out of *Egypt*. One would think, by the account given by *Diodorus*, that neither *Orpheus*, nor the *Egyptians*, believ'd any thing at all concerning a Future State: but that only ſome Ceremonies were us'd about Burials, wherein the Lives of Men were enquir'd into, and Judgment paſs'd upon them; which the Hiſtorian thinks more effectual for reforming Mankind, than the *Greek* or Poetical Fables. But that the *Egyptians* had a real Belief of another State, appears from *Diodorus* himſelf. For if any Perſon were accus'd before the ſolemn Judicature, which ſat upon him; if the matter were not prov'd, the Accuſer was ſeverely puniſh'd; if it were, the Body was depriv'd of Burial: If there were no Accuſation, then the Perſon's Virtues were remembred, his Piety, Juſtice, Chaſtity, *&c.* and they concluded with a Prayer, that he might be admitted to the bleſſed Society of the Good; and the People applauded his Happineſs in that reſpect. But *Porphyry*, who cannot be ſuſpected of Forgery in this matter, gives a more particular account of this Prayer, which he ſaith *Euphantus* tranſlated out of the *Egyptian* Language; and the ſubſtance of it is this: They firſt take out the Bowels, and put them into a Cheſt on purpoſe, and then lift it up towards Heaven; and the Perſon to whom it belongs, makes a Prayer in the name of the Deceaſed, to the Sun and all the Gods, which give Life to Men, that they would receive him into the Society of the immortal Gods. For he had piouſly worſhip'd the Gods his Parents had taught him, as long as he liv'd; he had honor'd thoſe from whom he came into the World; he had not kill'd, nor injur'd or defrauded any one, nor had committed any horrible Wickedneſs; but if he had offended in eating and drinking, it was for the ſake of that which was in that Cheſt; and ſo they took that, and threw it into the River, and intombed the reſt of the Body. By this we ſee a diſtinction is to be made between the general ſenſe of another Life, and ſome particular Superſtitions, ſuch as thoſe

Herodot. l. 9. c. 95.

Mela l. 2. c. 2.

Diod. Sic. l. 1. p. 58, 61.

Edda Mythol. c. 3.

Porphyr. de Abſtin. l. 1. c. 10.

Orpheus

Orpheus carry'd into *Greece*, where they had a notion of another World before, as well as in *Egypt*: For it is not reasonable to presume that the *Greeks* should be worse in this respect than the most barbarous Northern People. For, besides those already mention'd, *Cæsar*, and *Strabo*, and *Ammianus Marcellinus* say, *that the* Druids *asserted the Immortality of Souls*; and neither *Orpheus*, nor any out of *Egypt* ever convers'd among them.

Cæs. l. 6. *Strabo l. 4.* *Ammian. Marcellin. l. 15.*

But some in our Age are so fond of the *Egyptians*, that they will by all means make the Immortality of Souls to be *a Noble Invention of theirs*. What is the meaning of this *Noble Invention?* Is it that none ever thought of it before them, and all others deriv'd it from them? That appears already to be otherwise, and that very distant and remote Nations, who had no communication with these Noble Inventors, held the same Opinions; as might, if it were needful, be prov'd by undoubted Testimonies, both of the *East* and *West Indies*, where neither *Orpheus* nor the *Egyptian* Priests were ever heard of. And *Pausanias* long since observ'd, *That the* Chaldeans *and* Indians *held the same*, and before the *Egyptians*; for he *makes them the first*. But *Herodotus* saith, *That the* Egyptians *were the first who asserted the Immortality of Souls*. Not absolutely; *but so as to pass from one Body to another, till at last it came into a human Body*. And of this *Noble Invention* let the *Egyptians* have the due honor; and not those *Greeks*, who, as he saith, *would deprive them of it*. It is great pity they should lose it, since *Diodorus Siculus* saith, *The Soul of* Osiris *past into a Bull, and that is the reason why they give so much honor to it*. It cannot be deny'd, that some *Greek* Philosophers of great reputation did assert the *Transmigration of Souls*, if their Doctrine be not misrepresented: but neither *Pythagoreans* nor *Platonists* did hold it universally, nor in such a manner as is commonly understood. For, they held no Transmigration of the Souls of Good Men, which were fit for Happiness; but asserted that they went immediately to Heaven, or a state of Bliss, as may be prov'd by the testimonies of *Epicharmus*, *Empedocles*, *Plato*, and many others: but the difficulty lay about Impure Souls; the *Pythagoreans* utterly rejected the poetical Fables about the state of the Dead; and therefore they were forc'd to think of some way of purifying them after Death. They had no Light to direct them, but their own Imagination; and they thought it best for the same Soul to come into another Human Body, to try if it would behave it self better, that it might be happy: But for profligate and very wicked Persons, they told them of going into such Beasts, as were most remarkable for those Vices they were most addicted to; as the Cruel into Tygers and Beasts of Prey; the Voluptuous into Swine; the Proud and Vain into Birds; the Idle and Soft into Fishes. This is the account given, saith *Bessarion*, by *Timæus* in his Book *de Mundo & Animâ*. And when *Trapezuntius* charg'd *Plato* with asserting that *Brutes were informed by Human Souls*; Cardinal *Bessarion*, a very learned *Greek*, utterly denies it, and saith, *That* Plato *doth not make the Soul of a Man to become the Soul of a Brute; but only that it is confined to it as a Prison for a certain time, but it is not capable of acting there for want of proper Organs*. So that these Philosophers Opinion was very different from the *Egyptians*. But whence came the most antient Philosophers to hold the Immortality of Souls? Had they it from the *Egyptians?* *Plutarch* saith, That Thales *was the first*; not that held the Soul to be immortal; for so many did before him; but that maintained it as a Philosopher by Reason; that is, because it had the Principle

Nobilissimum autem eorum inventum fuit Immortalitas Animæ. Canon. Chron. p. 217.

Pausan. in Messs.

Herodot. l. 2. c. 123.

Diod. Sic. l. p. 54.

Epicharm. apud Grot. Excerpt. p. 481. *Clement. Alex. Str. 5.* *Poësis Philos. p. 28.*

Bessar. cont. Calumn. l. 2. c. 7.

* Θαλῆς δὲ πεφιλοσόφηκε πρῶτος περὶ ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀϊδιον καὶ ἀθάνατον, *Plut. de Plac. Phil. l. 4. c. 2.*

Principle of Motion within it self, and so could not be supposed to forsake it self, or to cease moving by the death of the Body. For, as *Cicero* observes, a Body is moved by impulse from another Body; but the Soul finds it hath this power wholly within and from it self, and therefore is immortal. *Cicero Tusc.* 1. 23.

But *Pythagoras* is said *to have learnt this Doctrine in* Egypt: He called the Soul *a self-moving Number*, saith *Plutarch* in the same place, *i. e.* as he well explains it, he puts *Number* after his mystical way for *a Mind*: and it seems very strange to me that so great a Man as *Aristotle* should think *Pythagoras* spake literally of *Numbers*, as tho' any Number could move it self. But *Plutarch* rightly interpreted him, and the latter *Pythagoreans* from *Moderatus Gadetanus* made no scruple of saying that Pythagoras *expressed his sense about immaterial Beings by Numbers and Figures, as having nothing of Matter in them.* And it is very probable, he learnt this way from the *Symbols* and *Hieroglyphicks* of the *Egyptians*. But *Cicero* saith, *That he had learnt the Immortality of the Soul from his Master* Pherecydes, *which he confirmed very much.* And it is observable, that he first supposes *a general consent of Mankind as to the Immortality of Souls, from a very antient Tradition*; and then proceeds to the *Philosophers*, who offer'd to give Reasons for asserting it, of which he gives an account. And if there were such a general consent *from all Antiquity*, as he affirms, then this Doctrine could not originally come out of *Egypt* by *Orpheus* into *Greece*. *Porphyr. in vit. Pythag. Plutarch. de Isid. & Osir. p. 354. Cicero Tusc.* 1. 16. *Cap.* 13. *Cap.* 12.

Let us now consider the sense of Religion or Divine Worship among the *Greeks* before *Orpheus* his time; whether they were such Strangers to it, as they must be supposed, if he brought it first among them. *Plato* was a very competent Witness as to the *Old Greeks*; and he affirms *that the first Inhabitants of* Greece *seem'd to him to have worship'd no other Gods, but the Sun, Moon, and Earth, and Stars, and the Heavens, as most barbarous Nations still do.* So that here we have the same *Religion* in *Greece*, that was then common to the rest of the World; *i. e.* the Worship of *Visible Deities*, and such as they apprehended to have the greatest influence upon their Affairs. The heavenly Bodies did strike them with astonishment at their Vastness, and Beauty, and orderly Motion, and the Benefits they continually receiv'd from them; and these they were most ready to pay their Devotions to, as to those which appear'd most to them; but that which did not appear, was to them, that were so much govern'd by Sense, as if it were not. As if we suppose a Prince travelling with his Chariot in the Country, with the Curtains drawn up on all sides, and a great Retinue about him; the People are much surprized with so great an Appearance, and flock about them to see to whom they must pay their Respects; and seeing no body in the Chariot, they turn their eyes to the Attendants, and especially to him that sits so high in the Coach-box and manages the Horses; and immediately give him that profound Reverence which was only due to the Prince himself, if he had appear'd. Much after this manner it was with the Barbarous People, both in *Greece* and other parts of the World. There was something so great, as to require Devotion from them; and they looked about them, and could see nothing which they thought could deserve it better than the Sun, Moon, and Stars, which were placed very high, and were the great Movers which kept all things in their order, and made them so serviceable to them. But this is far from being an argument that they had no Religion; it being rather a sign they had *Plato in Cratyl. p.* 397.

too much, but knew not how to govern it. But this was a far more reasonable Worship than that which *Orpheus* or the *Old Poets* brought in among the *Greeks*, whose Stories and Ceremonies were so filthy and indecent, as were enough to have turn'd the stomachs of modest and virtuous Men from any kind of Worship, which had the tincture of so much Obscenity going along with it. And it is really to be wonder'd at, that the *Orphick Mysteries* and *poetical Fables* receiv'd among the *Greeks*, did not quite overthrow all Religion among them. For, as *Plutarch* well saith, *Absurd Notions of* God *have very bad consequences both ways; for some are plung'd into the depth of Superstition, and others, to avoid that, run themselves into Atheism.* And if there had not been some very great reason in Nature, to have kept the Notion of a Deity in Mens Minds; it is hardly conceivable, that under all the horrible Superstitions of *Greece*, there should be any such thing as a sense of Religion left among them. But the evidence of that was so great, as made all Men of Understanding to put any tolerable sense upon those *vile Superstitions*, which were so prevailing in *Greece*, after the *Egyptian Fopperies* were brought in among them. The Rule they went by was this, That Religion must be preserv'd in the World, not to serve Politick Ends, but to satisfy the Reason and common Sense of Mankind; and that since such a way of Worship was so generally receiv'd, they were willing to put the best constructions upon it, and to make it some way or other serve to keep up the sense of a Divine Power in the management of the World. And of this we have a remarkable instance in *Plutarch*, with respect to the *Egyptian Mysteries*, in his Treatise of *Isis* and *Osiris*. He professes at first *a great desire to find out the truth of these things that concern the knowledg of* God, *it being the greatest Blessing* God *can give, and Mankind can receive; and that without it Immortality is not Life, but Duration. And the end of all*, he saith, *is the knowledg of the first and principal and intellectual Being.* But he can make nothing at all of the *Matters of fact* with relation to *Osiris* and *Isis*, which he looks on as very absurd, and so overthrows all the *Phœnician Scheme* of *Philo Byblius*, who lived much about the same time under *Trajan*: But *Plutarth* saith, *To understand those things of a Divine Being literally, is so absurd and impious, that they deserve to be spit at who offer them.* And for those, *who interpret these things of great Princes in former times, who had Divine Honor given them, this*, he saith, *is the way to overthrow the natural sense of a Divine Being, and so open the way to Atheism, by confounding Gods and Men together*; as he saith, *Euhemerus Messenius* had done. And therefore he was fain to turn all into *Allegory*, to avoid the mischief of absurd and impious Opinions concerning that Divine Power, which he owned to be in the World; and not only so, but he adds (as is already observed) that *there was a very antient Tradition in the World, among all sorts of Men; and which had obtained a firm and unshaken Belief in the World, not only in common talk, but in their greatest Mysteries, and that both among Greeks and Barbarians, that the Universe was not made by chance, or without reason, but that it was made and governed by it.* From whence it follows, that there was such a Tradition among the *old Greeks*, which did not lose its Authority, when those Mysteries were brought in; and that made the most intelligent Persons to apply them that way. For it seems, by the account he gives of *Euhemerus Messenius*, that Atheistical Persons took great advantages

Plutarch. de Isid. & Osir.

Ὧν τέλος ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν πρώτου καὶ κυρίου τὴν νοητὴν γνῶσις. p. 352.

P. 358.

Διὰ τὴν παμπάλαιον αὕτη ἐκ Θεολόγων τὴν νομοθετῶν εἴς τε ποιητὰς, τὴν φιλοσόφους δόξα τὴν ἐρχὴν ἀδέσποτον ἔχουσα, τὴν δὲ πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ δυσεξάλειπτον, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον, οὐδὲ ἐν φήμαις, ἀλλὰ ἔν τε τελεταῖς, ἔν τε θυσίαις, τὴν βαρβάροις καὶ Ἕλλησι πολλαχοῦ περιφερομένην, ὡς οὔτ' ἄνευ τὴν ἄλογον τὴν ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωπῖται τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ Πᾶν. P. 369.

from

from these Stories of their Gods, to prove that there were none at all; but only that Great Men in former Ages, that had found out some useful Inventions, were deify'd after their deaths. *Plutarch* makes that a fabulous Story, which he tells of his *Golden Inscriptions* in *Panchæa*, to prove the truth of his assertion, *which none ever saw besides himself*; and he affirms, That there were no such Persons as the *Panchæi*: but others have shew'd that there was such a place as *Panchæa* about *Arabia Fœlix*. And *Diodorus Siculus* mentions it as a considerable Island in the *Arabian* Sea, and that the Inhabitants are called *Panchæi*; and that near the City *Panara* there is a Temple to *Jupiter Triphyllius*, which was in great veneration for its Antiquity and Magnificence, which he describes at large; and upon the Mountain there it is said that *Uranus* of old inhabited; and the People were called *Triphyllii*, from three different Tribes which join'd there, and were afterwards driven out by *Ammon*. And to make the Story of *Euhemerus* more probable, he saith, the Inhabitants came first out of *Crete* in *Jupiter*'s time. So that *Plutarch* was very much to seek, when he deny'd that there was any such Place as *Panchæa*, or such a Person as *Jupiter Triphyllius*. And *Diodorus* further saith, there was in it a golden Pillar in the old *Egyptian* Letters, wherein there were Inscriptions containing the Acts of *Uranus* and *Jupiter*, and of *Diana* and *Apollo* written by *Hermes*. Which is a very different account of this matter, from what *Plutarch* gives. Some are willing to excuse *Euhemerus*, as tho' he intended nothing more, but to let the *Greeks* know, that they worship'd such for Gods which had been Men; which was true enough. But this did not reach his design, according to *Plutarch*; which was to prove, *that there were no other Gods but these*: so *Plutarch* ranks him with *Diagoras Melius* and *Theodorus*, who said *there were no Gods*. And the *Epicurean* in *Tully* said, *that* Euhemerus *destroy'd all Religion*; which could not be true, if he had left any Divinity to be worship'd. *Sextus Empiricus* reckons him among the *Atheists*, and saith, he was *a conceited Man*; but he charges him only with saying, *That some great Men in former Ages had been made Gods*. Which was so evident a thing, that one would think none could have been called an *Atheist* merely upon that account. But *Jupiter* of *Crete* had been advanc'd a long time to the highest Divine Honor; and consequently those who went about to disprove his Worship, were thought to destroy the Worship which belongs to the Supreme God. But *Diodorus Siculus*, in a Fragment of his sixth Book preserv'd by *Eusebius*, gives a very different account of him; and that from *Euhemerus* his own words, *viz.* That the Antients had deliver'd to their Posterity two different Notions of Gods; one of those that were Eternal and Immortal, as the Sun, Moon, and Stars, and other parts of the Universe; but others were Terrestrial Gods, that were so made, because they were Benefactors to Mankind, as *Hercules*, *Bacchus*, and others. And as to *Euhemerus*, he saith, *that he was a Favorite of* Cassander *King of* Macedonia, *by whose command he made a Voyage into those parts*, where he found the things before mention'd. But some learned Men are still of *Plutarch*'s opinion, that *Euhemerus* his *Panchæa* is a mere figment of his; for which I do not see any reason sufficient; especially when the same Persons do allow *Sanchoniathon*'s *Phœnician* Antiquities; and methinks *Euhemerus* his account of the Inscriptions on Pillars of the Acts of *Uranus* and *Cronus*, and *Jupiter* and *Ammon*, and *the Sacred Letters* by *Hermes*, comes so near to *Philo Byblius*, that one would think he had compar'd Notes with *Euhemerus* and *Diodorus Siculus*.

Diod. Sicul. l. 5. p. 220.

Plutarch. de Placitis Philos. l. 7.
Cicer. de N. D. l. 1.
Sext. Emp. ad Mathe. p. 317.

Euseb. Pr. Evang. l. 2. c. 2.

Bochart. Phaleg. l. 2. c. 8.

But their design was different in this respect, that *Sanchoniathon* justify'd the making Men to be Gods; but *Euhemerus* went about to prove they were *not Gods*, because they had *been Men*. It is possible that the common People might account him an Atheist for denying *Jupiter* of *Crete* to be God, or for saying, that his Sepulchre was to be found. But why should *Plutarch* charge him on this account, when he himself so much finds fault with these who made Men to be Gods? He endeavour'd, he saith, to avoid the extremes both of *Superstition* and *Atheism*; but he could but *endeavour* it, when he allow'd the Practices of the *Greeks* and *Egyptians*, and only offer'd at some forced Interpretations of them, against the general sense of the *Egyptian* Mysteries.

But however it appears from him, that the *old Greeks* did preserve the antient Tradition of *the World not being made by chance*, which is the foundation of all Religion. And *Plato*, when he enters upon the Discourse against *Atheism*, begins with two things, *viz. That the Sun, and Moon, and Stars, and the order of Seasons shew'd there was a* God *and Providence*; *and the consent of all Mankind, Greeks and Barbarians.* Now, how could *Plato* have said this of the *old Greeks*, if they had been without any Religion till *Orpheus* came out of *Egypt?* And we have an evident proof of the practice of Divine Worship among them, from the *Parian Chronicle*, where it is said, *That* Deucalion *after he had escaped the Flood went to* Athens, *and there offered a solemn Sacrifice for his Deliverance*; and *Pausanias* saith, *he there built a magnificent Temple.* Which are sufficient Evidences of the Religion of the *old Greeks*, even before they had the Name of *Hellens* from the Son of *Deucalion*. But I have not yet done with *Diodorus Siculus*, who lets fall several Insinuations, as tho' he were of the mind of *Euhemerus Messenius*; and that the old Religion, both in *Egypt* and elsewhere, was nothing but a *Politick Contrivance*. For in the beginning of his History, he pretends to give an account of the beginning of all things: but it is such a one as plainly shews he was no friend to Religion; for he takes away the very foundation of it, by supposing the World to be produc'd without any Intellectual Cause. He saith at first there were two Opinions among the Philosophers and Historians: One was, that the World had been always just as it is; the other, that there was a beginning of Mankind, and of other things. But how? This he undertakes to explain after this manner. At first there was a Chaos, or a confus'd mixture of Heaven and Earth and all together; then follow'd a Separation of Bodies from each other, and thence came the present Frame of the World. The lighter Bodies mov'd forward, as the Air and Fire, by which Motion came the Sun, Moon and Stars: But the grosser and more heavy parts subsided together; the moister made the Sea, and the dry the Earth, which was very moist; but being quicken'd by the heat of the Sun, swell'd up in several Tumors with thin Skins containing the Materials of living Creatures, which having strength brake thro' those Skins, and thence came all sorts of Animals. But the heat of the Sun and the Winds hardening the Surface of the Earth, no more of such Swellings appear'd; and so the Animals are since continued by Propagation. But the Men which were thus born were very wild at first, but by degrees they came to understand one another, and to find out the conveniencies of Living. This is the short Abstract of the Account he gives, which is just the *Epicurean Hypothesis* in other Terms, which was much in vogue in the time of *Diodorus Siculus*, (which, saith *Suidas*, was that of *Augustus*) especially after *Lucre-*

Plato de LL. l. 10.

Marmor. Arundell.

Pausan. in Atticis.

Lucretius his Poem was in such reputation: For, he saith, he very well understood the *Latin* Tongue, and had great helps to his History from *Rome*; and whosoever compares this with *Lucretius*, will scarce find any difference. And *Eusebius* observes, that he does not so much as once mention the Name of GOD in it, but leaves all to Chance and a fortuitous concourse; and as it is express'd in *Plutarch*, where the *Epicurean Opinion* is deliver'd much to the same purpose, the World is said to have come together at first by a Motion of Atoms without Providence. Where there must be something defective in the beginning, to shew this to have been the *Epicurean Hypothesis*; for as it stands, it seems to be *Plutarch*'s own opinion, which is directly contrary to what he had said before in the foregoing Chapter, where he blames *Anaximander* for leaving out the efficient Cause; for, saith he, Matter alone can do nothing without it. And the same he repeats against *Anaximenes*, and saith plainly, *That it is impossible that Matter alone should be the Cause of Things, as it is for Metals to form themselves into Pots and Cups without an Artist. So that *Plutarch* must be clear'd from that Opinion, which he so justly oppose; and he commends *Anaxagoras* in a particular manner, for adding Mind as the Efficient Cause to Matter, which brought it out of confusion into that order that appears in the World. *Pliny* saith of *Diodorus*, *Apud Græcos desiit nugari*; but he only applies it to the Title of his Book, and it is not true of the Beginning of it. *Pliny* himself took the World to be an Eternal Being, which he calls *God*, and so was against *Diodorus* his Making of the World. But *Diodorus* quotes *Euripides* the Scholar of *Anaxagoras* for his Chaos: but that is not the point, whether there were such Confusion at first, but how the World came out of it. It's certain that *Anaxagoras* did not only hold a *Chaos* at first, but an *Eternal Mind*, which order'd the World, and brought things into that Beauty and Usefulness which they have. *Diogenes Laertius* saith, that *Anaxagoras* follow'd *Linus*, and he was before *Orpheus*: If it were only in that of *the Chaos*, there was nothing extraordinary in that; for all that supposed the World to be made, asserted it; but if it were of the Mind as the Efficient Cause, that is a considerable testimony of the antiquity of that Opinion among the *old Greeks*. And *Orpheus*, as *Suidas* gives an account of his Doctrine, saith, *That he held a Chaos, and before that an Æther of* GOD*'s making, which was the great Instrument in framing the World.*

Euseb. Pr. Evang. l. 1. c. 7.

Plutarch. de Placit. Phil. l. 1. c. 4.

* Ἀδυνάτον γὰρ ἐκ μιᾶς τῆς ὕλης εἶναι τὰ πάντα· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον χρὴ ὑποτίθεσθαι.

Plutar. de Plac. Phil. l. 1. c. 3.

Plin. N. H. l. 1. c. 1.

Lib. 2. c. 1.

Laert. in Proëm.

But *Eusebius* charges *the most part of the* Greek *Philosophers with being of* Diodorus *his mind in this matter:* but I hope to make it appear otherwise in the progress of this Discourse, being now only to consider this Assertion as we find it in him. And I cannot but take notice of the unfairness of it; for he represents it, as if there had been but two Opinions among the Philosophers, that *of the Eternity of the World*, and its *being made by Chance*; as if he had never heard of an *Eternal Mind* among them: which it is impossible so inquisitive and learned a Man should be ignorant of. But he offers no kind of proof of the truth of what he lays down; not so much as the Inscriptions of *Hermes*, or the *Commentaries* of *Taautus*, which *Sanchoniathon* and *Philo Byblius* pretended to. He gave no manner of Reason how the confus'd Matter was put into motion, or how the separation of the lighter and heavier Bodies was effected; how the heavenly Bodies came to have distinct *Vortices*, without interfering with each other; how the moister and heavier parts came to be divided, so as to make two such great Bodies, as the Earth

Euseb. de Præp. Ev. l. 1. c. 8.

and

and Sea to be ſo diſtinguiſh'd and parted from one another: which are conſiderable Difficulties, and ought to have been clear'd. It may be ſaid, *That he writes not like a Philoſopher, but as an Hiſtorian, and only in general lays down the Principles that had been receiv'd by Philoſophers.* But this doth not vindicate him: For then he ſhould have ſet down all their Opinions, which he doth not; but purpoſely avoids that which would have reſolv'd theſe Difficulties. For if an Eternal Mind be ſuppos'd to give and direct the Motion of Matter, then we may eaſily conceive, not only whence Motion it ſelf came; but whence Gravitation, or the tendency of Bodies towards their Center; whence the ſeveral great Bodies of the Heavens came to have their diſtinct circumvolations; and whence the Earth and Sea came to be ſo divided, and parted from one another.

But *Diodorus* was ſenſible that there would be great Objections made againſt *the production of Animals out of the Earth*, without any other Cauſe than *the heat of the Sun, and moiſture and putrefaction of the ſlimy ſubſtance of the Earth.* And therefore to anſwer them, *the* Egyptians, he ſaith, *produce this Experiment among them, that about* Thebes, *when the Earth is moiſtened by the* Nile, *by the intenſe Heat of the Sun falling upon it, an innumerable multitude of Mice do ſpring out; which being done after the Earth was ſo much hardened, and the firſt Influences abated, much more might all kind of Animals come out of the Earth at firſt.*

I. But in the firſt place, we have nothing but the teſtimony of theſe *Egyptians* for the original truth of this, who brought it as an Argument to juſtify their own *Hypotheſis.* And from them other Writers have taken it, without examining the truth of it, as *Ovid*, *Mela*, *Pliny*, &c. *Ælian* goes farther (who liv'd in *Hadrian*'s time) for he ſaith, *in his way between* Naples *and* Puteoli, *he ſaw ſuch imperfect Animals, half Mud, and half living Creatures*;

Ovid. Metamorph. l. 15.

Plin. l. 9. 58.

Altera pars vivit, rudis eſt pars altera tellus;

As *Ovid* deſcribes them. But this is very far from making any tolerable proof; for they might be perfect Animals, and only one part appear out of the Mud or Dirt, and the other be cover'd over with it. And this in all probability was the caſe in *Egypt.* For theſe were ſeen only *in the Mud*, after the *Nile* was return'd into its Channel, as *Mela* affirms, *Ubi ſedavit diluvia & ſe ſibi reddidit, per humentes campos quædam non perfecta animalia*, &c. Now this was a very ill time for any Perſons to go farther than as to what appear'd to them at a diſtance: and becauſe they ſaw but ſome Parts, they concluded the reſt to be nothing but Slime. But this is a very ſlight and imperfect way of making *Experiments.* Did any of the *Egyptians* take and diſſect any of theſe *Imperfect Animals*, and ſhew how it was poſſible in the formation of them, for one part of them to be nothing but Mud, when the reſt had all the proper Organs belonging to ſuch Animals? If the internal and vital parts be firſt form'd (as no doubt they are) and the Blood paſſing thro' the Heart into the outward Parts, be the great Inſtrument of perfecting the *Organs* of Senſe and Motion; how is it poſſible to conceive that where the inward Parts are perfect in their kind, one main part of an Animal ſhould have nothing like Organs, but merely be a Maſs of Dirt? And by what means could that afterwards be join'd with the other to make up one perfect Animal? It is agreed among the beſt Obſervers and moſt curious Inqui-

Inquirers into these things, that the Heart is the first of the solid parts, and the Blood of the Fluid; but whether it be by a dilatation of the *Punctum saliens*, or red beating speck into several parts, whereof one is for the upper, and the other for the lower and remoter parts; or it be by extention of the several parts in little, as an *Embryo*, (as it is in Plants) or by a fermentation raised in the fluid matter by an active fluid conveyed into it, upon the conjunction of male and female; (which are the several *Hypotheses* of the most inquisitive Persons in this Philosophical Age) which way soever we take it, this *Egyptian Hypothesis* of *Imperfect Animals*, is repugnant to the most accurate Observations, which have been made about the Generations of Animals. And however such things might then pass among such who take all upon trust from the *Egyptians* or others who never examin'd them; yet it would be the only proof of *Imperfect Animals*, to find any in our Age to defend those crude and absurd Opinions. As tho' any thing were to be believed rather than the most reasonable things in the World, *viz.* GOD and Providence; which appear most conspicuously in the production of Animals. Insomuch that our sagacious Dr. * *Harvey* after all his diligent and exact Inquiries, confesses *that the power and presence of the* DEITY *is no where more observable than in the formation of Animals.* And he could find no satisfaction in any *Hypotheses* of the greatest Naturalists, without taking in *the immediate Power and Providence of* GOD. And even Mr. *Hobbes* himself, who was as unwilling to call in the help of Providence as another; yet is forc'd to give up the Cause in this matter; and freely confesses, † *That if Men examin the several Machines in order to Generation and Nutrition, and think they were not ordered by an intelligent Being to their several offices, must be said to be without Understanding themselves.* And yet he sets down the words of *Diodorus Siculus* in the beginning of that Chapter; and thinks *that is as far as Men can go by Phylosophy, without Revelation.* How can these things consist? For Men *without Revelation* may find out all the *Machines in the Body*; and therefore may be convinc'd that there was an Eternal Mind which gave a Being to these things; which is more than *Diodorus Siculus* or *his Philosophers* could find: For they affirm'd, *That Animals were form'd by Chance, out of Mud and Putrefaction without any Mind*; and therefore according to him they had none themselves. And some of our most experienc'd and skilful *Anatomists*, after all their debates about the several *Mechanical Hypotheses* concerning the Production of Animals, have concluded that || *it is impossible that mere Matter and Motion, of whatsoever figure the particles of Matter be, should make up the Body of an Animal; but that we must have recourse to a most Wise and Omnipotent Agent, which alone is able to do it.*

* Neq; fane usquam alibi, quam in Animalis fabrica, Omnipotens Creator in operibus suis aut manifestius conspicitur, aut præsentius ejus Numen adest. *Exercitat.* 49. Quapropter rem recte pieq; (mea qui dem sententia) reputaverit, qui rerum omnium Generationes, ab eodem illo æterno atq; omnipotente Numine deduxerit, à cujus nutu rerum ipsarum Universitas dependet. *Exercitat.* 50.

Quod ubique præsens, singulis rerum naturalium operibus non minus adsit, quam toti Universo, quod Numine suo sive providentia, arte ac mente Divina cuncta animalia procreet. *ibid.*

† Qui si machinas omnes, tum Generationis tum Nutritionis satis perspexerint, nec tamen eas a mente aliqua conditas ordinatasque sua quasque officia viderint, ipsi profecto sine mente esse censendi sunt. *Hobb. de Homine, l. 1. c. 1. ad fin.*

|| Interea ratum maneat juxta normam optimæ Philosophiæ fieri non posse, ut Particulæ sive Corpuscula quomodocunque figurata solo motu fortuito in corpus humanum aut belluinum sponte coalescant: Sed necessario ad hoc opus omnino sapientissimum potentissimumque Architectam requiri, qui Animalium Machinas tam affabre & artificiose componat. Adeoque Deum solum formare cuncta animalia, & fœcunditatem ovis addere. *Exercit. Anatomicæ & Medicæ Peiresi & Hardeci, p. 126.*

And those who plead most for the Motion of the Particles of Matter in forming the Body, yet confess, That it is hardly possible to conceive

Etmulleri Inſtit. Medicæ, c. 23.

ceive how the kinds of Animals can be preſerv'd, unleſs there be ſomething beyond that, to regulate and determin that Motion; but what that is, they are not able to explain. Let now any Perſons that have the uſe of Underſtanding, conſider whether this *Egyptian Hypotheſis* have the leaſt credibility in it; ſince it is grounded on ſo little Authority.

II. But that is not all. For we ſhall prove it to be repugnant to the moſt certain accounts we have of the *Nature*, as well as the *Production of Animals*; both which are impoſſible to be conceiv'd to be the mere reſult of a fortuitous Motion of Matter, by the heat of the Sun upon the ſlime of the Earth. As will appear by conſidering the moſt neceſſary and vital parts of Animals themſelves, and what relates to the ſeveral kinds and the Preſervation of them: For the *Egyptians* argued from their Mice to all other Animals. The moſt neceſſary and vital parts of *Animals*, are ſuch as the *courſe of the Blood* and *Reſpiration* depend upon, without which it is impoſſible for them *to live*. The *Courſe of the Blood* ſuppoſes *the Heart*, as the great Machine in the Body; and the ſeveral Arteries are as ſo many veſſels to convey the Blood into the ſeveral parts. But here is ſo much wiſdom and contrivance in this, that unleſs the Heart had been fram'd in ſuch a manner, and the Blood put into ſuch a Motion as it is, the preſervation of Life had been impoſſible. And Life it ſelf is ſomething beyond the mere Coalition of the Particles of Matter: For if that were ſufficient, then there muſt be Life in all parts of Matter united together; (but neither Stones nor Plants are *Animals*) and they become *Animals* by that which makes the difference between them and inanimated things; which are the conſtant courſe of the Blood, and the diſtribution of Nouriſhment to the ſeveral parts of the Body in order to their ſupport; and when theſe are at an end, the Life of an Animal is gone. Now in order to this courſe of the Blood, the Heart hath its peculiar and wonderful frame and motion; for therein is the chief ſeat of that which is called *the Flame of Life*; which is nothing elſe but that briſk and vigorous motion of the Blood, which actuates and enlivens the whole Body. But both the natural heat and motion of the Blood are unaccountable in the Mechanical way. To ſay the natural heat is caus'd by Fermentation, can give no manner of ſatisfaction; for from whence comes this fermentation, but from heat? And ſo heat muſt be ſuppos'd in order to the producing heat; and there can be no end in ſuch kind of Suppoſitions. And if the particles did of themſelves give it, then it muſt be diſcern'd as much at firſt as afterwards; but the contrary is obſerv'd in Animals: For the Blood is more fixed at firſt, and its heat riſes by degrees, as the parts are forming. If it be ſaid, *There is a Spiritus Genitalis which cauſes all that heat and motion*; I aſk, Whence that ariſes? Not from mere matter and motion. But it muſt be ſomething of a higher nature, and from a ſuperior cauſe. But if Heat and Mud can produce Animals, there is no need of any ſuch *Spiritus Genitalis* in Nature, but all muſt ariſe from mere motion, and the continuation of Animals might as well have been without any diſtinction of ſexes. But how came Matter of it ſelf to form ſuch a diſtinction, with parts ſutable to ſuch a deſign? How come the Inſtincts of Nature in *Animals* to be ſo violent to ſuch an end; when if there be nothing but *Matter*, there can be no ſuch end deſign'd? How come ſome *Animals* (as *Mules*) not capable of propagating their kind, when

Unde autem aliter calor hic perennis enaſcatur, haud facilè dixerim, ſiquidem ad fermentationis operam recurrere inane auxilium eſt, quoniam ipſamet ſine calore nihil egerit. *Ent. Apologia, p.* 204.

upon

upon Anatomical ſearches no kind of defect hath been found in them as ſome imagined? How come the *Species* of *Animals* to be ſo determined and limited, that in the revolution of ſo many Ages no new *Species* have appeared, altho' they are ſo different in ſome Countries from others? How comes the number of ſome *Animals* ſo very much to exceed others? i. e. How come the *Beaſts of Prey* to fall ſo much ſhort of the moſt tractable and *uſeful Animals* to Mankind, as *Sheep* and *Oxen?* And thoſe are obſerved to be moſt fruitful, which afford the beſt Food for them. Can we ſuppoſe *the heat of the Sun and ſlime of the Earth* ſhould regard ſo much the benefit of Mankind? How comes the difference of *Animals* as to the manner of their production? i. e. How come ſome to hatch their young ones within their own Bodies, and others to bring forth eggs, and ſo to bring them to maturity by incubation? And how comes this difference to have always continu'd without alteration? Whence comes that difference in Animals, that ſome do *Ruminate*, and others do not? Did mud quickened by the Sun deſign to ſupply the want of teeth for *Maſtication* by thoſe ſeveral ventricles, and the muſcles belonging to them? How come ſome Animals to have their ſenſes more exquiſite than others, according to the nature of their food; as ſight in ſome, and ſmelling in others? How come Birds and Fiſhes ſo very much to exceed Mankind in the frame of thoſe nerves, which ſerve for ſmelling? Whence comes that wonderful ſagacity in ſome Animals to purſue others meerly from the ſcent left upon the ground at ſome diſtance of time, and to diſtinguiſh it from all others of the ſame kind? Whence comes that wonderful care and tenderneſs of their young ones in the moſt cruel and fierceſt Animals? If heat and mud could produce the Beaſts themſelves, yet what influence could they have upon their Brood? How comes the change of the paſſage between the lungs and the heart, when a young Animal is come into the open Air, from what it had in the Womb? What particles of matter cloſe up the *Foramen Ovale*, and direct the paſſage of the Blood another way? What makes the milk to come into the proper Veſſels of the breeding Animal juſt at ſuch a time, and to decay when there is no farther Occaſion for it? Whence came the wonderful contrivance of Birds in making their neſts; and feeding and preſerving their young? What particles of Matter diſpos'd them to find out their proper food and Phyſick? How come the ſeaſons of bringing forth to be ſo ſetled, that there is a ſufficient proviſion to ſupport the young Animals when they come into the World, by the Milk ready prepar'd for them, and ſuch conveniences for the young to ſuck it? How come they to run ſo naturally to their dams without any director, and to avoid ſuch as would deſtroy them? What had the particles of Matter to do in all this? If we go to *Inſects*; How came the Silk-worms to hatch their eggs when the Mulberry-trees are ready for their food? The Bees to come forth in *May*, when there is moſt plenty of dew? The Waſps near Autumn, when the fruit is grown ripe to ſupport them? How come the ſeveral Inſects by that ſagacity to find out the moſt proper places to lay their eggs in? It being obſerv'd of them, by thoſe who have moſt curiouſly inquir'd about theſe matters, *That all the ſeveral ſorts of Inſects lay their eggs in places moſt ſafe and agreeable to them, where they are ſeldom loſt or miſcarry, and where they have a ſupply of nouriſhment for their young, ſo ſoon as they are hatched and need it.*

Cicer. de N. Deor. l. 2.

Neque alia parte ingenia avium magis admiranda ſunt. *Plin. N. H. l. 10. c. 33.*

Mr. Ray of the Creation, p. 115.

But there are ſome things yet further to be conſider'd in the neceſſary vital parts of Animals, which ſhew that they could not be the reſult of a fortuitous motion of Matter. The main vitals of Animals are the ſame; and where there is any obſervable difference, theſe two things are remarkable: 1. That they are alike in the ſame kind. 2. That it is for the greater conveniency of thoſe kinds. As the poſition of the heart is higher in Mankind, than in creatures that put their heads down to eat; becauſe if the Heart of Mankind were in the center of the Body, and not in the upper part, there could not be ſo eaſy a paſſage of the Blood from the heart to the head, which is ſo neceſſary for the ſupport of life; but in thoſe creatures which hold their heads downwards, altho' the paſſage may be longer in ſuch which have long necks, yet no inconvenience comes by it, becauſe of the eaſineſs of the deſcent in holding down their heads. But how comes a fortuitous production of Animals to cauſe ſuch an agreement in the ſeveral parts of living Creatures? That all have the ſame vitals, *Inſects* excepted (in which the heart is the whole Body) none wanting the heart with its arteries carrying out the Blood, and the veins returning it; nor the lungs for reſpiration, nor the brain for ſenſe and motion (to name no more;) How comes a blind motion of Matter to hit ſo exactly on all theſe, and to put them into ſuch a convenient ſituation for the preſervation of Life? How comes the heart to be endued with ſuch ſtrong fibres, unleſs it were intended not merely to receive the Blood in its paſſage, but to diſperſe it again by its contraction of it ſelf? How come the coats of the arteries about the Heart to be ſo much ſtronger than in the outward parts, but that there is the greateſt neceſſity of their being ſo, to receive the Blood in its firſt heat and quickeſt motion? How come the veins to be ſo diſpers'd in all parts of the Body, but to receive the Blood in its return; and ſo to keep up the life and warmth of all parts? What motion of Matter could frame the *Valves* in the *Veins*, ſo as to give free paſſage of the Blood towards the heart, but oppoſe the paſſage of the Venal-blood the other way? (which gave the firſt occaſion to the diſcovery of the Circulation of the Blood, as Mr. *Boyle* tells us from Dr. *Harvey* himſelf.) What is it which keeps the Blood in its conſtant courſe for ſo many years, as ſome Animals live to? And what makes the very different periods of their lives, when we can ſee no reaſon from their mechanical frame, why one ſhould in an ordinary courſe ſurvive another, for ſo great a compaſs of years? What is there in the texture and coalition of the parts of a Stag, to make it outlive an Ox or a Horſe ſo many years; when *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *They ſeem to be leſs made for long life than other Animals, as far as he could judge by their bearing and growth:* but *Pliny* ſo long after him ſaith, *Vita Cervis in confeſſo longa eſt; it was a thing taken for granted that they lived long.* But I meddle not with any improbable Stories about it; for my argument depends not upon any thing but what all grant to be true, *viz.* That there is a great diverſity in the Lives of *Animals*; of which I ſay no account can be given from mere Matter and Motion.

Tota Cor ſunt. *Harv.*

Boyle *of Final Cauſes, p.* 157.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 6. *c.* 29.

Plin. N. H. l. 8. *c.* 32.

III. There is no probability of any kind of *Animals* ariſing from *Putrefaction*, which the *Egyptians* and *Diodorus Siculus* make their foundation. *After the inundation of the* Nile, *a ſudden heat of the Sun falling on the ſlime, cauſes a putrefaction, and from thence an innumerable company of Mice came.* But *Theophraſtus*, a very great Philoſopher, in a Fragment

Diod. Sic. l. 1. *p.* 8.

Fragment preſerv'd in *Photius*, ſaith, *That the great number of Mice is to be found in dry Soils, and not in moiſt; for Water is a great Enemy to them, and they are certainly deſtroy'd by it.* How comes *Theophraſtus* to differ ſo much herein from *Diodorus Siculus* and the *Egyptians?* Or muſt we ſuppoſe that the Water of *Nile* was quite of a different nature from all other Waters to them? *Proventus eorum in ſiccitatibus*, ſaith *Pliny*; where he ſpeaks of the great Increaſe of them. How then came they to multiply in ſuch moiſt places, where the *Nile* hath overflow'd? *Rain-water kills them*, ſaith *Ariſtotle*; how then comes the *Nile* to produce them? If it be ſaid, *that* Ariſtotle *ſpeaks of great Showers which drown them*; it is eaſily anſwer'd, That at their going off, upon theſe Principles, they produce more, and ſo the greateſt numbers would be after great Rains. But what *Theophraſtus* ſaith before of *ſmall Frogs* will hold of theſe *Mice* too; *they do not come from the Water, but that diſcovers them, and brings them out of the places where they were before.* And *Pliny*'s words are remarkable, when he ſpeaks of this matter, *Detegente eo* (Nilo) *muſculi reperiuntur*, &c. And ſo the late Editor confeſſes it was in the beſt MSS. So that the going off of the *Nile* is that only which brings them to light. And before, *Pliny* ſaith, the *Gyrini* (the Name given to theſe ſmall Frogs) do come from other Frogs, and not from *Putrefaction: Pariunt minimas carnes nigras, quas Gyrinos vocant, oculis tantum & cauda inſignes; mox pedes figurantur*, &c. Theſe are called *Tadpoles*, and ſeem imperfect at firſt, but by degrees do come to all their Parts. But as to *Animals* ariſing from *Putrefaction*, learned and inquiſitive Perſons of our Age have taken great pains to diſcover the truth of it in ſeveral Countries, but with no ſucceſs. In *Italy*, *Franc. Redi* undertook the Diſcovery of this matter with incredible diligence, and great variety of Experiments; but after all, could not find *that any putrified Fleſh would produce Animals*, much leſs putrified Water or Slime; *but that leſſer Animals hide themſelves under Dirt and Slime, and therefore have been ſuſpected to have come out of it; and if thoſe who firſt broached this Opinion had examined this matter more ſtrictly, they would have found them only covered over, or at leaſt ſome part of them, with that Earth which they thought had brought them forth.* And *for the little Frogs*, he ſaith, *that they are ſo much of the colour of the Earth, that they might eaſily be miſtaken for parts of it; but upon opening of them, their Stomachs and Inteſtines are full of Food and Excrements.* Which is a plain demonſtration againſt their original from the Earth; and he concludes it a thing *impoſſible for any ſuch Creatures that are part Mud and part Animals, to be produced by the inundation of the* Nile. There is a remarkable Paſſage in *Olaus Wormius* concerning the *Norway* Mice, which ſeem to come out of the Clouds; *that aſſoon as they are fallen, they have found green Herbs in their Bowels*; (and I do not think any Graſs grows in the Clouds:) But he thinks *Scaliger*'s Opinion not improbable, *that they come from putrefied Water in the Clouds*; and he ſaith, *The Seamen have found them fallen into their Veſſels, and that the Clouds ſtink and hinder their breathing*; but at laſt he thinks *they may be only carried by ſome violent Storms from the Mountains and Iſlands where they breed in great abundance.* And *Etmullerus*, a *German* Phyſician, concludes all *Æquivocal Generation to be impoſſible.* Some of our own moſt diligent Inquirers, after all their Searches, declare that they can find no ſuch thing as a *Spontaneous Generation* of *Animals*; and I remember I have formerly read a Diſcourſe in MS. of Mr. *Boyle*'s to that purpoſe. Our ingenious and learned Mr. *Ray* poſi-

Phot. Bibl. Cod. 278.

Plin. N. H. l. 10. *c.* 65.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 6. *c.* 29.

Plin. N. H. l. 9. *c.* 58.

Cap. 51.

Fr. Redi de Gen. Inſect. p. 195, *&c.*

P. 208.

P. 209.

Muſeum Wormian. l. 3. *c.* 23. *p.* 326.

Exercit. 192. 3.

Etmuller. Inſtit. Med. c. 23.

Liſter in Goedart de Inſect. p. 47.

Ray of the Creation, part. 2. p. 71. tively affirms, *That there is no such thing in nature, as Æquivocal or Spontaneous Generation, but that all Animals, as well small as great, are generated by animal Parents of the same species with themselves.* And because some were offended at it, he goes about to justify his Assertion, not only *from Reason*, but from the *Authority* of *Malpighius*, as well as *Redi*, *Swammerdam*, and *Lewenhoek*, and many others, who have examin'd this matter *carefully and circumspectly*; *and therefore their Authority sways more with him than the concurrent suffrages of a thousand others*, as he saith.

But there are some things not yet sufficiently clear'd as to this matter, especially as to Animals breeding in Human Bodies, of particular Times, and in some Diseases: but as to Plants and some Insects about them, in which *Redi* himself gives up the cause, *Malpighius* contradicts him, and *Microgra. p. 189.* so do *Swammerdam* and others; particularly Mr. *Hook* saith, *He observ'd little Eggs in the Protuberancies of Plants, which became Worms with Legs, which eat through the Womb which inclos'd them: And in all Galls*, he saith, *there be either holes where the Worm hath eat out its passage, or a place where it had been.* All which he attributes to the particular design of Providence, in taking care for the conveniencies of the meanest Animals. But there seems to be more difficulty in the *Apiarium marinum* mention'd by *Piso*; for it is hard to understand how *those blue Worms* came to the bottom of the Sea, *which coming up with a spungy sort of shrub growing upon the Rocks, and being expos'd to the heat, turn'd to little Animals like Bees.* But this matter is not deliver'd distinctly enough to form any Argument upon, as Mr. *Hook* hath well observ'd. *Piso Hist. Nat. Brasil. l. 4. c. 2.* *Microgra. c. 43.* I see no difficulty in the *Ephemeron* or *Hemerobion*, as it is describ'd by the Authors at the end of *Goedart*, who give the best account of it; for it seems to be of the nature of other Insects: and the only difficulty is, why so much pains for so short a life? for it is produc'd by such Changes as other Insects are. But it cannot be deny'd, that there have been among us two very learned Men, who have asserted a kind of Spontaneous Generation of Animals; I mean Dr. *Harvey* and his *Apologist*. *Redi p. 19.* For Dr. *Harvey*, *Redi* observes, *That altho' he asserts every Animal to come of an Egg proper to its kind, yet he was of opinion that these Eggs are not always contain'd in the Bodies of Animals, but are dispers'd up and down by the Air, and after become Animals in an equivocal manner:* but he saith, *he hath not clear'd the grounds of his Opinion*, save only *that it comes from the Omnipotent Hand of God.* So that Dr. *Harvey* held a true Spontaneous Generation from mere Matter and Motion to have been impossible, as appears by what is said of him before. And so his *Apologist* *Ent. Apol. s. 17. f. 379.* supposes *a saline Spirit to be dispers'd in Nature, which meeting with proper Matter and a moderate Heat, may produce Insects, and such kind of Animals:* but he was very far from thinking this could be done without a Power far above Matter and Motion, which at first order'd the World, *P. 245.* and all things in it. But he thinks *such Insects come nearer to the nature of Plants than Animals, and live chiefly by the Heat of the Sun*; *and therefore in the Winter they are torpid and without Motion, and are reviv'd at Spring when the Heat increases.*

IV. Supposing it to be granted that there were such an Æquivocal Generation of Mice and Frogs on the Bank of the *Nile*, how doth it from thence follow that Mankind had the same kind of Original? It is a say- *Plin. N. H. l. 11. c. 1.* ing of *Pliny*, which hath been carry'd too far, *Quam Natura rerum nusquam magis quam in minimis tota sit*; where he compares Insects with the

greater Animals, and seems to admire the Workmanship of one far beyond the other: His words are, *Nusquam alibi spectatiore naturæ rerum Artificio.* And so he falls into admiration of the perfections of some Insects, as to the quickness of Sense and Motion, and of others as to their peculiar Properties. I think *Aristotle* was very much in the right when he held, *they were to be blam'd who despised the least things in Nature; for in all of them* ἐνεστί τι θαυμαστὸν, *there is something which deserves admiration:* And particularly in *Insects*, the Contexture of their Parts, the manner of their Transformations, the difference of their Kinds, the variety of their Food, and their time of taking it, have something in them, which cannot be accounted for by mere Matter and Motion: But yet there is a great difference in the inward make of these Creatures from more perfect Animals. For *Redi* affirms, that *Steno* and he opening some Insects together, they could find no other inward Parts, *but one long Channel thro' the whole Body, about which there were Filaments in a confus'd series, which they thought might be instead of Veins and Arteries.* When all their inward Parts were taken out, and the Head taken off, *they still lived and moved as other Insects do, and laid their Eggs.* By which we see what a vast difference there is between the principles of Life in Mankind from those in these admirable Insects. *Jul. Scaliger* extremely despises *Cardan*'s way of reasoning, *Mus è putredine potest nasci, ergo & homo potest:* and saith, *That the Woman in* Esop's *Fables, who was asked by her Husband how the Child came without him, and she answered, Out of the Snow; might have made a better answer from* Cardan's *Philosophy*, viz. *out of the Mud.* And it is wittily said by *Scaliger* of him in another place, *They who stick in the dirt, while they lift up one Foot to get out, set the other faster, and therefore it is best to keep out of it altogether.* But *Cardan* seem'd to be so little concern'd to get out of it, that he asserts *that every Putrefaction produces some Animal or other; and that all Animals come out of it: which,* saith *Scaliger, is a wicked and profane Speech.* And yet *Andr. Cæsalpinus* undertakes to defend *Cardan*, chiefly from the Generation of Insects; without regarding the difference between them and more perfect Animals, if his supposition had been true. *Aristotle*, who had all possible advantages for writing his *Books of Animals*, by the bounty of *Philip* or *Alexander*, or both, coming to speak of such *as had no Blood*, (among which are all Insects) he saith, *They have no Veins, nor Bladder, nor Respiration; but something that serves instead of a Heart, without which they could have no Life; but they have the Parts which serve for Nutrition:* and therefore their Life differs little, according to *Pliny* himself, from that of *Plants* and *Fruits*; but he would have them *spirare sine Visceribus*, breathe without Lungs; and he grants they have neither them, *nor Heart, nor Liver.* And altho' there be some higher degree of Life in such *Animals* as *Diodorus Siculus* speaks of, yet those fall so far short of Mankind, that it is a wonder Men of sense could imagin the Production of one could be an Argument for the other. For, if we go no farther than *Nutrition*, *Mice* and *Frogs* are easily provided for; but how should Mankind live that were produc'd out of Slime and Mud? But nothing can be more absurd and ridiculous than the accounts given of the several ways of producing Mankind by a Spontaneous Generation, as will appear by a particular examination of them.

Aristot. de par. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.

Redi de Gen. Insect. p. 218. Nihil intus, nisi admodum paucis Intestinum implicatum. Plin. l. 11. c. 4.

Aristot. Hist. Anim. l. 4. c. 6.

Scaliger. Exercit. 193.

Exercit. 180. 2.

Exercit. 190, 193.

Andr. Cæsalpin. Qu. Peripat. l. 5. c. 1.

De partib. Anim. l. 4. c. 5.

Franc. Redi hath reckon'd up the several *Hypotheses* to our hands: The first is, that of *Democritus, That Mankind came into the World like Worms,*

Redi de Gen. Insect. p. 14.

Worms, which by degrees grew up to the figure and ſhape of Men. I wiſh we had more of *Democritus* his own Writings left, that we might better judg what his true Opinion was; but by what remains it doth not appear that herein he differ'd from *Epicurus*. It's certain he did, as to the firſt Principles of all things being made of Atoms; but whether he did, as to the immediate Production of Animals, is not ſo clear. For they did not imagin that Animals were form'd immediately by Atoms, which was too general and indefinite a Principle; but that the Atoms firſt came together in one form, and then another, till they came to the perfection of Animals. And ſo 'tis ſaid, that *Democritus* held Mankind to have appear'd firſt in the faſhion of Worms. *Petronius Arbiter* ſaith, that *Democritus* ſpent his days in making Experiments, *Ætatem inter Experimenta conſumpſit*; and *Columella* particularly takes notice of his Experiments *about Inſects*; and it is not improbable that from his Obſervations about their Transformations he might form his *Hypotheſis* about Mankind. His original Notion was, as appears by *Plutarch*, *That there were infinite Atoms diſpers'd in a void ſpace, which had no kind of Qualities inherent in them; but as they caſually hit upon each other, they produc'd Water, and Fire, and Plants, and Men; which were nothing but a congeries of Atoms*; which, ſaith *Plutarch*, he calleth *Ideas*. And it appears by another place in him, that *Democritus* only held Bulk and Figure in his Atoms; but *Epicurus* added *Gravity*, without which he found *his Atoms could not move*. And altho' *Epicurus* deriv'd the main of his Principles from *Democritus*; yet it is plain by *Plutarch*, that his Followers ſet themſelves to leſſen the credit of *Democritus*, as one that overthrew the certainty of our Senſes, and reſolv'd all into Reaſon. To which purpoſe there are ſeveral Paſſages, in *Sextus Empiricus*, of *Democritus* himſelf. Wherein he affirms, *That the things we call Qualities, are only Names impos'd upon Opinions* (which he calls Law) *and ſo Bitter and Sweet, and Hot and Cold, are only Fancies and no Realities; and that there is nothing real but what is not ſeen but only apprehended by the Mind*, as *Atoms and Vacuity*; and in ſeveral other places, that there is no *Certain Knowledg*, but *only Opinion by our Senſes*. And he quotes *Democritus* his own words to prove, *that the Knowledg we have by our Senſes is dark and obſcure, but that which is genuine depends only upon Reaſon*. The *Epicureans*, who follow'd their Maſter, as to the certainty of Senſe, could by no means brook this Doctrine of *Democritus*, who ſaw far beyond *Epicurus*, and knew what Blunders he muſt fall into by the judgment of Senſe, as about the bigneſs of the Sun, which he poſitively ſaid, was *no greater than appear'd to our Senſes*, i. e. *two Foot over*, ſaith *Cicero*, or *a little more or leſs*; which was ſo notorious a Blunder, that *Democritus*, he ſaith, *could not fall into, being ſkill'd in Geometry*; *but* Epicurus *not only deſpis'd it, but perſuaded* Polyænus *it was falſe*. And his late great Defender hath little to ſay for him, but that *Socrates* underſtood as little *Geometry* as he; but *Socrates* was far enough from aſſerting ſuch ſtupid *Paradoxes*, and making *Geometry* nothing but a piece of *Sophiſtry*; as *Epicurus* did, and made a Mathematician think ſo too. Which ſhew'd his Authority ſway'd more than his Reaſon. But the *Epicurean* in *Plutarch* rejects *Democritus* his Doctrine, for that which *Plutarch* ſaith, *doth as well follow from that of* Epicurus; for if there be nothing but Atoms, then Qualities are only Appearances; and when we judg by our Senſes, we cannot judg truly of things, but of what they appear to us. But if nothing, ſaith he, can be produc'd out of nothing, and no Generation

Columel. l. 11. ult.

Plutarch. adv. Col.

De Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 3.

Sext. Emp. p. 163.

P. 164.

Cicero de Fin. l. 1. c. 6.

Acad. Qu. l. 4. c. 33.

can be of that which already is; how can indiviſible Atoms, which cannot be chang'd, produce Plants or Animals? Either therefore *Democritus* ſhould not have aſſerted ſuch immutable Principles, or he ſhould not have overlook'd the Conſequence, *i. e.* that there can be no Generation. But *Epicurus* impudently holds the ſame Principles, and yet would deny the Conſequence, and aſſert true Generation; juſt as he deny'd Providence, and yet aſſerted Piety; held Friendſhip to be only for Pleaſure, and yet that a Man muſt undergo any hardſhip for his Friends; made an Infinite Space, and yet placed an upper and lower Region in it. But he declares he can by no means underſtand, how Bodies indu'd with Qualities, ſhould be produc'd by Atoms that have none. There can be no Generation without Heat; how comes there to be Heat, when the Atoms themſelves have no Heat in them, nor become hot when they are join'd together? for if they are capable of Heat, then they are not impaſſible, nor without Qualities. So that according to the general Principles of *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, there can be no ſuch thing as a Generation of Animals.

But Democritus *obſerv'd ſtrange alterations in the Bodies of Inſects from Worms to flying Animals; and why might not Mankind have come into the World after the ſame manner?* If this were his Opinion, it is one of the wildeſt and moſt extravagant Opinions that could have enter'd into the head of ſuch a Man, and would make one think that the People of *Abdera* were not out in their judgment of him, if thoſe *Epiſtles* about him were genuine between *Hippocrates* and them.

There are wonderful alterations in the Bodies of *Inſects*, as appear beyond all contradiction by the many Experiments of thoſe who have apply'd themſelves for many years to obſerve them. But what then? Do not all theſe *Inſects* come out of Eggs, which have been laid by other *Inſects* before them? and therefore Mankind could not be *Worms* firſt, but there muſt have been Eggs before. And how ſhould theſe Eggs be tranſform'd into the Worms? What force was there in Nature to make ſo ſtrange a Transformation as is continually obſerv'd in them? And the very ſame Perſons, who have obſerv'd their *Transformations*, have as well obſerv'd the incredible number of Eggs that are laid by them, and the great and ſudden increaſe of them from thoſe Eggs. Even in the *Ephemeron*, which was ſo great a rarity taken notice of by *Ariſtotle* upon the River *Hypanon*, (but is ſo frequent upon ſome Rivers in *France* and the *Low Countries*, as is obſerv'd by *Scaliger*, *Auger. Clutius*, and others) it is agreed, *That they come out of ſuch a Transformation as other Inſects do, with four Wings and ſix Feet, and are very careful where they lay their Eggs, to keep them from the Water, in which they die, after they have ſpent their ſhort life in flying in great numbers together, at Sun-ſetting*; ſaith one from his own Obſervation. *Scaliger* ſaith, thoſe he obſerv'd *began to live at night, and dy'd by morning.*

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 5. c. 19. Scaliger. Exercit. 194. 5. Aug. Clut. de Hemerobio. Joh. de Mey Append. ad Goedart. Swammerdam Anatom. de Ephem. apud Thevenot. Amer. Sept.

But there are ſome things which deſerve a particular obſervation about Inſects, which plainly ſhew that they were not form'd by a caſual Coalition of Atoms, but by a wiſe Providence. As, that thoſe that have Wings have them ſtronger or weaker, more or leſs, according to their buſineſs and occaſion for uſing them; thoſe that have Feet, have an equal number on both ſides, altho' the numbers differ ſo much according to their kinds; thoſe which have neither Wings nor Feet, have Repoſitories made for them with proper Food in the Leaves of Trees or Plants. Concerning which there are ſeveral things very obſervable. (1.) Their great

great niceneſs as to their Food. *Goedart*, who made it his buſineſs to obſerve them 40 years, (as *Ariſtomachus Solenſis* did *Bees* for 58 years, ſaith *Pliny*) found it very difficult ſometimes to find the proper Food for them; for they would eat no other, and expreſs'd their joy when they had it. Dr. *Liſter* adds, *That Inſects would rather die than eat any thing elſe, not from want of Organs, but from a natural accuracy of Taſt.* And he ingeniouſly obſerves, that from hence may be found the beſt way of keeping Ships from Worms, by finding out that ſort of Wood which thoſe Worms will not touch. (2.) The different ſorts of Food in their different ſtates. While they are mere *Erucæ*, they eat a hard ſort of Food, as the Leaves of Plants; but when they come to have their Wings and to fly abroad, they live only on Honey and liquid things: which is very different from ſuch Animals as have Blood; for when they are *Embryo*'s they live on Liquids, but as they grow up they like harder Food. (3.) That thoſe which feed on Leaves of Plants growing, will not touch them when they are taken off or decaying: which *Goedart* ſaith he obſerv'd both as to Garden-herbs and Graſs. (4.) That thoſe flying Inſects which have very ſhort Feet, take their Food out of Flowers by the help of their Tongues as they fly. (5.) That thoſe which are moſt afraid of Birds, eat only in the night, when they are moſt ſecure from them; which argued a wonderful care of their own Safety. There are many other Obſervations to be made uſe of concerning the manner of their Transformations, the change made by them in the very Bodies of theſe Inſects, and the different times of continuance under them, and the ways to ſecure themſelves from Injuries of the Weather in cold Seaſons: but theſe are ſufficient to my purpoſe, which was to ſhew that *Democritus* made a very ill choice of Worms, as the inſtance of a fortuitous Production. But if they had been ſo, it was a very extravagant Fancy to think that Mankind ſhould undergo ſuch Transformations as Worms do, before they come to their perfection. For theſe Changes are evident to Senſe to all that obſerve no more than Silk-worms; but Mankind continue in one uniform ſtate, from an Embryo to a perfect Man, and while he is an Embryo hath one ſort of nouriſhment from the Mother, which is wholly different from what all ſorts of Worms do live upon; and the parts of Mankind are extremely remote from the ſhape, number and uſe of all ſorts of Worms. Inſomuch that *Democritus* might much better have fanſy'd, that Mankind were at firſt a ſort of Trees ſet with their Roots upwards: for the Head to Man is what the Root is to the Tree; and Trees come from an Embryo in the Seed, and are preſerv'd in the Womb of the Earth, and are fed with a Dew from above, and have Paſſages like *Lymphæducts* in their ſeveral parts; only they happen to want the Inſtruments of Senſe and Motion, which are needleſs to them, ſince their Food is brought home to them, and they grow up in the ſame uniform manner without Transformations, as Mankind do.

Plin. N. H. l. 11. c. 9. *Goedart de Inſectis. N. 5.* *Ed. Liſter. p. 13. 33.* *N. 14.* *N. 14.* *N. 15.*

The next *Hypotheſis* was that of *Anaximander*; and he makes them *to be bred up as Embryo's in the Bowels of other Creatures.* Of which *Plutarch* gives the fulleſt account: In one place he only ſaith, *That the firſt Animals were produc'd in moiſture, cover'd over with a certain Bark*, like the rind of a Cheſnut, ſaith *Redi*; *and when it grew dry it crackt, and the Animals ſtarted out, but liv'd not long.* Was not this a hopeful Beginning in the early days of Philoſophy? For *Anaximander* ſucceeded *Thales*, who was the firſt Philoſopher of *Greece*, and a much wiſer Man than his Scholar, as will afterwards appear. But we muſt now purſue

Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 5. c. 19.

Anaximander: and *Plutarch* in another place tells us, *That he was of opinion that Mankind were first bred in the Bellies of Fishes; and when they were strong enough to help themselves, they very fairly cast them upon dry ground and left them to shift for themselves.* Is not this a very good philosophical account of this matter? And he was in the right, when upon this ground *he dissuaded Men from eating of Fish*, lest they should be like *Cannibals.* It is a known saying, *That there is nothing so absurd, but it was said by one Philosopher or other.* I think *Anaximander* may put in for the first, who broach'd his own dreams and idle fancies under the name of Philosophy. And yet *Empedocles* in this matter, rather outwent him. For he saith, *Animals were not intire at first; but came into the world by pieces*; and so arms and legs, and all other parts happening to joyn together, made up one perfect Animal. *Hæc non sunt Philosophorum judicia, sed delirantium somnia*, may be much better apply'd here, than it is by the *Epicurean* in *Cicero* to their opinions of the Gods. But I rather think *Empedocles* his opinion is mis-represented; since the Author of the Book *De Mundo* (which is very ancient, if not *Aristotle*'s) gives another account of him; and saith, *He deriv'd the forming of Animals from* God; and his *Verses*, as they are in *Simplicius*, do not deny it; but only shew, *that all things except* God, *came from different principles.*

Plutarch. Sympos. l. 8. c. 9.

Plutarch. de Placit. l. 5. c. 19.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

But we are not deceiv'd in the third *Hypothesis* of *Epicurus* and his followers; which as *Redi* represents it is, *That Mankind and other Animals were inclos'd in certain Coats and Membranes in the womb of the Earth, which being broken in due time, they were all expos'd naked, without any sense of heat or cold, and sucked the Earth for nourishment, but the Earth grew too old for such births; and therefore was contented ever since to bring forth nothing but Insects.* This is so well known to be the *Epicurean Hypothesis* from *Lucretius, Censorinus*, &c. that there needs no farther proof of it. But whether it can be thought reasonable, is the thing now to be consider'd. And herein these two things are suppos'd: (1.) That there was a fit disposition of the Earth to produce them; and a capacity in it to form Wombs and Bags to preserve them till they were able to take nourishment; and that the Earth did afford a sort of Milk to support them. (2.) That the use of all the parts of human Bodies came only by chance, and were not form'd with any design. Both which are very unreasonable suppositions.

How can they make it appear that there ever was any such disposition of the Heavens and Earth to produce Animals more than there is still? When they were told *that if the Earth could at first produce Animals, why not still?* Their answer was, *The Seasons are changed, the Heavens were more benign, and the Earth more fruitful than they have been since.* (1.)

> *At novitas Mundi nec frigora dura ciebat,*
> *Nec nimios æstus, nec magnis viribus auras;*
> *Omnia enim pariter crescunt & robora sumunt.*
>
> Lucret. l. 5.

And *Lactantius* sets down their opinion more distinctly, *That certain motions of the Heavens are necessary to this production of Animals, as well as the freshness of the Earth; and that then there was no Winter nor Summer, but a perpetual Spring.* But how came such a *Proper Season* for this purpose at that time; and never since? *Animals*, say they, *can never since propa-*

Lactant. l. 2. c. 12.

gate themſelves: But what is this to the *Seaſon?* Do the *Seaſons* alter, as there is occaſion? Then there is a Superior Mind to direct them. If there be a natural courſe of the Heavens, which caus'd the Earth to be then prolifical; that muſt return and put a new vigor into the Earth, and make it young again. And this our modern Atheiſtical Philoſophers in *Italy*, ſuch as *Cardan*, *Pomponatius* and others, ſaw very well; and therefore aſſerted *that upon certain Conjunctions of the Heavens, the ſame effects would follow.* So *Berigardus*; who ſaith, that *Cardan* and *Pomponatius* laid much weight on this Story in *Diodorus Siculus* about *Animals produc'd by the Nile*; and he adds another very ridiculous, as he pretends out of *Camerarius*, *of ſeveral parts of human Bodies, which are ſeen to appear every year riſing out of the Earth about* Grand Cairo: and he thinks *they were like the Egyptian Mice, part Earth and part Animals.* What will not ſuch Men be inclin'd to believe rather than the truth! As when he adds, *of the two Green Boys in* England, *which came out of a Wolf's den* 500 *years ſince; and the Blew and Red Men out of the Mountains of* Armenia. Which are ſuch incredible Fictions, that it is a wonder any one that pretends to common ſenſe could repeat them. But as to the Egyptian Story in *Camerarius*, it relates not at all to the firſt making of Bodies; but *to the Reſurrection from the dead.* *Camerarius* neither pretends to have ſeen it himſelf, nor that his Friend did; but that his Friend heard one that had been a great Traveller ſay, *That in a certain place not far from the Pyramids, at a certain time of the year, a great multitude met to ſee the Reſurrection of the Dead, as they call'd it; and then he ſaid ſome part of the Body ſeem'd to come out of the Earth, ſometimes the Head, ſometimes the Feet, and ſometime the greater part of the Body; which were afterwards hid under the Earth again.* And another Friend of his ſhew'd him an old *Itinerary* to the ſame purpoſe; *and that the place was two Miles from the* Nile, *in an old Burying place; and that it laſted three days, and then no more were ſeen that year.* But he added, That *they were not ſeen riſing up or walking*; and he ſaith, *That he ſaw it not himſelf.* But *Camerarius* himſelf cenſures it as a *ſuperſtitious folly.* *Martinus à Baumgarten*, ſaith, *That at* Cairo *it was believ'd in his time, that at a certain Moſque near the* Nile, *the Bodies of the dead do ariſe out of their Graves at the time of Prayers, and there ſtand, and diſappear when they are over*; which he calls a *Diabolical Illuſion.* But when our Ingenious Mr. *Sandys* was in *Egypt*, the ſtory was chang'd; for then it was affirm'd, *That not far from the* Nilus, *upon Good-Friday, the Arms and Legs of a Number of Men did appear ſtretch'd forth of the Earth, to the aſtoniſhment of the multitude.* Which he not improbably conjectures *to have been taken out of the Mummies not far off by the Watermen, (who gain very much by it) and plac'd conveniently in the Sand to be ſeen,* as they thought would raiſe the greateſt admiration. Since his time Monſ. *Thevenot*, who was upon the place ſaith, *That at* Grand Cairo *it is generally believ'd that on three days in Paſſion-week, ſome part of the dead Bodies lie out of the graves, and then return into the Earth. He had the curioſity to go and ſee, and there found ſome ſkulls and bones, which they ſay confidently came out of the Earth; but he looked on it as a contrivance of the Santons.* But if this prove any thing, it is not what *Berigardius* brings it for, that Mankind came firſt out of the Earth, but that there ſhall be a Reſurrection of the Dead: for he ſaith, *It was in a place where many dead Bodies did lie buried*; and not far from the *Mummies*; which was the moſt famous place for Burials in all *Egypt:* an account whereof is

Berigard. Circul. 10. *p.* 636. *part.* 5.

Camerar. Operæ ſubciſ. Cent. 1. *c.* 73.

Martin. à Baumgart. Peregrin. l. 1. *c.* 18.

Sandys's *Travels, p.* 99.

Thevenot Voyage de Levant, part 2. *ch.* 12.

Bellon. l. 2. *c.* 47. *Pietr. della Valle Vol.* 1. *Lett.* 11. §. 8.

given by *Bellonius*, *Peter della Valle*, *Buratine* in *Thevenot's Collection*, Prince *Radzivil* and several others: Prince *Radzivil* observ'd, *That there were vast numbers of skulls and bones scatter'd up and down, where the flesh had been taken off, and sold away for Mummy.* But besides these *Mummies* (as they are call'd) there was continu'd a place of solemn Burial near to *Grand Cairo* by the *Turks*; so that there were always Bodies ready that were not proper *Mummies*, to make this annual shew with, to deceive the simple. But *Berigardus* is aware of the difficulty *of assigning the manner how Animals come out of the Earth*; and therefore he thinks it sufficient to shew that the Earth can produce them one way or other, and afford them *Nourishment* when they are produc'd; this he thinks *absolutely necessary*, and he suspects that *Lucretius* his *Folliculi* will not do the business; *because it is impossible for Children to subsist, if they did break the bags they were inclos'd in, which were fastened to the Earth:* But if there were such a *Milky Substance* in the Earth for new born Children to suck, is that all that is necessary for their support, when they are so unable to help themselves? Of all things one would not expect to find Milk in the breasts of the Earth; and it must be some very happy Conjunction of the Planets to make the Earth to give suck. How much would those who are friends to Religion have been despis'd and laugh'd at, if they had made such absurd and ridiculous *Hypothesis* as these? If such a thing did arise from natural and necessary Causes, it must continue; and since we are certain it hath never been since, we have no reason to think it ever was. If it were by chance; what hinders the same effect, unless Chance were ty'd up to one certain time? and by what Laws can Chance be bounded? If it were by particular design at that time for the support of new born Animals, then there must be a Providence owned; and yet all this was invented on purpose to exclude Providence: which shews how weak and inconsistent this *Hypothesis* is.

Thevenot Relat. part 1. ad fin. Peregrin. Principis Radzivil, p. 187.

We account it a wonderful work of Providence, that at the same time the Child is form'd in the womb of its Mother, there should be so ample and sutable provision made for its nourishment in the Mother's breasts against its coming into the World. Whether it be by turning the Blood into Milk, as was generally thought, or by a passage of the Chyle from the Ventricle thither, as some of late think; it cannot but be look'd on as a work of Design, to turn the nourishment another way on purpose to serve the necessities of the new born Child. But this is not all; but continual care and watchfulness of the Nurse is necessary to preserve it, otherways, as well as by feeding it. But these unadvis'd and fanciful makers of Mankind think they have done their business, if they can but imagin the Earth to afford some *Milky Substance*, to support the poor helpless Infants to a little suck from the Earth: why did they not as easily find out all other conveniencies for them? But there is so much absurdity in the whole Supposition, that *Berigardus* concludes, *That Mankind must come full grown out of the Earth, and able to shift for themselves; or else that some other Animals must come out before them to afford Milk for them, as the Wolf did to* Romulus *and* Remus. Such miserable shifts must those run into, who will not allow a wise Providence to have brought Mankind into the World.

II. But how came Mankind, if they came into the World so by chance, to be so admirably provided in all parts of their Bodies of such instruments of sense and motion, that look as like a design as any thing can

poſſibly do? The Bodies of Men are not like meer lumps of dirt and water put together, for there is not the leaſt part about them, but is made up of ſuch a *Wonderful Mechaniſm*, that there cannot be a diſcompoſure in it without a diſorder in the whole. But, ſuppoſe the fleſhly and bony parts could be made by the mixing and tempering ſeveral particles of Matter together; yet what can be imagin'd as to the *Muſcles* and *Nerves* and *Fibres*, which are ſo conveniently diſpers'd over the Body? The Heart it ſelf is found to be a very ſtrong Muſcle, conſiſting of abundance of Nerves, and all kind of Fibres complicated within each other, and a ſtrong Tendon at the Baſis of it; by virtue whereof it is able to contract it ſelf, and ſo makes the Blood to paſs into the Arteries, which convey it to all parts of the Body. Now let any one think with himſelf how it is poſſible for a meer Lump of Earth made in ſuch a form as the Heart is, to have ſuch a force and power to contract it ſelf to ſuch a degree as to ſend out ſo much Blood continually, and to receive it in again by the relaxation of it ſelf. How comes this Motion to begin in ſuch a piece of Clay made with a Baſis and a Cone? How came the inward cavities to be form'd, and kept ſo diſtinct from each other? For, if there were any ſtop of the paſſage, Life is at an end. How comes ſuch a Motion to continue ſo long and ſo uniform? Thoſe who have moſt narrowly ſearch'd into it, have found that no other account can be given of it, but that the Wiſe Creator that form'd the Heart, doth both give and continue its motion. And as to all the other Muſcles of the Body, if we conſider their number, their poſition, the contexture of their parts, and their continual uſefulneſs; we can never imagin that all theſe things could be the reſult of Heat and Mud, or a caſual conflux of the dull particles of Matter. Every Muſcle hath its proper Fibres laid upon one another, and its oppoſite Tendons, with an inward cavity, and the Artery, Veins and Nerves belonging to it, and a Membrane to cover all; and all parts capable of motion have ſeveral Muſcles peculiar to themſelves, for diſtinct uſes and different ſort of motions; as may be ſeen at large in all that treat of theſe matters. Who tell us generally that the Eyes have ſix, the Noſe four pair, the Cheeks two pair, the Lips four Muſcles, the nether Mandible five, the Ears ſix, the Tongue ſeven, &c. I need go no farther: and altho' there be ſome difference in the way of numbring them, yet they all agree, there are ſo many as are impoſſible to be made out by heat and mud, or any force of the Sun or Earth. And what is it which makes all theſe Muſcles ſo ſerviceable to Mankind, that upon the leaſt command they move the parts they ſerve in what manner we direct them? The Reaſon of *Muſcular Motion* is a thing as much out of our reach as that of the *Heart*: Some talk of *Elaſtick Spirits*; others of *the weight of the Blood*; others of *a nervous liquor diſtending the carnous Fibres*; others of *a Succus nutritius from the Nerves meeting with the Animal Spirits, and fermenting together, which being thruſt into the carnous Fibres, ſwells and dilates them ſo as to make them contract themſelves*; *from whence*, they ſay, *Local Motion proceeds*. But all theſe are but mere conjectures, and hardly anſwer to the moſt common appearances of Muſcular motion. And the Mechaniſm of our own Bodies, both as to Senſe and Motion, baffles all the attempts of the moſt ingenious and ſubtle Philoſophers; who may eaſier teach us the ways to talk about it, than to underſtand it. But there is one thing yet farther fit to be obſerv'd in this place concerning the Muſcles; which is the different Figure of them, according to the uſe they ſerve for; as

Lower *de Corde. p.* 85.

the

the Muſcle called *Deltoides* on the Shoulder, the Circular Muſcles, where their uſe is to open and ſhut; if ſuch things do not argue contrivance and deſign, it is not eaſy to imagin what doth. What can thoſe who follow *Diodorus Siculus* make of the whole *Syſtem of Nerves*, which are in the Body of Man? Did theſe come out of ſlime with *the heat of the Sun?* How came the different Riſe of the *Nerves*, ſome within and others without the Brain? What reaſon is there in the bulk, and figure, and texture of that ſame Subſtance, that it comes to be ſo divided, ſo as part of it to continue within the Brain, and the other to be continued down to the loweſt part of the Back, by ſeveral diſtinct *Vertebræ?* How came Matter of it ſelf to form ſuch a paſſage down from the Brain, and to ſecure it in ſuch a manner; and to compact the ſeveral parts together, ſo firmly as if they were but one bone, and yet ſo flexibly as to ſerve beſt for motion? What made the *Perforation* for the *Spinal Marrow* to paſs in the middle and on the ſides, for the ſeveral *Nerves* to go from thence to the ſeveral parts of the Body? Whence came that *Ligament*, which joyns the *Vertebræ* of the Back together, and covers the other Membranes of the *Spina Dorſi?* There is a wonderful curioſity obſerved by our greateſt *Anatomiſts*, in the order and placing of the *Nerves*, the *Arteries*, *the Veins* and the *hollow places* belonging to it: which they found by opening the *Vertebræ* in *Embryos*, and taking out the ſpinal Marrow, and injecting liquors into the ſeveral veſſels. And ſtill the farther any have gone in theſe ſearches, the more reaſon they have ſeen to admire the wiſdom of Providence: and ſo it hath been in other parts. *Ariſtotle* mentions a ſtrange ſaying of *Empedocles*, *That the reaſon why the Back-bone appears as if it were made up of ſeveral pieces, was that it was at firſt broken, and then put together; and ever ſince it hath ſo continued.* But how came the *Vertebræ* then to be ſo well faſtened together, and to be ſo much more convenient for motion than an intire bone would have been? Beſides in an *Embryo* that which is properly the *Spina*, doth not then appear, as being inconvenient for its poſture in the womb; which ſhews both the intention of Nature, and the deſign of Providence. How came the *Vertebræ* to be in other Animals as well as Mankind? And even *Ariſtotle* himſelf was therein miſtaken, for he affirms, *That a Lion hath no* Vertebræ *in his Neck-bone, but that it is all one continued bone:* But *Borrichius* in his Anatomy of one, declares *that he found the ſeveral* Vertebræ *in the Neck plain and diſtinct.* And the ſame learned Perſon obſerves, *That in a Crocodile, which he diſſected, he found in four foot length of the Back ſixty* Vertebræ; *which were of a ſpongy nature, fit to receive nouriſhment*; and from *the different formation of ſome parts of them,* he concludes it moſt probable that they grow ſo much longer than other Animals. But *Ariſtotle*'s miſtakes, about *the Lion's having no* Vertebræ *in his Neck*, had been diſcover'd by *Scaliger*, and confirm'd by ſeveral Diſſections ſince: So that the *Vertebræ* are of the original deſign of Nature. But to proceed: What made the ſeveral paſſages out of the Skull, for the Nerves which ſerve for the ſeveral Senſes of *Smelling*, *Seeing*, *Hearing* and *Taſting?* How come the ſeveral branches of the *Par Vagum* to be ſo diſpers'd, and to make ſuch knots with the *Intercoſtal Nerves?* Theſe, and many more ſuch Queſtions might be aſked relating to the wonderful *Syſtem* of *Nerves*, but theſe are ſufficient to my purpoſe, to ſhew that theſe wonderful contrivances for Senſe and Motion, could not come from meer fortuitous and unthinking Cauſes. But let us look now upon the moſt obvious parts of the Body, which lie to the

Willis de Cerebro, c. 29.

Ariſt. de Partib. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 4. c. 10.

Hermet. Sapient. vindic. c. 10. p. 245. p. 272.

Exercit. 208.

view of all Men, the *Eye*, the *Ear*, the *Mouth*, and the *Hand*; one would think it hardly poſſible for any Men pretending to Reaſon, to think theſe to be the reſult of Chance. Let us well conſider the ſtructure of *the Eye*, and we may well think *Lucretius* had no lucid interval when he wrote,

Illud in his rebus vitium vehementer & iſtam
Effugere errorem, vitareque præmeditator,
Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
Proſpicere ut poſſimus. Lucret. l. 4.

That we muſt have a great care to avoid the miſtake of thoſe that ſay, that Eyes were made for Seeing. For could any Man in his right Senſes think the Eye could be form'd for any other uſe but to ſee with? *But the uſe is after the thing is form'd.* What then? May it not be deſign'd for ſuch a uſe by him that form'd it? *But that which is form'd for a particular uſe, muſt be later than that for whoſe uſe it is form'd, as a Bed for a Man to ſleep on, a Cup to drink out of, Armour to defend himſelf; but a Man might ſleep, and drink, and defend himſelf, before thoſe things were found out.* What is the meaning of all this? No one is ſo ſenſleſs to queſtion, Whether Men be not before they find ſome conveniencies for their particular uſes; but the Queſtion here is, Whether when a thing is ſo form'd as to ſerve only for ſuch a uſe, it be not reaſonable to conclude that it was made on purpoſe for that uſe? But ſaith *Lucretius*,

Nil ideo quoniam natum'ſt in corpore ut uti
Poſſemus, ſed, quod natum'ſt id procreat uſum.

Nothing is made in the Body that we might uſe it, but when it is made we find out the uſe of it. As tho' it had been poſſible for Mankind to have found ſuch an uſe of the Eye, unleſs it had been purpoſely made for it, The Act of Seeing is no doubt ſubſequent to the making of the Eye; for we cannot ſee without Eyes; but if we could make no other uſe of Eyes; but to ſee with, is not this a plain evidence they were made for us to that end? This is not like a uſe we make of things which we alter the faſhion of for our conveniences. For, we do not make our own Eyes; they are very early form'd in the Body, and therefore were within the primary intention of Nature; and aſſoon as we come into the World, we do not deliberate whether we ſhould uſe Eyes or not, for we preſently ſee with them. And how can the Eye being made teach us the uſe of it, when we preſently make uſe of our Eyes without any previous deliberation? We may hinder the uſe of them, if we pleaſe, by blinding our ſelves, but we cannot turn them to any other uſe. If *Lucretius* in the extravagancy of his imagination, might fancy the uſe was arbitrary, then Men might have heard with their Eyes or have ſeen with their Ears, or have taſted with their Noſes, or ſmelt with their Tongues: But this I ſuppoſe none can think that he meant. What was it then? that Men could not uſe them till they were made? We grant it. But doth it follow thence that they were not made deſignedly for ſuch a uſe? How can we judge of that, but by examining the ſeveral parts? and if they were fitted for ſuch a uſe and no other, we have reaſon to conclude they were ſo intended. Now

what could the *Muſcles* and *Tunicles*, and *ſeveral Humours* of the Eye be made for, but for Sight? How came that *Cavity* to be form'd in the Forehead in which the Eyes are plac'd? What motion of the particles of Matter made two ſuch hollow places in the Skull? How came one not to be ſufficient? How come the *Eye-lids* to be ſo plac'd? Could they be deſign'd for any other uſe? How come the *Glands* to be fix'd in the corners of the Eyes, and with the *Lymphatick Veſſels* belonging to them? Could they have ſerv'd for other uſes? How comes the *Optick Nerve* to be continued to the three Tunicles of the Eyes? and that which partakes moſt of the ſubſtance of the Brain to be the chief organ of Sight, as fitteſt to tranſmit the images to the Brain? What was the *Chriſtallin Humour* deſign'd for, but to receive the impreſſions of outward objects? How comes the *Optick Nerve* to be ſo inſerted into the Eye, not directly behind, but on one ſide, but only for the more intire tranſmitting the Images receiv'd by the Eye? Can now any one think that the Eye could be ever made for any other uſe, but for ſight? And we do not therefore uſe it, becauſe we find it ready prepar'd? but it was therefore ſo prepar'd, that we might uſe it to ſuch a purpoſe. And as to his general ſaying, *That nothing in the Body is made for uſe, but that the uſe follows the making of it*; let us apply it to other Animals, and it will appear ridiculous. What could any Man anſwer ſeriouſly to one that ſhould ſay, that four-footed Animals had not Feet given them to go with; but that finding ſo many Feet, they did go with them? And ſo for the Wings of Birds, and the Fins of Fiſhes; and the particular ſhapes of ſome Animals for their particular uſe: As, the long Neck of the Swan, for going deeper in the water for his food; will any one ſay, that the Swan finding his Neck ſo long, us'd it for that purpoſe? Or that *Shell-fiſh* finding their hard Shells ready made as a defence againſt the Rocks, crept into them for that end? Whereas all the Muſcles they move by, are cover'd over with a hard bony Subſtance; and ſo they are the neceſſary parts belonging to them. What can be ſaid to the thick horny ſubſtance of an Eagle's Eye, which makes it bear the ſtrongeſt beams of the Sun; was this only us'd for that purpoſe, but not intended by Nature? Whence came that outward covering of the Eye, not only in Eagles but in other greater Birds, which they can draw over it as they pleaſe, and is ſo ſtrong a defence againſt light, that Anatomiſts tell us, by the help of it put to their open Eyes, they could look on the Sun without trouble, as *Borrichius* informs us? *Steno*, upon the obſervation of the wonderful Mechaniſm of the Eye both in Mankind, and Beaſts, and Birds, ſaith, *That if a Man firſt underſtands Mechanicks, and then curiouſly examins the fabrick of Animals, he muſt either put off his Reaſon, or he muſt admire the wiſdom and contrivance of Providence.* And he underſtood the frame of theſe things far beyond what either *Lucretius* or *Epicurus* did.

Borrich. Hermet. ſap. p. 259. Act. Dan. l. 2. Obſ. 127.

And ſo for the Ear *that was made*, ſaith *Lucretius*, *long before any Sound was heard.*

Multoque creatæ ſunt prius Aures,
Quam ſonus eſt auditus.

No doubt of it. For how ſhould we hear without Ears? But can any Man imagin they could be made for any other uſe but to hear with? How came they to be plac'd in the Head and not in any other part of the

the Body? Were there any form'd before with Ears in other parts, which did not do so well? In other cases they say, *Nature was put to try divers Experiments, because the imperfect Animals could not subsist*; But this cannot hold here: For Mankind might have lived without Ears in other places, but the Head is certainly the best for Sounds, being received and transmitted to the Brain. How comes the outward part of the Ear to be so framed as it is, but for the better gathering and more distinct conveyance of the Sounds, as appears by the confus'd noise which those have who have lost that part? What made the inward passage so winding, and such an exquisite Membrane at the end of it, and a Cord behind it, but for the advantage of the Sound? How come the three cavities behind, the first with little Bones of an extraordinary figure, whereof one triangular, the better to give passage to the Air; the second called *the Labyrinth*, and the third with *Spiral Windings* and *an Internal Air*, and all particularly serving the purpose of Hearing, by the Sound passing from one to another? Whence came all these subtle and intricate passages, if our Bodies were made by chance? And yet, if any of them be not in their due order, our sense of Hearing is prejudiced; which shews that this contrivance was necessary in order to it. And which is again observable, the greater discoveries have been made in these matters, the more reason we have to admire the contrivance of them. As in this sense of Hearing, the latest discoveries about the small bones of the first cavity, call'd *the Hammer*, *the Anvil*, and *the Stirrup*, and another in the joyning the two last, acquaint us with more than what the Ancients knew; since there are two things remarkable about them. 1. *That they do move each other*; the Drum moves the Hammer, the Hammer the Anvil, that the Stirrup, which opens the passage into the second cavity. 2. *That these bones are as big in an Infant, as in grown Persons.* Now how comes this to pass in a way of *Mechanism?* How come these Bones not to increase as the other parts of the Body do; since the most solid of them, *the Hammer* and *Anvil*, as well as the *Stirrup*, have manifest Pores in them to receive nourishment? But not only these, but the other small bones in the inner cavities, the *Semicircular passages* and the *Cochlea* only receive a greater *firmness* and *hardness* by Age. These things I can only mention, and refer the Reader to Mr. *Du Verney* and others, who have treated most exactly of them.

The frame of the Mouth as it is, is necessary for *Respiration*, and *Nourishment*, and *Speech*. For *Respiration*, the Mouth opened affords a Passage to the Air, and there are inward Vessels fitted to convey it to the Lungs, and without breathing it is impossible to live. But how came the two different Passages for the *Air* and *Food?* How came the *Valve* to secure the Passage to the Lungs from such things which may prejudice it, and pass the other way? As to *Nourishment*, the Mouth not only takes in the Food, but the Teeth are conveniently plac'd for the preparing it for its farther passage and alteration in the Stomach, in order to Nutrition; for which end there are Vessels prepar'd with wonderful variety and contrivance. How come those *Channels* into those hard Bones in the Mouth, which we call *Teeth*, by which an Artery, a Vein and a Nerve spread themselves in branches to each particular Tooth? How come the figures of them to vary according to their use, and to have stronger Roots where the work is harder? And because *Speech* is one of the peculiar excellencies of Mankind, there is an Instrument fram'd on

purpose for it in the Mouth (which serves for *Tasting* likewise) and without this, all the communication of Mankind with each other by words had been lost. And I cannot see how mere Matter and Motion could help Mankind either to frame words, or to utter them to others without a *Tongue*; nor, how it could be fram'd by it.

The *Hand* is so provided with *Joints*, *Muscles*, and *Tendons*, for the great variety of necessary uses it serves Mankind for, that he that can think it could be so contriv'd by chance, doth thereby shew that some can think only by Chance without any Reason; and it is a vain thing to hope to convince them. I shall not need to insist on the curiosity of the contrivance of all the Muscles of the Hand; but it is impossible for any Man to give an account of the *Perforation* of those Muscles, which serve for the use of some of the Fingers and Toes, from mere Matter and Motion; or the Ligaments about the Tendons of those Muscles, for the greater easiness of their motion. *Aristotle* hath a Discourse about the great use of a Hand to Mankind: *Anaxagoras*, he saith, *said that Man was the wisest Animal, because he alone had Hands*; but, saith he, *therefore Man had Hands, because he was the wisest, being best able to make use of such an excellent Instrument. For that is the Wisdom of Nature to do as a wise Man would do*, i.e. *to give the best Instruments to the best Workman. Now*, saith he, *the Hand is the most useful Instrument to him that is capable of making a good use of it.* And therefore he blames those that said, *Man was the worst provided for of any Animals; for they have but one help afforded them by Nature, but the Hand is instead of all, for it can make use of all.* And for that reason he shews how very convenient the make and fashion of the Hand is, and the division of it into five parts, on which he insists at large. So that *Aristotle* was fully satisfy'd that the production of Mankind was no casual or spontaneous thing, but the effect of Wisdom and Understanding.

Riolan. Anatom. l. 5. c. 28.

Aristot. de Part. Anim. l. 4. c. 10.

These things I have here laid together at first, because this *Hypothesis* of *Diodorus Siculus* hath been thought by some in our Age to be *the natural sense of Mankind without Revelation*; whereas in truth it is the foundation of Irreligion, and the reproach of Mankind; but not the sense of the wisest part of them. And to make out this more effectually, I shall now proceed to consider and compare the sense of the most *antient Philosophers* on both sides as to this point, whether the World was the effect of Chance, or of a wise Providence. For if the World were made by a wise and intelligent Being, it can never be suspected that Religion is an Imposture, or a contrivance of Politicians; for then it will appear to be built upon the truest Reason. And I shall the more carefully inquire into the Opinions of the eldest Philosophers, because they were neither *Priests* nor *Politicians*, having no Interest to carry on by the practice of Religion. And some of them were born in a very good condition, and quitted their Estates, or neglected other business, the more freely to attend on their philosophical Inquiries. And therefore we have the more reason to search into their Opinions, so far as relates to these matters.

It cannot be deny'd that after Men began to be inquisitive into the philosophical Reasons of Things, there were some who set up for material Causes only, without an Efficient. And there were two different sorts of these, and the other Schemes may be well reduced to them.

The first was of those who were the immediate Successors of *Thales*: For I see no reason to put him in the head of them, if what *Cicero*, *Diogenes Laertius* and *Plutarch* report of him be true. For it is said in

Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. 1. 25. *Cicero, That* Thales *made* God *to be the Mind that form'd all things.* And to what purpose should *Velleius* say this, if this had not been then known to have been his Opinion? For it had been better for his design to have made so great a Man as *Thales* was esteem'd, to have excluded God and Providence. *Diogenes Laertius* saith, *That he not only made* God *an Eternal Being, but that the World was of his making.* And he was no more partial in this case, than the *Epicurean* in *Tully.* It is observable, that when *Plutarch* blames *Anaximander* and *Anaximenes* for *leaving out the Efficient Cause,* he takes no notice of *Thales* on that account; which he ought to have done, as being the Head of that Sect of Philosophers called the *Ionick,* as himself acknowledges in that place. And *Stobæus* saith, *That* Thales *own'd a Divine Power, which pass'd thro' and gave motion to the fluid Matter, out of which he suppos'd all things to be made.* The great Objection against this, is, that several of the antient Writers say, *That* Anaxagoras *was the first Philosopher, who attributed the making of the World to an Infinite Mind*; and that *Plutarch* himself, in the Life of *Pericles,* saith the same. But the true answer to this, is, that *Anaxagoras* was the first who own'd this in writing, whose words are produc'd by so many; but *Thales* wrote nothing about it that appear'd, and therefore his Scholars going another way, there might be some presumption against him. For it is too evident that *Anaximander,* his Disciple, did never mention a God in the making of the World; *but he mentions several Gods made out of the World, Dii nativi*; a sort of *Phœnician Gods,* which rose out of Matter; and such as the *Poets* had possess'd the People with among the *Greeks.* I have already observ'd from *Plato, That the old Greeks worship'd the Sun, Moon, and Stars,* &c. *as other barbarous Nations did.* Now herein lay the artifice of *Anaximander,* that he took care to assert the *Popular Deities,* and so avoided the imputation of *Atheism* among the People, who look'd no farther, than whether Men own'd the Religion in vogue: But whether there were an Infinite Mind superior to those Gods they worship'd, they look'd on as a Speculation too deep for them; and therefore they let those alone, who spake nothing against the Gods they solemnly worship'd. And this was the true reason of the different usage of *Anaximander* and *Anaxagoras.* The former asserted the Beginning of all things to have been from Infinite Matter, without an Efficient Cause: The latter said this was impossible; but there must be an Eternal Mind to give motion to Matter, and to direct it. Now one would have thought that *Anaxagoras* should have been in favor with the People, who hated *Atheism,* and *Anaximander* punished: But on the contrary *Anaximander* kept up his Interest among the People where he liv'd, at *Miletus* in *Asia,* and at last carry'd a Colony along with him to *Apollonia.* The reason was, the People of *Miletus* had a wonderful veneration for the *Sun* and *Moon,* under the names of *Apollo* and *Diana*; and as long as *Anaximander* comply'd with them, as to these *Dii nativi,* they let him alone in his Philosophy. But *Anaxagoras* coming to *Athens,* and being there in favor with *Pericles,* a leading Man in the City, but oppos'd violently by a different Faction of *Thucydides Milesius,* who took all advantages they could against *Pericles* his Party: They finding that *Anaxagoras* had shew'd too much of his Philosophy, when he call'd the Sun a *Mass of Fire*; this set them all in a flame, and made such a disturbance about it, that *Anaxagoras* was accus'd of *Atheism*; and *Pericles* with all his Interest and Eloquence could not save him from Banishment, in which he died, as appears by *Laertius* and *Ælian.* *Ana-*

Plutar. de Plac. Phil. l. 1. c. 3. Stob. Eclog. Phys. c. 1.

Ælian. l. 3. c. 17. Strab. l. 14.

xagoras

xagoras was very clear as to the main point of *Atheiſm*, for he aſſerted an Eternal Mind which made the World; this *Anaximander* deny'd, but he aſſerted the Common Deities: and altho' the *Epicurean* in *Tully* argues well againſt *Anaximander*'s Opinion, *Sed nos Deum niſi ſempiternum intelligere quî poſſumus?* We can have no true Notion of GOD not eternal; yet ſuch philoſophical Reaſons ſignified little; he allow'd the ſame Worſhip which they practis'd, and this was enough to ſatisfy them.

I am not ignorant, that ſome have gone about to excuſe *Anaximander*, as tho' he were ſo intent upon the Material Cauſes, that thro' *Incogitancy* only *he left out the Efficient.* A ſtrange piece of *Incogitancy* in a Philoſopher to leave out the main point. For the juſt fault which *Anaxagoras* found, was that he went about to make a World without an Eternal Mind before Matter; and he knew very well what the ſenſe of *Anaximander*, and his Scholar *Anaximenes* were, by whom he was inſtructed. And why ſhould *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Theophraſtus*, &c. look on it as ſo extraordinary a thing in *Anaxagoras* to aſſert an Eternal Mind, as the firſt Cauſe, if his Predeceſſors meant the ſame thing? But there is a paſſage in *Ariſtotle* which ſeems moſt to favour *Anaximander*, viz. *That he own'd an infinite firſt Principle, which did contain and govern all things, and was Immortal and Incorruptible.* And this *Aug. Steuchus Eugubinus* in his learned Book *De perenni Philoſophia*, inſiſts much upon. (A Book written with ſo good a deſign, and bating ſome ſuppoſititious Authorities, ſo well manag'd, that the Elder *Scaliger*, as his Son tells us, commended it particularly to a great Friend of his, too inclinable to *Atheiſm* (as was too much the faſhion then as well as ſince, among ſome who would ſeem to have more Wit than others) and it had ſo great ſucceſs therein, that he utterly renounc'd all Principles tending that way.) The Paſſage which he produces is certainly in *Ariſtotle*, and it ſeems ſo capable of a good meaning, that *Clemens Alexandrinus join'd him with* Anaxagoras *in ſuppoſing an Infinite Being above the Elements:* And it cannot be deny'd that the Author of the Book *de Mundo* (who, as I before obſerv'd, was very antient, if not *Ariſtotle*) doth uſe the ſame Expreſſion concerning GOD, *that he doth contain and govern all things:* but yet laying the Paſſages in *Ariſtotle* together, there is too great reaſon to ſuſpect that *Anaximander* did not aſſert an Eternal Mind, as *Anaxagoras* did. He is there giving an account of the different Notions Philoſophers had concerning *the firſt Principle: Some aſſerted it to be Infinite, as* Anaxagoras *and* Democritus; *the former held things to be made out of one another, and that there was one firſt Principle of all, which he called Mind*; *the latter held no Generation of things out of another, but that one Common Matter or Body was the only Principle of all things, and that the parts differ'd only by bulk and figure.* Thus far *Ariſtotle* is clear; then he goes on to ſhew, *that the firſt Principle muſt be Ingenite and Incorruptible*; and then it *muſt contain and govern all things*; *as all do hold, who do not aſſert* other Cauſes, *as Mind* (as *Anaxagoras*) *or Friendſhip* (as *Empedocles.*) *And this is the* Τὸ Θεῖον *the Divine Being, which is immortal and incorruptible,* as was aſſerted by *Anaximander* and *the moſt of thoſe* he calls *Phyſiologiſts, i. e.* who went no farther than the bare Nature of things. Now here it is plain, that he doth diſtinguiſh *Anaximander* and his Followers from *Anaxagoras*, who aſſerted an Eternal Mind: and he diſtinguiſhes his Opinion both from that of *Democritus* and *Anaximander.* It may be ſaid, *that it is plain from hence, that* Anaximander *did aſſert a Divine Being*; but at laſt it came to nothing but *Infinite Matter*, which was the Ori-

De Perenni Philoſ. l. 11. 5.

Joſ. Scalig. de vit. Julii Scaligeri p. 50.

Clem. Alexandr. Protrept. p. 43.

Nat. Auſ. l. 3. c. 4.

ginal and Mother-God to his *Dii Geniti*, as he called them. In another place he ſpeaks yet more plainly, viz. *that thoſe Philoſophers before* Anaxagoras *went no farther than Matter, and made all things to come out of it, and to be diſſolv'd into it again, being it ſelf one and immutable under all the variety of changes.* He ſaith, *They differ'd about the firſt Material Principle: Thales*, and one *Hippon* called *the Atheiſt* (the firſt of that Order that we read of) *held it to be Water*; but *Ariſtotle* beſtows a very ſevere character upon him, viz. *that he did not deſerve to be mention'd for the meanneſs of his capacity.* (It ſeems Wit and Atheiſm did not begin together.) *Anaximander* would go no farther than Infinite Matter in general; but *Anaximenes* was for *Air*, and ſo was *Diogenes Apolloniates*, who liv'd in the time of *Anaxagoras*; but it ſeems by *Demetrius Phalereus* his Apology for *Socrates* (now loſt) *that he fell into ſome danger at* Athens (poſſibly for being againſt the Worſhip of Fire, as *Anaxagoras* was:) But upon the whole matter, I do not ſee how *Anaximander* can be excus'd, altho' he left the *Popular Gods*, and beſtow'd the name of *Divinity* upon his *Infinite Matter.*

Metaphyſ. l. 1. c. 3.

Διὰ τ' ἀτέλειαν αὐτῆς τ διανοίας.

But there was another *Succeſſion* of *Philoſophers* deriv'd from *Xenophanes*, who liv'd in *Sicily*, ſaith *Laertius*, and was Contemporary with *Anaximander:* and he was neither a Follower of *Thales* nor of *Pythagoras*; but from a Town near the Sea in *Italy*, whence his chief Followers came, it was called the *Eleatick Sect.* He was a great Enemy to *the poetical Fictions about the Gods*, as he had reaſon; for they ſtrangely corrupted the Minds of the People, and took away all inward Reverence towards the Deity. And altho' *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks with ſome contempt of him; yet others have ſhew'd that he miſunderſtood him, and that he aſſerted *One Infinite and Eternal Mind*; and the ſame *Simplicius* ſaith of *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus:* But ſince the learned Author of the *Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe*, hath very well clear'd that matter, I intend not to tranſcribe him, but to refer my Reader to him, and proceed to thoſe who changed the firſt Notions of the *Eleatick Sect*, and ſet up for the making a World without a Deity. And thoſe were *Lucippus* and *Democritus*; and yet *Stobæus* ſaith, *that* Leucippus *wrote a Book about Mind*, wherein he hath this Saying, *That nothing is done in vain, but all things are done from Reaſon and Neceſſity.* How theſe two things came to be ſo put together is hard for us now to conjecture, unleſs that Book of his had been preſerv'd. *Plutarch* ſaith, That *Democritus* held that God *was an Intellectual Fire, and the Soul of the World.* But it appears by *Cicero*, that *Democritus* did not ſtick at making ſome very ſubtle *Effluvia* of his Atoms to be Gods, both thoſe without us, and thoſe within us, *viz.* thoſe which make up our intellectual Faculties. It is very hard to ſay what his true Notion of *Divinity* was, unleſs we could have ſeen his Books about *Mind* and *Providence*, which *Laertius* ſaith *that he wrote.* But whatever he might write for the amuſing the World, (as *Epicurus* did afterwards) if he made the Origin of all things to have been *without Mind or Providence*, no Titles of Books will be a ſufficient Excuſe for him.

Beſſario c. Calumnia. Plat. lib. 2. c. 10, 11.

Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 8.

Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 7.

Cicero de N. Deor. l. 1.

And I confeſs it is all one to me, whether thoſe who fram'd the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſes* proceeded in the way of *Forms* and *Qualities*, or of *Atoms* and *Vacuity*; becauſe I think the one way as impoſſible as the other. For as *Ariſtotle* hath well obſerved, the great difficulties as to the firſt Principles lay in two things, *The beginning of Motion, and the Order of the World:* and in both theſe the different *Hypotheſes* of *Anaximander*

and

and *Democritus* were equally defective. But whether the World were made by *the Circumvolution of Infinite Matter, endued with contrary Qualities*; or *by the motion of Atoms, which had nothing but Bulk and Figure*, signifies nothing as to the main point. I do not deny but one *Hypotheſis* may in ſome reſpects be more intelligible than the other, and tend more to explain the difference of Body and Mind. But there are ſtill difficulties on both ſides: Some things may be taken for *Real Qualities*, which are not; and the many Experiments of this Age have fully prov'd it: but then there are other things, eſpecially relating to *Animals*, which can never be explain'd in the Mechanical way, to the ſatisfaction of any reaſonable Man.

But altho' *Anaximander* and *Democritus* ſtarted theſe two different *Hypotheſes* about the Origin of the World; yet thoſe who aſſerted an Eternal Mind to be the firſt Cauſe, had in common Reaſon very much the advantage of either; ſince it was impoſſible for them to give an account how the motion of Matter began, or how it fell into that Order, and Beauty, and Uſefulneſs, which we find in thoſe parts which make up the viſible World. All that we can learn of *Anaximander*'s *Hypotheſis* is, *That the Heavens and Infinite Worlds* (for why ſhould they ſtop, when they could make Worlds ſo eaſily) *were produced by an infinite circumvolution of all things; that theſe had in them very different Qualities from each other, ſome hot ſome cold, ſome dry ſome moiſt,* &c. *that theſe being in continual motion, a mixture of them happened, and according to the different mixtures of Qualities, the ſeveral ſorts of things did ariſe.* This, as far as I can apprehend, was his Scheme of the Production of things. *Plutarch. apud Euſ. Præp. Ev. l. 1. 8.*

There is little difference between the two *Hypotheſes* of *Anaximander* and *Democritus*, but only in the point of Mixture, which one attributes to Qualities, and the other to the Bulk and Figure of Atoms. They both aſſert the Production of things by the circumvolution of the parts of Matter; both held infinite Worlds, and that the things of this World came together of themſelves, without any ſuperior Cauſe.

But were not all the Philoſophers of their Mind? No; ſo far from it, that the beſt and greateſt of them utterly rejected this Doctrine, as unſatisfactory to Human Reaſon. Of which we have an evident proof from *Ariſtotle*, who cannot be ſuſpected of any partiality in this matter. In the beginning of his *Metaphyſicks* he gives an account of the Opinions of *Philoſophers before him about the firſt Principles of things.* I know that he is hardly thought of by many for miſrepreſenting the Opinions of thoſe before him, and that he endeavour'd to leſſen their Reputation to advance his own; but I can ſee no manner of reaſon for it in this caſe. 'Tis poſſible, as to the *Pythagorean* and *Eleatick Sect*, he might not repreſent their Opinions ſo fairly as they were capable of: but as to theſe *Phyſiologiſts*, as he calls them, he charges nothing upon them, but what they own'd; only he makes *Thales the Head of them*, for which I have offer'd Reaſons to the contrary. But in general he ſaith, *That thoſe who began firſt to philoſophize, look'd upon Matter as the only Principle, out of which all things came, and to which they did return; the Subſtance remaining the ſame, and the Affections only chang'd: As* Socrates *is the ſame Man, altho' his inward Habits were chang'd.* But what this Material Principle was, they were not agreed. Thales, *the firſt of them, thought it to be Water*; Anaximenes *and* Diogenes *Air*; Hippaſus *and* Heraclitus *Fire*; Empedocles *to them added Earth.* Hitherto, ſaith he, we find nothing but the Material Cauſe; but, ſaith he, when they had *Metaphyſ.* 1. §. 3.

gone

Περιόντος δ' ἔτως αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὁδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνωδάχασε ζητεῖν.

gone so far, the very Nature of things carried them farther in their Inquiries. For whatever change he made in Generation and Corruption, there must be some Cause why it so happened. For mere Matter doth not change it self. As Wood doth not make it self into a Bed, nor Brass into a Statue; but some Artificer doth it. *But the seeking this, is looking after another Principle*, which he calls *the Principle of Motion. Which those who asserted from the beginning, ran themselves into difficulties, altho' they asserted Matter to be one; but those who went no farther than Matter, whether Water, or Fire, or Earth, were never able to clear the Production of things; and therefore were forc'd by Truth it self,* (ὑπ' αὐτῆς τ ἀληθείας) *to seek for another Principle.* Where it is very considerable that *Aristotle* saith, That there were some from the beginning who asserted both Principles; and that those who asserted only a Material Principle, ran themselves into such difficulties which they could never see their way through; but were forc'd at last by the mere power of Truth to seek for another Principle. Which not only shews his own Opinion, but that others, upon consideration, were fain to set up a new *Hypothesis* against these Materialists, not wholly new, as he shews, but new in opposition to them, who thought at first, by pretending to skill in Philosophy, to have run down the antient Opinion of Mankind, founded on such a Tradition, of which none could trace the Original. Of which I have already produc'd the testimonies of *Plato* and *Plutarch.* But now the humor of philosophizing coming among the *Greeks*, the first setters up of this were very apt to contemn any thing that was built on Tradition; for that gave no Reason of things, which it was their business to do. In some things then unknown as to the natural Causes of them, they wonderfully surprised the common sort, who thereupon admired them as Men that could do any thing. Being thus puffed up with a vain opinion of their own skill, they attempted to give an account of the very beginning of the World; and finding out what they thought the main Principle of which things were composed, they had no more to do, but to suppose them all reduced to a Mass or Chaos; and then they fancied that by the motion of these several parts of Matter, things would fall into that state we now see them in the World. But as much as they pleas'd themselves with these Speculations, those who came after them found them extremely defective, both in the beginning of this Motion, and the Order of it. For they found Matter to be a dull unactive thing of it self, and that no Matter could form it self without an Agent; and therefore they saw it necessary to add a Supreme Efficient Cause, which should both put the parts of Matter, however qualified, into motion, and direct and regulate the course of it. For otherwise it was impossible to conceive, that there should be such distinct Systems or Bodies of Matter, as there are in the World. For how come the several *Vortices* not to interfere with each other? What made the Centers of them to be distinct from one another, so as that the Matter within such circumference should move about that alone? And without this it is impossible to conceive there should be such Bodies as the Sun, Moon, and Stars are; so great, and yet so distinct from each other. But what Cause then was found so necessary to be superadded? *Aristotle* saith, That the Order and Fitness of things, which he calls Εὖ καὶ Καλῶς, must proceed from an Intelligent Cause; for these things could never come either from mere Material Causes, as Fire, Earth, *&c.* or only by Chance. And therefore he saith, *Anaxagoras* wrote like a Man in his senses, in com-

parison of those before him; which shews that he look'd on the others Speculations as Dreams and idle Fancies. And he will not allow *Anaxagoras* to have been the first that asserted this; but he did it φανερῶς, openly and plainly, in opposition to such as had set up another *Hypothesis*. For before him, he saith, *Hermotinus Clazomenius* had said the same thing, as to a superior Cause: And so no doubt had many others; but he mentions him as a Philosopher of the same City from whence *Anaxagoras* came. But it seems the reputation of *Thales* and his Scholars had obtain'd so much in the *Greek* Colonies where they inhabited, that they buried the name of others, altho' *Clazomenæ* were a City of *Ionia* too.

But that *Anaxagoras* was a Person of a just esteem, appears by the great value which *Pericles* set upon him; who not only had him for his Counsellor, but ventur'd his interest to preserve him: and altho' he was over-rul'd by the contrary Faction, as to his Banishment; yet he took care of him in it. And as *Plutarch* saith, he obtain'd the name of Νοῦς; he cannot tell, whether it was for his Opinion, or the reputation of his Wisdom. And after he was buried at *Lamsacus*, a City of *Asia Minor* near the *Hellespont*, there were two Inscriptions on the Altar erected to his Memory, which testify'd the very great Esteem of him in two words, the one was Νοῦς, and the other Ἀλήθεια. And what can be said greater of a Philosopher, than that *Understanding* and *Truth* belong'd to him? *Timon*, who was not very civil to the memories of most Philosophers, gives him a high character in *Laertius*: who saith likewise, *That he was born to a considerable Estate; but he had a Mind above Riches.* And *Sextus Empiricus* saith, *he was the most skilful in Natural Philosophy*; and he was blam'd both by *Socrates* and *Aristotle*, for running too far into Natural Causes, as tho' he made use of his Supreme Mind only to help him out, when nothing else would. But therein he shew'd that it was not for want of understanding Natural Causes, that he asserted *an Eternal Mind, pure and unmix'd*, which was the first Cause of things; but it was his true skill in Philosophy, which brought him to it. For he fix'd on the Principle of *Gravitation*, as the main foundation of Union and Composition; but the other *Hypotheses* of *Vortices*, or *Circumlations* without it, he look'd on as weak and insufficient. So vain is that Saying of *Lucretius* and a modern Philosopher, that *Ignorance of Causes inclin'd Men to Religion*; especially as to the Heavenly Bodies:

Τοῦτον ὑπερφυῶς τὴν ἄνδρα θαυμάσας ὁ Περικλῆς. *Plutarch. in Pericle.*

Ælian. l. 8. c. 19.

Sext. Empir. p. 153. Plato in Phædr. Arist. Metaph. l. 4. Plutarch. in Pericle.

Leviathan. ch. 12.

Præterea cœli rationes ordine certo,
Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti,
Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoscere causis;
Ergo perfugium sibi habebant omnia Divis
Tradere, & illorum nutu facere omnia flecti.

Lucret. l. 5.

For the truest and exactest searcher into Natural Causes, we see, was the most firm and steddy asserter of a God. *Lucretius* magnifies his Heroe, *that neither the common Fame, nor the Thunder and Lightning had frighted him into any sense of Religion; but that he had gone beyond the Clouds by the strength of his Wit, and had setled all the bounds of Nature.*

Quem nec fama Deûm, nec fulmina, nec minitanti
Murmure compressit cœlum, &c.

Which was all becoming the more than Poetick fury of *Lucretius* to say. But *Plutarch* in the Life of *Pericles* saith, That *Anaxagoras* explain'd to him the Natural Causes of those Meteors which are so apt to terrify Mankind, and thereby took away an ignorant Superstition; but instead of that he settled in his Mind ἡ ἀσφαλῆ μετ' ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν δόξαν, *a firm Devotion accompanied with good Hopes.* And is not this far beyond the utmost *Lucretius* attributes to his *Hero?* supposing he had such success, as he imagin'd; which we have only the Poet's word for.

Quare Relligio pedibus subjecto vicissim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cælo.

But we can find no such victory that he ever obtain'd over Religion, by his foolish and precarious *Hypotheses*, which the more learned pretenders to *Atheism* in our Age are asham'd of, because of its vanity and inconsistency; and therefore there is now less need of insisting upon it. But what reason had *Lucretius* to make such extravagant boasting of *Epicurus* his success against the Principles of Religion; when *Cicero* of the same age and time, and a friend to *Lucretius*, had so very mean an opinion of it, and hath expos'd it so much to contempt in more places than one? But possibly he may mean, *it had so at Athens:* nothing like it. For it was observ'd, that none were more forward to comply with the *popular superstitions*, none more reserv'd as to their real opinions about the *Deity* than *Epicurus* and his followers. What need all this mean complyance, this caution and reserve, if they were such Conquerors, as he represents them? They never oppos'd the common sentiments, as *Anaxagoras* did, and suffer'd for it; but instead of it, they industriously labour'd to persuade the People, that they were *for Piety and Veneration of the Gods*; *and Epicurus* wrote about it: whether in earnest or not, I dispute not; but he was in earnest concern'd for his own security. Are these the marks of a *Conqueror?* And yet in his time the *fear of the Areopagus*, after the time of *Ephialtes* was in great measure remov'd. It is observed by *Josephus*, *That by the Laws of* Athens, *it was death without mercy, to speak against the established Religion*; and we find with what difficulty *Anaxagoras* escaped: But in *Epicurus* his time the Government was sunk, and the *Macedonian* Empire was continually growing upon them; and all People took greater liberty to speak their Minds, and without any such opposition as the Philosophers before him met with, when their Laws were observed more strictly; as when *Protagoras* and *Diagoras* were forced to abscond for fear of their lives; and *Aristotle* upon a suspicion of a profane *Hymn* to withdraw to *Calcis*. But in the time of *Epicurus*, the state of the City was altered, and the Government was in the hands of *Alexander*'s Successors; for *Epicurus* lived with his Scholars in *Athens*, when it was so closely besieged by *Demetrius*, as *Plutarch* informs us, who soon after had the possession of it delivered to him. Now in busy and disorder'd times, such as *Epicurus* might be far more secure than at another time; and yet even then he was afraid of giving any distast, as to his opinions about Religion; and still asserted his owning *the Anticipation of a Deity*, altho' not consistent with his own grounds of certainty. But where was *the victory the mean while over Religion*, which *Lucretius* boasts of? His Defenders say, *It was over the ill effects of Superstition*; but we find nothing like that effected by him. The World was not made one jot the

Plut. adv. Colot.

Jos. contr. Apion. l. 2.

Plut. vit. Demetrii.

the better, but a great deal the worſe for his Principles; for the very name of a Philoſopher went a great way with Perſons of bad inclinations: and they do not govern themſelves by any Reaſon; but when they can bring an Authority of a Perſon of any reputation, they inquire no farther, but go on with greater confidence in their former practices; and then they charge *Ignorance* and *Superſtition* on thoſe that contradict them. I do not deny but ſome of the Defenders of *Epicurus* in our Age, have been Perſons of Wit and Learning, and they have utterly diſown'd his irreligious Principles: but yet the very undertaking to defend the Author of ſo much impiety, hath done unſpeakable miſchief to the Age we live in; and all the diſcoveries of Natural Philoſophy can never make amends for it. We are now comparing the Notions of *Epicurus* and *Anaxagoras* as to religion; and that method which *Plutarch* tells us *Anaxagoras* took, as to the freeing the Mind of *Pericles* from *Superſtition*, was far better than that of *Epicurus*. For *Anaxagoras* ſatisfy'd him, that there were natural cauſes of Thunder and Lightning, but theſe were the effects of a Divine Providence, which order'd the affairs of Mankind for the beſt, as well as the Meteors in the Air; and therefore there was no reaſon why any wiſe and good Man ſhould not entertain a comfortable Hope of Divine Protection: but in the way of *Epicurus* there is a bare account of Natural Cauſes, which whether true or falſe, can give no ſatisfaction to a thinking Man. For the utmoſt comes to this; Such and ſuch Effects do naturally follow ſuch Cauſes. And what then? *Then if ſuch things happen, we cannot help it.* And what follows? Nothing more. And is this all the comfort of *Epicurus* his Inquiry into Cauſes? To underſtand this better, I will put a Caſe, which lately happened in the place where I live at preſent, to a Man working in his Garden near a great River: while he was there buſy, a violent ſhower of Rain fell of a ſudden; and the Man thinking to divert it, the Rain beat down a great heap of earth above him, and carried it through his Garden, and took away the Man with its force into a precipice hard by, and with great violence hurried him down into the River, which made him ſtupid and ſenſleſs; but it pleas'd GOD he was taken up, and recover'd. Now let us conſider what would tend moſt to the ſatisfaction of this Man's Mind, when he was in that deplorable ſtate, if he had been then ſenſible of his caſe: What comfort would it have been to him to have been told, that as things were, the earth above him falling down, and there being ſuch a precipice below him, there was no help for him, and he muſt be contented to ſuffer? But would it not be far greater ſatisfaction to be told, there were thoſe above who ſaw him fall, and pitied his caſe, and would be ſure to help him out, and give him what was neceſſary for his relief and remedy? Now this is the caſe of *Neceſſity* and *Providence*: the one gives only that heavy comfort, *Things muſt be ſo, and we cannot help it*; the other ſtill keeps up reaſonable hope, and the expectation of ſomething better. So that no one can deny, that upon mere principles of Natural Reaſon, this is the more deſirable *Hypotheſis*; and nothing but invincible arguments ſhould remove Mankind from it: but neither *Democritus* nor *Epicurus* could offer any thing but a very precarious *Hypotheſis* againſt it.

From *Anaxagoras* I now come to *Socrates* (for *Acheloüs* purſued his Principles at *Athens*, where *Socrates* was his Diſciple.) He was a Perſon of great vogue at *Athens*, for the *Natural ſharpneſs of his Wit*, and

the freedom he us'd in converſation with all ſorts, without regard to his own intereſt. And for this he appealed to his Judges, and to the whole City, that he was far from any deſign to enrich himſelf, as they all knew: he did not deny but that he had great preſents offer'd him; but he took no more than to keep him from poverty, as in the caſes of the King of *Macedonia* and *Alcibiades*: and none could blame him for being refractory to their Laws about Religion; for he declar'd that to be his Principle, *That* God *ought to be worſhip'd according to the Laws of the City where a Man liv'd.* And for this, *Xenophon* ſaith, *he truſted to the* Pythian *Oracle*; which was thought of good Authority among them: however ſome in our time have repreſented it as *ſo groſs an Impoſture*, that it is hardly credible any Men of common ſenſe could be deceived by it, much leſs the *Athenians*; who for all that we can perceive had as good an opinion of it, as the *Bœotians* themſelves.

Plato in Apol. Socr.

Xenoph. Mem. l. 1. c. 3.

Van. Dalen Diſſert. de Orac. Ethn.

This was a very hard point at that time among Men of better underſtanding, and who had a true ſenſe of God and Providence, how they ſhould behave themſelves with reſpect to the Popular Superſtitions. There was no difficulty, as to ſuch as had no Religion at all; for their Principle was to keep fair and to ſecure themſelves; and they look'd on ſuch as *Protagoras* and *Diagoras*, as Perſons who deſerved to be puniſh'd for their folly. But for Men who truly believ'd a wiſe God to govern the World, as *Socrates* and his two excellent Scholars *Plato* and *Xenophon* did, the caſe was very difficult: For, if they did not comply, they were ſure to be proſecuted as guilty of impiety; if they did, this ſeem'd to juſtify all their Superſtition.

The way which *Socrates* took was this: He avoided giving any offence as to the contempt of their publick worſhip. Nay, *Xenophon* ſaith, he was ſo far from any Impiety that way, that he was rather more remarkable for his diligence therein; and that no Man ever heard him ſay or do any thing that tended to the diſhonor of Religion; ſo that from the whole courſe of his life, he might be well concluded to be Εὐσεβέστατον, *a very devout Man.* *Cicero* had a very particular eſteem of *Socrates* not only for *the greatneſs of his Wit, but for his Wiſdom and Goodneſs*; and from him we learn what the grounds were which ſuch Men went upon. They found the World horribly corrupted with Superſtition, which was to be remov'd in the beſt way they could; but there was great danger, leſt under that pretence, all Religion ſhould be deſtroy'd. And they ſaw an abſolute neceſſity of keeping up that, ſince *the Beauty and Order of the World, was ſufficient to convince Mankind that there was an Excellent and Eternal Being, which was to be adored and worſhip'd by Mankind.* This was their fundamental Principle; and they rather choſe to comply with the follies of their Superſtitions, than not keep the ſolemn worſhip of the *Deity.* And to ſatisfy themſelves, they put ſuch interpretations upon the publick Rites, as made them ſerve to ſome part or other of natural worſhip, with reſpect to the benefits God beſtows on the World; and thus, even the *Eleuſinian* Myſteries were underſtood by them.

Propter ejus magnitudinem Ingenii. *De Orat.* 1. 54. Qui quum omnium ſapientiſſimus eſſet, ſanctiſſimeq; vixiſſet. *Ib.*

Eſſe præſtantem aliquam æternamque Naturam, & eam ſuſpiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo Mundi, ordoque rerum cœleſtium cogit confiteri. *Cic. de Div. l.* 2. *c.* 72.

But how then came *Socrates* to be ſo ſeverely proſecuted at *Athens?* 'Tis true, that his enemies charg'd him with *Impiety* and *Atheiſm*, as appears both by *Plato* and *Xenophon.* In *Plato's Apology* we find that *Melitus*

Melitus downright accus'd him *that he thought there were no Gods.* *Socrates* being much surpriz'd at this charge, ask'd him what ground he had for it; and all the proof he offer'd was, that he was of *Anaxagoras*'s Opinion that the Sun and Moon were not Gods: which *Socrates* deny'd; and said his charge was inconsistent, for he both accus'd him of bringing in new *Deities*, and asserting that there were none at all. But in the conclusion of his Apology, he fully own'd *a Divine Providence taking care of good Men living or dying; but whether of the two were better for a Man, he thought* GOD *alone knew.*

But to shew more plainly what *Socrates* his judgment was as to the Production of the World: *Xenophon* gives this account of it: *That he look'd on it as a great piece of folly in Mankind to attempt it from Material Causes; and he wonder'd that they did not find out, that these things were above their reach.* And he thinks those * *Philosophers argued like mad Men; neither agreeing with one another, nor with the nature of things: for some said, that it consisted of One thing; others, of Infinite: some said, all things were in motion; others said, there was no motion at all: some said, that all things were generated and corrupted; and others, that nothing at all was.* *Plato* in his *Phædo* lets us know how he came to be unsatisfy'd even with *Anaxagoras* himself, altho' he mightily approv'd his fundamental Notion of *all things being produc'd by an Eternal Mind.* When he was a young Man, he saith, he was a great admirer of Natural Philosophy, and endeavoured to find out the Causes of things; but at last *he found they were too hard for him*, and so fell into a kind of *Scepticism:* but he had heard of a Book of *Anaxagoras*, wherein he asserted that *Mind* order'd all things; this pleas'd him well: but he expected that from hence he would have shew'd how that Eternal Mind did frame every thing for the best, τὸ ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον· but finding him to falter there, and to run to mere Natural Causes as others had done, he gave over his pursuit of Natural Philosophy, and applied himself to matters of Morality; as more certainly known, and of greater use to Mankind.

Ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν. *Xenoph. Mem. l.* 1. *c.* 1.

* Ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς μέγιστον φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ τούτου λέγειν οὐ ταῦτα δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. *Ibid.*

Butas to Providence, *Xenophon* is very particular in it, *That it extended to all things said or done, altho' in never so great silence; and that* GOD *was present in all places.* To the same purpose *Diogenes Laertius* mentions a saying of *Thales*; *Being asked, whether a man could do an unjust action without* GOD'*s knowing it: No,* saith he, *not if he only thinks to do it.* Which saith *Valerius Maximus*, was intended to keep Mens Minds clean and pure, as well as their hands. But the Atheistical Club at *Athens* in *Socrates* his time turn'd this another way. For they said, *This was only a contrivance of some cunning man, to keep Mankind more in awe.* And that this was their sense, appears by the Verses still preserv'd in *Sextus Empiricus*; and part in *Plutarch* and others; but by the former they are attributed to *Critias*, and by the latter to *Euripides*, both of *Socrates* his time. But there seems to be far greater probability as to the former, because such a saying was very agreeable to the Character of the Man. For *Critias* was one of the *thirty Tyrants* set up by *Lysander* at *Athens*; a Man of Wit, and addicted to Poetry; as *Socrates* himself owns in *Plato*'s *Charmides*, that he deriv'd it from *Solon:* He and *Alcibiades* had been both under *Socrates* his care, as *Xenophon* tells us, but they both forsook him, and changed their Manners upon it. *Critias* went into *Thessaly*, and there fell into lew'd

Xenoph. l. 1. *c.* 1. *ad fin. & c.* 4. *ad fin.*

Valer. Max. l. 7. 2. §. 8.

Sext. Emp. p. 310. *Poesis Phil. p.* 75.

and debauch'd company; and from thence came to hate *Socrates*, whom he had admir'd before: and when he was one of the *thirty Tyrants*, he and *Charicles* shew'd a particular displeasure against him; for *Socrates* had spoken too freely against their Government. He was the head of the number, as appeared by *Theramenes* drinking a health to *Critias*, when he took off his Poison; and when *Thrasybulus* came to deliver *Athens*, upon his being kill'd, the whole Faction sunk. Nothing can be more agreeable to the Character of such a Man, than to make him look on all Religion as an imposture and contrivance of some crafty Politician. But nothing of it agrees with that of *Euripides*, who was Scholar to *Anaxagoras*, a friend to *Socrates*; and on all occasions wrote decently with respect to Piety and Vertue. But *Plutarch* saith, *he wrote the Verses in the Name of* Sisyphus *for fear of the* Areopagus. It cannot be deny'd, that Author (whether *Plutarch* or not, for some question it) doth say so. But if *Plutarch* had said it on good ground, how came *Sextus* after him, so positively to give them to *Critias*? And which is more to the purpose, the same Author had but a little before quoted a passage of *Euripides* very agreeable to a Scholar of *Anaxagoras*, *That the Heavens were* Καλὸν ποίκιλμα τέχνου & σοφῦ, *The beautiful Workmanship of a wise Architect*; and from thence we come to the Notion of God. How different is this from the sense of those Atheistical Verses! But it is no easy matter to judg what the true sense of a Poet is, when it is his design to personate others. And so *Euripides* might introduce *Sisyphus* as speaking agreeable to his own Character, who is represented as *an ill Man, and given to fraud*; and therefore it is no wonder such a Man should look on Religion as such a contrivance. For either *Sisyphus* or *Critias* might be well suppos'd to utter such things, but the question is, how far *Euripides* is to be charg'd with them; and whether he spoke his own sense under the name of *Sisyphus*, for fear of the *Areopagus*. This ought certainly to be prov'd some other way: and if not, it seems to be a very unjust imputation; especially since *Socrates* express'd such an esteem for *Euripides*; which he would never have done, if he had suspected that under the Person of *Sisyphus* he had overthrown the foundations of Religion.

P. Petit. Miscell. l. 1. c. 1.

Plutarch. de Placit. Philos. l. 1. c. 6.

Ælian. l. 2. c. 13.

But what the true sense of *Socrates* was, may be seen by his Discourse with *Aristodemus*, of which *Xenophon* hath preserv'd the remembrance. This *Aristodemus* was one of those that not only neglected Religion himself, but despised and laugh'd at those that regarded it. *Socrates* finding what sort of man he was, takes him to task after his dry manner. And are there no Persons, *Aristodemus*, said he, that you have any esteem of for being wiser than others? Yes, said he briskly and like a Man of Wit, *I admire* Homer *for an Epick Poem*, Melanippides *in Dithyrambics*, Sophocles *in Tragedy*, Polycletus *in the Art of making Statues, and* Phidias *in Painting*. The Man we see was a kind of *Virtuoso* in other things, but without any sense of God or Religion. Well! said *Socrates*, *and would you not admire those more who make living and moving Statues, than such only as have neither sense nor motion?* No doubt the former, *Aristodemus* reply'd, if they are made by Design, and not by Chance. Of that, said *Socrates*, we may best judg by the use, they are intended for. For those things which are for a manifest use are most agreeable to Design. As for instance, the Senses of Men are so plainly given them for particular uses, that we cannot reasonably think, but that he that made Mankind at first, gave them them for that

Xenoph. Mem. l. 1. c. 4.

purpose; as he particularly instances in the Fabrick of the Eye, and the care of Nature to preserve it, (which he calls a work of Providence) and so for the Ears, Nose and Mouth, which are so fram'd, as to be προνοητικῶς πεπραγμένα, done by a wise Design, and not by Chance. And I cannot, saith *Socrates*, look upon them otherwise than as the Workmanship Σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοτέχνου, of a wise contriver, and a lover of his own Workmanship. The same he shews in the propagation of Animals, and the love and care of their Young, *&c.* but as to Mankind, he saith, there is Φρόνιμόν τι, a reach beyond other Animals; and they have not only a Body made out of Earth, but a Mind which we perceive within our selves. And can these great and wonderful things come to pass ὑπ' ἀφρονος τινος, without Mind or Understanding? To which our *Virtuoso* had nothing to say, *but that he could not see the Artificer here, as he did in other cases.* Well! and do not you contrive and design things in your own Mind? And yet you can no more see that, than the wise contriver of these things. All that *Aristodemus* had to say, was, that he did not disown or despise a Divine Being; but he thought it too great to regard his Service. Hold a little, said *Socrates*; for the greater he is, the more he ought to be honor'd by Mankind. Then he question'd, whether there were such a thing as Providence, with respect to human affairs. For that, *Socrates* again bad him look to the frame of Human Nature, and the several parts of Man's Body, and he could not but see a Providence in the contrivance of the several parts of the Body; but especially the Mind, which he hath inspir'd into Men. Τῷ ψυχῇ κραδίην τε ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε, Not *blowing some subtile Air into Man*, as some modern Philosophers would translate it; or giving *a mere Vital Motion.* But *Socrates* was far from thinking *an Incorporeal Substance* within us to be *a Contradiction*; nor that it was any absurdity to take a Metaphor from *Air*, to express the infusion of an Immaterial Soul. And he shews the excellency of the human Soul above others, because it alone apprehends the Being of GOD, who made and contriv'd the greatest best things, and alone is capable of doing him service. Besides, that it hath Prudence and Memory above all others. So that Mankind are as so many Gods among inferior Creatures. If a Man had the Body of an Ox and the Mind of Man together, he could not do what he would; nor if Brutes had Hands and wanted Minds, could they do much with them. But you, said he to *Aristodemus*, have both, and can you think there is no care of Providence about you? Can you think, said he, that the Gods (as he speaks) should plant in Mens Minds an opinion that they are able both to reward and punish, if it were not so? And that Mankind should be always deceiv'd in this matter, and not be sensible of it? *Do not you see*, saith *Socrates*, *that the most antient and wisest Cities, and Nations, and Ages, have always shew'd the greatest regard to Religion?* This is a very remarkable testimony of *Socrates* concerning the sense of former Ages about the foundations of Religion; and that the Atheistical temper some were then fallen into, was a late Innovation, and in probability occasion'd by that smattering in Philosophy, which was crept in among the *Greeks* from the Principles of *Anaximander* and *Democritus.* But *Socrates* assures us *the best and wisest Ages* had a very different sense of these matters. And this *Xenophon* tells us he had from *Socrates his own Mouth, and that he heard this Discourse between them.*

And what now is to be said to such a Testimony as this, concerning the sense of Mankind about Religion? Have we any reason to mistrust such

such a Testimony as that of *Socrates*, who was so much valu'd for his Integrity, and lost his Life, because he could not flatter nor dissemble? For any one that will carefully examin the circumstances of his Trial, will find the true reason of his prosecution was, that he had disobliged so many sorts of People by his Plain-dealing: For, as he told his Judges, his way was when he heard any Man had a great opinion for his own Wisdom and Skill above other Men, to talk with him on purpose, to see whether there were any sufficient ground for such an Opinion: which was one of the most disobliging courses in the world; considering how fond Men are apt to be of themselves, and to think themselves wiser than others; at least in that which they most pretend to. By which means he disobliged the *Politicians*, who hate any Man that would pretend to find them out; the Sophists, whom on all occasions he expos'd, and in the most publick manner: and the Men of Wit and the Poets were enrag'd against him, because he slighted their way, as tending only to entertain the Fancy, and not to make Men wiser; and in their happiest strains, there was only a *Natural Enthusiasm*; and altho' they said many fine things, yet they were not one jot the wiser Men. The Artificers he found had many pretty knacks; but because of their Skill in such little things, they presum'd wonderfully at *Athens* upon their Understandings, and would never bear long any Great Men among them, when things went by majority of Votes: As *Socrates* found, when Sentence came to be past; for altho' he had many good Friends, yet when it came to the numbring of Votes, he was cast by a great Majority. But as the People of *Athens* were so opinionated of themselves, that they could not bear any Man, whose Reputation lessen'd theirs; so when they had done such things which made them ill spoken of abroad, then they were for redeeming their own honor; either by recalling them from Banishment, if living; or if dead, by punishing the instruments made use of in the Prosecution. So it happened in the case of *Socrates:* when they found his Death brought an *Odium* upon the City, one of his Accusers was *put to death*, another *banished*; and *Plutarch* saith, *some of the rest were so weary of their lives, that they put an end to them by hanging themselves.* And to shew their great esteem of him, they caus'd a Statue made by *Lysippus*, to be set up in a publick place in the City, as a perpetual Monument of his Wisdom, and their own Folly. And his carriage at his death was with so much courage, and constancy, and evenness of Mind, that they were all satisfy'd as to his integrity and freedom from any ill design. What reason can there be then to suspect his Testimony in this point of Religion, when there was not the least constraint or bias upon him, and this attested by so unexceptionable a witness as *Xenophon*; a Person of great honor and judgment, and whose Writings are such, as could hardly be counterfeited by any since him, by reason of their *unaffected sweetness*, for which the antient Criticks so much admired him; even *Cicero*, as well as *Dionysius Halycarnasseus*, and *Quintilian?*

Platon. Apolog. Socr.

Plutarch. de Odio & Invid.

Cicero de Orat. l. 2. Dionys. Halycarn. ad Pomp. Quint. X. Cicero ad Quint. l. 1.

From *Socrates* I go on to *Plato*, who in *Cicero*'s opinion (and he was a very good judg) was *Princeps Ingenii & Doctrinæ*, the *Top of antient Wit and Learning*; and to the same purpose *Quintilian*, whom *Valla* esteem'd above all other Criticks. But I need not go about to set up the Reputation of *Plato:* He was descended from *Solon* by his Mother, and by his Father from *Codrus*; he was nearly related to *Critias*, the first of the *thirty Tyrants*, and head of the Atheistical Club at *Athens*; and there-

fore it will be worth our while to find out his true ſenſe and opinion about theſe matters; to which I ſhall confine my Diſcourſe concerning him. And in his *tenth Book of Laws* he gives an account of three Opinions then in vogue among the looſer ſort of People at *Athens*. *One was, that there was no* GOD *at all: The 2d, that tho' there was a* GOD, *yet there was no Providence: The 3d, that if both were allow'd, yet that* GOD *would accept of Gifts and Sacrifices, as a compenſation for their faults.*

As to the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſis* it is obſervable, what character he gives of the Perſons who were for it, *that they were the looſer and more diſſolute ſort of Men among them; and eſpecially in the heat of their Youth. And that he never knew any Man who continued in it from his Youth to his Old Age*; and he calls it *the plague of young Men.* The *Hypotheſis*, as he lays it down, is much the ſame with *Anaximander*'s, viz. *That Nature and Chance produced all things out of a ſtrange Chaos, wherein were all ſorts of Qualities jumbled and confounded together, and at laſt by mixture came to that we call the World. But that Religion and the differences of juſt and unjuſt depended upon human Laws and Contrivances, for the better Government of Mankind.*

This is the ſubſtance of their *Hypotheſis*, which *Plato* in a long Diſcourſe ſets himſelf to refute, by ſhewing that theſe things could not come together by mere Nature and Chance; but were according to *right Reaſon, the product of a Superior Mind.* And whatever they pretended, as to ſkill in Natural Cauſes, this opinion did proceed from *great Ignorance about them*, and that their Reaſonings were both *Impious and Incoherent.* That their fundamental Miſtake lay in ſuppoſing ſuch Motion and Mixtures in Matter, before any Principle to begin or to direct it. For the firſt Motion muſt be from that which hath a power to move it ſelf, as well as other things; and therefore there muſt be a Mind antecedent to Matter, in order to the Production of things. This is the force of his Reaſoning. Then he ſhews how unreaſonable it is to ſuppoſe a GOD without Providence; becauſe it muſt argue either *Weakneſs* or *Neglect*, which were both inconſiſtent with *the Divine Perfections:* and ſo he proves was the laſt Opinion, and that it tended to overthrow *the practice of Virtue.*

In his *Epinomis* (which I ſee no reaſon to miſtruſt) he undertakes to prove *Religion to be the trueſt Wiſdom of Mankind*, the firſt Principle whereof is, *that there is an Eternal Mind before all Matter*; and then ſaith, *That there is no greater Virtue belonging to Mankind than Piety, or a due regard to the Divine Being.* So far was he from looking on Religion as an Impoſture, or Trick put upon Mankind in order to their better Government. *Epinom. p. 989.*

But *Ariſtotle* may be more ſuſpected for this, who wanted no Wit, but is generally thought to have been of no Religion; and he was by no means fond of *Plato*'s *Notions*, eſpecially thoſe he took from the *Pythagoric School:* but yet I hope to ſhew, that in the main foundation of all, as to the Being of GOD, and the Happineſs of Mankind, he agreed with him at laſt: I do not mean at his death, according to the ſtory in *Cælius Rhodiginus*, that then he ſaid, *Cauſa Cauſarum miſerere mei*; and which *Suarez* quotes *Laertius* for; but there is nothing like it in him, and *Cælius* had it out of a trifling Book *De Pomo:* But I go upon the Principles deliver'd by him in his beſt conſider'd Books. In his *Politicks* indeed he recommends Religion to a Prince, *in order to his eſteem among the People, that they may look on him as under the particular care of Providence.* *Cæl. Rhod. l. 17. c. 34.* *Ariſt. Polit. l. 5. c. 11.*

Now this *Aristotle* is charg'd to have utterly deny'd himself; and *Atticus* the *Platonist* in *Eusebius* makes him worse than *Epicurus*, *because he put his Gods quite out of the World, which* Aristotle *did not*; *but*, said he, *he overthrew all Religion by denying Providence.* And *Lactantius* is very sharp upon him, and makes him *a contemner of* God *and Religion:* but to do him right, he saith at other times, *That he plac'd one Mind over the World*; and *that* Aristotle *and his Followers were of the same mind with* Antisthenes, *that there was but One* God *in Nature, and many popular Gods. But was not* Aristotle *charg'd with Impiety at* Athens, *and forc'd on that account to withdraw to* Chalcis, *where he died*; *or as some say, was poisoned?* So *Eumelus*, and the anonymous Author of his Life, publish'd by *Menagius.* It cannot be deny'd that there was a prosecution against him by *Eurymedon* and *Demophylus*; but so there was against *Anaxagoras* and *Socrates:* but the pretence against *Aristotle* was not for *Impiety in his Doctrine*, but for a *profane Hymn* which he was said to have made on his Friend *Hermias*, such as were wont to be made to *Apollo.* This *Athenæus* denies, and *Aristotle* sent an Apology for himself to *Athens*, but it was not receiv'd. The truth was, *Aristotle* found it was time for him to be gone; lest, as he told his Friends, *that City should offend twice against Philosophy:* For, as he said in his Letter to *Antipater*, *He found the City abounded with Sycophants*; and he was fallen under *Alexander*'s displeasure, on the account of *Callisthenes* his Kinsman; and in a Letter of his to *Antipater* he had said, *he would be reveng'd on the Sophister*; and he publickly affronted him by the great Present he sent to *Xenocrates*, and none to him: which was sufficient intimation to his Enemies, which he never wanted, saith *Aristocles*, *because of the interest he had in Princes.* And if *Pliny*'s Story be true, (which *Plutarch* and *Appian* intimate too) as to *Antipater*'s design, *Alexander* had cause for his displeasure. But *Aristocles* saith, *That* Apellicon *(to whom his Books came) wrote so full a Vindication of him, that those who read that need no more.* But they are his Principles which we enquire after, and not his Practices. *Alexander Aphrodisiensis*, who is thought to have understood *Aristotle*'s Mind as well as any Commentator, owns *that* Aristotle *without doubt asserted, that there was one Eternal Mind, which gave the first motion to Matter, and that thereby things were put into such an order, not by Chance, but from the first Mover, so as to produce the variety of Species in the World, and to make them useful to each other, and for the good of the whole*; *and such an universal Providence*, he saith, Aristotle *did hold.* So much then is confess'd by one who was thought his most judicious Interpreter. But let us see, whether *Aristotle* may not be reasonably presum'd to go beyond this: For (1.) he blam'd *Anaxagoras* for making *no more use of his Eternal Mind, than merely to set things in order at first.* Then it follows, that according to him, God must be more than a mere *First Mover.* (2.) He makes this famous conclusion of his *Metaphysicks*, *That things are best govern'd by one Head*; which signified nothing, if there be no Providence. *Clausulam hanc tam insignem amplector & laudo*, said one of his most bitter Enemies; and it cannot be denied, that he there compares *the Government of the World* with *that of an Army or Family, wherein are there several Ranks and Orders of Men for different purposes*; *which must suppose a particular inspection and care.* (3.) He makes the complete Happiness of Mankind to be Θεῖόν τι, *a Divine thing*; and must suppose *Providence*, as I shall now make it to appear. He affirms that a Man's complete Happiness depends *upon something Divine in him, in*

Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. 15. c. 5. *Lactant. de Ira Dei, c. 19.* *De fals. Rel. l. 5.* *De Ira Dei c. 11.* *Bessario c. Calumn.* *Athen. l. 15.* *Suid. in Arist.* *Ælian. 3. 36.* *Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. 15. c. 2.* *Plin. N. H. l. 30. c. 16.* *Alexand. Aphrodis. in Arist. Physic. l. 2. c. 8.* *Met. 1. 4.* *Metaphys. l. 14. ult.* *P. Rami Schol. Metaphys. l. 12. c. 10.* *Eth. l. 1. c. 10.* *Eth. l. 10. c. 7.*

the exercise whereof his happiness consists. And therefore he advises those that study to be happy Ἀναθανατίζειν, *to draw themselves off from mortal things, and to live according to that which is the best thing in us,* viz. *our Minds; which altho' they do not so appear in bulk, yet in reality are far greater and of more value than other things.* By which he plainly owns such a Principle in Mankind as is capable of a greater Happiness than the things of this World can give him, because his Mind is of a higher Nature than they. But then the Question arises, whether Mankind can make themselves happy by this Divine Principle within them? He grants in one place, *That if there be any gift from* God, *it is most reasonable it should be that which is best for them;* but he avoids *the dispute there,* because his business was to put Men upon using their own endeavors to be happy: But in his last Book, where he speaks of this Divine Happiness, he saith, *That he that acts according to his Mind, and is dispos'd to do the best things, is the most likely to be beloved of* God: *for, if there be any care above of Human Affairs, as there seems to be, it is most reasonable to suppose that the Gods love what is best and nearest to them; which is our Mind.* But doth he not seem to speak very doubtfully in this matter? It is observ'd by his Commentator, that his manner of expression is such as he uses when there is no manner of doubt. But we must take *Aristotle* as a Philosopher, and consider on what grounds he went. He had no Revelation to direct him, and so was to judg according to what he thought *most reasonable;* and this he declares he took to be so. And in his following words he saith; *That those who did most esteem and value their own Minds, the Gods did regard as their friends, and such as did the best actions.* That word Ἀντευποιεῖν is very emphatical in this case; for it implies a *Retribution of a Reward* for doing good. So that here we have the complacency, which God takes in those that are good, and do good; and the reasonableness of expecting a Recompense for it. *Aristotle* was no Fool, but was especially admired by very great Men, particularly by *Cicero,* and *Quintilian,* and *Pliny,* for *the greatness of his Wit and Subtilty:* and such a Person would never have been guilty of so great impertinency to set down such Expressions as these, if he had not thought them fit to be believ'd; but he would have set some mark upon them, that they were the Opinions of other Men, and not his own. And in this case he had more particular reason to have done it. For any one that compares these expressions with those in *Plato,* 10 *de Rep.* would think that *Aristotle* had taken them from thence. For *Plato* there saith the same thing, *That a good Man is* Θεοφιλὴς, *one in favor with* God; *and whosoever is so, shall receive the best things from him. And we cannot suppose, that he that designs to be good, and minds the practice of Virtue, will be neglected above, when he makes it his business to be as like* God *as he can.* And *Plato,* who was far from being uncertain as to Providence, makes use of the same kind of expression. *It is not probable that he should be neglected of one so like him.* And *Aristotle* in the foregoing Chapter saith, *The Gods are in a state of perpetual Bliss, and Mankind are capable of Happiness, as they come nearer to resemblance of them.* Can any Expressions come nearer than these do?

Eth. l. 1. c. 10.

Ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα, καὶ Θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια, τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ Θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ· τοῦτο δὲ ἂν εἴη ὁ Νοῦς. Eth. l. 10. c. 9.

Καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας.

Aristoteles vir summo ingenio, scientiæ copia. *Tusc.* 1. 4. 10. *Acad.* 1. 4. Singulari vir ingenio Aristoteles, & pene Divino. *De Div.* 1. 25. *Quint.* X. 1. *Plin. N. H. l.* 8. 16, 18, 34.

Εἰκός γ' ἔφη τὴν τοιοῦτον μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίου.

Ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπήρχει.

We find *Aristotle* on other occasions not very shy of expressing his dissent from *Plato*, even in these Books of Morals. How warmly doth he dis-
Ethic. 1. 34. pute against *Plato*'s notion of *Ideas?* He saith, *there are three kinds of Men pretend to Happiness; the sensual and voluptuous*, which he saith, *is the Happiness of Slaves and Brutes: The busy and active Men place it in Honor, which is not in their power.* But besides these, *there are those who place it in Contemplation, which is most agreeable to the most perfect faculty we have.* But then he saith, *Some Friends of his had introduced Ideas to this purpose; however he was resolved to prefer truth before them.* Here we see he sticks not at contradicting *Plato, as to his Ideas*; but is so far from doing it in the present case, that he takes his very Expressions as his own; which he would never have done, if he had not thought them agreeable to Truth and Reason. He did not like *Plato*'s *Ideas*, nor his *Poetical Fictions* about a Future State, which made him more reserved in discoursing about it; but he was satisfy'd in these three things: 1. That the Mind of Man was capable of a real Happiness distinct from the Body. 2. That this Happiness lies in a similitude to God, as the most perfect Being. 3. That it was reasonable to suppose God should make the best to be most happy.

Mag. Mor. 1. 5. In his *Great Morals*, he declares it *not to be Courage but Madness not to be afraid of the Gods.* And if there be no Providence, what reason can there be for Fear?

In the conclusion of his *Eudemian Morals*, he makes it *the best end of a*
Eudem. l. 7. c. 15. *Man to contemplate* God, *and said*; *that it argues a very ill mind to hinder his Worship and Service, and the best temper of mind to be little affected with sensual Inclinations*; *and this*, saith he, *is the great end of Virtue and Goodness.*

These are not the Expressions of a Man that despis'd God and Providence; and we are certain these were his, as we are, that we have any Books of his. For even *Fr. Patritius* himself makes very slight Objections against them; and the Author of the antient *Paraphrase* upon his *Ethicks*
Discuss. Peripatet. To. 1. *l.* 3. *ad Nichomachum* (suppos'd to be *Andronicus Rhodius*) is a far better evidence for them, who is said to have *paraphrased upon* Aristotle's *Writings*, and not upon any other Man's. And he puts this matter out of doubt;
Paraphr. Ethic. l. 10. *c.* 10. for he thus *paraphrases* his words, *If* God *doth take care of Mankind*, καθάπερ πᾶσι δοκεῖ καὶ ἔστι γε, *as it seems to all and is true.* And not only *Plutarch* in the Life of *Sylla*, but *Porphyry* in that of *Plotinus*, say, *that* Andronicus Rhodius *took great care in digesting and explaining* Aristotle's *Works.*

Let us now compare these Sayings with the Objections taken out of him against Providence. *Alex. Aphrodisiensis* is of opinion that *Aristotle* meant no more by *Providence*, but *an universal care to preserve the Species of things, and the Order of the World*; *but he doth not deny that so far it extends even to sublunary things.* But if he did allow such an universal Providence as to the good of the World; I ask then, Whether God did know and intend this Good and Order that is in the World? If he did, then his great Argument against particular Providence is taken off; which was, *That it was below the Divine Perfections to take notice of such mean things.* For if it were not below it at first to appoint and order these things, then it cannot be below it to mind or regard them. And since they cannot deny such an *Universal Providence*, they cannot for this reason reject a Particular; for it is no more unbecoming God to regard the good of his Creatures, than it was at first to make them. But *Aristotle* utterly rejects

rejects their Opinion, that attributed the making of things, or the order that appears in them, to blind Neceſſity or Chance; and then God muſt have a Power and Will to make and order theſe things as they are, and with a deſign for the good of the whole. Then it follows, that a Providence that regards the good of the whole, as agreeable to the Divine Nature; and why not then a Particular Providence for the ſame end? If the ſame Power and Wiſdom can manage the whole for that end, with regard to Particular Events, why ſhould that be rejected, and the other allowed?

All that is pleaded from *Ariſtotle* is this, *That the knowledg and care of particular things is troubleſom and uneaſy; that the Eternal Being is happy in it ſelf; and it's better not to ſee and know ſome things, than to ſee and know them.* But I urge from *Ariſtotle* himſelf, that he yields, that the Divine Happineſs doth not lie in *an Unactive ſtate*, or ſuch *a perpetual ſleep, as they fancied of* Endymion. And what can be more agreeable to infinite Goodneſs, than ſuch an Activity as imploys it ſelf in the care of his Creatures? *Metaphyſ. l. 14. c. 6.* *Moral. l. 10. c. 8.*

But, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, *How can* God *underſtand any thing below himſelf? He is a perfect object, and fit for his own contemplation, and all other things are infinitely below him.* If any made the Divine Happineſs to conſiſt in the knowledg of his Creatures, they were extremely miſtaken; but I do not find that *Socrates* or *Plato*, who were hearty Aſſertors of Providence, ſay any thing like it; All that they ſay, is, That God being infinitely good and wiſe, takes care of the good of the whole, and eſpecially of thoſe that are good; and if he did not, it muſt be either from want of Power or Will, neither of which can be ſuppos'd in the Divine Nature. And if he wants neither of theſe, why is it not done? It cannot be ſaid, *That* Ariſtotle *abſolutely denied* God's *knowledg of all things*; for in one place he ſaith, *It is the Character of a bad man to ſuppoſe any thing hidden from* God; and in another, *That we attribute to* God *the knowledg of all things.* But 'tis poſſible he might be to ſeek as to the manner of God's knowing all things, as who is not? But if he could not comprehend it, it doth not therefore follow, that he denied it. *If* God, ſaith he, *underſtands nothing, then he is like one that ſleeps, which is not conſiſtent with that veneration which we owe to* God. *If he doth underſtand, and the principal object be without himſelf, then he is not the beſt Subſtance himſelf.* But none ever thought, that if there were a God, the principal object of his Underſtanding could be without himſelf. But what repugnancy is there for Infinite Knowledg to comprehend all things? And ſo if there be things without himſelf, he muſt know them, or his Knowledg cannot be infinite. Could *Ariſtotle* imagin that the World and the order of it were of his making and contriving; and yet he know nothing beyond himſelf? Are the ſeveral *ſpecies of things* of his ordering and appointing, and yet he not know them? This is impoſſible. But *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *That his Eſſence, as moſt perfect, is the moſt proper object of Divine Contemplation; and his Underſtanding is nothing but the underſtanding of himſelf:* and ſo, as he expreſſes it, *his Underſtanding is the underſtanding of his Underſtanding.* Wherein, as *Scaliger* ſaith, he did apprehend things *ſupra humanum captum*; and I am apt to think ſo too. But our buſineſs is not to unfold the Myſtery of Divine Knowledg with reſpect to it ſelf, but to conſider whether it be repugnant to it to know other things? *If ſo*, ſaith *Ariſtotle, there muſt be a change and motion, but the Divine Eſſence is always* *Rhet. ad Alex. c. 18.* *De Poet. c. 15.* *Scaliger. Exercit. 365. n. 5.*

the ſame. As tho' an Infinite Mind could not comprehend all things, without a change in it ſelf, or ſuch trouble as we find in our gradual perceptions of things, which ariſes from our Weakneſs and Imperfection. The Objection from *the meaneſs of things* is very inconſiderable. For, if they were fit to make up a part of the Order of the World, why are they below Divine Knowledg and Providence? If God thought fit to make them, why not to preſerve them?

Yes, ſay they, *as to the ſpecies he doth, but not as to all the little accidents about them.* The Schoolmen diſtinguiſh in Providence the *Ratio Ordinis* from the *Executio Ordinis*; the firſt they ſay, is wholly immediate, the other is by ſubordinate Cauſes, which we call the Courſe of Nature; which is no more than the common Order which God hath appointed in the World; which generally obtains, but yet ſo as that there muſt be a due ſubordination to the firſt Agent; if he ſees cauſe for particular ends to order things otherwiſe. And I cannot ſee any kind of incongruity or repugnancy in ſuch a Suppoſition, becauſe it anſwers the ſame ends, which the original intention and deſign of Univerſal Providence doth. As that in the ordinary courſe of Nature, Fire burns, *i. e.* diſſolves that contexture of Bodies which it meets with; and this it doth by virtue of that order of Cauſes and Effects, which is eſtabliſhed by Univerſal Providence: but ſuppoſe that there be a ſtop put to this method by an extraordinary act for great and wiſe ends becoming the ſupreme Governor of the World, why ſhould not this be as agreeable to the Deſign of Providence, as the firſt appointment of things in the common order was? Why not as well to work miraculous cures at ſome times, as to leave things to the ordinary methods at other times; But we muſt ſtill ſuppoſe the ends to be wiſe, and great, and good; for otherwiſe they do not reach the general deſign of Providence; and we mean no other particular Providence, but ſuch as anſwers the ſame general ends which an Univerſal Providence is deſigned for.

Magn. Moral. l. 2. c. 4. But, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, *If we ſuppoſe a particular Providence with reſpect to Mankind, then he muſt give to Men here according to their deſerts; which cannot be, ſince bad men often meet with good fortune; and therefore* God *being Lord over theſe things would deal unjuſtly as a Judg, which is not becoming him to do.* Here it cannot be deny'd that *Ariſtotle* doth exclude a *Judicial Diſpoſal* of theſe things; for if it were ſuch, his Argument muſt hold; but we diſtinguiſh between that and a *Providential management*, in order to the real good of Mankind. And I need no other than *Ariſtotle*'s own Arguments in this caſe: for if a Man's real happineſs lies in *a ſimilitude of the mind to* God, how can that be inconſiſtent with Divine Juſtice to exerciſe good Men here in ſuch a manner, as tends moſt to draw off their Minds from theſe tranſitory and decaying pleaſures? And if theſe things cannot make a Man really happy without virtue, which is the great deſign of his *Morals* to prove; how is it inconſiſtent with his Juſtice to let bad Men meet with good fortune? For theſe things can be no demonſtrations of the favor or diſpleaſure of God, which himſelf grants relates moſt to the inward temper of Mens Minds. But the real difficulty in this caſe, is a ſuppoſition that there is no future ſtate. I confeſs that *Plato* clears this matter eaſily and plainly; *A good man*, ſaith he, *if he be under poverty, diſeaſes, or other difficulties here, will find theſe things end in good to him, living or dying; and he makes no queſtion of ſuch a one's happineſs in another ſtate.* But *Ariſtotle* is upon a great reſerve, as to a future ſtate;

Plato de Rep. l. 10.

and altho' he asserts the possibility of it sufficiently, from what he saith of the Nature of the Mind of Man, as distinct from the principle of Life; yet I am afraid *Plato*'s giving too much way to such *Poetical Fictions*, as that of *Herus Pamphilius*, made *Aristotle* more cautious as to what he said concerning it, unless he could go upon surer grounds. He grants, That *the Mind is of a nature distinct from the Body, and separable from it*, that *it comes from without*; that *it is capable of pleasures more Divine* than the Body can enjoy or apprehend: But when he had gone thus far, the mere light of Reason would carry him no farther; and therefore he rather forbore to say any thing than affirm what he could not prove. As *Socrates* said in the case of Prayer, in the second *Alcibiades*, *they must stay till they were better inform'd.* Which is a mighty advantage in behalf of Divine Revelation. But of that afterwards.

Aristot. de. Anim. l. 1. c. 5. *L. 3. c. 5.* *De Part. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.* *De Gen. Anim. l. 2. c. 3.* *De Part. Anim. l. 4. c. 10.*

Thus far I have consider'd the Persons of greatest Reputation in *Greece*, and compar'd their Opinions and the grounds they went upon; and I shall proceed no farther there, because the following Sects were deriv'd from these, and they fell into quarrels and contentions with one another, which I have no occasion at present to consider. And therefore I shall now give an Account of another set of Philosophers, who settled in that part of *Italy*, which lay towards *Sicily*, and was call'd *Magna Græcia*; and this was called the *Pythagorean Sect:* which I shall inquire into, with respect to the present Subject. *Pythagoras* was a Man of wonderful esteem for his wisdom, not only in those parts, but at *Rome* too. For *Pliny* and *Plutarch* tell us, *That the Roman Senate erected a Statue to him, as to the wisest Man:* but *Pliny* wonders that *Socrates was not preferr'd before him.* But the *Romans* had a particular veneration for *Pythagoras*; from the Tradition that *Numa* the wisest of their Kings was instructed by him. It's true that this is contradicted by *Cicero* and *Livy*, (two great Men) but *Plutarch* thinks, *that they had no certain measure of times to direct them to judg by*; as he shews from *Clodius his Index.* And there are other odd circumstances, as to *Numa*, which favor the correspondence; as his Laws about *Worship* and *Sacrifices*, mention'd by *Plutarch*; and especially the *Greek Books* found in his Tomb, distinct from those of the *Pontifical Rites*; for which *Pliny* produces unexceptionable Authorities. Even *Livy* himself, who thought it a mistake about *Pythagoras*, yet confesses, *the Books contain'd the wisdom of the* Greeks *at that time.* If *Pythagoras* was contemporary with *Thales* (as we are told he took his advice about going into *Egypt*) what *Wisdom of the Greeks* was there before *Thales?* But *Varro*'s testimony is plain as well as the rest, *that these Books contain'd the Greek Philosophy.* And what *Greek Philosophy* could come to *Numa*, but that of *Pythagoras?* And therefore *Ovid* makes no scruple of saying, *That* Numa *did consult him.* But if *Pythagoras* was in such esteem at *Rome*, *how came these Books to be so solemnly burnt by the order of the Senate, after they were discover'd?* *Livy* saith, *because they tended to dissolve their Religion:* which *Lactantius* carries too far, when he saith, *That they tended to overthrow all Religion.* A most improbable story! That *Numa* should take such care that Posterity should believe him to have been a notorious Impostor. Do Men that deceive the World, write Books on purpose to let others see they have deceiv'd Mankind? No; they take all possible care to prevent any suspicion of that kind. But *Numa* could not think otherwise, but these Books would in time come to light? And it is a wonder

Plin. N. H. l. 34. c. 6. *Plutarch. in Numâ.* *Tusc. l. 1. 16. IV. 1.* *Plut. Num.* *Plin. N. H. l. 13. c. 13.* *Liv. l. 40.* *Ovid. Met. l. 15.* *Lact. 1. 22.*

that

that they were so long concealed; and so *Pliny* saith; for they lay there 535 years: *Plutarch* saith, *but about* 400 years, which others say is a great mistake. However, it was a long time before they were discover'd; *by a great shower*, saith *Plutarch*; by *plowing*, saith *Pliny* and others.

But still, why were these Books burnt? The true account I take to be this. *Numa*'s Religion was very different from what then obtain'd among them. And *Q. Petilius* the *Prætor*, having got a sight of them, saith *Livy*, *from his Kinsman* L. Petilius, in *whose Ground they were found*, very officiously inform'd the Senate that they were Books of dangerous consequence to their Religion; and upon his Oath, they order'd the burning of them. Now *Numa*, as *Plutarch* saith, had expresly forbidden any Images in Divine worship, which he saith continued for 160 years among the *Romans*; and the reason he gives was, *that the first or supreme Being according to* Numa, *was not sensible or visible, but was invisible, pure, and only to be apprehended by the Mind*; which saith he, was very agreeable to the Doctrine of *Pythagoras:* and the Sacrifices he appointed were unbloody, *of meal and wine, and other easy things.* But these things were soon chang'd; for *Plutarch* saith that *Tullus Hostilius*, his immediate Successor, *chang'd the Devotion which* Numa *had set up into great Superstition*; which daily increasing, it was no wonder that they should then order *Numa*'s *Books* to be burnt, which upbraided them with their superstitious folly. But by this we see what *Pythagoras* his notion of God and his worship was. *Ovid* admires him *for his skill in Divinity and Philosophy*; *for his giving an account of the beginning and nature of things.*

> ——*Isque licet cœli regione remotos*
> *Mente Deos adiit, & quæ natura negabat*
> *Visibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris hausit.*

So that, if we may trust a Poet (and surely his Authority is as good as that of *Lucretius*) *Pythagoras* asserted *the being of* God, *and the beginning of the World.*

> ——*Magni primordia Mundi,*
> *Et rerum causas, & quid natura docebat;*
> *Quid Deus, unde Nives, quæ fulminis esset origo.*

Cyrill. contra Jul. l. 1. There is a large description of God extant in St. *Cyril* against *Julian*, according to *Pythagoras*; wherein God is said to be *intimately present in the World, the beginning of all things, the mind and soul, and motion of the Universe.* And so *Velleius* in *Cicero*, saith that according to *Pythagoras*, God *was a Mind diffus'd thro' the World.* Which is likewise express'd by *Virgil* in his known Verses, *Mens agitat molem*, &c. *Philoaus*, a noted Scholar of *Pythagoras*, (whose Books brought the *Pythagorean Learning* into esteem in *Greece*) gives this description of God, * *That he is the eternal Governor and Ruler over all, being one and the same always, and different from all others.* Which we find in *Philo*, and have no reason to mistrust his Testimony; considering what the other *Pythagoreans* said concerning the Divine Nature. They made God to be *one Eternal, perfect Being, and that the happiness of Mankind lay in a*

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. *c.* 27.

* Ἐστὶ γὰρ φησὶν, Ἡγεμὼν καὶ Ἀρχων ἁπάντων θεὸς, εἷς ἐστὶν ὢν μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων. *Philo de Mundi Opific. p.* 23.

similitude to him; as appears by the *Pythagorean Fragments* in *Stobæus*, and elsewhere, which I need not repeat; but I shall only set down the passages of *Zaleucas* and *Charondas*, who were known *Pythagoreans* as appears by *Porphyry*, *Iamblichus*, *Laertius*, &c. in the excellent Prefaces to their Laws. *Zaleucus* saith, *That in the first place all persons ought to own and acknowledge the Gods*; *which*, saith he, *is manifest by seeing the Heaven and the World, and the order that is therein*; *for these are not the work of Fortune, or of Mens hands*; *and they ought to be worship'd and honour'd as the Author of all good things to us. And to that end they ought to keep their Souls pure from evil*; *for* GOD *is not honour'd by bad men, nor by costly sacrifices, but by virtue, and the choice of good and just actions. Charondas* saith, *That Men ought to begin their actions with piety. For* GOD *is the cause of all: and they must abstain from evil actions, for the sake of their respect to* GOD. *For* GOD *hath no regard to wicked persons.* These were Men of great and just esteem in their Cities, and their memory is preserv'd by all that speak of them with great veneration. *Stob. Serm. 42. p. 279.* *p. 289.*

I might pursue this matter much farther; but if this be not sufficient to my purpose, more will be less regarded: for Mankind are better pleas'd with *Choice* than *a Heap*; and I have only pitch'd upon Persons of great esteem in the World. Only *Pythagoras* did not go down well with some of the *Greeks*, because of his *Mystical* and *Symbolical ways* of Instruction; which the *Greeks* were by no means fond of; as appears by *Xenophon*'s Epistle to *Æschines* (if it be genuine, and I see little reason to question it) for he upbraids *Plato* with mixing *the Pythagorick Extravagancies* with the plain Doctrine of *Socrates*, which *Xenophon* kept strictly to. But as to *Pythagoras* himself, *Cicero* extols him *for his wisdom* and *Quality*; and he saith, *The Pythagoreans for a great while were accounted the only Learned men. Pliny* admires him for *his sagacity*; *Apuleius* for *the greatness of his Wit*; and the People of *Crotone* aud *Metapontum, as more than a Man.* His greatest fault was that he was too wise; for he lock'd up his Secrets so close, that the greatest part of Mankind were not much the better for them; only the Cities of *Magna Grecia* were wonderfully reform'd by his means (if the *Pythagoreans* may be believ'd) but at last the prevalent Faction of *Cylon* and his brutish Party at *Crotone* destroy'd many of the Disciples of *Pythagoras*, and dispersed the rest. And *Pythagoras* himself ended his days either by violence, or the discontent he had to find his good designs disappointed in such a manner. The reputation of his School was for some time kept up by *Archytas* and *Philolaus*; and some that escaped the common danger, as *Lysis* (who went to *Epaminondas* in *Greece*, and is suppos'd to have published the *Golden Verses*) and several others are mention'd by *Porphyry* and *Iamblichus*. But *Porphyry* observes, That *they only preserv'd some dark and obscure notions of the* Pythagorick *Doctrine, and made wonderful secrets of them*; which he thinks did not contain the true Doctrine of *Pythagoras*; but only *some sparks of it*, which were far from being clear. And the decay of the *Pythagorean Doctrine*, he doth not only impute to the violence of the Faction rais'd against the *Pythagorean Society* in those Cities of *Italy* where they flourish'd; but to their *Enigmatical* way of expressing their minds by *Numbers* and *Figures*; and to the *Dorick Dialect*, which was almost sacred among them: and after their Books were come into *Greece*, he saith, Plato *and others took out the best, and put it into smoother Language*, which made the rest be *Tusc. 4. 1. De Leg. 2. 9. Tusc. I. 16. Plin. N. H. 2. 21. Apul. Flor. Iambl. vit. Pyth. c. 6. 10.*

ſlighted. And he thinks ſome *invented things on purpoſe in their names to expoſe them the more.* So that it is no eaſy matter to judg now what was the genuine *Pythagorean Doctrine*, except what we find mix'd with *Plato*; who had the beſt opportunities of underſtanding their Doctrine by going among them himſelf, and afterwards getting the Books of *Philolaus* into his hands. And *Porphyry* in the Life of *Plotinus* doth particularly commend him, for *joining the Doctrines of* Pythagoras *and* Plato *together, beyond any that had gone before him.* From whence it appears, that there was no difference between them, as to the firſt Cauſe and the Production of things.

But what ſhall we ſay to *Ocellus Lucanus*, who is mention'd as a Diſciple of *Pythagoras* by *Iamblichus*; and *Architas* in his Epiſtle to *Plato* mentions a Book of his of *the Generation of things*; which hath been often publiſh'd out of MSS. and doth plainly aſſert the *World's Eternity, and Being from it ſelf*; and ſo overthrows the *Pythagorean Doctrine* of God's being the Beginning of all;

In anſwer. That there is ſomething genuine of *Ocellus* extant, I do not queſtion. For *Stobæus* produces a Fragment out of his *Book of Law*, written in the *Dorick Dialect*, according to their cuſtom, and the precept of *Pythagoras*; wherein he doth poſitively aſſert, *That* God *was the cauſe of the World* ὠτᾶς δὲ αὖτι@ ὁ Θεός· but that is not all; for he ſaith, *The World conſiſts of two parts, of that which governs, and is the principle of motion; and that which is called paſſive, and is governed; the firſt* he ſaith, *is Active and Divine, having Reaſon and Underſtanding; the other is made, unreaſonable, and liable to changes.* How can this be reconciled to the Principles of the other Book? And yet *Vizzanius* who compared it with ſeveral MSS. and publiſhed it, hath printed this Fragment at the end of the other. As to *the different Dialect*, he ſuppoſes *it was firſt written in* Dorick, *but after turn'd into the* Attick: but of this he offers no proof; only he ſaith, *It was done as words are tranſlated out of* Portugueſe *into* Caſtilian; or which anſwers more to the *Doric*, out of *Scotch* into *Engliſh.* No one queſtions but ſuch things have been done, and may be ſo again. But how doth it appear that the whole Book was ſo? For there are ſome Fragments of this very piece in *Stobæus* in the *Dorick Dialect*, which is the concluſion of the firſt Chapter, and ſome parts of the ſecond and third; which I ſuppoſe to have been genuine, and the groundwork of the reſt; which ſome unknown Philoſopher built more upon, and turn'd theſe Fragments into the *Attick Greek*, to make them all of a piece. The *Pythagoreans* did aſſert, that the World was incorruptible, as appears by the Fragments of *Philolaus* and others in *Stobæus*; but that which is aſſerted in this Piece is, That the World was ſelf-originated, which was contrary to their Doctrine, and of *Ocellus Lucanus* himſelf. There can be no diſpute about the Fragment of the Book of Law, where his opinion is plain and clear, *That* God *is the cauſe of all*, and that *the firſt Cauſe is a wiſe and intelligent Being:* let us now compare this with the Doctrine of this Book, wherein he aſſerts, * *That the World is the cauſe of perfection to other things, and therefore is perfect from it ſelf. Vizzanius* would have it believ'd that this was *the Peripatetic Doctrine:* If he means that *of Ariſtotle* I have already ſhew'd how falſe it is; ſince he ſo plainly derives the being and perfection of the World *from* God, and not *from it ſelf.* But that which will give the greateſt light into this matter is, that *Nogarola*, who publiſh'd *Ocellus* in *Italy* with Notes, obſerves, that *Critolaus*

Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 16. p. 32.

Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 24. p. 44.

* Οὕτως ἔν τε τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον γινόμενον τ αὐτο τελείας αὐτὸ ἐξ ἑαυτ῀ αὐτοτελές. *Ocell. Lucan. c. 1.*

the

the *Peripatetick* in *Philo*, us'd the same Argument, *That the World must be eternal, because it is the cause of its own Being, and of other things in it.* Now this *Critolaus* succeeded in the *Peripatetick* School at *Athens*, after the Doctrine of it about the beginning of things had been alter'd by *Strato Lampsacenus*, who as *Cicero* tells us, *attributed all to Nature, and nothing to* GOD; *supposing that Nature had all Causes within it self.* And so *Plutarch* saith, that *Strato* the *Peripatetick supposed Nature alone to give a Being to all things from it self.* Here we have found the very Principle of this Book, which goes under the name of *Ocellus Lucanus*, which is repugnant to what himself had expressly declar'd; but some one of these *Atheistick Peripateticks* at *Athens* finding that *Ocellus Lucanus* had said something that might be turn'd to their purpose, takes what was antient of *Ocellus*, and puts it out of the *Dorick* into the *Attick Dialect*, and makes a short *System of the Universe*, which they thought would better pass in the World under the name of antient *Pythagorean.* And this seems to me the truest account of this matter. As for the Arguments themselves, such as they are, I shall consider them in a more proper place.

Phil. Oper. p. 946. *Acad. Qu. l. 4. c. 38.* *Cicer. de N. D. l. 1.* *Plut. adv. Colot.*

Thus I have gone thro' the Opinions of the eldest Philosophers of greatest esteem about GOD *and Providence, and the production of the World.* But before I proceed farther, it will be necessary to make some Reflections on the foregoing Discourse, which may be very serviceable to my following Designs.

1. That those Philosophers who asserted *the Being of* GOD *and Providence*, were Persons of the greatest reputation for Wisdom and Knowledg, and did not hold these things merely from Tradition, but from the strongest evidence of Reason: which appear'd by this, that after the Atheistical Hypotheses of *Anaximander* and *Democritus* were started, they were not in the least mov'd by them; but saw an absolute necessity in point of Reason of holding a First Cause, which not only gave a beginning to the World, but continued to govern it. Even *Aristotle* owning an Universal Providence from such Reasons as will hold much farther.

2. That these Philosophers who follow'd their Natural Reason, were very far from looking on *the Universe* as made up *only of Bodies*; or that *an Incorporeal Substance imply'd a Contradiction.* These were Persons who understood very well what a *Contradiction* meant; and if there had been any such Repugnancy in the notion of *Mind* or *Spirit* as distinct from Body, they would have found it out. But *Anaxagoras* asserted a *Superior Mind* antecedent to Matter or Body; so did *Socrates* and *Plato*, and *Aristotle* too, who expresly asserts GOD to be *an Essence without bulk and indivisible, or without any Parts*; but this can never agree to a Body, altho' never so *fine and subtle.* And *Cicero* tells us, That *they could have no other notion of* GOD, *but as a free Mind, remote from any composition, knowing and perceiving, and moving all things.* Even the *Stoicks*, who blunder'd most in this matter, yet yielded GOD to be *Numen præstantissimæ mentis*, as *Balbus* in **Tully* calls him; and †*Zeno* in *Laertius* describes GOD *to be an Immortal, Rational and most happy Being, uncapable of evil, and taking care of the World.* ‖*Seneca* saith, *the World was framed by* GOD, *or by Incorporeal Reason.* If at other times they seem to contradict this, we are not here concern'd to clear or vindicate them; because my Inquiry is confin'd to those who were elder, and not so given to Paradoxes and Innovation in Terms, as the *Stoicks* were.

Metaphys. l. 14. c. 7.

Nec verò Deus ipse qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam & libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens & movens, ipsaque prædicta motu sempiterno. *Tusc. l. 26.*

* *Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.* † *Laert. vit. Zenon.* ‖ *Seneca Consol. ad Hel. c. 8.*

3. That the true and complete Happineſs of Mankind lay in a ſimilitude to God. Herein *Socrates* and *Pythagoras*, and their Scholars agreed, as abundantly appears in the *Pythagorean Fragments*; and that the way to be like God, is to be *virtuous, and good, and wiſe*; and that all other things, which Mankind are apt to value ſo much, fall infinitely ſhort of this. And I have ſhew'd that *Ariſtotle* himſelf came to this at laſt, for which I have produc'd unqueſtionable Authorities from his Works.

4. That Religion and Piety are very great and commendable Virtues in Mankind. *Plato* ſaid, *the greateſt*. *Pythagoras* gave very good Rules about Divine Worſhip, that it ſhould be perform'd *ſeriouſly and with great attention of Mind*, and not by *the By, and by Chance*. That *our Minds were moſt affected with Religion and Piety in the due Worſhip of* God; *that we ſhould undertake nothing without Prayer*; wherein *Socrates* and *Plato* agree with him. And *Ariſtotle* look'd on it as *Madneſs to deſpiſe God and Religion.*

Plut. in Numa. *Cicero de Leg. l. 2.* *Aur. Carm. 49.*

5. That good Men are to bear the troubles of this World as well as they can, and to look for Happineſs in a Future State. This appear'd by the carriage of *Socrates* at his death, and his Diſcourſes then; and the Courage and Conſtancy of *Pythagoras* and his *Diſciples*, when they were ſo miſerably handled by their inveterate Enemies; ſetting fire in the Houſe where they met, baniſhing ſome, and famiſhing others, and diſperſing the reſt.

6. That there was a common conſent of Mankind, as to the Being of God, and Immortality of Souls. Which appears not only by expreſs teſtimonies of Philoſophers, but by their appeals to the ſenſe of former Ages and diſtant Nations about them.

7. That, notwithſtanding that Light of Reaſon, which they had, yet they found it ſo defective in many things, that they thought nothing more deſirable than a clear Revelation about ſuch things, which were of great importance to Mankind, but they found to be out of their reach to recover; as appear'd by the Confeſſion of *Socrates*, and the Silence of *Ariſtotle* about a Future State, when his Reaſon could only go to the poſſibility, and not to the undoubted certainty of it. For I have ſhew'd that *Ariſtotle* hath aſſerted ſo much concerning the Nature and Properties of the Soul, or rather the Mind of Man, that it cannot be deſtroy'd by Death; but yet he was ſo far to ſeek concerning a Future State after Death, by reaſon of the Poetical Fictions about it, that he rather choſe to ſay nothing, than what might be thought fabulous or uncertain.

And now, I hope, I have ſufficiently clear'd the firſt thing which I undertook, which was to ſhew, That it was a moſt unreaſonable prejudice againſt Religion, *that it was only a contrivance of Prieſts and Politicians for their own ends.*

II. I come now to conſider in the next place, what account is given by ſuch Men of that impreſſion of Religion, which hath been upon the Minds of Men in all Ages. And the Cauſe muſt be as general as the Effect: Since then we find this Effect of Religion in all kinds of Men, ſome univerſal and common Reaſon muſt be aſſign'd for it: which is the thing I am now to conſider. And ſince no Perſon hath undertaken this Matter in ſuch a manner, as Mr. *Hobbes* hath done, I ſhall particularly examin what he hath ſaid concerning it. *Seeing there are no ſigns, nor fruit of Religion but in Man only, there is no cauſe to doubt, but that the Seed of Religion is alſo only in Man, and conſiſteth in ſome peculiar Quality, or at leaſt in ſome eminent degree thereof not to be found in other living Creatures.*

Leviathan, ch. 12.

But what is this *Peculiar Quality in Mankind?* For therein the difficulty lies. How come Men of all sorts to be poſſeſs'd with it? Not merely the unthinking Multitude, but Men of the deepeſt Senſe and greateſt Capacity, and who have taken the moſt pains to inquire into theſe matters.

And firſt, ſaith he, *It is peculiar to the Nature of Man to be inquiſitive into Cauſes of the Events they ſee, ſome more ſome leſs; but all Men ſo much as to be curious in the ſearch of the Cauſes of their own good and evil Fortune. To be inquiſitive into the Cauſes of Events* is very proper for Rational Beings; but we do not mean ſuch as relate merely *to their own good or evil Fortune*, which is no commendable curioſity; but into the nature and reaſon of things, which they ſee in the World; and this we ſay leads Men to a firſt Cauſe, which is GOD. This he mentions in the next words.

Secondly, Upon the ſight of any thing that hath a beginning to think alſo it had a Cauſe, to determin the ſame to begin when it did, rather than ſooner or later.

And was not this a very reaſonable thought? For *what hath a Beginning* muſt certainly *have a Cauſe* which produced it, which determined its Being at that time. And if this be ſuch a *Peculiar Quality in Mankind*, then there is ſomething in Reaſon which carries them to the owning a GOD, which gave a Being to the World, and to the things in it.

Thirdly, Man obſerveth how one Event hath been produced by another, and remembreth in them Antecedence and Conſequence; and if he cannot find out the true Cauſes of things, he ſuppoſes Cauſes of them rather from his own fancy, or Authority of others whom he eſteems.

But how come Mankind not *to find out the true Cauſes of things?* For this is here very ſlily ſuppos'd, without giving the leaſt reaſon for it; and withal the things that Men ſearch for *the Cauſes* of, are ſuppos'd to be *only* ſuch as relate *to their good and evil Fortune* (which are ſaid to be *for the moſt part inviſible*;) but is it not poſſible for Men to inquire into the Cauſes of other things, which we plainly ſee? Do we not ſee our own Bodies, and thoſe of other Animals, as well as the Heavens and Earth? and is it not as proper and reaſonable for Mankind to inquire into the Cauſes of theſe, as well as into their *good and evil Fortune?* What ſtrange ſtuff is this to ſuppoſe all Mankind only to run after *Fortune-tellers*, and never to concern themſelves about the Cauſes of the viſible World? Could any one that in the leaſt pretended to *Philoſophy*, ever think ſo meanly of the reſt of Mankind? But theſe are *the Cauſes* which we ſearch for, and we hope Natural Reaſon will conduct Men in this inquiry to their ſatisfaction; ſo that they need not to have recourſe to *Fancy* or *Authority*.

But he goes on: *The two firſt make Anxiety*, i. e. a Man's *Inquiſitiveneſs into Cauſes* in general, and *thinking that what had a Beginning muſt have a Cauſe.* For *being aſſur'd that there be Cauſes of all things, this fills him with ſolicitude for the time to come; and ſo his Heart is gnaw'd on perpetually by fear of Death, Poverty, or other Calamity; and hath no repoſe or pauſe of his Anxiety but in Sleep.* What? Do Men think of nothing but what Calamities may befal them? And muſt they needs perpetually perplex themſelves with the fear of future Evils? Thoſe who were called *Philoſophers* in former times, thought it poſſible for ſuch who believed GOD and Providence, not to live under ſuch *perpetual anxiety*. But what follows? *This perpetual Fear always accompanying Man-*

kind in the ignorance of Causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something; and therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good or evil Fortune, but some Power or Agent invisible. Thence the Poets said, that the Gods were first created by human Fear; which being spoken of the many Gods of the Gentiles, is very true. But how come we from the *Qualities* of Human Nature to fall upon *the Gods of the Gentiles?* The Question was, What it is in Mankind which inclines them to believe a God? The Answer is, *That Fear made the Gods of the Gentiles.* What is that to *all Mankind?* Suppose there had been no such Saying among the *Poets*, nor such *Gods among the Gentiles*, the Question still remains, whence comes Mankind to apprehend a *Deity?* Doth it all come from a vain superstitious Fear, such as Men have in the dark of they know not what; and because they see nothing, they imagin some *Invisible Power?* Is this the true ground of the Seed of Religion in Mens Minds? If so, then there is no ground in Reason to believe a God, but only an ignorant superstitious Fear.

Not so, saith Mr. *Hobbes. But the acknowledgment of One God, Eternal, Infinite and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived from the desire Men have to know the Causes of Natural Bodies, and their several Virtues and Operations, than from the fear of what was to befal them in time to come.* What is the meaning of this? *The acknowledgment of One God may be more easily derived,* &c. If he had meant sincerely, he would not have said, *That it may be more easily derived,* but that no tolerable account can be given of those things any other way. But we are to observe, That he makes *Ignorance* and *Fear* to be *the general Seeds of Religion in Mankind:* so that this *Acknowledgment of One* God doth not come from *the Seed of Religion,* but only from Mens being puzzled about a series of Causes. *For,* as he goes on, *he that from any Effect he sees come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate Cause thereof, and from thence to the Cause of that Cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of Causes, shall at last come to this (even as the Heathen Philosophers confess'd) one first Mover; that is, a First and an Eternal Cause of all things, which is that which Men mean by the name of* God. This seems a plain confession that *Reason* must carry Men to the owning *a First and an Eternal Cause of all things.* And is not Reason a *Peculiar Quality in Mankind?* How then comes *the Seeds of Religion* not to be plac'd therein, but *in Ignorance and Fear?* And he after saith, *That the Natural Seed of Religion lies in these four things; Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second Causes, Devotion towards what Men fear, and taking things casual for Prognosticks.* How comes the *Natural Reason* of Mankind to be left out? If by that Men may be convinc'd of a *First and Eternal Cause of things,* doth not that dispose Men to a fear and reverence towards a Divine Majesty? And is not that *Religion?* Then the best and truest Seed of Religion lies in that which most disposeth the Mind to fear God. What is the meaning then, that *the Seed of Religion* is plac'd by him in things without Reason? If Men by Reason are brought to own or *acknowledg One* God *Eternal, Infinite, Omnipotent;* doth not the same Reason oblige them to pay him that Reverence, and Fear, and Duty, which is owing to him? Therefore by this *Seed of Religion,* he really can mean nothing but an inclination to *Superstition:* And to this purpose he speaks in the conclusion of the foregoing Chapter. *And this Fear of things invisible, is the Natural Seed of that which every one in himself calleth Religion; and in them that fear or worship that Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.*

Here is a notable distinction found out between *Religion* and *Superstition*; the former is the good word a Man gives to himself, the other the Nick-name he bestows on those who differ from him. But in general, *Religion* and *Superstition* are the same thing to him; unless a difference be found out from the *allowance* of one, and not of the other. So he saith in another place: *Fear of Power invisible feign'd by the Mind, or imagin'd from tales publickly allow'd, is Religion; not allow'd, Superstition.* So that what is feign'd and allow'd is *Religion*, and what is not allow'd is *Superstition.* So that the Worship of the Heathen Gods, being from *Tales publickly allow'd*, was *Religion*, and not *Superstition:* and the *Christian Worship* under the Persecution, was *Superstition* and not *Religion.* No, saith Mr. *Hobbes: When the Power imagin'd is such as we imagin, that is true Religion.* How can it be *true Religion*, if Religion be *a fear of a power imagined by the Mind, or from Tales publickly allow'd?* For if this be Religion in general, *true Religion* must be a *true Fiction*, a real *Chimæra*, an allow'd piece of Nonsense. *But when the Power is such as we imagin it, then*, saith he, *it is true Religion.* But if it were *a Power imagined to be such as the Law makes it*, is not that *true Religion?* And if it contradicts what is so established, can this be according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s *true Religion?* Then it follows, that the distinction doth not arise from the *Publick Allowance* or *Disallowance.* For if it be possible for the Civil Power to *disallow* the Worship of the true God, (as we know it hath too frequently happen'd) is such Worship being disallow'd *true Religion?* If it be, then it is impossible the other should be true, that *Religion* is taken from the *Publick Allowance*, and *Superstition* from the *Disallowance.* But they who put in some Expressions only for a disguise and concealment, know well enough that they contradict themselves; and they know their Friends will allow them in it, as long as the true meaning may be understood by them: and the safest way of instilling Atheism is by writing Contradictions, *i. e.* by seeming at some times to own a God, but by the whole series of the Discourse to overthrow his Being, as a mere fancy of an invisible Power rais'd by a predominant Fear. But hereby we see that *Fear* prevails so much on such Men, that they dare not speak consistently; which is very unbecoming *Philosophers.* As the gross *Hypocrisy* of *Vaninus* before his discovery, and the most servile *Flatteries* and *Importunities* of *Theophile* in *France*, did shew how much the power of Fear may sway in those who have no Religion, (which may be allow'd in them.) But how comes Fear to be made out to be *the seed of Religion in Mankind?* This a true Disciple to the *Leviathan*, in the Preface to his Book, hath undertaken to make out more fully than Mr. *Hobbes* had done; and therefore ought to be consider'd in this place. *When Men*, saith he, *are under any great distress, and see not the way out of it, their Anxiety and Fear makes them act like Men distracted, and ask any one's help, which at another time they would despise: so we find it as to Religion; when they are in great trouble, they run to their Prayers, and when they are over, their Devotion is soon cool'd, as he instances in* Alexander, *and might have done in many others.* But what is all this to the proof of the main Point? That Men are too prone to *Superstition*, especially under Calamities, there is no question. But it is a most unreasonable supposition, that all *Religion* is nothing else but *Superstition*, which Men take up only when they are at their wits end. But if there be a God and Providence, as we find both the best *Philosophers* asserted, and the strongest

Leviathan, ch. 6. p. 26.

Lescaloper. in Cicer. de N. D. I. p. 127.

Tract. Theol. Polit.

ſtrongeſt Reaſons prove it; then whatever Men's condition be as to this World, there is the ſame ground in Reaſon for a due Reverence and Worſhip to be paid to him. But it is a very bad way of arguing againſt all Religion, becauſe of ſome Mens extravagant Superſtition. *Some Men have run mad with Superſtition.* What follows? Therefore all *Religion* is *Madneſs.* Where lies any colour in the Argument? Some have been mad through an exceſs of Love; therefore all Love is Madneſs. No; but we muſt enquire into the proper objects and degrees of Love, whereof ſome are allowable, and ſome not. So here in the Paſſion of Fear, there is a violent, fooliſh, ungovernable Fear; but may there not be a prudent, wiſe and reaſonable Fear? It is madneſs and folly in great diſtreſſes to run to what cannot help us; but is it ſo to make our addreſſes to a Being infinitely wiſe and powerful, who alone can do it? Here lies the fundamental miſtake of theſe Men, they would have it taken for granted, that there is no GOD nor Providence, and then they cry out upon the fooliſh Fear and Superſtition of Mankind: but they cannot deny that if our foundations be true, Religion is a wiſe and reaſonable thing in Mankind; as it is an owning our Creator by a ſolemn ſubmiſſion to him, and invocation of his help, and dependence upon his Providence. Let any Man in his wits (let his condition as to this World be what it will) deny that it is reaſonable for him to be govern'd by one infinitely wiſer and better than himſelf. If his condition be proſperous, he hath more reaſon to be thankful; if it be troubleſome, he hath more reaſon to be patient, becauſe GOD knows beſt both how to ſupport him under it, and to deliver him out of it. But if there be no GOD nor Providence, he hath nothing but the miſerable comfort of neceſſity. *But, did not the multitude of Gods in the Gentile World come from their ignorant and ſuperſtitious Fear, as Mr.* Hobbes *hath at large ſhew'd?* Truly he needed not to have taken ſo much pains to prove a thing which no body denies. But what then? The Gentiles feign'd a great many Gods from their ſuperſtitious Fear; therefore there is no GOD but what is the effect of Fear. Is this good arguing? *But they fancied Powers inviſible, which were only in their own Imaginations.* Therefore there is *no Inviſible Power* but what depends upon Imagination. Can ſuch Men pretend to Reaſon, who talk at this rate? *But thoſe inviſible Powers they took to be Spirits, and that they were incorporeal, or immaterial, which are words of a contradictory ſignification.* This is news, and ought to have been prov'd in ſome meaſure, ſince the beſt Philoſophers who underſtood contradictions never thought ſo, as I have ſhew'd already. *But thoſe who by their meditation arrive to the acknowledgment of One Infinite, Omnipotent, Eternal* GOD, *choſe rather to confeſs he is incomprehenſible and above their Underſtanding, than to define his Nature by Spirit incorporeal, and then confeſs their definition to be unintelligible.* Do any that believe GOD to be *an Immaterial Subſtance,* confeſs this to be *unintelligible?* I rather believe that they think a *Material God* to be *unintelligible,* as being inconſiſtent with the Divine Perfections. And altho' they acknowledg that what is *Infinite,* is ſo far incomprehenſible; yet they may have clear and diſtinct conceptions of *a Firſt and Eternal Cauſe,* which is endued with Infinite Perfections. And this is not only attributed to him *as a Title of Honor with a pious intention*; but from the true ſenſe of their Minds, as to ſuch Attributes which are proper to GOD.

When

When Mr. *Hobbes* was charg'd with introducing *Atheiſm by denying Immaterial or Incorporeal Subſtances*, he undertook to defend himſelf; not only becauſe we ſay God *is incomprehenſible, but becauſe the notion of an Incorporeal Subſtance came from* Plato *and* Ariſtotle, *who miſtook thoſe thin Inhabitants of the Brain they ſee in ſleep for ſo many incorporeal Men; and yet allow them motion, which is proper only to things Corporeal.* Before he ſeem'd only to ſay, That the ignorant ſuperſtitious People entertain'd this notion of *Spirits or inviſible powers being only Creatures of the Brain like the images in ſleep:* but now it ſeems *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* were no wiſer, and that we receive it from them. But I have made it appear that the difference of Mind and Matter was before them; and that not by mere fancy, but by invincible Reaſon: becauſe otherwiſe there could be no ſuch thing as the Motion and Diſpoſition of Matter in ſuch a manner, as we ſee it in the World. And this was the ground which thoſe Philoſophers went upon; who were as little given to be impos'd upon by their dreams, as any before or ſince their time. And it is a ſtrange confidence in any Man to think to bear down the general ſenſe of the moſt Philoſophical part of Mankind, with bare ſaying, that an Immaterial Subſtance implies a contradiction. But he offers to prove it, after an extraordinary manner; *For*, ſaith he, *it is in* Engliſh, *ſomething that without a Body ſtands under — Stands under what? Will you ſay, under Accidents?* Ridiculous! did *Plato* or *Ariſtotle* uſe the word Subſtance? And when it came to be us'd, the word ſignify'd the ſame with *Being*; and ſo the jeſt is quite loſt. Such pitiful things as theſe muſt paſs for Wit and Philoſophy with ſome Men.

Mr. Hobbes conſider'd, &c. p. 30.

p. 32.

p. 33.

But to proceed with Mr. *Hobbes*; After he hath reckon'd up the many follies which the Gentiles fell into by their ſuperſtitious Fear, he concludes in this manner. *So eaſy are Men to be drawn to believe any thing from ſuch as have got credit with them, and can with gentleneſs and dexterity take hold of their Ignorance and Fear.* Still we meet with nothing but the reſult of *Ignorance* and *Fear* in the *Gentile World.* We do not deny that Religion was exceedingly corrupted among them; but we affirm, that the true foundations of Religion were kept up among Men of Underſtanding; as fully appears by the Diſcourſes of *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Xenophon*, *Ariſtotle*, *Cicero*, &c. Why are their Reaſons never ſo much as mention'd, and nothing thought worth inſiſting upon, but only the groſs ſuperſtitions and follies of the People? This doth not look like fair dealing with Mankind; to repreſent only the meaneſt and moſt deform'd parts, and to conceal what any ways tended to the honor of them, and of Religion. *Cicero* dealt with Mankind in this matter in a much more ingenuous and candid manner. He doth not conceal the follies either of the *People* or of the *Philoſophers* about their Gods; but then he ſets down all the Arguments for God and Providence, and urges them with all his force. And in other places he owns the *general conſent of Mankind*, as to the eſteem and worſhip of a Divine Nature: which he is far from imputing to *Mens Ignorance and Fear*; but he ſaith, *it is the voice of Nature it ſelf.* Nay he goes ſo far as to ſay, * *that there is nothing more evident to any one that looks up to the Heavens, than that there is a moſt excellent Mind, by which theſe things are govern'd,* † *And he queſtions,*

Cicero de Nat. Deor.

Cic. de Leg. I. 8.

Tuſc. I. 13.

* Quid enim poteſt eſſe tam apertum, tamq; perſpicuum, cum cœlum ſuſpeximus, cœleſtiaque contemplati ſumus, quam eſſe aliquod Numen præſtantiſſimæ mentis quo hæc regantur. *De Nat. Deor. l.* 2.

† Quod qui dubitet, haud ſane intelligo, cur non idem Sol ſit an nullus ſit dubitare poſſit. Quid enim eſt hoc illo evidentius? *Ibid.*

ſtions, whether it be more evident that the Sun ſhines. At what another rate doth that excellent Orator ſpeak of *Human Nature*, with reſpect to Religion, than our modern pretenders to Philoſophy? Nay || *Sextus Empiricus* himſelf ſets down the Arguments fairly which prove the Being of GOD: *viz. The Conſent of Mankind; the Order of the World; the abſurdities of Atheiſm, and the weakneſs of the Arguments for it.* Which he doth largely inſiſt upon; and diſtinguiſhes between the *common errors of the people*, and the *Natural Arguments of Mankind*, with the conſent of the wiſeſt and ſharpeſt Men among them; as *Pythagoras*, *Empedocles*, the *Ionic Philoſophers* (from *Anaxagoras*) *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and the *Stoics*. And, ſaith he, *if we enquired after an object of ſight, we would rely moſt on thoſe who ſaw beſt; or after a ſound, on thoſe of the quickeſt hearing: ſo in matters of ſpeculation, the opinion of Philoſophers ought moſt to be regarded.* Which he never anſwers when he ſets down the Arguments on the other ſide; which are chiefly thoſe of *Carneades* againſt the *Stoics*, who laid themſelves open by ſome *Hypotheſes* of their own.

|| *Sextus Empir. ad Mathem. p.* 139.

But Mr. *Hobbes* tells us, *That the firſt Founders and Legiſlators of Common-wealths among the Gentiles took great care to keep the People in obedience and peace; and to that end pretended to Revelation for their Laws: and preſcrib'd Ceremonies, and Supplications, and Sacrifices, &c. by which they were to believe the anger of the Gods might be appeas'd. And thus the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.* Who goes about to deny this? or to juſtify the vain pretences to Revelation among ſome of the ancient Legiſlators, beſides *Numa Pompilius*, whom *Diodorus Siculus* takes care to preſerve the memory of; as of *Mnenis*, as he calls him, the firſt Legiſlator in *Egypt*; who pretended to have his Laws from the God *Hermes:* but this ſeems to have been a miſtake for *Menes*, whoſe Counſellor *Hermes* was: his others are, *Minos* of *Creet*, *Lycurgus* at *Sparta*, *Zathamuſtes* (as he calls him) among the *Arimaſpi*, *Zamolxis* among the *Getæ*; and among the reſt he reckons *Moſes*, who had his Laws from the God *Iäo*. No queſtion *Diodorus Siculus* believ'd all alike; but I hope to ſhew the mighty difference between *Moſes* and the reſt in the following Diſcourſes. But here I am only to conſider the force of the Argument. *Theſe Gentile Legiſlators did pretend Revelation when they had it not, only with a deſign to deceive the People.* Doth it hence follow, that there is no ſuch thing as *Religion*; but that it is only a Trick made uſe of by cunning Legiſlators to draw the People the better to Obedience? Now I think the Argument holds the other way. For, if the People were not before well perſuaded of the truth of *Religion* in general, this Argument would have no force at all upon them. For, let us ſuppoſe a People altogether unacquainted with Religion, or uncertain of the truth of it, to be dealt with, by ſome cunning Legiſlator; and he comes and tells them, he had brought them an excellent Body of Laws, which he had by Revelation from GOD; what would this ſignify to a People that were poſſeſs'd with Mr. *Hobbe*'s Notion of *Inviſible Powers* that were only *Fancies, ſuch as appear in a Dream or a Glaſs*; would they be at all perſuaded by ſuch an Argument to obedience? No; but they would rather look on him as an Impoſtor, that went about to deceive them in the groſſeſt manner; which would raiſe an invincible prejudice againſt them. But, ſaith Mr. *Hobbes*, *they had the Original ſeeds of Religion*, viz. *Ignorance and Fear, and upon theſe ſuch Legiſlators did work.* But he can never make it out, that ever there was a People

Diod. Sic. l. 1. *p.* 59.

poſſeſs'd with ſuch *Ignorance and Fear*, but they had a notion of a Deity among them before ſuch Legiſlators appearing; and all the advantage they had, was from ſuch an antecedent Belief of a God; then indeed it was no hard matter for ſuch Legiſlators to impoſe upon them; but without it, the ſuppoſition is unreaſonable. But Mr. *Hobbes* ſaith, *that Men in the dark are afraid of Inviſible Powers.* As tho' there were no more to be ſaid for the Being of God and Providence, than for ſtories of *Hobgoblings*, and this lies at the bottom of all his Diſcourſe. Wherein he contradicts the common Senſe and Reaſon of Mankind, who have agreed in the Notion and Belief of a Deity, and that as I have ſhew'd from *Socrates* and *Xenophon*, as well as others in *the eldeſt and beſt Ages*, even of the *Gentile World*. But Mr. *Hobbes* ſaith, where he ſpeaks his Mind more freely, *that there is no Argument from Natural Reaſon doth prove that the World had its beginning from* God; and yet he ſaith, *there is no Argument to prove a Deity but from the Creation.* So that all proof of a God in point of Reaſon, muſt be deſtroy'd by him. This he knew was objected againſt him; and the Anſwer he gives is, *That there are no Arguments from Natural Reaſon, except the Creation, that have not made it more doubtful to many than it was before:* and therefore his opinion is, *that this matter is to be left to the Law to determin.* A very philoſophical Anſwer! But why doth not the Argument from the Creation hold, when himſelf had ſaid, *that from the ſeries of Cauſes there muſt be one firſt Mover*, i. e. *a Firſt and an Eternal Cauſe of all things?* But that came in by the by, to avoid *odium* in a Book for all Perſons reading; but in his *Philoſophical Diſcourſes*, he doth not allow this Argument to hold. For what reaſon? *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *it only proves, that a Man's Mind cannot go on* in infinitum, *but he muſt ſtop ſomewhere; and at laſt he grows weary, and knows not whether he ſhould go on farther or not.* And is this all the force of the Argument from the Creation? What becomes now of the Argument from the *Mechanical Contrivance of the Human Body, which*, he ſaid, *was ſo clear a proof of a wiſe Maker, that he muſt be ſaid to be without a Mind, that did not aſſert that it was made by one?* And this is in one of his *Philoſophical Treatiſes*, publiſhed after the other; but in his Vindication of himſelf, he juſtifies the former paſſage; only he ſaith, *except the Creation.* So that he knew not well what to ſay in this matter, but only to keep himſelf out of danger, he was reſolv'd to ſubmit to the Law. But that is not our Point: and why did he not go about to take off the Argument from *the wiſe Contrivance of things*, which ought to go along with the other? But he knew it was far eaſier to darken an Argument, wherein *Eternity* and *Infinity* is concern'd; and ſo from thence would infer that in the ſeries of Cauſes Men's Mind are only puzzled and not convinced. But why, I pray, muſt a Man's Mind *give over in the ſearch of Cauſes, as not knowing whether he may go on or not?* Can any thing be plainer in common reaſon, than that in the order of Cauſes a Man muſt go on till he arrive at a firſt Cauſe? What ſhould make a Man to ſtop here; for he ſees he muſt go on till he comes at a firſt? No; ſaith Mr. *Hobbes*, *A firſt Cauſe is infinite, and whatever is infinite is above our conception, and ſo we are loſt.* But that is running from the order of Cauſes to the nature of the object, which is a thing of another conſideration.

Phyſ. c. 26. n. 1.

Mr. Hobbes conſider'd, p. 34.

But he ſaith yet farther, *That the Argument from motion doth only prove an eternity of motion, and not an eternal firſt Mover*; becauſe as nothing can be mov'd from it ſelf, ſo whatſoever gives motion muſt be firſt mov'd. But all this depends upon the ſuppoſition that there is

nothing in the Universe but Body; and if that be granted, his Argument holds: but if there be Mind distinct from Body, and can give motion to it, there is not so much as the color of reason in this Argument. And so much in answer to the Second Atheistical Pretence.

The Third *Atheistical Pretence* to be consider'd, is, *That there is no such common consent of Mankind, as to God and Providence, as was asserted by the Ancients, and is still by the defenders of Religion; for upon the late Discoveries whole Nations have been found without any sense of* God *or Religion.* This is a thing very fit to be inquir'd into, with more care than hath been yet us'd about it: for, altho' we do not ground the truth of Religion merely upon such a general consent; but upon those Arguments which the wiser part of Mankind hath insisted upon; of which I have given some account in the foregoing Discourse: yet such an universal consent doth manifestly shew that there is nothing repugnant to the common sense of Mankind in it; nothing that looks like a Trick or Imposture, which could never so universally prevail as this hath done; especially among the more sensible and civiliz'd part of Mankind.

But for our better understanding this Matter, it will be necessary to lay down some general Observations.

That we have reason to distinguish the more *Brutish* and *Savage* People, from the more *Tractable* and *Reasonable*; because it is possible for Mankind by an affected and universal neglect of all kind of Instruction, to degenerate almost to the nature of Brutes. But surely such are not fit to be brought in for the instances of what naturally belongs to Mankind: which we ought to judge of by a due measure, *i. e.* by such as neither want natural capacity, nor are profess'd Savages, nor have the improvements of the most civilized People. There are two sorts of brutish People in the World, whose sense in these matters is not much to be regarded. (1.) Such as have very little of common Humanity left among them; such as *Acosta* describes the *Uros*, who were such *dull and brutish People that they did not think themselves Men*; and such are the *Caffres* or *Hottentots*, at the *Cape of Good-hope*, who by the last Account we have of them remain as *Bestial* and *Sordid* as ever; insomuch that the Author who was among them, saith, *That if there be any medium between Men and Beasts, they lay in the fairest claim to that species.* And such are the *Caiguæ* of *Paraguaria* (of whom afterwards.) (2.) Such as express open contempt and defiance of *Laws* as well as *Religion*, as the *Chichimecæ* in the Northern part of *America*, who are said *to have lived without any Government as well as Religion*; (*unless that they offer the first wild Beast they catch to the Sun*) and so *Acosta* describes some other *Savages* among them; viz. *without King, Law,* God, *or Reason:* Those of *Brasil* are said to be *without Faith, without Law, without a King*; and the Savages of *Canada* are describ'd after the same manner. So that if any Argument can be drawn from such against Religion, it will as well hold against *Law* and *Civil Government.*

Acosta *of the Indies, l. 2. c. 6.*

Voyage to Surat, *An.* 1689. *p.* 489.

De Laet *Descript. Ind. Occid. l. 5. c. 25.*

De Orig. Gent. Am. p. 27.

Acosta *of the West-Indies, l. 7. ch.* 2.

Du Val *Observations sur le Voyage de Pirard, p.* 132.

De Laet *Ind. Occid. l. 2. c.* 12.

2. We must not judg by light informations of mere Strangers, and Persons look'd on as Enemies; which is the case of the Inhabitants of the *Southern Islands*, which we have only from *Seamen* who landed upon them, and were suppos'd to come with an ill design; whose Accounts must be very imperfect and partial. But in *Le Mair*'s Account we only read, *that they could observe no Offices of Religion among them:* And *Scouten* to the same purpose of the Inhabitants of *Horn Island* (as they call it)

Descript. Navig. Jac. Le Mair, 31. *Mair. Diarium* Scouten. *p.* 47.

not far from *New Guinea*; *but they seem'd*, he saith, *to live like the Birds of the Air, without any care, upon the fruits of the Earth.* But no certainty can be grounded upon such Observations. Nor can we build any thing upon the *Want of Religion* in places not yet fully discover'd; as what is said by some of the People of *Yedso* or *Jesso:* For the first Account given of it was from the Jesuit *Fronius*, who liv'd long in *Japan*; and he describes it as a Country of Savages; and he saith, *that they have no other Religion but the worship of the Heavens.* And so *Diodorus Siculus* saith, *the sight of the Heavens was that which brought Men first to Divine Worship*; and he doth not attribute it to *Ignorance and Fear*, but *to Admiration*; and therefore fix'd *on the Sun and Moon as their chief Gods*; which was the the most prevailing Idolatry in the World. But from hence we are not to infer that they believ'd no GOD above them; but they thought he that was above them was above their service: but their visible Worship they thought ought to be paid to these visible Gods, as hath been already observ'd of the old *Greeks*; and *Diodorus Siculus* saith the same of the *Egyptians.* But as to these People of *Yedso* we find the first Account of them was, that they were a very *Savage People*, but had such kind of Religion as most antient Idolaters had: Since that time there hath been no exact Account given of them; the best we have is from the *Dutch.* *Caron*, who was Resident in *Japan*, saith only, *that this People are brutish*; *and that the* Japonese *could never make a full discovery of the Country, which is parted from* Japan *by an Arm of the Sea, where it bounds on vast Mountains and Deserts, so that the common Passage is by ferrying over.* If this be true, there is a Passage by Land beyond that Arm of the Sea, and so *Japan* is one *Continent* with it, which extends in probability to the Northern parts of *America:* For in the Account of the *Dutch Embassy* to *Japan*, *A. D.* 1641. we are told, That in the Treaty between the *Japonese* Agent *Syvoan* and the *Dutch*, he produc'd a *Map* of those Parts agreeable to what *Caron* had said; and they observe *that* Jesso *was in it of a vast extent, and reach'd to* North America, *without any Streight of* Anian. *Martinius* makes no doubt, that Japan *was inhabited from* East Tartary, *as well as by a Colony from* China; which he proves from their *Customs* and *Language*; but he thinks *they came over the Water, or at least over the Ice*; *for he saith, there are severe Winters there.* But he saith withal, *that the* Chinese *do make* Jesso *a part of* Tartary, *and that it is join'd with the Province of* Niuthan *and* Yupi. *F. Couplet* agrees with *Martinius*, that *Japan* was peopled from *Tartary*; and he saith, they have a Chronology of their Kings for 660 Years before *Christ*, and long before that the Northern *Tartars* took possession of *Japan.* So that the People of *Yesso* and *Japan* are of the same Original. In the *Dutch* Account of *Yedso* printed by *Thevenot*, in the second Part of his Collections (which was taken from a Ship which went upon the Coasts of that Country and People) we have a more favourable Description both of the *Country* and *People*; only it is said, *that they do not love to take pains, have little Government or Religion*; but they observ'd some *Superstitious Practices* among them. And what exact Account could be expected from such, who went not thither to acquaint themselves either with the Country or their Religion, but to find a passage farther that way?

Maff. Epist. l. 4. Apr. 28. 1565.

Diod. Sic. l. 1. p. 7.

Ambassade Memorable, &c. p. 27.

Martin. *Atlas Extrem. Asiæ, p. 170.*

Martin. *Atlas, p. 21.*

Couplet *Dissert. Proœm. ad* Confuc. *Oper. p. 81.*

3. That it is no certain rule that the People have no Religion, because Strangers cannot find any set Times and Places of Worship among them. For this was a Principle among many Nations, that the *Supreme* GOD was

to be worship'd only by acts of the Mind; and that external Worship was only for lesser Deities. And *Trigautius* (or rather *Riccius*, who lived a long time in *China*) gives this account of the Religion of that antient and famous Kingdom, *That at first they own'd the Supreme* God, *Lord of Heaven; but afterwards they came to worship inferior Deities; and this*, he saith, *he took out of their most antient Annals and Books of Wisdom, which*, he saith, *did not, in respect to Religion and Morality, come short of the best Philosophers of* Greece. He affirms, *that the Sect of the Learned*, as he calls them, *did still worship one* God, *because all inferior things are preserved and governed by him; but that they gave an inferior Worship to Spirits under him. They are silent about the Beginning of things, as out of their knowledg; but there are some of no such reputation, that talk their own vain Dreams, to which little regard is given.* But *Martinius* hath given some account of these Notions among them; *some would have all by chance, others held the eternity of the World.* He saith, *that their antient Books speak of the supreme Governor of Heaven and Earth*; and altho' they have not *a proper name for* God, yet he confesses *they have such as express his Authority and Government of the World.* *Bartoli* saith, they are extremely mistaken who charge this Learned Sect with *Atheism, because they have no Temples, nor publick Ceremonies of Worship for him; because they apprehend that the supreme* God *is to be solemnly worship'd only by him that is supreme among them.* And *Magaillans*, who was well acquainted with the Court of *China*, and died there about 20 years since, gives this account of Divine Worship, *that at* Pekim *there is a Temple, called the Temple of Heaven, wherein there is a very large Cupolo supported by* 82 *Pillars, wherein the Emperor himself offers Sacrifice on the day of the Winter Solstice, with great solemnity and humility; and another wherein he doth the same at the Summer Solstice: Before which*, he saith, *they observe a strict Fast for three days. He enquired of one of their learned Men, what they meant by this solemn Worship of Heaven; whether it was directed to the material Heaven? He answer'd that they took Heaven not only for the visible Heaven, but for the Creator and Governor of all things; and that at the four Seasons of the Year their Emperor did offer sacrifice in Temples on purpose, not to the Creatures, but to the spiritual Heaven.* *F. Couplet* saith, *That by the antient Custom of* China, *the Emperor only sacrificed to the King of Heaven, as often as there was great occasion for it. And that if he were in a progress, he did it upon the Hills and Mountains.* And by the last account we have from *China*, we find *the same Custom is kept up at* Pekim *by the present Emperors, since the Conquest of* China. Now it were very unreasonable to infer, that there is no Religion or Worship of the Supreme Being in *China*, because it is not commonly practis'd; since according to their Notion of Ceremonies, wherein they are the nicest People in the World, they think none ought to perform Worship to the Supreme in Heaven, but he who is their Supreme upon Earth.

Trigaut. *de Christian. Exped. ap. Sinas*, c. 10.

Martin. *Hist. Sinic. init.*

Bartoli *Hist. Asiat. part.* 3. *l.* 1. *p.* 73.

Magaillans *Novel. Rel. de la China, ch.* 21.

Couplet *Decl. Proæm ad* Confuc. *p.* 83.

Le Compte *part.* 2. *Lett.* 2.

4. Another thing we are to observe in passing our judgment, whether Nations have any Religion among them, is to have a care of trusting too much to the Sayings of known and profess'd Enemies; but as much as may be we ought to take the Opinion of the most free and disinteress'd Persons, who have convers'd among them on the account of Religion. This I intend chiefly with respect to the *Spaniards* accounts of the *West-Indies*, when their design was to enslave the poor *Indians*; for then they made it their business to blacken them as much as possible, by representing

ſenting them as a People without any *ſenſe of* God *or Religion, or any Virtues belonging to Human Nature.* But the contrary appears from the firſt, the moſt impartial and the lateſt Accounts we have of them, from ſuch as have been converſant among them, upon the account of Religion.

In the firſt Account we have of the Diſcoveries of the *Weſt-Indies*, we find that when *Columbus* came to the Iſlands of *Hiſpaniola* and *Cuba*, he ſoon found *that they worſhip'd the Sun and Moon, and the Heavens, but could not then diſcover what other Deities they worſhip'd:* which *Peter Martyr Anglerius* underſtands both of *the Natives* and of the *Caribbians*, who were *Savages*, and very troubleſom to them. And he tells a remarkable Story of one of the Natives coming to *Columbus* at *Cuba*, being a Man of 80 years of age, and deſir'd to diſcourſe with him by an Interpreter. The ſubſtance of it was, That he underſtood *that he with his Ship had given a great diſturbance to the Natives, and bad him to conſider, that after death there were two Paſſages for Souls; the one dark and dreadful for thoſe who were troubleſom to Mankind, the other pleaſant and delightful for thoſe who promote the peace and welfare of People; and if he conſider'd that every Man was to receive according to his Actions after death, he would give over being ſo uneaſy to them.* *Columbus* took the Advice very well, and pretended that they only came to aſſiſt them againſt the *Savages* and *Cannibals, and would hurt none of them*; which the old Man was ſo pleas'd with, that as old as he was, he ſaid he was ready to go with him in ſo good a deſign. Was there any thing that favor'd of *Barbariſm* or *Irreligion* in this Diſcourſe, or what would not become a good *Chriſtian* to ſay? Beſides, the ſame Author commends their way of living far beyond what the *Spaniards* brought among them (as appear'd by *Columbus* his own ſuffering for checking their Enormities.) *They enjoy'd the Profits of the Earth in common, without any diviſion or property, having enough for every Family; and none ſuffer'd but ſuch as injur'd others; and without Laws and Judges they did what was right.* This was a great Character from one who was particularly intruſted in the Affairs and Council of the *Indies*, and had all the Accounts ſent to him, out of which he fram'd his *Decades*. *They thought*, as he ſaith, *that Contentment lay in a little compaſs; and they had more than they knew what to do with.* To the ſame purpoſe *Lerius* gives an account of a Conference he had with a *Braſilian* old Man about Trade. *I pray*, ſaid he, *why do your Countrymen take ſo much pains to come hither for our Wood? Have they not enough for Fuel? Yes*, ſaid *Lerius, but your* Braſil-*wood is of great advantage to them in Trade, by which they grow very rich. Very well*, ſaith he, *and when they are ſo rich, do they not die as other Men do? And whither then go all theſe Riches? To their Children or Relations.* Then ſaid the poor *Braſilian, Your Countrymen are a company of great Fools* (inſigniter Fatui.) *For why ſhould they undergo ſo much toil and danger by Sea and Land, to get that which they muſt part with when they die; and for the ſake of thoſe Children, who might live as contentedly without thoſe Riches? Do not you think that we love our Children as well as you? But we are contented that the ſame Earth which nouriſh'd us, will do as much for them? Theſe barbarous* Braſilians, ſaith *Lerius, will riſe up in judgment againſt too many Chriſtians.* To the ſame purpoſe, he ſaith, one of the Natives of *Peru* diſcours'd the *Spaniards*, who took ſo much pains to get their Gold; and ſaid, *they were the Froth of the Sea, reſtleſs and uneaſy, who might with far leſs trouble get a ſubſiſtence at home.* Theſe things I mention to ſhew, that theſe People were far enough from wanting Senſe and Capacity when

Columbi Navigat. c. 5.

Pet. Mart. Dec. I. c. 1.

Ler. Hiſt. Navig. in Braſil. c. 53.

the *Spaniards* came among them; and seem'd to have a much truer notion of the Happiness of Human Life than they had.

But to shew how far they were from being *without Religion* at that time, we have an Account by *Benzo* (who liv'd a great while in the *West-Indies*, upon their first Discovery) of an *Oracle* among them, which foretold the *Spaniards* a considerable time before. For the *Cachiqui* and *Bohitii*, (*i. e.* their *Great Men and Priests*) told *Columbus*, *That in the time of the Father of their present King, he and another King had a great mind to understand what would happen after their time, and to that end resolv'd to apply themselves to their Zemes* (the Gods they worship'd) *in an extraordinary manner, by fasting five days together in a most sad and mournful condition.* And then they receiv'd that *Oracle*, upon which they made a *most doleful Song*, which they repeated at certain times; but now they found things happen'd to them just as they were foretold. The same *Benzo* informs us, that after *Columbus* discover'd the Continent, the Islands were soon left by the *Spaniards* in hopes of greater gains; and finding they could not manage the Nations as they desired, they sent Persons on purpose to make the worst representation possible of them, that they might have *an Edict* to condemn them to *perpetual Slavery*: And therein they charge them with all manner of vices; but as to Religion, they only accuse them of *Idolatry*. But, if they had found any such thing as *Atheism* and *Irreligion* among them, they would have been sure not to have conceal'd that.

Benzo *Hist. Novi Orbis l.* 1. *c.* 8.

Cap. 17.

Joh. de Laet, in his Description of the Isle of *Cuba*, saith, *That the Inhabitants there had no Temple, no Sacrifices, no Religion.* Which I could not but wonder at, the account being so different from that of the first Discoverers, who must certainly know best what Religion they had among them: but in probability he followed the later *Spaniards*, who give the worst accounts of them, to justify the most inhuman Cruelties which were us'd against them. For *Benzo* saith, *That of two millions of Natives in* Hispaniola, *there were left not above* 150 *in his time*; and the like Desolation was made in *Cuba*, *Jamaica*, *Port-Rico*, and other places; and *de Laet* confesses *that they were all long since destroy'd.* But if we take the Account given of these People upon the first Discovery, we shall find it was very different. For *Peter Martyr*, who was imployed by the King of *Spain*, as himself tells us, to take the best intelligence he could meet with from the *Indies*, saith, *That at first they could find no other Worship among them but that of the Sun, and Moon, and the Heavens; but upon further acquaintance with them, they found out a great deal more, which related to their Religion*; which he said, *he receiv'd from one who was imploy'd by* Columbus *himself in instructing them. They had little Images, which they call'd* Zemes, which they suppos'd to be inhabited by Spirits, which gave Answers to them; but which is considerable, he saith, *That they look'd on them only as a kind of Messengers between them and the Only, Eternal, Omnipotent, Invisible* God. This was extant long before *De Laet* wrote his pompous Description of the *West-Indies*: Was *Peter Martyr* unknown to him? So far from it, that he mentions and commends him for his diligence: How then comes he to differ so much from him in his Account of their Religion? And he there mentions the same *Oracle* which *Benzo* had done, and adds, *That the Natives understood it at first of the* Caribbians *or* Cannibals; *but at last found it too true of the* Spaniards. In another place he gives an account of *Hispaniola* from *Andreas Morales* his own Mouth, who was imploy'd by the Go-

Descript. *Ind. Occid. l.* 1. *c.* 10.

Benzo *l.* 1. *c.* 25.

Pet. Mart. *Dec.* 1. *c.* 9.

Dec. 1. *c.* 9.

vernor to search out what he could find concerning the Island and the Natives. *And he found that they came from another Island, and built a House at the place of their landing, which they after consecrated and enriched, and reverenced to the time of the* Spaniards *coming: and he makes it to have been in as much esteem among them, as* Jerusalem *to the* Christians, Mecca *to the* Mahumetans, *and* Tyrena *in the Grand* Canaries; which he saith, *was in such esteem among the Natives, that Persons would with singing leap off from that Holy Rock, in hopes their Souls should be made happy by it.* But altho' this were a great Argument of *superstitious Folly* in them, yet it shews the falseness of that Saying in the first Relation of *Columbus* his Voyage, *That there was no such thing as Religion in the* Canaries: but those who pretend to give a more exact Account, say, *That the Natives did believe one* GOD, *who punished the Evil, and rewarded the Good.* Columbi Navigat. c. 2. Conquest de Canaries, par. II. p. 208.

The next we are to consider, are the *Savages* which disturbed the Natives, before the *Spaniards*; who were called the *Caribbians*, or the Inhabitants of the *Caribbe Islands*. These were a wild sort of People, and a great terror to their Neighbours, whom they were wont to eat in triumph, after they had taken them; which was not the general practice of the *Indians*, but only of the most *Brutish* and *Savage* People among them, as the *Caribbians* and those of *Brasil*; but the other Natives both of the Islands and Continent abhorr'd it, as is found by the latest Discoveries. This appears by *Christ. de Acunna*, who was imploy'd *A. D.* 1659. to discover the People about the River of *Amazons*; and there he found a considerable People call'd *Aguæ* (the *Spaniards* call them *Omaguæ*) and they were represented to be *Eaters of the flesh of their Enemies*; but he saith it was very false, and only a malicious calumny of the *Portuguese*; and there he saith, *It was a particular Custom of the* Caribbes, *and not us'd by other* Indians. And *Dampier* saith, *That in all his Adventures among the* Indians, *both East and West, he never met with any such People as eat Man's Flesh, and that he knew some of the Cannibal stories to be false.* But on the other side, it cannot be deny'd that there had been such a barbarous Practice, not only among the *Caribbians*, but the Savages of *Brasil* and elsewhere; as appears by the particular Accounts of such as liv'd among them, and saw their manner of doing it; as in *Joh. Lerius*, *Pet. Carder*, *Ant. Knivet*; but especially in *Claud. d'Abbeville* his Relation of *Maragnan*, who is most particular in it; and he saith, that it arose from the Hatred and Revenge they express thereby to their greatest Enemies; and he adds, that their Stomachs cannot bear or digest it; but notwithstanding it had been continu'd among them, because their Enemies did so by them; but they confess'd it to be cruel and barbarous, but having been long us'd, they could not lay it aside, without a general consent. Some say, that the *Tapuiæ* eat the Bodies of their Friends; but those who have liv'd among them, say nothing about it: which they would not have omitted; and they are most to be rely'd upon. The *Caribbe Islands* were discover'd by *Columbus* in his second Voyage: but the *Caribbians* would have no communication with them, *flying into their Woods.* *De Laet* saith only, *that they are a very brutish sort of People, of no shame or fidelity.* Not a word of their *Religion*; and it was not to be expected among them, who had very little regard to any thing but the satisfying their brutish Passions of *Cruelty* and *Revenge*, which are the only things they were then remarkable for. Since that time, they have liv'd more quietly, being so much over-power'd by the Plantations upon the *Caribbe*

Relation de la Riviere des Amazons, c. 52.

Dampier's Voyage, p. 485.

Ler. Hist. Navig. in Brasil, c. 15. Pilgrims, part. 4. p. 1188. 1217. Hist. de la Mission en l'Isle de Maragnan, ch. 49. Barlæ. Hist. Brasil. Piso Hist. Brasil.

L. 1. c. 17.

Caribbe Islands; by which means they have been brought to some kind of Humanity and Conversation. And there have been two understanding Persons conversant among them, who have given the best Account we have of them; and those are *Mons. Rochefort* and *F. Du Tertre*; who both agree, that they have some knowledge of One Supreme GOD in Heaven, who is of infinite Goodness, and hurts no body; but as *Du Tertre*, who liv'd longer among them, saith, they account the service of him a needless thing, being so far above them; but they are mightily afraid of the *Mabogas* or evil Spirits, which they think design to do them mischief: and to appease them they have their *Boyez*, who are a kind of Sorcerers among them. They both agree, that they believe the immortality of the Soul; and that the principal Soul, which is that in the Heart, goes to Heaven. And *Rochefort* from hence concludes the truth of *Cicero*'s saying, *That the knowledge of Divinity is planted in the Hearts of Men.*

Rochefort *Histoire de Caribb. l. 4. c. 13.*

Du Tertre *Hist. Nat. de Antilles par. 7. §. 3.*

But *De Laet* represents the Northern *Indians* to have been as much without Religion, as the Natives of *Cuba* and *Hispaniola*; and from no good grounds, altho' herein he did not rely upon the *Spanish* Reports. So he saith of the Natives of *New-found Land*, of *New-France*, of the *Souriquois*, and other People of *Canada*, and the parts thereabouts, and of *Virginia*, &c. But I shall make it appear, that he took up with very slight Informations in this matter; which are contradicted by those who liv'd longer among them, and understood their Sense and Language better. 'Tis true, which I suppose gave occasion to the mistake, that the Savages had no set and constant ways of Devotion; but at certain Seasons of the year, or in time of War and Calamities they had; or however, to Persons that discoursed with them, they did by no means deny a GOD, but thought it was no great matter whether they serv'd him or not in such a manner; so that their chief fault lay in a gross neglect of Religion, and not in any setled Principles of Irreligion. So the *Sieur de Champlain* saith, He discours'd with the Savages of *Canada*, and found they wanted no Capacity; and he asked one of them, why they did not pray to GOD; he answer'd, that every one was left to pray as he thought fit in his own Mind. So, saith he, for want of a Law for Divine Worship, they liv'd like Brutes: and he imputes a great deal to their Savage way of living upon Hunting; whereas if the Land were cultivated, it might be much easier to reduce them to Civility and Religion. Mr. *Winslow* one of the first Planters in *New-England*, had some discourse with the *Indian Savages* about Religion, and GOD's being the Author of all our Blessings, which they agreed to, and said, *That they own'd* GOD, *and call'd him* Kirtitan: upon which I observe, that he ingenuously retracts the Accounts he had given before of the Natives; *viz. That they had no Religion or Knowledge of* GOD; for, saith he, *we find that they do own one supreme Being, who was creator of Heaven and Earth; but they likewise own'd many Divine Powers under him.* Therefore *Acosta*, speaking of the *Indian Savages*, saith, *It is no hard matter to persuade them of a supreme* GOD, *be they never so barbarous and brutish.*

Laet. *Desc. l. 2. c. 2. 12. 16.*

L. 3. c. 18.

Les Voyages du Sieur de Champlain, l. 3. ch. 5.

Purchas *To. 4. l. 10. ch. 5.*

Acosta *Hist. of the Indies, l. 5. c. 2.*

But I must do that right to *Joh. de Laet*, as to shew that after he had receiv'd better Information, he did speak more favourably of the *Religion* of the *Indians*: For in his Book against *Grotius*, ten years after the other, he hath an *Observation* on purpose to clear this matter. Father *Sagard* had publish'd an Account of his Voyage to the *Hurons*, a People of *New-France*, or *Canada*, near the Lake call'd *Mare dulce*, where he

Jo. de Laet *de Origin. Gent. American. p. 187.*

Le Grand *Voyage du Pays de Hurons, c. 18.*

learnt

learnt their Language, and so was better able to judg of their Opinions; and he saith, Their general Sense was, that there was one Creator, who made the World; and that in their Language he was call'd *Ataouiacan*. Which is since confirm'd by the Account of the *French Missions* into those parts; especially of *Paulus Juvenæus*, who spent a Winter among them, to converse with them in their own Language. And when he preach'd to them about God, they all asked him, what he meant by it; he told them he meant such a Being who had infinite Power, and made Heaven and Earth: upon which they looked upon one another, and cried out *Ataouacan*. *Sagard* saith, *They believe the Immortality of the Soul*; and the latter Accounts say, *That he was told that the* Souriquosii *did truly believe one* God *that created all things*. Which is very different from *de Laet*'s former Account of them. But *de Laet* goes on, that he understood by *Davis* and *Baffin*, that *the Natives of those parts where they had been, i. e.* (about *Fretum Davis* and *Groen-land*) were *Idolaters, and worship'd the Sun*. *Davis* in the Account of his Voyage saith, *That they were a very tractable People, void of craft or double dealings, and easy to be brought to any Civility or good Order; but they judg'd them to be Idolaters and to worship the Sun*. This is quite another thing from being mere *Savages, and having no Religion among them*: Farther he owns *Hariot*'s Account of the People of *Virginia, that they believ'd many Gods of different degrees, but one supreme* God *who was from eternity*: But he had publish'd to the World in his *Description, that their only Religion was to worship every thing they were afraid of, as Fire, Water, Thunder, Guns, Horses*, &c. *and the Devil, whom they called* Okie. *Hariot*, who conversed among them, saith no such thing; but he saith expressly, *That they own'd that* God *made the World, and that Souls are immortal, and that they shall receive in another World according to their actions in this*. What a different Account is this concerning the same People? And if *Lederer* may be believ'd, who went among the *Indian Natives*, not far from *Virginia*, he saith, Okæe *was the name of the Creatour of all things among them; to him the high Priest alone offers sacrifice; but their ordinary Devotion is perform'd to lesser Deities, to whom they suppose sublunary affairs are committed*. *Denton*, who liv'd among the *Indian Savages* about *New-York*, saith, *That their solemn worship was not above once or twice a year; unless upon extraordinary occasions, as making War*, &c.

Hist. Canada, l. 1. p. 78.

P. 87.

Hackluit. *To.* 3. *p.* 100.

Harior *of* Virginia, 25, 26.

Lederer's *Discovery, p.* 4.

Denton *of* New York *p.* 8.

I shall not need to pursue this matter any farther; since he owns the Religion that was practis'd not only in *Peru* and *Mexico*, but in other parts of the *West-Indies*. Only as to *Chili* he saith, *that we have no certainty, but only that they have solemn Oaths by one they call* Enonamon. But *Marcgravius* in the account he gives of *Chili*, saith at first, *That they know not* God, *nor his worship*, &c. but this must be understood of a clear and distinct knowledge of him; for he saith afterwards, *That they have some knowledge of a supreme Being, by whom all earthly things and human affairs are governed; whom they call* Pillan.

G. Marcgravius *de Regione* Chili. *c.* 3.

The only difficulty then remaining as to the *West-Indies*, is as to the People of *Paraquaria* and *Brasil*. For it is affirm'd, *That there are whole Nations there who know nothing of* God, *or Religion*. Which must be more strictly inquir'd into.

As to *Paraquaria*, it is said, that *Nicholas del Techo in his Letters from thence, saith that the Caiguæ*, (a People of that Country) *had no name for* God, *or the Soul of Man; and no publick worship, nor Idols*. But

Hist. Prov. Paraquar. *Auth.* Nicolao del Techo, *Leodii* 1673. the same *Nicholas del Techo* hath publish'd a full Relation of all the Proceedings in *Paraquaria* and thereabouts, on the account of Religion, and therein he hath acquainted the World with the several Nations that inhabit those parts between *Brasil* and *Peru*, &c. which were scarce heard of before. The *Diaigritæ*, (who rather belong to *Tucumania*, between *Paraquaria* and *Chili*) he saith, *were worshipers of the Sun, after a particular manner; and they believ'd the immortality of Souls, and that the Souls of their great Men went into the greater Stars, and of ordinary People into the lesser.* The *Guaicurai worshipped the Moon and* Bootes. The *Guarani* were *a very superstitious People, but they could not tell what* God *they worshiped; but they were mightily addicted to Sorcery.* The *Calchaquini worshiped the Sun, and Thunder, and Lightning.* In the Plains between *Rio del Plata* and *Tucumania*, he saith, *are a very large People, who have little regard to Religion; but they believe that after death, their Souls return to their Creator.* In *Chili*, he saith, *when one* God *the Creator was preach'd to them, one of their* Casiques *(or great Men) stood up and said, that they would not bear that the power of creating should belong to any but their God* Pillan; *and that he plac'd the Souls of their great Men after death about the Sun.* After all these he mentions the *Caaiguæ, as the smallest and most inconsiderable and brutish People among them:* They were a most savage sort of Creatures, that could hardly speak so as to be understood; he saith, *They were much more like to Apes than Men, and liv'd upon Mice, and Ants, and Vipers,* &c. *utrique sexui,* saith he, *tenuissimus rationis usus est:* they are harder to be tamed than wild Beasts; and if they are put in chains, they starve themselves. And this is all the account he there gives of them, and saith not a word of their Religion; and it were very unreasonable to expect any from them. It is not improbable that others could not find a word for God or the Soul among them; for they were not able to speak sense, at least so as to be understood by Strangers.

L. 2. *c.* 18. *L.* 4. *c.* 16. *L.* 5. *c.* 7. *Chap.* 23. *L.* 3. *c.* 12. *L.* 2. *c.* 26. *L.* 9. *c.* 24.

Come we now to the People of *Brasil, who are said to be without any notion of* God. But those who have been best acquainted among them assure us, that they believe the immortality of Souls, and rewards and punishments after death. And from hence *Lerius* himself argues against the Atheistical Persons of his time; and that altho' they will not in words own God, yet he saith, they shew the inward conviction they have of him; especially when it thunders; which *de Laet* confesses they call *Tupâ cumanga*, a noise made by the Supreme Excellence: for *Tupâ* he saith signifies so much in their Language. And he adds, *That they are very apprehensive of evil Spirits; that they do own a God of the Mountains, and of the Highways; and altho' they differ in their idolatry and superstition, yet* he confesses *it generally prevails among them, and the other innumerable People who live on both sides the vast River* de la Plata. *Marcgravius*, a Learned Man, who liv'd in *Brasil*, and understood their Language so far as to write a Grammar of it, saith expressly, *That they call* God *Tupa* and *Tupana*; and in the short Dictionary of *Emmanuel Moraes*, *Tupana* is rendred *Deus*. But the great Argument to *Lerius* was, *that they had no public exercise of Religion*; which was the common case of the *Savages* in all parts, who liv'd under no Laws; not that they believ'd no God, but they would not be at the trouble to serve him. *Ludolphus* saith of the *Gallani*, a savage People who had almost overrun *Abyssinia*, that they had no publick worship, but if any asked them about a Supreme God, they would answer, *Heaven.* So *Dellon* saith of

Hist. Navi. in Brasil, *c.* 16. *p.* 223, 224.

Laet. *de Orig. Gen.* Americ. *p.* 193.

Marcgrav. *de* Brasil. *Reg. c.* 9.

Ludolph. *Hist.* Æthiopiæ, *l.* 1.

the Inhabitants of *Madagascar*, *that they did not question a Supreme Being that governs all*; *but with a strange obstinacy denied that there was any necessity of praying to him.* *Francis Cauche*, who sojourned a long time among them, saith, *he could observe no publick exercise of Religion among them*; *but they did not deny a* God *to be the Creator of all, and asserted the Immortality of the Soul*; *but Good and Bad went to Heaven.* *Flacurt* liv'd five Years among them, and he agrees in the same, as to *no publick exercise of Religion*; but he saith, *They believe One* God, *of whom they speak with honor and respect.* *P. Gillet* in the Account of his Voyage to *Goyane* 1674, saith, That the *Nouragues*, and *Acoquas*, and *Galibis*, *all agree in owning One* God *in Heaven, but they give no Worship to him.*

Dellon *Relation d'un Voyage, To.* 1. c. 8.

Relation du Voyage de F. Cauche, *p.* 119.

Histoire de l'Isle de Madagascar, *ch.* 17.

Journal du Voyage dans la Goyane, *p.* 81.

Joh. dos Santos saith of some of the *Caffres* (with whom he convers'd) *That they are the most brutish and barbarous People in the World*; *but they hold the Immortality of the Soul, and have a confus'd knowledg that there is a Great* God *from a Natural Instinct*; *but they pray not to him.* But for those *Caffres* at the *Cape of good Hope*, they may vye with any for *Brutishness*; but by the last Accounts given of them, by those who liv'd among them, and publish'd by *F. Tachard*, we find *that they do worship one* God, *altho' they have a confus'd knowledg of him*; *but they seem to have little regard to another Life, but sacrifice for Rain and good Seasons.* By which it appears that the Account given of them in *Thevenot*'s Collections is not true, viz. *That they have no knowledg of* God, altho' it were not much to be wonder'd at, since the same Author saith, *they are the most barbarous People in the World.* But that was a hasty Observation by Strangers, who could not understand one word they spake: For Sir *James Lancaster* said, *That in seven weeks time, the sharpest Wit among them could not learn one word of their Language*; *their Speech being uttered only in the Throat*, like the *Caaiguæ* in *Paraquaria.*

Histoire de l'Ethiopie Orientale, ch. 7.

Purchas *To. II. p.* 1639.

Voyage de Siam, l. 2. *p.* 84.

Thevenot, *Roe, p.* 2.

Purchas, *To. I. l.* 3. *ch.* 3. §. 1.

And so **Pliny* mentions a People of *Africa*, who *made a noise without any articulate Pronunciation*; who were surely the Ancestors of those *Hotentots*, concerning whom it is hard to affirm any thing, unless they have learnt lately to express themselves better: As it seems they have done by Monsr. *de la Loubere*'s Account of them; for he saith, *That they have some kind of Worship at new and full Moons*; *and he thinks they own a good* God; *to whom they need not to pray*; *but that there is a bad one, to whom they pray not to hurt them.* And in the Journal of Monsr. *de Chaumont*, we read, *That they have no great regard to Religion*; *but when they want Rain, they pray to a certain Being whom they know not, but that lives above*; *and offer Milk, the best thing they have*; *and that the* Dutch *Secretary had seen them at this Sacrifice with Eyes lifted up to Heaven, and in a profound silence.*

* Stridorque non vox; adeo sermonis commercio carent. *Plin. N. H. l.* 5. *c.* 8.

Du Royaume de Siam, *To.* 2. *p.* 112.

Journal du Voyage de Siam, *p.* 78.

Thus I have gone thro' all the Nations I have met with, who have been said to be *without any Notion of* God *or Religion*; there remains only one Objection to be taken off, which relates to a Sect in the *East-Indies*, which is said to be *Atheistical* in their *Principles*, having an *External Doctrine* for the People, and an *Internal*, which they keep from them.

To give the best Account I can of this matter; all the late Writers of *China* do agree, that besides the original Doctrine of the Country, there was brought in long since, (they generally say 65 *Years after* Christ) a new *Sect* from *Indostan*, which they call *Xekiao*. The Author is supposed to be one *Xekia*, or *Xaca* (as the *Japonese* call him) who liv'd long before. *Matt. Riccius*, (or *Trigautius*) saith, *This Sect was at first receiv'd with great applause, because it set forth the Immortality of the*

Trigaut. *l.* 1. *c.* 12.

Soul, and the Rewards and Punishments of another Life; but not eternal, becauſe it introduc'd the Doctrine of *Tranſmigration of Souls.* In order to the Happineſs after Death, it requir'd *Particular Devotions to Idols,* which by that means ſpread over all *China* and *Japan,* as well as other parts of the *Indies,* and *Abſtinence from Fleſh,* as well as *from Murder, Stealing,* &c. and Auſterities, Celibate, Retirement from the World, and great Liberalities to the *Tapoins* and *Bonzes.* Wherein *Bertoli, Marini,* and the reſt agree. But there was a Secret under all this, viz. *That this was but an external Doctrine for the People, but the internal Doctrine was another thing, that the ſupreme Felicity lay in Eternal Nothing*; or as they rather called it, *an Eternal Quiet, and that Souls are to paſs from Body to Body,* ſaith *Martinius, till they are fit for it. F. Couplet,* who hath given the fulleſt Account of this matter, ſaith, *That when* Xaca *came to die, he ſent for ſome of his choiceſt Diſciples, and told them, that the Doctrine he had hitherto declared to them was only a ſhew, and not the truth; and that all things came out of nothing, and would end in nothing,* as the late Author *Le Compte* expreſſes it; *and that is the Abyſs where all our hopes muſt end.* But *Couplet* ſaith, *That his Diſciples take great care, that this come not among the People; and only thoſe,* he ſaith, *even among the* Bonzes *and others are admitted to it, who are thought capable of ſuch a Secret. The Eternal Doctrine they look on,* as he ſaith, *as the wooden Account which is raiſed to ſupport the other; but they are by all means for keeping that up among the People.* But it is not clear what they underſtand by *Returning to Nothing*; for Monſ. *De la Loubere* ſaith, *They do not underſtand proper Annihilation by it, but in a myſtical ſenſe*; and two things are imply'd by it, 1. *That ſuch Souls as arrive to it, are paſt all Fears of returning to the Body.* 2. *That they live in perfect eaſe and quiet, without any kind of action.* And ſo *Couplet* explains it, *by Acting, Underſtanding, and deſiring nothing*; ſo that this is the higheſt degree of *Quietiſm:* And ſo Monſ. *Gervaiſe,* who was among thoſe of *Siam,* and endeavour'd to underſtand their Doctrine, ſaith, *That Annihilation is to be myſtically underſtood, and not in a phyſical ſenſe.* As appears by what *Couplet* ſaith, *That one of* Xaca's *poſterity ſpent nine years with his Face to the Wall, thinking of nothing, and ſo became perfect.* But from hence he ſadly laments the ſpreading of *Atheiſm* among the *Chineſe,* who were willing to underſtand it in the groſſeſt ſenſe.

Martin. *Atlas, p. 7.*

Couplet. *Proœm. Declar. ad* Confuc. *paragr. 4.*

Le Compte *Memoires Part. II. Let. 2.*

Loubere *du Royaume de* Siam, *To. I. c. 22.*

Hiſt. Nat. & Polit. du Siam, *Part. 3. c. p. 162.*

And ſuppoſe it be ſo taken, what imaginable ground can it be for Men of ſenſe, (as the *Chineſe* would be thought above others) to take this for granted, becauſe ſuch an Impoſtor ſaid it; concerning whom ſo many incredible things are ſaid by them, that ſome have queſtion'd whether there ever was ſuch a Perſon or not: and *Loubere* ſeems to think this Story *a Fiction of the* Chineſe; for he can find nothing of him among the *Talapoins* of *Siam,* with whoſe Traditions he was very converſant. But what reaſon or demonſtration did he offer? What ground could they have to believe one who had been an Impoſtor all his days ſhould ſpeak truth at laſt?

But all this ſignifies nothing to the conſent of Mankind: *For this was to be kept up as a Secret,* and only to be communicated to ſuch as were thought capable of it. If they thought this to be the truth, why was it not to be diſcover'd? Was it becauſe the People were ſtill to be kept up in the common perſuaſion about Religion? And was this for the ſake of the *Bonzes,* of whom the wiſe People of *China* had a very mean opinion, as they all agree? Therefore it could not be for their

ſakes. *But the People might grow more unruly, if this were known.* If the *Bonzes* were ſo bad as they make them, they might rather think the People would be better without them; and the beſt ſervice they could do, was to lay open the fraud and impoſture of theſe Men, as thoſe who preach'd *Chriſtianity* in *China* and *Japan* after they underſtood their Languages, did very freely. And yet they did aſſert GOD *and Providence*, and the *Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life*, againſt all the Doctrines of *Xaca*, both as to the *External* and *Internal part*. *Matth. Riccius* having attain'd to good ſkill in the Language of *China*, publiſh'd an account of the *Chriſtian Doctrine* at *Pekim*, *A.D.* 1603. wherein he aſſerted the Being of GOD, not only from Natural Reaſon, but from their own *moſt antient Books*, of which *Couplet* gives a large account, and how the Interpreters of latter times had perverted the Senſe of them. We have in *Kircher* a *Summary of the* Chriſtian *Faith*, as it was publiſh'd in *China*; and therein we find on what grounds they aſſerted the Being of GOD, againſt the *Atheiſtical ſenſe* of *Xaca*'s Doctrine, *That all things came out of nothing:* For, *if nothing were firſt, how came things into Being? therefore to bring them into Being, there muſt be a Creator before them; and this Creator is he whom we call* GOD. This was plain and true Reaſoning, and impoſſible to be anſwer'd by the ſubtileſt of thoſe *Atheiſtical* Wits of *China*. For nothing can produce *Nothing*. So that if *Xaca*'s interior Doctrine were true, *That all things came out of Nothing*, it muſt neceſſary follow, that there muſt be *Nothing* before *any thing*; and what poſſible imagination can any Man of ſenſe have, how any thing ſhould by it ſelf come out of Nothing? There is no repugnancy at all in conceiving that an Infinite Power ſhould give a Being to that which had it not before; for altho' the difference between *not being and being* be ſo great, yet where we ſuppoſe a Power Infinite in the Cauſe, that may command the terms of that diſtance, by giving a Being to that which had it not before. To ſay that *Nothing can be produced out of nothing*, implies that nothing can of it ſelf reſult out of nothing, where there is no ſuperior Cauſe; but to ſay that by no Cauſe whatſoever any thing can be put into Being which had it not before, is to take away all poſſibility of an Infinite Power, without any reaſon, when the very Being of things is an impregnable reaſon for it. For ſince we are certain things are, we muſt be certain that they came into Being; and that muſt be either out of nothing by themſelves, which is impoſſible; or it muſt be from ſuch a Power which can give Being where it was not, which muſt be infinite.

Couplet. *Declar. Proœm.* *Kircher.* China *illuſtrata, Par.* 2. c. 10.

Thus far I have conſidered the General Prejudices againſt Religion, and the *Atheiſtical* Pretences of this Age, and have ſhew'd how very little they ſignify to any Perſons that will take the pains to examin them.

Discourse II.

The Modern Atheistical Hypotheses *examin'd, and the Unreasonableness of them shew'd.*

I Now come to consider the *Atheistical Hypotheses* of this Age, which I shall rank under these two Heads:

1. Such as have a *Tendency* towards *Atheism.*
2. Such as are *plainly Atheistical.*

As to the former, I shall insist upon these two:

(1.) Such as weaken the known and generally receiv'd Proofs of God and Providence.

(2.) Such as attribute too much to the *Mechanical Powers* of *Matter* and *Motion.*

I begin with those who have gone about to weaken the known and generally received Arguments for God and Providence; which I have at large shew'd, were those taken from the manifest effects of Wisdom and Design in the parts of Animals, and in the frame of the World. I am far from intending to lay the *charge* of *Atheism* on any who have weakned some Arguments to prove a God, when they have industriously set themselves to do it from any other, altho' not so firm, nor so generally receiv'd. For I consider the fondness Men have for their own Inventions, and how apt therefore they are to slight other Arguments in comparison with them. And this I take to have been the case of a Modern Philosopher of great and deserved Reputation: For he designing to do something beyond other Men, thought he did nothing unless he produced Arguments which he thought had not been pursued by others. To this end he set aside the Argument from *Final Causes*, for two Reasons. 1. *Because in Physical Inquiries we ought to make use of none but the strongest Reasons.* 2. *Because all* God's *ends are unsearchable by us, being kept close in the Abyss of his infinite Wisdom.* But when he was smartly urged by his learned Adversary, That altho' upon another occasion he might set aside Final Causes, yet he ought not when the Honor of God, as the Maker of the Soul, is concerned; for by these means the Argument from the light of Nature, as to the Wisdom, Providence, Power, and Existence of God would be cast off; which he looks on as the chief Argument (which is taken from the parts of the visible World, the Heavens, Earth, Plants, Animals, and especially Mankind;) He had no other answer to make, but *that what was brought for a Final Cause, ought to be referred to the Efficient*; i. e. *that from those things we ought to know and honor* God, *as the Maker, but not to guess for what end he made them.* Which is a strange answer to be made by one of so much sagacity. For, as *Gassendus* well urges, how can we honor God for the excellent use of these things, and not know for what end they were made? Wherein lies the difference between *the Use* and *the End* in this case? For he that adores God for the Use, must do it for the End he designed those things for.

Des Cartes *Medit.* 4. *Princip. Phil. Part.* 1. *p.* 22.

Resp. ad 5. *Object.*

But, saith *Des Cartes*, *In Moral Considerations, wherein it is a pious thing to make use of Conjectures, we may consider* God's *End*; *but not in Physical Speculations, wherein we must only make use of the strongest Reasons.*

To which *Gassendus* very well answers, That if he takes away the Final Cause, he weakens the Argument for the Efficient: for that leads us to him. And it is not the bare sight of the visible World which makes us own God to be the Maker of it; because it is possible for Men to think that these things were so from Eternity, or came by Chance: but when we observe the Wisdom of God in the design and contrivance, then we come upon good grounds to own the Efficient Cause, and to adore him for the Workmanship of his hands. As, saith he, if a Man sees a Passage for Water, between Stones on each side with an Arch over, that doth not presently convince him that it is a *Bridge*; because pieces of Rocks might happen so, as to afford such a Passage: but when he comes to consider the Order in which they are framed and hold together, and the conveniency of Mankind for passing over, he cannot then but acknowledg there was a skilful Artificer who managed it, and that it could not be done by Chance.

To the other Argument, *That* God's *ends are unsearchable*, he answers, That it is not to be denied that God may have ends above our reach; but on the other side, there are ends which lie open to our view; as saith he, particularly in the Body of Man, as the frame of the Mouth for respiration and nourishment, and all other Passages so exactly fitted for those ends; and so the Bones, Muscles, Nerves, and other parts of the Body: but there are three especially which strike him with admiration. 1. The Umbilical Vessels, the fitness of them for distribution of Nourishment to the *Embryo*, and the alteration after the Child is born. 2. The Valves of the Heart, and the several Vessels for receiving and distributing the Blood. 3. The Perforation of the Tendons which serve to draw the Fingers into the Hollow of the Hand. These were close and pressing Instances, of which *Gassendus* professeth, *that neither himself nor any of his acquaintance, who had made it their business to search into the Causes of things, were able to give any other Account of them, but from the Wisdom and Power of* God. And he challenges *Des Cartes* to shew him, *what Mechanical Cause could produce such Valves about the Heart; out of what matter, and in what manner they were made; how they came to have such a Temper, Consistence, Flexibility, Bigness, Figure, Situation*, &c. But I do not find that he ever undertook to give any answer to it; but by a Letter to *Mersennus*, it seems he was of opinion, *that he could give an account of the formation of the several parts of Animals in a Mechanical way, supposing* God *to have established those Laws of Mechanism, which he supposes in the same manner as he had explained the grains of Salt, and figures of Snow in his Meteors.* But however he might please himself in his Opinion, he hath given the World no manner of satisfaction about it; insomuch that his posthumous piece to that purpose is charged with great and fundamental Mistakes. However his Disciples run on upon the same ground, that *Final Causes are to be considered only in Morals*; and they must overthrow the Argument to prove a Deity, from the Wisdom and Contrivance in the works of Creation, which, according to them are only occasion of our Meditation and Praise. But how can Men of sense satisfy themselves with this Answer? For can we give thanks to God for the use of our Senses, without knowing that God

Epist. Part. 2. ep. 98.

Regis Metaphys. l. 2. Part. 1.

Nittich. in Meditat. Metaph. 4. p. 97.

gave

gave us Eyes to see with, with such admirable contrivance for that purpose? and so for all the variety of Organs for our Hearing, unless we are satisfied that GOD did really give them for those ends? Otherwise all that we have to do, is to thank GOD for putting Matter into Motion, and for establishing those Laws of Mechanism from whence these Organs resulted. With what Devotion can we praise GOD for the Benefits we have from the Influences of Heaven and the Fruits of the Earth, if these things were not intended for our good; but it fell out by the Laws of Mechanism, that we have these advantages by them? So that all Natural Religion, according to this *Hypothesis*, comes to no more than an acknowledgment of GOD to be the Efficient Cause of the World, altho' we have no reason from his Works to conclude him to be so. *Yes*, say they, *from them as the effects of a First Cause, which put Matter into motion, we may; but not from the ends which* GOD *intended by them, which are above our capacity.* But this falls short of *Aristotle*'s *Divinity*; for he asserted, that not only the first Motion was from GOD, but the Order of the Universe; and that GOD did design the mutual Benefits which one part of it hath from others: but according to these Laws of Mechanism, GOD only put the Matter into motion with such Laws, and then every thing came into the order it is in, without any design of Providence. Which takes away all *Life* and *Spirit and Religion*, which depends upon GOD's managing the affairs of the World; and without that Men may own a *First Mover*, and yet live as *without God in the World.* What reason can we imagin, why we ought to give GOD thanks for *fruitful Seasons*, or to pray to him in time of Drought and Scarcity, if he hath left all these things to the natural course, which he hath established in the World? But it is not denied by *Des Cartes*, *That* GOD *may reveal to us his own Ends, and then we are to believe them, and to serve him accordingly; but that without such Revelation, we cannot find them out.* Now this I say is contrary to the general sense of Mankind, where there hath been the most confused Notion of a GOD. For I have already observed, that even the *Caffres* of *Soldania* (or at the *Cape of Good Hope*) do pray solemnly to GOD in their distresses for want of Rain; and the *Savages* of the Northern parts of *America* do the same at some Seasons of the Year above others; so that if the consent of Mankind signify any thing as to the Being of GOD, it will do as much as to his Providential care of the World. And if such a confused Idea did carry along with it the Notion of his Providence, much more the clear and distinct *Idea* of him. For *Des Cartes* proves the Being of GOD from the *Idea* of him in our Minds. Now what is there in that *Idea*, which doth not equally imply *Providence*, as well as his *Existence?* For, why should not a *Being absolutely perfect* as well regard the *Well-being* as the *Being* of his Creatures? *By the name of* GOD in this *Idea*, he saith he understands *a certain Substance, infinite, independent, most intelligent and most powerful; by which himself and all other things were created.* But this is not all; for he acknowledges soon after, and in other places, *that because there is no necessary connexion between the several moments of Existence in a contingent Being, we most evidently know our dependence on this superior Being for our conservation*; which he therefore owns to be *a continued Creation.* From hence I infer, that *Des Cartes* his own Idea of GOD doth imply a particular Providence. For, if we depend upon him for every moment of our Subsistence, and Conservation differ only by an act of our Mind from Creation, as he affirms; then there is as immediate

Medit. 3.

Princip. P. I. n. 21.

an act of Providence in our daily Subsistence, as in our first Being. But how is this consistent with leaving all to the Mechanical Laws of Motion? If it be said, *That this is only a general act of Providence in preserving things in that state he hath put them into*; I demand farther; Whether those very Laws of Motion be not the Effect of a wise Providence? And whether we cannot from them infer, that these Laws were directed for very good ends? I do not think this can be denied. And if it cannot, then I am sure it certainly follows, that we may know some ends which GOD hath; whereas *Des Cartes* said, *That all* GOD's *ends are unknown to us, being kept secret in the Abyss of his infinite Wisdom.* But the ends of appointing the Laws of Motion may be known; and if these, why not as well the particular ends of those works of his which we find so useful to Mankind? Especially when his Providence is imply'd in that very Idea from whence he infers his Existence.

I can by no means suspect that *Des Cartes* designed to take away the force of other Arguments for a Deity, that he might secretly undermine the belief of a GOD, by introducing his Argument from the Idea, which he knew would not hold; (as some have suggested) for I am satisfy'd, that he thought this Argument beyond any other: For, in a Letter to a Friend, he saith, *He had found out such an Argument as gave him full satisfaction; and by which he more certainly knew that there was a* GOD, *than the truth of any Geometrical Proposition; but he doubted, whether he could make others understand it so well as he himself did.* To the same purpose he speaks in a Letter to *Mersennus*. And in another Letter to *Mersennus*, he saith, *That he thought himself bound in conscience to publish his Arguments to prove the Existence of* GOD. Which being written to his intimate Friends, shew sufficiently his own apprehension of the strength of them. But what opinion soever he had of it himself, they have not met with such a reception among thinking Men, as a Geometrical Demonstration would have done; altho' he hath endeavor'd to put them into that form. For, after all, they cannot conceive how an objective reality of an Idea in the Mind, can prove the real existence of that object out of the Mind. He grants, That it doth not hold in other Ideas; but that there is some thing so peculiar to this Idea that the Mind could not frame it, if it had not a real Existence: now here lies the main difficulty, what that is in this Idea, distinct from all others, which so exceeds the capacity of human Understanding, that we could not have such an Idea, unless the object were in being.

Ren. Des Cartes, *Epist. Part.* 2. *Ep.* 103. — *Ep.* 104. — *Epist. P. II. Ep.* 37. — *Post Resp. ad duas Object. p.* 85.

The force of his Argument, as himself hath put it in the Mathematical way, Prop. 2. lies here.

The objective reality in our Ideas must have some Cause in which it is either formally, or eminently: but we have such an Idea within us, which is not within us either of those ways; and therefore there must be some other Cause of it, which can be none but GOD; *and therefore he is.* Now here the difficulty returns, *viz.* to shew what necessary Connexion there is between the *Objective Reality* in the *Idea*, and the real Existence of the thing out of the *Idea*. For that he saith, by *Axiom* 5. *That this is the true Principle of Knowledg; for,* saith he, *we do not know that there is such a thing as the visible Heaven, barely because we see it; for that goes no farther than our sense: but our knowledge is an act of the Mind from the Idea, which arises from hence that the Objective Reality of the Idea in our Minds doth come from the thing it self as the true Cause; and the more of Objective Reality there is, by* Axiom 6. *in Substance than Accident, and*

in an Infinite Subſtance than a Finite, ſo much more doth it prove the Exiſtence of the thing repreſented by the Idea.

But the caſe ſtill ſeems different between an Idea raiſed in our Minds from an object of Senſe; and that which the Mind raiſes within it ſelf about an infinite Subſtance. For, altho' it be impoſſible for the Mind to make an Objective Reality, which is infinite, by its own power; yet it doth not appear, but that it may frame an Idea within it ſelf to which it ſets no bounds, and ſo is infinite to it. And here lies the main ground of the Miſtake: If our Idea were infinitely perfect as GOD himſelf is, no doubt it were wholly out of our power to make it; but then it would follow, that Idea with its Objective Reality muſt be GOD: if it be not GOD, it muſt be finite; and if it be finite, it is within the power of our Minds to frame it. For, altho' our conceptions of GOD be not *merely Negative*, yet whatſoever conceptions we have, they are not adequate; and if not, they are imperfect; and ſo come within the reach of our capacities.

Cenſur. Philoſoph. Carteſ. c. 4. §. 3. *Réponſe à la Cenſure de Monſ. Huet, p. 192.* *P. 198.*

When the Learned Monſ. *Huet* urged this Argument againſt *Des Cartes*, *That the Idea in us muſt be finite, becauſe it wants ſomething to make it perfect, being not adequate:* Monſ. *Regis*, who undertook to defend *Des Cartes*, anſwers, *That if the Idea be taken formally as it is in us, ſo it is finite; but if we take it with its objective Reality, ſo it is infinite, and above our power: And as to its not being adequate, he ſaith, it doth not follow that it is finite objectively, but only formally*; becauſe *it repreſents an infinite object, and it is ſufficient to make it infinite becauſe it repreſents as much as we can apprehend.* I grant, that if it reaches as far as our capacity will go, it may be ſaid to be infinite in regard of its object, altho' it be finite as to our manner of apprehending it; but ſtill the main difficulty returns, *viz.* how a finite Idea in us can prove the Exiſtence of an infinite Object. For the Queſtion is not barely about our manner of conception of an infinite Being, which muſt be according to our capacities; but whether ſuch a finite Idea, as we are capable of, can prove an infinite Being: for our Idea can repreſent to us an object to which we can ſet no bounds; but how doth it hence appear that it muſt be an infinite object really exiſting, and that ſuch an Idea muſt proceed from an infinite Cauſe? Altho' theſe things be not ſo clear as were to be wiſh'd, yet we muſt not diſſemble the force of this Argument ſo far as it goes, *viz.* That we cannot form an Idea of Nothing; and that we have no Ideas in our Minds, but what have a proper Cauſe for them; either from without us by *Senſe*, or from within by the acts of our own Minds. As if a Man hath an *Idea* of a rare piece of workmanſhip, either he hath ſeen it, or elſe hath been told it, or was able to invent it. But here can be no evidence from Senſe, and no Man can find within himſelf a power to frame ſuch an object as GOD; therefore either he muſt have it from others, or elſe GOD himſelf hath imprinted it in our Minds. Now if the *Idea* of GOD had been alike in all, *viz.* of a Being infinitely wiſe, powerful and good, there might have been great reaſon to have believ'd it to have been planted in our Minds; but the general Idea of GOD among Mankind was too dark and confus'd to form any Argument from it; and it related chiefly to his power, and ſome kind of goodneſs; but not ſo as to exclude any other Beings from being honored as Gods. So that the force of it cannot be taken from the conſent of Mankind in this Idea; but if it be only ſaid, *That this is a true and juſt Idea of him*; and that there are other Arguments to prove it from his Works; ſo far

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it may and ought to be allow'd. But the *Metaphyſical Subtilty* of this Argument, as it was managed by *Des Cartes*, was ſo great, that not merely Perſons of common Capacities could not comprehend it; but he complains himſelf, *That the Mathematicians would not be convinced of the demonſtrative force of it.* Upon which he makes a ſharp Reflection, *That the Mathematicks did rather hinder than farther Men in Metaphyſical Speculations.* Des Cartes *Epiſt. To. 2. Ep. 33.*

But my buſineſs is not to lay open the weakneſs of theſe Arguments, but only to ſhew, that there is no cauſe to lay aſide thoſe which have been always uſed, and approved by the moſt ſincere and intelligent Perſons in all Ages. And this I ſhall make appear from his ſecond Argument in his *Meditations*, but the firſt in his *Principles*, where he briefly lays it down after this manner. That among the ſeveral Ideas of our Minds, we find one of a Being infinitely perfect in Wiſdom and Power, which hath not a contingent, but a neceſſary exiſtence; which being contained in the Idea, it follows that ſuch a Being actually exiſts. *Des Cartes* in his 5th Meditation confeſſes, That at firſt appearance this looks like a piece of *Sophiſtry*; but he ſaith, that upon conſideration, neceſſary Exiſtence doth as much belong to an infinite perfect Being, as three Angles do to a Triangle. But he objects againſt his own Argument, that our thoughts put no neceſſity upon things; as if I conceive a Mountain, I muſt likewiſe conceive a Valley, but it doth not follow that there is a Mountain exiſting: But, ſaith he, the difference is, that in this caſe there is no neceſſity of a Mountain's exiſting, but only that a Mountain and Valley cannot be ſeparated; but in the other, it is not our Thought makes neceſſary exiſtence to belong to God, but the nature of the thing makes that Thought neceſſary. For, ſaith he, I can frame no other Idea that hath neceſſary exiſtence beſides, nor can I make more than one God who hath it; which ſhews that it is no arbitrary or fictitious Idea. But *Gaſſendus* and others ſay, That all this *is a Paralogiſm*; becauſe it ſuppoſes that which it ſhould prove, *viz.* that God exiſts, which was the thing in queſtion; and withal they ſay, It is a piece of *Sophiſtry* to argue from the Idea in the Mind to the exiſtence of the thing out of the Mind. And this is the main thing which Monſ. *Huet* inſiſts upon; for he ſaith, *This Argument proves no more, than that a moſt perfect Being muſt neceſſarily exiſt in that way in which it doth exiſt; if it relates to the Idea, then it neceſſarily exiſts only in the Mind; if it relates to the thing, then it really exiſts out of the Mind; but the Argument doth not hold from one to the other.* To this Monſ. *Regis* anſwers, That thoſe things which are ſaid only to exiſt in the Mind, have their foundation out of the Mind; as a Syren, from the Ideas of a Fiſh and a Woman joyn'd together: and ſo other *Chimeras* are form'd from joyning things in the Mind, which nature hath not joyn'd; for a Man cannot have an Idea of nothing. But in the Idea of a perfect Being he cannot diſtinguiſh that which is in the Mind, and that which is out of the Mind. And that here is no taking that for granted which ought to be proved; but it is only arguing from the nature of the thing; and not firſt ſuppoſing it to be, and thence proving that it is. For it is as much of the nature of a perfect Being to have neceſſary exiſtence, as of the nature of a Triangle to have three Angles.

Princip. Part. I. n. 14.

Cenſur. Philoſoph. Carteſ. c. 4. n. 8.

Réponſe à la Cenſ. ch. 4. p. 233, &c.

And thus the matter ſtands as to this Argument, ſo that whatſoever force there is in it, we plainly ſee that Perſons of great Sagacity and Judgment, ſuſpect that there is ſomething in it of the nature of a *Paralogiſm.*

logiſm. And therefore there can be no reaſon why we ſhould quit the former Arguments, which were plain and obvious to all capacities, for ſuch a *Metaphiſical Demonſtration*, which thoſe who are moſt verſed in *Demonſtrations* will not allow. Let the followers of *Des Cartes* magnify and defend this Argument as well as they can; but let them not deſpiſe and reject all others, which have had the approbation of all Ages, and the wiſeſt Perſons in them; and that upon ſuch frivolous pretences, *that we cannot comprehend all the ends of Divine Wiſdom.*

Boyle *of Final Cauſes, p.* 36. But *Des Cartes* in an Epiſtle mentioned by Mr. *Boyle*, ſaith, *That it is a childiſh and abſurd thing to affirm in* Metaphyſicks, *that* God *like a proud Man, had no other end in building the World but to be praiſed by Men; or in making the Sun, which is ſo much bigger than the Earth, but only to give light to Mankind, who take up ſo ſmall a part of it.* Which is an Expreſſion not at all becoming the reverence due to the great Creator of the World, from any one that doth acknowledg him truly to be ſo. For the objection, if it be any, lies againſt his making the World at all: ſince it may as well be ſaid, to be *like a proud Prince, only to ſhew the greatneſs of his Power and Wiſdom.* But what is it which ſuch Men would have? Can they imagin the World ſhould be made without *any ends* at all? Is that becoming the wiſdom of the Maker? Or would they not have theſe ends to be known? To what purpoſe are great and noble ends deſign'd, if they are not to be underſtood? And by whom can they be underſtood, but by rational and intelligent Beings? It is a great preſumption in Mankind to pretend to know all the ends which the wiſe Creator had in the vaſt Fabric of the Univerſe; for ſome of the great parts of it are almoſt wholly unknown to us; I mean as to the fix'd Stars, every one of which of the firſt magnitude, is ſaid to be above a hundred times in bigneſs beyond the Globe of the Earth; and yet how ſmall do they appear to us? And in thoſe other Celeſtial Bodies, which we can hardly diſcern without the help of Glaſſes of a late invention: and we are told by ſkilful *Aſtronomers*, that there are many Stars not viſible, even with the help of Teleſcopes; and that they rather leſſen than add to the greatneſs of the fix'd Stars. But if they had given us a fuller view of them, we cannot imagin, that God's great ends could depend upon ſuch way of diſcovery: If all his deſign had been to be admir'd by Mankind for the greatneſs of his work, it would have been plac'd more within our reach; and the Earth we live upon would have born ſome bigger proportion to the Celeſtial Bodies, which is concluded to be but a Point in compariſon of the Starry Heaven; and the very Orb of the Sun is thought to be no more in reſpect of the whole Firmament. So that the main parts of the Univerſe cannot be ſaid to be made for our view. We grant therefore that the infinitely wiſe and powerful Creator hath great and glorious ends, which are above our reach; but how doth it follow from hence, that he hath no ends which we can judg of? For even in thoſe things which we diſcern at ſo great a diſtance, we ſee enough to admire the infinite Majeſty of him that made them; and conſequently to adore, and fear him: And whatever other ends he may have which we cannot ſee into; yet this is the beſt and moſt proper end for us with reſpect to him. Other ends might ſatisfy our curioſity more, but this tends moſt to promote our true happineſs. As I have ſhew'd in the precedent Diſcourſe that the wiſeſt Philoſophers, *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and the *Pythagoreans* all agreed upon Principles of Natural Reaſon, that the true happineſs of Mankind

lay in being made like to God, not in an affectation of greatneſs and power, but in goodneſs and true wiſdom; which lay in the knowledg of God, and a temper of Mind ſutable to our appprehenſions of him. Now if thoſe ends be attainable by ſuch Diſcoveries, which God hath made of himſelf in the works of Creation, it is to little purpoſe for any to pretend that we cannot know the particular ends which he had in making ſuch a number of vaſt Bodies of Light in the Heavens, nor why they are placed in ſuch a manner, and at ſo great a diſtance from us; nor whether the ſpace between be wholly void, or filled up with an Ethereal Matter, nor of what uſe thoſe ſeveral Bodies of the Stars are with reſpect to themſelves, or the reſt of the Univerſe. Suppoſing that we are to ſeek as to theſe, and many other things relating to the viſible Frame of the World, muſt we therefore ceaſe to admire and praiſe the great God, the Maker of all, leaſt we ſhould ſeem to flatter him for his Greatneſs and Power? There is doubtleſs a juſt veneration due to an infinite Majeſty, in what way ſoever he ſhews himſelf; but it is too mean a thing to imagin that theſe things were done by him only to be admir'd and prais'd by his own Creatures: But if ſuch an Admiration tends to beget in them a greater and deeper ſence of his Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs; and that be the beſt and moſt effectual means to bring Mankind to a conſtant fear and love of him, and thereby to fit them for a future happineſs; can any Man of ſenſe think this to be an end unbecoming the Creator of the World?

But theſe are ſaid *to be good Moral ends, but not proper for Phyſical Speculations.* I anſwer, That thoſe are truly the moſt *Philoſophical Contemplations*, which lead us to the beſt and moſt noble ends of our Beings; for this was of old look'd on as the trueſt end of *Philoſophy*, and the firſt occaſion of it. For, it is agreed on all hands, that it had its name from *Pythagoras:* And it is very well obſerv'd by S. *Auguſtin, that the Doctrine of the Soul's immortality gave the firſt occaſion to the Greeks to apply themſelves to Philoſophy; and from hence* Pythagoras *began it:* Who was inſtructed therein by his Maſters *Thales* and *Pherecydes*; and after long Travels into ſeveral Countries for his own ſatisfaction, he at laſt fix'd at *Crotone* in *Italy*, and there took upon him to inſtruct others in the way to *Immortality:* but finding great reaſon to miſtruſt many who came to be his Scholars, he ſet up a very ſevere Diſcipline in his School (which prov'd his ruin at laſt) and would admit none but ſuch as he had ſufficiently tried. But when he was aſk'd by one of the Great Men of thoſe parts, *What it was he profeſs'd*, he ſaid nothing but *Philoſophy*, or a *Love of Wiſdom*; which he made to conſiſt in two things, *A ſearch after Truth, and a purſuit of Virtue.* But by *Truth* he did not underſtand the *Phyſical Cauſes* of things, but *Abſtracted and Metaphyſical Speculations*; for his Notion was, that there was no certainty to be had from mere ſenſible things, which rather perplexed and confounded Mens Minds, which were apt to judg by the impreſſions of Senſe; (and his opinion was that the Senſe only tranſmitted the Objects, but *it was the Mind which ſaw and heard*, &c.) therefore to prevent falſe judgments, he thought it neceſſary to draw off their Minds from ſenſible Objects; to this end he bethought himſelf of the way of reaſoning by *Figures* and *Numbers* as is before obſerv'd, which were ſo ſoon and ſo groſly miſunderſtood. *He had learnt*, ſaith *Porphyry, from the Eaſtern Magi, that* God *was Light and Truth*; and therefore he look'd on a ſearch after Truth as one way of aſſimilation to God. But the main thing was

Aug. *ad* Voluſ. *Ep.* 3.

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in the practice of Virtue; of which there is a short Abstract in the *Golden Verses*, and *Hierocles* declares in the beginning, *The design of them all was to bring Mankind to a likeness to the Divine Nature.* And in this, saith *Eudorus* in *Stobæus*, *Socrates* and *Plato agreed with Pythagoras, That this was the chief end of Philosophy*; but *Plato* added Καθὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, *as far as Mankind could attain to it.* And so *Alcinous* expresses the sense of *Plato:* but he tells us, *That* Plato *sometimes set it forth by being Wise, and Just, and Holy; sometimes by following* God; *because according to the ancient Saying* God *is the beginning and end of all things. This,* saith *Hierocles, is the end of the Pythagorean Philosophy, to give wings to our Souls, that when death comes, we may leave a mortal Body behind us, and fly to the immortal Mansions above, and partake of a Divine Nature, as far as we are capable of it.* And *Simplicius* in the beginning of his Commentaries on *Aristotle* saith, *The end of Philosophy is to attain to our most perfect Happiness; and if a Man arriv'd to the top of Philosophy, he might be a God, and not a Man.* These things I mention to shew, that *Philosophy* as it was understood by the Ancients was far from excluding *Final Causes*, or *Moral Considerations* of things; since its great end was to bring Men to a likeness to God.

Stob. Eclog. c. 3.

Alcin. c. 27.

Simplic. in Categor.

This being then the true original end of *Philosophy*, to improve Mens Minds in order to their Happiness, how came the consideration of the great ends of God in the World, to be thought unbecoming Philosophical Speculations? The reason was, that the immortality of the Soul hath been excluded too. For, altho' according to the Doctrin of *Des Cartes* its distinction from the Body be asserted and proved, yet its immortality is pass'd over; under this pretence, *that* God *may fix its duration by his Will*; and therefore unless we know the Will of God in it, we can determin nothing in *Philosophy* about it. But the Ancient *Philosophers* made the immortality of the Soul the foundation of all their Inquiries, and therefore took in all such considerations as tended to improve, and refine, and purify the Minds of Men. For which end *Moral Considerations* are most proper. And therefore it cannot but seem strange to any thinking Man, to observe these to be so industriously set aside, on pretence *that we cannot find out the ends that* God *had in framing the World, and the several parts of it:* and yet at the same time they pretend to have found all the Mechanical Powers of Matter, which is much more difficult to comprehend. But of that afterwards: we now consider Final Causes. And have we not reason to conclude from the present Frame of the World with respect to mankind, that the Maker of it intended to dispose things for their advantage? Let Men consider the Faculties of their Minds together with the Materials about them, and the Organs God hath given them to make use of them; and can they think otherwise, but that God hath abundantly made up to them, what other Creatures seem to exceed them in? Their Understanding, and Contrivance, and artificial Inventions go far beyond the natural strength and sagacity of Brutes, as to the comfortable way of subsistence. They can make the Brutes to be very serviceable to them, as to Diet, Clothing, Journeying, Habitations, &c. They can find out ways to communicate their Thoughts to each other at a great distance, and entertain commerce in the remotest parts, by the help of their own Inventions as to Navigation. So that if one Country be not sufficiently furnished, they can bring home the products of others. And so, all the benefit of Trading (which in these later Ages is grown to so mighty

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a reputation above what it had in elder Ages) is owing to the happy Invention of the uſe of the *Magnet*. But ſet aſide theſe modern Improvements, and conſider Mankind as mere Natives of their ſeveral Countries, take all together, and the Inhabitants of the Earth have no cauſe to complain of Providence; which makes up what is wanting in one thing by ſuch advantages another way, that moſt Nations are fond of their own Countries, and would not change them. The ancient Geographers indeed mention People *who curſed the riſing and ſetting Sun, becauſe his heat was intolerable to them*; and the *Philoſophers* thought they had great reaſon to conclude the *Torrid Zone* uninhabitable. But the experience of theſe latter times have found it quite otherwiſe, and that the places there were fully peopled, and their condition tolerable enough, and in ſome reſpects pleaſant to them: as to the fruitfulneſs of Land, and numbers of Rivers and plenty of commodities. And as to Heat, that is very much qualify'd, by the conſtant breezes in the Day-time, and coolneſs of the Nights; and the particular ſituation of ſome places, at a very little diſtance have Winter and Summer; which ſhews that the Seaſons do not merely depend upon the Sun, but upon the motion of the Air; for where that is ſtopt by the height of Mountains, there is Winter on one ſide, and Summer on the other; as *If. Voſſius* obſerves on the coaſt of *Malabar*; and about the *Mountains* of *Arabia*, *Congo* and *Bengala*, and other places: And *Ludolphus* confirms it concerning the Mountains of *Malabar*; inſomuch, that he ſaith, *the King there may keep a perpetual Summer, only by croſſing the Mountains.* Others have given a more particular account of it, and tell us, That the *Cherſoneſe* between the Rivers of *Indus* and *Ganges*, is divided in the middle by a ridge of *High Hills*, which they call the *Gate*; on the one ſide is *Malabar*, and on the other *Coromandel*: and that it is Winter on one ſide from *April* to *September*, and Summer on the other; and that not above 20 Leagues diſtance in croſſing the Mountains. And the ſame is ſaid to be at Cape *Razalgate* in *Arabia*, and in *Jamaica*; which is imputed to the Mountains ſtopping the current of Vapours wherein the particles of them are driven together, and fall down into drops of Rain; and ſo the Seaſons depend upon the *Monſons* or fix'd Winds in thoſe parts; the North-eaſt blowing on one ſide from *November* to *April*, and the Southerly on the other from *April* to *November*. Sir *H. Middleton* ſpeaks of *ſo great cold on the Mountains of* Arabia, *that he could not have believ'd it, unleſs he had felt it himſelf*; for he deſpis'd their information at *Mecca*, who knew the Country far better. But he thought he went according to *Reaſon*, as the Ancients did; but *Experience* hath plainly diſcover'd their miſtakes. For Heat and Cold are found not to depend merely upon the nearneſs or diſtance of the Sun; for other things we find may not only qualify that heat, but produce cold where it was leaſt expected. *Acoſta* tells us that the old Philoſophers went upon Principles of Common Reaſon, when they ſuppoſed *the Torrid Zone was uninhabitable*, but notwithſtanding he found it ſo far from being ſo, that *he thought it pleaſant and agreeable, and ſaw it full of People:* and he ſaith, *that the Air is cleareſt when the Sun is fartheſt off, and fulleſt of Clouds and Rain when the Sun is neareſt.* As he ſhews at large from the experience himſelf had in thoſe parts. Some places of the *Torrid Zone* he obſerves to be *Temperate*, as in *Quitto*, and *the Plains of Peru*; ſome very cold, as at *Potoſi*; ſome very hot, as in ſome parts of *Æthiopia*, *Braſil* and the *Moluccas*. The temperateneſs of it he imputes to the Rains,

Herod. l. 1. Mela l. 1. c. 8. Plin. l. 5. c. 8.

If. Voſſ. de Nilo, c. 12. Ludolph. Comment. ad Hiſt. Æthiop. p. 101. Philoſoph. Tranſacti-ons, n. 175.

Purchas Pil. To. I. p. 255.

Acoſta *of the* Indies, *l. 2. c. 23.*

c. 9.

c. 10.

Rains, to the ſhortneſs of the Days, the nearneſs to the Ocean, the height of Lands and Mountains, but eſpecially to the Winds. For he
c. 13. ſaith, *The Providence of* God *hath ſo order'd it, that the freſh and cool Winds do qualify the exceſſive heat of the Sun.* But he obſerves, *that be-*
l. 3. c. 8. *ſides the Breezes from the Sea by day, there are Land-winds by night, which ſerve very much to temper the heat of the Air.*

It look'd like an Objection againſt Providence, when Men concluded that by the nearneſs of the Sun within the Tropics, ſo great a part of the Earth as the *Torrid Zone* ſhould be ſcorch'd by the Sun, as not to be capable of habitation by Mankind: but when the contrary is now found moſt certainly true, and ſuch reaſons are given for it, which Mankind could not have thought of, have we not ground to infer that Providence had certainly ſuch an end as the good of Mankind, to order things ſo, as by ſeveral means to make thoſe habitations not only tolerable, but in many places delightful? By this we ſee how vain thoſe old Arguments againſt Providence were, which were grounded on this ſuppoſition, that ſo great a part of the Earth was uſeleſs to Mankind by the intolerable heat of the Sun. Yet how confidently doth *Lucretius* argue upon this ſuppoſition, as tho' he could demonſtrate againſt Providence from Heaven and Earth?

Hoc tamen ex ipſis cœli rationibus auſim
Confirmare, aliiſque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus eſſe paratam
Naturam rerum, tanta ſtat prædita culpa.
Principio quantum cœli tegit impetus ingens,
Inde avidam partem montes, ſylvæque ferarum
Poſſedere, tenent rupes, vaſtæque paludes,
Et mare, quod late terrarum diſtinet oras.
Inde duas porro prope parteis fervidus ardor,
Aſſiduuſque geli caſus mortalibus aufert. Lucret. l. 5.

So much room taken up by the Heavens, ſo much by Mountains, Woods, Rocks, Marſhes and Seas; and two parts of the Earth uſeleſs for Mankind by intolerable Heat and Cold; that he could never imagin this Earth was fram'd with deſign for the good of Mankind. And yet at the ſame time there were *Philoſophers*, who thought the conveniencies for Mankind were ſo great in this World, that from thence they infer'd that there was a Providence, which had a particular regard to the advantages which they enjoy; and this without any Revelation from God of thoſe ends which he deſign'd. The *Stoics* knew, as well as *Epicurus*, the compaſs of the Heavens, the greatneſs of the Mountains, Woods, Rocks and Seas; and they believ'd as much that ſome parts of the Earth were not to be inhabited; and yet they concluded, that there was a deſign of Providence in all with reſpect to Mankind. For they took notice, not merely of the ſpace which the Heavens took up, but of the great Beauty, and order, and uſefulneſs of the *Celeſtial Bodies*; and particularly the convenient diſtance of the Sun to make the Earth fruitful and pleaſant; and to diſtinguiſh Days and Nights for Works and Reſt; and that the Mountains were large ſtore-houſes for Metals and Rivers, which could not otherwiſe be ſupply'd; and that the Seas afforded plenty of Fiſh, and large conveniencies for Commerce; and the Woods were furniſh'd with Timber to make Veſſels out of, to paſs over thoſe Seas, and ſo

preſerve a correſpondence among Mankind at the greateſt diſtance for their mutual advantage; and if there were uncultivated parts of the Earth, that only ſhew'd that God did not give theſe things to make Mankind lazy and idle, but to exerciſe thoſe abilities both of Body and Mind, which he had given them.

But as to the two parts of the Earth being wholly unſerviceable to Mankind, by reaſon of exceſſive Heat or Cold, that is found by experience of later Ages to have been a great miſtake. But *Ariſtotle* is poſitive in it; *That the places near the Sun have no Waters nor Paſtures; and that the remote Northern parts are not to be inhabited for the Cold.* But both theſe Aſſertions are found to be falſe; however his Authority was follow'd. Inſomuch, that *Pliny* ſaith, *Of five Zones two are uſeleſs by extremity of Cold; and that there is nothing but a perpetual Miſt, and a ſhining Froſt; and that within the Tropicks all is burnt up by the heat of the Sun, which is ſo intenſe, that,* he ſaith, *there is no paſſage from one Temperate Zone to the other.* This is a ſtrange Account to us now, and given by a Man who had read all Authors then extant about theſe matters; and it is the ſtranger, becauſe in the Chapter before he ſaith, *That* Hanno *paſſed from* Cadiz *to the end of* Arabia, (which is much doubted) *and that* Eudoxus *came to* Cadiz *from the* Arabian *Gulph; and that another went from* Spain *to* Æthiopia *on the account of Trade; and that ſome* Indians *trading abroad were caſt by ſtorms on the Northern Coaſts, who were preſented to the Proconſul of* Gaul. How could theſe things be, and yet they ſuch ſtrangers to the *Torrid Zone*, thro' which they muſt paſs? But he ſeem'd to take it for granted, *That thoſe Regions were unpaſſable, and uninhabitable*, altho' himſelf mentions ſeveral Nations which liv'd within *the Torrid Zone*; as the *Negroes* on both ſides the River *Niger*, the *Garamantes*, *Troglodytæ* (whom *Ludolphus* makes to be ſame with the *Hotentots*) and ſeveral others. Now if all theſe Countries were burnt up, how come ſo many People to be then known to live here; and ſo they were from the time of *Herodotus*, who mentions them? But how different are the beſt Accounts we now have of theſe Places from what the Antients imagin'd? The Country of the *Negroes*, thro' which the *Niger* runs (which is ſuppos'd to be of the ſame *Nature* (if not *Original*) with the *Nile*, and overflows the Country of the *Negroes*, in the ſame manner and at the ſame time that the *Nile* doth *Egypt*) is, according to a late Author, *a populous and fertile Country*, who ſaith, *that the Natives endure the Heat with eaſe, and are healthful and vigorous.* Another, who ſpent ſome time in that Country, ſaith, *That the Heat is more ſupportable by the cool Wind which blows; and that for 6 Months it is as pleaſant as* France. *Andrew Battel*, who liv'd about 18 Years in *Angola* and thereabouts, ſpeaks enough of the *Populouſneſs* of thoſe parts; and *Lopez* who was at *Congo*, commends the *Temperature of the Air* there. *Ludolphus*, in his Account of *Ethiopia*, which he had chiefly from a Native, ſaith, *that it is as temperate as* Portugal. The ſame we have already produc'd from *Acoſta* of *Peru*. Many more ſuch Inſtances might be produc'd, but theſe are ſufficient to ſhew what a wonderful Miſtake the Antients were under as to the *Torrid Zone*, and how very weak *Lucretius* his Argument againſt Providence from thence is. But the Argument for it is much ſtronger from theſe Diſcoveries, becauſe, according to the ordinary effects of the Heat of the Sun, they reaſon'd truly; but there is a concurrence of ſeveral other things which temper the Air, which they could not underſtand. It is true, there are ſome things that abate the

Ariſt. *Meteor. l. 2. c. 5.*

Plin. *l. 2. c. 68.*

L. 5. c. 8.

Herodot. l. 4. c. 183. Plin. l. 5. 8. Solin. c 43.

Voyage to Surat, *p. 51. p. 71.*

Relation de la Nigritie, *1689 p. 85.* Purchas *II. l. 7. c. 3. Id. c. 4.*

Ludolph. Comment. l. 1. c. 5. n. 36.

Heat which ariſes from the Sun's nearneſs; as the equality of Nights to Days, and the abundance of Rains which fall at that time, of which the moſt probable account is, that altho' in our parts the diſtance of the Sun cauſes Cold and Rain, and the nearneſs Heat and Drought; yet it is quite otherwiſe there, for the Sun raiſes up the Vapors more there by rarifying the Air, and that to a great height; which joining together, and falling down with greater force, doth thereby produce a Wind as well as Water, both which cool and refreſh the Air; and where the Vapors do not produce Rain, yet they make a Dew, as in ſome parts of *Peru*, which falling on the ground makes it fruitful. But theſe things are not ſufficient; for were all the Country in the *Torrid Zone* a flat, with thoſe advantages, it would not be habitable; and therefore the height of the Mountains was neceſſary for this purpoſe. Which ſhews, that theſe are ſo far from being *Botches* or *Ruins*, that they are great inſtances of Divine Providence, if they can be made out to be ſerviceable to this purpoſe. *Scaliger* ſaith, that thoſe do *piè delirare, who impute the Mountains to the fractures made in the Earth by the Flood; and that it is impoſſible that the Earth which fell in, ſhould ever make a ſurface equal with the height of the Mountains:* but he aſſerts them to be a work of Providence in the original frame of the World, and chiefly intended to be a receptacle for Water: and he obſerves that the higheſt Mountains are under the Torrid Zone, where they ſerve likewiſe for tempering the Air. For, *Acoſta* gives that reaſon of the temper of the Air in the *Weſt Indies*, that *it is a high Country, having many Mountains, which afford a great refreſhment to the neighbour Countries:* and he obſerves, *that the Sea-coaſt in* Peru *and* New Spain *is very hot, being low and flat; but it is otherwiſe in the higher parts. Piſo*, a learned Phyſician, who liv'd in *Braſil*, and hath given a *Natural Hiſtory* of that Country, imputes the *Healthfulneſs* of the *Maritime Coaſts* there, which he thinks compares with *Europe*, to two things: 1. *The conſtant breeze from the Sea lying on the Eaſt of it, which* he ſaith, *very much defends them from the exceſſive Heat of the Sun.* 2. *A Ridg of Mountains between that and* Peru, *which keep off the noiſom Vapors of the Mooriſh Grounds on the other ſide of them. In the Night*, he ſaith, *the Cold is ſo great* (even in the *Torrid Zone*) *that they are forc'd to keep Fires to prevent the ill effects of it. Nichol. de Techo*, who was in *Tucumania*, ſaith, *That the part of it which is within the Torrid Zone is very cold, by reaſon of the Mountains there; which*, he ſaith, *evidently confutes the Antients opinion concerning it. Andrew Battel* mentions *the high Mountains* about *Angola, over which he march'd, and found the Air very cold. Ludolphus* ſaith, *The Providence of* God *is much to be admir'd in the Mountains of* Ethiopia; *for the height of their Mountains makes that Country habitable, and their Air more temperate, and affords them Rivers, which the flat in the Torrid Zone do want,* unleſs they be ſuch as come out of the mountainous part. And, which ſeems very ſtrange, he affirms from *Tellez, That the Heats in ſome parts of* Ethiopia *are more tolerable than in* Portugal, *which lies ſo many degrees more to the North.*

Scaliger. Exerc. 43.

Exerc. 42.

Acoſta *Hiſt. of the Indies, l.* 2. *c.* 12.

Piſon. Hiſt. Nat. & Medic. Braſiliæ, l. 1. *c.* 1.

Hiſt. Paraquar. l. 1. *c.* 19.

Purchas *To.* II. *l.* 7. *c.* 3. §. 3.

Ludolph. Hiſt. Æthiop. l. 1. *c.* 6.

C. 5.

The force of what I have ſaid comes to this. It was ſuppos'd to be an Argument againſt Providence, that ſo great a part of the Earth was uſeleſs to Mankind: Which is ſo far from being true, that undoubted Experience hath convinc'd the World, that they have been fully inhabited; and that to the comfortable ſubſiſtence of Mankind, there hath been concurrence of ſeveral things, which could not be the reſult of

Chance, or of the Mechanical Laws of the motion of Matter: and therefore we ought to conclude these things to be ordered by Divine Providence, for the use and benefit of Mankind.

There is yet one thing to be observ'd before I end this part of my Discourse, which is to shew the pernicious use that hath been made of *Des Cartes* his laying aside the consideration of *Final Causes*. For there was lately a Person too well known in the World, (and whom I intend to consider at large afterwards) who at first profess'd himself a strict Follower of *Des Cartes* his *Notions* in his *Metaphysical Meditations*. But he made use of the Argument from the *Idea* to prove *the World to be* GOD: And *Des Cartes* cannot be excus'd from giving too great advantage to *Spinoza*, by supposing *the Idea of extended Matter to be infinite and necessary*; which overthrows the force of his own Argument from the *Idea*, for if it agrees to Matter, it cannot prove the Being of a Substance distinct from Matter, and gave occasion to the other to think, that nothing but *Infinite Matter* was imply'd in this *Idea*: and to carry on his design the better, he kept close to *Des Cartes* in excluding the *consideration of Final Causes*. For in his *Mathematical Ethicks* (as he calls them) he hath an *Appendix* to his first Part, where he doth purposely set himself to overthrow all *Final Causes*, *as meer Fictions of Mens Brains*. But the comfort is, that they are no late *Fictions*, but the wisest Men in all Ages, as I have already shew'd, did assert them: And it is not a mere *Mathematical Appearance* will fright Men now out of the Principles of Reason. But let us examin what the grounds are on which *Final Causes* are thus peremptorily condemned. He saith, *That they arise from the common prejudice of Mankind, who have so much fondness for themselves as to think that all things are done for their sakes: that* GOD *made all things for Man, and Mankind to serve him.* But this is not a just and fair representation of the matter. We do not say, that GOD had no other end in the frame of the Universe, but merely for the sake of the Inhabitants of the Earth; for we do not pretend to give an account of the great ends which the Almighty had in those vast and numerous Bodies of the fix'd Stars, which are so very remote from us; but that which we say, is, that GOD hath plac'd Mankind in such a station here upon Earth, that they cannot but look about them; and when they do so, they cannot but admire to find so great and so wise a Being order all things so, as to see not only the Wisdom but the Goodness of their Maker. And how doth this appear to be *a mere Fiction of Mens Brains?* Are there not such just causes for our admiration? Are there not such conveniences for human Life? Do not all Men see the wonderful contrivance and usefulness of the parts of their Bodies? And are there not great discoveries of the like Wisdom in Plants and Animals, and the Earth and Sea? Are all these mere Phantasms and Fictions of Mens Brains? Why are not the mistakes about these things discover'd in a Mathematical manner? This might have signify'd something: But to go about to confute Mankind by telling them, *That Final Causes are mere Fictions of their Brains*, is far from being a Geometrical way of Demonstration. Let us examin, however, the method he takes to make it out. (1.) In the first place, he undertakes to shew how Mankind came to think so much of *Final Causes*; and then, (2.) How repugnant they are to the nature of things: (3.) How Men came to take up the Notions of Good and Evil, and of Rewards and Punishments, from this Opinion about *Final Causes*. All which I shall briefly consider. As to the first, he supposes *that all Men are born igno-*

Des Cartes *Prin. Part. II. n. 21.*

B. D. Spinos. Opera Posth. p. 36.

rant of Cauſes, and look after their own advantage, which they are conſcious to themſelves of. And what follows? *Firſt, that they ſuppoſe themſelves free, becauſe they know their own Deſires.* And why ſhould they not, as well as know that they think? For they have the like inward Perception as to both. *But they are ignorant of the Cauſes which determine their Deſires.* How doth it appear, that there are ſuch *Cauſes*, which they are thus ignorant of? If any Man undertakes to aſſign Cauſes which Mankind are not at all ſenſible of, he ought not to take it for granted, that there are ſuch Cauſes, but to prove it in ſuch a manner, as to overballance the evidence of their inward Perceptions. For Mankind are conſcious to themſelves of no ſuch Cauſes; if therefore any one will prove, that however they are not free, certainly that Evidence ought to be clearer than the Argument from our own Perception to the contrary. I think I move my Eye freely to this or that Object, and am fully ſatisfy'd from that inward Perception I have of the voluntary motion of the Muſcles belonging to the Eye. Now if any one goes about to tell me that I am deceiv'd herein, and that there were other Cauſes, which determin'd the motion of my Eye; is it not reaſon I ſhould have Evidence greater than what I have from my own Senſation? But here we have no Cauſes at all aſſign'd; therefore we muſt go on. *Secondly*, ſaith he, *Mankind do all things for ſome End*, viz. *for their own Profit; and therefore deſire only to know Final Cauſes, and if they find theſe they are ſatisfy'd.* Is not this well ſaid by a Man that pretends to *Demonſtration*, and that in a *Geometrical manner?* Could no other *Ends* be thought of but *Profit?* I begin to be of *Des Cartes* his mind, *That Geometry ſpoils Mens Reaſonings in other matters.* For, how was it poſſible for a Man of common ſenſe to argue in ſuch a manner; *Men aim at their own Profit, therefore they deſire only to know Final Cauſes?* What *Profit* was it which this Author aim'd at in making this Work of his. He had without doubt ſome end in it; for I hardly think he could take ſo much pains for no end at all. Was it a *Good* or a *Bad end?* (For Mankind are ſtill apt to be inquiſitive into *Final Cauſes.*) *A Good End*, no doubt his Friends will ſay. What was this *Good End?* was it *mere Profit?* No certainly, they will ſay, his Mind was above it; *for he devoted himſelf wholly* (as they tell us in the Preface to his Works) *to Philoſophy*; and *retired on purpoſe for the proſecution of his Studies.* It is then more than poſſible for a Man to aim at ſome other end, than mere *Profit.* And what was the End he propos'd in Philoſophy? Still we enquire after *the End*, altho' *Profit* be ſet aſide; and we cannot have a better account of it than from himſelf. He tells us, *His Mind was ſet upon finding out the true Good of Mankind.* This was a noble End indeed, and fit for a Perſon that deſign'd to improve his Underſtanding. But was this *true Good* nothing but *Profit?* So far from it, that he ſaith, *He was ſoon ſatisfy'd, that what things Mankind generally purſued, were a hindrance to the End he aim'd at: and therefore he ſaw it neceſſary to give over the purſuit of Riches, Honors and ſenſual Pleaſures; and to fix upon an eternal and infinite Good, which alone can give ſatisfaction to the Mind, and therefore ought to be purſued with all our might.* This, one would think, were ſpoken like a true Chriſtian Philoſopher; but his way is, to uſe our Expreſſions, and to couch his own meaning under very plauſible Terms: but he ſpeaks his Mind more afterwards, when he ſaith, *This chief Good of Man is to underſtand the union between the Mind and Nature.* What that is, will appear more afterwards; but here he ſaith, *That this is the End to which*

De Intell. Emend. p. 357.

P. 361.

our Studies and Endeavors are to be directed. Which is sufficient to my present purpose. For here it is confess'd, that they are only vulgar Minds that aim at *mere Profit* as their End; but that there is a higher, and more certain, and agreeable End for the Minds of Men to search after; and that their Happiness lies in the attaining of that End. Which being allow'd, if we suppose a wise and intelligent Being to have created Mankind, there is no incongruity at all in Man's making that infinite and eternal Good to be his chief End, nor in pursuing after it with all his Endeavors; nor can there be any in supposing that this GOD should order things in this World with that design, that they should be serviceable to him here as to his present subsistence, in order to his main End. For he allows his *Philosopher* to do many things with that design to serve his End, viz. *To speak as other Men do, whatever he thinks: To use sensual Pleasures, as they serve for Health: To get as much Wealth as will make his Condition easy.* Thus far then we find that Mankind may propose Ends to themselves; and that there are things which have a tendency to them; and that it is very becoming to them to use those Means in order to their Ends. Why then may not the wise Creator of the World appoint proper Ends and Means to Mankind, as to their conveniencies and future Happiness? What repugnancy is there in this, more than in the former case? All that he can say is, *That Mankind finding something very useful to them, as Eyes for seeing, Teeth for eating, Herbs and Animals for nourishment, the Sun to give Light, the Sea to breed Fish,* &c. *and because they are so useful to them, conclude that there was a Being above them, which prepar'd all these things for them.* And what absurdity is there in so doing? What *Geometrical Demonstration* is there, that these things all came together so of themselves without any intelligent Agent? All that he saith is, *That they considering them as Means, could not believe that they made themselves; but because they were wont to provide things for their own use, they supposed or believed some free Agent which ordered all these things for them. And from hence they judging all by themselves, concluded that* GOD *ordered all these things for their use; to oblige Mankind to him, that they might honor and serve him; and so under a pretence of doing honor to* GOD, *they fell into Superstition, and were so bent upon Final Causes, till at last they made* GOD *no wiser than themselves.* Is not all this *Demonstration?* They must think very meanly indeed of the Understandings of Men, that can think they will be satisfy'd with such Accounts as these. We find he grants *Eyes fitted for Sight, Teeth for Eating,* &c. And why, I pray, may we not in reason conclude, that they were design'd for that use? He finds some things to cavil at, about *Unseasonable Weather, Earthquakes, Diseases,* &c. (which are consistent with the general Ends of Providence) but he hath nothing to say as to his former Instances, why we should not believe *we had Eyes to see with, or Ears to hear with, or Teeth to eat with:* But if these things were given for those uses and no other, doth not this prove particular Ends of Providence with respect to Mankind? What, *if Men do provide Means for their Ends?* Is it an Argument of *Folly*, or *Wisdom* so to do? If it be *Wisdom* to act for an End, and *Folly* to act for none, why may we not suppose an infinitely wise Being to act for Ends agreeable to himself? Not for mean, foolish, sordid Ends, but such as become the great Creator and wise Governor, and bountiful Benefactor to Mankind. And what is there unbecoming our *Idea* of GOD in these relations? Is it then unfit for a wise Creator, and Governor, and Benefactor, to bestow on Mankind

Ethic. P. I. p. 34.

kind such things as tend to the use and good of his Creatures, or to take care of their welfare, so as to furnish us with such Organs of our Senses, such Faculties of our Minds, as may make use of the many conveniences which we have about us for our comfortable subsistence, and our cheerful service of so Great, and so Good, and so Liberal a Benefactor? Can this be call'd *Superstition*, to serve and adore him? Is this *making* God *like to our selves*, when we acknowledg the infinite distance between him and us, and serve him with devout Reverence and godly Fear? Far be it from us to think so meanly of him, as to attribute the least degree of our Passions and Weaknesses to him. We know he could not be God, if he were not infinitely above our Thoughts as well as our Services: but if he please to be so kind to us, to give us so many reasons to love and serve him, is it fit for his Creatures to despise his Service, on pretence that he is above it? *Superstition* is a foolish thing, because it comes from mean apprehensions of God; but *true Religion* is a wise and agreeable thing, because it flows from a due sense of a Divine Majesty, and a tender regard to his Honor. And whatever Men pretend as to *Philosophy* and *Demonstration*, there are none that really want Sense and Understanding so much, as those who despise *Religion*, under the name of *Superstition*. We cannot deny that there is too much of it in the World: but as God remains the same notwithstanding the Follies of Mankind, so *Religion* is as just and reasonable a thing as ever, altho' *Superstition* hath brought so much dishonor upon it.

The next thing is to shew, *That Final Causes are repugnant to the Nature of things*. This is to the purpose indeed, if he can make it out. As to his Argument *from the necessity of all things*, that must be referr'd to its due time; because it is not prov'd but suppos'd: But here we are to consider how *Final Causes* do so lamentably pervert the Order of Nature. *They make*, saith he, *the Cause to be the Effect, and the Effect to be the Cause; and that which was first in Nature to be the last; and make the most perfect Being to be the most imperfect.* These are sad Consequences, if they hold: The two former he passes over, as he had reason, and fixes on the last, *That they overthrow the Divine Perfection*; and he needs no more, if he can make this out. But how? *If* God *works for an End, then he must want that which he works for.* Is this the *Demonstrating Ethicks in a Geometrical way?* A Father out of kindness to his Son designs to advance him in the World, and furnishes him with all necessary means to that end: Doth this argue weakness and indigency, or only kindness and good-will to his Son? If there may be a design of doing good to others, with regard to their welfare, and many means us'd to that end, what want doth this argue? But rather it flows from *abundant Goodness*; and the more perfect any Being is, the greater is the beneficence and readiness to do good to others: and one would think Men did not want Geometry to know this. *But*, saith he, God *did not do this for their sakes, but his own; his own Glory is the end of all.* But if the *Glory of* God be most advanced by the good of his Creatures, how can these two be separated from each other? Men may make a distinction by Metaphysical Speculation: but if his Glory be advanced by their good, there can be no real distinction between them; for both are carried on by the same thing.

After these faint Attempts, our *Geometrician* falls to *Ignorance of Causes*, (of which I have said so much already) and from thence, he saith *comes Mens admiration of the Fabrick of Man's Body, because they know not*

the Cauſes of it. And did our Philoſopher know the *Mechanical Cauſes* of all the parts of it? What pity it is we had not ſeen them, inſtead of theſe looſe and idle Diſcourſes; for I can call them no other, when there is ſo much bluſtering talk about *Geometry*, and ſo very little appearance of true Reaſon. But, ſaith he very ſenſibly, *The World looks upon a Man as a very dangerous Heretick, and impious Perſon, if he gives an account of Natural Cauſes, and takes away their ignorance.* I ſee no ſuch great danger from his *Knowledg*, whatever there be from his *Impiety*; for he hath ſhew'd much more cauſe for us to wonder at one, than at the other. But the *Impiety* of his *Syſtem* muſt be conſider'd in its proper place.

The laſt thing he ſaith, as to Cauſes, is, *That Mankind being perſuaded that all things were made for them, they ſet an eſteem upon ſuch things as they found moſt uſeful, and meaſur'd the value of things by their agreeableneſs to themſelves. From hence came the difference of Good and Evil, Orderly and Confus'd, Hot and Cold, Beautiful and Deform'd; and becauſe they imagin'd themſelves free, thence came Praiſe and Diſhonor, Fault and Merit. And what tended to Health or the Worſhip of* GOD, *they called Good, and the contrary Evil; what ſuted to their Imagination, they called Order, what did not, Confuſion. What was agreeable to their Senſes they called Beautiful, Sweet, Pleaſant, and the contrary to what was not, and attributed their Modes of Senſation to the things themſelves: and Men judg of things by their different Imaginations; and from thence come ſuch great differences among Mankind about Good and Evil, Order and Confuſion; all which come from Mens following Imagination, and not Reaſon.* This is the ſubſtance of what he ſaith; which in ſhort takes away all the real difference between Good and Evil, and makes *Good* to be a mere effect of Mens Imaginations, from reſpect to their own Conveniency, or what they call *the Honour of God*; and *Evil* what is repugnant to them. But how comes this to follow from *Final Cauſes?* Yes, ſaith he, *ſince all things are made for them, therefore Good and Evil are to be taken with reſpect to them.* This is a very weak foundation to build this Doctrin upon. For things are not therefore ſaid to be *Morally Good*, becauſe they are uſeful to Mankind; but that implies only a *Natural Fitneſs* for ſuch purpoſes, which is quite another thing from Moral Goodneſs; and it is ſtrange our Philoſophers ſhould not diſcern the difference. For, is there no meaſure of Good and Evil among Mankind with reſpect to one another? If the Good and Evil of things did depend upon Final Cauſes, with reſpect to Mankind in general, then there could be no ſuch thing in regard to each other; for theſe Final Cauſes do not reach to one individual more than another, for they reſpect the whole kind. But we ſay upon good grounds, that there are things which are good and evil between Man and Man. *Yes*, it may be ſaid, *with reſpect to Society, and the common good of the whole.* If it be ſo, then it follows that it doth not depend upon mere Imagination, but that there is a true and juſt meaſure in things; for if Human Society cannot be preſerv'd without Juſtice, and keeping Faith and Obedience to Government, Conjugal Fidelity, *&c.* then there is a real tendency in theſe things to that end, and a repugnancy in the contrary; and if ſo, then their being good or evil doth not depend upon Mens Fancies or Humors, any more than the taking away Fuel doth for leſſening a Fire, or the adding it doth to the increaſe of it. For Mens indulging their own Paſſions againſt Reaſon and a common Intereſt, doth as much tend to a Civil Combuſtion, as the other

ther to a Natural; and Mens due government of themſelves and actions doth as naturally tend to Peace and Tranquillity, as withdrawing Fuel or caſting Water doth to quench the violence of Fire. From whence it appears, that there are real ends as to Mankind, which are the meaſures of Good and Evil, with reſpect to Society. But beſides this, Mankind cannot be ſuppos'd to ſubſiſt without the Relations of Parents and Children: and can any Man in his right Senſes imagin that the Duties of theſe to each other depend only upon Fancy? Is there no natural regard due from Children to Parents, no natural affection and tenderneſs in Parents to Children? Is all this only the product of Imagination? So as to the difference of Sexes; Chaſtity, Modeſty, and a decent regard to each other are things founded in Nature, and do not ariſe from Cuſtom or Fancy. But in all theſe things, altho' there be a juſt regulation of them by Laws, yet the foundation of them is laid in the nature and reſpects of things to one another. As to our own Bodies, Health is not the only meaſure of Good and Evil; for it is ſo uncertain, that thoſe Exceſſes do little prejudice to ſome, which are miſchievous to others: but there is a juſt proportion of things to be obſerv'd with reſpect to their uſe; and ſo *Intemperance* may be conſiſtent with a healthful Body. As to the condition of others, who by reaſon of Poverty or Sickneſs ſtand in need of our help, it is a thing in it ſelf good to afford them our aſſiſtance; and ſo Liberality, Charity, and doing good, are ſo far from being good only from Imagination, that no Man can imagin them to be otherwiſe than good. But beſides all theſe, there are Duties which are owing to that infinite Being, from whom we derive all that we enjoy or hope for; and can it be any other than good for us to fear, and ſerve, and love, and honor him? He confeſſes Mankind allow *that to be good which reſpects the honor of* GOD; but he means *that it is becauſe we ſuppoſe that he made all things for Men.* But altho' his Goodneſs and Providence be very great reaſons for our ſerving him; yet if he had been leſs bountiful to Mankind, they had been bound to ſerve him as their Creator. And it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe that he ſhould diſcharge his Creatures from ſo neceſſary a duty, and to make the contrary not to be a Fault. For, it would imply ingratitude and contempt of the beſt Being in the World not to be evil; and that he who is infinitely good, ſhould require what is in it ſelf evil. From all which it appears, that the nature of Good and Evil doth not depend upon the arbitrary Fancies and Opinions of Men; but upon the Nature of things, the Reaſon of Mankind, and the Reſpects they ſtand in to one another.

And it is a great confirmation of this, that our Philoſopher himſelf makes it the ſame caſe as *to Good and Evil*, as it is with reſpect to *Order* and *Confuſion*, and *Beauty* and *Deformity*, and *Harmony* and *Diſcord*. For altho' there may be a *Variety* of *Fancies*, as to ſome *Degrees* of theſe things, and that may pleaſe ſome which doth not others; yet in the main they all agree in a real difference between them: and none can have ſo little judgment, as to think that there is nothing but Fancy which puts a difference between a well digeſted Diſcourſe, and a confus'd heap of Thoughts; or between an exact Beauty, and the Picture of Deformity; or the moſt raviſhing Muſick, and the noiſe of a pair of Tongs. So that the Extremes muſt be allow'd to be really different from one another, what difference ſoever there be in Perſons Fancies, as to what lies between; and yet as to them, when the Idea of the thing it ſelf is agreed upon, then the nearer any approach to it, the more it hath of the reality,

and the farther off, it doth ſo much more depend upon Fancy.

But, ſaith he, *in our Objects of Senſe we imagin the Qualities to be real things without us, whereas they are only the different impreſſions made upon our Senſes, and ſo convey'd to our Imaginations.* And is this an Argument that there is no real difference between *Bitter and Sweet, Savory and Unſavory*, or *that all Sounds are alike?* Or that becauſe ſome have fancied the Muſick of the Spheres, therefore there is no ſuch thing as Harmony? But ſuch kind of arguing deſerves no farther conſideration.

I now come to the ſecond *Hypotheſis*, which tends towards *Atheiſm*, and that is of thoſe who *attribute too much to the Mechanical Powers of matter and motion.* It cannot be denied by any ingenuous Man, that in our Age a great improvement hath been made in *Natural* and *Experimental Philoſophy.* But there is a great difference to be made between thoſe who have proceeded in the way of *Experiments*, which do great ſervice as they go, and ſuch as have form'd *Mechanical Theories* of the Syſtem of the Univerſe; and have undertaken to give an Account how the World was fram'd, and what the immediate Cauſes are of thoſe things which appear in the World. I do not go about to diſpute, whether many things are not better reſolv'd by the *New* than by the *Old Philoſophy*; I am not concern'd in the Doctrines of *Antiperiſtaſis*, *Fuga vacui*, *Occult Qualities*, *Intentional Species*, and ſuch like: And I confeſs, that the *Particular Hiſtories* and *Experiments* relating to things of Nature, as to the *Bodies* of *Animals*, the *Vegetation* of *Plants*, and *Particular Qualities*, tend much more to the true knowledg of Nature, than the mere nice and dry general Speculations about *Forms* and *Qualities*: which have been handled in ſuch a manner, that they have been like ſome of *Ariſtotle*'s *Books*, *ſet forth, but not to be underſtood.* If therefore ſeveral *Qualities* of Bodies be explain'd *mechanically*, *i. e.* by virtue of the known Affections of Matter, *viz. Size*, *Figure*, *Motion*, &c. and that new ones can be produc'd by changing the *Texture* or *Motion*, or ſome other *Mechanical Affection* of Matter; it is far from my deſign to oppoſe them, or any ſuch Diſcourſes, which tend only to give us more light into the *Occult Nature* (tho' not *Qualities*) *of things.* For to ſay, that Things proceed from *Occult Qualities*, is in other words to ſay, that they come from we know not what; and none can take that for a good Anſwer from one that pretends to give the reaſon of a thing.

But to proceed more diſtinctly, I make no difficulty of allowing theſe following Principles, as to the *Nature* and *Qualities* of Natural Bodies; which are moſt inſiſted upon by a late Excellent Philoſopher, and a truly *Chriſtian Virtuoſo* among us. (1.) That there is One Univerſal Matter of Bodies, that is, a Subſtance extended, diviſible, and impenetrable. (2.) That there is a diverſity of Motion in ſeveral parts of Matter; ſo it be not ſaid to be in Matter from it ſelf as eſſential to it; for then it muſt always move, and there could be no Reſt, and ſo no Compoſition. (3.) That by virtue of this Motion, Matter is divided into greater and leſſer parts, which have their Determination, Size and Figure. (4.) That beſides theſe, their Situation is to be conſider'd; that is, their Poſture and order, with reſpect to one another: and when the ſeveral parts join together to make up one Body, that is called the *Texture* of them. (5.) That there is a different *Texture* both in our *Organs* of Senſe, and in the *Objects* which make impreſſions upon them, with a different Mo-

Mr. Boyle *of the Origin of Forms and Qualities.*

tion, Figure and Size; from whence arise our different Sensations, and our Apprehensions of different sensible Qualities in things. (6.) That by a Coalition of the smaller Particles of Matter into one Body, there are different Substances in the World of distinct Denominations; but by a change of Texture or Motion, or other Properties of Matter, that compound Body may be put into a different state, which may be called its Alteration or Corruption; and if the change be so made as to offend our Senses, it is then called *Putrefaction.* (7.) That there may be an incomprehensible variety in the Coalition and Texture of the minute Particles of Matter, which may be so different from each other, as to be thought to be endued with distinct Qualities. As the 24 Letters make up an inconceivable number of words by the different placing of them.

But when I have allow'd these, I can by no means agree, 1. That there are no other Qualities in Bodies, but what relate to our Senses. It's true we could not be sensible of Heat and Cold, but from the impressions made on our Senses: but supposing we were not sensible of the different agitation of Particles without us; it doth not at all follow, that there is not a real Alteration in the objects themselves, as that the Fire doth not burn, if we do not feel the heat of it; and why that disposition in Matter, which is apt to produce such a sense in us, may not be called an inherent Quality, is not so easy to apprehend. But if there be such a real difference in Bodies, as that one will make such an impression on our Senses, and another will not, we cannot in reason say that there is no Quality in things, but that it wholly depends on our Apprehension. It is granted, *That Snow hath a greater disposition to reflect light outwards, than a Coal or Soot, when the Sun shines upon all three.* Now why this disposition should be called a distinct Quality from what is in the other two, seems to me a Dispute of no consequence. So, if an Eccho be nothing but the cavity of a place, whereby it is dispos'd to reflect the sound back to the place from whence it came, altho' it must not be called the Quality of the place which makes the Eccho; yet it cannot be denied to be the peculiar Figure and Disposition of the parts which make it. So that, if Men will allow such inherent Dispositions in things to produce what we call *Qualities* in us, the difference will not be found worth the disputing. And I have wonder'd Persons of Judgment and skill in these matters lay so much weight upon it, as tho' the Quality must be said to be only in us, when it is confess'd to arise from a different Disposition in the parts without us.

2. That there are no other Qualities in Bodies, but such as an account may be given of by the foregoing Principles: For I do not find it possible for any Person by virtue of these Principles to give an account either of the make or composition of the Bodies of Animals, or of the disposition and relation of the inward Parts, or of the instruments of Nature for preservation of the Individual or Species; or of the Diseases they are subject to, or of the proper methods of cure. And the more any Person searches into all the Mechanical attempts of this kind, the more unsatisfy'd he will find himself about them; and will see reason to conclude, as a Learned Physician hath done, *That we may know enough for our general direction what to do, but that the secret Causes are so hidden from us, as we have reason to admire the Supreme Artificer in what we know, and to adore him in what we do not.*

Sydenham *de Hydrope* p. 160.

These things being premis'd, I come to the main point, which is, Whether Matter being put into motion, can in a Mechanical manner produce that frame of the Universe which we see, and the several things which are in the Heavens, and in this Globe of Earth and Sea.

To make this Matter as clear as we can, we must first consider the *General Principles*; and then proceed to the Account given of the several *Phænomena*, as they are commonly called.

I begin with the *General Principles*, which are these;

That the Matter of the Universe is one and the same extended Substance; and that all the properties we clearly perceive in it, are, that it is divisible and capable of motion in its parts. I. *Princip. l. II. n. 23.*

That this matter is without bounds, and that the Idea of Extension is the same with that of Corporeal Substance. II. *N. 21.*

That it is capable of division into so many parts, as we cannot comprehend the utmost bounds of its divisibility. III. *N. 34.*

That GOD alone is the first and universal Cause of the motion of matter, which continues the same in the whole, altho' it vary in the several parts. IV. *N. 36.*

That there are certain Laws of motion, whereof these are the chief: V.

1. That every part continues in the state it was in, unless mov'd by an External Cause. *N. 37.*

2. That all motion of it self is in a right Line, but by other Bodies it becomes oblique, and all matter being in motion it becomes circular. *N. 39.*

3. That when two Bodies meet, the weaker loses not its motion, but changes its tendency, and the stronger loses so much as it gives to the weaker. *N. 40.*

That the parts of matter were at first divided into many parcels of an equal and indifferent size, and had among them all that motion which is now in the World. VI. *Princip. Part. 3. n. 46.*

That these Particles of matter could not at first be spherical, because then there must be a void space between them, but by force of motion and natural attrition they became so. VII. *N. 48.*

That those lesser Particles which came off from the Angles of the bigger, fill up all the empty spaces between them, and have a quicker motion. VIII. *N. 49, &c.*

That besides these, there are some Particles which are large and slower than the rest, being full of Angles, and so more apt to stick to one another, which by reason of their passage thro' the triangular spaces between the globular Particles become wreathed. IX. *N. 88.*

And these are the three Elements out of which he supposes all Bodies to be made; and accordingly the Ingenious Author hath framed *a System of the Universe* with great Art and appearance of Reason; but at sometimes he is content to let it pass as a bare *Hypothesis, agreeing with the Phænomena of the World*; but withal he saith, *That he makes use of no Principles but such as are most evident, and deduces nothing from them but by Mathematical Consequences.* *Part. III. n. 44.* And in an *Epistle* to *Mersennus*, to whom he opened his Mind more freely, he saith, *That he should think he knew nothing in Physicks, if he could only tell how things might be, if he could not demonstrate that they could be no otherwise.* *N. 43, 44.* *Ep. To. II.* But to another Person he calls it his *Romance of the World*; *which* he confesses *he was very well pleas'd with.* *Ep. 37.* *Ep. 103.*

But so have not others been, who have taken great pains both in *Philosophy* and *Mathematicks*; and altho' they cannot deny this *Hypothesis* to be very consistent and well put together, yet they will by no means allow it to be a true and satisfactory account of the *Nature* and *Formation* of the World. But it is not my business to lay together the Objections of others against the *Cartesian Hypothesis*, but to shew the tendency of it to *Atheism* in these two Points.

1. In setting up a Notion of *Matter*, or *Corporeal Substance* independent upon the Power of GOD.

2. In undertaking to give an Account of the *Phænomena* of the *Universe from the Mechanical Laws of motion without a particular Providence.*

As to the former; His first Principle is, *That Matter is one and the same thro' the Universe; and is every where known by its essential property, which is Extension:* and therein he places *the Essence of a Corporeal Substance*; (as will presently appear.) If then the very Essence of Matter be independent upon GOD's Power, so that he can neither create nor annihilate it, what becomes of the Creation of the World according to this *Hypothesis?*

Princip. Part. 2. n. 23.

Du Hamel *de consensu vet. & nov. Philosoph. l. 1. c. 9. n. 9.* P. Petiti *Dissert. de Principiis Cart. p. 28.* Huet. *Cens. Philosoph. Cartes. c. 8. n. 4.*

Some object against his *Notion* of *Matter*, and say, that he hath confounded *Mathematical* and *Physical Bodies* with one another. For, say they, the strength of his whole *Hypothesis* depends upon the supposition *that Matter is nothing but Extension, and therefore there can be no Vacuity, because all Space is extended, and therefore Matter is Infinite*, or as he calls it *Indefinite*; but so, as he positively saith, *that the Idea of Space is the same with that of Corporeal Substance, and that we can conceive nothing in it but Extension.* Which they say, is true, if we speak of *Mathematical Quantity*, but not of *Real and Physical.* But, saith *Des Cartes, Men may pretend to distinguish Corporeal Substance from Quantity; but they utter that in words, which they cannot comprehend in their Minds; for either they mean nothing by Substance, or attribute a confus'd notion of an Incorporeal Substance to a Corporeal, and leave the true Idea of Corporeal Substance to Extension.* But this is very far from clearing this matter. For himself lays it as a fundamental Principle, *That it is capable of Division into Parts, and was actually divided by* GOD *himself.* Now I desire to know what that was which was so divided? It must be *Something*; and that not *an Incorporeal, but a Corporeal Substance:* not *pure Extension*, but *a Body that was extended*; and of which the Substantial parts of the Universe are compos'd. Nay, his whole *Hypothesis* depends upon *the actual Division of Matter into Parts that are equal, or very* near it; without which his three Elements could not be made; which arise from the Motion and mutual attrition of those Particles; and yet he affirms in the Conclusion of the 2d Part of his Principles, *That he owns no other Corporeal Matter, but such as Geometricians call Quantity, and is the thing which their Demonstrations are conversant about.* But is there no difference between *Geometrical* and *Physical Quantity?* It's true that in Mathematical Quantity there is nothing but Extension; but doth it therefore follow, that there is nothing more in a Real and Physical Body? How can we imagin that GOD should create mere Extension in the World; and that out of that all the Bodies in the Universe are fram'd? Nay, upon *Des Cartes* his *Principles* it is impossible that Matter should either be *created* or *annihilated.* For according to him, *the Idea of Matter and Extension are the same*; but he saith positively, *that the Idea of Extension and Space are the same*; therefore

Part. II. n. 9.

Part. 3. n. 46.

Part. II. n. 64.

if

if *Space* can neither be *created* nor *annihilated*, neither can *Matter*. And it seem'd strange to me, that a Person so sagacious, should not lay these things better together; but his *Mathematical Notions* ran so much in his Mind, that his endeavor to accommodate them to the nature of things, was that which led him into such inextricable difficulties. It is well observ'd by Monsr. *Du Hamel*, that the great mistakes in *Natural Philosophy* have risen from Mens applying their *former Notions to it*; *thus*, saith he, *the common Philosophers confounded Natural things with Metaphysical speculations: on the other side*, Des Cartes *being a great Mathematician, endeavor'd to reduce Nature to Geometry, and so consider'd nothing in Body but Extension. Extension*, saith he, *which constitutes Space, is the same which constitutes Bodies; but we consider it more particularly in Bodies, and more generally in Space, which is not chang'd, as the other is.* But is there then nothing to make a *Body*, but mere *Extension?* I mean not *a Mathematical*, but *a real Physical Body*. No, saith he, *in the Idea of a Body, we may cast off other Qualities, as Hardness, Color, Gravity, Heat and Cold, and yet a Body remains; to which then nothing belongs but Extension, which is common to Body and Space.* This is not so deep reasoning, as might have been expected from so great a Master of it. For altho' the particular Qualities may be cast off, yet the Capacity of them can no more than *Extension*; as is plain in *Figure* and *Size*, as well as *Hardness*, &c. any one particular *Figure* and *Size* may be abstracted from Body, but it is impossible to conceive a Body, but it must be capable of one or other. Besides, all this proves no more but that *Extension* is the *Inseparable Property of Body*. And what then? Must the whole Essence of a Body consist in one inseparable Property? *But this is all the Idea we have of Body.* Then I say, our Ideas of things are short and imperfect, and there is no forming Worlds upon such Ideas. And this was the fundamental mistake of *Des Cartes*. He lays this down as his ground of certainty; *or that we cannot take falshood for truth, if we only give assent to such things as we clearly and distinctly perceive.* Then he goes on, *that the things which fall under our perception, are either things and their Properties, or eternal Truths. Of things, the most general are Substance, Duration, Order, Number and such like, which extend to all kinds of things.* And he saith, *they may all be comprehended under those two: Of Intellectual or Thinking Substances; or of Material, i. e. of Bodily and Extended Substances.* Thus far all is clear and distinct. Then, as to the Notion of *Substance*, he saith, *By that we can understand nothing but a thing which so exists, as to need nothing else to support it. There is but one Substance in the World which needs no support, and that is* God. *All created Substances needs his support, and the Notion of them is, that they are things which only stand in need of* God's *concourse to support them.* Hitherto we find nothing to stick at. *But how come we to have an Idea of created Substances? Not from the bare Existence, for that doth not affect us: but it must be from some Properties, Attributes or Qualities; because Nothing can be attributed to Nothing. From whence we conclude from any Real Attribute, that there must be a thing or Substance to which it belongs.* All this appears very well still; only we must take notice, that all Properties do assure us of a *Real Substance* under them: Which is very true, relating to *Physical Bodies*. But it is possible he may from hence aim at proving, *That there must be a Corporeal Substance in Imaginary Space, because there is an Extension there, and nothing cannot be attributed to nothing; therefore there must*

De Consensu vet. & nov. Philosoph. l. I. c. 9. n. 8.

Part. 2. n. 10.

N. 11.

Princip. P. I. n. 43.

N. 48.

N. 51.

N. 52.

be a Real Body there. But I think it may be truly anſwer'd, That the Extenſion is no more real than the Space is, and implies no more but a Capacity of having Bodies which it had not; that is, that God might create Bodies beyond this World; and if he did ſo, then there would be a real Extenſion; but as we conceive it, the Imaginary Space is no more but a Poſſibility for Bodies exiſting out of the compaſs of this Univerſe. And therefore I deny this to be any real Extenſion; and that it can be no *Real Subſtance*, becauſe *Des Cartes* himſelf, but juſt before, owned *that a created Subſtance was that which ſtood in need of* God *to ſupport it.* Now is it poſſible to imagin that *Space* needs *a Divine Concourſe?* Therefore he muſt diſtinguiſh it from *Subſtance:* or elſe he muſt affirm it to be an uncreated Subſtance; which overthrows his diſtinction here between *Created and Uncreated Subſtances.* As to his Maxim, that *nothing can have no properties*, it certainly relates to *Subſtance*, and not to a *mere Space*; which by the common ſenſe of Mankind muſt be diſtinguiſh'd from *Bodily Subſtance*; and there can be no greater prejudice to Philoſophy, than to go againſt that. Now let us
N. 53. proceed. *From every Attribute a Subſtance is known; but there is one chief Property which conſtitutes the Eſſence and Nature, to which the reſt are referr'd. So*, ſaith he, *Extenſion makes the Nature of a Corporeal Subſtance, and Cogitation of a Thinking Subſtance. For every thing which we attribute to Body, ſuppoſes Extenſion, which is only the Mode of the thing extended; as all things attributed to our Minds, are different Modes*
N. 54. *of thinking. And thus we come to two clear and diſtinct Notions or Ideas; one of a Thinking Subſtance, and the other of a Corporeal; if we diſtinguiſh between the Attributes of thinking and Extenſion.* After this he
N. 63. ſaith, *That Cogitation and Extenſion may be conſider'd, as conſtituting the Natures of a Thinking and Corporeal Subſtance; and ſo their clear Ideas are, a Subſtance which thinks, and a Subſtance which is extended: but then theſe Properties*, he ſaith, *may be conſider'd likewiſe only as Modes*
N. 64. *belonging to thoſe Subſtances; and ſo they make a diſtinct Idea of themſelves, not without the Subſtances, but as Modes belonging to them.*

Thus I have carefully laid down his own Notions about theſe matters. And now ariſes the main difficulty; *viz.* how upon theſe grounds *the Idea of Space, and of Corporeal Subſtance ſhould be the ſame?* All
Part. 2. that I can can find is, that Extenſion is really *Corporeal Nature, altho'*
N. 9. *it be call'd an Accident.* But did not himſelf diſtinguiſh it as *a Mode of Matter*, and as *a Subſtance extended?* And was not this look'd on *as ſuch a Property of Matter, as Thinking is of a Mind?* But can any Man ſay, that *Thinking* by it ſelf is *an Intellectual Subſtance*; how then can *Extenſion* by it ſelf be *a Corporeal Subſtance?* And yet, if it be not, as I can ſee no reaſon from his own grounds why it ſhould be; then his Suppoſition of the *Infiniteneſs of Matter*, of *the Plenarty of the World*, and *the circular motion of his Particles of Matter*, on which his whole *Hypotheſis* depends, comes to nothing. And what a ſtrange foundation is *Des Cartes* his World built upon? I could hardly believe that ſo thinking a Man ſhould not diſcern the Weakneſs of his own Grounds. But inſtead of that, it is plain that he laid great weight upon it: For when a learned Man of our own, and then a great admirer of him, ob-
Epiſt. Des Cartes *To.* *I. Ep.* 87. *Ep.* 88. jected to him, *that he extended the notion of Corporeal matter too far; but he thought it of no great conſequence to the main of his Principles*; *Des Cartes* takes him up ſmartly for it, for he ſaith, *he look'd on it, as one of the chief and moſt certain Principles of his Philoſophy.* And in the

Fragment of his laſt Anſwer, which he liv'd not to finiſh, he perſiſted in his Opinion, *That the empty Space was a real Body, becauſe nothing can have no properties.* But there is a difference between *Real Properties* and *Imaginary*; if there be any Bodies in that Space, there will be *Extenſion, Diſtance,* &c. but it is a very unconceivable thing that one of his judgment ſhould ſo much contend to the laſt, *That there was a difference of parts in ſuch a ſpace, where there was nothing but ſpace. i. e.* That there muſt be ſomething, where there is nothing. And therefore *Bernier* obſerves, *That thoſe who confound Space and Body, run themſelves into ſtrange abſurdities by a Corporeal Subſtance to fill all poſſible ſpace, or rather to be ſpace it ſelf; and that* GOD *cannot annihilate the leaſt part of it.* And he concludes it to be *neither Subſtance nor Accident, but a mere Capacity.* And it was not an improbable Conjecture of that Learned Perſon who wrote to *Des Cartes* upon this Argument, that this Doctrine of his, as he explain'd it, laid the foundation of *Spinoza*'s opinion of the *Infinite extent* and *power of matter*; but I cannot think that *Des Cartes* himſelf intended it ſo, however the other underſtood it. And it is great pity one of ſo clear a Capacity in other things, ſhould ſo ſtifly adhere to ſo unreaſonable an Opinion. And yet we find his Diſciples go on to defend him in this Matter. For when Monſ. *Huet* had objected, *That* Des Cartes *had made Extenſion, which was an Accident, to be a Subſtance*; Monſ. *Regis* anſwers, *That he confounded Extenſion which was of the eſſence of Body, with the Extenſion which belonged to Quantity; whereof the one is conſidered in it ſelf, and the other with reſpect to Magnitude.* But let it be conſider'd how he pleaſes, it is ſtill but a Mode belonging to a Subſtance, and not the Subſtance it ſelf. However, he refers us to his Book of *Phyſics* for the clearing of this Matter. And there we find indeed, that he diſtinguiſhes three ſorts of Bodies, *Phyſical, Mechanical,* and *Mathematical. A Phyſical Body is one compos'd of many inſenſible parts in its due order and figure, from whence reſult the Phyſical properties. A Mechanical Body is one compos'd of groſs and ſenſible parts, which by their figure and ſituation are proper for particular motions. A Mathematical Body is a Body conſider'd with its proper extenſion under a regular figure, as a Cube or a Cylinder.* But this doth not ſhew that *Des Cartes* did not confound a *Mathematical* and *Phyſical Body:* For it is an eaſy thing to find out diſtinctions to avoid a difficulty; but then they ought to be agreeable to the general ſenſe of thoſe Terms. But here a *Mathematical Body* is confin'd to *Regular Figures*; whereas the general notion of it is ſuch a Body as *Des Cartes* himſelf means, when he calls it, *Geometrical Quantity, ſuch as is the object of Mathematical Demonſtrations: i. e.* of any kind of Figures abſtract from Phyſical Bodies; and *this,* he ſaith, *is that matter he treated of.* And to ſuch a *Body* Extenſion alone belongs, and to none elſe, either *Phyſical* or *Mechanical.*

Ep. 93.

Bernier *Abregé de Gaſſend. To. I. p. 25.*

H. Mori *Oper. Phil. To. 2. p. 242.*

Cenſur. Carteſ. l. 5. n. 1. Regis *Réponſe à la Cenſure, ch. V. Art. I. p. 255.*

La Phyſiq. Regis *To. I. p. 273.*

Here then lies the difficulty as to *Des Cartes* his Principles: he conſiders Matter *Geometrically*, i. e. *Abſtractedly*, with reſpect to bare *Extenſion*, and yet ſuppoſes the effects of *Phyſical Bodies*; ſuch as *Diviſion of parts of matter one from another*, and *a motion of thoſe parts* in order to the compoſition of things. But *Mathematical Extenſion* is capable of no Diviſion but in the Mind; for no Man imagins the Earth really divided by the *Parallels* and *Meridians*, &c. and the Diviſion of the parts of an empty ſpace is nothing but a Mathematical Diviſion, which implies nothing

nothing really in that ſpace, but a mere act of the Mind in conceiving the diſtance between the ſeveral parts of it.

Prin. Part. II. n. 16. But *Des Cartes* proves it impoſſible *there ſhould be a vacuum in Nature, becauſe the extenſion of Space and Body are all one.* But may not God *annihilate* that Air which is between the ſides of a Veſſel, and *N. 18.* would there not be a *Vacuum* between? No; he ſaith, *It is impoſſible to conceive ſuch a Cavity without Extenſion, or ſuch an Extenſion without Matter; and if the middle ſubſtance were annihilated, the ſides muſt come together, becauſe there would be nothing between.* By which we ſee, that this Notion of the Identity of *Extenſion* and *Corporeal Subſtance* had ſunk ſo deep into his Mind, that he makes *Annihilation* of the Subſtance of Matter impoſſible to Divine Power: for there can be no ſuch Vacuity, but there muſt remain *Extenſion*, and conſequently *a Corporeal Subſtance.* This hath been objected to the followers of *Des Cartes*, and *Réponſe aux Reflex. de M.* Du Hamel, *Part.* 2. *ch.* 4. lately by *Du Hamel*, in his Cenſure of *Regis* his *Carteſian Philoſophy*; and it is worth the while to ſee what anſwer he makes to it. He ſaith, *That his objection about the Annihilation of the Air between the Heaven and Earth, can be of no force to prove a Vacuum; becauſe if there be no ſpace, they muſt touch one another; and if they do not, there muſt be ſpace, and conſequently a Corporeal Subſtance.* But ſaith *Du Hamel*, may not God by the ſame power by which he preſerves the Bodies between Heaven and Earth, deſtroy them, and then there muſt be a Vacuum? He anſwers plainly, *That an Annihilation of the ſubſtance of matter is impoſſible, even to the power of* God; *becauſe his Will is immutable. He grants that* God *may deſtroy the Air, and all other Bodies as to their Form, or preſent Modification; but he cannot deſtroy their Matter,* i.e. *their Extenſion, which is a true ſubſtance, and ſubſtances are indefectible.* Where we plainly ſee that the *Carteſians* aſſert the neceſſary Exiſtence of Matter, and that it is not in the power of God to deſtroy it; and whatever they may talk of the Will of God, they deny any power to exerciſe it with reſpect to Matter.

But *Du Hamel* proceeds. How can thoſe Bodies touch one another, when God can create another Body between? No, ſaith *Regis*, *That ſtill ſuppoſes a ſpace between; and if there be a ſpace, there muſt be a body, and ſo a vacuum is a repugnancy in it ſelf.* But this Space, ſaith *Du Hamel*, is nothing but imaginary, a fiction of the Mind, and there is no arguing from thence to the Nature of things. *Regis* replies, *that their Ideas depend on the objective realities of things; and that the Idea of ſpace or extenſion is one of their primitive Ideas; and that it repreſents ſubſtance, and all ſubſtance is incorruptible.* Still we ſee the neceſſary exiſtence of Matter is look'd on by them as a fundamental Principle, and depending on primitive Ideas.

Abregé To. I. p. 13. Monſ. *Bernier* puts the caſe of Air being annihilated between two walls; and he deſires to know of the *Carteſians*, whether theſe two walls will come together or not? They ſay, *They muſt, if there be nothing between.* True, ſaith he, there is nothing Corporeal, or that touches our Senſes, no Subſtance or Accidents; but there is a true diſtance remaining. Suppoſe a Chamber 20 foot long, 15 foot broad, and 10 foot high; and theſe dimenſions to be meaſured, and one wall 20 foot diſtant from the other: it cannot be ſaid that it is the Air that makes the diſtance between them; how then comes this diſtance to be quite loſt, if the Air be deſtroy'd? They have no anſwer, he ſaith, but to ſay, It

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is an impoſſible Suppoſition; and they will rather deny God's Omnipotency in annihilating the Air, than let go their Opinion. Monſ. *Regis* in his *Phyſicks* takes notice of *Bernier*'s Doubts, and in anſwer to them he reſolves it at laſt into this, *That it is impoſſible there ſhould be an Annihilation, ſo as to make a Vacuum; becauſe Subſtances cannot ceaſe: not from the Nature of things, but from the immutable Will of* God. And after all poſſible Objections, here they ſtick, and ſeem reſolv'd to maintain, that *Extenſion* and *Matter* are the ſame. Reg. *Phyſ. Part. I. ch. 3. n. 3.*

Even Monſ. *Rohault* himſelf, altho' in ſome things he ſaw it neceſſary to leave *Des Cartes*, yet in this he perſiſts, *That the Eſſence of Matter conſiſts in Extenſion, and that Space and Matter are the ſame; and therefore a Vacuum is impoſſible.* And to the Objection about the Walls of a Chamber ſtanding, when the Air is annihilated, he avoids anſwering *as to God's Omnipotency*; but, he ſaith, *according to our Underſtanding the Walls muſt come together.* And to that about the Wall's diſtance not depending on the Air, he anſwers, *That the Being of the Walls does not depend upon the Air within, but the ſtate or diſpoſition of them doth upon the Extenſion between them.* Which he ſuppoſes impoſſible to be taken away, and that the Subſtance of Matter hath a neceſſary Exiſtence. Rohault, *Tr. Phyſ. l. 1. c. 7. n. 9.* *c. 8. 1,2,3.*

The ſubſtance of this Argument comes to this. *Des Cartes* makes *all the matter of the World to be one and the ſame:* but he aſſerts *the Eſſence of Matter to be Extenſion*; and that Extenſion can neither be created nor annihilated: and therefore it is impoſſible upon his Principles, to make out the dependence of Matter upon an infinite Creator. If it be ſaid, that *Des Cartes* expreſly ſaith, *That it ſeemed manifeſt to him that there is no other General Cauſe which created Matter with Motion and Reſt but God*; and that in the *Fragment* of his laſt Anſwer to Dr. *H. M.* he ſaith, *That if Matter were left to it ſelf, it would not move; but that it was firſt moved by* God: I anſwer, That according to his *Principles* the Subſtance of Matter muſt be before, becauſe there muſt be *Space*; and *Space and Matter are the ſame.* And I can ſee no poſſible way of clearing him, but by ſaying, that he held two ſorts of *Matter*; one part is *Phyſical Matter*, which God gave motion to at firſt when he created it, and out of which the World was fram'd; and the other *Mathematical*, which conſiſts in mere *Extenſion:* but how to reconcile theſe two to his aſſerting *One and the ſame matter in the World*, is a thing above my Underſtanding. Prin. *P. II. n. 36.* *Epiſt. To. I. ep. 93.*

II. The next thing to be conſider'd, is *Des Cartes* his undertaking to give an account of the *Phænomena* of the *Univerſe* from the *Mechanical Laws of Motion*, without a particular Providence. We are told by ſome, who have been very converſant with the Atheiſtical Perſons of our Age, That *they deſpiſe the Epicurean Hypotheſis of the World's being made by a fortuitous concourſe of Atoms, as a ridiculous thing; and think* Moſes *his Account more probable than that*; (which is a great Favor indeed.) So that it is to little purpoſe now to ſpend time in ſhewing how *precarious* and *unſatisfactory* the *Principles* of *Epicurus* were, who ſuppos'd Motion in Matter, without the leaſt ground for it; but *Des Cartes* was a Man of too great ſenſe and judgment to commit ſuch Blunders as *Epicurus* was guilty of (whom one of his ſharpeſt Adverſaries allows to have been *of a great and ſearching Wit, well ſkilled in Geometry, to which he endeavor'd to reduce Natural Philoſophy, (altho' he fail'd in his Attempt;) That he had a faculty of expreſſing his Mind clearly in few words above any* Fr. Cuperi *Arcan. Atheiſm. l. 2. c. 3.* Huet. *Cenſ. Phil. Cart. c. 8. n. 4.*

either antient or modern Writer.) Therefore it will be neceſſary to conſider what *Des Cartes* yields, that we may not miſtake or miſrepreſent his deſign.

1. He grants, that GOD did at firſt create Matter, which was capable of Reſt or Motion.

2. That Matter left to it ſelf would be without any motion; and therefore the firſt Motion was from GOD.

3. That GOD by his ordinary Providence doth preſerve as much Motion in the World, as was given at firſt.

4. That we have no reaſon to ſuppoſe any other alteration in the ordinary courſe of things, according to the Laws of Motion, than what we are certain of by Experience or Revelation.

And now the main point is, Whether Matter being thus put into motion, can produce the *Phænomena* of the World, without any farther interpoſition of Providence, than only to preſerve the motion of matter? For which we muſt conſider, That he doth not give a ſatisfactory account, 1. of the *Nature* and *Laws of Motion*; nor 2. of the *Phænomena of the Univerſe.*

(I.) As to the former, I ſhall inquire into his *Notion* of *Motion*, and then of the *Laws* of it.

Princ. Part. II. §. 25. (1.) He aſſerts, That Motion, according to his Principles, is barely *Mode of Matter*, without any inward Principle of Motion. For *Motion*, he ſaith, is the change of the ſituation of Bodies, with reſpect to one another, or *a removing a Body from the vicinity of ſome Bodies to the neighbourhood of others*; and he places it in ſuch *a Tranſlation* on purpoſe, that it may be underſtood to be only *a Mode of the Matter moved, as Figure is of a thing figured.* But it is not ſo eaſy to underſtand that *Motion*, which imports an Action, ſhould be only *a Mode of the Matter moved*, as it is that Figure belongs only to the thing figured. For it is not poſſible for the Figure to be any where elſe, but in that Body which hath it; but it is poſſible to apprehend Motion to come either from an external Agent, or an internal Principle; and ſo it is not a mere mode of the thing moved. But when the whole weight is laid upon the Nature of *Motion* in this caſe, ſome greater evidence ought to have been given how Motion being once given to Matter, as a Mode of it, muſt always continue, when the reſiſtence of Bodies doth certainly weaken it ſo as to need a new force to repair it. For either all motion of matter muſt be by a violent impulſe, without regard to the different force or magnitude of things (which is to overthrow the due Laws of Motion;) or elſe there muſt be a proportion in the force of the mover to the reſiſtence of the Body moved: and if there be a regard to that proportion (or elſe the ſmalleſt Body might move the greateſt) then there muſt be a reſiſtence in that Body which is moved: But every reſiſtence gives a check to the motion of that Body which moved it, and every check leſſens the impulſe; and ſo from a gradual reſiſtence there muſt come a gradual decay, till at laſt all motion muſt ceaſe; as it is in all Machines, whoſe motion depends upon external force. *Des Cartes* indeed ſaith, *That whatever Motion is loſt by one Body is communicated to the next, and ſo the firſt motion is ſtill preſerved.* But it is hardly poſſible to make it appear, that Motion is not ſo much weakned by reſiſtence, but that it can preſerve it ſelf in a degree of motion proportionable to that which is not communicated to another. For the frequency of impulſe leſſens the power of reflection; and it appears in Light, and Sounds, and other things, that

whatever is reflected grows weaker. So that reſiſtence muſt gradually weaken motion. And in the *Motion of Projected Bodies*, *Des Cartes* himſelf grants, *That the Motion continues till it be hinder'd by the reſiſtence it meets with*; and he ſaith, *It is manifeſt that the Motion is retarded by the Air, and other ambient Fluids, and ſo it cannot continue long.* But is that an Argument *that Bodies do continue motion till they be hinder'd, and that Motion is only a Mode of the Body mov'd?* Whatever *Mode* it is, it comes from the force of the immediate Agent, and not from the motion at firſt given to Matter; and here we ſee the reſiſtence it meets with, ſoon gives a ſtop to it. Therefore it ſeems unconceivable that all the Motion in the World, conſidering the continual reſiſtence of Bodies, ſhould be the ſame mode of Matter, which was at firſt given to it. And as to his definition of *Motion*, ſome have undertaken to demonſtrate it to be falſe, by ſhewing how one Body may come nearer to another, without changing the ſituation of the parts next adjoining to it; and that there is no ſuch reciprocal motion as he aſſerts, altho' there be a reciprocal change of ſituation, which is unavoiable. But Monſ. *Rohault* ſaith, *That Motion is to be taken with reſpect to the next, and not to any remote Bodies.* However Monſ. *Regis* thought fit to quit that definition of *Des Cartes* for another, which *Du Hamel* ſaith is not at all better; but he thought it neceſſary to take in *the efficient Cauſe of Motion*, which makes it not to be a mere mode of the matter moved. And but for the Authority of *Mathematicians* and *Philoſophers*, it would be thought ridiculous for a thing not to be ſaid *to be moved, becauſe it doth not change the ſituation as to the next Bodies about it*; as that the Kernel of a Nut is not moved, becauſe it is thrown with the Shell upon it; or that the Wine is not moved in a Ship at Sea, becauſe it keeps within the Veſſel. So, if the Earth be carry'd about with the force of the *Vortex* wherein it is, 'tis as certainly moved as a Pendulum is with the motion of the Ship, altho' it hath a proper motion of its own.

Part. II. n. 38.

H. Mori Enchirid. Metaphyſ. Part. I. c. 7.

Rohault. *Tr. Phyſic. c.* 10. *n.* 1.

Regis *Réponſe aux Reflections Critique de M.* Du Hamel, *ch.* 7.

But *Des Cartes* undertakes to give an account of the Proportion of the increaſe and leſſening of motion, upon the meeting of two hard Bodies, and he lays down *ſeven Rules* to determin it; but it falls out very unhappily, that *ſix of them* are deny'd *to be true, and that the firſt doth not anſwer the end it was brought for.* This was a bold charge on ſo great a Mathematician; but all that *Regis* ſaith in anſwer to it is, *That he did not undertake to defend all* Des Cartes *his Rules of motion, becauſe they did not appear to him exact enough.* But if the Particular Rules of motion be no better fix'd nor underſtood, how come they to be ſo certain, that the ſame quantity of motion is ſtill preſerv'd in the World? For that *Des Cartes* hath recourſe *to the immutable Will of* God *which hath determin'd it.* No doubt if God hath determin'd it, ſo it muſt be. But from whence comes *Des Cartes* to know this to be the *immutable Will of* God? What antecedent Reaſon is there to ſatisfy any Man's Mind, that God *by his immutable Will* muſt keep up the ſame proportion of motion in the World? Why may not God alter or ſuſpend the Laws of motion, as to the parts of matter, in what way or manner he thinks good? What repugnancy is there to the *Divine Nature* in ſo doing? So that theſe Arguments *à priori* (as they call them) have no kind of Evidence as to ſuch matters, which may be or not be, as God pleaſes. Beſides, what neceſſity was there that *Motion* muſt be only a *Mode of Matter?* And that Mode to be preſerv'd by ſuch *Laws of Motion*, which are ſo very uncertain? A very Skilful and Ingenious Philoſopher of our own

Des Cartes *Prin. Part. II. n.* 45, &c.

Réponſe, &c. *Part.* 2. *ch.* 12.

Prin. Part. II. n. 36.

Mr. Boyle *of the high Veneration of Man's Intellect towards God, p.* 41, 42.

faith, *That this Rule, which he faith is the moſt uſeful of all* Des Cartes's, *is very metaphyſical, and not very cogent to him: And he doth not ſee how it can be demonſtrated; and he queſtions whether it be agreeable to Experience.* And he was a Perſon very favorable to *Des Cartes*, as far as he could, as appears on all occaſions in his Writings; but here we ſee he gives up his Fundamental Rule. *Du Hamel* ſaith, *The Argument from* GOD's *Immutability is no force, becauſe it holds not as to Extrinſecal Actions.* *Regis*, to defend this, runs into that Abſurdity to make GOD a neceſſary Agent, becauſe GOD's Will and his Eſſence are the ſame; which overthrows all Religion in the Conſequence of it.

Reponſe aux Reflections, part. 2. *c.* 13.

Prin. Part. II. *n.* 36.

But *Des Cartes* himſelf excepts *ſuch Mutations as are made in Matter, by evident Experience, or Divine Revelation.* What is the meaning of this? Can that be *an Immutable Will of* GOD, which is contradicted by *Evident Experience*, and *Divine Revelation?* Or were theſe words only put in to avoid Cenſure? As the World was ſaid to be *Indefinite*, leſt he ſhould be charg'd with making the World *Infinite*; and the Definition of *Motion* was altered, to avoid *Galileo*'s fate: But there is no diſſembling in this matter; if it be contradicted by *Evident Experience*, it can be no fix'd and *Immutable Rule*; if it can be alter'd in caſe of Miracles, the Argument from GOD's Immutability ſignifies nothing. For if it be no repugnancy to the Divine Nature to alter, or ſuſpend the Laws of Motion, as he ſees cauſe; then we can have no aſſurance as to GOD's Will any farther than himſelf hath declar'd it; and conſequently they muſt prove that GOD hath manifeſted this to be his Will. But ſaith *Rohault*, *It is unbecoming Philoſophers on all occaſions to run to Miracles and Divine Power.* Who puts them upon it? We may certainly allow an ordinary courſe of Providence, as to Cauſes and Effects, without aſſerting theſe Notions of *Des Cartes*; but this is a pleaſant way of taking it for granted, that none but his Principles are fit for *Philoſophers.*

Rohault. *part.* I. *c.* 10. *n.* 13.

(II.) Come we now to examin his *Catholick Laws of Motion:* and of all things, thoſe ought to be very clear and certain, becauſe ſo much depends upon them; and yet I am afraid we ſhall hardly find one of them to be ſo.

II. The firſt of them is, *That every thing remains in the ſame ſtate it was in, unleſs it be changed by External Cauſes.* From whence he concludes, *That which is moved always continues to be moved; and that nothing tends to Reſt, which is contrary to the Laws of Nature, becauſe Reſt is contrary to Motion: and nothing tends to its contrary, for that would be to tend to its own deſtruction.* The main thing intended by this, is to aſſert the continuance of Motion in the parts of the Univerſe, upon their being once put into it; ſo that Reſt is a ſtate of violence to a Body once moved, becauſe Reſt and Motion are contrary to each other. But this is a very weak Foundation to build ſo much upon: For, we are not to conſider Reſt and Motion Abſtractly, but Phyſically, together with the Bodies in which they are: And I think it will be very hard to perſuade any Body endued with Senſe and Motion, that after weariſome Motion, he doth aim at his own deſtruction by ſeeking for Reſt. This is a ſort of Reaſoning would not be expected from *Philoſophers*; that becauſe Motion and Reſt are contrary Motions, therefore no Body in motion can tend to Reſt. *But every thing continues in the ſtate it was in, till it be put out of it; therefore every thing in motion muſt continue to move.* This is not clearly expreſs'd. For if it be meant, that every thing from it ſelf continues in its original ſtate, then it is not true. For Matter, he confeſſes, would

Princip. Part. II. *n.* 37.

would rest, if God did not give motion to it; and so it must continue to rest, and there could be no Motion at all: If it be meant, that every thing continues in the state God put it into, unless he appointed several Causes to alter it, then it is true; but it doth not serve his purpose. For if God hath appointed both Motion and Rest for some Bodies, it can never be said that such tend to their own destruction, when they tend to that Rest which God and Nature appointed for them. If God hath appointed them for continual Motion, as the great Bodies of the Universe, then they must continue in it, not by virtue of any inherent Law of Motion, but by the immutable Will of God. *Des Cartes* saw it necessary for God to put Matter into motion, but he would have the framing of the Laws of this motion himself; whereas he had acted more respectfully towards his Maker, and more like a Philosopher, *i.e.* more consonantly to his own Principles to have left God that made the World and gave motion to Matter, to have setled those Laws of Motion, which were agreeable to his Infinite Wisdom. For these Notions are unbecoming *Philosophers*, to make *Motion* a mere *Mode of Matter*; and this *Mode* to be supported by *Divine Concourse*; but so, that *Motion* and *Rest* being contraries, whatever is in *Motion* must continue in it; because *Motion* and *Rest* being contraries, nothing can tend to its own destruction.

Besides, I know not how to reconcile this with another Law of Nature, as he calls it, *That all Bodies in a circular motion endeavor what in them lies to recede from the center of their motion.* Is not a Body put into a *Circular Motion* in a state belonging to it? How comes it then not to continue in that state, but to endeavor all it can to get out of it? And yet all the *Phænomena* of *Light* depends upon this Law: *That the round particles of the second Element endeavor to recede from their centers; not from any cogitation,* (no doubt of it) *but because they are so plac'd and incited to that Motion.* Is that possible, and yet *all Bodies continue in the state they are in,* when they endeavor what they can to get out of it? Are not these more contrary than *Motion* and *Rest?* I do not meddle with *External Hindrances*, but the *Natural Endeavors* of Bodies. But it may be said, *That* Des Cartes *intends his Rule only of Primary and Simple Motions, and not of Circular, which are violent and unnatural.* So indeed his words seem to run at first, that this Rule relates to *simple and undivided Bodies*; but then I say, it is of no use, as to the present *Phænomena*; and he speaks of *the Laws of such Motion as we may observe in Bodies:* which words signify nothing, unless his Law reaches to the Bodies now in being; and I see no reason for him to suppose Circular Motion to be any more repugnant to the Nature of Matter, than any other. *Regis* to avoid this, saith, *That Circular Motion is not Unnatural, but Accidental; and the state of the Body is to be taken from what it would be, if External Causes were removed;* i. e. *in a right Line.* But he doth not attend to the Consequences of this; for then the Circular Motion of the Heavens must be *Accidental*, and not under the care of Providence, or the immutable Will of God. For God's *Will*, he saith, is, *that every Body be preserved in its own state; now,* saith he, *the state of a Body in motion is in a right line, and the endeavor of Nature is to keep to that.* Then say I, whatever Motion is against the state wherein Nature designs it, must be not only *Accidental* but *Violent*, because it is against the course of Nature. And if it be violent, it cannot be suppos'd to be under God's immutable Will; but if it be not *Violent*, then a Body in circular

Part. 2. *n.* 39. *Part.* 3. *n.* 55.

N. 56.

Réponse, &c. part. 2. *ch.* 10.

circular motion must endeavor to preserve it self in that state, and not to recede from it, as *Des Cartes* supposes.

Monſ. *Du Hamel* objects against this Law, that Permanent Beings do indeed endeavor to preserve themselves in the state they are in; but it doth not hold in Beings that are successive; because the former are in their full state at first, but it is otherwise in successive. But saith *Regis*, *This doth not hinder them from not doing any thing to their destruction.* So that it is a plain case, no Body in *motion* can tend to *Rest*, *because Motion and Rest are contrary*; and this is a Fundamental Law of Nature for this weighty Reason.

Réponse aux Reflex. part. 2. c. 9.

The second Law is, *That all Motion, according to Nature, is in a right Line, and that oblique and circular Motion arises from the motion and interposition of other Bodies; and whatever Body is moved circularly, hath a perpetual tendency to recede from the center of the circle it describes.*

Now if this Rule had that evidence which is necessary to make it a fundamental Law of Motion, it must be proved either from the Nature of Matter and Motion, or from the immutable Will of God: The latter is not pretended to be proved, but only *from the immutability and simplicity of the operation whereby* God *doth preserve Motion in Matter; which only regards that very moment, without regard to what was before.* But how from hence it follows that *Motion*, which extends to more moments, should be determined one way rather than another, I cannot apprehend. For if the Motion be in a right line, it must be in more moments than one, as well as in a circle; and if it prove any thing, it is *that* God *preserves Motion* only in a point: but *Des Cartes* owns *That it cannot be conceived in an instant, altho' in a right line.* How then comes *Motion* in a *Right Line* to come from God's *Immutability*, and not *in a Circle? Because it is determined in every instant towards a right line.* This ought to have been made more evident, than from the instance of the *Sling:* For the falling down of the Stone to the Earth, is certainly from another cause, *viz.* from the Principle of *Gravitation*, and not from the Inclination of matter to move in a right line. Neither can it be said to come from the *Nature* of *Matter*, or *Motion:* For a Circular Motion, hath as much the Nature and Definition of *Motion*, according to *Des Cartes*, as the other: and *Matter* is of it self indifferent, which way it moves; and some have thought *Circular Motion* more perfect, because they observ'd the motion of the Heavens to be so. But if it arises from the impediments of other Bodies, they must shew, that Matter was first put into motion in a streight line; and if God put all the parts of Matter at first into motion in a right line, how came the impediments to make it circular? For God preserves motion as he gave it; he first gave it in *right lines*, and *his Will is immutable*, therefore it must always so continue; and so *Circular Motion* will be impossible.

But let us suppose *Circular Motion*, how comes it to be so evident as to be made a Law of Nature, *That a Body in that motion always endeavors to recede from the Center?* How is this consistent with the Principle of *Gravitation and Attraction*, which depends upon Mathematical Demonstrations? Can it be in the Nature of Bodies to tend to the center, and to recede from it at the same time? And it is a very improbable thing, that *Gravity* should be nothing else, but some Particles being not so quick in their motion from the center as others are, these being left in the lurch, and press'd by the motion of the other, do sink under them; and

and so come nearer to the center, which is all that *Des Cartes* means by *Gravity*. But of this afterwards.

The last Fundamental Law of Motion is, *That when a Body meets another, if it hath not a greater power to proceed in a right line than the other hath to hinder it, then it turns aside, but loseth not its motion; if it hath a greater force than the other, then it communicates its motion to the other, and loseth it self as much as it gives.* The reason given of this is, *Because it is the immutable Will of* God, *that the same quantity of motion shall be always preserved:* Of which I have spoken already. And as to the whole matter of these Laws of Motion, Mr. *Boyle* saith, *That they have been received by Learned Men, rather upon the Authority of so famous a* Mathematician, *than upon any convictive evidence which accompanies the Rules themselves.* N. 40. Mr. Boyle of Veneration, &c. p. 41.

The next thing we are to do is, to see whether from these *Laws of Motion*, he gives a satisfactory Account of the making of the Universe.

And here we must consider the *Elements* out of which he supposeth it made, and the account of the things made out of them.

As to the *Elements*, this, in short, is his account of them, *The Particles of matter into which it was first divided, could not at first be round, because then there must be a vacuum between them; but they must by succession of time become round, because they had various circular motions* (altho' the *Natural Motion* be in *a Right Line*, and *God's immutable Will be that every thing should be preserved in its Natural state.*) *But that force which put them into these Notions, was great enough to wear off their Angles, and so they become round. Which being join'd together must leave some intervals, which were filled up by the filings off from the Angles; which were very small and of a figure fit to fill up all interstices, and were carried about with a very quick motion. So that here we have two Elements, one of the round Particles, and another of the subtile Æthereal matter, which came by the attrition of the first Particles. But besides these, there are others more gross and unapt for motion by their figure; and which make the third Element, and out of these, all the Bodies of the visible World are compos'd; the Sun and fixed Stars out of the first; the Heavens out of the second; and the Earth, with Comets and Planets out of the last.* Princip. Part. 3. n. 48. N. 49. N. 52.

The main thing which makes this *Hypothesis* unsatisfactory to me is, that it is as precarious and groundless as the *Epicurean*, and they differ only as to the beginning of Motion, which the *Epicureans* suppose to belong to Matter, and *Des Cartes* saith, it comes from an infinite Agent distinct from it; because he supposes that it would not move of it self, unless it were put into motion. Which being set aside, there is no more of the Wisdom or Providence of God to be found in His making of the World than the others, nor any more evidence as to the Production of his Elements. For he first supposes, that there can be no *Vacuum* in Nature, which he proves only from his Mathematical Notion of Body consisting only in Extension; and from hence he undertakes to give an account, not of God's creating the matter of the World at once, nor of his Production of things within six days; but how in process of time Particles of matter being divided would come to make up his several Elements. And for this, he makes use of several Suppositions without any ground of reason why it must be so and no otherwise, which was the thing which he undertook to *Mersennus* to do. For what reason doth he give that Matter must be divided at first, in order to the production of the Elements? When there can be no *Division*, but there must be Intervals

tervals between the Parts; and if all Matter be *One and the same*, and the Space of the Intervals be neceſſarily fill'd up with *Extended Matter*, what diviſion of Parts could there be? And how can that Extenſion be divided into ſolid Bodies? *Des Cartes* grants, *That by reaſon we cannot find out how big the parts of Matter were at firſt, how quick their motion, nor what kind of Circles they deſcribed.* Then it is impoſſible to find out by Reaſon how the World was made. For, *if God*, as he confeſſes, *might uſe innumerable ways of doing it, and we cannot tell which he pitched upon*; what a vain thing is it in any Man to undertake to give an Account how the World came to be form'd? And therefore *Rohault* with great Judgment, pretends not to give an Account how Matter was form'd by GOD at the firſt Creation; but only to ſhew a poſſibility how it might be fram'd, ſo as to ſolve the Appearances of the World. But neither he nor *Des Cartes* can reconcile this primitive diviſion of Matter into parts, with their original notion of Matter, which is nothing but *Extenſion*. *But if Matter be ſo divided*, as *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes, *may we not reaſonably conclude, that there were three ſuch Elements as he ſpeaks of?* The Queſtion is not, Whether there be not a Diſtinction of the Particles of Matter anſwerable to theſe three Elements, *viz.* a more ſubtle and ethereal Subſtance, as in Fire; a leſs ſubtle and globular, as in Air; a groſſer, as in Earth; which are moſt made according to theſe Principles, out of ſuch different Particles: but the point is, Whether theſe Elements can be produc'd in ſuch a manner by the mere Motion of Matter? And *Des Cartes* will by no means allow them to be made round, for fear of his *Vacuum*, which would ſpoil all, but *that by length of time they would become round*; *nay they muſt become round: Eas non potuiſſe ſucceſſu temporis non fieri rotundas*, are his words. Now here lies the difficulty, to ſhew how theſe muſt become round by his own Laws of Motion, *i. e.* by a motion in a right line; for he ſaith, *It is done by various circular motions.* But how comes the Original Matter of it ſelf to deviate from the fundamental Law of Motion? That is, from whence came theſe Circular motions, without which the Elements could not be form'd? And if the firſt Particles were ſo ſolid, as is ſuppos'd, how came the Angles to be worn off? For when two ſolid Bodies meet, according to his own Laws of Motion, the one communicates motion to the other, and loſes of its own, which implies nothing but a mutual contact and rebounding upon the colliſion; but this doth by no means ſhew how theſe Bodies come to wear off each others Angles. And therefore this is only a product of fancy, but very neceſſary to his purpoſe. But let us ſuppoſe that by frequent colliſions ſome alterations would be made in the figure of theſe Bodies; what a long time muſt it be before they become ſpherical? Too long to be conſiſtent with ſuch a thing as *Creation*, which at the ſame time is pretended to be believ'd. But the only agreeable Suppoſition to this is, the exiſtence of matter from eternity, which having we know not how many Ages ſince been put into motion, then by a caſual concourſe (for it was not by the Laws of Motion) theſe Particles juſtling one againſt another, at laſt rubb'd off the uneven Particles, ſo as to make them round. But what quantity was there of ſuch Particles in proportion to what was left? For it may eaſily be too great, and ſo the firſt Element be too powerful for the ſecond, as ſome have undertaken to demonſtrate that it muſt be, upon *Des Cartes* his own grounds. And the Anſwer given is inſufficient; becauſe the Proportion of the firſt Element will ſtill be too great, notwithſtanding all the uſes found out for it; and

Part. 3. *n.* 46.

Tract. Phyſic. c. 21. *n.* 6.

N. 48.

Enchirid. Metaphyſ. c. 16.
Huet *Cenſ. Philoſoph. Carteſ. c.* 6.
Regis *Reponſe ch.* 6. *Art.* 2.

and therefore *Rohault* more wisely avoided these attempts of forming the World out of the first *Chaos* of confus'd matter, which he found could give no satisfaction.

Let us now in the last place come to the Account he gives of the *Phænomena of the Universe* according to these Principles. And because it would be too large a task to run thro' all, I shall confine my self to these following: (1.) The formation of the Sun and Stars. (2.) The motion of the Air. (3.) The placing of the Earth. (4.) The Mechanism of Animals.

As to the formation of the Sun and Stars: which *Des Cartes* saith was in this manner; *That the matter of the first Element increas'd by the attrition of the particles of the second, and there being greater quantity of it than was necessary to fill up the interstices between the round particles of the second Element, the remainder went to the centers of the several Vortices.* But here arises a difficulty, which takes away any appearance of satisfaction in this matter; which is, That *Des Cartes* owns *that in this matter of the first Element there are some parcels which are less divided and slower moved, having many Angles; and therefore unfit for motion.* Now why should not these take up the *Center* of the *Vortex*, and not those which have a quicker Motion, and endeavor to recede from it? For we must observe, that *Des Cartes* supposes *that these bigger fragments are mix'd with the lesser, and that they transfer their motion to them: according to the Laws of Nature* (which serve his turn as he pleases) *greater Bodies do easier transfer their motion to lesser, than receive motion from them.* So that here we have these bigger fragments of the first Element mix'd with the lesser, and communicating their motion to them. Now, who could expect any other than these should have fix'd in the centre of the *Vortex?* But if this be suppos'd, his whole *Hypothesis* is lost; for then the Sun and Stars must be *Opaque*, and not *Luminous Bodies.* But *Des Cartes* hath found out a notable Invention to send them far enough from the centre; which is, *That they move in the way between the Poles, towards the middle of the Heaven in a right line, and there are gathered into little masses, some from the North; and others from the South. But when they are in the Body of the Sun or a Star, then they make those spots which hinder their Light, and are thrown off like a thick scum from heated Liquors.* But when he assigns the reason of Gravity, he saith, *It comes from hence, that those particles which have a quicker motion press down those which are not so fit for it, and by that means they get nearer to the centre.* How comes it then to be so much otherwise in these parts of the third Element; how come they not to be press'd down in the same *Vortex* towards the center? Especially when himself there saith, *That the particles of the first Element have more power to depress the earthy particles than of the second, because they have more agitation*; and here he speaks of the motion within the *Vortex:* So that according to his Principles, the matter of the third Element ought to subside and be near the center, being least apt for motion. But this would overthrow his whole Theory about the Sun and Stars; and about Light, and the spots of the Sun, and of Magnetic Particles, &c. so that these Particles of the third Element must be dispos'd of as he thinks fit, lest they put all out of order. And it is strange he should parallel the Scum made by the fermenting of Liquors, with the natural Motion of the Matter of his Elements. And if this Principle were true, that the Matter of the third Element might get above,

I. *Princip. Part.* 3. *N.* 54. *N.* 88. *N.* 89. *N.* 91. *N.* 94. *Princip. Part.* 4. *N.* 23. *N.* 25.

and leave the thinner and more ſubtle Matter neareſt the center, I do not ſee how the Earth could be habitable; for then we could breath nothing but thin and ethereal Air, which we could not bear. As appears by the famous inſtance of *Acoſta*, who ſpeaks by his own ſad experience, as well as of others, that he was in great danger of his Life, by going over one of the higheſt Mountains of *Peru*. From whence it is obſerv'd, that the moſt ſubtle Air is too thin for Reſpiration. But how comes it to paſs, according to theſe Principles, that the heavier part of the Air is moſt towards the center, and the lighter aſcends higheſt? For Air, according to *Des Cartes*, is *a Congeries of the Particles of the third Element very thin and diſ-joyn'd*; and yet we find this comes nearer the center according to its Gravity; and the lighter Air goes higher, and hath very different effects on Mens Bodies, tho' the motion of it be not ſtrong nor violent. For *Acoſta* ſaith, That Air which is ſo fatal to Paſſengers on thoſe Mountains of *Peru* (which are ſo high, that he ſaith, the *Alps* and *Pyrenees* were but as ordinary Houſes to lofty Towers) is ſo ſtill, that it is but *as a ſmall Breath, neither ſtrong nor violent*; and yet it pierces ſo that it often kills Men without feeling, and makes their Hands and Toes drop off; as he affirms from his own knowledg.

Acoſta of the Indies, l. 3. c. 9.

Boyle's Experiments of Air, p. 182.

Princip. Part. 4. N. 45.

From whence it appears to be a mere fetch in *Des Cartes* to keep theſe Particles of his third Element from being nearer to the center, altho' they are more weighty and indiſpos'd to motion than others are.

But his whole *Hypotheſis* is overturn'd concerning the Celeſtial Bodies, if there be a Principle of *Gravitation* in *Matter*; which makes a Natural tendency towards the *Center*, according to the *Quantity* and *Diſtance* of it. The opinion of *Des Cartes* his great ſkill in *Geometry*, hath gone much farther towards perſuading the World of the truth of his Theory, than any evidences that appear'd in his Principles themſelves: For Men who are not deeply ſkill'd in thoſe matters, are very apt to be ſway'd by the Authority of thoſe that are. But as it falls out in this caſe, we have this *Theory* of *Gravitation* fully demonſtrated by a very Learned and Judicious Mathematician of our own, to whom I refer the Reader, who hath given a *Mathematical Account* of the *Cæleſtial Bodies*; not only of *the Sun and Stars, but of Comets, and the Moon, from the Principle of Gravitation*; not inherent and eſſential to Matter, but by a force given and directed by Divine Power and Wiſdom. Which being granted, we have no reaſon to be diſpleas'd with the cleareſt Account can be given, in a Mathematical manner, of the chief *Phænomena* of the Univerſe. And the ſame Perſon ſaith, *He hath many Reaſons to ſuſpect that the reſt may depend upon ſome ſecret Powers, by which the Particles of matter do either cohere or fly from each other; for want of the knowledg whereof, Philoſophers have hitherto blunder'd in Natural Philoſophy.* But we proceed in *Des Cartes* his Account of his *Cœleſtial Vortices*.

Sir. Newton Philoſoph. Natural. Principia Mathem.

Præfat.

FINIS.

A

LETTER

TO A

DEIST,

In Answer to several

OBJECTIONS

AGAINST THE

TRUTH and AUTHORITY

OF THE

SCRIPTURES.

THE

PREFACE.

THIS following Discourse was written for the satisfaction of a particular Person, who owned the Being *and* Providence *of* God, *but expressed a mean Esteem of the* Scriptures, *and the* Christian Religion. *Which is become so common a* Theme *among the* Scepticks *of this* Age, *that the Author of this Discourse thought it worth his time and care, to consider the force of the Objections that were made against them. Especially being written in a grave and serious manner, and not with that* Raillery *and* Buffonry, *which the rude Persons of this Age commonly bestow upon Religion. It might be justly expected from such who pretend to* Breeding *and* Civility, *that they would at least shew*

more reſpect to a thing, which hath prevailed ſo much among Men of the beſt Underſtanding and Education, and who have had no Intereſt to carry on by it. For it is againſt the ordinary Rules of Converſation, to affront that which others think they have great reaſon to eſteem and love; and they would not endure that ſcorn and contempt of their meaneſt Servant, which they too often ſhew towards Religion, and the things belonging to it. If they are not in earneſt *when they ſcoff and mock at ſacred things, their own Conſciences will tell them it is an horrible Impiety; if they are* in earneſt, *let them debate theſe things calmly and ſeriouſly, and let the ſtronger* Reaſon *prevail. Men may ſpeak ſharply and wittily againſt the cleareſt things in the World, as the* Scepticks *of old did againſt all Certainty of Senſe and Reaſon; but we ſhould think that Man out of his Senſes, that would now diſpute the Being of the Sun, or the Colour of the Snow. We do not ſay, the Matters of Religion are capable of the ſame evidence with that of Senſe; but it is a great part of Judgment and Underſtanding, to know the proportion and fitneſs of evidence to the Nature of the thing to be proved. They would not have the Eye to judge of Taſts, nor the Noſe of* Metaphyſicks; *and yet theſe would be as proper, as to have the Senſes judge of Immaterial Beings. If we do not give as good Reaſon for the Principles of our Religion, as, the Nature of Religion conſidered, can be given for it, let us then be blamed for our Weakneſs in defending it; but let not Religion ſuffer, till they are ſure nothing more can be ſaid for it.*

Tractat. Theol. politic.

There is a late Author, *I hear is mightily in vogue among many, who cry up any thing on the* Atheiſtical ſide, *tho' never ſo weak and trifling. It were no difficult Task to lay open the falſe Reaſonings, and inconſiſtent* Hypotheſes *of his Book; which hath been ſufficiently done already in that Language wherein it was written. But if for the* Advancement *of* Irreligion *among us, that* Book *be, as it is talked, tranſlated into our Tongue, there will not, I hope, want thoſe who will be as ready to defend* Religion *and* Morality, *as others are to decry and deſpiſe them.*

A LET-

A LETTER *of Resolution to a Person unsatisfied about the* Truth *and* Authority *of the* Scriptures.

SIR,

Although I do not pretend to any Skill in the *Depths of Theology*, yet I am heartily concerned for the *Truth* and *Honour* of the *Christian Religion*; which it is the design of your Papers to undermine. When I first looked them over, I could not think them so considerable, as to deserve a particular Answer; especially from one in my Circumstances, who have so much other Business lying upon me, and so little Leisure and Health to perform it; but I found at the conclusion of your Papers, so earnest and vehement a desire expressed by you, that I would return an Answer, in order to the settlement of your Mind, that I could not refuse an Office of so great Charity, as you represent it to be. I confess, when I considered the nature of your Objections, and the manner of managing them, I could hardly believe that they proceeded from a doubtful Mind, that was desirous of any satisfaction; but since you tell me so, I will first shew my Charity in believing it, and then in endeavouring to give you my poor Assistance, and impartial Advice, in order to your satisfaction. And in truth, I think impartial Advice will contribute more to that end, than spending Time and Paper in running through all the Difficulties, which it is possible for a cavilling Mind to raise against the plainest *Truths* in the World. For there is nothing so clear and evident, but a *Sophistical Wit* will always find something to say against it; and if you be the *Person* I take you for, you very well know, that there have been some, who wanted neither Wit, nor Eloquence, who have gone about to prove, *That there was Nothing in the World*; *and that if there were any thing, it could not be understood by Men*; *that if it were understood by one Man, it could not be expressed to another:* And besides such extravagant Undertakers as these, how many have there been, who with plausible and subtle Arguments, have endeavoured to overthrow all manner of *Certainty*, either by *Sense* or *Reason?* Must we therefore quit all Pretences to *Certainty*, because we cannot, it may be, answer all the Subtilties of the *Scepticks?* And therefore I am by no means satisfied with your manner of proceeding, *desiring all particular Difficulties to be answer'd, before we consider the main Evidences of the Christian Faith:* For the only reasonable way of proceeding in this matter, is to consider, first, whether there be sufficient *Motives* to persuade you to embrace the *Christian Faith*; and then to weigh the Difficulties, and to compare them with the *Reasons* and *Arguments* for believing; and if those do not appear great enough to overthrow the force of the other, you may rest satisfied in the *Christian Faith*, although you cannot answer every Difficulty that may be raised against the *Books* wherein our Religion is contained. I pray, Sir, consider with your self; do not you think it possible for any Man to have Faith enough to save him, unless he can solve all the Difficulties

ficulties in *Chronologie* that are in the *Bible*, unleſs he can give an account of every particular *Law* and *Cuſtom* among the *Jews*, unleſs he can make out all the *Prophetick Schemes*, and can tell what the *Number* of the *Beaſt* in the *Apocalypſe* means? If a Man may believe and be ſaved, without theſe things, to what purpoſe are they objected for the overthrow of the *Chriſtian Faith?* Do you think a Man hath not reaſon enough to believe there is *extended Matter* in the World, unleſs he can ſolve all the Difficulties that ariſe from the *Extenſion*, or *Diviſibility* of *Matter?* Or that he hath a *Soul*, unleſs he can make it clear how an immaterial and material Subſtance can be ſo united as our *Soul* and *Body* are? Or that the *Sun* ſhines, unleſs he can demonſtrate whether the *Sun* or the *Earth* moves? Or that we have any *certainty* of things, unleſs he can aſſign the undoubted *Criterion* of *Truth* and *Falſehood* in all things? Theſe things I mention on purpoſe, to let you ſee, that the moſt certain things have Difficulties about them, which no one thinks it neceſſary for him to anſwer, in order to his aſſurance of the *Truth* of the *things*; but as long as the evidence for them is much more conſiderable than the Objections againſt them, we may ſafely acquieſce in our Aſſent to them, and leave the unfolding theſe Difficulties to *the Diſputers of this World*, or the *Knowledge* of another. Is it not far more reaſonable for us to think, that in *Books* of ſo great *Antiquity*, as thoſe of *Moſes* are, written in a Language whoſe *Idiotiſms* are ſo different from ours, there may be ſome difficulty in the *Phraſes*, or Computation of Times or Cuſtoms of the People, that we cannot well underſtand, than that all the Miracles wrought by *Moſes* ſhould have been Impoſtures; and that Law which was preſerved ſo conſtantly, maintained with that reſolution, by the wiſeſt of the People of the *Jews*, who choſe to die rather than diſown it, ſhould be all a Cheat? Is it not more reaſonable for us to ſuſpect our own Underſtandings, as to the *Speeches* and *Actions* of ſome of the *Prophets*, than to think that Men who deſigned ſo much the advancing Virtue, and diſcouraging Vice, ſhould be a Pack of Hypocrites and Deceivers? Can any Man of common Senſe ſuſpect the *Chriſtian Religion* to be a *Fourb*, or an Impoſture, becauſe he cannot underſtand the Number of the *Beaſt*, or interpret the *Apocalyptic Viſions?* I could hardly have believed any Man pretending to *Reaſon*, could object theſe things, unleſs I ſaw them, and were called upon to anſwer them.

Therefore, Sir, my ſerious and impartial Advice to you is, in the firſt place, to conſider and debate the main Point, *i. e.* the Proofs of the *Chriſtian Doctrine*, and not to hunt up and down the *Scriptures* for every thing that ſeems a difficulty to you, and then by heaping all theſe together, to make the *Scriptures* ſeem a confuſed heap of indigeſted ſtuff, which being taken in pieces and conſidered, with that Modeſty, Diligence, and Care, that doth become us, will appear to contain nothing unbecoming that *Sacred* and *Venerable* Name, which the *Scriptures* do bear among us.

If therefore you deſign not cavilling but ſatisfaction, you will join iſſue with me upon the moſt material Point, *viz. Whether the Chriſtian Religion were from God, or from Men?* For if this be proved to have been from *God*, all the other things will eaſily fall off of themſelves, or be removed with a little Induſtry.

In the Debate of this, I ſhall conſider, firſt, what things are agreed upon between us, and then, wherein the Difference lies.

1. *You*

1. *You grant an absolutely perfect and independent Being, whom we call God.*

2. *That the World was at first Created, and is still Governed by Him.*

3. *That He is so Holy, as to be the Author of no Sin, although he doth not hinder Men from sinning.*

4. *That this God is to receive from us all Worship proper to Him, of Prayers, Praises,* &c.

5. *That it is the Will of this God, that we should lead holy, peaceable, and innocent Lives.*

6. *That God will accept Mens sincere Repentance, and hearty Endeavours to do his Will, although they do not perfectly obey it.*

7. *That there is a State of Rewards and Punishments in another World, according to the Course of Mens Lives here.*

8. *That there are many excellent Precepts in the Writings of the New Testament, inducing to Humility and Self-denial, and to the Honour of God, and civil Duty and Honesty of Life; and these in a more plentiful manner than is to be found in any other Profession of Religion publickly known.*

The Questions then remaining, are, (1.) *Whether the Matters of Fact are true, which are reported in the Writings of the New Testament?* (2.) Supposing them true, *Whether they do sufficiently prove the Doctrine to have been from God?*

1. *Whether the Matters of Fact were true or no?* And as to this Point, I wish you had set down the Reasons of your doubting, more clearly and distinctly than you have done: What I can pick up, amounts to these things. 1. *That there can be no certainty of a Matter done at such a distance of time, there having been many fictitious Histories in the World.* 2. *That it is probable, that these things might be written, when there was no one living to detect the Falshood of them; and thus you say, the* Grecians, Romans, Egyptians, *and other Nations were at first imposed upon by some Men, who pretended to deliver to them the History of their Gods and Heroes, and the Wonders wrought by them.* 3. *That these things might more easily be done, before Printing was used; and that there is reason to suspect the more, because of the pious Frauds of the Primitive Christians, and the Legends of the Papists.* 4. *That there may have been many more Deceptions and Impostures in the way of propagating false Revelations and Miracles than we can now discover.* 5. *That we ought not to take the Testimony of Scripture, or the Christian Writers in this Case, because they may be suspected of Partiality; and that the Testimony of* Josephus *is suspected by divers learned Men to be fraudulently put in by Christians.* 6. *That there are sufficient Grounds from the Story it self, and the Objections of Enemies to suspect the truth of it; because of the contradiction and inconsistency of the Parts of it; the want of accomplishment of the Promises and Prophecies of it; the obscurity and unintelligibleness of other Parts; the Defects of the Persons mentioned therein; St.* Paul's *Ostentation; the Jarrs between* Peter *and* Paul, *and* Paul *and* Barnabas. 7. *That from these things you have just cause to doubt the Apostles Sincerity, and you think they might have indirect ends in divulging the Miracles recorded in Scripture; and that Men might be contented to suffer, to make themselves Heads of a new Sect of Religion, and to rule over the Consciences of Men; and that they had time enough to make a considerable interest before the Persecutions began.*

This is the force of all I can find out, in the ſeveral Parts of your Papers, towards the invalidating the Teſtimony concerning the *Matters* of *Fact* reported in the Writings of the New Teſtament.

In anſwer to all theſe things, I ſhall ſhew: 1. That Matters of Fact, done at ſuch a diſtance of Time, may have ſufficient evidence to oblige Men to believe them. 2. That there is no reaſon to ſuſpect the Truth of thoſe Matters of Fact which are contained in the Hiſtory of the New Teſtament. 3. That the *Apoſtles* gave the greateſt Teſtimonies of their Sincerity, that could be expected from them; and that no Matters of Fact were ever better atteſted than thoſe which are reported by them; from whence it will follow, That it is not reaſon but unreaſonable *Suſpicion* and *Scepticiſm*, if not Willfulneſs and Obſtinacy, which makes Men to continue to doubt after ſo great evidence.

1. That we may have ſuch evidence of *Matters* of *Fact* done at ſuch a *diſtance* of Time as may oblige us to believe the Truth of them. This we are firſt to make out, becauſe ſeveral of your Objections ſeem to imply, *That we can have no certainty of ſuch things, becauſe we cannot know what Tricks may have been plaid in former Times, when it was far more eaſie to deceive; and that it is confeſſed, there have been ſeveral Frauds of this kind, which have a long time prevailed in the World.* But have not the very ſame Arguments been uſed againſt all *Religion*, by *Atheiſts?* And if the *Cheats* that have been in *Religion*, have no force againſt the *Being* of *God*, why ſhould they have any againſt the *Chriſtian Religion?* And if the common Conſent of Mankind ſignifie any thing as to the acknowledgment of a *Deity*, why ſhould not the *Teſtimony* of the *Chriſtian Church*, ſo circumſtantiated as it is, be of ſufficient ſtrength to receive the Matters of Fact delivered by it? which is all I at preſent deſire. Do we queſtion any of the Stories delivered by the common Conſent of *Greek* or *Latin Hiſtorians*, although we have only the bare Teſtimony of thoſe Hiſtorians for them? And yet your *Objections* would lie againſt every one of them: How do we know the great prevalency of the *Roman Empire*, was it not delivered by thoſe who belonged to it, and were concerned to make the beſt of it? What know we, but *thouſands* of *Hiſtories* have been loſt, that confuted all that we now have concerning the Greatneſs of *Rome?* What know we, but that *Rome* was deſtroyed by *Carthage*, or that *Hannibal* quite overthrew the *Roman Empire*; or that *Cataline* was one of the beſt Men in the World, becauſe all our preſent Hiſtories were written by Men of the other ſide? How can we tell but that the *Perſians* deſtroyed the *Macedonians*, becauſe all our *Accounts* of *Alexander*'s Expedition are originally from the *Greeks?* And why might not we ſuſpect greater Partiality in all theſe Caſes, when the Writers did not give a thouſand part of that evidence for their Fidelity, that the Firſt *Chriſtians* did? And yet, what ſhould we think of ſuch a Perſon who ſhould call in queſtion the beſt Hiſtories of all Nations, becauſe they are written by thoſe of the ſame *Country?* By which, it ſeems, you will never allow any competent Teſtimony at all; for if ſuch things be written by Enemies and Strangers, we have reaſon to ſuſpect both their Knowledge and Integrity; if written by *Friends*, then though they might know the *Truth*, yet they would write partially of their own ſide: So that upon this Principle, no Hiſtory at all, ancient or modern is to be believed; for they are all reported either by Friends or Enemies; and ſo not only Divine, but all Humane Faith will be deſtroyed. I am by no means a Friend to unreaſonable Credulity;

lity; but I am as little to unreasonable Distrust and Suspicion; if the one be Folly, the other is Madness. No prudent Man believes any thing, because it is possible to be true, nor rejects any thing, merely because it is possible to be false; but it is the prudence of every Man to weigh and consider all Circumstances, and according to them, to assent or dissent. We all know it is possible for Men to deceive, or to be deceived, but we know there is no necessity of either; and that there is such a Thing as Truth in the World; and though Men may deceive, yet they do not always so; and that Men may know they are not deceived. For else there could be no such thing as *Society* among Mankind; no *Friendship*, or *Trust*, or *Confidence* in the Word of another Person; because it is possible that the best Friend I have may deceive me, and the World is full of Dissimulation, must I therefore believe no body? This is the just consequence of this way of Arguing, *That we have reason to suspect the Truth of these Matters of Fact, because there have been many frauds in the World, and might have been many more than we can now discover*; for if this Principle be pursued, it will destroy all Society among Men; which is built on the Supposition of mutual Trust and Confidence that Men have in each other: And although it be possible for all Men to deceive, because we cannot know one another's Hearts, yet there are such Characters of Honesty and Fidelity in some Persons, that others dare venture their Lives and Fortunes upon their Words. And is any Man thought a Fool for doing so? Nay, have not the most prudent and sagacious Men reposed a mighty Confidence in the Integrity of others? And without this, no great Affairs can be carried on in the World; for since the greatest Persons need the help of others to manage their Business, they must trust other Men continually; and every Man puts his Life into the Hands of others, to whom he gives any Freedom of access, and especially his Servants: Must a Man therefore live in continual Suspicion and Jealousie, because it is possible he may be deceived? But if this be thought unreasonable, then we gain thus much, that notwithstanding the possibility of Deception, Men may be trusted in some Cases, and their Fidelity safely relied upon: This being granted, we are to enquire what that Assurance is which makes us trust any one; and where ever we find a Concurrence of the same Circumstances, or equal evidence of Fidelity, we may repose the same Trust or Confidence in them. And we may soon find that it is not any one's bare Word that makes us trust him; but either the reputation of his Integrity among discerning Men, or our long experience and observation of him: This latter is only confined to our own tryal; but the former is more general, and reaches beyond our own Age, since we may have the *Testimony* of discerning Persons convey'd down to us in as certain a manner, as we can know the Mind of a *Friend* at a hundred Miles distance, *viz.* by writing. And in this Case, we desire no more than to be satisfied that those things were written by them; and that they deserved to be believed in what they writ; thus, if any one would be satisfied about the Passages of the *Peloponnesian War*, and hath heard that *Thucydides* hath accurately written it, he hath no more to do, than to enquire whether this *Thucydides* were capable of giving a good Account of it, and for that, he hears that he was a great and inquisitive Person, that lived in that Age, and knew all the Occurrences of it; and when he is satisfied of that, his next enquiry is, whether he may be trusted or no; and for this, he can expect no better satisfaction, than that his History

hath been in great reputation for its Integrity among the moſt knowing Perſons; but how ſhall he be ſure this was the Hiſtory, written by *Thucydides*, ſince there have been many counterfeit Writings obtruded upon the World? Beſides the Conſent of learned Men in all Ages ſince, we may compare the *Teſtimonies* cited out of it with the Hiſtory we have, and the Style, with the Character given of *Thucydides*, and the Narrations, with other credible Hiſtories of thoſe *Times*; and if all theſe agree, what reaſon can there be not to rely upon the Hiſtory of *Thucydides?* All learned Men do acknowledge, that there have been multitudes of fictitious Writings, but do they therefore queſtion, whether there are any genuine? Or whether we have not the true *Herodotus*, *Strabo*, or *Pauſanias*, becauſe there is a counterfeit *Beroſus*, *Manetho*, and *Philo*, ſet forth by *Annius* of *Viterbo?* Do any ſuſpect whether we have any of the genuin Works of *Cicero*, becauſe an *Italian* counterfeited a Book, *De Conſolatione* in his Name? Or whether *Cæſar*'s *Commentaries* were his own; becauſe it is uncertian who writ the *Alexandrian War* that is joined with them? By which we ſee, that we may not only be certain of the Fidelity of Perſons we converſe with, but of all things neceſſary to our belief of what was done at a great diſtance of Time from the *Teſtimony* of Writers, notwithſtanding the many ſuppoſititious Writings that have been in the World.

But it may be ſaid, *That all this only relates to meer Matters of Hiſtory, wherein a Man is not much concerned whether they be true or falſe; but the things we are about are Matters that Mens Salvation or Damnation are ſaid to depend upon, and therefore greater Evidence ſhould be given of theſe, to oblige Men to believe them.*

To this I anſwer. 1. That my deſign herein, was to prove, that notwithſtanding the poſſibility of Deception, there may be ſufficient ground for a prudent and firm aſſent to the Truth of Things done at as great a diſtance of Time, and convey'd after the ſame manner, that the Matters of Fact reported in the *New Teſtament are*; and hereby thoſe general Prejudices are ſhewed to be unreaſonable: And all that I deſire from this Diſcourſe is, that you would give an aſſent of the ſame Nature to the Hiſtory of the *Goſpel*, that you do to *Cæſar*, or *Livy*, or *Tacitus*, or any other ancient Hiſtorian. 2. As to the greater Obligation to aſſent, I ſay it depends upon the Evidence of Divine Revelation, which is given by the Matters of Fact which are deliver'd to us. And here give me leave to aſk you; 1. Whether it be any ways repugnant to any conception you have of God, for him to make uſe of fallible Men to make known his Will to the World? 2. Whether thoſe Men, though ſuppoſed to be in themſelves fallible, can either deceive, or be deceived, when God makes known his Mind to them? 3. Whether on ſuppoſition, that God hath made uſe of ſuch Perſons for this end, thoſe are not obliged to believe them, who do not live in the ſame *Age* with them? If not, then *God* muſt either make no *Revelation* at all, or he muſt make a New one every Age: If they are, then the Obligation lies as much on us now to believe, as if we had lived and converſed with thoſe inſpired Perſons.

2. That there is no reaſon to ſuſpect the Truth of thoſe Matters of Fact which are reported in the *New Teſtament*; For ſince it is univerſally agreed among Men, that Humane *Teſtimony* is a ſufficient ground for aſſent, where there is no poſitive ground for ſuſpicion; becauſe deceiving and being deceived, is not the common Intereſt of Mankind; there-

therefore we are to conſider what the general grounds of *ſuſpicion* are, and whether any of them do reach the *Apoſtles Teſtimony*, concerning the Matters of Fact reported by them. And the juſt grounds of ſuſpicion are theſe; 1. If the *Perſons* be otherwiſe known to be Men of Artifice and Cunning, full of Tricks and Diſſimulation, and that make no Conſcience of ſpeaking Truth, ſo a Lye tends to their greateſt Advantage; which is too much the *Papiſts* caſe in their *Legends*, and *Stories* of *Miracles*. 2. If they temper and ſuit their Story and Doctrine to the *Humour* and *Genius* of the People, they hope to prevail upon, as *Mahomet* did, in encouraging *War* and *Laſciviouſneſs*. 3. If they lay the Scene of their Story at a mighty diſtance from themſelves, at ſuch an Age, wherein it is impoſſible to prove, or diſprove; which is the caſe of the *Brachmans*, as to their *Brahmà*, and their *Vèdà*; and was of the *Heathens* as to their Fabulous Deities. 4. If there be any thing contained in the Story, which is repugnant to the moſt authentick Hiſtories of thoſe Times; by which means the Impoſtures of *Annius* have been diſcovered. 5. If there be evident contradiction in the Story it ſelf; or any thing repugnant to, or unbecoming the Majeſty, Holineſs, Sincerity, and Conſiſtency of a Divine Revelation; on which account we reject *Fanatick* pretences to *Revelations*. If there were any thing of this nature in the *Writings* of the *New Teſtament*, we might then allow there were ſome ground to ſuſpect the *Truth* of what is contained therein: But I ſhall undertake, by the Grace of God, to defend that there is not any Foundation for Suſpicion as to any one of theſe.

1. As to the *Perſons*, ſuch who go about to deceive others, muſt be Men that are verſed in buſineſs, and know how to deal with Men; and that have ſome Intereſt already that they have gained by other Means, before they can carry on ſuch a Deſign as to abuſe Mankind, by Lies and Impoſtures in *Religion*: Therefore the *Atheiſts* lay the deceiving the World by *Religion*, to the Charge of *Politicians* and *Law-givers*, to Men verſed in the practice of Fraud, ſuch as *Numa*, or *Lycurgus*, or *Xaca*, or *Mahomet*, ſuch as underſtood the ways of cajoling the People; or to *ſubtle Prieſts*, that know how to ſuit the hopes and fears of the ſuperſtitious Multitude; whence came the multitude of Frauds in the *Heathen Temples* and *Oracles*. But would any Man in the World have pitched upon a few *Fiſhermen*, and illiterate Perſons, to carry on ſuch an intrigue as this? Men that were rude and unexperienced in the World, and uncapable of dealing in the way of Artifice with one of the common Citizens of *Hieruſalem*. When was it ever heard that ſuch Men made ſuch an alteration in the *Religion* of the World, as the Primitive *Chriſtians* did, againſt the moſt violent Perſecutions? And when they prevailed ſo much, the common Charge ſtill againſt them was, that they were a Company of *rude, mean, obſcure, illiterate, ſimple Men*: And yet in ſpight of all the Cunning, and Malice, and Learning, and Strength of their Adverſaries, they gained ground upon them, and prevailed over the *Obſtinacy* of the *Jews*, and *Wiſdom* of the *Greeks*. If the *Chriſtian Religion* had been a meer deſign of the *Apoſtles* to make themſelves *Heads* of a new *Sect*, what had this been but to have ſet the Cunning of twelve, or thirteen Men, of no Intereſt, or Reputation, againſt the *Wiſdom* and *Power* of the whole World? If they had any *Wiſdom*, they would never have undertaken ſuch an impoſſible deſign as this muſt appear to them at firſt View: And if they had none, how could they ever hope to manage it? If their aim were only at Reputation, they might have

thought of thouſands of Ways more probable, and more advantageous than this: If we ſuppoſe Men ſhould be willing to hazard their Lives for their Reputations, we may ſuppoſe withal ſuch Men to have ſo much cunning as not to do it till they cannot help it; but if they can have Reputation and Eaſe together, they had rather have it. I will therefore put the Caſe concerning the only Perſon that had the Advantage of a learned Education among the *Apoſtles*; *viz.* St. *Paul*, and whom you ſeem to ſtrike at more than the reſt: Is it reaſonable to believe, that when he was in favour with the *Sanhedrin*, and was likely to advance himſelf by his oppoſition to *Chriſtianity*, and had a fair proſpect of Eaſe and Honour together; he ſhould quit all this, to join with ſuch an inconſiderable and hated Company, as the *Chriſtians* were, only to be one of the *Heads* of a very ſmall Number of Men, and to purchaſe it at ſo dear a rate as the loſs of his Friends and Intereſt, and running on continual Troubles and Perſecutions, to the hazard of his Life? Is it poſſible for Men that are deceived and mean honeſtly to do this; but it is ſcarce ſuppoſable of a Man in his Senſes that ſhould know and believe all this to be a *Cheat*, and yet own and embrace it, to ſo great diſadvantage to himſelf: When he could not make himſelf ſo conſiderable by it, as he might have been without it. Men muſt love *cheating* the World at a ſtrange rate, that will let go fair hopes of Preferment and Eaſe, and lead a Life of perpetual Trouble, and expoſe themſelves to the utmoſt Hazards, only for the ſake of deluding others. If the *Apoſtles* knew all they ſaid to be falſe, and made it ſo neceſſary for all Men to believe what they ſaid to be true; they were ſome of the greateſt Deceivers which the World had ever known: But Men that take pleaſure in deceiving, make uſe of many Artifices on purpoſe to catch the ſilly Multitude; they have all the Arts of Inſinuation and fawning Speeches, fit to draw in the weakeſt, and ſuch as love to be flatter'd; but what is there tending this way in all the Apoſtles Writings? How ſharply do they ſpeak to the *Jewiſh Sanhedrin*, upon the Murder of Chriſt? With what plainneſs and ſimplicity do they go about to perſuade Men to be *Chriſtians?* They barely tell the Matters of Fact concerning the *Reſurrection* of *Chriſt*, and ſay *they were Eye-witneſſes of it*, and upon the Credit of this *Teſtimony* of theirs, they preach *Faith* and *Repentance* to *Jews* and *Gentiles:* Was ever any thing farther from the appearance of Artifice than this was? So that if they were deceivers, they were ſome of the ſubtileſt that ever were in the World, becauſe there ſeems to be ſo little ground for any ſuſpicion of Fraud; and we cannot eaſily imagin Perſons of their Education, capable of ſo profound Diſſimulation and ſo artificial a Cheat. Beſides all this, we are to conſider how far ſuch Perſons do allow the liberty of *Diſſimulation* and *artificial Juglings*, eſpecially in *Religion*; we ſee the *Papiſts* could not practiſe theſe things, without being forced to defend them, by ſhewing how convenient it is for the People to be told ſtrange Stories of *Saints*, on purpoſe *to nouriſh Devotion* in them: To which end, they ſay, *it ſignifies not much, whether they were true or no:* And withal they aſſert the *Lawfulneſs of Equivocations, and Mental Reſervations, and doing things, not otherwiſe juſtifiable, for the Honour of their Church and Religion*; And I ſhall freely confeſs to you, if I found any countenance to ſuch things as theſe, from the Doctrine or Practice of the *Apoſtles*, it would give me too juſt a ground for ſuſpicion as to what they deliver'd. For if they allowed *Equivocations* or *Mental Reſervations*, how could I poſſibly know what they

they meant by any thing they ſaid? For that which was neceſſary to make the Propoſition true, lay without my reach in the Mind of another; and while they ſo firmly atteſted that *Chriſt was riſen from the Dead*, they might underſtand it of a *Spiritual* or *Myſtical Reſurrection*; but if they ſhould be found to allow *Lying or Cheating for the Cauſe of Religion*, their Credit would be gone with me; for how could I be any longer ſure of the *Truth* of one Word they ſaid? I ſhould be ſo far from thinking them *Infallible*, that I could not but ſuſpect them to have a deſign to deceive me. The firſt thing therefore we are to look at in Perſons who require our belief, is the ſtricteſt Veracity; if they falter in this, they expoſe themſelves to the ſuſpicion of all but credulous Fools. But we no where find greater plainneſs and ſincerity required, no where more ſtrict and ſevere Prohibitions of Diſſimulation in *Religion*, nor more general Precepts about *ſpeaking Truth*, than in the Writings of the *New Teſtament*. *But might not all this be done with the greater Artifice to prevent ſuſpicion?* Suſpicion is a thing, which *he that ſet Bounds to the Sea*, can ſet no Bounds to; if Men will give way to it, without Reaſon, there can be no end of it. For the moſt effectual ways to prevent it, will ſtill afford new matter and occaſion for it. If Men do uſe the utmoſt Means that are poſſible, to aſſure others of their ſincerity, and they will not believe them, but ſtill ſuſpect the deſign to be ſo much deeper laid; there is no way left poſſible to ſatisfy ſuch Men; their ſuſpicion is a Diſeaſe incurable by rational Means, and ſuch Perſons deſerve to be given over as paſt all Remedy. If Men act like prudent Men, they will judge according to the *Reaſon* of *Things*; but if they entertain a jealouſie of all Mankind, and the moſt of thoſe who give them the greateſt aſſurance they have no Intention to deceive them, it is to no purpoſe to go about to ſatisfie ſuch Perſons, for that very Undertaking makes them more ſuſpicious. If the *Apoſtles* therefore gave as much ground as ever any *Perſons* did, or could do, that they had no deſign to impoſe upon the World, but proceeding with all the fairneſs and openneſs, with the greateſt Evidence of their Sincerity, there can be no reaſon to faſten upon them the Imputation of cunning Men who made it their buſineſs to deceive others.

2. This will more appear if we conſider the *Matters* deliver'd by them, and the nature of their Doctrine. For if the *Chriſtian Religion* were only a contrivance of the firſt Preachers of it, it muſt by the event be ſuppoſed that they were very ſubtle Men, who in ſo little time, and againſt ſo great oppoſition could prevail over both *Jews* and *Gentiles*; but if we reflect on the *nature* of their *Doctrine*, we can never imagine that theſe Men did proceed by the ſame Methods that Men of ſubtilty do make uſe of. If it were their own Contrivance, it was in their Power to have framed it as they thought fit themſelves; and in all probability, they would have done it in a way moſt likely to be ſucceſsful; but the *Chriſtian Religion* was ſo far from it, as though they had induſtriouſly deſigned to advance a *Religion* againſt the *Genius* and *Inclination* of all Mankind. For it neither gratifies the voluptuous in their Pleaſures, nor the Ambitious in their deſires of External Pomp and Greatneſs, nor the Covetous in their Thirſt after Riches; but lays a ſevere reſtraint on all thoſe common and prevailing Paſſions of Mankind; which *Mahomet* well underſtood, when he ſuited his *Religion* to them. *Chriſtianity* was neither accommodated to the Temper and Genius either of *Jews* or *Gentiles*: The *Jews* were in great expectation of a Tempo-

ral *Prince* at that Time to deliver them from the *Roman* Slavery; and every one that would have ſet up for ſuch a *Meſſias*, might have had Followers enough among them, as we find afterwards by the Attempts of *Barchocebas* and others. But the *Meſſias* of the *Chriſtians* was ſo directly contrary to their Hopes and Expectations, being a *poor* and *ſuffering Prince*, that this ſet them the more againſt his Followers, becauſe they were hereby fruſtrated of their greateſt Hopes, and defeated in their moſt pleaſing Expectations: But beſides, if they would have taken in the *Moſaick Law*, it might in probability have ſuceeded better; but this St. *Paul* would by no means hear of. *But if they rejected* Jews, *methinks, they ſhould have been willing to have had ſome Aſſiſtance from the* Gentiles. No, they charged them with *Idolatry* wherever they came, and would not join in any parts of their Worſhip with them, nor ſo much as Eat of the *remainder* of their *Sacrifices*. But ſuppoſing they had a mind to ſet up wholly a new *Sect* of their own; yet we ſhould think they ſhould have framed it after the moſt plauſible manner, and left out all things that were moſt liable to Reproach and Infamy: But this they were ſo far from, that the moſt contemptible part of the *Chriſtian Religion*, viz. *A crucified Saviour*, they inſiſt the moſt upon, and preach it on all Occaſions, and in compariſon of it, ſtrangely deſpiſe all the *Wiſdom* and *Philoſophy* of the *Greeks*. What did theſe Men mean, if *Chriſtianity* had been only a *Contrivance* of theirs? If they had but left out this one Circumſtance, in all human probability, the excellent moral Precepts in *Chriſtianity* would have been highly magnified among all thoſe who had been bred up under the Inſtructions of *Philoſophers*. Nay, they would not make uſe of the moſt commendable Methods of Human Wiſdom; nor do as the *Jeſuits* have done in *China*, make Men have a better Opinion of the *Religion* they brought, for their Skill in *Mathematicks* and *Aſtronomy*; but as much as it was poſſible, to let the World ſee it was no contrivance of Humane Wiſdom, they ſhunned all the Ways of ſhewing it in the manner of its Propagation. Nay, when the People would have given the *Apoſtles* Divine Worſhip, never were vain Men more concerned to have it, than they to oppoſe it; And do theſe things look like the Actions of Men that deſigned only to make themſelves great, by being the *Heads* of a new *Sect* of *Religion?*

3. Men that made it their deſign to deceive the World, if they had thought it neceſſary to bring in any matter of *Story* concerning the *Author* of their *Religion* would have placed it at ſuch *a diſtance of Time*, that it was not capable of being diſproved: As it is apparent in the *Heathen Mythologie*; for the Stories were ſuch, as no Perſon could ever pretend to confute them otherwiſe than by the inconſiſtency of them with the common Principles of *Religion*. But if we ſuppoſe *Chriſtianity* to have been a meer Device, would the *Apoſtles* have been ſo ſenſeleſs to have laid the main Proof of their *Religion* on a thing which was but newly acted, and which they were very capable of enquiring into all the Circumſtances that related to it, *viz.* The *Reſurrection of Chriſt from the Dead*. We may ſee by the whole deſign of the *New Teſtament*, the great Streſs of *Chriſtianity* was laid upon the Truth of this; to this *Chriſt* himſelf appealed before-hand; to this all the *Apoſtles* refer as the mighty confirmation of their Religion; and this they deliver as a thing which themſelves had ſeen, and had converſed with him for Forty Days together, with all the demonſtrations imaginable of a *true*

and *real Body:* And that not to one or two credulous Persons, but so many of them who were hard to be satisfied, and one, not without the most sensible Evidence; but besides these, they tell us of 500 *at once who saw him, whereof many were then living* when those things were written. Now I pray tell me what *Religion* in the World ever put it self upon so fair a Trial as this? Of a plain Matter of Fact as capable of being attested as any could be. Why did not *Amida*, or *Brahmà*, or *Xaca*, or any other of the Authors of the present *Religions* of the *East-Indies?* Why did not *Orpheus*, or *Numa*, or any other introducers of *Religious* Customs among the *Greeks* or *Romans?* Or *Mahomet* among the *Arabians* put the issue of the Truth of their *Religion* on such a plain and easie *tryal* as this? If you say, *That Christ appeared only to his Friends, who were ready to believe such things, and not among his Enemies:* I answer, That though they were his *Friends*, yet they were very hard to be persuaded of the *Truth* of it at first; and afterwards gave larger Testimonies of their Fidelity than the Testimony of the greatest *Enemies* would have been; for we should have had only their *bare Words* for it, (if they would have given that, which is very questionable, considering their dealing with the other *Miracles* of *Christ:*) But the *Apostles* manifested their *sincerity* by all real Proofs that could be thought sufficient to satisfie Mankind; appealing to the very Persons who were concerned the most in it, having a hand in the Death of *Christ*, declaring their greatest readiness to suffer any thing rather than deny the Truth of it, and laying down their Lives at last for it. If all this had been a mere Fiction, how unlikely is it, that among so many as were conscious of it, no one Person by Hopes or Fears, by Flatteries or Threatnings, could ever be prevailed upon to deny the Truth of it. If there had been any such thing, what triumphing had there been among the *Jews*; and no doubt his Name had been recorded to Posterity among the Writers both of *Jews* and *Gentiles* that were professed Enemies of *Christianity*. But they are all wonderfully silent in this matter; and instead of saying enough to overthrow the *Truth of Christianity*, as you seem to suggest, I do assure you, I am mightily confirmed in the Belief of the Truth of it, by carefully observing the slightness of the Objections that were made against it, by its most professed Enemies.

But you seem to imply, *That all this Story concerning Christ was invented long after the pretended Time of his being in the World*, Why may not you as well suspect, that *Julius Cæsar* lived before *Romulus*; or that *Augustus* lived at the Siege of *Troy?* For you might as well reject all History upon such grounds as those you assign; and think *Mahomet* as right in his *Chronology*, as the *Bible*. It is time for us to burn all our *Books*, if we have lived in such a Cheat all this while. Methinks you might as well ask, whether *Lucretia* were not *Pope Joan?* Or *Alexander* the *Sixth*, one of the *Roman Emperors?* Or whether *Luther* were not the *Emperor* of *Turkey?* For there is no greater evidence of any History in the World, than there is, that all the Things reported in the *New Testament* were done at that time, when they are pretended to be.

4. Therefore we offer this Story of the *New Testament* to be compared with all the *Circumstances of that Age*, delivered by any other *Historians*, to try if any *inconsistencies* can be found therein: Which is the most reasonable way can be taken to disprove any History. If it could be proved, that there could be no such *Taxation* of the *Empire* as is mention'd

tion'd in the Time of *Auguſtus*, that *Herod* did not live in that *Age*, or that the *Jews* were not under the *Roman Government*, or that there were no *High-Prieſts* at that time, nor the *Sects* of *Phariſees* and *Saducees*, or that there were any other remarkable *Characters* of Time ſet down in the *Hiſtory* of the *New Teſtament*, which could be manifeſtly diſproved; there were ſome pretence to call in Queſtion the Truth of the Story; but there is not the leaſt Foundation for any ſcruple on this account; all things agreeing ſo well with the trueſt Accounts we have of that *Age*, both from *Joſephus* and the *Roman Hiſtory*. I ſhall not inſiſt on the particular *Teſtimony* of *Joſephus* concerning *Chriſt*, becauſe we need it not; and if thoſe who queſtion it, would proceed with the ſame ſeverity againſt many other particular Paſſages in good *Authors*, they might as well call them in queſtion as they do that; ſince it is confeſſed, that all the ancient *Manuſcripts* have it in them, and ſuppoſing that it doth not come in well, muſt we ſuppoſe it impoſſible for *Joſephus* to write incoherently? Yet this is the main Argument that ever I have ſeen urged againſt this *Teſtimony* of *Joſephus*. But I ſay, we need it not; all other things concurring in ſo high a degree to prove the *Truth* of the *Hiſtory* of *Chriſt*. Yet ſince you ſeem to expreſs ſo much doubtfulneſs concerning it, *as though it were framed when there was no one living capable of diſproving it*; give me leave to ſhew you the great abſurdity of ſuch a Suppoſition. 1. Becauſe we have the plain Teſtimonies of the greateſt Enemies of *Chriſtianity*, that there was ſuch a Perſon as *Chriſt* was, who ſuffered according to the *Scripture Story*. For *Tacitus* not only mentions the *Chriſtians* as ſuffering at *Rome* for their *Religion* in the Time of *Nero*, (*Annal.* 15.) but ſaith, *That the Author of this Religion was one Chriſt, who ſuffered under* Pontius Pilate, *Procurator of* Judea, *in the Time of* Tiberius; which is an irrefragable Teſtimony of the *Truth* of the Story concerning *Chriſt*, in an *Age*, when if it had been falſe, nothing could have been more eaſily detected than ſuch a Fiction, by the number of *Jews* which were continually at *Rome:* And neither *Julian*, nor *Celſus*, nor *Porphyry*, nor *Lucian* did ever queſtion the *Truth* of the Story it ſelf; but only upbraided the *Chriſtians* for attributing too much to *Chriſt*. 2. If there were really ſuch a Perſon as Chriſt was, who ſuffered as *Tacitus* ſaith, then the whole Story could not be a Fiction, but only ſome part of it; and theſe additional parts muſt either be contrived by the *Apoſtles*, or after their Time: Not after their Time, for then they muſt be added after *Chriſtianity* was received in the World, for that, as appears by *Tacitus*, was ſpread in the *Apoſtles* Times as far as *Rome*; and if theſe parts were not received with it; the Cheat would preſently have been diſcover'd as ſoon as broached, by thoſe who had embraced *Chriſtianity* before: And beſides, *Tertullian* in his Time appeals to the *authentick Writings* of the *Apoſtles* themſelves, which were then extant, wherein the ſame things were contained that we now believe: If theſe things then were forged, it muſt be by the *Apoſtles* themſelves; and I dare now appeal to you, whether ever any Story was better capable of being diſproved than this was, if it had not been true, ſince it was publiſhed in that very Time and Place where the *Perſons* were living, who were moſt concerned to diſprove it: As appears by the hatred of the *Jews* to the *Chriſtians*, both then and ever ſince: which is a very obſervable Circumſtance for proving the *Truth* of *Chriſtian Religion*; for the *Jews* and *Chriſtians* agreed in the *Divine Revelations* of old, the *Chriſtians* believed moreover, that *Chriſt* was the

Meſſias promiſed; this *Chriſt* lived and died among the *Jews* his Enemies; his *Apoſtles* preached, and wrought Miracles among their moſt inveterate Enemies, which Men that go about to deceive never care to do: And to this Day the *Jews* do not deny the *Matters* of *Fact*, but look on them as inſufficient to prove *Jeſus* of *Nazareth* to have been the *Meſſias:* Nay, *Mahomet* himſelf, who in all probability would have overthrown the whole Story of the *New Teſtament*, if he could have done it with any colour, yet ſpeaks very honourably of *Chriſt* and of the great Things which were ſaid and done by him.

5. That there is nothing in the *Chriſtian Religion*, unbecoming the *Majeſty*, or *Holineſs*, or *Truth* of a *Divine Revelation.* As to the Precepts, *you acknowledge their excellency*; and the *Promiſes* chiefly refer either to *Divine Grace*, or *future Glory*; And what is there herein unbecoming *God?* And as to what concerns the *Truth* of it, we have as great Characters of that throughout, as it is poſſible for us to expect; there appearing ſo much Simplicity, Sincerity, Candour, and Agreement in all the parts of it. Some Men would have been better pleaſed, it may be, if it had been all written by one *Perſon*, and digeſted into a more exact Method, and ſet forth with all the Lights and Ornaments of Speech. This would have better become an Invention of Men, but not a *Revelation* of *God:* Plainneſs and Simplicity have a natural greatneſs above Art and Subtilty; and therefore *God* made choice of many to write, and at ſeveral times, that by comparing them we may ſee how far they were from contriving together, and yet how exactly they agree in all things which Men are concerned to believe. But you ſay, *We have many Infirmities of the* Apoſtles *diſcovered therein, their Heats and Animoſities one againſt another.* But I pray conſider; 1. How came you to know theſe things; Is it not by their own Writings? And if they had been ſuch, who minded only their Applauſe, had it not been as eaſie to have concealed theſe things, and would they not as certainly have done it, if that had been their aim? If *St.* Paul *ſeems to boaſt*, doth he not do it with that conſtraint to himſelf, as a Man that is forced to do it for his own vindication againſt malicious Enemies? And who ever denied a Man of a generous Mind the liberty of ſpeaking for himſelf? 2. But ſuppoſe *they had Infirmities and Heats among them*; doth this prove that *God* could not make uſe of them as his Inſtruments to declare his *Truth* to the World? Then it will follow, that *God* muſt never reveal his Will by *Men*, but by *Voices* from *Heaven*, or *Angels*, or the *aſſumption* of the *Humane Nature by the Divine.* But, if *God* be not denied the liberty of imploying meer Men, we cannot find ſo great evidences of Piety and Zeal, of Humility and Self-denial, of Patience and Magnanimity, of Innocency and univerſal Charity in any Men as were in the *Apoſtles*; And therefore did appear with the moſt proper *Characters* of *Embaſſadors* from Heaven. And I dare venture the compariſon of them with the beſt *Philoſophers*, as to the greateſt and moſt excellent *Virtues*, for which they were the moſt admired; notwithſtanding the mighty difference as to their Education; allowing but the ſame Truth as to the Story of the *New Teſtament*, which we yield to *Xenophon*, or *Diogenes Laertius*, or any other Writers concerning them.

But what is it then which you object againſt the Writings of the *New Teſtament*, to make them inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom of God? I find but two things in the Papers you ſent me. 1. *Want of the continuance of the Power of Miracles, which you ſay is promiſed.* Mark 16. 17.

2. *The number of the Beaſt in the Revelations.* But, Good Sir, conſider what it is to call in queſtion a Divine Revelation for ſuch Objections as theſe are? Muſt there be no Revelation, unleſs you underſtand every Prophecy, or the extent of every Promiſe? Be not ſo injurious to your own Soul, for the ſake of ſuch Objections, to caſt away the great Aſſurance which the *Chriſtian Religion* gives us, as to the pardon of Sin upon Repentance here, and eternal Happineſs in another World. Would you reject all the Writings of *Plato*, becauſe you do no more underſtand ſome part of his *Timæus* than the number of 666? You muſt have a very nice Faith, that can bear with no Difficulties at all, ſo that if there be but one or two hard things that you cannot digeſt, you muſt throw up all the beſt Food you have taken; at this rate you muſt ſtarve your Body, as well as ruin your Soul. But of theſe places afterwards.

3. I have hitherto removed the Grounds of Suſpicion, I now come to ſhew the poſitive Teſtimonies of their *Sincerity* which the *Apoſtles* ſhewed, which were greater than were ever given to any other Matter of Fact in the *World.* I will then ſuppoſe the whole *Truth* of the *Chriſtian Doctrine* to be reduced to this one Matter of Fact, Whether *Chriſt did riſe from the dead or no?* for (as I have ſaid already) it is plain, the *Apoſtles* put the main force of all that they ſaid upon the *Truth* of this; and often declared, that they were appointed to be the *Witneſſes* of this thing. Now let us conſider how it is poſſible for Men to give the higheſt aſſurance of their *Sincerity* to others; and that muſt be either by giving the utmoſt Teſtimony that Men can give; or by giving ſome Teſtimony above that of Men, which cannot deceive, which is the *Teſtimony of God.*

1. They gave the *utmoſt Teſtimony* that meer Men could give of their *Fidelity.* I know no better way we have for a full Aſſurance, as to any humane Teſtimony, than to conſider what thoſe Circumſtances are, which are generally allowed to accompany Truth, and if we have the Concurrence of all theſe, we have as much as can be expected: For nothing that depends on *Teſtimony* can be proved by *Mathematical Demonſtration.* But notwithſtanding the want of this, either we may have ſufficient ground to aſſent to *Truth* upon *Teſtimony*, or there can be no difference known between *Truth* and *Falſhood* by Humane *Teſtimony*; which overthrows all Judicial Proceedings among Men; the *Juſtice* whereof doth ſuppoſe not only the *Veracity* of *Humane Teſtimony:* But that it may be ſo diſcerned by others, that they may ſafely rely upon it. Now the main things to be regarded as to the *Truth* of *Humane Teſtimony*, are theſe: 1. If Men teſtifie nothing but what they ſaw. 2. If they teſtifie it at no long diſtance of time from the thing done. 3. If they teſtifie it plainly, and without doubtful Expreſſions. 4. If a great number agree in the ſame Teſtimony. 5. If they part with all that is valuable to Mankind, rather than deny the Truth of what they have teſtified! And where all theſe concur, it is hardly poſſible to ſuppoſe greater evidence to be given of the *Truth* of a *Thing*; and now I ſhall ſhew that all theſe do exactly agree to the *Apoſtle*'s *Teſtimony* concerning the *Reſurrection* of *Chriſt.*

1. They teſtified nothing but what they ſaw themſelves. The *Laws* of *Nations* do ſuppoſe that greater credit is to be given to *Eye-witneſſes* than to any others, thence the Rule in the Civil Law, *Teſtimonium de auditu regulariter non valet:* Becauſe, ſay the *Civilians* and *Canoniſts*, *Witneſſes are to teſtifie the Truth, and not barely the Poſſibility of things.*

That which Men see, they can testifie whether they are or not: That which Men only hear, may be, or not be; and their *Testimony* is not of the *Fact*, but is looked on as more uncertain, and ought to have greater Allowances given it; but the Apostles testified only *what they saw and handled*; and that after the most scrupulous enquiry into the *Truth* of *Christ*'s *Body*, and after many *Doubts* and *Suspicions* among themselves about it; so that they did not seem hastily and rashly to believe what they afterwards declared to the World. Now a *Body* was a proper Object of Sense, and no Tryal could be greater, or more accurate than theirs was; nor any satisfaction fuller than putting their *Fingers* into the very *Wounds* of the *pierced Side.*

2. They did not stay till the *circumstances* might have slipt out of their Memories, before they testified these things; but very soon after, while the impression of them was fresh upon them: If they had let these Matters alone for any long time, the *Jews* would have asked them presently, if these things were true, why did we not hear of them as soon as they were done? Therefore we see the Apostles, on the very Day of *Pentecost*, a little after *Christ*'s *Ascension* to Heaven, openly and boldly declare the *Truth* of these things, not in private Corners among a few *Friends*, but in the most solemn Meeting of their Nation from all Parts, which was the worst time could have been chosen, if they had any intention to deceive.

3. They testifie it in as *plain a manner* as is possible, on purpose to prevent all Mistakes of their meaning, *This Jesus hath God raised up, whereof we all are witnesses; Therefore let all the House of* Israel *know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ.* Men that had a mind to deceive, would have used some more general and doubtful Words, than these were. Acts 2. 32, 36.

4. If this had been testified by one single Witness, the World would have suspected the Truth of his Testimony; for according to the Rule in the *Civil Law*, in the Case of *Testimony*, *Vox unius, vox nullius est:* But this was testified by very many, not merely by the Twelve Apostles, but by Five hundred at once; among whom some might be supposed to have so much Honesty, or at least capable of being perswaded to have discovered the Imposture, if they had in the least suspected any.

5. But that which adds the greatest weight to all this, is, that there was not one of all the Apostles, and scarce any one of the rest, but exposed themselves to the utmost *Hazards* and *Dangers*, rather than deny or retract the *Truth* of what they had witnessed. If the *People* had been careless and indifferent about *Religion*, it is possible Men might have gone on in a Lie so long, till they had gotten *Interest* enough to maintain it; but no sooner did the Apostles appear, witnessing these things, but they met with an early and vigorous opposition, and that from the chiefest Men in *Power*, who made it their business to suppress them. Now in this Case they were put to this Choice, if they would renounce or conceal the *Truth* of what they testified, they might presently enjoy Ease, and it may be Rewards too; but if they went on, they must look for nothing but the sharpest Persecution; and this they met with almost in all Places; and is it conceivable, that Men should be so *fond* of a *Lie*, to forsake all and follow it, and at last to take up their Cross for it? If *Credit* and *Interest* in the Hearts of People, might carry a Man on a great way in the Delusion, yet he would be loth to die for it; and yet there was never a one of the Apostles, but ventured his

Life for the *Truth* of this; and all but one, they tell us, did ſuffer Martyrdom for it. I pray, Sir, conſider, where you ever meet with any thing like this, that ſo many Men ſhould ſo reſolutely die, for what themſelves, at the ſame time, knew to be a Lie; and that they muſt certainly do, if it were all a Contrivance of their own Heads.

2. But although in theſe things they went as high as it was poſſible for *humane Teſtimony* to go, yet they had ſomething beyond all this, which was a *concurrence* of a *Divine Teſtimony*, in the *miraculous Gifts* and *Operations* of the *Holy Ghoſt*. And this we aſſert to be the higheſt Teſtimony can be given in the World, of the *Truth* of any thing, becauſe *God* will not employ his *Power* to deceive the World. And as all other *Truth* hath a *Criterion* proper to it; ſo this ſeems to be the proper *Criterion* of a *Divine Teſtimony*, that it hath the *power of Miracles* going along with it. For if we do ſuppoſe God to make known his Mind to the World, it is very reaſonable to believe there ſhould be ſome *diſtinguiſhing note* of what is immediately from God, and what comes only from the *Inventions* of *Men*; and what can be more proper to diſtinguiſh what comes from *God*, and what from *Men*, than to ſee thoſe things done, which none but *God* can do? But againſt this you object ſeveral things, which I ſhall eaſily and briefly anſwer.

1. *You cannot tell what it is that Miracles do atteſt; not all their Doctrine, ſince* Paul *ſaid, ſome was not from the Lord.* Anſw. *Miracles* do atteſt the *Veracity* of the *Speaker*, and by conſequence, the *Truth* of the *Doctrine*; *not that you ſhould believe that to be from the Lord, which he ſaid was not*; but that which he ſaid, was from the Lord. But when he makes ſuch a diſtinction himſelf, it is very unreaſonable to urge that as an Argument, that he had *nothing from the Lord*; it is much rather an Argument of his Candor and Ingenuity, that he would not pretend to *Divine Revelation*, when he had it not.

2. *You would have it ſignified, what Doctrine it is which is atteſted by Miracles, ſince the Doctrines of Scripture lie in heaps and confuſion. Anſw.* To what purpoſe ſhould any Doctrines be ſingled out to have the *Seal* of *Miracles* ſet to them, ſince it is their *Divine Commiſſion* to teach and declare the *Will* of *God*, which is *ſealed* by it? And what they did ſo teach and declare, is eaſily known by their Writings.

3. *But why do not Miracles ſtill continue? Anſw.* Becauſe there are no Perſons employ'd to teach any *new Doctrines*, and no Promiſe of *Scripture* doth imply any more: For the *Signs* which were to follow them that believe, were ſuch as tended to the firſt confirmation of the *Chriſtian Faith*; which being effected, their uſe ceaſed; and ſo to aſk why God doth not continue a Gift of *Miracles* to convince Men that the former were true, is to the ſame purpoſe as to aſk why *God* doth not make a *New Sun*, to ſatisfie *Atheiſts* that he made the *Old?*

4. *But doth not the Scriptures ſay, that Wonders are not always to be taken as Confirmations of the Truth of Doctrine, ſince falſe Prophets may work Wonders*, Deut. 13. 1. *Anſw.* That ſignifies no more, than that *Wonders* are not to be believed againſt the Principles of *Natural Religion*; or *Revealed Religion* already confirmed by *greater Miracles:* And that thoſe who would value ſuch a particular *Sign* above all the *Series* of *Miracles* their *Religion* was firſt eſtabliſhed by, may be juſtly left to their own *Deluſions.* You might as well object the lying Wonders of the *Man of Sin*, againſt all the *Miracles* of *Chriſt* and his *Apoſtles.* If God hath once done enough to convince Men, he may afterwards juſtly

leave them to the tryal of their Ingenuity; as a Father that hath uſed great care to make his Son underſtand *true Coyn*, may afterwards ſuffer *falſe* to be laid before him, to try whether he will mind his being cheated or no?

5. But you may yet farther demand, *What the Teſtimony of Miracles doth ſignifie to the Writings of the New Teſtament? Anſw.* 1. The Miracles do ſufficiently prove the *Authority* of that Doctrine, which was delivered by thoſe who wrought *Miracles*, as *Chriſt* and his *Apoſtles*. 2. If there had been the leaſt ground to queſtion the *Truth* and *Authority* of theſe *Writings*, they had never been ſo univerſally received in thoſe *Ages*, when ſo many were concerned to enquire into the *Truth* of theſe things; for we ſee ſeveral of the *Books* were a long time examined, and at laſt, when no ſufficient reaſon could be brought againſt them, they were received by thoſe *Churches*, which at firſt ſcrupled the receiving them: And I am ſo far from thinking the *Doubts* of the firſt *Ages* any Argument againſt the *Authority* of a *Book*, that by the Objections of ſome againſt ſome of them, I am thereby aſſured, that they did not preſently receive any *Book*, becauſe it went under the Name of an *Apoſtolical Writing:* As I am the more confirmed in the belief of the *Reſurrection* of *Chriſt*, becauſe ſome of the *Diſciples* were at firſt very *doubtful* about it.

6. You may yet aſk, *What doth all this ſignifie to the Writings of the Old Teſtament, which were written at a longer diſtance of Time from us, and in a more ignorant Age of the World? Anſw.* There cannot be a *more* evident Proof of the *Old Teſtament*, than by the *New:* For if the *New* be *true*, the *Old* muſt be ſo, which was confirmed ſo plainly and evidently by it; our *Saviour*, and his *Apoſtles* appealing to *Moſes* and the *Prophets* on all occaſions. So that the ſame *Miracles* which prove their *Teſtimony* true, do at the ſame time prove the *Divine Authority* of the *Old Teſtament*, ſince it is ſo expreſly ſaid in the *New*, *That Holy Men of God did ſpeak as they were moved by the Holy Ghoſt*.

But after all this, you urge, That you have diſcover'd ſuch things in theſe Writings, as could not come from God, as

1. *Contradictions in them.* 2. *Some things inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom of God.* 3. *Promiſes made that were never fulfilled.* 4. *Things ſo obſcure as no one can tell the meaning of them.* Under theſe Four Heads I ſhall examine the particular Allegations you bring againſt the *Scriptures*.

1. Under the Head of *Contradictions*, you inſiſt on the *Prophecy*, Gen. 15. 13, 14, 15, 16. *made to* Abraham, *concerning his Poſterity*; *compared with the Accompliſhment mentioned*, Exod. 12. 40, 41. And the force of your Argument lies in this, *That the Prophecy in* Geneſis *doth imply that the Servitnde of the Children of* Iſrael *in* Egypt *was to be* 400 *Years*; *or* 430 *ſaith* Exod. *but both theſe are repugnant to other places of Scripture, which make their abode in* Egypt *not to exceed* 215 *Years*; *or at the higheſt, by the number of Generations could not exceed* 350 *Years, ſtretching them to the utmoſt advantage.* To this which you lay ſo much weight upon, I anſwer diſtinctly,

1. By your own Confeſſion, ſuppoſing the 430 Years to begin from the *Covenant* made with *Abraham*, the accompliſhment mentioned, *Exod.* 12. 40. doth fall out exactly in the time of the *Children* of *Iſraels* going out of *Egypt*, for you have proved from *Scripture*, that from the *Covenant* with *Abraham* to *Jacob*'s being in *Egypt*, were 215 Years; to which you add, *that* Coath *being ſuppoſed* 5 *Years old at the going into* Egypt;

Egypt; *and that at* 70 *Years he begat* Amram, *and that* Amram *at* 70 *begat* Moſes, *to which* Moſes *his* 80 *Years being added, makes up the other* 215 *Years, whereby we have the full* 430 *Years, by your own Computation.* Now, Sir, I pray conſider what reaſon you have to charge the *Scripture* with Contradiction in a matter your ſelf acknowledges, ſo exactly accompliſhed in this way of *Computation?*

2. But you ſay, *the Words will not bear this; becauſe they ſpeak of the* 400 *Years to expire in their ſervitude in* Egypt. *Anſw.* For this we muſt conſider the importance of the Words both in *Geneſis* and *Exodus.* There is not a Word of *Egypt* mentioned in *Geneſis*, but only in general it is ſaid, *Thy Seed ſhall be a Stranger in the Land that is not theirs, and ſhall ſerve them, and they ſhall afflict them* 400 *Years*; and it will conduce very much to the right underſtanding this *Prophecy*, to conſider the main ſcope and deſign of it, which was not to tell *Abraham* how long they ſhould be in *ſervitude* to the *Egyptians*, but how long it would be before his Seed would come to the *poſſeſſion* of the promiſed *Land:* And it ſeems *Abraham*, by the *Queſtion*, Gen. 15. 7, 8. did expect to have the *Inheritance* of this Land *in his own time:* To this therefore *God* anſwers, by telling him, he meant no ſuch thing, but it was intended for *his Seed*, and that not ſuddenly neither, for they were to tarry *till the iniquity of the* Amorites *ſhould be full*, which would not be till the *fourth Generation*; and then *his Seed ſhould after* 400 *Years, come to the Poſſeſſion of the promiſed Land*; *but in the mean time they were to ſojourn in a Land that was not theirs, and to meet with many hardſhips and difficulties.* This is plainly the ſcope of this *Prophecy*, and by attending to it, the great Objections preſently appear without force; for the *Land* of *Canaan*, notwithſtanding the Promiſe, was by the *Patriarchs* themſelves looked on as a *Land* wherein they were *Strangers.* So *Abraham* ſaith, *Gen.* 23. 4, *I am a Stranger and a Sojourner with you*; and which is more remarkable in the Bleſſing of *Jacob* by *Iſaac*, to whom the *Promiſe* was made, it is ſaid, *And give thee the Bleſſing of* Abraham *to thee, and to thy Seed, that thou mayeſt inherit the Land wherein thou art a Stranger, which God gave unto* Abraham, *Gen.* 28. 4. Where the very ſame Word is uſed concerning *Jacob*, that is expreſſed in the Prophecy, *Gen.* 15. 13. So that the *Patriarchs* looked on themſelves as *Strangers in the Land of* Canaan, ſo long after the *Promiſe* made, and after the *increaſe* of the *Seed* of *Abraham:* And therefore the *Land* of *Canaan* was called *Terra Peregrinationum*, the *Land* wherein they were *Strangers*; Gen. 36. 7.--- 37. 1. And when *God* was calling the People of *Iſrael* together out of *Egypt*, yet then the *Land* of *Canaan* was called by the very ſame Title, the *Land of their Pilgrimage, wherein they were Strangers: Exod.* 6. 4. And *Pſ.* 105. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. where we have a full account of the *Promiſe* made to *Abraham*, *Iſaac* and *Jacob*, concerning the *Inheritance* of that *Land*, it is ſaid, *that they were few, and Strangers in it, when they went from one Nation to another, from one Kingdom to another People.* Which doth fully explain the meaning of the *Prophecy* in *Geneſis*, and that it is not to be reſtrained to the *Servitude* of the *People* of *Iſrael* in *Egypt*, but to be underſtood of their *State* of *Pilgrimage* for 400 Years, wherein they were to ſuffer great Hardſhips, before they ſhould come to the Inheritance of *Canaan.* *This is no forced or unnatural Expoſition of the Words*, as you ſeem to ſuggeſt; but to my Apprehenſion, very plain and eaſie, if we attend to the main ſcope and deſign of them, which was to acquaint *Abraham* how long it would be before the

the *Prophecy* were accomplished, and what the Condition of his Seed should be the mean time, *viz. That they should have no Land which they should call their own by Inheritance all that time, but they should be exposed to great Hardships, yea even to Servitude; but that Nation whom they should serve, should at last suffer for their ill usage of them, and they should come out of that Captivity with great Substance; and all this to be done in the Fourth Generation of the* Amorites, *when their Iniquities should be arrived at the full height.* All which Particulars were so remarkably accomplished at such a distance of Time, and under such improbable Circumstances, that this very *Prophecy* were enough to convince an unprejudiced Mind, that it came from Divine Inspiration. For where do we meet with any thing like this in the Histories of other Nations? *viz.* A Prophecy to be accomplished 400 Years after, and the very manner foretold, which no humane Conjecture could reach to, since the manner of Deliverance of the *People* of *Israel* out of their Captivity in *Egypt*, was to all humane appearance so impossible a thing, especially at such a time when the *Spirits* of the People were sunk and broken by so long a Slavery: And not only the manner foretold, but the accomplishment happened to a Day, according to *Exodus* 12. 41. *And it came to pass at the end of the* 430 *Years, even the self-same Day it came to pass, that all the Hosts of the Lord went out from the Land of* Egypt. But against this you object, *That the sojourning is spoken of the Children of* Israel *in* Egypt *for* 430 *Years; which cannot hold good any ways; since, to make it up, the Times of* Abraham, Isaac, *and* Jacob, *must be taken in, who could not be called the Children of* Israel. *Answ.* For the 430 Years, I grant, that according to St. *Paul*, they did commence from the *Covenant* made to *Abraham*, Gal. 3. 17. and that the 400 Years began from *Isaac*'s being owned for the *Promised Seed*; between which time the 30 Years were passed; and all appearance of difficulty is avoided, if we admit the reading of the best Copies of the *LXX*, which is in these Words, Ἡ δὲ παροίκησις τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ, ἣν παρῴκησαν ἐν γῇ Αἰγύπτῳ, καὶ ἐν γῇ Χαναάν, αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἔτη τετρακόσια τριάκοντα, *Now the sojourning of the Children of* Israel, *who dwelt in* Egypt *and* Canaan, *they and their Fathers was* 430 *Years.* This is the reading of our *Alexandrian* Copy, and the *Complutensian*, and that of *Aldus*, and of *Eusebius* in his *Chronicon*, and of St. *Hierome* in his Translation of it; and of the *Church* in St. *Augustine*'s time, and afterwards; and lest any should reject this as a late Interpolation, or Gloss received into the Text, besides these Testimonies of the Antiquity of it, we find the very same in the *Samaritan* Copy, which the Enemies of it do allow to be as ancient as our *Saviour*'s time. And that which very much confirms the Truth of this reading is, that the *Jews* themselves follow the Sense of it, who are the most eager Contenders for the *Authority* of the *Hebrew* Copy; who all agree, that the beginning of the Computation of the 430 Years is to be taken before the *Children* of *Israels* going into *Egypt*; and *Menasseh Ben Israel* contends with many others, that the 430 Years did begin from the *Promise* made to *Abraham*, and the 400 from the time of *Isaac*, to which their most ancient *Books* of *Chronology* do agree, and to the same purpose speak both *Philo Judæus*, and *Josephus*; who although in one place he seems to make *the* Israelites *affliction in* Egypt *to have been* 400 *Years*, yet when he speaks more particularly of it, *he makes the time of their abode in* Egypt *to have been only* 215, *and the* 430 *to begin from* Abraham's *entrance into* Canaan: The

Targum

Targum of *Jonathan* begins the 430 from the Viſion of *Abraham*, and the 400 from the Birth of *Iſaac*; all which I mention, to let you ſee that the *Jews* themſelves do in Senſe concur with the *Samaritan* and *Greek* Copy; and therefore we have more reaſon to ſuſpect ſomething left out in the preſent *Hebrew*, than any thing added in thoſe Copies. *But doth not this take off from the Authority of the Scripture?* Not at all: For the only Queſtion is about the true Reading: And having the Conſent of the *Samaritan*, *Alexandrian*, and other Copies of the *LXX*, and of the ancient *Church*, and of the *Jews* themſelves, as to the Senſe of it, we have reaſon to look on this as the truer Reading; which is making no addition to the *Scripture*, either as to Perſons or Places, but only producing the more authentick Copy; much leſs is this Adding or Changing as we pleaſe, for if we did this without ſo much Authority as we have for it, you might as eaſily reject it as we produce it.

3. After all this, I do not ſee the mighty force of your Reaſon to charge the Scripture with Contradiction, ſuppoſing *the* 400 *Years were to be ſpent in the Servitude of the Children of* Iſrael *in* Egypt. I confeſs, when I found the *Scripture* ſo boldly, ſo frequently charged with no leſs than Contradiction, I expected ſomething like Demonſtration in the Caſe, eſpecially in this place which you choſe to put in the Front of all; but I do not find any thing like ſuch a proof of a Contradiction, ſuppoſing we ſhould allow the 400 Years to be ſpent in *Egypt*. Yes, ſay you, Coath *was* 5 *Years old when he came down into* Egypt, *and when he had lived there* 65 *Years, he begat* Amram, *and* Amram *being* 70 *Years old, begat* Moſes, *to which* Moſes *his* 80 *Years being added, we have only* 215 *Years*. But ſince the *Scripture* doth not aſſign, the particular Age of any of theſe, when they begat their Children, I ſee no impoſſibility or repugnancy in the Suppoſition, that 400 Years ſhould paſs from *Levi*'s going into *Egypt*, to the Eightieth of *Moſes*, any more than from *Salmon*'s entrance into *Canaan* to the *time* of *David*, for no more are reckoned in *Scripture* than *Boaz* the Son of *Salmon*, by *Raab*, and *Obed*, and *Jeſſe*: So that by the ſame way, this latter may be explained, the former may be ſo too. If it be ſaid, *That either they begat their Children at a great Age, or that the Scripture in Genealogies doth not ſet down all the intermediate Parents, but only the moſt eminent,* (*as* Caleb *is called the Son of* Eſhron, 1 Chron. 2. 9, 18. *although there was at leaſt one between them*) the very ſame Anſwer will ſerve to clear this part of the *Chronology* of *Scripture* from any appearance of Contradiction. Theſe things you might have found more largely deduced and fully handled by thoſe Learned Perſons, who have undertaken to clear the *Chronology* of *Scripture*; who were Men of more Judgment, than from any difficulty of this nature, to call in queſtion the *Truth* and *Authority* of the *ſacred Scriptures*! and although the Opinions of *Chronologers*, are like the City Clocks, which ſeldom agree, yet ſome come nearer the time of the Day than others do; and therefore you ought to examine and compare them before you pronounce ſo peremptorily about Contradictions in *Scripture*, which you have no reaſon to do, till you find that no one *Hypotheſis* among them will ſerve to free the *Scripture* from Contradiction: For otherwiſe, you do but blame the *Sun*, becauſe you cannot make the Clocks agree.

This is all I can find in your Papers under the *Head* of Contradictions; and I leave you now ſoberly to conſider, whether this place did afford you ſufficient ground for ſo heavy a Charge; but if you ſay,

you

you have a great many more by you, but you sent me this only for a Trial of my Skill; before you send any more, I beseech you, Sir, to consider,

1. How easily things do appear to be Contradictions to weak, or unstudied, or prejudiced Minds, which after due consideration appear to be no such things. A deep prejudice finds a Contradiction in every thing; whereas in *Truth*, nothing but ill-will, and impatience of considering, made any thing, it may be, which they Quarrel at, appear to be so. If I had been of such a quarrelsome Humour, I would have undertaken to have found out more Contradictions in your Papers, than you imagine, and yet you might have been confident you had been guilty of none at all. When I consider the great Pains, and Learning, and Judgment, which hath been shewn by the *Christian Writers* in the Explication of the *Scriptures*; and the raw, indigested Objections which some love to make against them, if I were to judge of things barely by the fitness of Persons to judge of them, the disproportion between these would appear out of all comparison. A modest Man would in any thing of this nature say with himself, methinks, if there were such Contradictions in the *Bible*, as now seem to me; so many Persons of incomparable Abilities in the First, and latter Ages of the *Christian* Church, who have made it their business to enquire into these things, would have discerned them before me: And yet they retained a mighty veneration for the *Scriptures*, as coming from God himself; and therefore it may be only weakness of Judgment, want of Learning, or some secret Prejudice may make me suspect these things; or else I must suspect the honesty of all those Persons who have pretended such a Devotion to the Scriptures, and yet have believed them full of Contradictions.

2. *Wherein* the Contradiction appears. Is it in the main and weighty parts of the *Religion* revealed herein; or is it only in some smaller Circumstances as to Time and Place? The great thing you are to look after, are the Matters those *Scriptures* tell you your Salvation depends upon; and if there be a full Consent and Agreement therein, you find enough for you to believe and practise. And if some Contradictions should still appear to you in smaller Matters, what follows from thence, but only that the same care was not taken about little, as about great things? And you ought to set that appearance of Contradiction in small Matters, together with the real consent in the Things of the highest Importance; and from thence rather to infer, that this was no Combination or design to deceive others; for such Persons take the greatest care to prevent suspicion, by their exactness in every minute Circumstance; and sometimes the over-much care to prevent suspicion doth raise it the more.

3. *What ways* have been used by Men of Judgment and Learning, to clear those places from the charge of Contradiction. For, not one of the Objections you can start now, but hath been considered over and over; and all the difficulties that belong to it examined; If you will not take the Pains to do this, it is plain you do not desire satisfaction, but only seek for a Pretence to cavil; especially, if you only search the weakest or most injudicious Writers on the Scriptures, and endeavour to expose their Opinions, without taking notice of what others have said with more clear and evident Reason. This shews either want of Judgment in chooſing such Expositors, or want of Candor and fair dealing and a desire of taking any advantage against the Scriptures.

4. How hard a matter it is for us at this distance to understand exactly the grounds of *Chronology*, or the manner of computation of Times used so long ago: and therefore in all difficulties of this nature, we ought to make the fairest allowances that may be, considering withal, that Escapes and Errors are no where more easily committed by Transcribers, than in *numbers:* and that it is a very unreasonable thing, that a *Book* otherwise deserving to be thought the best *Book* in the World, should be scorned and rejected, because there appears some difference in the *computation* of *Times*. We do not so exactly know the manner of the *Hebrew Chronology*, nor, the nature of their Year, or Intercalations, nor the Customs of their *Genealogies*, nor the allowance to be made for *Interregnums*, so as to be able to define peremptorily in these things; but it is sufficient to shew, that there is no improbability in the Accounts that are given; and no sufficient reason can be drawn from thence to reject the Authority of the *Scriptures*.

2. I come to consider the places you object, *as containing things inconsistent with the Wisdom or Goodness of God, according to a rational persuasion*; and those are either, 1. *From the Laws of* Moses. 2. *From the express Story of the Bible, or Actions of the Prophets.*

1. *From the Laws of* Moses: Your *first Objection* is from *Exod.* 21. 7. *Where a Man is supposed to sell his Daughter; which you say, it is incredible to believe that God should permit; because it implies unnatural Affection and Covetousness in the Father.* But, Sir, 1. You do not consider, that this is barely a *provisional Law*, and is not the *permission* of the thing, so much as the *regulation* of it, supposing it to be done, *i. e.* in case a Man should part with his interest in his Daughter to another Person, upon an extraordinary case of Necessity, as the *Jews* understand it; yet then, she was not to be in the Condition of a Servant, but to be either Betrothed to the Person who receiv'd her, or to his Son; which was intended for the restraint of promiscuous Buying and Selling Daughters, merely for the satisfaction of Lust. The *Jews* who certainly best understood their own Judicial *Laws*, do say, that this was never to be done but where there was a presumption of such a *betrothing*; for no Man could sell his Daughter to those to whom it was unlawful to *marry* by their *Law*; so that this was looked on as a kind of *Espousals* of a young Girl, taken into Wardship by another; but so, that if she were not Betrothed, she was to remain her Six Years during her Minority, as the *Jews* understand it; unless she were redeemed, or set Free, or the *Jubilee* came, or the Master died, or the time of her Minority expired.

2. The case of *Necessity* being supposed, it hath been thought lawful for *Parents* to make Advantage by their *Children*, not only by the *Jews*, but by other Nations, who have been in the greatest Esteem for Wisdom. For by the *Law* of the 12 *Tables*, among the *Romans*, the *Father* had the liberty of Selling his Son three times for his own Advantage, as *Dionys. Halicarnasseus* relates; and before that time, it was not only in Use among the *Romans*, but in such Esteem among them, that upon the review of their Laws the *Decemviri* durst not leave it out; but by one of the *Laws* of *Numa Pompilius*, it was restrained to times before Marriage, for in case the *Son* had the *Fathers* consent to Marry, he could not sell him afterwards, as the same *Author* tells us. This *Law* continued in force among them till *Christianity* prevailed in the *Roman Empire*, for although there were a prohibition of *Diocletian* against it, yet that

that ſignified nothing, till *Conſtantine* took care, *That ſuch indigent Parents ſhould be relieved out of the publick Charge*, Cod. Theodoſ. l. 11. tit. 27. 2. And yet after this, the Cuſtom did continue, when the *Parents* were in great Want, as appears by a *Law* of *Theodoſius*, Cod. 3. tit. 3. *Omnes quos Parentum miſeranda fortuna in ſervitium dum victum requirunt addixit, ingenuitati priſtinæ reformentur.* And it farther appears, that even in *Conſtantin*'s time, notwithſtanding the Law made by him, *Parents* would ſtill, when they thought themſelves overcharged with Children, part with their Intereſt in them to others for advantage, but it was chiefly while they were *ſanguinolenti*, as the Law expreſſes it, *i. e. new Born. Cod. Theod. l. 5. tit. 8.* By the Laws of *Athens*, before *Solon*'s time, Parents might ſell their Children, as appears by *Plutarch*, in his Life; and the ſame *Philoſtratus* reports of the *Phrygians*, *l. 3. vit. Apollon. Tyan.* and the like Cuſtom doth obtain among the *Chineſes* to this Day, if Perſons do think themſelves unable to bring up their *Children* themſelves. And there are two things to be ſaid for it: 1. The natural Obligation lying on Children to provide for their Parents in Neceſſity, by any way they are able. 2. The probability of better Education under more able Perſons; and therefore the *Thebans* had a Law, *That* Parents *in caſe of Poverty, were to bring their* Children *to the Magiſtrate, as ſoon as they were Born, who put them out to ſuch as were judged fit to bring them up, and to have their Service for their Reward.* *Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. 2. c. 7.*

But however, you ſay, *This place implies a toleration of having many Wives, becauſe it is ſaid, if he take him another Wife*, ver. 10. I do not deny that the *Moſaical* Law did ſuppoſe the practice of *Polygamy*; but as it doth no where expreſly allow it, neither doth it expreſly condemn it. And although we ſay, the *Chriſtian Law* is far more excellent, which reduceth Marriage to its firſt Inſtitution; yet you will find it a hard Matter to prove ſuch a permiſſion of *Polygamy* as this was, to be ſo repugnant to the *Law* and Principles of *Nature*, as from thence to infer, that this *Law* of *Moſes* could not be from *God:* You might have ſaid the ſame about the Matter of *Divorce*, which was permitted them; *Chriſt* ſaith, *for the hardneſs of their Hearts:* Which ſhews, that *God* doth not always require that from Men which is beſt pleaſing to himſelf; and that as to his *Political Government*, he may not always puniſh that which is not ſo pleaſing to him.

The next Law you quarrel at is that *Deut.* 22. 13, &c. *about the trial of Virginty:* Which you object againſt, *as immodeſt, and uncertain, and therefore unbecoming the Wiſdom of God.* So, many Cuſtoms of thoſe elder Times of the World, and of the *Eaſtern* Parts to this Day ſeem very ſtrange to us, that are not ſo well acquainted with the *Reaſons* of them. Methinks, it better becomes our *Modeſty* in ſuch caſes, to queſtion our underſtanding thoſe Cuſtoms, than preſently to caſt ſo much diſparagement on the Author of them. If you had been offended at the literal Senſe of thoſe Words, many of the *Jews* themſelves ſay, they are to be underſtood Figuratively of the Evidence that was to be brought and laid open before the *Judges*, on behalf of the defamed Perſon. And both *Joſephus* and *Philo* omit the laying open the Cloth. But ſuppoſing it to be taken in the plaineſt literal Senſe, I have two Things to ſay in vindication of this Law. 1. That however uncertain ſome *Phyſicians* have thought that way of Tryal to have been in theſe parts of the

World; yet it is generally agreed to have held for the *Eaſtern* parts, by the moſt ſkilful *Phyſicians* among the *Arabians*: And a Cuſtom of the ſame nature is ſaid by good Authors to have been obſerved among the *Egyptians*, and other *Africans*, as well as the *Arabians*; ſo that this could not be thought ſo ſtrange or immodeſt among the Inhabitants of thoſe Parts: And it is very probable that ſome particulars, as to the Practice of theſe *Laws* are not ſet down, which might very much tend to the certainty of them, as the Age of the married Perſons, which was moſt likely then, as it is to this Day in the *Eaſtern* parts, very early, the *Jews* ſay, at 12 Years old, which would make the Tryal more certain. 2. As to the Modeſty of it, you are to conſider, that the *Law* was intended to keep Perſons from unjuſt *defamations*, and ſuch a way of *Tryal* was therefore pitch'd upon to deter Perſons from ſuch defamations; which Men might otherwiſe have been more ready to, becauſe of the *liberty* of *Divorce*, and the Advantage they had in ſaving the *Dower*, if they could prove the Party vitiated before Marriage; therefore all the proof of that Nature was to be paſſed ſoon after the conſummation of Marriage, which being agreed then by all the Friends, there was to be no liberty left for Defamation afterwards; but in caſe any Man ſhould be guilty of it, the producing thoſe Evidences, which before they were agreed upon, ſhould be ſufficient to clear the Innocency of the Party accuſed. And therefore I look on this *Law*, as the *Jews* do on that of the *rebellious Son*, of which they ſay, that there is no inſtance of the practice of it; the Penalty threatned being ſo effectual to prevent the occaſion of it.

And ſuch in a great meaſure, I ſuppoſe the other *Law* mentioned by you to have been, *viz. Of the Water of Jealouſy*, which you make ſo ſtrange a matter of; and think it *favours too much of a deſign to gratify the jealous Humour of the Jewiſh Nation*: But you might have put a fairer conſtruction upon it, *viz.* That it was intended to prevent any occaſion of ſuſpicion being given to the Huſband, by too much familiarity with other Perſons; ſince the Law allowed ſo ſevere a Trial, in caſe the Wife after admonition did not forbear ſuch ſuſpected familiarity, but if you had looked on the Law, as it is, *Num.* 5. 12, 13, *&c.* you would have found, that the deſign of it was to keep Women from committing *ſecret Adultery*, by ſo ſevere a Penalty; yet withal allowing ſo much to a reaſonable Suſpicion, (for ſo the *Jews* underſtand it, with many Cautions and Limitations) that rather than married Perſons ſhould live under perpetual Jealouſies, he appointed this extraordinary way of Tryal, whereby Adultery was moſt ſeverely puniſhed, and the honour of Innocency publickly vindicated; which certainly are not ends at all unbecoming due Conceptions of God.

The laſt of the *Jewiſh Laws*, which you quarrel with is *the prohibition of Uſury, in ſeveral places of* Moſes *his Law and the Pſalms*: And from hence you fall into a long Diſcourſe *to prove the lawfulneſs of Uſury*: But to what purpoſe I beſeech you? For you were to prove, that *God* could never forbid it; you might have ſpared *your pity for Men*, as you think, *blinded with Superſtition, and cheated with New and Aëry Notions*: For by all that I can ſee by theſe Papers, ſome pretended Enemies to *Superſtition* have no better Eyes than their Neighbours, and are as eaſily cheated with groundleſs Fancies and Aëry Imaginations. The only thing to the buſineſs in that long Diſcourſe is this, *That you*

cannot

cannot imagine that God ſhould make a Law ſo much to Mans inconvenience, and forbid him ſo nice and indifferent a thing, as moderate increaſe of Profit by letting out of Money, when it is allowed upon Lands, Houſes, and Trade, &c. To this I anſwer, That the Prohibition of *Uſury* to the *Jewiſh Nation*, was upon *political Grounds* peculiar to the Conſtitution of that *People*; as appears by the Words of the Law, *Deut.* 23. 19, 20. *Thou ſhalt not lend to Uſury unto thy Brother— Unto a Stranger thou mayeſt lend upon Uſury*; but none of the *Laws* which are founded upon common and moral Reaſons have ſuch Limitations as this; for God would never have ſaid, *Thou ſhalt not commit Adultery with thy Brother's Wife*; but *with the Wife of a Stranger thou mayeſt*. But there was this particular Reaſon for the prohibition of *Uſury* to the *Jewiſh Nation:* It pleaſed God to fix their Habitation, not upon the Sea-ſide, as *Tyre* and *Sidon* ſtood, but within Land where they had no conveniencies of Trading, but the Riches of the *Nation* lay in *Agriculture* and *Paſturage:* In which the Returns of Money are neither ſo quick nor ſo advantageous to make ſufficient compenſation for the Intereſt of the Money in the Time they have it: For the main thing valuable in Money is the advantage the Borrower makes of it; and where that is great, it ſeems reaſonable that the Perſon whoſe the Money is, ſhould have a proportionable ſhare of the Advantage made by it; but where Perſons borrow only for preſent Occaſions to ſupply their Neceſſities, there it is only an Act of Kindneſs to lend, and it would be unreaſonable to preſs upon, or take Advantage by anothers Neceſſities. And this ſeems to have been the caſe among the *Jews*; they were only the Poor that wanted Money for preſent Neceſſities; the Rich had no way to imploy it in Trading, unleſs that they lent to the *Tyrian Merchants*, which it was lawful by their Law to do; now if they took *Uſury* of their own People, it muſt be of thoſe whoſe urgent Neceſſity, and not hopes of a mighty Increaſe by it made them borrow, and therefore it was a very juſt and reaſonable *Law* to forbid *Uſury* among them: which I believe he would never have done, if he had placed the *Jews* upon the Coaſts of *Phœnicia*, where Trading was ſo much in requeſt.

Theſe are all the *Laws* which you have picked out of the *whole* Body of the *Jewiſh Law*, to repreſent it unbecoming the *Wiſdom* of *God:* And now I pray, Sir, look back again upon them, ſee how few, how ſmall, how weak your Objections are; and compare them with the *Weight*, and *Juſtice*, and *Prudence*, and *Piety*, expreſſed in all the reſt, and I hope you will find cauſe to be aſhamed of ſpeaking ſo harſhly of thoſe *Laws*, ſo well accommodated to thoſe Ages of the World, and the Condition of that *People* for whom they were appointed.

2. I now conſider what you object againſt the *Story* of the *Bible*.

1. *That Paſſage of* Moſes, *Exod.* 32. 32. *Blot me out of thy Book which thou haſt written:* Where your deſign is to ſhew, *that* Moſes *prayed to be damned, and that this was a very irrational thing; and favouring more of Paſſion than of the Spirit of God.* But what if *Moſes* meant no ſuch thing as Damnation? As there is not any word in the Context relating that ways, but all the deſign of that Chapter is about a Temporal Puniſhment, which was a preſent Deſtruction of the People for their Sins. And the Book out of which he prayed *God to blot him*, ſeems to me to be no other than the Roll of *Gods choſen People, who were to poſſeſs the Land of* Canaan: For ſo ספר properly ſignifies a *Roll*

a *Roll* or *Regiſter*. *Pſalm* 69. 28. We meet with ספר חיים *the Roll of the Living, or the Book of the Living* we render it, becauſe all ancient *Books* were in the faſhion of *Rolls*. In that Chapter *Moſes* intercedes with *God* on behalf of the People, that he would make good his Promiſe to them, of bringing them into the *Land of* Canaan, *v.* 13. and *v.* 30. He goes up to make an Atonement for the People, i. e. *as to the cutting them off in the Wilderneſs*, and therefore he deſires rather than the People ſhould be deſtroy'd, *that God would ſtrike him out of the Roll, that he might die in the Wilderneſs rather than the People:* And God gives that anſwer to this purpoſe, *v.* 33. *Whoever hath ſinned againſt me, will I blot out of my Book*, the Senſe of which is the ſame with thoſe words of the *Pſalmiſt*, *He ſware in his Wrath that they ſhould not enter into his Reſt*, Pſal. 95. 11. And according to this interpretation, which is moſt natural and eaſie, all your long Diſcourſe *againſt praying to be damned* comes to juſt nothing; there being no pretence for it, either in the Text or Context.

2. The *Story* of *Ruth* doth not pleaſe you, *as ſavouring in your Opinion of a great deal of Immodeſty*; but you would have a better Opinion of it, if you conſider that the reaſon of her Carriage towards *Boaz*, in ſuch a manner, was upon *Naomies* telling her *that he was one to whom the right of Redemption did belong, and by conſequence*, by their Law, *was to marry her*, Ruth 2. 20. And this *Ruth* pleaded to *Boaz*, Ruth 3. 9. By which it appears, that ſhe verily believed that he was *legally* her Huſband; and *Boaz* we ſee ſpeaks of her *as one that was a vertuous Woman, and known to be ſuch in the whole City*, ver. 11. And he confeſſes *he was her near Kinſman, only*, he ſaith, *there was one nearer*, ver. 12. By which it ſeems, if there had not, *Boaz* had made no ſcruple of the matter: And the *Jews* ſay, in ſuch Marriages very little *Ceremony* was required, if the next of *Kin* did not renounce his Right, becauſe the *Law* had determined the *Marriage* before-hand. If you had but conſidered this one thing, you would have ſpared the many *Obſervations* you make on this Story.

3. You object againſt 2 *Sam.* 12. 8. *As too much countenancing either Inceſt or Adultery, becauſe it is ſaid, that God gave to* David *his Maſter's Wives into his Boſom.* But 1. It is very ſtrange to bring this place as a countenance to *Adultery*, which was purpoſely deſigned to upbraid *David* with the Sin of *Adultery*; and you will find it no eaſie matter, by the Conſtitution of the *Moſaical Law*, to prove *Polygamy* to be *Adultery*. 2. The *Jews* give a fair Interpretation of this place, for they ſay, that the *Wife* of a *King* could never *marry* after her Huſbands deceaſe, as the *Gemara* on the Title *Sanhedrim* expreſly ſaith, although ſome among them follow the Opinion of *R. Jehuda*, that ſhe might marry the ſucceeding *King*; but that is built chiefly on this place; of which the reſt give a better account, *viz.* that נשים doth not imply *Saul's Wives*, but the *Maids of Honour*, or *Attendants* on the *Court* of *Saul*, which all fell into *David's* Power, and out of whom he might chooſe *Wives*, without danger of *Inceſt*; and even ſome of thoſe who aſſert it lawful for one *King* to marry his predeceſſor's Wife, yet ſay in this caſe of *David*, that the Word only implies, that they were of *Saul's Family*, as *Merab* and *Michal* were, but not *Saul's Wives*. So that all the difficulty here ariſes only from the Interpretation of an *unuſual Word*, in which we have much more reaſon to truſt the *Jews* than other Writers.

Selden. Uxor Ebra. l. 1. c. 10. Schick. De jure Reg. c. 16. Theor. 19.

4. You

4. You are much offended *at Hosea's marrying an Adultéress:* But all the formidable Difficulties of that place will presently vanish, if you allow the *Prophetical Schemes*, wherein those things are said to be done, which are intended only to represent in a more lively manner the things signified by them. And so you may see the *Chaldee Paraphrase*, fully explains this place of *Hosea*, and *Maimonides* purposely discourseth on the *Prophetick Parables*, and brings this as one of the Instances of them; and with him the rest of the *Jewish Interpreters* agree. But you object against such a way of Teaching, *as tending to the encouragement of Vice*, which it is very far from, being designed to represent the odiousness of it: For the whole Scope of the *Prophet* is to let the People understand, that their *Idolatry* was as hateful to *God* as the Sin of *Adultery*, and that the consequences of it would be their Misery and Ruin. And yet that *God* expressed as much Tenderness to them, as a Man that was very fond of a Woman would do, in being unwilling to put her away, altho' he knew she were false to his Bed: the former is intended in the first *Chapter*, and the latter in the third. And what is there tending to Immorality in all this? May not *God* make use of one Vice, whose evil is more notorious to represent another by, whose evil they are more hardly convinced of? May not he set forth a *Degenerate People* by the *Sons* of an *Adultéress?* And by the Names given to them express his Detestation of their Wickedness? Especially when the *Parabolical* Terms are so clearly explained, as they are in the Second Chapter.

Maim. More Nevoch. l. 2. c. 46.

But you will say, *these things are related as plain Matters of Fact; with the several Circumstances belonging to them.* It is true, they are so, but so Parables use to be; so was *Nathan's* to *David*; so is that of the Rich Man and *Lazarus* in the *New Testament*: so is *Jeremy's* going to *Euphrates to hide his Girdle*; (for it is not very likely the *Prophet* should be sent 18 or 20 Days Journey into an Enemies Country for no other end:) So is *Ezekiel's lying on one side for 390 Days, and shaving his Head and Beard*, contrary to the Law, as *Maimonides* observes: And his *digging in the Walls of the Temple at* Hierusalem, while he was in *Babylon:* And many other things of a like nature, which are set forth with as punctual a Narration of Circumstances, as this of *Hosea*, and yet they were only figurative Expressions. We that are accustomed to another way of Learning, think these things strange; but this was a very common way in the *elder* Times, and it is to this Day much used in the *Eastern Countries*, to represent *Duties* to some, under the *Parables* of things as really done by others: As may be seen in *Locman* and *Perzoes*, besides what *Clemens Alexandrinus* and others have said, concerning the *Antiquity* and common use of this *Parabolical* way of Teaching.

Jer. 13. 4, 5. *Ezek. 4. 5, 6.* *Ezek. 5. 1.* *Ezek. 8. 8.*

I now come to your Objections against the *New Testament*; but I find them so few, and those so slight and inconsiderable, as to the end for which you produce them, that I may easily pass them over. To that *about the continuance of Miracles*, I have already answer'd: And I find not one Word in the places mentioned by you, which implies the necessity of the continuance of them in all Ages of the *Christian Church*. That place, *Mark* 10. 29, 30. speaks of no more but such a *recompence* in this Life *as is consistent with Persecution*; and therefore must chiefly lie in inward Contentment; which all wise Men have valued above external Accommodations; although withal, by the Account St. *Paul* gives

of

of himſelf, and his Brethren, God did abundantly provide for them
2 Cor. 6. 10. one way or other. *As having nothing, and yet enjoying all things:* Which amounts to a Hundred-fold in this Life.

But certainly you are the firſt Man, who have objected *the obſcurity of the Book of Revelations, againſt the Authority of the Scriptures*; which is juſt as if one ſhould object the *Quadrature* of the *Circle* againſt *Mathematical Certainty.* If we grant that there are ſome things in that *Myſtical Book*, we do not yet well underſtand; what then? Muſt neither that *Book*, nor any other of the *Bible* be of *Divine Revelation?* I will not purſue the unreaſonableneſs of this way of arguing ſo far as I might, but I leave your ſelf to conſider of it; and of all that I have written, in order to your *ſatisfaction.* If you think fit to return an Anſwer, I pray do it clearly and ſhortly, and with that freedom from Paſſion, which becomes ſo weighty a Matter: And I beſeech *God* to give you a right underſtanding in all things. I am,

SIR,

June 11, 1675.

Your Faithful Servant.

IRENI-

IRĒNICUM.

A

WEAPON-SALVE

FOR THE

Churches Wounds:

OR THE

DIVINE RIGHT

OF

Particular Forms of Church Government,

Discussed and examined according to the Principles of the Law of Nature, the positive Laws of God, the Practice of the Apostles, and the Primitive Church, and the Judgment of Reformed Divines.

Whereby a Foundation is laid for the Church's Peace, and the Accommodation of our present Differences.

THE

PREFACE to the READER.

I *Write not to* increase *the* Controversies *of the Times, nor to* foment *the* Differences *that are among us*; *the* one *are by far too* many, *the* other *too* great *already. My only design is to* allay *the* heat, *and* abate *the* fury *of that* Ignis sacer, *or* Erysipelas *of* Contention, *which hath risen in the Face of our Church, by the overflowing of that* bilious Humour *which yet appears to have too great* predominancy *in the* Spirits *of Men. And although with the poor* Persian *I can only bring a* handful *of Water,*

yet that may be my juſt Apology, *that it is for the quenching thoſe* Flames *in the Church, which have cauſed* the Bells of *Aaron* to jangle *ſo much, that it ſeems to be a Work of the greateſt difficulty to make them* tuneable. *And were this an* Age *wherein any thing might be wondred at, it would be matter of deſerved Admiration, to hear the* noiſe *of theſe* Axes and Hammers *ſo much about the* Temple, *and that after theſe nigh twenty Years* carving *and* hewing, *we are ſo* rude *and* unpoliſhed *ſtill, and ſo far from being* cemented *together in the* unity of the Spirit, and the Bond of Peace. *May we not juſtly fear that Voice,* Migremus hinc, *when we ſee the* Veil *of the* Temple *ſo* rent aſunder, *and the* Church *it ſelf made a* Partition-wall *to* divide *the* Members *of it? And ſince the* wiſe and gracious God *hath been pleaſed (in ſuch an almoſt miraculous manner) ſo lately to abate the* Land-flood *of our* civil inteſtine Diviſions, *how ſtrange muſt it needs ſeem, if our* ſacred Contentions, *(if Contentions may be called ſacred) like* the Waters of the Sanctuary, *ſhould riſe* from the Ancle to the Knee, *till at laſt they may grow unpaſſable? Muſt only the* Fire *of our unchriſtian* Animoſities *be like that of the* Temple, *which was never to be* extinguiſhed? *However I am ſure it is ſuch a one as was never* kindled from Heaven, *nor* blown up *with any* Breathings *of the* Holy and Divine Spirit. *And yet that hath been the* aggravation *of our Diviſions, that thoſe whoſe Duty it is* to lift up their Voices like Trumpets, *have rather ſounded an* Allarm *to our contentious Spirits, than a* Parley *or* Retreat, *which had been far more ſuitable to our* Meſſengers of Peace. *In which reſpect it might be too truly ſaid of our Church, what is ſpoken of the* Eagle *in the* Greek Apologue:

Βλέπει τὸ σῆθος αἰετὸς τρωθὲν πάλαι,
Ἄλγῶν ὃ λοιπὸν, ἧστο πολλὰ δακρύων.
Βλέπων ὃ οἰστὸν, εἶπεν ἐπερωμένον,
Βαβαὶ, πτερόν με τὸν πτερωτὸν ὤλυσε.

The Eagle ſaw her Breaſt was wounded ſore,
She ſtood, and weeped much, but grieved more:
But when ſhe ſaw the Dart was feather'd, ſaid,
Woe's me, for my own Kind hath me deſtroy'd.

It is ſo long ſince that Verſion of the vulgar *Latin,* Pſal. 68. 15. Inter Domini cleros, *might have been ſadly rendered* to lie among the Pots; *and* Pierius Valerianus *might have met with too many Examples to have increaſed his Book* De Literatorum Infœlicitate; *and in the next Age it might have been true again what* Matthew Paris *obſerves of the* Clergy *in the* Conquerour's *time*; adeò literaturâ carebant ut cæteris ſtupori eſſet qui Grammaticam didiciſſet. *But bleſſed be God who hath freed us from that* Dœmonium meridianum *of* Ignorance *and* Barbariſm; *may we be but as happily delivered from the plague of our Diviſions and Animoſities: Than which, there hath been no greater* Scandal *to the* Jews, *nor* opprobrium *of our Religion among* Heathens *and* Mahumetans, *nor more common objection among the* Papiſts, *nor any thing which hath been more made a Pretence even for* Atheiſm *and* Infidelity. *For our* Controverſies *about* Religion, *have brought at laſt even* Religion *its ſelf into a* Con-

Controverſie, *among ſuch whoſe weaker Judgments have not been able to diſcern where the plain and unqueſtionable Way to Heaven hath lain, in ſo great a* Miſt *as our* Diſputes *have raiſed among us. Weaker Heads, when they once ſee the* Battlements *ſhake, are apt to ſuſpect that the* Foundation *its ſelf is not* firm *enough; and to conclude, if any thing be call'd in queſtion, that there is nothing certain. And truly it cannot but be looked on as a ſad Preſage of an approaching* Famine, not of Bread, but of the Word of the Lord, *that our* lean Kine have devoured the fat, *and our* thin Ears the plump and full; *I mean our* Controverſies *and* Diſputes, *have* eaten *ſo much out the* Life *and* Practice *of* Chriſtianity. Religion *hath been ſo much* rarified *into* aery Notions *and* Speculations, *by the* diſtempered heat *of Mens Spirits, that its inward* Strength, *and the* Vitals *of it have been much* abated *and* conſumed *by it.* Curioſity, *that* Greenſickneſs *of the Soul, whereby it longs for Novelties, and loaths ſound and wholeſome Truths, hath been the* epidemical Diſtemper *of the Age we live in. Of which it may be as truly ſaid, as ever yet of any, that it was* ſæculum fertile religionis, ſterile pietatis; *I fear this will be the Character whereby our* Age *will be known to Poſterity, that it was* the Age wherein Men talked of Religion moſt, and lived it leaſt. *Few there are who are content with that* Dimenſum *which* God *hath ſet them; every one almoſt is of the* Spaniſh Jeſuite's *Mind,* Beatus qui prædicat verbum inauditum, *ſeeking to find out ſomewhat whereby he may be reckoned, if not among the* Wiſe, *yet among the* Diſputers of this World. *How ſmall is the number of thoſe ſober Chriſtians, of whom it may be ſaid as* Lucian *of his* Paraſites, ἐκ ἠθέλαζον νοσεῖν, *they were not at leiſure to be ſick of this* pica, (1 Tim. 6. 4.) *ſuch as longed more to taſte of the* Tree of Life, *than of the* Tree of Knowledge: *And as* Zenophon *ſpeaks of the* Perſians, τὸ ὕſρὸν ἐκπιόντες ἀνήλισκον, *they conſume the* fomes morbi, *the Root of this Diſtemper by their ſerious Endeavours after* Peace and Holineſs. *But inſtead of this, the generality of Men let all their Religion run up into* Briars *and* Thorns, *into Contentions and Parties, as tho' Religion were indeed* ſacramentum militiæ, *but more againſt fellow-Chriſtians than the unqueſtionable Hindrances of Mens eternal Happineſs. Men being very loth to put themſelves to the trouble of a* Holy Life, *are very ready to embrace any thing which may but diſpence with that, and if but liſting Mens ſelves under ſuch a Party, may but ſhelter them under a Diſguiſe of Religion, none more ready than ſuch to be known by* diſtinguiſhing Names; *none more zealous in the defence of every* Tittle *and* Punctilio *that lies moſt remote from thoſe eſſential Duties wherein the Kingdom of God conſiſts,* viz. Righteouſneſs and Peace, and Joy in the Holy Ghoſt. *And hence all the ſeveral Parties among us have given ſuch glorious Names only to the outward Government of the Church; the* undoubted Practice of the Apoſtles; the Diſcipline of Chriſt; the order of the Goſpel, *and account only that the* Church, *where their own method of Government is obſerved; juſt as the* Hiſtorian *obſerves of* Brutus *and* Caſſius, Ubicunque ipſi eſſent prætexentes eſſe rempublicam, *they think the Church can never be preſerved, but in that Veſſel they are imbarked in: As though* Chriſt *could not have cauſed his Flock to reſt* ſub Meridie, *unleſs the* Pars Donati *had been in the* South. *And from this* monopolizing *of* Churches *to* Parties, *hath proceeded that ſtrange Uncharitableneſs towards all who come not up to every Circumſtance of their Way and Method, which is a piece of Prudence like that of* Brutus, *who when he had raiſed thoſe Flames*

in the Common-wealth, *was continually calling* Cæsar Tyrant; ita enim appellari Cæsarem, facto ejus expediebat. *So when Men have caused such lamentable Divisions in the Church, by their several Parties and Factions, it concerns them to condemn all others besides themselves, lest they most of all condemn themselves for making unnecessary Divisions in the Church of God. This Uncharitableness and ill opinion of all different Parties, only gathers the Fuel together, and prepares combustible Matter, which wants nothing but the clashing of an adverse Party, acted upon Principles of a like nature, to make it break out into an open Flame. And such we have seen, and with sadness and grief of Heart felt it to be in the Bowels of our own Church and Nation, by reason of those violent* Calentures *and* Paroxysms *of the Spirits of Men, those* Heart-burnings *and* Contentions *which have been among us, which will require both Time and Skill to purge out those* noxious Humours *which have been the causes of them. I know no Prescriptions so likely to effect this happy end, as an* Infusion *of the true* Spirits *of Religion, and the* Revulsion *of that* extravasated Blood *into its proper Channels: Thereby to take Men off from their eager pursuit after Ways and Parties, Notions and Opinions, (wherein many have run so far, that they have left the best part of their Religion behind them) and to bring them back to a right understanding of the* Nature, Design *and* Principles *of* Christianity.

Christianity! *a* Religion, *which it is next to a Miracle Men should ever quarrel or fall out about; much less that it should be the* occasion, *or at least the* pretence *of all that Strife and Bitterness of Spirit, of all those Contentions and Animosities which are at this Day in the Christian World. But our only comfort is, that whatever our Spirits are, our God is* the God of peace, *our Saviour is* the Prince of Peace, *and that* Wisdom *which this Religion teacheth, is both* pure and peaceable. *It was that which once made our Religion so amiable in the Judgment of impartial* Heathens, *that* nil nisi justum suadet & lene, the Court of a Christian's Conscience was the best Court of equity in the World. Christians *were once known by their* ὕφεσιν καὶ μειλιχὸν ἦθος, *the Benignity and Sweetness of their Disposition, by the Candor and Ingenuity of their Spirits, by their mutual Love, Forbearance and Condescension towards one another. But* Aut hoc non est Evangelium, aut nos non sumus Evangelici, *either this is not the Practice of Christianity, or it was never* calculated *for our* Meridian, *wherein Mens Spirits are of too* high *an* elevation *for it. If Pride and Uncharitableness, if Divisions and Strifes, if Wrath and Envy, if Animosities and Contentions were but the Marks of true Christians,* Diogenes *never need light his Lamp at Noon to find out such among us. But if a Spirit of Meekness, Gentleness and Condescension, if a stooping to the Weakness and Infirmities of others, if a pursuit after peace even when it flies from us, be the* indispensable *Duties, and the* Characteristical *Notes of those that have more than the Name of* Christians, *it may possibly prove a difficult* Inquest *to find out such for the Crouds of those who shelter themselves under that glorious Name. Whence came it else to be so lately looked on as the way to* advance Religion, *to* banish Peace, *and to* reform Mens Manners, by taking away their Lives? *Whereas in those pure and primitive Times, when* Religion *did truly* flourish, *it was accounted the greatest* Instance of *the Piety of Christians,* not to fight, but to die for Christ. *It was never thought then that* Bellona *was a* nursing Mother to the Church of God, *nor* Mars a God of Reformation. *Religion was then propagated*

propagated, not by Christians *shedding the Blood of others, but by laying down their own. They thought there were other ways to a* Canaan *of* Reformation, *besides the passing through a* Wilderness *of* Confusion, *and a* Red-Sea *of* Blood. Origen *could say of the* Christians *in his Time,* ἐκέτι γὰρ λαμβάνομεν ἐπ' ἔθνη μάχαιραν, οὐ δὲ μανθάνομεν ἔτι πολεμεῖν ἡμύομεν διὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν ὑοὶ τῆς εἰρήνης. *They had not yet learned to make way for Religion into Mens Minds by the Dint of the Sword, because they were the Disciples of that Saviour who never* pressed *Followers as Men do* Soldiers, *but said,* If any Man will come after me, let him take up his Cross, *(not his Sword)* and follow me. *His was* ἥμερος καὶ φιλάνθρωπος νομοθεσία, *his very Commands shewed his Meekness; his Laws were sweet and gentle Laws; not like* Draco's, *that were writ in Blood, unless it were his own that gave them.* C. Celsum, l. 3.

His design was to ease Men of their former Burdens, and not to lay on more; the Duties he required were no other but such as were necessary, and withal very just and reasonable. He that came to take away the insupportable Yoke of Jewish Ceremonies, *certainly did never intend to gall the Necks of his Disciples with another instead of it. And it would be strange the Church should require more than* Christ *himself did; and make other Conditions of her Communion, than our Saviour did of Discipleship. What possible reason can be assigned or given why such things should not be sufficient for Communion with a Church, which are sufficient for eternal Salvation? And certainly those things are sufficient for that, which are laid down as the necessary Duties of Christianity by our Lord and Saviour in his Word. What ground can there be why* Christians *should not stand upon the same Terms now which they did in the Time of* Christ *and his Apostles? Was not Religion sufficiently guarded and fenced in them? Was there ever more true and cordial Reverence in the Worship of God? What* Charter *hath* Christ *given the Church to bind Men up to more than himself hath done? or to exclude those from her Society, who may be admitted into Heaven? Will* Christ *ever thank Men at the great Day, for keeping such out from Communion with his Church, whom he will vouchsafe not only Crowns of Glory to, but it* may *be* aureolæ *too, if there be any such things there? The Grand Commission the Apostles were sent out with, was only to* teach what *Christ* had commanded them. *Not the least intimation of any power given them to impose or require any thing beyond what himself had spoken to them, or they were directed to by the immediate Guidance of the Spirit of God. It is not whether the things commanded and required be lawful or no? It is not whether Indifferencies may be determined or no? It is not how far* Christians *are bound to submit to a restraint of their* Christian Liberty, *which now I enquire after, (of those things in the Treatise its self) but whether they do consult for the Church's Peace and Unity, who suspend it upon such things? How far either the Example of our Saviour, or his Apostles doth warrant such rigorous Impositions? We never read the Apostles making Laws, but of things supposed necessary. When the Council of Apostles met at* Jerusalem, *for deciding a Case that disturbed the Church's peace, we see* they would lay no other burden πλὴν τῶν ἐπάναγκες τούτων, besides these necessary things, *Acts* 15. 29. *It was not enough with them that the things would be necessary when they had required them, but they looked on an* antecedent *necessity either absolute or for the present state, which was the only ground of their imposing those Commands upon the* Gentile Christians.

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There were after this, great diverſities of Practice, and varieties of Obſervations among Chriſtians, *but the Holy Ghoſt never thought thoſe things fit to be made matters of Laws, to which all Parties ſhould conform: All that the Apoſtles required as to theſe, was mutual Forbearance and Condeſcenſion towards each other in them. The Apoſtles valued not* Indifferences *at all, and thoſe things it is evident they accounted ſuch, which whether Men did them or not, was not of concernment to Salvation. And what reaſon is there why Men ſhould be ſo ſtrictly tied up to ſuch things, which they may do or let alone, and yet be very good* Chriſtians *ſtill? Without all Controverſie, the main In-let of all the Diſtractions, Confuſions and Diviſions of the* Chriſtian World, *hath been by adding other Conditions of Church-Communion than* Chriſt *hath done. Had the Church of* Rome *never taken upon her to add to the Rule of Faith, nor impoſed idolatrous and ſuperſtitious Practices, all the injury ſhe had done her ſelf, had been to have avoided that fearful Schiſm which ſhe hath cauſed throughout the* Chriſtian World. *Would there ever be the leſs Peace and Unity in a Church, if a Diverſity were allowed as to Practices ſuppoſed indifferent? yea there would be ſo much more as there was a mutual Forbearance and Condeſcenſion as to ſuch things. The Unity of the Church is an Unity of Love and Affection, and not a bare Uniformity of Practice or Opinion. This latter is extremely deſirable in a Church; but as long as there are ſeveral Ranks and Sizes of Men in it, very hardly attainable, becauſe of the different Perſuaſions of Mens Minds, as to the lawfulneſs of the things required. And it is no commendation for a* Chriſtian *to have only the Civility of* Procruſtes, *to commenſurate all other Men to the* Bed *of his* own Humour and Opinion. *There is nothing the* Primitive Church deſerves *greater imitation by us in, than in that admirable Temper, Moderation, and Condeſcenſion which was uſed in it, towards all the Members of it. It was never thought worth the while to make any ſtanding Laws for Rites and Cuſtoms, that had no other original but Tradition, much leſs to ſuſpend Men her Communion for not obſerving them.* Εὔηθες γὰρ καὶ μάλα δικαίως ὑπέλαβον ἐθῶν ἕνεκεν ἀλλήλων χωρίζεσθαι, περὶ τὰ κατὰ τῆς θρησκείας συμφωνοῦντες, *as* Sozomen *tells us.* They judged it, and that very juſtly, a fooliſh and frivolous thing, for thoſe that agree in the weighty Matters of Religion, to ſeparate from one another's Communion for the ſake of ſome petty Cuſtoms and Obſervations. Οὐ γὰρ πάσας αὐτὰς παραδόσεις καὶ πάντα ὁμοίας κἂν ὁμόδοξοι εἶεν, ἐν πάσαις τῇ ἐκκλησίαις εὑρεῖν ἔστιν· For Churches agreeing in the ſame Faith, often differ in their Rites and Cuſtoms. *And that not only in different Churches, but in different Places belonging to the ſame Church; for, as he tells us, many Cities and Villages in* Egypt, *not only differed from the Cuſtoms of the* Mother Church *of* Alexandria, *but from all other Churches beſides,* in their publick Aſſemblies on the Evenings of the Sabbath, and receiving the Euchariſt after Dinner: *This admirable Temper in the Primitive Church might be largely cleared from that Liberty they allowed freely to Diſſenters from them in Matters of Practice and Opinion; as might be cleared from* Cyprian, Auſtin, Jerome, *and others; but that would exceed the Bounds of a Preface. The firſt who brake this Order in the Church, were the* Arrians, Donatiſts, *and* Circumcellians, *while the true Church was ſtill known by its priſtine Moderation and ſweetneſs of Deportment towards all its Members. The ſame we hope may remain as the moſt infallible evi-*

Hiſt. Eccl. l. 7. c. 19.

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dence of the Conformity of our Church of England, *to the Primitive, not ſo much in* uſing *the ſame* Rites *that were in Uſe then, as in* not impoſing them, *but leaving Men to be won by the obſerving the true Decency and Order of Churches, whereby thoſe who act upon a true Principle of Chriſtian Ingenuity, may be ſooner drawn to a Compliance in all lawful things, than by force and rigorous Impoſitions, which make Men ſuſpect the weight of the thing it ſelf, when ſuch force is uſed to make it enter. In the mean time, what cauſe have we to rejoice, that Almighty God hath been pleaſed to reſtore us a* Prince *of that* excellent Prudence and Moderation, *who hath ſo lately given aſſurance to the World, of his* great Indulgence towards all that have any pretence from Conſcience to differ with their Brethren: *The only thing then ſeeming to retard our Peace, is, the* Controverſie *about* Church-Government, *an unhappy Controverſie to us in* England, *if ever there were any in the World. And the more unhappy, in that our Contentions about it have been ſo great, and yet ſo few of the Multitudes engaged in it, that have truly underſtood the Matter they have ſo eagerly contended about. For the State of the Controverſie, as it concerns us, lies not here, as it is generally miſtaken,* what Form of Government comes the neareſt to Apoſtolical Practice; *but* Whether any one individual Form be founded ſo upon Divine Right, that all Ages and Churches are bound unalterably to obſerve it: *The clearing up of which by an impartial enquiry into all the Grounds produced for it, being of ſo great a tendency to an Accommodation of our preſent Differences, was the only Motive which induced me to obſerve* Ariſtotle's *wild* Politicks, *of expoſing this deformed Conception to the entertainment of the wide World. And certainly they who have* eſpouſed *the moſt the* Intereſt *of a* jus divinum, *cannot yet but ſay, that if the Opinion I maintain be true, it doth exceedingly conduce to a preſent Settlement of the Differences that are among us. For then all Parties may retain their different Opinions concerning the Primitive Form, and yet agree and pitch upon a Form compounded of all together, as the moſt ſuitable to the State and Condition of the Church of God among us: That ſo the Peoples Intereſt be ſecured by Conſent and Suffrage, which is the pretence of the Congregational-way; the due Power of Preſbyteries aſſerted by their joint concurrence with the Biſhop, as it is laid down in that excellent Model of the* late incomparable Primate of Armagh; *and the juſt Honour and Dignity of the* Biſhop *aſſerted, as a very laudable and ancient Conſtitution for preſerving the Peace and Unity of the Church of God. So the learned* Is. Caſaubon *deſcribes the* Polity *of the* Primitive Church, Epiſcopi in ſingulis Eccleſiis conſtituti cum ſuis Preſbyteris, & propriam ſibi quiſque peculiari curâ, & univerſam omnes in commune curantes, admirabilis cujuſdam Ariſtocratiæ ſpeciem referebant. *My main Deſign, throughout this whole Treatiſe, is to ſhew that there can be no Argument drawn from any pretence of a* Divine Right, *that may hinder Men from conſenting and yielding to ſuch a Form of Government in the Church, as may bear the greateſt correſpondency to the Primitive Church, and be moſt advantagiouſly conduceable to the Peace, Unity, and Settlement of our divided Church. I plead not at all for any Abuſes or Corruptions incident to the beſt Form of Government, thro' the corruption of Men and Times. Nay, I dare not harbour ſo low Apprehenſions of Perſons enjoying ſo great Dignity and Honour in the Church, that they will in any wiſe be unwilling of themſelves to reduce the Form*

Exerc't 15. §. 11.

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of Church-Government among us, to its primitive State and Order, by retrenching all Exorbitances of Power, and reſtoring thoſe Preſbyteries which no Law hath forbidden, but only through diſuſe have been laid aſide. Whereby they will give to the World that rare Example of Self-denial, *and the* higheſt Chriſtian Prudence, *as may raiſe an honourable Opinion of them, even among thoſe who have hitherto the moſt ſlighted ſo ancient and venerable an* Order *in the Church of God; and thereby become the Repairers of thoſe otherwiſe irreparable Breaches in the Church of God. I conclude with the Words of a late* learned, pious *and* moderate Prelate, *in his* Via media; I have done, and now I make no other account, but that it will fall out with me, as it doth commonly with him that offers to part a Fray, both parts will perhaps drive at me for wiſhing them no worſe than Peace. My Ambition of the publick Tranquillity ſhall willingly carry me through this hazard; let both beat me, ſo their Quarrel may ceaſe; I ſhall rejoice in thoſe Blows and Scars which I ſhall take for the Church's Safety.

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WEAPON-SALVE for the CHURCH'S-WOUNDS:

OR,

The Divine Right of particular forms of Government in the Church of God, discussed and examined according to the principles of the Law of Nature, the positive Laws of God, the practice of the Apostles, and the Primitive Church, and the judgment of Reformed Divines.

PART I.

CHAP. I.

Things necessary for the Church's peace must be clearly revealed. The Form of Church Government not so, as appears by the remaining controversie about it. An evidence thence, that Christ *never intended any one form, as the only means to peace in the Church. The nature of a divine right discussed. Right in general either makes things Lawful, or else Due: For the former, a non-prohibition sufficient, the latter an express command. Duty supposeth legislation and promulgation. The Question stated. Nothing binds unalterably but by vertue of a standing Law, and that twofold. The Law of nature, and positive Laws of God. Three ways to know when positive Laws are unalterable. The divine right arising from Scripture Examples, Divine acts, and Divine approbation considered.*

§. 1. HE that imposeth any matter of opinion upon the belief of others, without giving evidence of reason for it, proportionable to the confidence of his assertion, must either suppose the thing propounded, to carry such unquestionable credentials of truth and reason with it, that none who know what they mean, can deny it entertainment; or else that his own understanding hath attained to so great perfection, as to have authority sufficient to oblige all others to follow it. This latter cannot be presumed among any who have asserted the freedom of their own understandings, from the dictates of an infallible chair: But if any should forget themselves so far as to think so, there needs no other argument to prove them not to be infallible in their assertions, than this one assertion, that they are infallible, it being an undoubted evidence that they are actually deceived, who know so little the measure of their own understandings. The former can never be pretended in any thing which is a matter of controversie among men, who have not wholly forgot they are reasonable creatures, by their bringing probable arguments for the maintaining one part of an opinion as well as another. In which case, though the arguments brought be not convincing for the necessary entertaining either part to an unbiassed understanding, yet the difference of their opinions is ar-

gument ſufficient that the thing contended for is not ſo clear as both parties would make it to be on their own ſide; and if it be not a thing of neceſſity to ſalvation, it gives men ground to think that a final deciſion of the matter in controverſie, was never intended as a neceſſary means for the peace and unity of the Church of God. For we cannot with any ſhew of reaſon imagine that our ſupreme Law-giver and Saviour, who hath made it a neceſſary duty in all true members of his Church, to endeavour after the peace and unity of it, ſhould ſuſpend the performance of that duty upon a matter of opinion, which when men have uſed their utmoſt endeavours to ſatisfie themſelves about, they yet find, that thoſe very grounds which they are moſt inclinable to build their judgments upon, are either wholly rejected by others, as wiſe and able as themſelves, or elſe it may be they erect a far different fabrick upon the very ſame foundations. It is no ways conſiſtent with the wiſdom of *Chriſt* in founding his Church, and providing for the peace and ſettlement of it, to leave it at the mercy of mens private judgments and apprehenſions of things, than which nothing is more uncertain, and thereby make it to depend upon a condition never like to be attained in this world, which is the agreement and uniformity of mens opinions. For as long as mens faces differ, their judgments will. And until there be an *Intellectus Averroiſticus*, the ſame underſtanding in all perſons, we have little ground to hope for ſuch an univerſal harmony in the intellectual world; and yet even then the ſoul might paſs a different judgment upon the colours of things, according to the different tincture of the ſeveral Optick-glaſſes in particular bodies which it takes a proſpect of things through. Reaſon and experience then gives us little hopes of any peace in the Church, if the unity of mens judgments be ſuppoſed the condition of it; the next enquiry then is, how the peace of the Church ſhall be attained or preſerved, when men are under ſuch different perſuaſions; eſpecially if they reſpect the means in order to a peace and ſettlement. For the ways to peace, like the fertile ſoils of *Greece*, have been oft-times the occaſion of the greateſt quarrels. And no ſickneſs is ſo dangerous as that when men are ſick of their remedy, and nauſeate that moſt which tends to their recovery. But while Phyſicians quarrel about the Method of cure, the Patient languiſheth under their hands; and when men increaſe Contentions in the behalf of peace, while they ſeem to court it, they deſtroy it. The only way left for the Church's ſettlement and peace under ſuch variety of apprehenſions concerning the means and method in order to it, is to pitch upon ſuch a foundation, if poſſible to be found out, whereon the different parties retaining their private apprehenſions, may yet be agreed to carry on the ſame work in common, in order to the peace and tranquillity of the Church of God. Which cannot be by leaving all abſolutely to follow their own ways; for that were to build a *Babel* inſtead of *Salem*, *Confuſion* inſtead of *Peace*; it muſt be then by convincing men, that neither of thoſe ways, to peace and order which they contend about, is neceſſary by way of divine command, (though ſome be as a means to an end) but which particular way or form it muſt be, is wholly left to the prudence of thoſe in whoſe power and truſt it is to ſee the peace of the Church be ſecured on laſting foundations. How nearly this concerns the preſent debate about the Government of the Church, any one may quickly diſcern. The main plea for forms of Government in the Church, is their

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neceſſity in order to its peace and order, and yet nothing hath produced more diſorder and confuſion, than our diſputes about it have done. And our ſad experience ſtill tells us that after all our debates, and the evidences brought on either ſide, men yet continue under very different apprehenſions concerning it. But if we more ſtrictly enquire into the cauſes of the great diſtances and animoſities which have riſen upon this controverſie, we ſhall find it hath not been ſo much the difference of judgments concerning the primitive form of Government which hath divided men ſo much from one another, as the prevalency of faction and intereſt in thoſe whoſe Revenues have come from the rents of the Church, and among others of greater integrity it hath been the principle or hypotheſis which men are apt to take for granted, without proving it, *viz.* that it is in no caſe lawful to vary from that form, which by obſcure and uncertain conjectures they conceive to have been the primitive practice. For hereby men look upon themſelves as obliged by an unalterable Law to endeavour the eſtabliſhment of that Idea of Government which oft-times affection and intereſt, more than reaſon and judgment hath formed within them; and ſo likewiſe bound to overthrow any other form not ſuitable to thoſe correſpondencies which they are already engaged to maintain. If this then were the cauſe of the wounds and breaches this day among us, the moſt ſucceſsful Weapon-ſalve to heal them, will be, to anoint the ſword which hath given the wound, by a ſeaſonable enquiry into the nature and obligation of particular forms of Government in the Church. The main ſubject then of our preſent debate will be whether any one particular form of Church-Government be ſettled upon an unalterable divine right; by vertue whereof all Churches are bound perpetually to obſerve that individual form? or whether it be left to the prudence of every particular Church to agree upon that form of Government which it judgeth moſt conducible within its ſelf to attain the end of Government, the peace, order, tranquillity, ſettlement of the Church, If this latter be made fully appear, it is then evident, that however mens judgments may differ concerning the primitive form of Government, there is yet a ſure ground for men to proceed on in order to the Church's peace. Which one conſideration will be motive ſufficient to juſtifie an attempt of this nature, it being a deſign of ſo great importance, as the recovery of an advantagious piece of ground, whereon different parties may with ſafety not only treat, but agree in order to a ſpeedy accommodation.

§. 2. We come therefore cloſely to the buſineſs in hand, and for the better clearing of our paſſage, we ſhall firſt diſcuſs the nature of a divine right, and ſhew whereon an unalterable divine right muſt be founded, and then proceed to ſhew how far any form of Government in the Church is ſettled upon ſuch a right. Right in the general is a relative thing, and the ſignification and import of it muſt be taken from the reſpect it bears to the Law which gives it. For although in common acceptation it be often underſtood to be the ſame with the Law its ſelf, as it is the rule of actions (in which ſenſe *Jus naturæ*, *gentium*, *civile*, is taken for the ſeveral Laws of Nature, Nations and particular States) yet I ſay *jus*, and ſo right, is properly ſomething accruing to a perſon by vertue of that Law which is made, and ſo *jus naturæ* is that right which every man is inveſted in by the Law of nature, which is properly *jus perſonæ*,

τὸ δίκαιον ἀναλογόν τι. *Ariſt. Eth. l. 5. c. 6.*

Grot. de jure belli & pac. lib. 1. cap. 1. §. 4. *Lessius de justit. & jure, l. 2. cap. 2. Dub. 1. Etymol. Philol. voc. Jus.*

sonæ, and is by some call'd *jus activum*, which is defined by *Grotius* to be *Qualitas moralis personæ competens ad aliquid juste habendum aut agendum*; by *Lessius* to be *Potestas legitima ad rem aliquam obtinendam*, &c. So that by these descriptions, right is that power which a man hath by Law to do, have or obtain any thing. But the most full description of it is given by *Martinius*, that it is *adhærens personæ necessitas vel potestas recta ad aliquid agendum, omittendum aut permittendum*, that whereby any person lies under a necessity of doing, omitting or suffering a thing to be, or else hath a lawful authority of doing, *&c.* For we are to consider that there is a twofold right, either such whereby a man hath liberty and freedom by the Law to do any thing; or such whereby it becomes a man's necessary duty to do any thing. The opening of the difference of these two, and the different Influences they have upon persons and things, is very useful to our present purpose; *Jus* then is first that which is *justum*; so *Isidore*, *Jus dictum quia justum est.* So whatever is just, men have right to do it: Now a thing may be said to be just either more generally, as it signifies any thing which is lawful, or in a more restrained sense, when it implies some thing that is equal and due to another. So *Aristotle* distributes τὸ δίκαιον into τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον. The former sense of it is here only pertinent, as it implies any thing which may be done according to Law, that is done *jure*, because a man hath a right to do it. In order to this we are to observe, that an express positive command is not necessary to make a thing lawful, but a non-prohibition by a Law is sufficient for that. For it being the nature of Laws to bound up mens rights, what is not forbidden by the Law is thereby supposed to be left in mens power still to do it. So that it is to little purpose for men to seek for positive commands for every particular action to make it lawful; it sufficeth to make any action lawful, if there be no bar made by any direct or consequential prohibition: unless it be in such things whose lawfulness and goodness depend upon a mere positive command. For in those things which are therefore only good because commanded, a command is necessary to make them lawful, as in immediate positive acts of worship towards God; in which nothing is lawful any farther than it is founded upon a divine command. I speak not of circumstances belonging to the acts of worship, but whatever is looked upon as a part of divine worship if it be not commanded by God himself, it is no ways acceptable to him, and therefore not lawful. So our Saviour cites that out of the Prophet, *In vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines, the commandments of men*, which the *Chaldee* Paraphrast and *Syriack* version render thus, *Reverentia quam mihi exhibent, est ex præcepto & documento humano*, plainly imputing the reason of God's rejecting their worship to the want of a divine command for what they did. And therefore *Tertullian* condemns all those things to be *vacuæ observationis & superstitioni deputanda*, as superstitious, which are done *sine ullius Dominici aut Apostolici præcepti autoritate*, without the warrant of divine command. Although even here we may say too, that it is not merely the want of a divine precept which makes any part of divine worship uncommanded by God unlawful, but the general prohibition, that nothing should be done in the immediate worship of God, but what we have a divine command for. However in matters of mere decency and order in the Church of God, or in any other civil action of the lives of men, it is enough to make things lawful, if they are not forbidden

Etymol. l. 5. cap. 3. *Ethic. l. 5. cap. 2.* *Matt. 15. 9. Isa. 29. 11.* *Tertull. de orat. Cap. 12. v. Herald. digress. lib. 2. cap. 2. in Tertull.*

bidden. But againſt this, that a non-prohibition is warrant enough to make any thing lawful, this objection will be ſoon levyed, that it is an argument *ab authoritate negativè*, and thefore it is of no force: To which I anſwer, that the rule if taken without limitation upon which this objection is founded, is not true; for although an argument *ab authoritate negativè* as to matter of Fact avails not, yet the negative from authority as to matter of law and command is of great force and ſtrength. I grant the argument holds not here; we do not read that ever Chriſt or his Apoſtles did ſuch a thing, therefore it is not to be done; but this, We read of no law or precept commanding us to do it, therefore it is not unlawful not to do it; and we read of no Prohibition fobidding us to do it, therefore it may be lawfully done; this holds true and good, and that upon this twofold reaſon. Firſt, from God's intention in making known his will; which was not to record every particular fact done by himſelf, or Chriſt, or his Apoſtles, but it was to lay down thoſe general and ſtanding Laws, whereby his Church in all ages ſhould be guided and ruled: and in order to a perpetual obligation upon the conſciences, there muſt be a ſufficient promulgation of thoſe laws which muſt bind men. Thus in the caſe of infant-baptiſm, it is a very weak unconcluding argument to ſay that Infants muſt not be baptized, becauſe we never read that Chriſt or his Apoſtles did it; for this is a negative in matter of fact; but on the other ſide it is an evidence that infants are not to be excluded from baptiſm, becauſe there is no divine law which doth prohibit their admiſſion into the Church by it; for this is the negative of a law; and if it had been Chriſt's intention to have excluded any from admiſſion into the Church who were admitted before as infants were, there muſt have been ſome poſitive law whereby ſuch an intention of Chriſt ſhould have been expreſſed; for nothing can make that unlawful which was a duty before, but a direct and expreſs prohibition from the legiſlator himſelf, who alone hath power to reſcind as well as to make laws. And therefore *Antipædobaptiſts* muſt inſtead of requiring a poſitive command for baptizing infants, themſelves produce an expreſs prohibition excluding them, or there can be no appearance of reaſon given why the Goſpel ſhould exclude any from theſe privileges, which the law admitted them to. Secondly, I argue from the intention and end of laws, which is to circumſcribe and reſtrain the natural liberty of man, by binding him to the obſervation of ſome particular precepts. And therefore where there is not a particular command and prohibition, it is in Nature and reaſon ſuppoſed that men are left to their natural freedom, as is plain in poſitive humane laws; wherein men by compact and agreement for their mutual good in ſocieties were willing to reſtrain themſelves from thoſe things which ſhould prejudice the good of the community; this being the ground of mens firſt incloſing their rights and Common privileges, it muſt be ſuppoſed, that what is not ſo incloſed, is left common to all as their juſt right and privilege ſtill. So it is in divine poſitive laws, God intending to bring ſome of mankind to happineſs by conditions of his own appointing, hath laid down many poſitive precepts, binding men to the practice of thoſe things as duties which are commanded by him. But where we find no command for performance, we cannot look upon that as an immediate duty, becauſe of the neceſſary relation between duty and law; and ſo where we find no prohibition, there we can have no ground to think that men

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are debarred from the liberty of doing things not forbidden. For as we ſay of exceptions as to general laws and rules, that an exception expreſſed *firmat regulam in non exceptis*, makes the rule ſtronger in things not expreſſed as excepted; ſo it is as to divine prohibitions; as to the poſitives, that thoſe prohibitions we read in Scripture make other things not prohibited to be therefore lawful, becauſe not expreſly forbidden. As God's forbidding *Adam* to taſte of the fruit of one tree did give him a liberty to taſte of all the reſt. Indeed, had not God at all revealed his will and laws to us by his word, there might have been ſome plea why men ſhould have waited for particular revelations to dictate the goodneſs or evil of particular actions, not determined by the law of nature; but ſince God hath revealed his will, there can be no reaſon given why thoſe things ſhould not be lawful to do, which God hath not thought fit to forbid men the doing of. Further, we are to obſerve that in theſe things which are thus undetermined in reference to an obligation to duty, but left to our natural liberty as things lawful, the contrary to that which is thus lawful, is not thereby made unlawful. But both parts are left in mens power to do, or not to do them; as is evident in all thoſe things which carry a general equity with them, and are therefore conſonant to the law of nature, but have no particular obligation, as not flowing immediately from any dictate of the natural law. Thus community of goods is lawful by the law and principles of nature, yet every man hath a lawful right to his goods by dominion and propriety. And in a ſtate of community it was the right of every man to impropriate upon a juſt equality, ſuppoſing a preceding compact and mutual agreement. Whence it is that ſome of the School-men ſay, that although the Law of nature be immutable as to its precepts and prohibitions, yet not as to its demonſtrations (as they call them) as, *Do, as you would be done to*, bind always indiſpenſably; but *that in a ſtate of nature all things are common to all:* This is true, but it binds not men to the neceſſary obſervance of it. Theſe which they call demonſtrations are only ſuch things as are agreeable to nature, but not particularly commanded by any indiſpenſable precept of it. Thus likewiſe it is agreeable to nature that the next of the kindred ſhould be heir to him who dies inteſtate, but he may lawfully wave his intereſt if he pleaſe. Now to apply this to our preſent caſe, according to this ſenſe of *jus* for that which is lawful, thoſe things may be ſaid to be *jure divino* which are not determined one way or other by any poſitive Law of God, but are left wholly as things lawful, to the prudence of men to determine them in a way agreeable to natural light, and the general rules of the word of God. In which ſenſe I aſſert any particular form of government agreed on by the governours of the Church, conſonant to the general rules of Scripture, to be by divine right, *i.e.* God by his own Laws hath given men a power and liberty to determine the particular form of Church Government among them. And hence it may appear that though one form of government be agreeable to the word, it doth not follow that another is not; or becauſe one is lawful, another is unlawful; but one form may be more agreeable to ſome parts, places, people and times than others are. In which caſe that form of government is to be ſettled which is moſt agreeable to the preſent ſtate of a place, and is moſt advantagiouſly conducible to the promoting the ends of Church-Government in that place or nation. I conclude then according to this

Alex. Alenſis, part. 3. q. 27. m. 3.

ſenſe of *jus*, that the *Ratio regiminis Eccleſiaſtici* is *juris divini naturalis*, That the reaſon of the Church-Government is immutable, and holds in all times and places, which is the preſervation of the peace and unity of the Church; but the *modus regiminis Eccleſiaſtici*, the particular form of that Government is *Juris Divini permiſſivi*, that both the laws of God and nature have left it to the prudence of particular Churches to determine it. This may be cleared by a parallel inſtance. The reaſon and the ſcience of Phyſick is immutable, but the particular preſcriptions of that ſcience are much varied, according to the different tempers of Patients. And the very ſame reaſon in Phyſick which preſcribes one ſort of Phyſick to one, doth preſcribe a different ſort to another, becauſe the temper or diſeaſe of the one calls for a different method of cure, yet the ground and end of both preſcriptions was the very ſame, to recover the Patient from his diſtemper. So I ſay in our preſent caſe; the ground and reaſon of Government in the Church is unalterable *by Divine Right*, yea, and that very reaſon which determines the particular forms; but yet thoſe particular forms flowing from that immutable reaſon, may be very different in themſelves, and may alter according to the ſeveral circumſtances of times, and places, and perſons, for the more commodious advancing the main end of Government. As in morality there can be but one thing to a man *in genere ſummi boni*, as the chief Good, *quo tendit & in quod dirigit arcum* ——— to which he refers all other things, yet there may be many things *in genere boni conducentis*, as means in order to attaining that end. So though Church-Government vary not as to the ground, end and reaſon of it, yet it may as to the particular forms of it: As is further evident, as to forms of civil Government, though the end of all be the ſame, yet Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy are in themſelves lawful means for the attaining the ſame common end. And as *Alenſis* determines it in the caſe of community of goods by the Law of nature, that the ſame reaſon of the Law of nature which did dictate Community of goods to be moſt ſuitable to man in the ſtate of innocency, did in his fal'n eſtate preſcribe a propriety of goods, as moſt agreeable to it; ſo that herein the *modus obſervantiæ* differed, but the *ratio præcepti* was the ſame ſtill; which was man's comfortable enjoyment of the accommodations of life: which in innocency might have been beſt done by community, but in man's degenerate condition, muſt be by a propriety. So the ſame reaſon of Church-Government may call for an equality in the perſons, acting as Governours of the Church in one place, which may call for ſuperiority and ſubordination in another.

Having now diſpatched the firſt ſenſe of a divine right, I come to the other, which is the main ſeat of the controverſie, and therefore will require a longer debate. And ſo *Jus* is that which makes a thing to become a duty: ſo *jus quaſi juſſum*, and *juſſa jura*, as *Feſtus* explains it, *i. e.* that whereby a thing is not only *licitum*, in mens lawful power to do it or no, but is made *debitum*, and is conſtituted a duty by the force and vertue of a divine command. Now man's obligation to any thing as a duty doth ſuppoſe on the part of him from whoſe authority he derives his obligation, both *legiſlation* and *promulgation*. Firſt, there muſt be a *legiſlative power* commanding it; which if it reſpects only the outward actions of a man in a nation imbodied by Laws, is the ſupreme magiſtrate; but if the obligation reſpect the §. 3.

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conſciences of all men directly and immediately, then none have the Power to ſettle any thing by way of an univerſal ſtanding Law, but God himſelf: Who by being ſole Creator and Governour of the World, hath alone abſolute and independent Dominion and Authority over the Souls of men. But beſides legiſlation, another thing neceſſary to man's obligation to duty, is a *ſufficient promulgation* of the Law made; becauſe though before this there be the ground of obedience on man's part to all God's commands, yet there muſt be a particular declaration of the Laws, whereby man is bound in order to the determination of man's duty. Which in poſitives is ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that unleſs there be a ſufficient promulgation and declaration of the will of the Law-giver, man's ignorance is excuſable in reference to them, and ſo frees from guilt and the obligation to puniſhment; but it is otherwiſe in reference to the dictates to the natural Law, wherein though man be at a loſs for them, yet his own contracted pravity being the cauſe of his blindneſs, leaves him without excuſe. Hence it is ſaid with good reaſon, that though man under the moral Law, was bound to obey Goſpel precepts, as to the reaſon and ſubſtance of the duties by them commanded, as Faith, Repentance from dead Works, and new obedience; yet a more full and particular revelation by the Goſpel was neceſſary, for the particular determination of the general acts of obedience, to particular objects under their ſeveral Modifications expreſſed in the Goſpel. And therefore Faith and Repentance under the moral Law, taken as a tranſcript of the Law of nature, were required under their general notion as acts of obedience, but not in that particular relation which thoſe acts have under the Covenant of Grace. Which particular determination of the general acts to ſpecial objects under different reſpects, ſome call New precepts of the Goſpel, others New light; but taking that light as it hath an influence upon the conſciences of men, the difference is ſo ſmall, that it deſerves not to be named a Controverſie.

But that which I am now clearing is this, that whatſoever binds Chriſtians as an univerſal ſtanding Law, muſt be clearly revealed as ſuch, and laid down in Scripture in ſuch evident terms, as all who have their ſenſes exerciſed therein, may diſcern it to have been the will of Chriſt, that it ſhould perpetually oblige all believers to the World's end, as is clear in the caſe of baptiſm, and the Lord's-Supper. But here I ſhall add one thing by way of caution; that there is not the ſame neceſſity for a particular and clear revelation in the *alteration* of a *Law unrepealed* in ſome circumſtances of it, as there is for the eſtabliſhing of a *New Law*. As to the former, *viz.* the change of a ſtanding Law as to ſome particular circumſtance, a different practice by perſons guided by an infallible ſpirit is ſufficient; which is the caſe, as to the obſervation of the Lord's-Day under the Goſpel: For the fourth Command ſtanding in force as to the morality of it, a different practice by the Apoſtles may be ſufficient for the particular determination of the more ritual and occaſional part of it, which was the limitation of the obſervation of it to that certain day. So likewiſe that other Law ſtanding in force, that perſons taken into covenant with God, ſhould be admitted by ſome viſible ſign, apoſtolical practice clearly manifeſted, may be ſufficient ground to conclude what the mind of *Chriſt* was, as to the application of it to particular perſons; and what qualifications are requiſite in ſuch as are capable of admiſſion, as in the caſe

caſe of Infants. Whereby it is clear why there is no particular Law or command in reference to them under the Goſpel, becauſe it was only the application of a Law in force already to particular perſons, which might be gathered ſufficiently from the Apoſtles practice, the Analogy of the diſpenſation, the equal reaſon of excluſion under the Law, and yet notwithſtanding the continual admiſſion of them then into the ſame Goſpel-Covenant; Circumciſion being the ſeal of the righteouſneſs of faith. But this by the way to prevent miſtakes. We muſt now by parity of reaſon ſay, that either the former Law, in thoſe things wherein it was not typical, muſt hold in reference to the form of Government in the Church of Chriſt, or elſe that Chriſt by an univerſal Law hath ſetled all order in Church Government among the Paſtors themſelves; or elſe that he hath left it to the prudence of every particular Church, to determine its own form of Government, which I conceive is the direct ſtate of the Queſtion about Divine Right, *viz.* Whether the particular form of Government in the Church be ſetled by an univerſal binding Law or no? Rom. 4. 3.

§. 4. But for a farther clearing the ſtate of the queſtion, we muſt conſider what it is that makes an unalterable Divine Right, or a ſtanding Law in the Church of God: for thoſe who found forms of Government upon a Divine Right, do not plead a Law in expreſs terms, but ſuch things from whence a Divine Right by Law may be inferred. Which I now come to examine; and that which I lay down as a *Poſtulatum*, or a certain concluſion according to which I ſhall examine others aſſertions concerning Divine Right, is, That nothing is founded upon a Divine Right, nor can bind Chriſtians directly or conſequentially as a poſitive Law, but what may be certainly known to have come from God, with an intention to oblige believers to the world's end. For either we muſt ſay it binds Chriſtians as a Law when God did not intend it ſhould, or elſe God's intentions to bind all believers by it muſt be clearly manifeſted. Now then, ſo many ways and no more as a thing may be known to come from God with an intention to oblige all perpetually, a thing may be ſaid to be of an unalterable Divine Right; and thoſe can be no more than theſe two; Either by the Law of Nature, or by ſome poſitive Law of God: Nothing elſe can bind univerſally and perpetually but one of theſe two, or by vertue of them, as ſhall be made appear. I begin with the Law of Nature. The Law of Nature binds indiſpenſably, as it depends not upon any arbitrary conſtitutions, but is founded upon the intrinſecal nature of good and evil in the things themſelves, antecedently to any poſitive declaration of God's will. So that till the nature of good and evil be changed, that Law is unalterable as to its obligation. When, I ſay, the Law of Nature is indiſpenſable, my meaning is, that in thoſe things which immediately flow from that Law by way of precept, as the three firſt commands of the Moral Law, no man can by any poſitive Law be exempted from his obligation to do them; neither by any abrogation of the Laws themſelves, nor by derogation from them, nor interpretation of them, nor change in the object, matter or circumſtance, whatſoever it be. Now although the *formal reaſon* of man's obedience to the precept of this Law, be the conformity which the things commanded have to the Divine Nature and goodneſs, yet I conceive *the efficient cauſe* of mans *obligation* to theſe things, is to be fetched from the Will, Command, and pleaſure of God: Not as it is taken for an arbitrary poſitive will, but as it is executive of Divine purpoſes, and as it engraves ſuch a Law upon the hearts of men. For notwithſtanding

man's reaſon, conſidered in it ſelf, be the chiefeſt inſtrument of diſcovery what are theſe neceſſary duties of humane nature (in which ſenſe *Ariſtotle* defines a natural Law to be that which παντα χῆ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, hath every where the ſame force and ſtrength, *i. e.* as *Andronicus Rhodius* very well interprets it, παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς τε ὀρθῶς καὶ ὑγιῶς ἔχουσι, καὶ τοῖς νοσοῦσι τὰς φρένας καὶ διεστραμμένοις, *among all that have the free uſe of their reaſon and faculties*) yet I ſay, it is not bare reaſon which binds men to the doing of thoſe things commanded in that Law, but as it is expreſſive of an eternal Law, and deduceth its obligation from thence. And ſo this Law, if we reſpect the riſe, extent, and immutability of it, may be call'd deſervedly the Law of Nature; but if we look at the emanation, efflux, and original of it, it is a divine Law, and ſo it is call'd by *Molina*, *Alphonſus à Caſtro*, and others. For the ſanction of this Law of Nature, as well as others, depends upon the will of God, and therefore the obligation muſt come from him, it being in the power of no other to puniſh for the breach of a Law, but thoſe who had the Legiſlative power to cauſe the obligation to it. It appears then from hence, that whatever by juſt conſequence can be deduced from the preceptive Law of Nature, is of Divine Right, becauſe from the very nature of that Law (it being indiſpenſible) it appears that God had an intent to oblige all perſons in the world by it.

Ethic. l. 5. cap. 10.

V. Selden. de jure nat. apud Ebr. lib. 1. c. 7. & 8. Mol. de juſt. & jur. p. 1. diſp. 3. Alphonſ. de leg. pur. l. 2. c. 14.

§. 5. The ſecond way whereby we may know what is of Divine Right, is by God's poſitive Laws; for God being the Supream Governour of the world, hath the Legiſlative power in his hands, to bind to the performance of what duties he pleaſe, which carry no repugnancy in them to his Divine Nature and Goodneſs. Hence ariſe all thoſe poſitive Laws of God which we have in Scripture; for God's end in his written Law was, that man ſhould have a copy of all Divine conſtitutions by him, that he might therein read what his duty was toward his Maker. The precepts of the Law of Nature, are by the Jews call'd משפטים and מצות abſolutely, without any addition; becauſe they are of ſuch things as do perpetually bind, which becauſe they are known to all by natural light, they ſometimes call them מצות הרעת *præcepta ſcientiæ*; and being that their righteouſneſs is ſo evident and apparent, they call them המישרים דברים *verba rectitudinis:* but the cleareſt difference between the precepts of the Law of Nature, and other poſitive commands, is that which the famous *Iſ. Caſaubon* takes notice of out of the Jewiſh Doctors. *Obſervant doctiſſimi è Rabbinis inter* מצות & חוקים *hanc eſſe differentiam, quod* Mitſvoth, *ſive præceptorum ratio aperta eſt, ut Deum cole, honora patrem & matrem, at* Chukin *ſtatuta ſive decreta earum rerum eſſe dicunt quarum* טעם *ratio ſoli Deo ſit nota, ut circumciſionis & ſimilium.* The reaſon of the Laws of Nature is evident, but of poſitive Laws there is no reaſon to be given אינו אלא גזירת מלך *non eſt alia præter decretum regis:* no other account to be given of them but the will of God. The Laws of Nature are by the LXX. often call'd δικαιώματα, and ſo uſed, *Rom.* 2. 16. by *Juſtin Martyr*, παραθόλω καὶ φύσει καὶ αἰώνια καλὰ· by *Joſephus*, τῆς φύσεως δικαιώματα· but God's poſitive Laws are call'd ἐντολαὶ, thence we read of *Zachary* and *Elizabeth*, Luke 1. 6. πορευόμενοι ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἐντολαῖς καὶ δικαιώμασι, *walking in all the ordinances and commandments of God blameleſs*, and thoſe are call'd νόμῳ ἐντολῶν ἐν δόγμασι, by St. *Paul* Eph. 2. 15. *The Law of commandments in ordinances.* Now although this difference be not always obſerved in the words in Scripture, yet there is a vaſt difference between the things themſelves though both equally com-

Exercit. Eccleſ. adverſ. Bar. exer. 16. ſect. 43.

Seld. de jure Nat. apud Ebr. l. 1. cap. 10.

Colloq. cum Tryph. Judæo. Origen. lib. 16. cap. 10. V. Grot. in Luc. 1. 6.

commanded by God. That which is moſt to our preſent purpoſe to obſerve, is, that poſitives being mutable and alterable in themſelves, a bare Divine command is not ſufficient to make them immutable, unleſs there be likewiſe expreſſed, that it is the will of God that they ſhould always continue. This was that which the Jews ſtumbled at ſo much, and do to this day, becauſe they are aſſured their Law came once from God, therefore it muſt of neceſſity have a perpetual obligation: as may be ſeen in their two great Doctors *Maimonides* and *Abarbinel*, who both of them make the eternity of the Law one of the fundamental Articles of their Creed. But *Abarbinel* ſplits this Article into two; whereof the firſt is, that the Law of *Moſes* ſhall never be changed; the other, that no other Law ſhall come in ſtead of it. The original of which grand error is from want of obſerving the difference between things commanded by God, ſome of which are good, and therefore commanded; others commanded, and therefore good. In which latter, if the reaſon of the command ceaſeth, the command its ſelf obligeth no longer. As the ceremonial Law was to be their παιδαγωγὸς εἰς χριστὸν, which is not meant in regard of the ſharp ſevere nature of the Law to drive them unto Chriſt, as it is by many interpreted, but the Law is a Pædagogue in regard of its tutorage and conduct, as it ſignified him whoſe office it was to conduct Noblemens Children to the School (as a learned man obſerves.) This being then the office of the Law, when the Church was now entred into Chriſt's School, the office of this Pædagogue then ceaſed. And ſo the ceremonial Law needed no abrogation at all, expiring of its ſelf at Chriſt's coming, as Laws made for the times of war do when peace comes. Only becauſe the Jews were ſo hardly perſuaded that it ſhould expire, (the believing Jews conceiving at firſt the Goſpel came rather to help them to obey the Law of *Moſes* than to cancel the obligation of it) therefore it was neceſſary that a more honourable burial ſhould be given to it, and the Apoſtles ſhould *pro roſtris* declare more fully that believers were freed from that Yoke of ceremonies, under which the neck of their fore-fathers had groaned ſo long. It appears then, that a poſitive Law coming from God, doth not merely, by vertue of its being enacted by God, bind perpetually all perſons, unleſs there be a declaration of God's will adjoined, that it ſhould do ſo.

Maimon. de fundam. legis, cap. 9. ſect. 1. Abarb. de Capit. fidei, cap. 8. p. 29. Ed. Vorſtii.

Gal. 3. 24.

§. 6. It will be here then well worth our enquiry to find out ſome κριτήρια or notes of difference whereby to know when poſitive Laws bind immutably, when not; I ſhall lay down theſe following. Firſt, when the ſame reaſon of the command continues ſtill, then we cannot conceive how that which was inſtituted upon ſuch an account as remains ſtill, ſhould not have the ſame force now which it had at firſt. That poſitive Law under which *Adam* was in his ſtate of innocency touching the forbidden fruit, did not bind any longer than his fall; becauſe the reaſon of the command ceaſed, which was the tryal of man's obedience: For which, God made choice of a very facile and eaſie command, according to that rule of Politicians, *In minimis obedientiæ periculum faciunt Legiſlatores*, of which they give this rational account, *Quia legiſlatoris ad obedientiam obligantis potius habenda eſt ratio quam rei de quâ lex eſt lata:* thence aroſe that Law of the *Ephori* at *Sparta*, *barbam tondere*, to which no other reaſon was annexed but this, *obtemperare legibus*, to learn them to obey the Laws. This was God's aim in that eaſie command given to *Adam*, to make thereon an experiment of man's willing-

neſs to obey his maker, and wherein man ſoon loſt that *Obſequii gloriâ*, as he in *Tacitus* calls it, which as *Pliny* ſaith is *in eo major quod quis minus velit.* But had this Law been a ſtanding Law for all mankind, it would have continued its obligation ſtill; but ſince we ſee that it was only a perſonal, temporary, probative precept; for no ſooner was man fallen but its obligation ceaſed. So likewiſe thoſe precepts of the Judicial Law, which immediately reſpected the Common-wealth of the Jews as ſuch, their obligation reacheth not to Chriſtians at all, nor (as it is generally conceived) to the Jews themſelves, when out of the Confines of their own country, becauſe the reaſon of thoſe Laws doth neither deſcend to Chriſtians, nor did travel abroad with the Jews. But thoſe judicial Laws which are founded upon common equity do bind ſtill, not by vertue of that *ſanction*, but by virtue of common principles of equity, which certainly in the preſent ſhortneſs of humane reaſon cannot be fetched from a clearer fountain than thoſe Laws which once came from the fountain of goodneſs: none of whoſe conſtitutions can any ways be ſuppoſed to deviate from the exacteſt rules of juſtice and equity. And upon this very ground too, ſome part of the fourth commandment is abrogated, and the other continues to bind ſtill; For the reaſon of the ceremonial and occaſional part is ceaſed, and the reaſon of what was moral, continues. Therefore the School-men ſay right of the Sabbath day, *Cultus eſt à naturâ, modus à lege, virtus à Gratiâ.* Nature dictates that God ſhould be worſhipped, the Law informs what day and time to ſpend in his worſhip, Grace muſt enable us to perform that worſhip on that day in a right manner. And becauſe the ſame reaſon for God's worſhip continues ſtill, therefore it is a precept of the natural Law, that God ſhould be worſhipped. What time preciſely muſt be ſpent in God's worſhip (as one day in ſeven) though the reaſon be evident to the nature of it when it is made known, yet it is hard to conceive that nature could have found out the preciſe determination of the time. Although I muſt confeſs the general conſent of nations, as to the ſeventh part, (if it were fully cleared) would ſpeak fair to be the voice of nature, or at leaſt a tradition received from the Sons of *Noah*, which, if ſo, will be an evidence of the obſervation of the Sabbath before the Children of Iſraels being in the Wilderneſs. But granting that the ſeventh part of time was a poſitive Law of God, yet I ſay it binds immutably, becauſe there is as ſtrong a reaſon for it now as ever, and *ratio immutabilis præcepti, facit præceptum immutabile.* This I take to be the ſenſe of thoſe who diſtinguiſh between *morale poſitivum*, and *morale naturale*, *i. e.* that ſome things are ſo moral, that even nature its ſelf can diſcover them, as that God ſhould be worſhipped. Other things are ſo moral, that though the reaſon of them be founded in nature, yet there wants divine revelation to diſcover them to us; but when once diſcovered, are diſcerned to be very agreeable to common principles of reaſon: And theſe when thus diſcovered, are as immutably obligatory as the other, becauſe the reaſon of them is immutable. And of this nature is the determination of the particular time for God's worſhip, and limitation of it to one day in ſeven. But what was in that precept merely occaſional, as the firſt and original ground of its limitation to the ſeventh in order, *God's reſting on that day from the work of Creation*, and the further ground of its inforcement to the Jews, *viz. their deliverance out of Egypt*; theſe being not immutable but temporary and occaſional, may upon as great ground given, and approved of

Gen. 2. 2. Deut. 5. 15.

God for that end (as is evident by the Apoſtles practice) be ſufficient reaſon of the alteration of the ſeventh day to the firſt day of the week. By this may briefly be ſeen how irrationally thoſe ſpeak, who ſay we have no farther ground for our obſervation of the Lord's day now, than for other arbitrary Feſtivals in the Church, *viz.* The tradition of the Church of God. I grant, the tradition of the Church doth acquaint us with Apoſtolical practice, but the ground of our obſervation of the Lord's day, is not the Church's tradition, but that Apoſtolical practice conveyed by univerſal tradition, (which ſetting aſide the Feſtivals obſerved upon the Lord's day, can very hardly be found for any other.) But ſuppoſing univerſal tradition for other Feſtivals, I ſay here tradition is not only uſed as a teſtimony and inſtrument of conveyance, as in the other caſe of the Lord's day; but is it ſelf the only argument, and the very ground of the original obſervation: Between which two, what a wide difference there is, let any rational man judge. But for a farther clearing this obſervation, we muſt conſider, that the reaſon of the command, which we ſay is the meaſure of its obligation, muſt not be fetched from mens uncertain conjectures, (among whom dreams often paſs for reaſons) but it muſt be either expreſſed in the Law its ſelf, or deducible by apparent and eaſie collection from it; as is plain in the decrees of the Apoſtles about *things ſtrangled, and offered to Idols*, where the reaſon of the command is plainly implied, to wit, for preſent compliance with the Jews; and therefore no ſooner did the reaſon of the command ceaſe, but the obligation of it ceaſed too: but of this more afterwards. This is one way then to diſcern the difference between poſitive Laws, as to the obligation of them, by the ground and reaſon of the command. And therefore it is well obſerved by Divines, (which farther confirms what I now prove) that no command doth bind againſt the reaſon of the command; becauſe it is not the words, but the ſenſe and reaſon of a command which hath the greateſt obligatory force. Therefore *Tully* tells us that the *ratio juris & legiſlatoris conſilium*, is the beſt interpreter of any Law: who excellently and largely proves that the reaſon of the Law is the law, and not the words. So much for the firſt rule. Acts 15. 29. *Orat. pro A. Cæcin.*

§. 7. Secondly, Another way to know when poſitive Laws are immutable, is, when God's will is expreſly declared that ſuch Laws ſhall bind immutably. For it being granted on all hands that God may bind us to thoſe things which are left indifferent by the Law of nature, and likewiſe for what term he pleaſe; the only enquiry left, is to ſee in his word whether he hath ſo bound us or no; and if he hath, whether he hath left it in man's power to revoke his Laws. For as to poſitive Laws expreſly laid down in Scripture, the ground of which is only as the Jews ſpeak רצון מלך *the will of the King*, *i. e.* God's own pleaſure, without any reaſon or occaſion of it ſelf expreſſed or neceſſarily implied, theſe do bind immutably, unleſs the ſame power which commanded them, doth again revoke them. For we cannot in any wiſe conceive that the wiſe God ſhould after the declaring his own will, leave it in the power of any corrupt fallible being to determine, or to diſpence with the obligation of his own Laws. Which to do, and inſtead of them to enforce others immediately upon the conſciences of men, as ſtanding Laws, is an attempt beyond that of the Giants againſt Heaven, (or the men at *Babel*) that being only an affectation of reaching Heaven, but this an actual uſurpation of God's ſupreme and legiſlative power and authority. But though man hath not, God always reſerves to himſelf a

power

power to relax, interpret, and dispence with his own positive Laws; which imply no repugnancy to his own nature. And this power is always to be understood in all Laws to be reserved to God, where he hath not himself declared that he will not use it; which is done either by the annexing an oath or a promise, which the Apostle calls the *two*
Heb. 6. 18. *immutable things in which it is impossible for God to lie.* For though God be free to promise, yet when he hath promised, his own nature and faithfulness binds him to performance; in which sense I understand those who say, God in making promises is bound only to himself, and not to men; that is, that the ground of performance ariseth from God's faithfulness. For else if we respect the right coming by the promise, that must immediately respect the person to whom it is made, and in respect of which we commonly say that the promiser is bound to performance. But the case is otherwise in penal Laws, which though never so strict, do imply a power of *relaxation* in the Legislator: because penal Laws do only constitute the *debitum pœnæ*, and bind the sinner over to punishment, but do not bind the Legislator to an actual execution upon the debt. Which is the ground that the person of a Mediator was admittable in the place of fallen man, because it was a penal Law, and therefore relaxable. But because the debt of punishment is immediately contracted upon the breach of the Law, therefore satisfaction was necessary to God as Law-giver, either by the person himself, or another for him; because it was not consistent with the holiness of God's nature and his wisdom as Governor, to relax an established Law, without valuable consideration. Now for the third kind of God's Laws besides promissory and penal, *viz.* such as are merely positive respecting duties, which become such by vertue of an express command: these, though they be revocable in themselves, yet being revocable only by God himself, and his own power, since he hath already in his word fully revealed his will, unless therein he hath declared when their obligation shall cease, they continue irreversible. This is the case as to the Sacraments of the New Testament, which being commands merely positive, yet Christ commanding Christians as Christians to observe them, and not as Christians of the first and second ages of the Church, his mind can be no otherwise interpreted concerning them,
Catech. Racov. cap. 4. than that he did intend immutably to bind all Christians to the observance of them. For although the Socinians say, that baptism was only a Rite instituted by Christ for the passing men from Judaism and Gentilism to Christianity, yet we are not bound to look upon all as reason that comes from those who profess themselves the admirers of it. For Christ's command no where implying such a limitation; and an outward visible profession of Christianity being a duty now, and the Covenant entred into by that Rite of initiation, as obligatory as ever, we have no
Acts 3. 38. reason to think that Christ's command doth not reach us now, especially the promise being made to as many as God shall call, and consequently the same duty required which was then in order to the obtaining of the same ends. A third way to discern the immutability of positive Laws, is, when the things commanded in particular are necessary to the being, succession, and continuance of such a society of men professing the Gospel, as is instituted and approved by Christ himself. For Christ must be supposed to have the power himself to order what society he please, and appoint what orders he please to be observed by them; what Rites and Ceremonies to be used in admission of Members into

into his Church, in their continuing in it; in the way, means, manner of ejection out of it; in the preserving the succession of his Church, and the administration of ordinances of his appointment. These being thus necessary for the maintaining and upholding this society, they are thereby of a nature as unalterable, as the duty of observing what Christ hath commanded is. How much these things concern the resolution of the Question proposed, will appear afterwards. Thus we have gained a resolution of the second thing, whereon an unalterable Divine Right is founded; *viz.* either upon the dictates of the Law of Nature, concurring with the Rules of the written word; or upon express positive Laws of God, whose reason is immutable, or which God hath declared shall continue, as necessary to the being of the Church.

§. 8. The next thing is to examine the other pretences which are brought for a Divine Right; which are either Scripture *examples*, or *Divine acts*, or *Divine approbation*. For *Scripture examples*: First, I take it for granted on all hands, that all Scripture examples do not bind us to follow them; such are the Mediatory acts of Christ, the Heroical acts of extraordinary persons, all accidental and occasional actions. Example doth not bind us as an example; for then all examples are to be followed, and so we shall of necessity go *qua itur; non qua eundum*, walk by the most examples, and not by rule. There is then no obligatory force in example it self. Secondly, there must be then some rule fixed to know when examples bind, and when not: for otherwise there can be no discrimination put between examples which we are to follow, and which to avoid. This rule must be either immediately *obligatory*, making it a duty to follow such examples, or else *directive*, declaring what examples are to be followed: And yet even this latter doth imply as well as the former, that the following these examples thus declared, is become a duty. There can be no duty without a Law making it to be a duty: and consequently, it is the Law making it to be a duty to follow such examples, which gives a Divine Right to those examples, and not barely the examples themselves. We are bound to follow Christ's example, not barely because he did such and such things, (for many things he did we are not bound to follow him in) but because he himself hath by a command made it our duty to follow him in his humility, patience, self denial, *&c.* and in whatever things are set out in Scripture for our imitation. When men speak then with so much confidence, that Scripture examples do bind us unalterably, they either mean that the example it self makes it a duty, which I have shewn already to be absurd; or else that the moral nature of the action done in that example, or else the Law making it our duty to follow the example, though in it self it be of no moral nature. If the *former* of these two, then it is the morality of the action binds us, without its being *incarnate* in the example: For the example in actions not moral, binds not at all, and therefore the example binds only by vertue of the morality of it, and consequently, it is the morality of the action which binds, and not the example. If the *latter*, the rule making it our duty, then it is more apparent, that it is not the example which binds necessarily, but that rule which makes it a duty to follow it; for examples in indifferent things do not bind without a Law making it to be a duty: And so it evidently appears, that all obligatory force is taken off from the examples themselves, and resolved into one of the two former, the moral nature of the action, or a positive Law. And therefore those who plead the

Matth. 11. 28. 1 Joh. 2. 6. 1 Pet. 2. 22.

obliga-

obligatory nature of Scripture examples, muſt either produce the moral nature of theſe examples, or elſe a rule binding us to follow thoſe examples. Eſpecially, when theſe examples are brought to found a New poſitive Law, obliging all Chriſtians neceſſarily to the end of the world. Concerning the binding nature of Apoſtolical practice, I ſhall diſcourſe largely afterwards. The next thing pleaded for a Divine Right, is by *Divine Acts*. As to this, it is again evident that all Divine Acts do not conſtitute ſuch a Right; therefore there muſt be ſomething expreſſed in thoſe Acts when ſuch a Divine Right follows them; whence we may infallibly gather it was God's intention they ſhould perpetually oblige: as is plain in the caſes inſtanced in the moſt for this purpoſe; as God's reſting on
Gen. 2. 2. the ſeventh day, making the Sabbath perpetual: For it was not God's reſting that made it the Sabbath, for that is only expreſſed as the occaſion of its inſtitution; but it was God's ſanctifying the day, that is, by a Law ſetting it apart for his own ſervice, which made it a duty. And ſo Chriſt's reſurrection was not it which made the Lord's day Sabbath of Divine Right; but Chriſt's reſurrection was the occaſion of the Apoſtles altering only a circumſtantial part of a moral duty already; which being done upon ſo great reaſons, and by perſons endued with an infallible ſpirit, thereby it becomes our duty to obſerve that moral command in this limitation of time. But here it is farther neceſſary to diſtinguiſh between acts merely *poſitive*, and acts *donative* or *legal*. The former confer no right at all, but the latter do; not barely as acts, but as legal acts, that is, by ſome declaration that thoſe acts do confer right. And ſo it is in all donations, and therefore in Law the bare delivery of a thing to another doth not give a legal title to it, without expreſs transMatth. 16. 19. 18. 18. ferring of dominion and propriety with it. Thus in Chriſt's delivering the Keys to *Peter* and the reſt of the Apoſtles, by that act I grant the Apoſtles had the power of the Keys by Divine Right; but then it was not any bare act of Chriſt which did it, but it was only the declaration of Chriſt's will conferring that authority upon them. Again, we muſt diſtinguiſh between a *right* conferr'd by a *donative act*, and the *unalterable nature* of that Right; for it is plain there may be a Right *perſonal* as well as *ſucceſſive*, *derivative*, and *perpetual*. And therefore it is not enough to prove that a Right was given by any act of Chriſt, unleſs it be made appear it was Chriſt's intention that Right ſhould be perpetual if it oblige ſtill. For otherwiſe the *extent of the Apoſtolical commiſſion*, *the power of working miracles*, as well as *the power of the Keys*, (whether by it we mean a power declarative of duty, or a power authoritative and penal) muſt continue ſtill, if a difference be not made between theſe two: And ſome rule found out to know when the Right conferr'd by Divine Acts is perſonal, when ſucceſſive; which rule thus found out, muſt make the Right unalterable, and ſo concerning us, and not the bare donative act of Chriſt: For it is evident they were all equally conferr'd upon the Apoſtles by an act of Chriſt; and if ſome continue ſtill, and others do not, then the bare act of Chriſt doth not make an unalterable Divine Right. And ſo though it be proved that the Apoſtles had ſuperiority of order and juriſdiction over the Paſtors of the Church by an act of Chriſt, yet it muſt farther be proved, that it was Chriſt's intention that ſuperiority ſhould continue in their ſucceſſors, or it makes nothing to the purpoſe. But this argument, I confeſs, I ſee not how thoſe who make a neceſſary Divine Right to follow upon the acts of Chriſt, can poſſibly avoid the force of. The laſt thing pleaded for Di-

vine Right, is *Divine approbation*, but this leaſt of all conſtitutes a Divine Right: For if the actions be extraordinary, God's approbation of them as ſuch, cannot make them an ordinary duty. In all other actions which are good, and therefore only commendable, they muſt be ſo either becauſe done in conformity to God's revealed will, or to the nature of things good in themſelves. In the one it is the poſitive Law of God, in the other the Law of Nature, which made the action good, and ſo approved by God, and on that account we are bound to do it. For God will certainly approve of nothing but what is done according to his will revealed, or natural; which will and Law of his, is that which makes any thing to be of Divine Right, *i. e.* perpetually binding, as to the obſervation of it. But for acts of a merely poſitive Nature, which we read God's approbation of in Scripture, by vertue of which approbation thoſe actions do oblige us; in this caſe I ſay it is not God's mere approbation that makes the obligation, but as that approbation ſo recorded in Scripture, is a ſufficient teſtimony and declaration of God's intention to oblige men: And ſo it comes to be a poſitive Law, which is nothing elſe but a ſufficient declaration of the Legiſlator's will and intention, to bind in particular actions and caſes. Thus now we have cleared whereon a neceſſary and unalterable Divine Right muſt be founded; either upon the Law of Nature, or ſome poſitive Law of God, ſufficiently declared to be perpetually binding.

CHAP. II.

Six Hypotheſes laid down, as the baſis of the following Diſcourſe. 1. *The irreverſible obligation of the Law of Nature, either by humane, or Divine poſitive Laws, in things immediately flowing from it.* 2. *Things agreeable to the Law of Nature may be lawfully practiſed in the Church of God, where there is no prohibition by poſitive Laws, enlarged into five ſubſervient Propoſitions.* 3. *Divine poſitive Laws, concerning the manner of the thing whoſe ſubſtance is determined by the Law of Nature, muſt be obeyed by vertue of the obligation of the natural Law.* 4. *Things undetermined, both by the natural and poſitive Laws of God, may be lawfully determined by the ſupreme authority in the Church of God.* 5. *What is thus determined by lawful authority, doth bind the conſciences of men ſubject to that authority, to obedience to thoſe determinations.* 6. *Things thus determined by lawful authority, are not thereby made unalterable, but may be revoked, limited, and changed by the ſame authority.*

HAving ſhewed what a Divine Right is, and whereon it is founded; our next great enquiry will be, how far Church Government is founded upon Divine Right, taken either of theſe two ways. But for our more diſtinct, clear and rational proceeding, I ſhall lay down ſome things, as ſo many *Poſtulata* or general *Principles* and *Hypotheſes*, which will be as the baſis and foundation of the following diſcourſe; which all of them concern the obligation of Laws, wherein I ſhall proceed gradually, beginning with the Law of Nature, and ſo to Divine poſitive Laws; and laſtly to ſpeak to humane poſitive Laws. The firſt Principle or hypotheſis which I lay down, is, §. 1.

That where the Law of Nature doth determine any thing by way of duty, as flowing from the principles of it, there no poſitive Law can be ſup- Hypoth. 1.

poſed to take off the obligation of it. Which I prove, both as to humane poſitive Laws and divine: Firſt as to humane. For *firſt*, the things commanded in the Law of Nature, being juſt and righteous in themſelves, there can be no obligatory Law made againſt ſuch things. *Nemo tenetur ad impoſſibile*, is true in the ſenſe of the civil Law, as well as in Philoſophy; as *impoſſibile* is taken for *turpe*, and *turpe* for that which is contrary to the dictates of nature. A man may be as well bound not to be a man, as not to act according to principles of reaſon: For the Law of Nature is nothing elſe but the dictate of right reaſon, diſcovering the good or evil of particular actions, from their conformity or repugnancy to natural light. Whatever poſitive Law is then made directly infringing and violating natural principles, is thereby of no force at all. And that which hath no obligation in it ſelf, cannot diſſolve a former obligation. Secondly, the indiſpenſableneſs of the obligation of the Law of Nature, appears from the end of all other Laws, which are agreed upon by mutual compact, which is the better to preſerve men in their rights and privileges. Now the greateſt rights of men, are ſuch as flow from Nature it ſelf; and therefore, as no Law binds againſt the reaſon of it, ſo neither can it againſt the common end of Laws. Therefore, if a humane poſitive Law ſhould be made, that God ſhould not be worſhipped, it cannot bind, being againſt the main end of Laws, which is to make men live together as reaſonable creatures, which they cannot do, without doing what Nature requires, which is, to ſerve God who made it. Again, it overturns the very foundation of all Government, and diſſolves the tye to all humane Laws, if the Law of Nature doth not bind indiſpenſably; for otherwiſe, upon what ground muſt men yield obedience to any Laws that are made? is it not by vertue of this Law of Nature, that men muſt ſtand to all compacts and agreements made? If Laws take their force among men from hence, they can bind no farther than thoſe compacts did extend, which cannot be ſuppoſed to be to violate and deſtroy their own natures. Poſitive Laws may reſtrain much of what is only of the permiſſive Law of Nature (for the intent of poſitive Laws, was to make men abate ſo much of their natural freedom, as ſhould be judged neceſſary for the preſervation of humane ſocieties) but againſt the obligatory Law of Nature, as to its precepts, no after Law can derogate from the obligation of it. And therefore it is otherwiſe between the Law of Nature and poſitive Law, than between Laws merely civil: for as to theſe the rule is, that *poſterior derogat priori*, the latter Law caſſates and nulls the obligation of the former; but as to natural Laws and poſitive, *prior derogat poſteriori*, the Law of Nature, which is firſt, takes away the obligation of a poſitive Law, if it be contrary to it. As *Juſtellus* obſerves it was in the primitive Church, in reference to the obligation of the Canons of the Councils, that ſuch as were inſerted in the *Codex Canonum*, being of the more ancient Councils, did render the obligation of later Canons invalid, which were contrary to them, unleſs it were in matters of ſmall moment. We ſee then, that ſuppoſing the Law of Nature doth not continue obligatory, the obligation of all humane poſitive Laws will fall with it (as the ſuperſtructure needs muſt when the foundation is removed) for if any other Law of Nature may be diſſolved, why not that whereby men are bound to ſtand to covenants and contracts made? and if that be diſſolved, how can the obligation to humane Laws remain, which is founded upon that *baſis*? And ſo all civil ſocieties are thereby overturned.

Grot. de jure belli, &c. lib. 1. cap. 1. ſ. 10.

Præfat. in Cod. Canon. Eccleſ. Afric. p. 14.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, it appears from the nature of that obligation which follows the Law of Nature, so that thereby no humane Law can bind against this; for humane Laws bind only outward humane actions *directly*, and internal acts only by virtue of their necessary connexion with, and influence upon outward actions, and not otherwise; but the Law of Nature immediately binds the soul and conscience of man: And therefore *obligatio naturalis*, and *nexus conscientiæ*, are made to be the same by *Lessius*, *Suarez*, and others. For *Lessius* disputing, Whether a Will made without solemnity of Law, doth bind in conscience or no? He proves it doth by this argument, from the opinion of the Lawyers, that without those solemnities there doth arise from it a natural obligation; and the *hæres ab Intestato*, who is the next of Kin, is bound to make it good; therefore it doth bind in conscience. So then there ariseth a necessary obligation upon conscience, from the dictates of the Law of Nature, which cannot be removed by any positive Law. For although there lye no action in the civil Law against the breach of a meerly natural Law, as in the former case of succession to a will not legally made; in covenants made without conditions expressed, in recovery of debts from a person to whom money was lent in his Pupilage without consent of his Tutor; in these cases though no action lie against the persons, yet this proves not that these have no obligation upon a man, but only that he is not responsible for the breach of moral honesty in them before civil Courts. In which sense those Lawyers are to be understood which deny the obligation of the Law of Nature. But however conscience binds the offender over to answer at a higher tribunal, before which all such offences shall be punished. Thus then we see no positive humane Law can dispence with, or dissolve the obligation of the Law of Nature. Much less, Secondly, can we suppose any positive divine Law should. For although God's power be immense and infinite to do what pleaseth him, yet we must always suppose this power to be conjoyned with goodness, else it is no divine power: and therefore *posse malum, non est posse*, it is no power, but weakness to do evil; and without this *posse malum* there can be no alteration made in the nature of good and evil; which must be supposed, if the obligation of the natural Law be dispensed with. Therefore it was well said by *Origen*, when *Celsus* objected it as the common speech of the Christians, that with God all things are possible, that he neither understood *how it was spoken, nor what all these things are, nor how God could do them:* and concludes with this excellent speech, Δύναται δὲ καθ' ἡμᾶς πάντα ὁ θεὸς, ἅπερ δυνάμενος τοῦ θεὸς εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ἐξίσταται. *We say*, saith he, *that God can do all things which are reconcileable with his Deity, Goodness, and Wisdom.* And after adds, *That as it is impossible for honey to make things bitter, and light to make things obscure, so it is for God to do any thing that is unjust.* Ἐναντίον γὰρ ἐστι αὐτοῦ τῇ θειότητι καὶ τῇ καθ' αὐτὴν πάσῃ δυνάμει, ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖν δύναμις. *For the power of doing evil is directly contrary to the divine nature, and that omnipotency which is consistent with it.* To the same purpose he speaks elsewhere, οὐδὲν μὴ πρέπον ἑαυτῷ ὁ θεὸς, βούλεται, *God wills nothing unbecoming himself:* And again, φαμὲν δὲ ὅτι οὐ δύναται αἴσχρα ὁ θεὸς, ἐπεὶ ἔσται ὁ θεὸς δυνάμενος μὴ εἶναι θεὸς εἰ γὰρ αἰσχρόν τι δρᾷ ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐστὶ θεὸς. *We affirm that God cannot do evil actions, for if he could he might as well be no God. For if God should do evil, he would be no God.* So then though God be omnipotent, yet it follows not that he can therefore dissolve the obligation of the preceptive Law of nature,

Less. de just. & jure l. 2. c. 19. dub. 3. n. 12. Suarez de leg. lib. 2. cap. 9. sect. 6.

Orig. lib. 3. c. Celsum. p. 154. ed. Cont.

C. Celsum. l. 5. p. 247.

ture, or change the natures of good and evil. God may indeed alter the properties of those things from whence the respects of good and evil do result, as in *Abraham*'s offering *Isaac*, the *Israelites* taking away the *Egyptians* Jewels; which God may justly do by vertue of his absolute dominion; but the change here is not in the obligation of the Law, but in the things themselves. Murther would be an intrinsecal evil still; but that which was done by immediate and explicite command from God, would have been no murther. Theft had been a sin still, but taking things alienated from their properties by God himself, was not theft. We conclude then, what comes immediately from the Law of nature by way of command binds immutably and indispensably. Which is the first Hypothesis or Principle laid down.

§. 2. The second Hypothesis is, *that things which are either deducible from the Law of nature, or by the light of nature discovered to be very agreeable to it, may be lawfully practised in the Church of God, if they be not otherwise determined by the positive Laws of God, or of lawful humane authority.* We shall first inquire into the nature of these things, and then shew the lawfulness of doing them. For the nature of these things, we must consider what things may be said to be of the Law of nature. They may be reduced to two heads, which must be accurately distinguish'd. They are either such things which nature dictates to be done, or not to be done necessarily and immutably; or else such things as are judged to be very agreeable to natural light, but are subject to positive determinations. The former are called by some *jus naturæ obligativum*; by others *jus naturæ proprium*, whereby things are made necessarily duties or sins; the latter *jus naturæ promissivum*, and *reductivum*, for which it is sufficient if there be no repugnancy to natural light. From these two arise a different obligation upon men; either strict, and is called by *Covarruvias obligatio ex justitiâ*, an obligation of duty and justice; the other larger, *obligatio ex communi æquitate*, or *ex honestate morali*, an obligation from common equity, that is according to the agreeableness of things to natural light. The former I have shewn already do bind indispensably, but these latter are subject to positive Laws. For our better understanding the obligation of these (which is more intricate than the former) we shall consider men under a double notion, either in a state of absolute liberty, which some call a state of nature, or else in a state wherein they have restrained their own liberty by mutual compacts, or are determined by a higher Law. These things premised, I lay down these propositions.

Covarr. c. 10. de testam. n. 1.

1. *In a state of absolute liberty before any positive Laws were superadded to the natural, whatsoever was not necessarily determined by the obligatory Law of Nature, was wholly left to mens power to do it or not, and belongs to the permissive Law of Nature.* And thus all those things which are since determined by positive Laws, were in such a supposed state, left to the free choice of a man's own will. Thus it was in mens power to join in civil society with whom they pleased, to recover things, or vindicate injuries in what way they judged best, to submit to what constitutions alone they would themselves, to choose what form of Government among them they pleased, to determine how far they would be bound to any authority chosen by themselves, to lodge the legislative and coercive power in what persons they thought fit, to agree upon punishments answerable to the nature of offences. And so in all other things not repugnant to the common light of reason, and the dictates of the preceptive part of the Law of Nature.

2. *A*

2. *A ſtate of abſolute liberty not agreeing to the nature of man conſidered in relation to others, it was in mens power to reſtrain their own liberty upon compacts ſo far as ſhould be judged neceſſary for the ends of their mutual ſociety.* A ſtate of nature I look upon only as an imaginary ſtate, for better underſtanding the nature and obligation of Laws. For it is confeſſed by the greateſt aſſertors of it, that the relation of Parents and Children cannot be conceived in a ſtate of natural liberty, becauſe Children aſſoon as born are actually under the power and authority of their parents. But for our clearer apprehending the matter in hand, we ſhall proceed with it. Suppoſing then all thoſe former rights were in their own power; it is moſt agreeable to natural reaſon, that every man may part with his right ſo far as he pleaſe for his own advantage. Here now, men finding a neceſſity to part with ſome of their rights to defend and ſecure their moſt conſiderable ones, men begin to think of compacts one with another (taking this as a principle of the natural Law, and the foundation of ſociety, that all Covenants are to be performed.) When they are thus far agreed, they then conſider the terms upon which they ſhould enter into ſociety one with another. And here men deveſt themſelves of their original liberty, and agree upon an incloſure of properties, and the fences of thoſe properties; I mean, upon living together in a civil ſtate, and of the Laws they muſt be ruled by. This is apparently agreeable to natural reaſon, the things being in their own power, which they agree to part with.

Hobs *de Cive cap.* 1. *ſ.* 11. *Ann.*

Men entring upon ſocieties by mutual compacts, things thereby become good and evil which were not ſo before. Thus he who was free before to do what and how he pleaſed, is now bound to obey what Laws he hath conſented to; or elſe he breaks not only a poſitive Law, but that Law of nature which commands man to ſtand to Covenants once made, though he be free to make them. And therefore it is obſervable that the doing of things that were lawful before covenants made, and things thereby determined, may be ſo far from being lawful after, that the doing of them may contradict a principle of the obligatory Law of nature. Thus in a ſtate of liberty every one had right to what he thought fit for his uſe, but Propriety and Dominion being introduced, which was a free voluntary act, by mens determining rights, it now becomes an offence againſt the Law of nature, to take away that which is another mans. In which ſenſe alone it is that theft is ſaid to be forbidden by the Law of nature. And by the ſame reaſon he that reſiſts and oppoſeth the lawful authority, under which he is born, doth not only offend againſt the Municipal Laws of the place wherein he lives, but againſt that Original and fundamental Law of Societies, *viz.* ſtanding to Covenants once made. For it is a groſs miſtake as well as dangerous, for men to imagine that every man is born in a ſtate of abſolute liberty to chooſe what Laws and Governours he pleaſe; but every one being now born a ſubject to that authority he lives under, he is bound to preſerve it as much as in him lies; thence *Auguſtus* had ſome reaſon to ſay, He was the beſt Citizen, *qui præſentem reipublicæ ſtatum mutari non vult, that doth not diſturb the preſent ſtate of the Common-wealth*; and who as *Alcibiades* ſaith in *Thucydides*, ὅπερ ἐδέξατο χῆμα τῆς πολιτείας, τοῦτο συνδιασώζει, *endeavours to preſerve that form of Government he was born under.* And the reaſon of it is, that in contracts and Covenants made for Government, men look not only at themſelves, but at the benefit of poſterity; if then one party be bound to maintain the rights of the others poſterity

§. 3. *Prop.* 3.

Paulus l. 1. *D. de furtis. Ulpian. lib. Poſt. D. de. verb. ſig.*

V. Grot. de jure belli, &c. lib. 2. *cap.* 4. *ſect.* 8.

as well as of his perſon, the other party muſt be ſuppoſed to oblige his poſterity in his Covenant to perform obedience, which every man hath power to do, becauſe Children are at their parents diſpoſal; And equity requires that the Covenant entred ſhould be of equal extent to both parties: And if a man doth expect protection for his poſterity, he muſt engage for the obedience of his poſterity too, to the Governours who do legally protect them. But the farther proſecution of theſe things belongs to another place to conſider of; my purpoſe being to treat of Government in the Church, and not in the State. The ſumm of this is, that the obligation to the performance of what things are determined (which are of the permiſſive Law of nature) by poſitive Laws, doth ariſe from the obligatory Law of nature. As the Demonſtration of the particular Problemes in the Mathematicks, doth depend upon the principles of the Theoremes themſelves; and ſo whoever denies the truth of the Probleme deduced by juſt conſequence from the Theoreme, muſt conſequently deny the truth of the Theoreme its ſelf: ſo thoſe who violate the particular determinations of the permiſſive Law of nature, do violate the obligation of the preceptive part of that Law: Obedience to the other being grounded on the principles of this.

4. *God hath power by his poſitive Laws to take in and determine as much of the permiſſive Law of nature as he pleaſe, which being once ſo determined by an univerſal Law, is ſo far from being lawful to be done, that the doing of them by thoſe under an obligation to his poſitive Laws, is an offence againſt the immutable Law of nature.* That God may reſtrain man's natural liberty, I ſuppoſe none who own God's legiſlative power over the world can deny; eſpecially conſidering that men have power to reſtrain themſelves; much more then hath God, who is the Rector and Governour of the world. That a breach of his poſitive Laws is an offence againſt the common Law of nature, appears hence; becauſe man being God's creature, is not only bound to do what is in general ſuitable to the principles of reaſon in flying evil, and chooſing good; but to ſubmit to the determinations of God's will, as to the diſtinction of good from evil. For being bound univerſally to obey God, it is implyed that man ſhould obey him in all things which he diſcovers to be his will: whoſe determination muſt make a thing not only good, but neceſſary to be done, by vertue of his ſupreme authority over men. This then needs no farther proof, being ſo clear in its ſelf.

5. *Laſtly. What things are left undetermined by divine poſitive Laws, are in the Churches power to uſe, and practiſe according as it judgeth them moſt agreeable to the rule of the Word.* That things undetermin'd by the word are ſtill lawful, evidently appears: becauſe what was once lawful, muſt have ſome poſitive Law to make it unlawful, which if there be none, it remains lawful ſtill. And that the Church of God ſhould be debar'd of any privilege of any other ſocieties, I underſtand not; eſpecially if it belong to it as a ſociety conſidered in its ſelf, and not as a particular ſociety conſtituted upon ſuch accounts as the Church is. For I doubt not but to make it evident afterwards, that many parts of Government in the Church belong not to it as ſuch in a reſtrained ſenſe, but in the general notion of it, as a ſociety of men imbodyed together by ſome Laws proper to its ſelf: Although it ſubſiſt upon a higher foundation, *viz.* of divine inſtitution, and upon higher grounds, reaſons, principles, ends; and be directed by other Laws immediately than any other ſocieties in the world are.

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The third Hypotheſis is this, *Where the Law of nature determines the thing, and the divine Law determines the manner and circumſtances of the thing, there we are bound to obey the divine Law in its particular determinations, by vertue of the Law of nature in its general obligation.* As for inſtance, the Law of nature bindeth man to worſhip God; but for the way, manner and circumſtances of worſhip, we are to follow the poſitive Laws of God: becauſe as we are bound by nature to worſhip him, ſo we are bound by vertue of the ſame Law to worſhip him in the manner beſt pleaſing to himſelf. For the light of nature, though it determine the duty of worſhip, yet it doth not the way and manner; and though acts of pure obedience be in themſelves acceptable unto God, yet as to the manner of thoſe acts, and the poſitives of worſhip, they are no farther acceptable unto God than commanded by him. Becauſe in things not neceſſarily determined by the Law of nature, the goodneſs or evil of them lying in reference to Gods acceptance, it muſt depend upon his command, ſuppoſing poſitive Laws to be at all given by God to direct Men in their worſhip of him. For ſuppoſing God had not at all revealed himſelf in order to his worſhip; doubtleſs it had been lawful for men not only to pray to God and expreſs their ſenſe of their dependence upon him, but to appoint ways, time and places for the doing it, as they ſhould judge moſt convenient and agreeable to natural light. Which is evident from the Scripture its ſelf as to places: for as far as we can find, ſacrificing in high places, (that is, ſuch as were of mens own appointment) was lawful, till the Temple was built by *Solomon*; as appears by the ſeveral examples of *Gedeon*, *Samuel*, *David*, and others; Indeed after the place was ſettled by God's own Law, it became wholly ſinful: but if ſo before we ſhould not have read of God's accepting ſacrifices in ſuch places as he did *Gedeons*, nor of the Prophets doing it, as *Samuel* and *David* did. It is a diſputable caſe about Sacrifices, whether the offering of them came only from natural light, or from ſome expreſs command: the latter ſeems far more probable to me, becauſe I cannot ſee how natural light ſhould any wiſe dictate, that God would accept of the blood of other creatures as a token of man's obedience to himſelf. And *Rivet* gives this very good reaſon why the deſtruction of any thing in ſacrifice cannot belong to the Law of nature, becauſe it is only acceptable as a ſign, and token of obedience, and not ſimply as an act of obedience; and this ſign ſignifying *ex inſtituto* (for mans deſtroying the life of a beaſt can never naturally ſignifie mans obedience to God) and therefore it muſt have ſome poſitive Law; for thoſe which ſignifie only by inſtitution, and not naturally, cannot be referred to a dictate of the Law of nature. To which purpoſe it is farther obſervable that God doth ſo often in Scripture ſlight the offering of Sacrifices, in reſpect of any inherent vertue or goodneſs in the action it ſelf, or acceptableneſs to God upon the account of the thing done. In which ſenſe God ſaith, *He that killeth a bullock is as if he ſlew a man; and he that Sacrificeth a ſheep, as if he cut off a dogs neck, &c.* For what is there more in the one than in the other, but only God's appointment, which makes one acceptable and not the other? So that it is no ways probable that God would have accepted *Abel*'s ſacrifice rather than *Cain*'s, had there been no command for their ſacrificing. For as to mere natural light, *Cain*'s Sacrifice ſeems more agreeable to that than *Abel*'s, *Cain*'s being an Euchariſtical offering without hurt to other creatures; but *Abel*'s was *cruentum Sacrificium* a Sacrifice of blood. But

Judg. 6. 18. 1 Sam. 7. 1, 4. 16. 5. 10. 3. 2 Sam. 15. 18. &c.

Exercit. in Gen. 42.

Iſa. 66. 3.

Gen. 4. 3, 4.

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Heb. 11. 4. the chief ground of *Abel*'s acceptance, was his offering in faith, as the Apoſtle to the Hebrews tells us: Now faith is a higher principle than natural light, and muſt ſuppoſe divine revelation, and ſo a divine command as the principle and ground of his action. *Moſes* his ſilence in reference to a command, is no argument there was none, it not being his deſign to write at large all the particular precepts of the *oral* Law, but to deduce the Geneaology of the Patriarchs down from *Adam* and the Creation. But ſuppoſing a command given from God, determining modes and circumſtances of ſuch things of which the ſubſtance depends on a natural Law, men are as well bound to the obſervation of them after their revelation, as the other before. The one being a Teſtimony of their obedience to God as clear and full as the other; yea and ſo much the clearer evidence of obedience, in that there could be no argument for the performing of thoſe things but a divine command. And even in doing things intrinſically good, the ground of purely religious obedience is, becauſe God commands men to do thoſe things more than that they are good in themſelves: Doing a thing becauſe moſt ſuitable to nature, ſpeaking morality; but doing becauſe God commands it, ſpeaks true religion and the obedience of Faith. For as the formal reaſon of the act of faith is a divine Teſtimony diſcovered to our underſtandings, ſo the formal principle of an act of ſpiritual obedience is a divine command inclining the will, and awing it to performance. So far then as divine Law determines things, we are bound to obſerve them from the dictates of the natural Law.

§. 5. The fourth Hypotheſis: *In things which are determined both by the Law of nature, and divine poſitive Laws, as to the ſubſtance and morality of them, but not determined as to all circumſtances belonging to them, it is in the power of Lawful authority in the Church of God to determine them, ſo far as they judge them tend to the promoting the performance of them in due manner.* So that not only matters wholly left at liberty as to the ſubſtance of them are ſubject to humane Laws and Conſtitutions, but even things commanded in the Divine Law, in reference to the manner of performance, if undetermined by the ſame Law, which enforce the duty. Thus the ſetting apart ſome time for God's worſhip, is a dictate of the natural Law: that the firſt day of the week be that time, is determin'd under the Goſpel; but in what places, at what hours, in what order, decency and ſolemnity this worſhip ſhall be then performed, are circumſtances not determined in Scripture, but only by general rules: as to theſe then, ſo they be done in conformity to thoſe rules, they are ſubject to humane poſitive determinations. But this is not an *Hypotheſis* in the age we live in to be taken for granted without proving it: ſome denying the Magiſtrate any power at all in matters of religion, others granting a defenſive, protective power of that religion which is profeſſed according to the Laws of Chriſt, but deny any determining power in the Magiſtrate concerning things left undetermin'd by the Scripture. This *Hypotheſis* then hath landed me into a Field of controverſie, wherein I ſhall not ſo much ſtrive to make my way through any oppoſite party, as endeavour to beget a right underſtanding between the adverſe parties, in order to a mutual compliance; which I ſhall the rather do, becauſe if any controverſie hath been an increaſer and fomenter of heart-burnings and diviſions among us, it hath been about the determination of indifferent things. And, which ſeems ſtrange, the things men can leaſt bear with one another in, are

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matters of *liberty:* and thoſe things men have divided moſt upon, have been matters of *uniformity*, and wherein they have differed moſt, have been pretended things of *Indifferency*. In order then to laying a foundation for peace and union, I ſhall calmly debate what power the Magiſtrate hath in matters of religion, and how far that power doth extend in determining things left undetermin'd by the word. For the clear underſtanding the firſt of theſe, we ſhall make our paſſage open to it by the laying down ſeveral neceſſary diſtinctions about it, the want of conſidering which hath been the ground of the great confuſion in the handling this controverſie. Firſt then, we muſt diſtinguiſh between a power *reſpecting religion in it ſelf*, and a power *concerning religion as it is the publick owned and profeſſed religion of a Nation*. For although the Magiſtrate hath no proper power over religion in it ſelf, either taking it *abſtractly* for the rule of worſhip, or *concretely*, for the internal acts of worſhip; for he can neither add to that rule, nor diſſolve the obligation of it; nor yet can he force the conſciences of men, (the chief ſeat of religion) it being both contrary to the nature of religion it ſelf, which is a matter of the greateſt freedom and internal liberty, and it being quite out of the reach of the Magiſtrates Laws, which reſpect only external Actions as their proper object; for the obligation of any Law can extend no farther than the juriſdiction and authority of the Legiſlator, which among men is only to the outward actions. But then if we conſider religion as it is publickly owned and profeſſed by a Nation, the ſupreme Magiſtrate is bound by vertue of his office and authority, not only to defend and protect it, but to reſtrain men from acting any thing publickly tending to the ſubverſion of it. So that the plea for liberty of conſcience, as it tends to reſtrain the Magiſtrate's power, is both irrational and impertinent; becauſe liberty of conſcience is the liberty of mens judgments, which the Magiſtrate cannot deprive them of. For men may hold what opinions they will in their minds, the Law takes no cognizance of them: but it is the liberty of practice, and venting and broaching thoſe opinions which the Magiſtrate's power extends to the reſtraint of. And he that hath the care of the publick good, may give liberty to, and reſtrain liberty from men, as they act in order to the promoting of that good; And as a liberty of all opinions tends manifeſtly to the ſubverting a Nation's peace, and to the embroyling it in continual confuſions, a Magiſtrate cannot diſcharge his office, unleſs he hath a power to reſtrain ſuch a liberty. Therefore we find plainly in Scripture that God imputes the increaſe and impunity of Idolatry as well as other vices to the want of a lawful Magiſtracy, *Judges* 17. 5, 6. where the account given of *Micah*'s Idolatry was, becauſe there was no King in *Iſrael*; which implies it to be the care and duty of Magiſtrates to puniſh and reſtrain whatever tends to the oppoſing and ſubverting the true religion. Beſides, I cannot find any reaſon pleaded againſt the Magiſtrate's power now, which would not have held under *David*, *Solomon*, *Aſa*, *Jehoſaphat*, *Hezekias*, *Joſias*, or other Kings of the Jews, who aſſerted the publick profeſſion, to the extirpation of what oppoſed it. For the plea of conſcience, (taken for mens judgments going contrary to what is publickly owned as religion) is indifferently calculated for all Meridians, and will ſerve for a Religion of any elevation. Nay ſtiff and contumacious Infidels or Idolaters may plead as highly, (though not ſo truly) as any, that it goes againſt their judgments or their conſcience to own that religion which is eſtabliſhed by authority. If it be lawful

then to reſtrain ſuch, notwithſtanding this pretence, why not others, whoſe doctrine and principles the Magiſtrate judgeth to tend in their degree, (though not ſo highly) to the diſhonouring God, and ſubverting the profeſſion entertained in a Nation? For a mans own certainty and confidence that he is in the right, can have no influence upon the Magiſtrate judging otherwiſe; only if it be true, it will afford him the greater comfort and patience under his reſtraint: which was the caſe of the primitive Chriſtians under perſecutions: The Magiſtrate then is bound to defend, protect and maintain the religion he owns as true, and that by vertue of his office, as he is *Cuſtos utriuſque tabulæ*, The maintainer of the honour of God's Laws, which cannot be, if he ſuffer thoſe of the firſt table to be broken without any notice taken of them. Were it not for this power of Magiſtrates under the Goſpel, how could that promiſe be ever made good, that *Kings ſhall be nurſing Fathers to the Church of God?* unleſs they mean ſuch Nurſing Fathers as *Aſtyages* was to *Cyrus*, or *Amulius* to *Romulus* and *Remus*, who expoſed their nurſtlings to the Fury of wild Beaſts to be devoured by them. For ſo muſt a Magiſtrate do the Church, unleſs he ſecure it from the incurſion of Hereticks, and the inundation of Seducers. But ſo much for that which is more largely aſſerted and proved by others. The Magiſtrate then hath power concerning Religion, as owned in a Nation.

Iſa. 49. 23.

Secondly, we muſt diſtinguiſh between an *external* and *objective* power, about matters of Religion, and an *internal formal* power; which ſome call an imperative and elicitive power, others a power of order and a power of juriſdiction, others *poteſtas Eccleſiaſtica*, and *poteſtas circa Eccleſiaſtica*, or in the old diſtinction of *Conſtantine*, τῆς ἐκτὸς & τῶν ἔσω τῆς ἐκκλησίας, a power of things within and without the Church; the ſenſe of all is the ſame, though the terms differ. The internal, formal, elicitive power of order, concerning things in the Church, lies in authoritative exerciſe of the Miniſterial function, in preaching the word, and adminiſtration of Sacraments; but the external, objective, imperative power of juriſdiction, concerning the matters of the Church, lies in a due care and proviſion for the defence, protection, and propagation of Religion. The former is only proper to the Miniſtry, the latter to the Supream Magiſtracy: For though the Magiſtrate hath ſo much power about Religion, yet he is not to uſurp the Miniſterial function, nor to do any proper acts belonging to it. To which the inſtance of *Uzzia*'s is pertinently applied. But then this takes nothing off from the Magiſtrate's power; for it belongs not to the Magiſtrate *imperata facere*, but *imperare facienda*, as *Grotius* truly obſerves, not to do the things commanded, but to command the things to be done. From this diſtinction we may eaſily underſtand, and reſolve that ſo much vexed and intricate Queſtion, concerning the mutual ſubordination of the Civil and Eccleſiaſtical power: For as *Peter Martyr* well obſerves, theſe two powers are ſome ways ἀντιστρόφαι, are converſant ſeveral ways about the ſame thing; but the Functions of both of them muſt be diſtinguiſhed: For the Paſtors of the Church are not to adminiſter juſtice, but it is their duty to declare how juſtice ſhould be rightly adminiſtred, without partiality, or oppreſſion. So on the other ſide, the Magiſtrate muſt not preach the Goſpel, nor adminiſter Sacraments; but however, muſt take care that theſe be duly done by thoſe to whoſe function it belongs: but for a clearer making it appear, theſe things are to be conſidered, both in a Magiſtrate and Miniſter of the Goſpel. In a Magiſtrate the *Power it ſelf*,

Euſeb. vit. Conſtant. l. 4. c. 24.

De Imp. ſum. Poteſt. cap. 2. l. 1.

In Jud. c. 19.

ſelf, and the *perſon bearing that power:* The power it ſelf of the Magiſtrate is no ways ſubordinate to the power of the Miniſtry; indeed if we conſider both powers, in reference to their objects, and ends, there may be an *inferiority of Dignity*, as *Chamier* calls it, in the civil power to the other, conſidered *abſtractly*; but conſidering it *concretely*, as lodged in the perſons, there is an *Inferiority of ſubjection* in the Eccleſiaſtical to the Civil. But ſtill the perſon of the Magiſtrate, though he is not ſubject to the power of the Miniſters, yet both as a Chriſtian, and as a Magiſtrate, he is ſubject to the word of God, and is to be guided by that in the adminiſtration of his Function. So on the other ſide, in a Miniſter of the Goſpel, there are theſe things conſiderable; the object of his function, the function it ſelf, the liberty of exerciſing it, and the perſon who doth exerciſe it. As for the *object of this function*, the Word and Sacraments, theſe are not ſubject to the civil power, being ſettled by a Law of Chriſt; for then for the *function it ſelf*, that may be conſidered, either in the *derivation* of it, or in the *adminiſtration* of it. As for the derivation of the power and authority of the function, that is from Chriſt, who hath ſettled and provided by Law, that there ſhall be ſuch a ſtanding function to the end of the world, with ſuch authority belonging to it: But for the adminiſtration of the function, two things belong to the Magiſtrate: *Firſt*, to provide and take care for *due adminiſtration* of it; and to ſee that the Miniſters preach the true doctrine, though he cannot lawfully forbid the true doctrine to be taught; and that they duly adminiſter the Sacraments, though he cannot command them to adminiſter them otherwiſe than Chriſt hath delivered them down to us: This for due adminiſtration. *Secondly*, in caſe of *male-adminiſtration* of his function, or ſcandal rendring him unfit for it, it is in the Magiſtrate's power, if not formally to depoſe, yet to deprive them of the liberty of ever exerciſing their function within his Dominions; as *Solomon* did *Abiathar*, and *Juſtinian Sylverius*, as *Conſtantius* did *Vigilius:* For the liberty of the exerciſe of the function is in the Magiſtrate's power, though a right to exerciſe it be derived from the ſame power from which the authority belonging to the function was conveyed. And then laſtly, as to *the perſons exerciſing* this function, it is evident, as they are members of a civil ſociety as well as others, ſo they are ſubject to the ſame civil Laws as others are. Which as it is expreſly affirmed by *Chryſoſtom*, on *Rom.* 13. 1. Let every ſoul be ſubject to the higher powers, that is, ſaith he, κἂν ἀπόστολος ᾖς, κἂν εὐαγγελιστὴς, κἂν προφήτης, κἂν ὁτιοῦν. *Be he an Apoſtle, Evangeliſt, Prophet, Prieſt, Monk, be he who he will.* So it is fully, largely, irrefragably proved by our Writers againſt the Papiſts: eſpecially by the learned *Iſ. Caſaubon* in his piece *de libertate Eccleſiaſticâ.* So then we ſee what a fair, amicable, and mutual aſpect theſe two powers have one upon another, when rightly underſtood, being far from claſhing one with the other; either by a ſubjection of the civil power to the Eccleſiaſtical, or the civil powers ſwallowing up and devouring the peculiarity of the Miniſterial function. And upon theſe grounds, I ſuppoſe *Beza* and *Eraſtus* may, as to this, ſhake hands; So that the Magiſtrate do not uſurp the Miniſterial function, which *Vedelius* calls *Papatus politicus*; nor the Miniſters ſubject the civil power to them, which is *Papatus Eccleſiaſticus.*

Panſtrot. Cath. Tom. 2. l. 15. cap. 6.

In loc. To. 3. Ed. Æton. p. 189. Ed. 1607.

De Epiſcop. Conſt. Mag.

Thirdly, we diſtinguiſh between an *abſolute Architectonical* and *Nomothetical* power, independent upon any other Law, and a *Legiſlative power*, *abſolute* as to *perſons*, but *regulated* by a *higher Law.* The former §. 7.

we attribute to none but God; the latter belongs to a Supreme Magiſtrate, in reference to things belonging to his power, either in Church or Common-wealth. By an Architectonical, Nomothetical power, we mean that power which is diſtinguiſhed from that which is properly call'd Political. The former lies in the making Laws for the good of the Common-wealth; the latter in a due execution and adminiſtration of thoſe Laws for the common good. This we have aſſerted to the Magiſtrate already; we now come to aſſert the other; where we ſhall firſt ſet down the bounds of this power, and then ſee to whom it belongs. *Firſt* then, we ſay not that the Magiſtrate hath a power to revoke, repeal, or alter any Divine poſitive Law; which we have already ſhewn. *Secondly*, we ſay not, that the Magiſtrate by his own will may conſtitute what new Laws he pleaſe for the worſhip of God. This was the fault of *Jeroboam* who made *Iſrael* to ſin, and therefore by the rule of reaſon muſt be ſuppoſed to ſin more himſelf: So likewiſe *Ahab*, *Ahaz*, and others. Religion is a thing ſettled by a Divine Law; and as it is taken for the doctrine and worſhip of God; ſo it is contained in the word of God, and muſt be fetched wholly from thence. But then *thirdly*, The Magiſtrate, by his power, may make that which is a Divine Law already, become the Law of the Land. Thus Religion may be incorporated among our Laws, and the Bible become our *Magna Charta*. So the firſt Law in the *Codex Theod.* is about the believing the Trinity, and many others about Religion are inſerted into it. Now as to theſe things clearly revealed in the word of God, and withal commanded by the Civil Magiſtrate, although the *primary obligation* to the doing them, is from the former determination by a Divine Law; yet the ſanction of them by the Civil Magiſtrate, may cauſe a *farther obligation* upon Conſcience than was before, and may add puniſhments and rewards not expreſſed before. For although when two Laws are contrary the one to the other, the obligation to the higher Law takes away the obligation to the other; yet when they are of the ſame nature, or ſubordinate one to the other, there may a New obligation ariſe from the ſame Law, enacted by a New authority. As the commands of the Decalogue brought a New obligation upon the Conſciences of the Jews, though the things contained in them, were commanded before in the Law of Nature: And as a Vow made by a man, adds a new tie to his Conſcience, when the matter of his Vow is the ſame with what the word of God commands; and renewing our Covenant with God after Baptiſm, renews our obligation: So when the faith of the Goſpel becomes the Law of a Nation, men are bound by a double cord of Duty to entertain and profeſs that faith. *Fourthly*, In matters undetermined by the word, concerning the external Polity of the Church of God, the Magiſtrate hath the power of determining things, ſo they be agreeable to the word of God. This laſt clauſe is that which binds the Magiſtrates power, that it is not abſolutely Architectonical, becauſe all his Laws muſt be regulated by the general rules of the Divine Law. But though it be not as to Laws, yet I ſay it is as to perſons; that is, that no other perſons have any power to make Laws, binding men to obedience, but only the Civil Magiſtrate. This is another part of the controverſie between the Civil and Eccleſiaſtical power, about the power of determining matters belonging to the Churches Government: But there is here no ſuch breach between thoſe two, but what may be made up with a diſtinction or two. We diſtinguiſh then between a *power declarative*,

Ariſtot. Ethic. lib. 6. c. 6.

rative, of the obligation of former Laws, and a *power authoritative*, determining a new obligation; between the *office* of *counselling* and *advising* what is *fit to be done*, and a power *determining what shall be done*; between the Magistrates *duty* of *consulting*, in order to the doing it, and his *deriving* his *authority* for the doing it. These things premised, I say: *First*, that the power of declaring the obligation of former Laws, and of consulting and advising the Magistrate for setling of new Laws, for the polity of the Church, belongs to the Pastors and Governours of the Church of God. This belongs to them, as *they are commanded to teach what Christ hath commanded them*, but no authority thereby given to make new Laws to bind the Church; but rather a tying them up to the commands of Christ already laid down in his word. For a power to bind mens Consciences to their determinations, lodged in the officers of the Church, must be derived either from a Law of God giving them this right, or else only from the consent of parties. For any Law of God, there is none produced with any probability of reason, but that, *Obey those that are over you in the Lord.* But that implies no more than submitting to the Doctrine and Discipline of the Gospel, and to those whom Christ hath constituted as Pastors of his Church, wherein the Law of Christ doth require obedience to them, that is, in looking upon them, and owning them in their relation to them as Pastors. But that gives them no authority to make any new Laws, or Constitutions, binding mens Consciences any more than a command from the supream authority that inferiour Magistrates should be obeyed, doth imply any power in them to make new Laws to bind them. But thus far I acknowledge a binding power in Ecclesiastical Constitutions, though they neither bind by vertue of the matter, nor of the authority commanding (there being no legislative power lodged in the Church) yet in respect of the circumstances and the end, they should be obey'd, unless I judge the thing unlawful that is commanded, rather than manifest open contempt of the Pastors of the Church, or bring a scandal to others by it. But as to the other power, arising from mutual compact and consent of parties, I acknowledge a power to bind all included under that compact, not by vertue of any supream binding power in them, but from the free consent of the parties submitting; which is most agreeable to the nature of Church-power, being not coactive but directive; and such was the confederate discipline of the Primitive Church, before they had any Christian Magistrate: And thence the decrees of Councils were call'd *Canons*, and not Laws. *Secondly*, Though it be the Magistrates duty to consult with the Pastors of the Church, to know what is most agreeable to the word of God, for the settlement of the Church; yet the Magistrate doth not derive his authority in commanding things from their sentence, decree, and judgment, but doth by vertue of his own power cause the obligation of men to what is so determin'd, by his own enacting what shall be done in the Church. The great use of Synods and Assemblies of Pastors of Churches, is to be as the Council of the Church unto the King, in matters belonging to the Church, as the Parliament is for matters of civil concernment. And as the King, for the settling Civil Laws, doth take advice of such Persons who are most versed in matters of Law; so by proportion of reason, in matters concerning the Church, they are the fittest Council, who have been the most versed in matters immediately belonging to the Church: In the management of which affairs, as much, if not more, prudence, experience,

Matth. 28. 18.

Heb. 13. 17.

V. Pet. Martyr. in 1 Sam. 14. *Whitaker, cont.* 4. *q.* 7. *Cameron. de Eccles. p.* 386. *To.* 1. *op.*

rience, judgment, moderation, is requiſite, as in the greateſt affairs of State. For we have found by doleful experience, that if a fire once catch the Church, and *Aaron*'s bells ring backward, what a Combuſtion the whole State is ſuddenly put into, and how hardly the Churches inſtruments for quenching ſuch fires, *lacryhmæ & preces Eccleſiæ*, do attain their end. The leaſt peg ſcrued up too high in the Church ſoon cauſeth a great deal of diſcord in the ſtate, and quickly puts mens ſpirits out of Tune. Whereas many irregularities may happen in the ſtate, and men live in quietneſs and peace. But if *Phaetons* drive the chariot of the Sun, the world will be ſoon on fire. I mean ſuch in the Church whoſe brains like the Unicorns run out into the length of the Horn; Such who have more fury than zeal, and yet more zeal than Knowledge or Moderation. Perſons therefore whoſe calling, temper, office, and experience hath beſt acquainted them with the State-actions, Polity of the Primitive Church, and the incomparable Prudence aud Moderation then uſed, are fitteſt to debate, conſult, deliberate, determine about the ſafeſt expedients for repairing breaches in a divided, broken, diſtracted Church. But yet I ſay when ſuch men thus aſſembled have gravely and maturely adviſed and deliberated what is beſt and fitteſt to be done, the force, ſtrength and obligation of things ſo determin'd doth depend upon the power and authority of the Civil Magiſtrate for taking the Church as incorporated into the Civil State, as *Eccleſia eſt in republicâ, non reſpublica in Eccleſiâ*, according to that known ſpeech of *Optatus Milivetanus*; ſo though the object of theſe conſtitutions, and the perſons determining them, and the matter of them be eccleſiaſtical, yet the force and ground of the obligation of them is wholly civil. So *Peter Martyr* expreſly; *Nam quod ad poteſtatem Eccleſiaſticam attinet, ſatis eſt civilis Magiſtratus: is enim curare debet ut omnes officium facient* (But for the judgment of the reformed Divines about this, ſee *Vedelius de epiſcopatu Conſtant. M—— & Officium Magiſtratus Chriſtiani*, annexed to *Grotius de Imper. &c.*) I therefore proceed to lay down the reaſon of it. *Firſt*, That whereby we are bound either to obedience or penalty upon diſobedience, is the ground of the obligation; but it is upon the account of the Magiſtrates power that we are either bound to obedience, or to ſubmit to penalties upon diſobedience. For it is upon the account of our general obligation to the Magiſtrate, that we are bound to obey any particular Laws or Conſtitutions. Becauſe it is not the particular determinations made by the Civil Magiſtrate, which do immediately bind Conſcience, but the general Law of Scripture requires it from us as a Duty to obey the Magiſtrate in all things lawful. Obedience to the Magiſtrate is due immediately from Conſcience; but obedience to the Laws of the Magiſtrate comes not directly from Conſcience, but by vertue of the general obligation. And therefore diſobedience to the Magiſtrates Laws is an immediate Sin againſt Conſcience, becauſe it is againſt the general obligation; but obedience to particular Laws ariſeth not immediately from the obligation of Conſcience to them in particular, but to the Magiſtrate in general. So that in things left lawful and undetermined by the word, where there ariſeth no obligation from the matter, it muſt ariſe from our ſubjection and relation to the Magiſtrate; and what is the ground of Obedience, is the cauſe of the Obligation. *Secondly*, He hath only the power of obligations who hath the power of making ſanctions to thoſe Laws. By ſanctions I mean here in the ſenſe of the Civil Law, *eas legum partes quibus pœnas conſtituimus adverſus eos qui*

Lib. 2. c. Parmen.

In 1 Sam. 8. Loc. com. Claſſ. 4. c. 5. ſ. 11.

contra

contra leges fecerint, thoſe parts of the Law which determine the puniſhments of the violaters of it. Now it is evident that he only hath power to oblige who hath power to puniſh upon diſobedience. And it is as evident that none hath power to puniſh but the Civil Magiſtrate; I ſpeak of legal Penalties which are annexed to ſuch Laws as concern the Church. Now there being no coercive or coactive power belonging to the Church as ſuch, all the force of ſuch Laws as reſpect the outward Polity of the Church, muſt be derived from the Civil Magiſtrate. *Thirdly*, He who can null and declare all other obligations void, done without his power, hath the only power to oblige. For whatſoever deſtroys a former obligation, muſt of neceſſity imply a power to oblige, becauſe I am bound to obey him in the abſtaining from that I was formerly obliged to: But this power belongs to the Magiſtrate. For ſuppoſe in ſome indifferent Rites and Ceremonies, the Church repreſentative, that is, the Governours of it *pro tempore* do preſcribe them to be obſerved by all, the ſupreme Power forbids the doing of thoſe things, if this doth not null the former ſuppoſed obligation, I muſt inevitably run upon theſe abſurdities. Firſt, That there are two ſupreme powers in a Nation at the ſame time. Secondly, That a man may lie under two different obligations as to the ſame thing; he is bound to do it by one power, and not to do it by the other. Thirdly, The ſame action may be a Duty and a Sin; a Duty in obeying the one power, a Sin in diſobeying the other. Therefore there can be but one power to oblige, which is that of the ſupreme Magiſtrate.

Papin. l. 41. D. de pœnis Hiſtor. Hottoman. Com. v. juris v. ſanct. Cicero ad Attic. lib. 3. ep. 23.

§. 8. Having thus far aſſerted the Magiſtrates due power and authority as to matters of Religion, we proceed to examine the extent of this power in determining things left at liberty by the word of God, in order to the Peace and Government of the Church. For our clear and diſtinct proceeding, I ſhall aſcend by theſe three ſteps. Firſt, To ſhew that there are ſome things left undetermin'd by the word. Secondly, That theſe things are capable of poſitive determinations and reſtraint. Thirdly, That there are ſome bounds and limits to be obſerved in the ſtating and determining theſe things. *Firſt*, That there are ſome things left undetermined by the word: by determining here, I do not mean determining whether things be *lawful* or no; for ſo there is no Rite or Ceremony whatſoever, but is determined by the Scripture in that ſenſe, or may be gathered from the application of particular actions to the general rules of Scripture; but by determining, I mean whether all things concerning the Churches Polity and Order be determined as *Duties* or no: *viz.* that this we are bound to obſerve, and the other not. As for inſtance, what time, manner, method, geſture, habit be uſed in preaching the word; whether Baptiſm muſt be by dipping or ſprinkling; at what day, time, place, the Child ſhall be baptized; and other things of a like nature with theſe. Thoſe who aſſert any of theſe as Duties, muſt produce neceſſarily the command making them to be ſo: for duty and command have a neceſſary reſpect and relation to one another. If no command be brought, it neceſſarily follows that they are left at liberty. So as to the Lord's Supper *Calvin* ſaith, whether the Communicants take the Bread themſelves, or receive it being given them: whether they ſhould give the Cup into the hands of the Deacon or to their next Neighbour: whether the Bread be leaven'd or not, the Wine red or white, *nihil refert*, it matters not; *Hæc indifferentia ſunt & in eccleſiæ libertate poſita*; *they are matters of indifferency, and are left to the Churches*

Inſtitut. l. 4. cap. 17. ſ. 43. &c. cap. 15. ſ. 19.

Churches liberty. But this matter of indifferency is not yet so clear as it is generally thought to be; we shall therefore bare the ground a little by some necessary distinctions, to see where the root of indifferency lies: Which we shall the rather do, because it is strongly asserted by an Honourable person, that there is no indifferency in the things themselves which are still either unlawful or necessary, (if Lawful at this time, in these circumstances) but all indifferency lies in the darkness and shortness of our understandings, which may make some things seem so to us. But that Honourable person clearly runs upon a double mistake. First, That Indifferency is a *medium participationis* of both extreams, and not only *negationis*, viz. that as intermediate colours partake both of black and white, and yet are neither; so in morality, between good and bad, there is an intermediate entity, which is neither, but indifferent to either: Whereas the nature of Indifferency lies not in any thing intermediate between good and bad, but in some thing undetermined by divine Laws as to the necessity of it; so that if we speak as to the extreams of it, it is something lying between a necessary duty, and an intrinsecal evil. The other mistake, is, that throughout that discourse he takes indifferency as circumstantiated in individual actions, and as the morality of the action is determined by its circumstances; whereas the proper notion of Indifferency lies in the nature of the action considered in it self abstractly; and so these things are implied in an indifferent action. First, Absolute undetermination as to the general nature of the act by a divine Law, that God hath left it free for men to do it or no. Secondly, That one part hath not more propension to the rule than the other; for if the doing of it comes nearer to the rule than the omission, or on the contrary, this action is not wholly indifferent. Thirdly, That neither part hath any repugnancy to the rule; for that which hath so, is so far from being indifferent, that it becomes unlawful: So that an indifferent action is therein like the Iron accosted by two Loadstones on either side of equal vertue, and so hovers *in medio*, inclining to neither, but supposing any degree of vertue added to the one above the other, it then inclines towards it; or as the Magnetical *needle* about the *Azores*, keeps it self directly parallel to the *Axis* of the world without variation, because it is supposed then to be at an equal distance from the two great Magnets, the Continents of *Europe* and *America*; but no sooner is it removed from thence, but it hath its variations. So indifferency taken *in specie*, as to the nature of the act, inclines neither way; but supposing it lie under positive determinations, either by Laws or circumstances, it then necessarily inclines either to the nature of good or evil.

Nature of Episc. *cap.* 5.

Neither yet are we come to a full understanding of the nature of indifferent actions; we must therefore distinguish between indifferency as to goodness *necessitating* an action *to be done*, and as to goodness *necessary* to an action *to make it good*; For there is one kind of goodness *propter quam fit actio*, in order to which the action must necessarily be done; and there is another kind of goodness *sine quâ non benè fit actio*, necessary to make an action good when it is done. As following after peace hath such a goodness in it, as necessitates the action, and makes it a necessary duty: but handling a particular controversie is such an action, as a man may let alone without sin in his course of studies; yet when he doth it, there is a goodness necessary to make his doing it a good action, *viz.* his referring his study of it to a right end, for the

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obtaining of truth and peace. This latter goodneſs is twofold, either *bonitas directionis*, as ſome call it, which is referring the action to its true end; in reference to which, the great controverſie among the Schoolmen, is about the indifferency of particular actions, *viz.* Whether a particular direction of a mans intention to the ultimate end, be not ſo neceſſary to particular actions, as that without the action is of neceſſity evil, and with it good; or whether without that an action may be indifferent to good or evil, which is the ſtate of the Queſtion between *Thomas Scotus*, *Bonaventure* and *Durandus*; but we aſſert the neceſſity of at leaſt an habitual direction, to make the action *in individuo* good, and yet the act in it ſelf may notwithſtanding be indifferent, even *in individuo*, as there is no antecedent neceſſity lying upon mens Conſciences for the doing of it; becauſe men may omit it, and break no Law of God. Beſides this, to make an action good, there is neceſſary a *bonitas originis*, or rather *Principii*, a good principle out of which the action muſt flow; Which muſt be that faith, which whatſoever is not of, is ſin, as the Apoſtle tells us. Which we muſt not ſo underſtand, as though in every action a Man goes about, he muſt have a full perſuaſion that it is a neceſſary duty he goes about; but in many actions that faith is ſufficient whereby he is perſwaded upon good grounds, that the thing he goes about is lawful; although he may as lawfully omit that action, and do either another, or the contrary to it. There may be then the neceſſity of ſome things in an action when it is done to make it good, and yet the action it ſelf be no ways neceſſary, but indifferent and a matter of liberty. This may be eaſily underſtood by what is uſually ſaid of God's particular actions, that God is free in himſelf either to do or not to do that action (as ſuppoſe the Creation of the World) but when he doth it, he muſt neceſſarily do it with that goodneſs, holineſs, and wiſdom, which is ſuitable to his nature: So may many actions of men be in themſelves indifferent, and yet there muſt be a concomitant neceſſity of good intention and principle to make the action good. But this concomitant neceſſity doth not deſtroy the radical indifferency of the action it ſelf; it is only an antecedent neceſſity from the obligation of the Law, is that which deſtroys indifferency. So likewiſe it is as to evil; there is ſuch an evil in an action, which not only ſpoils the action, but hinders the perſon from the liberty of doing it, that is, in all ſuch actions as are intrinſecally evil; and there is ſuch a kind of evil in actions, which though it ſpoils the goodneſs of the action, yet keeps not from performance; which is ſuch as ariſeth from the manner of performance, as praying in hypocriſie, *&c.* doing a thing lawful with a ſcrupulous or erring Conſcience. We ſee then what good and evil is conſiſtent with indifferency in actions, and what is not. And that the nature of actions, even *in individuo*, may be indifferent, when as to their circumſtances they may be neceſſarily determin'd to be either good or evil. As marrying, or not marrying, as to the Law of God, is left at liberty, not making it in it ſelf a neceſſary duty, one way or other; but ſuppoſing particular circumſtances make it neceſſary, *pro hic & nunc*, yet the nature of it remains indifferent ſtill; and ſuppoſing marriage, it is neceſſary it ſhould be in the Lord, and yet it is not neceſſary to make choice of this perſon rather than of that; ſo that not only the abſolute indifferency of the action is conſiſtent with this concomitant neceſſity, but the full liberty both of *contradiction* and *contrariety*. Again, we muſt diſtinguiſh between an *indifferency* as to its *nature*, and indifferency

V. Forbeſ. Iren. lib. 1. cap. 13.

Rom. 14. 23.

as to its *use and end*; or between an indifferency as to a *Law*, and indifferency as *to order and peace:* here I say, that in things wholly indifferent in both respects, that is, in a thing neither commanded nor forbidden by God, nor that hath any apparent respect to the peace and order of the Church of God; there can be no rational account given, why the nature of such indifferencies should be alter'd by any humane Laws and Constitutions. But matters that are only indifferent as to a command, but are much conducing to the peace and order of a Church, such things as these, are the proper matter of humane constitutions concerning the Churches polity: Or rather to keep to the words of the *Hypothesis* it self, where any things are determin'd in general by the word of God, but left at liberty as to manner and circumstances, it is in the power of lawful authority in the Church of God to determine such things, as far as they tend to the promoting the good of the Church.

§. 9. And so I rise to the second step, which is, that matters of this nature may be determin'd and restrained. Or that there is no necessity, that all matters of liberty should remain in their primary indifferency. This I know is asserted by some of great note and learning; that in things which God hath left to our Christian liberty, man may not restrain us of it, by subjecting those things to positive Laws; but I come to examine, with what strength of reason this is said, that so we may see, whether men may not yield in some lawful things to a restraint of their Christan liberty, in order to the Peace of the Church of God: Which I now prove by these Arguments. *First*, What may be lawfully done when it is commanded, may be so far lawfully commanded, as it is a thing in it self lawful: but matters of Christian liberty may be lawfully done when they are commanded to be done, though it were lawful not to do them before that command. The truth of the proposition appears, because lawful authority may command any thing that may be lawfully done. Because nothing can exempt from obedience to a lawful Magistrate, but the unlawfulness of the thing commanded; and therefore nothing can debar the Magistrate from commanding these things; for nothing can hinder him from commanding; but what may hinder the subject from obedience. I grant in many cases it may be lawful to obey, when it is very inconvenient for the Magistrate to command; but inconveniency and unlawfulness are two things; nay, and in some cases a man may lawfully obey when he is unlawfully commanded; but then the matter of the command it self is unlawful. As in executing an unjust sentence, granting that a Princes servants may lawfully do it, especially when they know it not; yet in that case, the ground of their lawful obedience, is the ground of the Magistrates lawful command, which is the supposed justice of the execution. But that which makes the Magistrates command unlawful, is the intrinsecal evil of the thing it self. So for unlawful wars, though the Subjects may lawfully obey, yet the Prince sins in commanding, not but that he hath a right to command so far as they are bound to obey, which is only in things lawful; but that which in this case alters the matter, is the Princes knowing his cause to be unjust. So that however the proposition holds in things not manifestly unjust. But however this be, it is hereby granted, that the things may be lawfully done, when they are restrained by the Magistrates command; and by that it appears that liberty may be restrained; else it could not be lawful to act under that restraint; not as it respects the things themselves, but under that formality, as they are the re-

ſtraint of that which ought to be left free. The reſtraint however then is lawful, as to the perſons acting under authority, who are the ſubjects of this liberty, though it were granted unlawful as to the authority doing it. Which former is ſufficient for my purpoſe, *viz.* that Chriſtian liberty, as to the ſubjects of it, may be lawfully reſtrained. *Secondly*, A leſſer duty ceaſeth to be a duty, when it hinders from the performance of greater: but the preſerving Chriſtian liberty is a leſſer duty, which may hinder the peace of the Church, which is a greater; therefore in that caſe it may be reſtrained. The *Major* is granted by Divines and Caſuiſts; when duties ſtand in competition, the leſſer ceaſeth to bind, as is evident, in that God will have mercy rather than ſacrifice. Poſitives yield to morals and naturals. Thence the obligation of an oath ceaſeth, when it hinders from a natural duty; as the *Corban* among the *Jews* from relief of Parents. And therefore *Grotius* ſaith, that oath taken concerning a thing lawful, if it doth hinder *majus bonum morale*, the obligation of that oath ceaſeth. Now that preſerving liberty is a leſſer duty than the looking after the peace of the Church, is evident, becauſe the one is only a matter of liberty, and left undetermin'd by the Word; and the other a matter of neceſſity, and abſolutely, and expreſly required of all, as a duty as much as poſſibly lies in them to endeavour after. *Thirdly*, If an occaſional offence of weaker brethren may be a ground for reſtraining Chriſtian liberty, then much more may commands from lawful authority do it; but the offence of weaker Brethren may reſtrain Chriſtian liberty, as to the exerciſe of it, as appears by the Apoſtles diſcourſe, *Rom.* 14. 21. The reaſon of the conſequence lies here, that a caſe of mere offence, which is here pleaded towards weak Brethren, cannot have that obligation upon conſcience, which a known duty of obeying lawful authority, in things in themſelves lawful, hath. Nay farther, inſiſting only on the Law of ſcandal, I would fain know, whether it be a greater offence and ſcandal to Chriſtians conſciences, to infringe the lawful authority of the Magiſtrate, and to deny obedience to his commands, in things undetermined by the Law of God; or elſe to offend the Conſciences, that is, go againſt the judgments of ſome well meaning, but leſs knowing Chriſtians. Or thus, whether in the matter of ſcandal, it be a greater offence to go againſt the judgments of the weaker and more ignorant, or the more knowing and able, when the one have only their own weak apprehenſions to biaſs them, the other are backed by and grounded upon an eſtabliſhed Law. And whether it be not a greater ſcandal to Religion to diſobey a Chriſtian Magiſtrate, than it is to offend ſome private Chriſtians. Let theſe things be examined and then let us ſee whether the argument will not hold *à majori*; if the Law of Scandal as to private Chriſtians may reſtrain liberty, then may a command from the Magiſtrate do it. *Fourthly*, I argue thus: If the nature of Chriſtian liberty may be preſerved under the reſtraint of the exerciſe of it, then it is not againſt the nature of Chriſtian liberty to have the exerciſe reſtrained; but the former is true, and therefore the latter. Now that the nature of Chriſtian liberty may be preſerved under the reſtraint of its exerciſe, I prove by theſe Arguments.

Grot. de jure belli & pacis, lib. 2. cap. 13. ſect. 7.

First. Becauſe the nature of Chriſtian liberty is founded upon the freedom of judgment, and not the freedom of practice. The caſe is the ſame in moral and natural liberty as in Chriſtian. Now we ſay truly, that the radical liberty of the ſoul is preſerved, though it be determined §. 10.

to a particular action: For the liberty of the Will lying in the *power* of determining it ſelf either way, (as it is generally thought) the actual determination of the will doth not take away the internal power in the ſoul; and in that reſpect there may be *potentia faciendi*, where there is not *poſſibilitas effectûs*, a power of doing, when there is no poſſibility the thing ſhould be done, when the event is otherwiſe determined by a divine decree, as in breaking the bones of Chriſt upon the Croſs. So it is in reference to Chriſtian liberty; though the exerciſe of it be reſtrained, yet the liberty remains; becauſe Chriſtian liberty lies in the freedom of judgment, *that is*, in judging thoſe things to be free which are ſo; ſo that if any thing that is in its ſelf free, be done by a man with an opinion of the neceſſity of doing it antecedent to the Law commanding it, or without any Law preſcribing it, thereby his Chriſtian liberty is deſtroyed; but if it be done with an opinion of the freedom and indifferency of the thing it ſelf, but only with a conſequential neceſſity of doing it, ſuppoſing the Magiſtrate's command, he retains the power of his Chriſtian liberty ſtill, though under the reſtraint of the exerciſe of it. And therefore it would be well obſerved, that the opinion of the neceſſity of any one thing undetermined by Scripture, deſtroys Chriſtian liberty more than a Magiſtrate's command doth. And by this reaſon they that hold any one poſture at receiving the Lord's Supper neceſſary, (as ſitting, leaning, kneeling) do all equally deſtroy their own Chriſtian liberty as to theſe things which are undetermined by the word. So a Magiſtrate, when commanding matters of Chriſtian liberty, if in the preface to the Law, he declares the thing neceſſary to be done in its ſelf, and therefore he commands it, he takes away, as much as in him lies our Chriſtian liberty. And in that caſe we ought to hold to that excellent rule of the Apoſtle, *ſtand faſt therefore in the liberty wherewith Chriſt hath ſet you free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage.* But if the Magiſtrate declare the things to be in themſelves indifferent, but only upon ſome prudent conſiderations for peace and order he requires perſons to obſerve them, though this brings a neceſſity of obedience to us, yet it takes not away our Chriſtian liberty. For an antecedent neceſſity expreſſed in the Law, (as a learned and excellent Caſuiſt of our own obſerves) doth neceſſarily require the aſſent of the practical judgment to it; which takes away our liberty of judgment, or our judgment of the liberty of the things; but a conſequential neceſſity upon a command ſuppoſed, doth only imply an act of the will, whereby the freedom of judgment and conſcience remaining, it is inclined to obedience to the commands of a ſuperior Law. Now that liberty doth lie in the freedom of judgment, and not in the freedom of practice, and ſo is conſiſtent with the reſtraint of the exerciſe of it; appears both in the former caſe of ſcandal, and in the actions of the Apoſtles and primitive Chriſtians complying with the Jews in matters of liberty; yea which is a great deal more, in ſuch ceremonies of which the Apoſtle expreſly ſaith, that if they obſerved them, Chriſt would profit them nothing; and yet we find *Paul* himſelf circumciſing *Timothy* becauſe of the Jews, Certainly then however theſe ceremonies are ſuppoſed to be not only *mortuæ* but *mortiferæ* now the Goſpel was preached, and the Law of Chriſtian liberty promulged, yet *Paul* did not look upon it as the taking away his liberty, at any time when it would prevent ſcandal among the Jews, and tend to the furtherance of the Goſpel, to uſe any of them. It was therefore the opinion of the neceſſity of them was it

Gal. 5. 1.

Dr. Sanderſon, de oblig. conſ. præl. 6. ſ. 5.

Gal. 5. 2.

Acts 16. 3.

which deſtroyed Chriſtian liberty; and therefore it is obſervable, that where the opinion of the neceſſity of obſerving the Judaical Rites and Ceremonies was entertained, the Apoſtle ſets himſelf with his whole ſtrength to oppoſe them, as he doth in his Epiſtles to the *Galatians* and *Coloſſians*. Whom yet we find in other places, and to other Churches, not leaven'd with this doctrine of the neceſſity of judaical Rites, very ready to comply with weak Brethren, as in his Epiſtles to the *Romans* and *Corinthians*. From which we plainly ſee, that it was not the bare doing of the things, but the doing them with an opinion of the neceſſity of them is that which infringeth Chriſtian liberty, and not the determination of one part above the other by the Supreme Magiſtrate, when it is declared not to be for any opinion of the things themſelves as neceſſary, but to be only in order to the Church's peace and unity. *Secondly*. It appears that liberty is conſiſtent with the reſtraint of the exerciſe of it; becauſe the very power of reſtraining the exerciſe of it, doth ſuppoſe it to be a matter of liberty, and that both antecedently and conſequentially to that reſtraint. *Antecedently*, ſo it is apparent to be a matter of liberty, elſe it was not capable of being reſtrained: *Conſequentially*, in that the ground of obſervance of thoſe things when reſtrained, is not any neceſſity of the matter, or the things themſelves; but only the neceſſity of obeying the Magiſtrate in things lawful and undetermin'd by the word: which leads to another argument. *Thirdly*, Mens obligation to theſe things, as to the ground of it, being only in point of contempt and ſcandal, argues that the things are matter of liberty ſtill. I grant the Magiſtrate's authority is the ground of obedience, but the ground of the Magiſtrate's command is only in point of contempt and ſcandal, and for preſerving order in the Church: For I have already ſhewed it to be unlawful, either to command or obey, in reference to theſe things, from any opinion of the neceſſity of them, and therefore the only ground of obſerving them, is to ſhew that we are not guilty of contempt of the power commanding them, nor of ſcandal to others that are offended at our not obſerving them. *Tota igitur religio eſt in fugiendo ſcandalo & vetando contemptu*, ſaith our learned *Whitaker*: All our ground of obedience is the avoiding ſcandal and contempt of authority. To the ſame purpoſe *Pet. Martyr*, ſpeaking of the obligation of Eccleſiaſtical Laws: *Non obſtringunt ſi removeatur contemptus & ſcandalum*: So that non-obſervance of indifferent things commanded, when there is an apparent contempt or ſcandal, do not involve a man in the guilt of ſin: as ſuppoſe a Law made that all publick prayer be performed kneeling, if any thing lies in a man's way to hinder him from that poſture, in this caſe the man offends not; becauſe there is no contempt or ſcandal: So if a Law were made that all ſhould receive the Lord's-ſupper faſting, if a man's health calls for ſomewhat to refreſh him before, he ſins not in the breach of that Law. And therefore it is obſervable which *Whitaker* takes notice of in the Canons of the Councils of the primitive Church, that though they did determine many things belonging to the external Polity of the Church, yet they obſerved this difference in their Cenſures of Anathema's; That in matters of mere order and decency they never pronounced an *Anathema*, but with the ſuppoſition of apparent contempt; and inſerted, *Si quis contra præſumpſerit, ſi quis contumaciter contra fecerit*: but in matters of doctrine or life, fully determin'd by the Law of God, they pronounced a ſimple *Anathema*, without any ſuch clauſe inſerted. Now from this we may take

Gal. 4. 9, 10, 11. Coloſſ. 2. 16, 18, 19. Rom. 14. 3, 6, 21. 1 Cor. 10. 24.

Controv. 4. *queſt.* 7. *cap.* 2.

In 1 Sam. 14.

take notice of a difference between Laws concerning indifferences in Civil and Eccleſiaſtical matters: That in civils the Laws bind to indifferencies without the caſe of contempt or ſcandal, becauſe in theſe the publick good is aimed at, of which every private perſon is not fit to judge, and therefore it is our duty either to obey or ſuffer; but in Eccleſiaſtical conſtitutions, only peace and order is that which is looked at, and therefore, *Si nihil contra* εὐταξίαν *feceris, non teneris illis*, is the rule here, if nothing tending to apparent diſorder be done, men break not thoſe Laws: For the end and reaſon of a Law is the meaſure of its obligation. *Fourthly*, Mens being left free to do the things forbidden, either upon a repeal of the former Laws, or when a man is from under obligation to that authority which commands them, argues them ſtill to be matters of liberty, and not matters of neceſſity. That Laws reſpecting indifferent things may be repealed, I cannot imagine that any have ſo little reaſon as to deny, upon a different ſtate of affairs from what it was when they were firſt enacted; or when they cannot attain the ends they are deſigned for, the peace and order of the Church, but rather tend to embroil it in trouble and confuſion: And that when men are from under the authority impoſing them, men are at their own liberty again, muſt neceſſarily be granted, becauſe the ground of reſtraint of that liberty was the authority they were under; and therefore the cauſe being taken away, the effect follows. Therefore for men to do them when authority doth not impoſe them, muſt imply an opinion of the neceſſity of the things themſelves, which deſtroys Chriſtian liberty. Whence it was reſolved by *Auguſtine* in the caſe of Rites, that every one ſhould obſerve thoſe of that Church which he was in: which he ſaith he took from *Ambroſe*. His words are theſe, *Nec diſciplina ulla in his melior gravi prudentique Chriſtiano quàm ut eo modo agat, quo agere viderit Eccleſiam, ad quamcunque forte devenerit. Quod enim neque contra fidem, neque contra bonos mores injungitur, indifferenter eſt habendum, & pro eorum inter quos vivitur ſocietate ſervandum eſt.* He tells us, *He knew no better courſe for a ſerious prudent Chriſtian to take in matters of Rites and Cuſtoms, than to follow the Church's example where he is: for whatſoever is obſerved neither againſt faith or manners, is a matter in its ſelf indifferent, and to be obſerved according to the cuſtom of thoſe he lives among.* And after acquaints us that his Mother coming to *Milan* after him, and finding the Church there not obſerve the Saturday faſt as the Church of *Rome* did, was much perplexed and troubled in mind at it, (as tender but weak conſciences are apt to be troubled at any thing contrary to their own practice) ſhe for her own ſatisfaction ſends her ſon to *Ambroſe*, then Biſhop of the Church there, who told him he would give him no other anſwer but what he did himſelf, and if he knew any thing better, he would do it. *Auguſtin* preſently expects a command from him to leave off Saturday faſts; inſtead of that, *Ambroſe* tells him, *Cum Romam venio, jejuno ſabbato; cum hîc ſum, non jejuno. Sic etiam tu ad quam forte Eccleſiam veneris, ejus morem ſerva, ſi cuiquam non vis eſſe ſcandalo, nec quenquam tibi.* *When I am at* Rome *I faſt on the Sabbath, but at* Milan *I do not. So thou likewiſe, when thou comeſt to any Church, obſerve its cuſtom, if thou wouldſt neither be an offence to them, nor have them be ſo to thee.* A rare and excellent example of the piety, prudence, and moderation of the Primitive Church: far from rigid impoſing indifferent cuſtoms on the one ſide; from contumacy in oppoſing mere indifferences on the other. Which judgment of *Ambroſe*, *Auguſtine* ſaith, he

Aug. ep. 118. ad Januar.

he always looked on as often as he thought of it, *tanquam cœleſte oraculum*, as an oracle come from Heaven; and concludes with this excellent ſpeech, which if ever God intend peace to our Church, he will make men underſtand: *Senſi enim ſæpe dolens & gemens multas infirmorum perturbationes fieri per quorundam fratrum contentioſam obſtinationem, & ſuperſtitioſam timiditatem qui in rebus hujuſmodi, quæ neque Scripturæ ſanctæ autoritate, neque univerſalis Eccleſiæ traditione, neque vitæ corrigendæ utilitate ad certum poſſunt terminum pervenire (perducere) tantum quia ſubeſt qualiſcunque ratiocinatio cogitantis, aut quia in ſuâ patriâ ſic ipſe conſuevit, aut quia ibi vidit ubi peregrinationem ſuam quo remotiorem à ſuis eo doctiorem factam putat, tam litigioſas excitant quæſtiones ut niſi quod ipſi faciunt, nihil rectum exiſtiment. I have often,* ſaith he, *found it to my grief and ſorrow, that the troubles of weaker Chriſtians, have been cauſed by the contentious obſtinacy of ſome on the one hand, and the ſuperſtitious fearfulneſs of others on the other; in things which are neither determin'd by the authority of the holy Scriptures, nor by the cuſtom of the univerſal Church, nor yet by any uſefulneſs of the things themſelves, in order to the making mens lives better; only for ſome petty reaſon in a man's own mind, or becauſe it hath been the cuſtom of their Country, or becauſe they have found it in thoſe Churches, which they have thought to be the nearer to truth, the farther they have been from home, they are continually raiſing ſuch quarrels and contentions, that they think nothing is right and lawful, but what they do themſelves.* Had that bleſſed Saint lived in our age, he could not have uttered any thing more true, nor more pertinent to our preſent ſtate: which methinks admirers of antiquity ſhould embrace for its authority, and others for the great truth and reaſon of it. Did we but ſet up thoſe three things as Judges between us in our matters of Ceremonies, *The authority of the Scriptures, the practice of the Primitive Univerſal Church, and the tendency of them to the reforming mens lives*; how ſoon might we ſhake hands, and our controverſies be at an end! But as long as contentious obſtinacy remains on one ſide, and a ſuperſtitious fearfulneſs on the other, (for ſuperſtition may as well lie in the imagined neceſſity of avoiding things indifferent, as in the neceſſary obſerving of things which are not) we may find our ſtorms increaſe, but we are not like to ſee any Land of Peace. How happy might we be, did men but once underſtand that it was their duty to mind the things of peace! How little of that Duſt might ſtill and quiet our moſt contentious Frays!

Hi motus animorum, atque hæc certamina tanta
Pulveris exigui jactu compreſſa quieſcunt.

But in order to ſo happy and deſirable an union and accommodation, I ſhall not need to plead much from the nature of the things we differ about; the lowneſs of them in compariſon of the great things we are agreed in, the fewneſs of them in compariſon of the multitude of thoſe weighty things we ought moſt to look after, the benefits of union, the miſeries of diviſion, which if our lamentable experience doth not tell us of, yet our conſciences may; I ſhall crave leave humbly to preſent to ſerious conſideration ſome propoſals for accommodation: which is an attempt which nothing but an earneſt deſire of peace can juſtifie, and I hope that will: which here falls in as the third ſtep of my deſigned diſcourſe, about the bounds to be ſet in the reſtraint of Chriſtian liberty.

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§. 11. The *firſt* is, that nothing be impoſed as neceſſary, but what is clearly revealed in the word of God. This there is the higheſt reaſon and equity for, ſince none can have command immediately over conſcience, but God himſelf, and whatever is impoſed as neceſſary, doth immediately bind conſcience. And whatever binds mens conſciences with an opinion of the neceſſity of it, doth immediately deſtroy that Chriſtian liberty which men are neceſſarily bound to ſtand faſt in, and not be intangled with any yoke
Gal. 5. 1. of bondage. Not only the yoke of Jewiſh Ceremonies, but whatever yoke pincheth, and galls as that did, with an opinion of the neceſſity of doing the thing commanded by any but the word of God. Which the Apoſtle calls *Dogmatizing*, Coloſſ. 2. 20. and *v.* 16. let no man judge you in meat and drink; *nè Præpoſiti quidem veſtri*, ſaith *Whitaker*; theſe impoſitions he calls, *v.* 22. the commandments and doctrines of men. And ſuch he calls a ſnare, 1 *Corinth.* 7. 23. which was the making an indifferent thing, as Cœlibate, neceſſary. *Laqueus eſt quicquid precipitur ut neceſſarium quod liberum eſſe debet.* So that though obedience be neceſſary to indifferent things when commanded; yet it muſt always be *libera à conſcientiâ quoad res ipſas legum*, no obligation to be laid upon conſcience to look upon the things as neceſſary.

Secondly, That nothing be required, nor determin'd, but what is ſufficiently known to be indifferent in its own nature. The former propoſal was in reference to the manner of impoſing, this reſpects the nature of the things themſelves. The only difficulty here is, how a thing may be ſufficiently known to be indifferent; becauſe one man looks upon that as indifferent, which another doth not. The moſt equal way to decide this controverſie, is to make choice of ſuch judges as are not intereſted in the quarrel: And thoſe are the *ſenſe of the Primitive Church* in the firſt four Centuries, who were beſt able to judge whether they looked upon themſelves as bound by any command of Scripture or no; and withal the judgment of the Reformed Churches: So that what ſhall be made appear to be left indifferent, by both the ſenſe of the Primitive Church, and the Churches of the Reformation, may be a matter determinable by Law, and which all may be required to conform in obedience to.

Thirdly, That whatever is thus determined be in order only to a due performance of what is in general required in the word of God, and not to be looked on as any part of divine worſhip or ſervice. This is that which gives the greateſt occaſion of offence to mens conſciences, when any thing is either required, or if not, yet generally uſed and looked on as a neceſſary part or concomitant of God's worſhip, ſo that without it the worſhip is deemed imperfect. And there is great difference to be made between things indifferent in their own nature, and indifferent as to their uſe and practice. And when the generality of thoſe who uſe them do not uſe them as indifferent, but as neceſſary things, it ought to be conſidered whether in this caſe ſuch a uſe be allowable till men be better informed of the nature of the things they do. As in the caſe of the Papiſts about image-worſhip, their divines ſay, that the images are only as high tenors of Devotion, but the worſhip is fixed on God; but we find it is quite otherwiſe in the general practice of people who look at nothing beyond the image. So it may be, bating the decrees of the offence, when matters of indifferency in themſelves are by the generality of people not looked on as ſuch, but uſed as a neceſſary part of divine ſervice. And it would be conſidered whether

ſuch

ſuch an abuſe of matters ſuppoſed indifferent being known; it be not *ſcandalum datum* to continue their uſe without an effectual remedy for the abuſe of them.

Fourthly, That no ſanctions be made, nor mulcts or penalties be inflicted on ſuch who only diſſent from the uſe of ſome things whoſe lawfulneſs they at preſent ſcruple, till ſufficient time and means be uſed for their information of the nature and indifferency of the things, that it may be ſeen whether it be out of wilful contempt and obſtinacy of ſpirit, or only weakneſs of conſcience and diſſatisfaction concerning the things themſelves that they diſobey. And if it be made evident to be out of contempt, that only ſuch penalties be inflicted as anſwers to the nature of the offence. I am ſure it is contrary to the Primitive practice, and the Moderation then uſed, to ſuſpend or deprive men of their miniſterial function for not conforming in habits, geſtures, or the like. Concerning habits, *Walafridus Strabo*, expreſly tells us, there was no diſtinction of habits uſed in the Church in the Primitive times. *Veſtes ſacerdotales per incrementa ad eum, qui nunc habetur, auctæ ſunt ornatum. Nam primis temporibus communi veſtimento induti, Miſſas agebant, ſicut & hactenus quidam Orientalium facere perhibentur.* And therefore the *Concilium Gangrenſe* condemned *Euſtathius Sebaſtenus* for making a neceſſity of diverſity of habits among Chriſtians for their profeſſion, διαπλὼ ἄσκησιν, it being acknowledged both by *Salmaſius* and his great adverſary *Petavius*, that in the Primitive times the Preſbyters did not neceſſarily wear any diſtinct habit from the people, although the former endeavours to prove that commonly they did in *Tertullian*'s time; but yet that not all the Preſbyters, nor they only did uſe a diſtinct habit, *viz.* the *Pallium Philoſophicum*, but all the Chriſtians who did ἀκριβῶς χριστιανίζειν, as *Socrates* ſaid of *Sylvanus Rhetor*, all that were ἀσκηταὶ among them, ſtricter profeſſors of Chriſtianity; among which moſt of the Preſbyters were. And *Origen* in *Euſebius* expreſly ſpeaks of *Heraclas* a Preſbyter of *Alexandria*, that for a long time χρόνῳ ἐσθῆτι χρώμενον, he uſed only the common garment belonging to Chriſtians, and put on the *Pallium Philoſophicum* for the ſtudy of the Grecian Learning, after that Chriſtianity began to loſe in height what it got in breadth: inſtead of the former ſimplicity of their garments as well as manners, and their τριβώνια came in the uſe of the *byrri*, *Penulæ Dalmaticæ*, and ſo daily increaſing, as *Strabo* ſaith. I ſay not this in the leaſt to condemn any diſtinction of habit for mere decency and order, but to ſhew it was not the cuſtom of the Primitive times to impoſe any neceſſity of theſe things upon men, nor to cenſure them for bare diſuſe of them. He muſt be a great ſtranger in the Primitive Church that takes not notice of the great diverſity of rites and cuſtoms uſed in particular Churches, without any cenſuring thoſe who differed from them; or if any by inconſiderate zeal did proceed ſo far, how ill it was reſented by other Chriſtians. As *Victors* excommunicating the *Quarto-decimani* for which he is ſo ſharply reproved by *Irenæus*, who tells him, that the primitive Chriſtians who differed in ſuch things, did not uſe to abſtain from one anothers communion for them, οὐ γὰρ οἱ τῆς αὐτῆς πίστεως ὄντες, διαφωνεῖσι περὶ τὰ ἔθη πρὸς ἑαυτούς, as *Socrates* tells us, *Thoſe that agree in the ſame faith, may differ among themſelves in their rites and cuſtoms*; as he largely ſhews in a whole Chaptet to that purpoſe, as in the obſervation of Eaſter ſome the fourteenth day of *April*, others only upon the Lord's day, but ſome of the more Eaſtern Churches differed from both. In their faſts, ſome ob-

De rebus Eccleſ. cap. 24.

Can. 14. in Cod. Can. in Vin. Eccleſ. can. 71. Salm. Not. in Tertul. de Pallio. 76. Ant. Cercoth. in Salmaſ. p. 12. Euſeb. lib. 6. cap. 20.

Euſeb. l. 5.

Socrat. hiſt. Eccleſ. l. 5. c. 23.

ſerved Lent but for one day, ſome two, ſome three weeks, ſome ſix weeks, others ſeven: and in their Faſts ſome abſtained from all kind of living creatures, others only from fleſh, eating fiſh: and others fowl: others abſtained from fruit and eggs: others eat only dry bread, others not that neither. And ſo for their publick Aſſemblies, Some communicating every Lord's day, others not. The Church of *Alexandria* had its publick Meetings and Sermons every fourth day of the week as he tells us. The ſame Church made the publick readers and interpreters, either of the Catechumeni, or of the baptized, differing therein from all other Churches: Several cuſtoms were uſed about Digamy and the marriage of Miniſters in ſeveral Churches. So about the time of Baptiſm, ſome having only one ſet time in the year for it, as at Eaſter in *Theſſaly*, others two, Eaſter and *Dominica in Albis*, ſo called from the white garments of the baptized. Some Churches in baptiſm uſed three dippings, others only one. Great differences about the time of their being Catechumeni, in ſome places longer, in others a ſhorter time. So about the excommunicate and degrees of penance (as they are called) their *Flentes*, *audientes*, *ſuccumbentes*, *conſiſtentes*, the *Communio peregrinæ*, the ſeveral Chriſms *in vertice*, *in pectore*, in ſome places at Baptiſm, in ſome after. So for placing the Altar (as they metaphorically called the Communion Table) it was not conſtantly towards the Eaſt; for *Socrates* affirms, that in the great Church at *Antiochia* it ſtood to the Weſt end of the Church; and therefore it had ἀντίθυρον θέσιν, a different poſiture from other Churches. And *Euſebius* ſaith out of the Panegyriſt, that in the New Church built by *Paulinus* at *Tyre*, the Altar ſtood ἐν μέσῳ *in the middle.* Theſe things may ſuffice for a taſte at preſent of which more largely elſewhere (God willing) in due time. We ſee the primitive Chriſtians did not make ſo much of any uniformity in rites and ceremonies; nay I ſcarce think any Churches in the primitive times can be produced that did exactly in all things obſerve the ſame cuſtoms: Which might eſpecially be an argument of moderation in all as to theſe things, but eſpecially in pretended admirers of the Primitive Church. I conclude with a known ſaying of *Auſtin*, *Indignum eſt ut propter ea quæ nos Deo neque digniores, neque indigniores poſſunt facere, alii alios vel condemnemus, vel judicemus. It is an unworthy thing for Chriſtians to condemn and judge one another for thoſe things which do not further us at all in our way to heaven.*

Cap. 23. l. 5.

Eccleſ. hiſt. l. 10. cap. 4.

Laſtly, That Religion be not clog'd with Ceremonies. They when multiplied too much, if lawful, yet ſtrangely eat out the heart, heat, life, vigour of Chriſtianity. Chriſtian Religion is a plain, ſimple, eaſie thing. Chriſt commends his yoke to us by the eaſineſs of it, and his burden by the lightneſs of it. It was an excellent teſtimony which *Amm. Marcellinus* a heathen gave to Chriſtianity, when ſpeaking of *Conſtantius*, *Religionem Chriſtianam rem abſolutam & ſimplicem anili ſuperſtitione confudit, That he ſpoiled the beauty of Chriſtianity, by muffling it up in ſuperſtitious obſervations.* And it is as true which *Eraſmus* ſaid in anſwer to the Sorboniſts, *Quò magis in corporalibus ceremoniis hæremus, hoc magis vergimus ad Judaiſmum. External Ceremonies teach us backward, and bring us back from Chriſt to Moſes*; which is fully proved as to the Papiſts, by our learned *Rainolds* and Mr. *De Croy*; but we need no farther evidence than a bare peruſal of *Durandus Mimatenſis* his *Rationale Divinorum officiorum.* By Ceremonies, I mean not here matters of mere decency and order, for order ſake; which doubtleſs are lawful (if the meaſure

Eraſ. in declar. ad Cenſ. Pariſ. art. 14.

Conf. with Hart. cap. 8. Div. 8.

De Croy 3. Conformity, part 2.

measure of that order be not the pomp and glory of the world, but the gravity, composure, sobriety, which becomes Christianity) for when the Jews were the most strictly tyed up by a Ceremonial Law, they did introduce many things upon the account of order and decency: as the building Synagogues, their hours of prayer, their *Parashoth* and *Haphtaroth*, the Sections of the Law and Prophets; the continuation of the Passover 14 days by *Hezekiah*, when the Law required but seven: the feast of *Purim* by *Ester* and *Mordecai*: the fasts of the 4th, 5th, and 10th month under the captivity, the feast of dedication by the *Maccabees*. The use of Baptism in Proselyting, washing the feet before the Passover, imitated and practised by our Saviour: So that matters of order and decency are allowable and fitting; but Ceremonies properly taken for actions significative, and therefore appointed because significative, their lawfulness may with better ground be scrupled. Or taking Ceremony in *Bellarmine*'s description of it, to be *actio externa quæ non aliunde est bona & laudabilis nisi quia sit ad Deum colendum:* And in this sense it will be hard to manifest any thing to be lawful, but what is founded upon a Divine precept; if it be not a matter of order, and so no Ceremony. And as for significative Ceremonies, concerning matter of doctrine or fact, a learned Doctor puts us in mind of the old rule, that they be *paucæ & salubres*; and the fewer, the more wholsom: For as he observes from *Aristotle* in Insectile Animals, the want of blood was the cause they run out into so many legs. I shall conclude this whole Discourse with another speech of S. *Austin*, very pertinent to our present purpose. *Omnia itaque talia quæ neque sanctarum Scripturarum autoritatibus continentur, nec in Conciliis Episcoporum statuta inveniuntur, nec consuetudine universæ Ecclesiæ roborata sunt, sed diversorum locorum diversis moribus innumerabiliter variantur, ita ut vix aut omnino nunquam inveniri possint causæ, quas in eis instituendis secuti sunt homines, ubi facultas tribuitur, sine ulla dubitatione resecanda existimo. All such things which are neither founded on the authority of the Scriptures, nor determined by general Councils* (for so it must be understood) *nor practised by the Catholick Church, but vary according to the customs of places, of which no rational account can be given; assoon as men have power to do it, I judge them to be cut off without any scruple:* For which definitive sentence of his, he gives this most sufficient reason; *Quamvis enim neque hoc invenire possit, quomodo contra fidem sint, ipsam tamen religionem (quam paucissimis & manifestissimis celebrationem sacramentis misericordia Dei liberam esse voluit) servilibus oneribus premunt, ut tolerabilior sit conditio Judæorum, qui etiamsi tempus libertatis non agnoverint, legalibus tamen sarcinis, non humanis præsumptionibus subjiciuntur; For although we cannot positively say, how such things as these do manifestly impugn our faith, yet in that they load our Religion with such servile burdens, (which the mercy of God hath left free for all other observations, but the celebration of some few and most clear Sacraments) that they make our condition worse than that of the Jews; for they, although strangers to Gospel liberty, had no burdens charged upon them by the constitutions of men, but only by the Law and commands of God:* Which sentence and reason of his, I leave to the most impartial judgment of every true sober-minded Christian. And thus I am at last come through this field of thorns and thistles; I hope now to find my way more plain and easie. So much for the fourth Hypothesis. The two next will be discharged with lesser trouble.

De Sacram. lib. 2. c. 29.

Dr. Ham. of Superstition, sect. 39.

Ep. 119. ad Jan. cap. 19.

§. 12. Hypoth. 5. *What is left undetermin'd both by Divine positive Laws, and by principles deduced from the natural Law, if it be determined by lawful authority in the Church of God, doth bind the consciences of those who are subject to that authority, to obedience to those determinations.* I here suppose, that the matter of the Law be something not predetermined, either by the Law of Nature, or Divine positive Laws, for against either of these no humane Law can bind the conscience: For if there be any moral evil in the thing commanded, we are bound to obey God rather than men; in which case we do not formally and directly disobey the Magistrate, but we chuse to obey God before him. And as we have observed, a former obligation from God or Nature, destroys a latter; because God hath a greater power and authority over mens consciences, than any humane authority can have: And my obedience to the Magistrate being founded upon a Divine Law, it must be supposed my duty to obey him first, by vertue of whose authority I obey another; then the other whom I obey, because the former hath commanded me. If I am bound to obey an inferiour Magistrate, because the supreme requires it; if the inferiour command me any thing contrary to the Will and Law of the supreme, I am not bound to obey him in it, because both he derives his power of commanding, and I my obligation to obedience from the authority of the supreme, which must be supposed to do nothing against it self. So it is between God and the supreme Magistrate; *by him Kings reign*; God, when he gives them a Legislative power, doth it *cumulativè non privativè*, not so as to deprive himself of it, nor his own Laws of a binding force against his: So that no Law of a Magistrate can in reason bind against a positive Law of God. But what is enacted by a lawful Magistrate, in things left undetermined by God's Laws, doth even by vertue of them bind men to obedience, which
Rom. 13. 5. require subjection to the higher powers *for conscience sake.* So that whatsoever is left indifferent, obedience to the Magistrate in things indifferent is not: And if we are not bound to obey in things undetermin'd by the word, I would fain know wherein we are bound to obey them? or what distinct power of obligation belongs to the authority the Magistrate hath over men? For all other things we are bound to already by former Laws; therefore either there must be a distinct authority without power to oblige, or else we are effectually bound to whatsoever the Magistrate doth determine in lawful things. And if it be so in general, it must be so as to all particulars contained in that general, and so in reference to matters of the Church, unless we suppose all things concerning it to be already determined in Scripture; which is the thing in question, and shall be largely discussed in its due place.

§. 13. *Sixthly*, Hypoth. 6. *Things undetermined by the Divine Law, natural and positive, and actually determined by lawful authority, are not thereby made unalterable, but may be revoked, limited, and changed, according to the different ages, tempers, inclinations of men, by the same power which did determine them.* All humane constitutions are reversible by the same power which made them: For the obligation of them not arising from the matter of them, but from the authority of the person binding, are consequently alterable, as shall be judged by that power most suitable to the ends of its first promulgation. Things may so much alter, and times change, that what was a likely way to keep men in unity and obedience at one time, may only enrage them at another: The same Physick which may at one time cure, may at another only enrage the distemper more. As therefore the skill of a Physician lies most in the appli-

cation of Physick to the several tempers of his Patients: So a wise Magistrate, who is as *Nicias* said in *Thucydides*, πόλεως κακῶς βουλευομένης ἰατρός. *The Physician to cure the distempers of the body Politick*; and considers, (as *Spartian* tells us *Adrian* used to say in the Senate; *ita se Rempub. gesturum, ut sciret populi rem esse, non propriam*) that the peoples interest is the main care of the Prince, will see a necessity of altering, reforming, varying many humane constitutions, according as they shall tend most to the ends of Government, either in Church or State. Thence it is said of the several Laws of nature, divine and humane: that *Lex naturæ potest poni, sed non deponi, Lex divina nec poni nec deponi, Lex humana & poni & deponi. The Law of Nature may be laid down,* (as in case of marriage with Sisters in the beginning of the world) *but not laid aside; the Law of God can neither be laid down nor laid aside: but humane Laws both may be laid down and laid aside.* Indeed the Laws of the *Medes* and *Persians* are said to be unalterable, (but if it be meant in the sense it is commonly understood in) yet that very Law which made them unalterable, (for they were not so of their own nature) was an alterable Law, and so was whatever did depend upon it. I conclude then, whatever is the subject of humane determination may lawfully be altered and changed, according to the wisdom and prudence of those in whose hands the care of the publick is. Thus then, as those things which are either of natural or Christian liberty, are subjected to humane Laws and Restraints, so those Laws are not irreversible; but if the Fences be thrown down by the same authority which set them up, whatever was thereby inclosed, returns to the community of natural right again. So much for these *Hypotheses*, which I have been the longer in explaining and establishing, because of the great influence they may have upon our present peace, and the near concernment they have to this whole discourse, the whole Fabrick of which is erected upon these foundations.

Hist. lib 6. Spartian. in Adrian.

Dan. 6. 8.

CHAP. III.

How far Church Government is founded upon the Law of nature. Two things in it founded thereon. 1. *That there must be a society of men for the worship of God.* 2. *That this society be governed in the most convenient manner. A society for worship manifested.* Gen. 4. 26. *considered: The sons of God and the sons of men, who? Societies for worship among heathens evidenced by three things.* 1. *Solemnity of sacrifices; sacrificing how far natural; the antiquity of the Feast of First-fruits largely discovered.* 2. *The original of Festivals for the honour of their Deities:* 3. *The secrecy and solemnity of their mysteries. This farther proved from man's sociable nature; the improvement of it by religion, the honour redounding to God by such a society for his worship.*

HAving now laid our foundation, we proceed to raise a superstructure upon it. And we now come closely to enquire how far Government in the Church is founded upon an unalterable divine right? That we have found to be built upon a double foundation, *the dictates of the Law of nature, and Divine positive Laws.* We shall impartially enquire into both of them; and see how far Church Government is settled upon either

§. 1.

either of these two. I begin then with the Law of Nature. Two general things I conceive are of an unalterable divine right in reference to this. *First, That there be a society and joining together of men for the worship of God. Secondly, That this Society be governed, preserved, and maintained in a most convenient manner. First*, That there must be a society of men joining together for the worship of God. For the dictate of nature being common to all, that God must be served, nature requires some kind of mutual society for the joint performance of their common duties. An evidence of which dictate of nature appears in the first mention we find of any publick society; so that a society for religious worship was as ancient as the first civil societies we have any records of. Nay the very first publick society we read of was gathered upon this account. For we read in the early days of the world, that the Charter for this society was soon made use of, *Gen.* 4. 26. *In the days of* Enosh *men began to call upon the name of the Lord.* Now *Enosh* was *Seth*'s son, whom *Adam* had given to him in the place of *Abel*; and as soon as the number of men did increase, that men grew into Societies, they then had their publick Societies for God's worship. For we cannot understand that place absolutely, as though God had not been called on before, but now he was called on more signally and solemnly; when men were increased, that they began to imbody themselves into Societies, *Cœpit congregare populum ad tractandum simul dei cultum*, saith *Pererius*; *Tunc cœptum est populariter coli Deus*, *Mariana*. *Invocare*, i. e. *palam colere*, *Emanuel Sa*, relating all to the publick Societies being then gathered for the worship of the true God. From which time, in all probability did commence that title of those who joined in those Societies that they were called בני-----האלהים *The sons of God* which we read of soon after, *Gen.* 6. 2. as they are distinguished from the ——— בנ' האדם the sons of men, which titles, as I am far from understanding in the sense of the Fathers taking them for the Angels, (which in likelihood they took from the supposititious piece going under the name of *Enoch*'s Prophecy) so I cannot understand them as commonly they are taken, for mere discretive titles of the posterity of *Seth* and *Cain*; as though all that came of *Seth* were the Sons of God, and all of *Cain* were the sons of men. For as there certainly were many bad of *Seth*'s Posterity, because the flood destroyed all of them, *Noah* only and his Family excepted; so there might be some good of the other, vice being no more entail'd than vertue is; and Jewels may sometimes lie in a heap of dung: and so this name of the sons of God might be appropriated to those who joined themselves to those societies for God's worship. In which sense some understand the very words of the Text, הוחל לקרא בשם יהוה *then began men to be called by the name of the Lord:* Which I suppose is the sense of *Aquila*, who thus renders the place, τότε ἤρχθη τὸ καλεῖσθαι ἐν ὀνόματι Κυρίου, although it be brought by *Dionys. Vossius* to justifie the former interpretation of the words. This sense, if the construction of the words will bear it, (which *Drusius* questions, but others are much for it, and *Theodoret*, the *French* and *Piscator* so render it) seems most genuine and natural; and not at all impugning what I have formerly gathered from the words, but implying it; For this distinction of names and titles did argue a distinction of Societies among them. I am not ignorant that the generality of Jewish Expositors, and many of their followers, do cary the sense of the words quite another way, from the ambiguity of the signification of הוחל which may be interpreted as well

Not. in Maim. de Idol. c. 1. sect. 1.

V. Chamier. Paustrat. Cath. To. 2. l. 9. c. 9. s. 9. Amam. Antib. Bibl. l. 2. p. 228.

to

to prophane as begin, and so they read it, *tunc prophanatum est ad invocandum nomen Domini*, Then men prophaned the name of the Lord: And accordingly *Maimonides* begins Idolatry בימי אנוש *from the days of* Enosh. But the words will scarce bear this construction, as *Vossius* upon him observes; and besides there is no mention at all of the name of any false Gods, but only of the true one. So much then for the first original of this Society for religion, which we see began as soon as there was matter for a Society to be gathered up of. Some indeed derive this Society a great deal higher; and because we read that *Abel* and *Cain* brought their sacrifices, they thence infer, that it was to *Adam* who was the publick Priest then, and performed all publick duties of worship in his own person, and so was indeed Œcumenical Bishop of the whole world, and yet had but four persons, or but few more for his charge. Such a Diocese we might be content to allow him that pleads for the same office, and derives his Title somewhat higher than *Adam*; for Pope *Boniface* the eight proved there must be but one chief Priest, and so one Pope, because it is said, *Gen.* 1. 1. that God created the world *in Principio* not *in Principiis*; mark the number, therefore there must be but one beginning, and so one Bishop, and not many. What excellent disputants an infallible chair makes men! Much good may his argument do him.

V. Selden de Diis Syris Proleg. p. 28. & 44. Abodazara cap. 1.

Bertram. de Polit. Jud. cap. 2. p. 12. Franz. Sch. Sacrif. disp. 2. Coppenb. Sch. Sacrif. p. 14.

§. 2. As a farther evidence, how much nature dictates that such a Society there should be for Divine worship, we shall enquire into the practice of men in their dispersion after the Flood. And what we find unanimously continued among them, under such gross Idolatry as they were given to, and which did arise not from their Idolatry as such, but from the general nature of it as a kind of worship, we have reason to look upon as one of those planks which hath escaped the common shipwrack of humane nature by the fall of man. And so though that argument from the general consent of Nations owning a way of worship, though a false one, in order to the proving the existence of God, be slighted by some, yet there is this double evidence in it to prove it, more than is generally taken notice of, and beyond the bare Testimony it self given by that consent. *First*, From mens being so easily imposed upon by false religions, in that they are so soon gull'd into Idolatry; it argues there are some Jewels in the world, or else men would never be deceived with counterfeits; it argues that a Child hath a Father, who is ready to call every one that comes to him Father; so it argues there is some natural instinct in men towards the worship of God, when men are so easily brought to worship other things instead of God. We see no other creatures can be so imposed upon; we read of no Idolatry among the Brutes, nor that the Bees, though they have a King, and honour him, did ever bow their Knees to *Baal*, or worship the Hive instead of him. If men had no journeys to go, others need not be sworn as the *Athenians* were, not to put them out of their way. If there were no inclinableness to religion, all cautions against Idolatry were superfluous; there is then from mens proneness to error, as to the person and object of worship, an evidence of a natural ὅρμη, an instinct within towards the act of worship: And as when I see sheep flock together, even in their wandrings, I may easily gather, that though they are out of their proper pastures, yet they are of a tame and sociable nature; so when we see Societies for worship were preserved among men after they were degenerated into Idolatry, is an evident argument that such associating

Socinus Præl. cap. 2.

together

together for the general nature of the act, doth flow from the nature of man. *Secondly*, All mens agreeing in some kind of worship, though differing as to the object and manner of it, is an evidence it comes from nature, because it plainly evinces it could be nothing taken up out of design, received by custom, nor conveyed by tradition, because even among those whose interests and designs have been contrary to one another, and could have no mutual compacts to deceive their people, have all agreed in this thing, though almost in all other things they have strangely differed. All other Customs and Traditions, are either changed, or lost, among several Nations; as the rude barbarous Northern Nations, that in their inroads and incursions upon other places, have left in process of time, almost all other customs but only their religion behind them. This sticks closer than *Saladine*'s black shirt, or the old *Monk*'s cloaths, which they put not off till they died. Nay even those Nations, who openly, and as by a Law, violate the other received dictates of nature, do yet maintain and hold up this. Those that have had the least of commerce and converse with civilized people, have yet had their Societies for worship: And when they could find no Gods to worship, they would rather make than want them. The *Egyptians* would rather spoil their Sallets than be without Gods; and they that whipt their Gods, yet had them still. They who had no sense of another Life, yet would pray to their Gods for the good things of this; and they that would not pray that the Gods would do them good, yet would that they might do them no hurt: So that in the most prodigious Idolatry, we have an argument for Religion, and in the strange diversities of the ways of worship, we have an evidence how natural a Society for worship is. This to shew the validity and force of the argument drawn from consent of Nations, even in their Idolatry.

§. 3. Three things I shall evidence these Societies for worship among the Heathens by; the solemnity of their sacrifices, their publick Festivals, and their secret Mysteries, all which were instituted peculiarly in honour of their Gods: It being necessary in such Societies for worship, to have some particular Rites, whereby to testifie the end of such Societies to be for the honour of their Deity, and to distinguish those solemnities from all other. *First* then for sacrifices; *Paulus Burgensis* observing how this custom spread all the world over, concludes from thence that it was natural to men. *In qualibet ætate, & apud quaslibet hominum nationes semper fuit aliqua sacrificiorum oblatio. Quod autem est apud omnes, naturale est.* Thus far I confess sacrificing natural, as it was a solemn and sensible Rite of worship; but if he meant by that, the destroying of some living creatures to be offered up to God, I both deny the universal practice of it, and its being from the dictate of nature; and I rather believe with *Fortunius Licetus*, that it was continued down by tradition, from the sacrifices of *Cain* and *Abel* before the flood, or rather from *Noah*'s after; which might the easier be, because Nature dictating there must be some way of worship, and it being very agreeable to Nature it should be by sensible signs, all Nations having no other rule to direct them, were willing to observe that Rite and Custom in it, which was conveyed down to them from their Progenitors: But let us see what reason *Burgensis* gives; *Ratio naturalis dictat, ut secundum naturalem inclinationem, homines ei quod est supra omnes, subjectionem exhibeant, secundum modum homini convenientem. Qui quidem modus est, ut sensibilibus signis utatur, ad exprimendum interiorem conceptum, sicut ex sensibilibus*

Scrutin. Scrip. part. 2. dist. 3. cap. 11.

V. Porphyr. περὶ ἀποχῆς.

Encyclop. ad æram Nonarii Terrig. c. 9. p 96.

ſenſibilibus cognitionem accipit inviſibilium. Unde ex naturali ratione procedit, quod homo ſenſibilibus ſignis utatur, offerens eas Deo in ſignum ſubjectionis & honoris ad ſimilitudinem eorum qui Dominis ſuis aliquid offerunt in recognitionem Dominii. But all this will extend no farther, than that it is very agreeable to natural reaſon, that as man attains the knowledge of inviſible things by viſible, ſo he ſhould expreſs his ſenſe of inviſible things by ſome viſible ſigns, thereby declaring ſubjection to God as his Lord and Maſter, as Tenants expreſs their Homage to their Lords by offering ſomething to them. And I withal acknowledge, that as to oblations without blood, they ſeem indeed very natural: Whence we ſhall ſomewhat largely diſcover the antiquity of the Feaſts of Firſt-fruits, which were the cleareſt acknowledgment of their dependence upon God, and receiving theſe things from him. *Ariſtotle* tells us, αἱ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συναγωγάς· οἷον ἀπαρχαί. *That the moſt ancient Sacrifices and Aſſemblies appear to have been upon the ingathering of fruits, ſuch as the ſacrifices of firſt-fruits to the Gods were.* *Nicomach. l. 8.* To the ſame purpoſe *Porphyrius*, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μὲν γὰρ αἱ τῶν καρπῶν ἐγίνοντο τοῖς θεοῖς θυσίαι. The firſt ſacrifices were of firſt fruits. And *Horace*, *De Abſtin. lib. 2. ſ. 27.*

Agricolæ priſci fortes, parvoque beati
Condita poſt frumenta, levantes tempore feſto
Corpus, & ipſum animum ſpe finis dura ferentes,
Cum ſociis operum & pueris & conjuge fidâ,
Tellurem porco, Sylvanum lacte piabant. *Ep. ad Aug.*

Although he be not ſo expreſs for offering the very fruits of the earth; yet it is evident from him, that their great Feſtivals in honour of their Gods, were immediately after harveſt, and that they had great Aſſemblies for that purpoſe, and did then ſolemnly ſacrifice. And from theſe ſolemnities came the original of Tragedies and Comedies, as *Horace* intimates, and is largely ſhewed by *Iſaac Caſaubon* in his Treatiſe *de Satyricâ Poeſi.* *Lib. 1. c. 1.* But to fetch this yet a little higher, and ſo bring it downwards: The firſt ſacrifice we read of in Scripture, was this of the fruits of the earth, (unleſs the ſkins which *Adam* cloathed himſelf with, were of the beaſts ſacrificed, as ſome conjecture) *Cain*'s ſacrifice was מנחה an *oblation of the fruits of the earth*; in all probability, the firſt-fruits as *Abel* offered the firſt-born of the Cattle to the Lord: This ſeems to have been at ſome ſolemn time of ſacrificing, which is implied in מקץ ימים *At the end of days.* In proceſs of time we render it; but the Jews underſtand it at the end of the year; days in Scripture being often put for years, which Interpretation if we follow, we find a very early obſervation of the Anniverſary feſtival of firſt-fruits: But however this be, we have by unqueſtionable Tradition, that no Feſtival was more anciently, nor more univerſally obſerved, than this of offering the firſt fruits to God of their increaſe. The Jews were bound up ſo ſtrictly to it by their Law, *Leviticus* 23. 14. that they were to eat nothing of their crop, till the offering of the firſt fruits was made. And *Porphyrius* tells us out of *Hermippus*, that one of the Laws made for the *Athenians* by *Triptolemus*, was, Θεὸς καρποῖς ἀγάλλειν, *To feaſt the Gods with their fruits.* Of which *Xenocrates* there gives a twofold reaſon; ſenſe of gratitude to the Gods, and the eaſineſs at all times to offer up theſe; by which he ſuppoſed the cuſtom would continue longer. *Draco* afterwards put this among his Θεσμοὶ ἀθῶιοι, his unalterable Laws, Θεὸς τιμᾶν ἀπαρχαῖς καρπῶν, To worſhip *Gen. 4. 2.* *V. Ainſworth in loc.* *De abſtin. l. 4. ſ. 22.* *V. Petit. ad Leg. Att. p. 3.*

worſhip their Gods with their firſt fruits. Beſides which, for other Greeks we have the teſtimony of *Plutarch*, οἱ πολεῖτοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς τὰς πάνυ παλαιὰς θυσίας ἐχρῶντο ταῖς κριθαῖς, ἀπαρχομένων τῶν πολιτῶν. *The moſt of the Grecians*, ſaith he, *in their moſt ancient ſacrifices did uſe barley, the firſt-fruits being offered by the Citizens*; and therefore the *Opuntii* called their chief Prieſt κριθολόγον, becauſe he gathered in the firſt fruits. The manner of offering the firſt fruits among them, was much of the ſame nature with the *Mincha* among the Jews, which was of *fine flower mingled with oyl for a burnt offering to the Lord:* The word there uſed implies the bruiſing the ears of corn in a mortar, becauſe they were as yet moiſt, and could not be ground as hard corn was. Whence, becauſe it was not all brought to flower, the Cake was called σῶα, and κρίμνα. It is called by the *Septuagint* κριθὴ πεφρυγμένη. So I ſuppoſe it ſhould be read, which in our great Bibles is πεφρυγμένα χόνδρα· and it is called by the Greeks ἠλοκύται, which word is frequently uſed by *Homer* and *Apollonius Rhodius*, whom I forbear to tranſcribe, it being ſo obvious; which is expounded both by the excellent Scholiaſt on *Apollonius*, and by *Euſtathius* and the ſhort Scholiaſt on *Homer*, to be κριθαὶ μετ' ἀλῶν μεμιγμέναι, Barley and Salt mixed together. To which among the Romans the *Mola ſalſa* anſwered, of which *Feſtus: Eſt far toſtum & ſale conſperſum*, as the *Mincha* under the Law, was always ſalted with ſalt, *Levit.* 2. 13. This *Mola ſalſa* among the Romans, had originally relation to the firſt fruits: For the cuſtom of offering up firſt fruits among them, was as ancient as their inſtitution of Religious Rites; as *Pliny* fully informs us. *Numa inſtituit Deos fruge colere, & mola ſalſa ſupplicare, atque ut autor eſt Hemina, far terrere:* which likewiſe anſwers to the Jewiſh *Mincha*, which was to be קלוי באש *toſta in igne*, parched in the fire: For which purpoſe *Numa* inſtituted the *Fornicalia*, which were *farris torrendi feriæ, the feaſt of firſt fruits among them*, the parching the corn being in order thereto: For as *Pliny* adds, *ac ne deguſtabant novas fruges, aut vina antequam ſacerdotes primitias libâſſent*; which may be exactly rendred in the very words of the Law, *Leviticus* 23. 14. But though the *Mola ſalſa* came originally from hence, it afterwards came to be uſed in moſt ſacrifices; thence the word *immolare* to ſacrifice, again parallel to the *Mincha acceſſorium*, as ſome call it among the Jews, which was uſed in other ſacrifices, and was diſtinct from the *Mincha per ſe*, which of its ſelf was an oblation to the Lord. From this offering up bruiſed corn, ſome derive the name of *Ceres* from גרש which ſignifies as much, and was required *Leviticus* 2. 14. thence *Ovid l.* 8. *Met. Primitias frugum Cereri, ſua vina Lyæo*; but beſides *Ceres* they offered their firſt fruits among the Greeks to *Horæ, Diana, Apollo, Veſta*, as may be ſeen in *Meurſius* in Ὧραῖα, Θαργήλια, Ἑστιαά. Thus we ſee how theſe three Nations did agree not only in the obſervation of the Feaſt of firſt fruits, but very much in the ceremonies of their offerings too. Only this difference may be obſerved between them, the Romans did mix their *Mola ſalſa* with water, the Jews their *Mincha* with oyl only; the Greeks did not bruiſe the corn in their ἠλοκύται, but only mixed ſalt with the grains of corn. But the Jews and Romans both bruiſed and parched it, before they offered it up for the firſt fruits. Thus much to ſhew the antiquity and obſervation of the offering up of the firſt fruits among the moſt ancient and civilized nations. Which though it may ſeem a Digreſſion, yet I hope not wholly unacceptable, it being likewiſe the offering of my firſt fruits, and therefore the more ſeaſonable.

Quæſt. Græc. q. 6.

Levit. 23. 13.

Iliad. α. v. 449. Arg. 1. v. 409, &c.

Hiſt. Natur. lib. 18. c. 2.

Lev. 2. 14.

V. Sanbertum de ſacrif. c. 15.

Voſſius de Idol. l. 2. cap. 59.

Græc. Fer.

Proceed we now to other Feſtival Solemnities, to ſee what evidences of a ſociety for worſhip we find in them. And for this, it is apparent that the firſt original of Feſtivals among the heathen was for the honour of the Gods. Upon which account a grave and prudent author accounts the obſervation of ſome Feſtivals natural; becauſe nature doth dictate the neceſſity of ſome ſociety for the worſhip of God. For thus *Strabo*, Κοινὸν τοῦτο καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐστὶ τὸ τὰς ἱεροποιΐας μετὰ ἀνέσεως ἑορταστικῆς ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦθ' ἡ φύσις οὕτως ὑπαγορεύει. It was the cuſtom of all nations (who are comprehended under his words) to have Feſtival days for the honour of their Gods, which nature it ſelf dictates. Hence the Greeks as *Athenæus* obſerves, πάσης εὐωχίας τὴν αἰτίαν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀνέφερον, uſed to ſay *that their Gods beg'd them all their play-days.* After telling us of the mirth and jollity uſed after their ſacrifices, which was always the ſecond courſe at theſe Feſtivals, thence the Jews called their high Feſtival days יומים טובים good days or days of Mirth. We read of few Nations but had theſe Feſtival ſolemnities for the honour of their Gods. The Perſians had theirs for their God *Mithras:* The Babylonians ſaith *Athenæus* out of *Beroſus*, had their Feaſt *Sacæa* which *Caſaubon* would have called *Seſacæa*, becauſe *Babylon* in Scripture is called ששך *Seſac*, as the *Ludi Romani* were from *Rome.* It is to no purpoſe to mention the Feſtivals obſerved by the Greeks and Romans in honour of their Gods being ſo many that whole Books have been compoſed of them. That which I obſerve from hence, is, that Societies for the worſhip of God are natural; becauſe of their ſolemn reſting from their ordinary labour upon days appointed for the honour of their Gods: Thereby ſhewing they looked upon thoſe as peculiar days, and themſelves as peculiar Societies upon thoſe days from what they were at other times. One thing more evidenceth this among them; their ſolemn and ſecret myſteries which were ſocieties on purpoſe, as pretended for this very end in honour of their Gods. Their σεμνὰ, μεγάλα, φρικτὰ μυστήρια, as they were wont to call them, preſerved with the greateſt ſecrecy by the ἐπόπται. Their great and leſſer *Eleuſinian*, *Samothracian*, *Cotyttian*, *Mithriacal* Myſteries, to which none were admitted without paſſing through many degrees, κάθαρσις, μύησις, σύστασις, before they came to be ἐπόπται perfectly initiated. Wherein they were much imitated by the Chriſtians in the celebration of the Lord's ſupper about the fourth or fifth Century, as is largely ſhewed by *Caſaubon* in a moſt learned *Diatriba* on this ſubject in his Exercitations: to which I refer the reader. We ſee what ſtrict rules they had for admiſſion of any into theſe pretendedly ſacred but truly moſt impious ſocieties. In thoſe of *Mithras* as *Suidas* and *Nonnus* tell us, they paſſed through eighty degrees before they were throughly initiated, and ſeldom eſcaped with life. However we may gain from them this general notion, that they looked on a peculiar diſtinct ſociety as neceſſary for the worſhip and honour of the Deity they ſerved. Thus we ſee *à poſteriori* how a diſtinct ſociety for God's worſhip appears to be a dictate of Nature.

§. 4.

Geogr. l. 10.

Deipnoſoph. lib. 9.

Deipnoſ. l. 14. cap. 10.

V. Meurſii Græc. Ariſt. Caſtellon. ἑορτολόγιον. Hoſpin. de Feſtis. Mich. Benther de Faſtis.

Exercit. in Bar. 16. ſ. 42. ſed vide Gothofred. in Tim. 3. 16. Salmaſ. in hiſt. Aug. p. 31, 33. Suidas in v. Mithras. Nonnus in Naz. Stelit. p. 132. Meurſ. in Eleuſinis.

We ſhall now ſee if we can evidence *à priori* that it is a dictate of nature that there muſt be ſome ſociety for the worſhip of God. Three things will make that appear. *Firſt*, The ſociableneſs of man's nature. Man is ἀγελαῖόν τι, a creature that loves to herd it ſelf with thoſe of his own kind. Ἄνευ γὰρ φίλου, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἕλοιτο ζῆν ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα. If a man had all other comforts of life and wanted ſociety, he would not think his life worth leading, as *Ariſtotle* obſerves who farther

§. 5.

Ariſtot. Nicom. l. 8. c. 1.

takes notice of the ſociableneſs of man's nature Ὅθεν τὸς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινεῖσθαι, from the general commendation that is given to courteous and affable men. I deny not but in the entring into a civil ſtate of ſociety, either fear or profit might be a main inducement to it; but though it be an inducement, yet there muſt be ſuppoſed an inclinableneſs to a ſociety; or a Commonwealth might be as ſoon ſet up among Tigers as men. So that they have very little ground of reaſon, who from the external inducements of fear or profit, in entring into civil ſocieties, do conclude againſt the ſociableneſs of man's nature. If then mans nature be ſociable in all other things, then nature will tell men, they ought to be ſo in things of common concernment to them all, and which is every ones work or duty, as religion is; if in other things men are ſociable, much more in this; For *Secondly*, Religion gives a great improvement to mans ſociable nature; and therefore *Plutarch* well calls Religion συνεκτικὸν ἁπάσης κοινωνίας καὶ νομοθεσίας ἔρεισμα. *A foundation that knits and joins ſocieties together.* And thence wiſely obſerves that in the conſtitution of Laws, πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἡ περὶ θεῶν δόξα καὶ μέγιστον· the firſt and greateſt thing to be looked at, is, the religion eſtabliſhed, or the opinions men entertain of the Gods. To which he ſubjoyns this excellent reaſon, πόλις ἂν μοι δικεῖ μᾶλλον ἐδάφους χωρὶς, ἢ πολιτεία τ περὶ θεῶν δόξης ἀναιρεθείσης, παντάπασι σύστασιν λαβεῖν ἢ λαβεῖσα τηρῆσαι. *That it is more impoſſible for a Common-wealth either to be formed or ſubſiſt without religion, than a City to ſtand without foundations.* Thence a prudent Stateſ-man called *Religion* the beſt *Reaſon of State.* It appears then evidently both from reaſon and experience, that Religion hath a great influence upon the modelling and ordering civil ſocieties, whence as the ſame *Moraliſt* obſerves, *Lycurgus* did as it were conſecrate the *Lacedemonians* with religious rites, as *Numa* the *Romans*, *Jon* the *Athenians*, and *Deucalion* the *Hellens*. Whence ſome half-witted men (but I know not whether more defective in wit or grace) have (obſerving the great influence religion hath to keep men in order) been ready to look upon it as only a Politick device, to awe men with greater eaſe. It is not here a place largely to examine and refute this unworthy pretence. Only I adjure them by their only Goddeſs, Reaſon, to tell me whence come men to be ἐμπαθεῖς περὶ τὰ θεῖα δι' ἐλπίδων ἅμα καὶ φόβων, as *Plutarch* expreſſeth it, to be ſo eaſily awed by the hopes and fears of another life more than other creatures are? Why are they at all affected with the diſcourſe of them? why cannot they ſhake off the thoughts of theſe things when they pleaſe? Are not men hereby made the moſt miſerable of creatures? for no other creature can be perſuaded that it ſhall ever quench its thirſt in thoſe rivers of pleaſures, nor make its bed in everlaſting flames. The beaſts of *Sardinia* that have their only refreſhment by the dew of Heaven, yet have never any hopes to come there. The Lyon never keeps from his prey by the thoughts and fears of a great Tribunal. But ſuppoſe only mankind of all creatures ſhould be liable to be thus impoſed on, as is pretended; How comes it to paſs that in no age of the world this impoſture hath not been diſcovered, confuted, ſhaken off by ſome people as wiſe as themſelves? Or have there never been any ſuch in the world? But whence come ſome men then to be wiſer than others? Whence come ſome to know things which all the reaſon in the world could never find out, without revelation? Whence comes a power to do any thing above the courſe of nature, if there be nothing but nature? Or are all men deceived that believe ſuch things?

Moral. adverſ. Colotem.

Lord Bacon Eſſay of a King.

things? If so, then there must be somewhat that must deceive men; men would not deceive themselves, and they could not be so long imposed upon by other men; there must be then some evil spirit must do it; and whence should that come? from nature too? but then whence comes nature its self? from its self too, or something else? Did it make it self, or was it made by a greater power than it? if it made its self, it must be and not be at the same time; it must be as producing and not be as produced by that act. And what is become of our Reason now? there must be then a supreme, eternal, infinite Being which made the world and all in it; which hath given nature such a *Touch* of its own immortality and dependence upon God, that reason capable of Religion is the most proper distinctive Character of man from all inferior beings. And this Touch and sense being common to the whole nature, they therefore incline more to one anothers society in the joint performance of the common duties, due from them to their Maker. And so Religion not only makes all other bonds firm (which without it are nothing, as Oaths, Covenants, Promises, and the like, without which no civil society can be upheld) but must of its self be supposed especially to tye men in a nearer society to one another in reference to the proper acts belonging to its self. *Thirdly*, It appears from the greater honour which redounds to God by a sociable way of worship. Nature that dictates that God should be worshipped, doth likewise dictate that worship should be performed in a way most for the honour and glory of God. Now this tends more to promote God's honour, when his service is owned as a publick thing, and men do openly declare and profess themselves his subjects. If the honour of a King lies in the publickly professed and avowed obedience of a multitude of subjects; it must proportionably promote and advance God's honour more to have a fixed, stated Worship, whereby men may in a Community and publick society declare and manifest their homage and fealty to the supreme Governour of the World. Thus then we see the light of Nature dictates there should be a society and joyning together of men for and in the Worship of God.

CHAP. IV.

The second thing the Law of Nature dictates, that this society be maintained and governed in the most convenient manner. A farther inquiry, what particular orders for Government in the Church came from the Law of Nature. Six laid down, and evidenced to be from thence. First, A distinction of some persons, and their superiority over others, both in power and order, cleared to be from the Law of Nature. The power and application of the power distinguished; this latter not from any Law of Nature binding, but permissive: therefore may be restrained. Peoples right of choosing Pastors considered. Order distinguished from the form and manner of Government: the former natural, the other not. The second is, that the persons imployed in the service of God, should have respect answerable to their imployment, which appears from their relation to God as his servants; from the persons imployed in this work before positive Laws. Masters of families the first Priests.

The

The Prieſthood of the firſt born before the Law diſcuſſed: the arguments for it anſwered. The conjunction of civil and ſacred authority largely ſhewed, among Egyptians, Grecians, Romans, and others. The ground of ſeparation of them afterwards, from Plutarch *and others.*

§. 1. THE *ſecond* thing which the light of Nature dictates, in reference to Church Government, is, That the ſociety in which men joyn for the worſhip of God, be preſerved, maintained, and governed in the moſt convenient manner. Nature, which requires ſociety, doth require Government in that ſociety, or elſe it is no ſociety. Now we ſhall inquire what particular orders for Government in this ſociety eſtabliſhed for the worſhip of God, do flow from the light of Nature, which I conceive are theſe following.

Firſt, *To the maintaining of a ſociety, there is requiſite a diſtinction of perſons, and a ſuperiority of power and order, in ſome over the other.* If all be rulers every man is *ſui juris*, and ſo there can be no ſociety, or each man muſt have power over the other, and that brings confuſion. There muſt be ſome then inveſted with power and authority over others, to rule them in ſuch things wherein they are ſubordinate to them, that is, in all things concerning that ſociety they are entred into. Two things are implied in this: Firſt, Power; ſecondly, Order. By Power, I mean right to govern; by Order, the ſuperiority of ſome as rulers, the ſubordination of others as ruled. Theſe two are ſo neceſſary, that no civil ſociety in the world can be without them: For if there be no power, how can men rule? if no order, how can men be ruled, or be ſubject to others as their Governours? Here ſeveral things muſt be needfully diſtinguiſhed. *The power* from the *application* of that *power*, which we call the Title to government. The *Order it ſelf* from the *form or manner of government.* Some of theſe I aſſert as abſolutely neceſſary to all Government of a ſociety, and conſequently of the Church, conſidered without poſitive Laws; but others to be accidental, and therefore variable. I ſay then, that there be a Governing power in the Church of God, is immutable, not only by vertue of God's own conſtitution, but as a neceſſary reſult from the dictate of nature, ſuppoſing a Society: but whether this power muſt be derived by ſucceſſion, or by a free choice, is not at all determined by the light of Nature; becauſe it may be a lawful power and derived either way: and the Law of Nature as binding, only determines of neceſſaries. Now in civil Government, we ſee that a lawful Title is by ſucceſſion in ſome places, as by election in other. So in the Church under the Law, the power went by lineal deſcent, and yet a lawful power; and on the other ſide, none deny (ſetting aſide poſitive Laws,) but it might be as lawful by choice and free election. The main reaſon of this is, that the Title or manner of conveying authority to particular perſons, is no part of the preceptive obligatory Law of Nature, but only of the permiſſive; and conſequently is not immutable, but is ſubject to Divine or humane poſitive determinations, and thereby made alterable: And ſuppoſing a determination, either by Scripture or lawful authority, the exerciſe of that natural right is ſo far reſtrained as to become ſinful, according to the 3[d] Propoſition under the 2[d] Hypoth. and the 5th Hypoth. So that granting at preſent, that people have the right of chooſing their Paſtors; this right being only a part of the permiſſive Law of Nature, may be lawfully reſtrained and otherwiſe determined, by thoſe that have lawful authority

rity over the people, as a civil ſociety, according to the 5th Hypoth. If it be pleaded that they have a right by Divine poſitive Law, that Law muſt be produced; it being already proved, that no bare example, without a declaration by God that ſuch an example binds, doth conſtitute a Divine Right which is unalterable. We ſay then, that the manner of inveſting Church-Governours in their Authority, is not determin'd by the Law of Nature; but that there ſhould be a power Governing is (ſuppoſing a ſociety) of the immutable Law of Nature, becauſe it is that without which no ſociety can be maintained. And this is one of thoſe things which are of the Law of Nature, not in an abſolute ſtate of liberty, but ſuppoſing ſome acts of men (which once ſuppoſed) become immutable, and indiſpenſible. As ſuppoſing propriety, every man is bound to abſtain from what is in anothers poſſeſſion, without his conſent, by an immutable Law of Nature; which yet ſuppoſeth ſome act of man, *viz.* the voluntary introducing of propriety by conſent: So ſuppoſing a ſociety in being, it is an immutable dictate of the Law of Nature, that a power of Government ſhould be maintained and preſerved in it.

So I ſay for the ſecond thing, Order, This, as it implies the ſubordination of ſome in a ſociety, to others as their rulers, is immutable and indiſpenſable; but as to the form whereby that order ſhould be preſerved, that is, whether the Government ſhould be in the hands of one or more, is no wiſe determined by the obligatory Law of Nature; becauſe either of them may be lawful and uſeful for the ends of Government, and ſo neither neceſſary by that Law: for as to the Law of Nature, the caſe is the ſame in civil and religious ſocieties; now who will ſay, that according to the Law of Nature, any form of Government, Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, Democracy, is unlawful. Theſe things are then matters of natural liberty, and not of natural neceſſity, and therefore muſt be examin'd according to poſitive determinations of divine and humane Laws, where we ſhall ſpeak of it. This then is clear as to our purpoſe, That a power in the Church muſt be conſtantly upheld and preſerved, fitly qualified for the ends of Government, is an immutable Law, ſo that this power be lodged in ſome particular Perſons to act as Governours, and ſo diſtinct from others, as ſubordinate to them; but whether the power of Government come from people by election, or from Paſtors by ordination, or from Magiſtrates by commiſſion and delegation; whether one, two, or all theſe wayes, is not determined by natural Law, but muſt be looked for in God's poſitive Laws; if not there neither to be found, we muſt acquieſce in what is determined by lawful authority. The ſame I ſay again, as to forms of Government, whether the power of ſole juriſdiction, and ordination, be inveſted in one perſon above the rank of Preſbyters, or be lodged in a College acting in a parity of power, is a plea muſt be removed from the Court of Common Law of Nature, to the King's Bench; I mean to the poſitive Laws of God, or the Supreme power in a Commonwealth: There being no Statutes in the Law of Nature to determine it; it muſt be therefore *Placitum Regis*, ſome poſitive Law muſt end the controverſie. We therefore traverſe the ſuit here, and ſhall enter it at the other Court. §. 2.

The ſecond thing dictated by the Law of Nature, is, *That the Perſons imployed in the immediate ſervice of God, and entruſted with the power of governing the ſociety appointed for that end, ſhould have reſpect paid them anſwerable to the nature of their imployment.* This appears to have §. 3.

foundation

foundation in the Law of Nature, being easily deducible from one of the first principles of that Law, that God is to be worshipped; if so, then those whose employment is chiefly to attend upon himself, ought to have greater reverence than others. By the same reason in nature, that if we do honour the King himself, the nearer any are to the King's person in attendance or employment, the greater honour is to be shewed them. The ground of which is, that the honour given to servants as such, is not given to their persons, but to their relation, or to the one only upon the account of the other; and so it doth not fix and terminate upon themselves, but rebounds back, and reflects upon the original and fountain of that honour, the Prince himself: So if any be honoured upon the account of their immediate employment in the service of God, it is God who is chiefly honour'd, and not they; it being the way men have to express their honour to God, by shewing it proportionably and respectively to those who either represent him, or are employed by him. Εἰς τὸ τοῦ ὅλων δεσπότην ἡ τιμὴ διαβαίνει, as *Chrysostome* speaks in this very case. *The honour passeth through them to God himself.* Where he largely proves this very thing from the Egyptians sparing the Land of their Priests; and argues at least for an equality of honour, from reason, to be given to those who serve the true God. Nay, he is so far from looking upon it as a part of their superstition, that he mounts his argument *à pari* to one, *à minori ad majus*, ἀλλ' ὅση ἡ διαφορὰ τῆ πλάνης πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ τῶν ἐκείνων ἱερέων πρὸς τοὺς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἱερεῖς, τοσαύτην διαφορὰν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τιμὴν ὑπερδεχώμεθα, that is, *as much as truth exceeds error, and the servants of God do the Idol priests, so much let the honour we give to them, exceed that which was given by the Heathen to theirs:* But we have a farther evidence of the honourableness of this employment, by the light of Nature, from the persons employed in this work, before any positive Laws did restrain it: for I say not, that the Law of Nature doth dictate, that the function of those employed in this work should be differenced from all other; that is done by divine positive Laws; but the honour of those in that function is from the Law of Nature: which appears hence, in that in the eldest times, those who had the greatest authority civil, had likewise the sacred conjoined with it. For as *Aristotle* rightly observes, that the original of civil government was from private families: so in those families, before they came to associate for more publick worship, the Master of the Family was the Priest of it. Thence we read of *Noah*'s sacrificing, *Abraham*'s duty to instruct his family, and his own command for offering up his son: we read of *Jacob*'s sacrificing, and *Job*'s, and so of others, Every master of the family then was the High-priest too, and governed his family, not only as such, but as a religious society.

Homil. 65. *in* Gen. 47. 26. *Tom.* 1. *p.* 505. *Ed. Savil.*

Politic. lib. 1. *cap.* 2.

Gen. 8. 20. 18, 19. 22. 2. 31. 54. Job. 42. 8.

§. 4. Afterwards (from what institution we know not; but certainly the reason of it, if it were so, was to put the greater honour upon the eldest Son) it is generally conceived, that the first-born had the Priesthood of the family in their possession, till the time of the Levitical Law. The Jewish Doctors think that was the Birthright which *Jacob* procured from his Father, and which *Abraham* gave to *Isaac*, when it is said that he gave him כל all that he had: For saith *Postellus*, if it be meant in a literal sense, how could he give those gifts to his other Sons which are mentioned before? Wherefore he conjectures, by that All is meant the spiritual knowledge of Christ, which he calls *Intellectus generalis*; which might be proper to him as a Priest of the family. But the plain meaning

V. Selden. de succeff. ad leo. Heb. cap. 5. *Origin. cap.* 15. *p.* 69.

ing is no more, than when *Abraham* had beſtowed Legacies on his other Children, he left *Iſaac hæredem ex aſſe*, his lawful heir: I am unwilling to deny a tradition ſo generally received, among both Jewiſh and Chriſtian Writers, as the Prieſthood of the firſt-born before the Law; but this I ſay, I cannot yet find any other ground for it but tradition: no place of Scripture giving us ſufficient evidence for it, and many againſt it. That which ſerves ſufficiently for the confutation of it, is that obſervation of *Theodoret* ἐπισημαντέον ὅτι πανταχοῦ τῶν πρωτοτόκων οἱ μετ' αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύονται. *It is to be obſerved, that the younger are always preferred before the firſt-born.* Which he takes notice of from the caſe he there ſpeaks to of *Ephraim* and *Manaſſes*; and ſo runs it up to *Abel* preferr'd before *Cain*, *Seth* before *Japheth*, *Abraham* before his elder brethren, *Iſaac* before *Iſmael*, *Jacob* before *Eſau*, *Judas* and *Joſeph* before *Reuben*, *Moſes* before *Aaron*, and *David* before the reſt of his Brethren; (although that was after the Law.) That place which gives the greateſt countenance to the opinion is, *Numb.* 3. 41. *And thou ſhalt take the Levites for me inſtead of the firſt-born:* Where it ſeems, that the firſt-born were formerly the Prieſts, in whoſe room the Levites were taken. But with ſubmiſſion to better judgments, I can ſee nothing implied in this place, but only that God having delivered their firſt-born in *Egypt*, *Exod.* 12. 23. and calling for them to be ſanctified to him, *Exod.* 13. 2. upon the account of the propriety he had in them, in a peculiar manner, by that deliverance (and not on the account of any ſpecial ſervice, for many were very unfit for that by reaſon of age, and which is obſervable, God requires as well the firſt-born of beaſts both to be ſanctified and redeemed, *Numb.* 3. 41.) therefore God now ſetling a way of worſhip, he gave the Iſraelites liberty to redeem them, and inſtead of them pitched on the tribe of *Levi* for his own ſervice. Another place is *Exodus* 24. 5. where the young men are mentioned that offered burnt offering. It is confeſſed that the Chaldee Paraphraſt and Arabick Verſion underſtand here the firſt-born; but however the place implies no more than that they were employed to bring the ſacrifices, for ſo the Septuagint renders it, καὶ ἐξαπέστειλε τοὺς νεανίσκους τῶν υἱῶν Ισραὴλ καὶ ἀνήνεγκεν ὁλοκαυτώματα, or elſe that they were employed as the *Popæ* only to kill the ſacrifices; for we ſee the ſprinkling of the blood which was the main thing intended here as a fœderal rite, was done by *Moſes* himſelf, who was the High Prieſt of the people as well as Prince, till *Aaron* and his ſons were ſet apart, which was not till *Exodus* 28. 1, 2. and yet *Aaron* was three years elder than *Moſes*, *Exod.* 7. 7. which is an evidence that *Aaron* as firſt-born was not the Prieſt; for till his conſecration, *Moſes* and not *Aaron* performed the offices of Prieſthood. Thence we read *Pſalm* 99. 6. Moſes *and* Aaron *among his Prieſts.* For although the word כהן be ſometimes attributed to thoſe in civil authority, as, 2 *Sam.* 8. 18. compared with 1 *Chron.* 18. 17. and 2 *Sam.* 20. 26. *Gen.* 41. 50. *Exod.* 2. 16. *Job.* 12. 19. Yet there is no reaſon ſo to underſtand it of *Moſes:* And farther the ground why כהן was attributed to both Prince and Prieſt before the Law, was, becauſe the ſame Perſon might be both; as the Prieſts of *Egypt* were Princes too, *Gen.* 41. 50. But for *Moſes*, we read not only of the title, but the proper offices of Prieſts attributed to him, as ſacrificing, *Exod.* 24. 5. conſecrating *Aaron* and his ſons, *Exod.* 29. 35. and therefore *Aben Ezra* upon that Pſalm forecited, calls him כהן חבהנים the High-Prieſt.

Qu. 108. *in Gen.*

V. Iſidor. Pel. lib. 2. *ep.* 47. & 48. *ad fin.*

V. Selden. de ſucceſſ. ad Pontif. Ebr. cap. 1. *ſed & V. eum de Syned. l.* 1. *cap.* 16.

V. Selden. de Syned. l. 2 *cap.* 2. *ſ.* 3.

§. 5. The Prieſthood of *Moſes* leads us to another evidence of the honour of thoſe who were employed in the ſervice of God, which is that when Families increaſed and many aſſociated into a Commonwealth, though the private ſervice might belong to the maſter of the Family, yet the publick before poſitive Laws reſtraining it, was moſt commonly joined with the civil power. Thus *Melchizedeck* was both King and Prieſt in *Salem*; if with the Jews we conclude he was *Sem* (which we have little reaſon for) it will be a greater evidence, *Sem* being then the greateſt Potentate living. But we paſs from him to other Nations after the diſperſion, to ſee where the power over religious ſocieties was generally held. In *Egypt* we find that their Prieſts were often made Kings, as *Plutarch* obſerves out of *Heccateus*, and is confeſſed by *Strabo*, *Diodorus* and others. Of the Greeks the ſame *Plutarch* gives us a large teſtimony, that among them ἀντίῤῥοπον ἴσῳ τὸ τῆς ἱερωσύνης ἀξίωμα πρὸς τὸ τῆς Βασιλείας, *the Prieſthood was accounted of equal dignity with the Kingdom.* The ſame doth *Ariſtotle* in ſeveral places in his Politicks: and particularly of the *Spartans*, of whom *Herodotus* adds that the Prieſthood of *Jupiter Cœleſtis* and *Lacedæmonius* did always belong to the King's own perſon. For the old Latins *Virgil*'s *Anius* is ſufficient: and among the Romans after the power was ſeparated, the *Pontifex Max.* had royal ſtate, his *cella curulis* and *Lictors* as the Conſuls had; only their Prieſts medled not in civil affairs, of which *Plutarch* gives a double reaſon; the impoſſibility of minding both employments as they ſhould do, and ſo muſt either ἀσεβεῖν τὴς θεὸς, neglect the worſhip of the Gods, or elſe βλάπτειν τὲς πολίτας, wrong the people with the neglect of the adminiſtration of juſtice. The other reaſon is, becauſe thoſe that were employed in civil affairs, were put upon execution of juſtice; and it was no ways fit a man ſhould come reeking from the blood of Citizens, to go and ſacrifice to the Gods. This conjunction of civil and ſacred power is atteſted by *Clemens Alexandrinus* of the moſt civilized heathens, ſo likewiſe by *Syneſius* of the moſt ancient Nations, by *Strabo* of the *Epheſians*, by the Roman Hiſtorians of the Roman Emperors, who from *Auguſtus* to *Gratian*, and ſome ſay after, continued the title of *Pontifex Maximus* among the reſt of the Imperial Honours. Thus much then may ſerve to manifeſt how the Honour of thoſe perſons who are employed in the ſervice of God, and the Government of religious ſocieties, is a dictate of the Law of Nature.

Plut. *de Iſ. & Oſirid.* *Str. Geog. l.* 17. *Queſt. Rom.* 110. *Politic. l* 3. *cap.* 10 11. *l.* 6. *cap.* 8. *lib.* 3. *c.* 4. Herod. *l.* 6. *V. Crag. de rep. Laced. lib.* 2. *c.* 2. *Qu. Rom.* 110. *Strom. l.* 7. *ep.* 121. *Geogr. l.* 41. *Sueton. in Aug. c.* 31. *V. Caſaub. in l. & Seld. de Syned. l.* 1. *c.* 10.

Chap. V.

The third thing dictated by the Law of Nature, is the ſolemnity of all things to be performed in this ſociety; which lies in the gravity of all Rites and Ceremonies, in the compoſed temper of mind. God's worſhip rational. His ſpirit deſtroys not the uſe of reaſon. The Enthuſiaſtick Spirit diſcovered. The circumſtantiating of fit time and place for worſhip, The ſeventh day, on what account ſo much ſpoken of by the Heathens. The Roman Holy-days. Ceſſation of labour upon them. The ſolemnity of Ceremonies uſed. Χέριψ, *παῤῥησία, ſilence in devotions. Excluſion of unfit perſons. Solemnity of diſcipline: excommunication among the Jews by the ſound of a Trumpet, among Chriſtians by a Bell.*

§. 1. THE next thing in reference to religious ſocieties which nature dictates, is, *that all things, either pertaining to the immediate worſhip*

worſhip of God, or belonging to the Government of that ſociety, be performed with the greateſt ſolemnity and decency that may be. Which dictate ariſeth from the nature of the things themſelves; which being moſt grave and ſerious, do require the greateſt gravity and ſerioufneſs in the doing of them. And therefore any Ceremonies, actions, or geſtures, which tend to the diſcompoſing mens ſpirits, are upon that account to be exploded out of any religious ſocieties, as being ſo directly repugnant to the nature, deſign, and performance of religious duties. Wherefore that is the ſtanding rule of all inſtituted Ceremonies, by the Law of Nature in the worſhip of God, that they be ſuch as tend immediately to the advancing the ſerenity, tranquillity, and compoſure of their minds who obſerve them; and not ſuch which in their own nature, or by continual cuſtom of the uſers of them, do either rarifie mens ſpirits too much into a ſuperficial lightneſs and vanity of ſpirit; or elſe ſink them too much below the command of reaſon, into the power of unruly paſſions. A clear and compoſed ſpirit, is only fit for converſe with things of ſo high a nature. That region which is neareſt heaven, is the freeſt from clouds and vapours, as well as thoſe dancing Meteors, which hover about in a light uncertain Motion. It ſtrangely unbecomes the Majeſty of religious worſhip to have any thing vulgar, trivial, much more ridiculous in it. The worſhip of God is λατρεία λογικὴ, a rational worſhip, Rom. 12. 1. as well in regard of that worſhip which ſhould moderate and govern the manner of ſervice, as in regard of thoſe faculties which ſhould be moſt employed in it; or the foundation which the ſervice hath upon the dictates of mens natural reaſon.

§. 2. And as nature tells us, there ſhould be nothing too light or ſuperficial, ſo neither any thing whereby men are carried beyond the bounds of their own reaſon: For what men do at ſuch a time, is not their own proper act, but is more properly to be aſcribed to the power, ſtrength, and exceſs of a melancholy fancy, or elſe to a higher Enthuſiaſtical ſpirit, which then actuates and informs their fancies: and therefore it hath been well obſerved, as a *Characteriſtical* difference between the true *Prophetical ſpirit*, and the falſe and counterfeit; that the one leaves men in the free uſe of their reaſon and faculties; the other alienates them by panick fears, tremblings, and conſternations both of body and mind. To which purpoſe many evidences are brought by a *late learned Writer*, in his *Diſcourſe* of *Prophecy* out of the Heathen and Chriſtian Authors. Theſe latter diſcovering the vanity of the *Montaniſtical ſpirit* by this one obſervation: which beſides the Authors there cited, *viz.* (*Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Miltiades* in *Euſebius*, *Jerom* and *Chryſoſtom*) may appear from *Epiphanius*, who largely and excellently diſcourſeth on this ſubject, when he diſcovers the folly of *Montanus* and his followers: and gives this reaſon why they could be no true Prophets; for thoſe that were ſo, had ἐῤῥωμμένην τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ τὴν διδασκαλίαν καὶ τὴν διαλογήν. *A great conſiſtency of ſenſe, reaſon, and diſcourſe*; and inſtanceth in *Iſaiah* and *Ezekiel*: for, ſaith he, ὁ προφήτης μὴ κατασάσεως λογισμῶν, καὶ παρακολουθήσεως ἐλάλει καὶ ἐφθέγγετο ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου τὰ πάντα ἐῤῥωμένως λέγων. *A true Prophet had always the free uſe of his reaſon and faculties, and ſpake from the ſpirit of God with conſiſtency and coherence of Diſcourſe.* But it was quite otherwiſe with the Montaniſts; ἐδὲ εὐσαθοῦντες φανῆναι, ὅτε παρακολουθίαν λόγε ἔχοντες· λοξὰ γὰρ τὰ παρ' αὐτῶν ῥήματα καὶ σκαληνὰ καὶ ἐδεμιᾶς ὀρθότητος ἐχόμενα. *They were always trembling both in body and mind; uſed no conſequence of reaſon in diſcourſe, their words*

Mr. Smith's diſc. 6. of prophecy, cap. 4.

Strom. 1. Eccl. hiſt. l. 5. 17. Præf. in Iſ. Nahum. Habak. Chryſ. in 1 Cor. Hom. 29. Epiph. hæreſ. 48. Ezek. 4. 14.

had no proper ſenſe, but were all dark, intricate, and obſcure. An exact deſcription of a late prevailing Sect among us, who have their names from thoſe conſternations they were wont to fall into, and whoſe language carries as much obſcurity with it, as any of the followers of *Montanus* could wrap up theirs into. Only inſtead of *Montanus* his *Paraclete*, they tell us of a *Light within*, whoſe office is much of the ſame nature with the other; and one of the great errors of *Montanus* was, the adhering to *Enthuſiaſms* and Revelations beyond and beſide the written Word; which is the *Helena* of our late Opinioniſts, becauſe it gives a liberty for venting any conceptions of their own brains, under the pretence and diſguiſe of a *Light within.* But we ſee hence, how far ſuch tremblings and conſternations of body or mind are from a true, ſober, prophetick ſpirit; and how thoſe Chriſtians who lived in the time when the ſpirit of Prophecy had not yet left the Church of Chriſt (as appears by *Origen*, *Tertullian*, and others:) yet they always looked upon any violent extaſie, or fury, as an evidence of a falſe Prophet. And therefore *Tertullian*, when grown a *Proſelyte* of *Montanus*, endeavours ſtrongly to remove that apprehenſion of the ecſtatical fury of *Montanus*, and *Priſca*, and *Maximilla*, granting, if it were true, that it was a mark of a falſe and counterfeit prophetical ſpirit. The true Prophets I grant of old, were by the ſtrength of the impreſſion of their viſions upon their Animal ſpirits, ſometimes thrown into a fit of trembling; but when it was not continually ſo, and when it was, it might be rather a preſent aſtoniſhment from ſo ſtrange and unwonted ſight (as is common in ſuch caſes) or elſe from the ſtrong apprehenſion they had of the diſmal judgments God threatned to the people; but however, it never took from them the free uſe of their reaſon and faculties, which were always converſant about the matters revealed unto them. But as *Procopius Gazæus* obſerves of the falſe Prophets, τοῖς μαινομένοις ἐῴκησαν, they were acted like mad men. Which he takes notice of upon occaſion of *Saul*'s propheſying when the evil ſpirit came upon him: and interprets with the Jewiſh Writers, of a madneſs rather than true Prophecy. Such as that of *Caſſandra* when ſhe is brought in by *Lycophron.*

Orig. c. Celſum, lib. 2 p. 62. l. 3. p. 124. *Tertul. de an. c. 9.* *Dan. 10. 11.* *Habak. 3. 16.* *Procop. Gaz. in 1 Reg. 18. Ed. Meurſii.*

Lycophr. Alex. p. 2.

Ἄσπετον χέασα παμμιγῆ βοὴν,
Σφιγγὸς κελαινῆς γῆρυν ἐκμιμουμένη.

Utt'ring a ſtrange confuſed noiſe,
Much like unto black Sphynx*'s voice.*

Ἄσπετον, ſaith *Tzetzes*, that is πολλὴν, ἀφθέγκτου δὲ which is fully deſcribed by *Lucan*, of one pretending *Enthuſiaſm:*

———ſub pectore ficta quieto
Verba refert, nullo confuſæ murmure vocis,
Inſtinctam ſacro mentem teſtata furore.

And ſoon after,

———non rupta trementi
Verba ſono, nec vox antri complere capacis
Sufficiens ſpatium———

Whereby he diſcovers her not to be a true *Enthuſiaſt*, becauſe ſhe uſed not a ſtrange confuſed voice and tremblings as they did who were their proper

proper *Enthuſiaſts*, as the *Sibyls* and the *Pythian propheteſs*. By this we ſee, that theſe earthquakes of violent paſſions are cauſed by the Prince of the air, and not by the gentle breathings of the divine Spirit: That theſe convulſions of mens ſpirits, are not the conſequents of the inhabitation of the good Spirit, but of the violent intruſion of the evil one: That that temper of mind is moſt ſuitable to religion, which is as well free from the *bleakneſs* and *turbulency* of paſſion, as the faint *gleams* of Lightneſs and Vanity.

§. 3. But a farther ſolemnity than this is required by the dictates of nature too, which lies in the circumſtantiating of time and place, and a dedication of both to the end of worſhip. That theſe are very conſonant to natural reaſon, appears by the univerſal conſent of all Nations agreeing in any form of the Worſhip of a Deity: who have all had their ſet times and fixed places to perform this worſhip in. I ſhall not inſiſt as ſome have done, that the ſeventh day hath been particularly and ſolemnly obſerved for the worſhip of God by the conſent of Nations: Although there be many probable arguments and plauſible teſtimonies brought for a peculiarity of honour to, if not ſervice on, the ſeventh day, out of *Joſephus*, *Ariſtobulus Judæus* (and by him from *Linus*, *Heſiod*, *Homer*) *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Tertullian*, *Lampridius*, *Seneca*, *Tibullus*, and many others. From which Teſtimonies it appears that ſome kind of reverence and honour was given to the ſeventh day; but whether that day was the ſeventh of the week, or the ſeventh of the month; (which was conſecrated among the Greeks to *Apollo*, upon which the Θαργήλια and Πυανέψια, and the ſeventh of every month were obſerved in honour of him;) whether the Title of ἱερὸν ἦμαρ did belong to the ſeventh as one of the ἑορτάσιμοι or ἀποφράδες, *Feſtival* or *inauſpicious days* (for it was common to both)? Whether obſerved by any publick religious cuſtom, or by ſome private ſuperſtition, are things too large to inquire into, too difficult now to determine, and not neceſſary for my preſent purpoſe; It being ſufficient in order to that, if they had any ſet times at all for worſhip, which ſhews how ſolemn the worſhip of God ought to be. And this is not denyed by any; it being ſo neceſſary a conſectary from the duty of worſhip that there muſt be a time for performance of it. And not only in general that there muſt be ſome time, but a ſufficient proportion of time to be conſecrated to the publick exerciſe of piety, both from the conſideration of mans obligation to divine ſervice from his nature, from the weight and concernment of the things that time is employed in, and in the inward ſenſe of immortality upon the ſoul of man. But then what this proportion of time muſt exactly be, I ſee not how mere natural light could determine it, but it would rather ſuggeſt it to be highly reaſonable to wait for and expect ſuch a determination from the ſupreme Rector and Governor of the world. It being far more fit for the Maſter to preſcribe unto the ſervant what proportion of ſervice he expects from him; than that the ſervant ſhould both divide and chooſe his own time, and the proportion of ſervice which he owes to his Maſter. Nay it being ſo much more reaſonable for us to wait for God's order, than for a ſervant for his Maſters, as God's Power and Dominion over the creature is greater than that of a Maſter over his ſervant; as it is the voice and ſenſe of nature that God's commands cannot otherwiſe be but juſt, holy, reaſonable and good: which may be otherwiſe from men; as the acceptance of our perſons with God, lies not barely in the work done, but in the doing it

Joſeph. c. App. l. 2. Euſeb. Præp. l. 13. cap. 12. Tertul. Apol. c. 16. c. Notion. l. 1. c. 13. Lamprid. vit. Alex. Sever. Seneca ep. 95. Tibullus. eleg. 3. l. 1. Lucian. Pſeudol. p. 893. ed. Pariſ.

out of obedience to the commands of God, which is otherwise with men; as God can give strength to perform what he commands, which man cannot; which things considered make it evident to be highly reasonable that God himself should prescribe the proportion of time, and not mans nature. But when God hath thus determined it, nature cannot but assent to that particular determination, that in consideration of the works of God, it is most reasonable that rather one day in a week, than one in a month, should be dedicated to God's service; that the seventh day of the week upon God's resting on that day and sanctifying it should be the precise day, unless some reason equivalent to that of the first institution, and approved by God for that end, be the ground of its alteration to another of the seven, which is the reason of the change under the Gospel.

§. 4. As an evidence of the solemnity of times for worship, the *Romans* as well as other Nations had their several *feriæ*, their days set apart for the honour of their Gods. In which *Macrobius* tells us the Priests held them polluted, *si indictis conceptisque opus aliquod fieret; præterea regem sacrorum flaminesque non licebat videre feriis opus fieri, & ideò per præconem denuntiabatur nè quid tale ageretur, & præcepti negligens mulctabatur.* If any work were done upon those days of rest, the day was polluted, and the person punished, unless it were as *Umbro* there affirms, in order to the honour of their Gods, or for necessaries of life. To which purpose *Scævola* answered him that asked what work must be done upon the *Feriæ: Quod prætermissum noceret, which would be spoiled by letting it alone*; as taking an Oxe out of a ditch, strengthening a beam like to fall and ruine men; and thence *Maro* allowed it lawful to wash sheep if it were to cure and not only to cleanse them.

Macrob. Saturnal. l. 1. c. 16.

Balantumque gregem fluvio mersare salubri.

By which last word *Macrobius* saith it was only lawful to do it for healing them, and not in order to gain. *Servius* informs us likewise, that the Priests when they went to sacrifice, sent their servants before to bid all tradesmen leave working, *ne pro negotio suo & ipsorum oculos & Deorum ceremonias attaminent; Feriæ enim operæ Deorum creditæ sunt*; Lest by following their work they both offend them and the Gods too: For these Holy days are devoted to the service of the Gods. *Festus* saith, that upon their *dies religiosi, nisi quod necesse est, nefas habetur facere; nothing but works of pure necessity were to be done.* But by *dies religiosi*, probably he means the *dies atri & nefasti*; their ominous unlucky days, as they accounted them. But however *Macrobius* distinguisheth the days among the *Romans* into *Dies festi, profesti, & interciſi.* The *Festi* were dedicated to the Gods, the *Profesti* to their own work, the *Interciſi* were divided between both, at some hours of which it was lawful to follow their civil employments, at others not. *Nam cum hostia cæditur, fari nefas est; inter cæsa & porrecta fari licet: rursus cum adoletur non licet.* While the sacrifice was killing, no Courts of Judicature were opened (in which the Prætor might *fari tria verba solemnia, do, dico, addico*, thence called *dies fasti*) but between the killing the sacrifice and offering up the entrails (called *Porrecta* from *porricere*, which was *verbum sacrificiale pervetustum*, saith *Turnebus*, an old word belonging to sacrificing, *exta Diis cum dabant porricere dicebant*, Varro.) then it was lawful to open the Courts; but again, when the sacrifice was offered,

Servius Honor. in Virgil. Georgic. 1.

Festus V. religios.

Adverſ. l. 24. c. 13.

ed, it was not. By which we see as from the light of nature, that what days and times whether weekly, monthly, or Anniversary, were designed and appointed as *dies Festi*, for the service of God, were to be spent wholly in order to that end, and not to give some part to God, and to take others to themselves: as they were wont to do in their sacrifices to offer up some part to the Gods, and feast upon the rest themselves; as *Athenæus* tells us, that *Conon* and *Alcibiades* offered such *Hecatombs* to the Gods, that they entertained the people upon the remainders of them. And from hence we may see how far short of natural light their Religion falls, who make no scruple of spending a great part of the days devoted to God's worship in following either their imployments or recreations: Which latter seem more directly to impugn the end of such time appointed than the other, in as much as recreations tend more to the rarifying mens spirits, and evaporating them into lightness and vanity, and so discomposing them for the duties of spiritual worship, than mens serious and lawful callings do. But farther, we observe, among the *Romans* the several sorts of days appointed for publick worship. *Macrobius* reckons up four sorts of them, *Stativæ*, *Conceptivæ*, *Imperativæ*, & *Nundinæ*. *Stativæ*, were the set Festival days observed every year by the whole people, and marked for that end in their *Fasti*. Such were the *Agonalia*, *Carmentalia*, *Lupercalia*, which are marked with red Letters in the *Fasti consulares*, or the *Calendarium Romanum*, by *Jos. Scaliger* called *Calendarium Colotianum*, which may be seen at large in Mr. *Selden:* besides which, their other anniversary festivals are there set down: which *Tertullian* saith, being all put together, *Pentecostem implere non poterunt*, make not up the number of fifty; and so not so many as our Lord's days in a year are. *Conceptiva*, were such Festivals as were annually observed, but the days of the keeping them were every year determined by the Magistrates or the Priests, as *Latinæ*, *Sementivæ*, *Paganalia*, *Compitalia*, *Imperativæ*, were such as the *Consuls* or *Prætors* did command at their own pleasure. Such were their solemn *supplications* in times of trouble, and their days of Triumph and Thanksgiving for victories. The *Nundinæ* were those which returned every ninth day, and therefore the Letter by which they observed the return of the ninth day, was H. as among us Christians G. which because it notes the return of the Lord's days, we call the *Dominical* Letter. These *Nundinæ* were the days when the country people brought in their wares into the City to be sold, which were anciently observed as festival days, sacred to *Jupiter*; but by the *Lex Hortensis* were made *Dies fasti*, for determining the controversies that might arise among the people in their dealings; as the *Court of Pye powder* was instituted among us upon the same account. So much for the solemnity of time used in the service of God.

De Re Rust. l. 1. c. 29.

Deipnos. l. 1.

Saturn. l. 1. c. 16.

De jure Nat. apud Heb. l. 3. cap. 15. de Idolol. c. 14.

Another evidence of the solemnity of Worship, was the extraordinary care of the Heathens in preparing themselves for it, by cleansing and purifying themselves with water, for which purpose they had their χέρνιβ for cleansing their hands, and their λοῦτρα and περιῤῥαντήρια standing at the porch of their Temples for their whole bodies, which custom was generally observed by the Heathens, as is very obvious in the several Writers of their customs in sacrificing; besides which they observed likewise this washing with water, by way of lustration and expiation of their faults, as *Triclinius* the Scholiast on *Sophocles* tells us, it was an ancient custom when men had murdered others, ὕδατι ἀπονίπτειν τὰς §. 5.

Hom. Iliad. Apoll. Argon. l. 1. Casaub. ad Theophr. περὶ δεισιδαιμον. Saub. de sacri. cap. 12.

Pauſ. l. 2. Matth. 27. 24. Caſaub. ad. Bar. exer. 16. ſ. 75. Baron. ad An. Chriſti 34. Montacutius Orig. Eccleſ. To. 1. l. 2. p. 388. Voſſius Harm. Evang. l. 2. cap. 5. V. Meyerum de Papatu Rom. l. 1. c. 32. De Croy. Conf. 1. c. 33. Ovid. Faſt. lib. 2.

τὰς χεῖρας εἰς κάθαρσιν τῶν μιάσματος, to waſh their hands in expiation of their guilt; as *Oreſtes* did in *Pauſanias* after the killing his mother, and ſome think *Pilate* in the Goſpel did ſo for the ſame end; but his was only to declare his innocency, and not to expiate his ſin, as is obſerved by many upon that place. But however, from hence we may take notice of the Spring and Fountain of the Pope's Holy-water: which was conſecrated by *Numa* long before *Alexander* I. to whom *Polydore Virgil*, and others attribute the firſt uſe of it in the Chriſtian Church: And as the uſe of it, and the manner of ſprinkling it is the ſame among the Papiſts, as it was among the Heathen; ſo likewiſe the end of it, witneſs the old Rime,

Hæc aqua benedicta deleat mihi mea delicta.

Which may be ſufficiently anſwered with the cenſure of a heathen:

Ah nimium faciles qui triſtia crimina cædis
Tolli flumineâ poſſe putatis aquâ!

Too eaſie ſouls who think the ſpots of blood
Can be waſh'd out with ev'ry watry flood!

V. Briſſon. de formulis l. 1. p. 8. Onomaſtic. lib. 4. c. 12. V. Leon. 5. Allatium de Narthec. vet. Eccleſ. p. 45, &c. Athenæus Deipnoſ. l. 8. c. 8. V. apud Briſſ. de formulis, l. 1. & apud Seld. de Syned. lib. 1. cap. 10. Suidas in τίς τῇδε;

But from this I paſs to the ſolemnity in their worſhip it ſelf, evidenced by the general ſilence commanded in it; which appears by *Horace*'s *Favete linguis*, Ovid's *Ore favent populi nunc cum venit aurea pompa*; Virgil's *fida ſilentia ſacris*; Feſtus's *linguam paſcito*, i. e. *coerceto*; The *Egyptians* ſetting *Harpocrates* his image in the entrance to their Temples, and the Romans placing the Statue of *Angerona* on the Altar of *Volupia*. The Greeks had their κήρυκες which did ἡσυχίαν κατακηρύττειν ἐν ἱερουργίαις, as *Julius Pollux* tells us, which *Plautus* calls *facere audientiam*, to command ſilence: much as the Deacons afterwards did in the Primitive Church, who were wont to command ſilence by their *Orarium*, and were thence called κήρυκες among the Chriſtians (for though κηρύττειν, as applied to the Biſhop and Preſbyters, did ſignifie ὁμιλεῖν and εὐαγγελίζεσθαι, *to preach*; yet as it was applied to the Deacons, it implyed only their commanding ſilence in order to the prayers of the *Catechumeni* called παραθέσεις, as *Ariſtenus* obſerves on *Concil. Carthag. can.* 106. But this by the way.) The *formula* uſed by the Greeks in commanding ſilence was, ἀκούετε λαοὶ, to which *Ariſtonicus* the Fidler alluded when in the market place of *Mylaſſa*, a Town in *Caria*, he ſaw many Temples, and but few Citizens, he cried out ἀκούετε νάοι inſtead of ἀκούετε λαοὶ. But I paſs theſe things over, as being commonly known, only obſerving from them the ſolemnity of their publick devotions, which is farther ſeen in their ſolemn excluding unfit perſons from partaking with them in their ſacrifices. Of which *Virgil*, *Ovid*, *Statius*, *Silius Italicus*, and others among the Romans ſpeak; and the Lictor in ſome ſacrifices ſtood up, ſaith *Feſtus*, and cryed aloud, *Hoſtis*, *mulier*, *vinctus exeſto*, i. e. *extra eſto*: and to keep unfit perſons the better off, the *Flamines* had a *Commentaculum*, a kind of rod in their hands. Among the Greeks the old form continued from *Orpheus* or *Onomacritus* his *Orphaica*, ἕκας ἕκας ἕστε βέβηλοι· and thoſe that ſacrifice, aſked τίς τῇδε; the other anſwered πολλοὶ καγαθοί. From all theſe things laid together, we ſee the great ſolemnity uſed by them in their worſhip, which conſidered in its ſelf, was not the product

of

of superstition, but a dictate of the Law of Nature. And it seems most natural to the acts of discipline, that they should be performed in the most publick solemn manner, and not in any private clandestine way: which being so done, oft times lose the designed effect of them, in making men sensible and ashamed of those miscarriages which made them deserve so sharp and severe a censure. Thence among the Jews, their solemn sentence of the greater excommunication was pronounced by the sound of a Trumpet; and so they say *Meroz* was excommunicated with 400 Trumpets: and the same number they report was used in excommunicating *Jesus* of *Nazareth*, which was usually done by the Magistrate, or the Rector of the University: As they tell us a story of a man coming to buy flesh at *Pombeditha* (which was one of the three Universities of the remaining Jews in *Chaldea*, after the return from captivity, the other were *Sora* and *Neharda*) but offering some opprobrious language to *R. Jehuda* then Governor of the University, he makes no more to do, but *prolatis tubis hominem excommunicavit*, brings out his Trumpets and excommunicates him. And as the use of bells, since their invention, did supply the former use of Trumpets in calling the Congregation together, (which I suppose was the account of using Trumpets in excommunicating from the Congregation) so it seems the bells were sometimes used to ring men out of, as well as into the Church; thence the solemn Monkish curse, cursing men with *Bell*, *Book*, and *Candle*, which can have no other sense but from this practice. So much shall suffice to shew the foundation which the solemnity of worship, and the acts belonging to it, have in the dictates of nature manifested by the voice and consent of Nations; for herein *vox populi* is *vox naturæ*, as at other times it is *Vox Dei*.

Joh. Coch. Excerpt. Gen. Sanhed. cap. 1. p. 146. Vorstius in Pirke Eliezer. p. 226. Selden. de Syned. l. 1. cap. 7.

CHAP. VI.

The fourth thing dictated by the Law of Nature, that there must be a way to end controversies arising, which tend to break the peace of the society. The nature of Schism considered; Liberty of judgment and authority distinguished; the latter must be parted with in religious societies as to private persons, What way the light of nature directs to, for ending controversies, in an equality of power, that the less number yield to the greater: on what Law of Nature that is founded. In a subordination of power that there must be a liberty of Appeals defined. Independency of particular Congregations considered. Elective Synods. The Original of Church-Government as to congregations. The case parallel'd between civil and Church-Government. Where appeals finally lodge. The power of calling Synods, and confirming their acts in the Magistrate.

§. 1. THE *fourth* thing which Nature dictates in reference to a Church society, is, *That there must be a way agreed upon to determine and decide all those controversies arising in this society, which immediately tend to the breaking the peace and unity of it.* We have seen already that natural reason requires a disparity between persons in a society, to form and constitute a society; there must be order and power in some, there must be inferiority and subjection in others answering to the former; and by these we suppose a society to be now model'd. But na-

ture must either be supposed defective in its designs and contrivements as to the necessaries required for the management of them; or else there must likewise be implyed a sufficient provision for the maintenance and preservation of a society thus entred into. It is no wise agreeable to the wisdom of nature to erect a fabrick with such materials, which though they may lie one upon the other, yet if not fitly compacted together, will fall in pieces again as soon as it is set up: nor yet to frame a body with mere flesh and bones, and the superiority of some members above the other; for unless there be joints and sinews and ligatures to hold the parts together, the dissolution will immediately follow the formation of it. The end and design of nature is, preservation and continuance, and therefore things necessary in order to that must be implyed in the first design of the being of the thing; so that at least, as to its self, there be no defect in order to that. This must in reason be supposed in all societies, that when they are first entred, it must be upon such terms as may be sufficient to maintain and keep up those societies in that peace and order which is requisite in order to the continuance of them. For what diseases are to bodies, age and fire are to buildings, that divisions and animosities are to societies, all equally tending to the ruine and destruction of the things they seize upon. And as bodies are furnished by nature not only with a receptive and concoctive faculty, of what tends to their nourishment, but with an expulsive faculty of what would tend to the ruine of it; so all civil bodies must not only have ways to strengthen them, but must have likewise a power to expel and disperse those noxious humours and qualities, which tend to dissolve the frame, compages and constitution of them. A power then to prevent mischiefs is as necessary in a society, as a power to settle things in order to the advancement of the common good of society. This therefore the Church as a religious society must likewise be endowed with, *viz.* a power to maintain its self, and keep up peace and unity within its self: which cannot otherwise be supposed (considering the *bilious* humour in mens natures, not wholly purged out by Christianity) without some way to decide controversies which will arise, disturbing the peace of it. For the clearing of this, which much concerns the power and government of the Church, we shall consider what the controversies are which tend to break the Churches peace: and what way the Law of Nature finds out for the ending of them. Which we are the more necessitated to speak to, because nothing hath begotten controversies more than the power of determining them hath done.

§. 2. The controversies then which tend to break the peace of a religious society, are either matter of different practice, or matter of different opinion. The former, if it comes from no just and necessary cause, and ends in a total separation from that society, the person guilty of it was joined with, is justly call'd *Schism*; which (as one defines it) is an Ecclesiastical sedition, as sedition is a Lay-Schism; both being directly contrary to that communion and friendliness, which should be preserved in all societies. The latter, if impugning somewhat fundamental, in order to the end of constituting religious societies, or being a lesser matter, if wilfully taken up, and obstinately maintained, is called *Heresie*: which two are seldom seen out of each others company; and when they are together, are like the blind and lame man in the Fable, the one lent the other eyes, and the other lent him feet: one to find out what they desired, the other to run away with it when they had it. The Heretick

he uſeth his eyes to ſpie out ſome cauſe or pretence of deſerting communion; the Schiſmatick he helps him with his legs to run away from it; but between them both, they rob the Church of its peace and unity. But in order to the making clear what the Churches power is in reference to theſe, we are to take notice of theſe things. *Firſt*, That the Church hath no direct immediate power over mens opinions. So that a matter of mere different opinion lies not properly within the cognizance of any Church power: the reaſon of it is this, becauſe the end of power lodged in the Church, is to preſerve the peace and unity of its ſelf: now a mere different opinion doth not violate the bonds of ſociety; for *opinionum diverſitas & opinantium unitas non ſunt ἀσύστατα.* Men may preſerve communion under different apprehenſions. So long then as diverſity of opinion tends not to the breaking the quiet and tranquillity of the Church of God, a man may ſafely enjoy his own private apprehenſions, as to any danger of moleſtation from Church Governours; That is, ſo long as a man keeps his opinion to himſelf; and hath the power of being his own counſellor. It is not the difference of opinion formally conſidered when it is divulged abroad that is puniſhable, but the tendency to Schiſm, which lies in the divulging of it, and drawing others away from the received Truths: For the opinion its ſelf is an internal act of the mind, and therefore puniſhable by no external power, as that of the Magiſtrate or Church is; as no internal action is under the juriſdiction or authority of a Magiſtrate, any farther than as neceſſarily conjoyned with the outward action, or as it hath a direct influence upon it. The caſe of blaſphemy, which is a thing of the higheſt nature in this kind, is not puniſhable by men, as blaſphemy implies low and undervaluing thoughts of God; but as being a thing divulged (elſe no formal blaſphemy) it tends apparently to the diſhonour of God, and conſequently to the breaking in pieces all ſuch ſocieties, whoſe great foundation is the belief of the Majeſty and Glory of God. So idolatry under the Law was puniſhed, as it was immediately deſtructive of that obedience which men did owe to the true God. And under the Goſpel, it is not mere difference of opinion, judgment, and apprehenſion, which lays men open to the Cenſures of that power which moderates and rules a religious ſociety; but the indeavour by difference of opinion to alienate mens ſpirits one from another, and thereby to break the ſociety into fractions and diviſions, is that which makes men liable to reſtraint and puniſhment. From whence it follows, that where the peace and unity of the Church may be preſerved, and yet men keep up indifferent apprehenſions of things, there is nothing deſerving any ſevere animadverſion from the rulers of that ſociety: for a power corrective and vindictive muſt ſuppoſe ſomething acted contrary to the Laws and rules of the ſociety, and the end of committing that power into the hands of Governours: now here is nothing of that nature; for the Laws of mutual ſociety are obſerved; and the end of Church Government is to ſee *nè quid Eccleſia detrimenti capiat*, leſt the Church as a ſociety be any ways prejudiced: which cannot be while men maintain that love, affection, and communion which becomes the members of ſuch a ſociety. The unity then required in the Church is not an unity of judgment and apprehenſion among the members of it; which though it be their duty to indeavour after, yet it is no farther attainable by mens indeavours than perfection is; and *Unio Chriſtianorum* in this ſenſe, is one of the Jewels belonging to the Crown of Heaven. There is no neceſſity then of in-

quiring after an infallible judge of controverſies, unleſs we had ſome promiſe and aſſurance from Chriſt, that the members of his Church ſhould never differ in their judgments from one another, and then what need of an infallible Judge? and if Chriſt had appointed an infallible Judge, he would infallibly have diſcovered it to the minds of all ſober men; or elſe his infallibility could never attain its end: For while I queſtion whether my Judge be infallible or no, I cannot infallibly aſſent to any of his determinations. And where there is no ground for an infallible Judge, for any to pretend to it, is the worſt of ſuppoſable errors; becauſe it renders all others incurable by that apprehenſion, and takes away all poſſibility of repentance while men are under that perſuaſion. The unity then of the Church, is that of communion, and not that of apprehenſion; and different opinions are no farther liable to cenſures, than as men by the broaching of them, do endeavour to diſturb the peace of the Church of God.

§. 3. That then which ſeems moſt liable to cenſures in a Church, is Schiſm, as being immediately deſtructive of that communion which ſhould be maintained in a religious ſociety. But as to this too, we muſt obſerve ſomething farther, and not to think and judge every thing to deſerve the name, which is by many call'd Schiſm; it being well obſerved by a very learned and judicious Divine, *that Hereſie and Schiſm, as they are commonly uſed, are two Theological Scarecrows, with which, they who uſe to uphold a party in religion, uſe to fright away ſuch, as making enquiry into it, are ready to relinquiſh and oppoſe it, if it appear either erroneous or ſuſpicious. For as* Plutarch *reports of a Painter, who having unskilfully painted a Cock, chaſed away all Cocks and Hens, that ſo the imperfection of his Art might not appear by compariſon with nature; ſo men willing for ends, to admit of no fancy but their own, endeavour to hinder an enquiry into it, by way of compariſon of ſomewhat with it, peradventure truer, that ſo the deformity of their own might not appear.* Thus he. Schiſm then, as it imports a ſeparation from communion with a Church ſociety, is not a thing intrinſecally and formally evil in it ſelf, but is capable of the differences of good and evil according to the grounds, reaſons, ends, and circumſtances inducing to ſuch a ſeparation. The withdrawing from ſociety, is but the materiality of Schiſm; the formality of it muſt be fetched from the grounds on which that is built. It is therefore a ſubject which deſerves a ſtrict enquiry, what things thoſe are which may make a withdrawing from a religious ſociety, to which a man is joined, to be lawful: For as it is a great ſin on the one hand, unneceſſarily to divide and ſeparate from Church ſociety; ſo it is an offence on the other ſide, to continue communion when it is a duty to withdraw it. For the reſolving this knotty and intricate Queſtion, I ſhall lay down ſome things by way of premiſal, and come cloſely to the reſolution of it.

Tract of Schiſm, 1642.

Firſt, *Every Chriſtian is under an obligation to join in Church ſociety with others*; becauſe it his duty to profeſs himſelf a Chriſtian, and to own his religion publickly, and to partake of the Ordinances and Sacraments of the Goſpel, which cannot be without ſociety with ſome Church or other. Every Chriſtian, as ſuch, is bound to look upon himſelf as the member of a body, *viz.* the viſible Church of Chriſt; and how can he be known to be a member, who is not united with other parts of the body? There is then an obligation upon all Chriſtians, to engage in a religious ſociety with others, for partaking of the Ordinances of the Goſpel.

Gospel. It hath been a case disputed by some (particularly by *Grotius* the supposed Author of a little Tract, *An semper sit communicandum per symbola?* when he designed the Syncretism with the Church of *Rome*) whether in a time when Churches are divided, it be a Christian's duty to communicate with any of those parties which divide the Church, and not rather to suspend the communion from all of them. A case not hard to be decided; for either the person questioning it, doth suppose the Churches divided to remain true Churches, but some to be more pure than other; in which case, by virtue of his general obligation to communion, he is bound to adhere to that Church which appears most to retain its Evangelical purity: Or else he must suppose one to be a true Church, and the other not; in which the case is clearer, that he is bound to communicate with the true Church; or he must judge them alike impure, which is a case hard to be found; but supposing it so, either he hath joined formerly with one of them, or he is now to choose which to join with; if he be joined already with that Church, and sees no other but are as impure as that, he is bound to declare against the impurity of the Church, and to continue his communion with it; if he be to choose communion, he may so long suspend till he be satisfied, which Church comes neerest to the primitive constitution, and no longer. And therefore I know not whether *Chrysostome*'s act were to be commended, who after being made a Deacon in the Church of *Antioch* by *Meletius*, upon his death, because *Flavianus* came in irregularly as Bishop of the Church, would neither communicate with him, nor with *Paulinus* another Bishop at that time in the City, nor with the *Meletians*, but for three years time withdrew himself from communion with any of them. Much less were the Διαχειρόμψοι or the *Hæsitantes* as the *Latins* called them, to be commended, who after the determination of the *Council* of *Chalcedon*, against *Eutyches*, because of great differences remaining in *Egypt* and the Eastern Churches, followed *Zenoes Henoticum*, and would communicate neither with the Orthodox Churches, nor *Eutychians*. But I see not what censure *Jerome* could incur, who going into the Diocese of *Antioch*, and finding the Churches there under great Divisions, there being besides the *Arian* Bishop, three others in the Church of *Antioch*, *Meletius*, *Paulinus*, and *Vitalis*, did so long suspend communion with any of them, till he had satisfied himself about the occasion of the Schism, and the innocency of the Persons and Churches engaged in it. But if he had withdrawn longer, he had offended against his obligation to join in Church society with others, for participation of Gospel ordinances; which is the necessary Duty of every Christian.

Socrat. hist. Eccles. lib. 6. cap. 3.

V. Petavii. Diatrib. de Potest. Consa. & com. usurp. cap. 4.

Secondly, *Every Christian actually joined in Church society with others,* §. 4. *is so long bound to maintain society with them, till his communion with them becomes sin.* For nothing else can justifie withdrawing from such a society, but the unlawfulness of continuing any longer in it. Supposing a Church then to remain true, as to its constitution and essentials, but there be many corruptions crept into that Church; whether is it the duty of a Christian to withdraw from that Church because of those corruptions, and to gather new Churches only for purer administration, or to join with them only for that end? This as far as I understand it, is the state of the Controversie between our Parochial Churches, and the Congregational. The resolution of this great Question must depend on this, Whether it is a sin to communicate with Churches true as to essen-

essentials, but supposed corrupt in the exercise of discipline? For Parochial Churches are not denied to have the essentials of true Churches by any sober Congregational men. For there is in them the true word of God preached, the true Sacraments administred, and an implicite Covenant between Pastor and People, in their joining together. All that is pleaded then, is corruption, and defect in the exercise and administration of Church order and discipline. Now that it is lawful for Christians to join with Churches so defective, is not only acknowledged by reverend Mr. *Norton* in his answer to *Apollonius*, but largely and fully proved. For which he lays down five propositions which deserve to be seriously considered by all, which make that a plea for withdrawing from society with other Churches. *First*, A believer may lawfully join himself in communion with such a Church, where he cannot enjoy all the ordinances of God; as in the Jewish Church, in our Saviour's time, which refused the Gospel of Christ, and the Baptism of *John*; and yet our Saviour bids us hear the Scribes and Pharisees sitting in *Moses* chair, which hearing, saith he, doth imply *conjunctionem Ecclesiæ Judaicæ*, a joining with the *Jewish* Church; and so with Churches rejecting an article of faith, as in the Church of *Corinth* the doctrine of the resurrection, the Churches of *Galatia* the doctrine of justification by faith; but the Apostle no where requires separation on that account from them. *Secondly*, A believer may lawfully join in communion with such a Church in which some corruption in the worship of God is tolerated without reformation. As the offering on high places from *Solomon* to *Hezekiah* in the Church of *Juda*, observation of circumcision, and the necessity of keeping the ceremonial Law in the Churches of *Galatia*. *Thirdly*, A believer may lawfully join himself in communion with such a Church in which such are admitted to sacraments, who give no evident signs of grace, but seem to be Lovers of this world; which he proves, because it is every one's main duty to examine himself, and because another's sin is no hurt to him, and therefore cannot keep him from his duty; and then by mens coming unworthily, *non polluitur communio, licet minuitur consolatio*, the communion is not defiled, though the comfort of it be diminished. He brings instance from the Church of *Corinth*, among whom were many scandalous, and had not repented, 2 *Cor.* 12. 20, 21. So in the Jewish Church which lay under great corruptions, when our Saviour and his Apostles communicated with it. *Fourthly*, Although a Believer join with such a Church, he is not therefore bound with the guilt nor defiled with the pollutions of others; which he proves, because it is lawful to do it, and so he contracts no guilt by it. *Fifthly*, A believer that hath joined himself to such a Church, is not bound to withdraw, and separate from such a Church under pain of guilt if he doth it not, because it implies a contradiction to be lawful to join to such a Church, and yet unlawful to continue in its communion; for that speaks it to be a Church, and this latter to be no Church: and by that he doth imply it to be unlawful to separate from any society which is acknowledged to be a true Church. Thus for that *learned* and *reverend Man*, by whom we see that the received Principles of the sober and moderate part of those of that persuasion, are not at such a distance from others, as many imagine. We see then that communicating with a Church not so pure as we desire, is no sin by the arguments by him produced. And how it should be then lawful to withdraw from such a Church, merely for

Respons. ad Syllog. Quest. cap. 16.

1 Cor. 14. 34.

1 Cor. 6. 4. —15.

purer

purer communion, I underſtand not. This I am ſure was not the caſe of our Churches in their ſeparation from the Church of *Rome*: the main ground of which was the ſin of communicating with that Church in her Idolatry and Superſtition, and the impoſſibility of communicating with her, and not partaking of her ſins, becauſe ſhe required a profeſſion of her errors, and the practice of her Idolatry as the neceſſary conditions of her communion; in which caſe it is a ſin to communicate with her.

§. 5. And this leads me now to a cloſer reſolution of the caſe of withdrawing from Churches in which men have formerly been aſſociated, and the grounds which may make ſuch a withdrawing lawful. In order to that we muſt diſtinguiſh between theſe things. *Firſt*, Between *corruptions in the Doctrine* of a Church, and *corruptions in the practice* of a Church. *Secondly*, Between *corruptions* whether in doctrine, or practice *profeſſed and avowed by a Church, and required as conditions of communion* in all members of it, *and corruptions crept in, and only tolerated in a Church. Thirdly*, Between *Non-communion* as to the *abuſes of a Church*, and a *poſitive* and *total ſeparation* from a Church, as it is ſuch. From theſe things I lay down theſe following *Propoſitions.*

Firſt, *Where any Church is guilty of corruptions, both in doctrine and practice, which it avoweth and profeſſeth, and requireth the owning them as neceſſary conditions of communion with her, there a Non-communion with that Church is neceſſary, and a total and poſitive ſeparation is lawful and convenient.* I have ſaid already that the neceſſity and lawfulneſs of this departing from communion with any Church is wholly to be reſolved by an enquiry into the grounds and reaſons of the action it ſelf. So that the matter of fact muſt of neceſſity be diſcuſſed, before the matter of Law as to ſeparation from the Church, be brought into debate. If there be a juſt and neceſſary cauſe for ſeparation, it muſt needs be juſt and neceſſary; therefore the cauſe muſt be the ground of reſolving the nature of the Action. Schiſm then is a ſeparation from any Church upon any ſlight, trivial, unneceſſary cauſe; but if the cauſe be great and important, a departure it may be, Schiſm it cannot be. They who define Schiſm to be a voluntary ſeparation from the Church of God; if by *voluntary* they mean that where the will is the cauſe of it, the definition ſtands good and true; for that muſt needs be groundleſs and unneceſſary as to the Church it ſelf: but if by *voluntary* be meant a ſpontaneous departing from communion with a Church, which was cauſed by the corruptions of that Church, then a ſeparation may be ſo voluntary, and yet no Schiſm: for though it be voluntary, as to the act of departing, yet that is only conſequentially, ſuppoſing a cauſe ſufficient to take ſuch a reſolution; but what is voluntary antecedently, that it hath no other Motive but faction and humour, that is properly Schiſm, and ought ſo to be looked upon. But in our preſent caſe, three things are ſuppoſed as the cauſes and motives to ſuch a forſaking communion. *Firſt*, *Corruption in Doctrine*; the main ligature of a religious ſociety is the conſent of it in doctrine with the rule of religion, the word of God. Therefore any thing which tends to ſubvert and overthrow the foundation of the gathering ſuch a ſociety (which is the profeſſion and practice of the true religion) yield ſufficient ground to withdraw from communion with thoſe who profeſs and maintain it. Not that every ſmall error is a juſt ground of ſeparation, for then there would be no end of ſeparation, and men muſt ſeparate from one another, till knowledge comes to its perfection,

fection, which will only be in glory; but any thing which either directly or consequentially doth destroy any fundamental article of Christian faith. Which may be as well done by adding to fundamental articles, as by plain denying them. And my reason is this: because the very *ratio* of a fundamental article doth imply, not only its necessity to be believed and practised (and the former in reference to the latter, for things are therefore necessary to be known, because necessary to be done, and not *è contrà*) but likewise its sufficiency as to the end for which it is called fundamental. So that the articles of faith called fundamental, are not only such as are necessary to be believed, but if they be, are sufficient for salvation to all that do believe them. Now he that adds any thing to be believed or done as fundamental, that is, necessary to salvation, doth thereby destroy the sufficiency of those former articles in order to salvation; for if they were sufficient, how can new ones be necessary. The case will be clear by an instance. We assert the satisfaction of Christ for sinners to be a fundamental article, and thereby do imply the sufficiency of the belief of that in order to salvation; now if a Pope or any other command me to believe the meritoriousness of good works with the satisfaction of Christ as necessary to salvation, by adding this, he destroys the former as a fundamental article: for if Christ's satisfaction be sufficient, how can good works be meritorious? and if this latter be necessary, the other was not; for if it were, what need this be added: Which is a thing the Papists with their new Creed of *Pius* the *fourth* would do well to consider: and others too, who so confidently assert that none of their errors touch the foundation of faith. Where there is now such corruption in doctrine supposed in a Church, withdrawing and separation from such a Church is as necessary as the avoiding of her errors, and not partaking of her sins is. Thence we read in Scripture, of *rejecting such as are hereticks*, and *withdrawing from their society*, which will as well hold, as to Churches as Persons, and so much the more, as the corruption is more dangerous, and the relation nearer of a member to a Church, than of one man to another: And from the reason of that command, we read in Ecclesiastical History, that when *Eulalius*, *Euphronius*, and *Placentius* were constituted Bishops of *Antioch*, being Arians, many both of the Clergy and people, who resolved to adhere to the true faith, withdrew from the publick meetings, and had private Assemblies of their own. And after, when *Leontius* was made Bishop of *Antioch*, who favour'd the Arians, *Flavianus* and *Diodorus*, not only publickly reproved him for deserting the Orthodox faith, but withdrew the people from communion with him, and undertook the charge of them themselves: So when *Fælix* was made Bishop of *Rome*, none of the Church of *Rome* would enter into the Church while he was there. And *Vincentius Lirinensis* tells us a remarkable story of *Photinus* Bishop of *Sirmium* in *Pannonia*, a man of great abilities and fame, who suddenly turned from the true faith, and though his people both loved and admired him, yet when they discerned his errors, *Quem antea quasi arietem gregis sequebantur, eundem deinceps veluti lupum fugere cœperunt. Whom they followed before as the leader of the flock, they now run away from as a devouring Wolf.* This is the first thing which makes separation, and withdrawment of communion, lawful and necessary, *viz.* corruption of doctrine. The *second* is *Corruption of practice*: I speak not of practice, as relating to the civil conversation of men, but as it takes in the *Agenda* of Religion. When idolatrous customs, and superstitious practice are not only crept into

Theodoret. lib. 1. *c.* 22.

Id. l. 2. *Cap.* 24.

Lib. 2. *c.* 17.

Adverf. hæref. cap. 16.

into a Church, but are the prescribed devotion of it: Such as the adoration of the Eucharist (chiefly insisted on by Mr. *Daillé* in his Apology, as a cause of separation from the Church of *Rome*) invocation of Saints and Angels, worshipping images, and others of a like nature, used among the Papists, which are of themselves sufficient to make our separation from them necessary. But then *Thirdly*, as an accession to these two, is the publick owning and professing them, and requiring them, as necessary conditions of communion, from all the members of their Church, which makes our withdrawing from them unavoidably necessary, as long as we judge them to be such corruptions as indeed they are. For men not to forsake the belief of errors, supposing them to be such, is impossible; and not to forsake the practice and profession of them upon such belief, were the highest hypocrisie: and to do so, and not to forsake the communion of that Church where these are owned, is apparently contradictious (as Mr. *Chillingworth* well observes) seeing the condition of communion with it is, that we must profess to believe all the doctrines of that Church, not only to be errors, but to be certain and necessary truths: So that on this account, to believe there are any errors in the Church of *Rome*, is actually, and *ipso facto*, to forsake the communion of that Church; because the condition of its communion is the belief that there are none: And so that learned and rational Author there fully proves, that those who require unlawful and unnecessary conditions of communion, must take the imputation of Schism upon themselves, by making separation from them just and necessary. In this case, when corruptions in opinion or practice are thus required, as conditions of communion, it is impossible for one to communicate with such a Church without sin; both materially, as the things are unlawful which he joyns with them in; and formally, as he judgeth them so. This is the first Proposition. *Answ. to the pref. p. 16. f. 22.*

The *second* is, *Where a Church retains the purity of doctrine in its publick profession, but hath a mixture of some corruptions, as to practice, which are only tolerated and not imposed, it is not lawful to withdraw communion from such a Church, much less to run into total separation from it:* For here is no just and lawful cause given of withdrawing; here is no owned corruption of doctrine or practice, nor any thing required as a condition of communion, but what is in its self necessary; and therefore there can be no plea, but only pollution, from such a communion, which cannot be to any who do not own any such supposed corruptions in the Church. Men may communicate with a Church, and not communicate with the abuses of a Church; for the ground of his communicating is, its being a Church, and not a corrupt or defective Church. And that men are not themselves guilty, by partaking with those who are guilty of corruptions in a Church, might be easily and largely proved, both from the Church of the Jews in the case of *Eli*'s sons, and the Christian Churches of *Asia*, and *Corinth*, where we read of many corruptions reproved, yet nothing spoken of the duty of the members of those Churches to separate from them, which would have been, had it been a sin to communicate with those Churches when such corruptions were in it. Besides, what reason is there that one mans sins should defile another, more than anothers graces sanctifie another? and why corruption in another should defile him more than in himself, and so keep him from communicating with himself? and what security any §. 6.

one can have in the moſt refined Churches, but that there is ſome ſcandalous, or at leaſt unworthy perſon among them? and whether then it is not his duty to try and examine all himſelf particularly, with whom he communicates? and why his preſence at one Ordinance ſhould defile it more than at another? and why at any more than in worldly converſe, and ſo turn at laſt to make men *Anchorets*, as it hath done ſome? Many other reaſons might be produced againſt this, which I forbear, it being fully ſpoke to by others. And ſo I come to the *Third* Propoſition, which is,

See Mr. Durham's Tract of ſcandal, part. 2. ch. 12.

Where any Church, retaining purity of doctrine, doth require the owning of, and conforming to any unlawful or ſuſpected practice, men may lawfully deny conformity to, and communion with that Church in ſuch things, without incurring the guilt of Schiſm. I ſay not: Men may proceed to poſitive Schiſm as it is call'd, that is, erecting of new Churches, which from *Cyprian* is call'd *erigere Altare contra Altare*; but only that withdrawing communion from a Chruch in unlawful or ſuſpected things, doth not lay men under the guilt of Schiſm: which becauſe I know it may meet with ſome oppoſition from thoſe men, who will ſooner call men Schiſmaticks than prove them ſo, I ſhall offer this reaſon for it to conſideration. If our ſeparation from the Church of *Rome* was therefore lawful, becauſe ſhe required unlawful things, as conditions of her communion; then where-ever ſuch things are required by any Church, non-communion with that Church in thoſe things will be lawful too; and where non-communion is lawful, there can be no Schiſm in it. Whatever difference will be thought of, as to the things impoſed by the Church of *Rome* and others, will be ſoon anſwered by the proportionable difference between bare non-conformity, and total and poſitive ſeparation. What was in its ſelf lawful and neceſſary then, how comes it to be unlawful and unneceſſary now? Did that juſtifie our withdrawing from them, becauſe they required things unlawful, as conditions of communion; and will not the ſame juſtifie other mens non-conformity, in things ſuppoſed by them unlawful? If it be ſaid here, that the Pope's power was an uſurpation, which is not in lawful Governours of Churches; it is ſoon replyed, That the Pope's uſurpation mainly lies in impoſing things upon mens conſciences as neceſſary, which are doubtful, or unlawful; and where-ever the ſame thing is done, there is an uſurpation of the ſame nature, though not in ſo high a degree; and it may be as lawful to withdraw communion from one as well as the other. If it be ſaid that men are bound to be ruled by their Goverours, in determining what things are lawful, and what not? To this it is anſwered: firſt, no true Proteſtant can ſwear blind obedience to Church Governours in all things. It is the higheſt uſurpation to rob men of the liberty of their judgments: That which we plead for againſt the Papiſts, is, that all men have eyes in their heads as well as the Pope; that every one hath a *judicium privatæ diſcretionis*, which is the rule of practice, as to himſelf; and though we freely allow a miniſterial power, under Chriſt, in the Governours of the Church, yet that extends not to an obligation upon men, to go againſt the dictates of their own reaſon and conſcience. Their power is only directive and declarative, and in matters of duty can bind no more than reaſon and evidence brought from Scripture by them doth. A man hath not the power over his own underſtanding, much leſs can others have it. *Nullus credit aliquid eſſe verum, quia vult credere id eſſe verum; non eſt enim in poteſtate hominis facere ali-*

Picus Mirand. Apol. p.225, 226.

quid apparere intellectui ſuo verum quando voluerit. Either therefore men are bound to obey Church Governours in all things abſolutely, without any reſtriction or limitation; (which if it be not uſurpation and dominion over others faith in them, and the worſt of implicite faith in others, it is hard to define what either of them is,) or elſe if they be bound to obey only in lawful things; I then enquire who muſt be judge what things are lawful in this caſe, what not? if the Governours ſtill, then the power will be abſolute again; for to be ſure, whatever they command, they will ſay is lawful, either in it ſelf, or as they command it: if every private perſon muſt judge what is lawful, and what not, which is commanded (as when all is ſaid, every man will be his own judge in this caſe, in things concerning his own welfare) then he is no farther bound to obey than he judgeth the thing to be lawful which is commanded. The plea of an erroneous conſcience, takes not off the obligation to follow the dictates of it; for as he is bound to lay it down, ſuppoſing it erroneous, ſo he is bound not to go againſt it, while it is not laid down. But then again, if men are bound to ſubmit to Governours in the determination of lawful things, what plea could our Reformers have to withdraw themſelves from the Pope's yoke? it might have ſtill held true, *Boves arabant & Aſinæ paſcebantur ſimul*, which is *Aquinas* his argument for the ſubmiſſion of inferiours in the Church to their ſuperiours: for did not the Pope plead to be a lawful Governour; and if men are bound to ſubmit to the determination of Church Governours, as to the lawfulneſs of things, they were bound to believe him in that as well as other things; and ſo ſeparation from that Church was unlawful then: So that let men turn and wind themſelves which way they will, by the very ſame arguments that any will prove ſeparation from the Church of *Rome* lawful, becauſe ſhe required unlawful things, as conditions of her communion, it will be proved lawful, not to conform to any ſuſpected or unlawful practice, required by any Church Governours upon the ſame terms; if the thing ſo required, be after ſerious and ſober enquiry, judged unwarrantable by a man's own conſcience. And withal it would be farther conſidered, whether when our beſt Writers againſt the Papiſts, do lay the imputation of Schiſm, not on thoſe who withdraw communion, but on them for requiring ſuch conditions of communion (whereby they did rather eject men out of their communion, than the others ſeparate from them) they do not by the ſame arguments, lay the imputation of Schiſm on all who require ſuch conditions of communion, and take it wholly off from thoſe who refuſe to conform for conſcience ſake. To this I ſhall ſubjoin the judgment of as a learned and judicious a Divine, as moſt our Nation hath bred, in his excellent (though little) Tract concerning Schiſm.

Job 1. 14. *Summ.* 2. 2. *q.* 2. *art.* 6.

" In thoſe Schiſms, *ſaith he*, which concern fact, nothing can be a juſt " cauſe of refuſing communion, but only to require the execution of " ſome unlawful or ſuſpected act; for not only in reaſon, but in religion " too, that Maxim admits of no releaſe, *cautiſſimi cujuſque præceptum* " *quod dubitas nè feceris.* And after inſtanceth in the Schiſm about " image-worſhip, determin'd by the ſecond Council of *Nice*, in which " he pronounceth the Schiſmatical party to be the Synod it ſelf, and " that on theſe grounds: Firſt, becauſe it is acknowledged by all, that " it is a thing unneceſſary. Secondly, it is by moſt ſuſpected. Third- " ly, it is by many held utterly unlawful: Can then (ſaith he) the " enjoining of ſuch a thing be ought elſe but abuſe? or can the refu- " ſal

Mr. Hales *of Schiſm. p.* 8.

" ſal of communion here, be thought any other thing than duty? Here,
" or upon the like occaſion, to ſeparate, may peradventure bring per-
" ſonal trouble or danger (againſt which it concerns any honeſt man to
" have *pectus præparatum*) farther harm it cannot do, ſo that in theſe
" caſes you cannot be to ſeek what to think, or what you have to do.
" and afterwards propounds it as a remedy to prevent Schiſm, to have
" all Liturgies and publick forms of ſervice ſo framed, as that they ad-
" mit not of particular and private fancies, but contain only ſuch things
" in which all Chriſtians do agree. For, ſaith he, conſider of all the
" Liturgies that are, and ever have been, and remove from them what-
" ever is ſcandalous to any party, and leave nothing but what all agree
" on; and the evil ſhall be, that the publick ſervice and honour of
" God ſhall no ways ſuffer: Whereas, to load our publick forms, with
" the private fancies upon which we differ, is the moſt ſovereign way
" to perpetuate Schiſm unto the World's end. Prayer, Confeſſion,
" Thankſgiving, reading of Scriptures in the plaineſt and ſimpleſt man-
" ner, were matter enough to furniſh out a ſufficient Liturgy, though
" nothing either of private opinion, or of Church Pomp, of Garments
" or preſcribed geſtures, of Imagery, of Muſick, of matter concerning
" the dead, of many ſuperfluities, which creep into the Church, under
" the name of Order and Decency, did interpoſe it ſelf. To charge
" Churches and Liturgies with things unneceſſary, was the firſt begin-
" ning of all ſuperſtition; and when ſcruple of conſcience began to be
" made, or pretended; there Schiſm began to break in; if the ſpecial
" guides and Fathers of the Church, would be a little ſparing of in-
" cumbring Churches with ſuperfluities, or not over rigid, either in re-
" viving obſolete cuſtoms, or impoſing new, there would be far leſs
" cauſe of Schiſm or Superſtition; and all the inconvenience were like-
" ly to enſue, would be but this, they ſhould in ſo doing yield a little
" to the imbecillity of their inferiors, a thing which St. *Paul* would
" never have refuſed to do: mean while, whereſoever falſe or ſuſpected
" opinions are made a piece of Church Liturgy, he that ſeparates is
" not the Schiſmatick; for it is alike unlawful, to make profeſſion of
" known or ſuſpected falſhood, as to put in practice unlawful or ſuſpe-
" cted actions. Thus far that excellent perſon, whoſe words I have
taken the pains to tranſcribe, becauſe of that great wiſdom, judgment,
and moderation, contained in them; and the ſeaſonableneſs of his coun-
ſel and advice, to the preſent poſture of affairs among us. Were we
ſo happy but to take off things granted unneceſſary by all, and ſuſpected
by many, and judged unlawful by ſome; and to make nothing the
bonds of our communion, but what Chriſt hath done, *viz.* one faith,
one baptiſm, *&c.* allowing a liberty for matters of indifferency, and
bearing with the weakneſs of thoſe who cannot bear things which o-
thers account lawful, we might indeed be reſtored to a true Primitive
luſtre far ſooner, than by furbiſhing up ſome antiquated ceremonies,
which can derive their pedigree no higher, than from ſome ancient cu-
ſtom and tradition. God will one day convince men, that the Union
of the Church lies more in the Unity of faith and affection, than in
uniformity of doubtful rites and ceremonies. The bond of Church-
communion ſhould be ſomething common to ſtrong and weak Chriſtians,
Ep. 57. as St. *Auſtin* ſaith of the rule of faith, that it is *puſillis magniſque com-
munis*; and certainly the Primitive Church, that did not charge mens
faith with ſuch a load of articles, as now in theſe latter ages men are
charged

charged with, would much leſs burden men with impoſing doubtful practices upon them, as the ground of Church-communion. And for publick forms of Divine ſervice, ſuch of all things certainly ſhould be ſo compoſed, as to be the leaſt ſubject to any ſcruple from any perſons whatſoever; being on purpoſe compoſed for the declaring mens unity and conſent in their publick worſhip: And thoſe who are the moſt addicted to any one form, can never plead it unlawful to amend it, whereas others may, that it is not lawful or convenient, at leaſt to uſe it without ſuch alterations. And therefore, were there that ſpirit of mutual condeſcenſion, which was moſt certainly in *Eccleſiâ primo primitivâ*, as *Gratian* ſomewhere ſpeaks, in the firſt and truly primitive Church in the Apoſtles time; our breaches as to this thing too, might ſoon be cloſed up, and the voice of Schiſm be heard among us no more. It argued very much the prudence and temper of the French Churches, in compoſing their publick forms of prayer, that they were ſo far from inſerting any thing controverſial into them, that *Amyraldus* tells us, the Papiſts themſelves would uſe them. *Et quod vix credibile eſſet niſi publicè viſeretur, eas inſeruerunt in eos libros in quos congeſſerunt varias precationum formulas.* And that which men would ſcarce believe unleſs they ſaw it, they inſerted them into their own prayer-books. The ſame temper was uſed by our Reformers in the compoſing our Liturgy, in reference to the Papiſts, to whom they had then an eſpecial eye, as being the only party then appearing, whom they deſired to draw into their communion, by coming as near them as they well and ſafely could: And certainly thoſe holy men, who did ſeek by any means to draw in others, at ſuch a diſtance from their principles as the Papiſts were, did never intend by what they did for that end, to exclude any truly tender conſciences from their communion. That which they laid as a bait for them, was never intended by them as a hook for thoſe of their own profeſſion. But the ſame or greater reaſon which made them ſeek ſo much at that time (before the rent between the Papiſt and us was grown to that height it is now at; they being then in hopes by a fair complyance to have brought the whole Kingdom to join with them) I ſay the ſame reaſon which at that time made them yield ſo far to them then, would now have perſuaded them to alter and lay aſide thoſe things which yield matter of offence, to any of the ſame profeſſion with themſelves now. For ſurely none will be ſo uncharitable towards thoſe of his own profeſſion, as not to think there is as much reaſon to yield in compliance with them, as with the Papiſts. And it cannot but be looked upon as a token of God's ſevere diſpleaſure againſt us, if any, though unreaſonable propoſals of peace between us and the Papiſts ſhould meet with ſuch entertainment among many; and yet any fair offers of union and accommodation among our ſelves, be ſo coldly embraced and entertained.

De ſeceſſ. ab Eccl. Rom. & pace inter Evang. conſt. p. 225.

§. 7. Having thus far ſhewed how far the obligation to keep in a Church ſociety doth reach to the ſeveral members of it: I now proceed to ſhew what way the light of nature directs men to for the quieting and compoſing any differences which may ariſe in ſuch a ſociety tending to break the peace of it. But before I come to the particular ways directed to, by the Law of nature, for ending Controverſies in the Church, I ſhall lay down ſome things by way of caution, for the right underſtanding of what is already ſpoken, leſt I ſhould be thought inſtead of pleading for peace, to leave a door open for an univerſal liberty, and ſo pave a new cauſeway towards *Babel*. *Firſt*, that though it be law-

ful not to conform to unlawful or ſuſpected practices in a Church, yet it is not therefore lawful to erect new Churches. For all other eſſentials ſuppoſed in a Church, a mere requiring conformity in ſome ſuſpected rites, doth not make it to be no true or ſound Church, as to other things, from which it is lawful to make a total divorce and ſeparation. A total ſeparation is when a new and diſtinct ſociety for worſhip is entred into, under diſtinct and peculiar officers governing by Laws and Church-rules different from that form which they ſeperate from. This I do not aſſert to be therefore lawful, becauſe ſome things are required, which mens conſciences aae unſatisfied in : unleſs others proceed to eject and caſt them wholly out of communion on that account, in which caſe their ſeparation is neceſſary, and their ſchiſm unavoidable. *Secondly*, therefore I aſſert, that as to things in the judgment of the Primitive and Reformed Churches left undetermined by the Law of God, and in matters of mere order and decency, and wholly as to the form of Government, every one notwithſtanding what his private judgment may be of them, is bound for the peace of the Church of God to ſubmit to the determination of the lawful Governours of the Church. And this is that power of ending controverſies which I ſuppoſe to be lodged in a Church ſociety ; not ſuch a one as whereto every man is bound to conform his private judgment, but whereto every private perſon is bound to ſubmit in order to the Churches peace. That is, that in any controverſies ariſing in a Church, there is ſuch a power ſuppoſed, that may give ſuch an authoritative deciſion of the controverſie in which both parties are bound to acquieſce, ſo as to act nothing contrary to that deciſion. For as it is ſuppoſed that in all contracts and agreements for mutual ſociety, men are content to part with their own liberties for the good of the whole ; ſo likewiſe to part with the authority of their own judgments, and to ſubmit to the determination of things by the rulers of the ſociety conſtituted by them. For there muſt be a difference made between the *liberty and freedom* of a man's own judgment, and the *authority* of it : for ſuppoſing men out of all ſociety, every man hath both ; but ſocieties being entred, and contracts made, though men can never part with the freedom of their judgments, (men not having *a Deſpotical power* over their own underſtandings) yet they muſt part with the authority of their judgments, *i.e.* in matters concerning the Government of the ſociety, they muſt be ruled by perſons in authority over them. Elſe there can be nothing imagined but confuſion, and diſorder, inſtead of peace and unity in every civil ſtate and ſociety. The caſe is the ſame in a religious ſociety too, in which men muſt be ſuppoſed to part with the authority of their own judgments in matters concerning the Government of the Church, and to ſubmit to what is conſtituted and appointed by thoſe who are intruſted with the care and welfare of it. Elſe it is impoſſible there ſhould be unity and peace in a Church conſidered as a ſociety ; which is as much as to ſay, there neither is, nor can be ſuch a ſociety. And that God hath commanded that which is naturally impoſſible ; I mean, freedom from diviſions, and the unity and peace of his Church : Which will appear from hence, becauſe it can never be expected that all men ſhould be exactly of one mind, Either then men retaining their private apprehenſions, are bound to acquieſce in what is publickly determined, or there is a neceſſity of perpetual confuſions in the Church of God. For the main inlet of all diſturbances and diviſions in the Church, is from hence, that men conſider themſelves abſolutely,

and

and not as members of a governed ſociety, and ſo that they may follow their own private judgments, and are bound ſo to do in matters belonging to the Government of the Church, and not to acquieſce for the Churches peace in what is eſtabliſhed in order to the ruling of this ſo conſtituted ſociety, by lawful authority.

Theſe things premiſed, the way is now fully cleared for the diſcovering what ways are preſcribed by the Light of Nature for ending controverſies in the Church; which will appear to be theſe two. §. 8.

1. *In ſocieties wherein perſons act with an equality of power, for the ending differences ariſing, the leſs number muſt always acquieſce in the determination of the greater.* And therefore it is a generally received *Axiome*, that in all ſocieties *pars major jus habet univerſitatis*, the greater part hath the power of the whole: And it is a ſtanding rule in the Civil Law, *refertur ad univerſos quod publicè fit per majorem partem*, which is determined by the Lawyers to hold not of the perſons in power, but of the perſons preſent at the determination; as when *Alexander Severus* made fourteen of the *Viri Conſulares* to be *Curatores Urbis* joyned with the *Præfectus Urbis*, to determine caſes brought before them, what was determined by the greater part of thoſe preſent, was looked upon as binding, as if the whole number had been there. And this *Ariſtotle* lays down as one of the fundamental laws of a Democratical Government. ὅ, τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ τέλος καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον. *That muſt be looked on as a juſt and final deciſion of a caſe debated, which the major part determines.* And therefore rationally infers, that in a Democracy the poorer ſort (and ſo likewiſe the worſe) muſt always bear the greateſt ſway, becauſe they are the moſt. Which is an unavoidable inconvenience in that form of Government whether in Church or State. The ſame he elſewhere applies to other forms of Government which have a multitude of rulers, as *Ariſtocracy* and *Oligarchy*: That which ſeems good to the moſt obtains as a Law amongſt all, Which *Appian* thus briefly expreſſeth, τὸ πλεῖον δικαιότερον· and *Dinoyſ. Halicarnaſſeus* ὅ, τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτο νικᾶν, the one ſpeaking of matter of fact, that it doth obtain, the other of matter of Law that it ſhould do ſo. It appears then from the Law and light of Nature, that wherever any multitude acts in an equality of power, the greater part have the power of the whole; not from any right which the major part hath as ſuperior over the leſs; but from the Law of Nature, which will have every part ordered for the good of the whole; which good cannot oft times be obtained without a ſpecial determination on one ſide or other; nor that determination have its effect, if the Act of the major part may be reſcinded by the leſs. So that in every thing requiring ſpecial determination, this is to be eſteemed the moſt juſt and final deciſion which is done by the major part: For it would be manifeſtly unjuſt for the leſſer part to determine the greater, and therefore by the Law of Nature, the greater part hath the right of the whole.

C. de decurion. lib. 10. l. nominationem Pet. Fabri Comment. ad tit. de diverſis Reg. juris. Lampridius in Alex. Severo.

Politic. l. 6. cap. 2.

V. Grotium de jure bel. &c. lib. 2. cap. 5. ſect. 17.

2. *In a ſociety conſiſting of many particular companies or congregations, there muſt be a ſubordination of powers by the Law of Nature, which grants a right of appeal to an injured perſon from the lower and ſubordinate power to the higher and ſuperior.* Appealing is defined by the Lawyers to be *Provocatio iniquæ ſententiæ querelam continens.* An addreſs to a higher power with complaint of wrong: and ſo in general it is defined by *Ulpian* to be *ab inferioris Judicis ſententiâ ad ſuperiorem provocatio*: but as *Hottoman* obſerves, appeals may ſometimes be made to a co-ordinate

V. Jac Omphalium de uſurp. Leg. l. 7. c. 2. Ulp. l. 1. D. de Appel. Hottom. com. V. Jurii.

co-ordinate power upon complaint of injuſtice done. As one Prætor, Conſul, Tribune might be appealed to, from the ſentence of another. The original of appeals then is, that injuries may be redreſſed, and in order to that, nature dictates that there ought to be a ſubordination of powers one to another, leſt any injury done through corruption or ignorance of the immediate Judges, prove irremediable. To which purpoſe our learned *Whitaker* ſaith, that Appeals are *juris divini & naturalis, & in omni ſocietate admodum neceſſariæ; propter multorum judicum vel iniquitatem, vel ignorantiam; alioqui actum eſſet de innocente, ſi non liceret ab iniqua ſententia appellare:* So that appeals are founded upon natural right, leſt men ſhould be injured in any determination of a caſe, by thoſe who have the cognizance of it. And in order to a redreſs of wrongs, and ending controverſies, nature tells us that Appeals muſt not be infinite, but there muſt be ſome power, from whence Appeals muſt not be made: What that ſhould be, muſt be determined in the ſame manner that it is in Civils; not that every controverſie in the Church muſt be determined by an Œcumenical Council, but that it is in the power of the ſupreme Magiſtrate, as Supreme head in cauſes Eccleſiaſtical, to limit and fix this ſubordination, and determine how far it ſhall go, and no farther. The determination being in order to the peace of the Church, which Chriſtian Magiſtrates are bound to look after, and ſee that cauſes hang not perpetually without deciſion: And ſo we find the Chriſtian Emperours conſtituting to whom Appeals ſhould be made, and where they ſhould be fixed, as *Juſtinian* and *Theodoſius* did. For when the Church is incorporated into the Commonwealth, the chief authority in a Commonwealth as Chriſtian, belongs to the ſame to which it doth as a Commonwealth: But of that already. It is then againſt the Law and Light of Nature, and the natural right of every man, for any particular company of men, calling themſelves a Church, to engroſs all Eccleſiaſtical power ſo into their hands, that no liberty of Appeals for redreſs can be made from it. Which (to ſpeak within compaſs) is a very high uſurpation made upon the Civil and Religious Rights of Chriſtians; becauſe it leaves men under a cauſeleſs cenſure, without any authoritative vindication of them from it. As for that way of *elective Synods*, ſubſtitued in the place of authoritative power to determine controverſies, it is a σφὸν φάρμακον, which will never be ſoveraign enough to cure the diſtemper it is brought for: For elective Synods are but like that which the Lawyers call *arbitrium boni viri*, which they diſtinguiſh from *arbitrium ex compromiſſo*, and binds no farther than the party concerned doth judge the ſentence equal and juſt. So that this helps us with no way to end controverſies in the Church, any farther than the perſons engaged are willing to account that juſt which ſhall be judged in their caſe. Taking then a coercive power, only for ſuch a one as may authoritatively decide a controverſie, we ſee what great reaſon there is for what the Hiſtorian obſerves: *Arbitriis ii ſe debent interponere, qui non parentem coercere poſſunt*; That all power of arbitration ſhould have ſome juridical power going along with it, to make a final end of quarrels. But that which ſeems yet more ſtrange to me, is this, that by thoſe who aſſert the Independency of particular Congregations, it is ſo hotly pleaded, that Chriſt hath given every particular Congregation a power over its own members, to determine controverſies ariſing between them: but, that if one, or many of theſe particular Congregations ſhould err, or break

Controv. 4. qu. 4. c. 2.

Juſt. auth. diſſ. epiſ. collat. 9. Theod. cod. de SS. Eccl. c. omni.

Grot. de jure belli ac pacis, l. 3. cap. 20. ſect. 46.

Vell. Paterc. hiſt. lib. 2.

break the rule, he hath left no power authoritatively to decide what ſhould be done in ſuch caſes. Can we conceive that Chriſt ſhould provide more for the caſes of particular perſons, than of particular Churches? And that he ſhould give authority for determining one, and not the other? Is there any more coactive power given by any to Synods, or greater officers, than there is by them to particular Churches? which power is only declarative as to the rule, though authoritative as to perſons wherever it is lodged. Is there not more danger to God's people, by the ſcandals of Churches, than perſons? Or did Chriſt's power of governing his people reach to them only as particular congregations? Doth not this too ſtrongly favour of the *Pars Donati?* only the *Meridies* muſt be rendred a particular Congregational Church, where Chriſt cauſeth his Flock to reſt? But ſuppoſing the Scripture not expreſly to lay down a rule for governing many Churches, are men out-lawed of their natural rights? that ſuppoſing a wrong ſentence paſſed in the Congregation, there is no hopes, way, or means to redreſs his injury, and make his innocency known? Doth this look like an inſtitution of Chriſt? But that which I conceive is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος, and the original of this miſtake, is, that the Churches we read of firſt planted in Scripture, were only particular Congregations; and therefore there is no proper Church-power beyond them, or above them. I meddle not with the antecedent now, which is largely diſcuſſed by others; but the extream weakneſs of the conſequence, is that I am here obliged to diſcover. For what a ſtrange ſhortneſs of diſcourſe is it to argue thus, if when there was but one Congregation, that Congregation had all power within its ſelf; then when there are more particular Congregations, it muſt be ſo; and yet this is the very foundation of all thoſe Kingdoms of *Ῥvetot*, as one calls them, thoſe ſole ſelf-governing Congregations. When there was but one Congregation in a Church, it was neceſſary if it had any Church power, that it muſt be lodged in that one Congregation: But when this Congregation was multiplyed into many more is it not as neceſſary for their mutual government, there ſhould be a common power governing them together, as a joynt-ſociety? Beſides, the firſt Congregational Church in the New Teſtament, *viz.* that of *Jeruſalem*, could be no particular organical Church; for it had many, if not all, univerſal officers in it; and if they were the fixed Paſtors of that Church, they could not, according to the principles of thoſe who thus ſpeak, preach to any other Congtegation but their own, by vertue of their office: And ſo, either their Apoſtolical office and commiſſion muſt be deſtroyed, if they were Paſtors of particular organical Churches; or if their Apoſtolical office be aſſerted, their Paſtorſhip of particular organical Churches is deſtroyed by their own principles, who aſſert that the Paſtor of a Church can do no Paſtoral office out of his own Congregation. The caſe is the ſame, as to other Churches planted by the Apoſtles and governed by themſelves; which two, as far as I can find in the New Teſtament, were of an equal extent; *viz.* that all the Churches planted by the Apoſtles, were chiefly governed by themſelves, though they had ſubordinate officers under them. Theſe firſt Churches then were not ſuch particular organized Churches, but they were as the *firſt matter* of many Congregations to be propagated out of them; which after made one ſociety, conſiſting of thoſe ſeveral Congregations imbodied together, and ruled by one common government. As in a College, every Tutor hath his own pupils, which he

rules; and if we ſuppoſe but one Tutor at firſt in the College, with his pupils, all the power, both common to the ſociety, and peculiar to his flock, is joined together; but when there are many more Tutors, having Pupils under their charge, all theſe, for their better ordering as a ſociety, muſt be governed by the common government of the College, to which the particular government of every Tutor is and muſt be ſubordinate: But this will be more fully made appear in the original of Civil government. It is far more evident, that all Civil power lay at firſt in *Adam* and his family, and afterwards in particular families, than that all Church power lay in particular Congregations at firſt. We may then with as good reaſon ſay, that there is no lawful Civil Government now, but that of particular families; and that no National Government hath any right or power over particular families, becauſe families had once all Civil power within themſelves; as becauſe it is ſuppoſed, that all Church-power lay firſt in particular Congregations, therefore there muſt be no Church power above them; nor that particular Congregations are ſubject to ſuch Government as is requiſite for the regulating of the ſociety in common, as comprehending in it many particular Congregations. Let them ſhew then, how any Government in the State is lawful, when families had the firſt power, and by what right now thoſe families are ſubordinate to the Civil Magiſtrate, and what neceſſity there is for it; and by the very ſame reaſons will we ſhew the lawfulneſs of Government in the Church over many Congregations, and that thoſe are by the ſame right, and upon the ſame neceſſity, to ſubordinate themſelves to the Governours of the Church conſidered as a ſociety taking in many particular Congregations. The Parallel runs on farther and clearer ſtill: For as the heads of the ſeveral families after the Flood, had the command over all dwelling under their roofs, while they remained in one family; and when that increaſed into more, their power was extended over them too; which was the firſt original of Monarchy in the world: So the planters of the firſt Churches, that while the Church was but one Congregation, had power over it, then this Congregation was multiplied into more, their power equally extended over them all. And as afterwards, ſeveral heads of families upon their encreaſe, did conſtitute diſtinct Civil Governments, wherein were ſubordinate officers, but thoſe Governments themſelves were co-ordinate one with another: So in the Church, ſo many Congregations as make up one Provincial, or National ſociety (as ſucceſſion and prudence doth order the bounds of them) do make up ſeveral particular Churches, enjoying their officers ruling them, but ſubordinate to the Governours of the Church in common: Which ſociety, National or Provincial, is ſubordinate to none beyond its ſelf, but enjoys a free power within its ſelf of ordering things for its own Government, as it judgeth moſt convenient, and agreeable to the rules of Scripture. The ſumm then of what I ſay, concerning ſubordination of officers and powers in the ſociety of the Church, is this, that by the light and Law of Nature it appears, that no individual company or Congregation, hath an abſolute, independent power within its ſelf; but that for the redreſſing grievances happening in them, appeals are neceſſary to the parties aggrieved, and a ſubordination of that particular Congregation, to the government of the ſociety in common. So that, the right of appealing, and original of ſubordination, is from Nature; the particular manner and form of ſubordinate and ſuperiour Courts, is to be fetched from

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positive Laws; the limitation of Appeals, extent of jurisdiction, the binding power of sentence, so far as concerns external Unity in the Church, is to be fetched from the power of the Magistrate, and civil sanctions and constitutions. The Churches power, as to Divine Law, being only directive and declarative; but being confirmed by a civil sanction, is juridical and obligatory. Concerning the Magistrates power to call, confirm, alter, repeal the decrees of Synods, see *Grotius*, *Chamier*, *Whitaker*, *Casaubon*, *Mornay*, and others, who fully and largely handle it; To whom having nothing to add, I will take nothing at all from them: As for that time when the Church was without Magistrates ruling in it, in those things left undetermined by the rule of the Word, they acted out of principles of Christian prudence agreeable to the rules of Scripture, and from the principles of the Law of Nature: One of which we come in the next place to speak to. So much for the Churches power, considered as a society for ending controversies arising within its self, tending to break the peace and unity of it:

Grot. de Imp. summ. Potest. c. 7. s. 14, 15. &c. c. 8. s. 13. Chamir. T. 2. l. 13. c. 12. Whitaker Contr. 3. q. 2. Cas. de Lib. Eccles. c. 2. Mornæ. hist. Papatus passim.

CHAP. VII.

The fifth thing dictated by the Law of Nature, That all that are admitted into this society, must consent to be governed by the Laws and Rules of it. Civil societies founded upon mutual consent; express in the first entrance, implicite in others born under societies actually formed. Consent as to a Church necessary, the manner of consent determined by Christ by baptism and profession. Implicite consent supposed in all baptized, explicite, declared by challenging the privileges, and observing the duties of the Covenant. Explicite by express owning the Gospel when adult, very useful for recovering the credit of Christianity. The Discipline of the Primitive Church cleared from Origen, Justin Martyr, Pliny, Tertullian. *The necessary requisites of Church membership, whether positive signs of grace: Explicite Covenant, how far necessary; not the formal constitution of a Church, proved by several arguments.*

THE Law of Nature dictates, *that all who are admitted into this society, must consent to be governed by the Laws and Rules of that society, according to its constitution.* For none can be looked upon as a member of a society, but such a one as submits to the Rules and Laws of the society, as constituted at the time of his entrance into it. That all civil societies are founded upon voluntary consent and agreement of parties, and do depend upon contracts and Covenants made between them, is evident to any that consider that men are not bound by the Law of Nature to associate themselves with any but whom they shall judge fit; that dominion and propriety was introduced by free consent of men: and so there must be Laws and Bonds fit, agreement made, and submission acknowledged to those Laws; else men might plead their natural right and freedom still, which would be destructive to the very nature of those societies. When men then did first part with their natural liberties, two things were necessary in the most express terms to be declared; first a free and voluntary consent to part with so much of their natural rights as was not consistent with the well

S. 1.

being of the ſociety: Secondly, a free ſubmiſſion to all Laws, which ſhould be agreed upon at their entrance into ſociety, or afterwards as they ſee cauſe. But when ſocieties were already entred, and children born under them, no ſuch expreſs conſent was required in them, being bound by vertue of the protection, they find from authority to ſubmit to it, and an implicite conſent is ſuppoſed in all ſuch as are born under that authority. But for their more full underſtanding of this obligation of theirs, and to lay the greater tye of obedience upon them, when they come to underſtanding, it hath been conceived very requiſite by moſt States to have an explicite declaration of their conſent, either by ſome formal oath of allegiance, or ſome other way ſufficiently expreſſing their fidelity, in ſtanding to the Covenants long ſince ſuppoſed to be made. To apply this now to the Church.

We have all along hitherto conſidered the Church in general, as a ſociety or corporation which was neceſſary in order to our diſcovering what is in it from the Light of Nature without poſitive Laws.

§. 2. *Hiſt. Council of Trent. l. 7. p. 612.* But here we muſt take notice of what was obſerved by Father *Laynez* the Jeſuit at the Council of *Trent*, That it is not with the Church as with other ſocieties, which are firſt themſelves, and then conſtitute the Governours. But the Governour of this ſociety was firſt himſelf, and he appointed what Orders, Rules, and Laws ſhould govern this ſociety; and wherein he hath determined any thing, we are bound to look upon that, as neceſſary to the maintaining of that ſociety which is built upon his conſtitution of it. And in many of thoſe orders which Chriſt hath ſetled in his Church; the foundation of them is in the Law of Nature, but the particular determination of the manner of them is from himſelf. Thus it is in the caſe we now are upon; nature requires that every one entring into a ſociety, ſhould conſent to the rules of it. Our Saviour hath determined how this conſent ſhould be expreſſed, *viz.* by receiving Baptiſm from thoſe who have the power to diſpenſe it; which is the fœderal rite whereby our conſent is expreſſed to own all the Laws and ſubmit to them, whereby this ſociety is governed: which at the firſt entring of men into this ſociety of the Church was requiſite to be done by the expreſs and explicite conſent of the parties themſelves, being of ſufficient capacity to declare it; but the Covenant being once entred into by themſelves, not only in their own name, but in the name of their poſterity (a thing implied in all Covenants wherein benefits do redound to poſterity, that the obligation ſhould reach unto them too, but more particular in this, it having been always the tenour of God's Covenants with men, to enter the ſeed as well as the perſons themſelves, as to outward privileges) an implicite conſent as to the children in Covenant, is ſufficient to enter them upon the privileges of it by baptiſm, although withal it be highly rational for their better underſtanding the ingagement they entred into, that when they came to age they ſhould explicitely declare their own voluntary conſent to ſubmit to the Laws of Chriſt, and to conform their lives to the profeſſion of Chriſtianity; which might be a more than probable way, and certainly moſt agreeable both to reaſon and Scripture to advance the credit of Chriſtianity once more in the world, which at this day ſo much ſuffers by ſo many profeſſing it without underſtanding the terms of it; who ſwallow down a profeſſion of Chriſtianity, as boys do pills, without knowing what it is compounded of, which is the great reaſon it works ſo little alteration upon their ſpirits.

Deut. 29. 19. Act. 2. 38.

§. 3.

The one great cause of the great flourishing of religion in the Primitive times, was certainly the strictness used by them in their admission of members into Church societies, which is fully described by *Origen* against *Celsus*, who tells us they did φιλοπαστεῖν τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς ἀγωγὰς τῶν προσιόντων, *inquire into their lives and carriages, to discern their seriousness in their profession of Christianity during their being Catechumeni:* Who after tells us they did require τὸ κεκαθάρσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, καὶ ὅση δύναμις βέλτιον βεβιωκέναι, *true repentance and reformation of life,* τὸ τηνικάδε καλοῦμεν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς παρ' ἡμῖν τελετὰς, *then we admit them to the participation of our mysteries.* I confess the Discipline of the Primitive Church hath been very much misrepresented to us, by mens looking upon it through the glass of the modern practices and customs obtaining among us: as though all this only concerned the admission to the Lord's Supper; though that was always in chiefest veneration in the Church of God, as being the chief of Gospel mysteries (as they loved to speak) yet I cannot find that any were admitted to all other Ordinances freely with them who were debarred from this: but their admission to one, did include an admission to all: so on the contrary, I find none admitted to baptism, who were not to the Lord's Supper; and if *Catechumeni*, presently after, only confirmation intervening (which will hardly be ever found separate from baptism, till the distinction of the double *Chrisme in vertice & pectore* came up, which was about *Jerom*'s time.)

Lib. 3. p. 142, 143. & 147.

Tertul. Apol. 39. describes exclusion to be *à communicatione Orationis & conventus, & omnis sancti commercii.*

§. 4.

The thing then which the Primitive Church required in admitting persons adult to baptism, and so to the Lord's Supper, was a serious visible profession of Christianity, which was looked upon by them as the greatest evidence of their real consent to the rules of the Gospel. For that purpose it will be worth our taking notice what is set down by *Justin Martyr, Apolog.* 2. speaking of the celebration of the Lord's Supper; καὶ ἡ τροφὴ αὕτη καλεῖται παρ' ἡμῖν εὐχαριστία ἧς οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μεταχεῖν ἐξόν ἐστιν ἢ τῷ πιστεύοντι ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ δεδιδαγμένα ἐφ' ἡμῶν, καὶ λουσαμένῳ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἀφέσεως ἁμαρτιῶν καὶ εἰς ἀναγέννησιν λουτρὸν, καὶ οὕτως βιοῦντι ὡς ὁ χριστὸς παρέδωκεν, where we see what was required before admission to the Lord's Supper, *a profession of faith in the truths of the Gospel, and answerable life to the Gospel, without which it was not lawful to participate of the Lord's Supper.* And farther we see by *Pliny*, that the Christians of those times did make use of some solemn ingagements among themselves which he calls *Sacramenta*; they did *se sacramento obstringere, ne furta, ne latrocinia ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent,* &c. and *Tertullian* reports it out of *Pliny*, that he found nothing *de Sacramentis eorum* (as *Junius* first reads it out of *M. S.* for *de sacris*, after him *Heraldus*, and as it is now read in *Rigaltius*'s Edition) besides *cautelam & ad confederandum disciplinam, &c. scelera prohibentes*, which *Eusebius* calls συνθήκας *pacta*, Covenants between them; and so Mr. *Selden* interprets the place of *Origen* in the beginning of his book against *Celsus*, where *Celsus* begins his charge against the Christians, ὡς συνθήκας κρύβδην πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιουμένων χριστιανῶν παρὰ τὰ νενομισμένα· where he takes συνθήκας not as *Gelenius* renders it, *conventus*, but in its proper sense for contracts or covenants that were made by the Christians as by other societies, only permitted, and tolerated by the Commonwealth. And we find by *Pliny*, that when the *hæteriæ* were forbidden, he brought the Christian in under the Law; the ground of those societies was only a mutual compact and agreement among the persons of it: Such as among the Essens of the Jews,

P. 97. ed. Paris. 1636.

Lib. 10. ep. 97.

Hist. Eccl. lib. 3. c. 33. Selden. de Syned. l. 1. cap. 9. V. Heraldum in Tertul. Apologet. cap. 39.

Joseph. Hæres. p. 2. cap. 12.

Jews, and the Schools of Philosophers among the Greeks. *Josephus* mentions the ὅρκους φρικώδεις of those who were admitted into the society of the Essens. And so in all other societies which subsist only from mutual confederation in a Commonwealth. Thus I acknowledge it to be in Christianity, that there must be such a supposed contract or voluntary consent in the persons ingaged in such societies. But with this observable difference, that although there must be a consent in both, yet the one is wholly free, as to any pre-ingagement or obligation to it, as well as to the act its self; but in religious societies, though the act of consent be free, yet there is an antecedent obligation upon men, binding them to this voluntary consent. The want of the understanding this difference, is, the very foundation of that opinion men call *Erastianism*; for the followers of *Erastus*, when they find that Christians did act *ex confederatâ disciplinâ*, they presently conclude all Church power to lay only in mutual consent. It is granted Church power doth suppose consent, but then all Christians are under an obligation from the nature of Christianity to express this consent, and to submit to all censures legally inflicted. About the *hetæriæ* and societies among the Romans, we may take notice of the Law of twelve Tables. So in the collection of *Lud. Charondus*, *Sodalibus qui ejusdem collegii sunt, & jus coeundi habent, potestas esto pactionis quam volent inter se ineundæ dum nè quid ex publicâ lege corrumpant. Ex Caio c. 4. D. de Collec. & corp.*

§. 5. I confess when persons are entred into a visible Church-Society by Baptism, if they will own that profession they were baptized into, and are not guilty either of plain ignorance of it, or manifest scandal, and demand as their right the other ordinances of the Gospel, I see not by what power they may be excluded. If we fix not in a serious visible profession as the ground of giving right, but require positive evidences of grace in every one to be admitted to ordinances as the only thing giving right, for my part, setting aside the many inconveniencies besides which attend that in reference to the persons to be admitted, I see not how with a safe and good conscience ordinances can be administred by any. My reason is this. Every one, especially a Minister in that case ought to proceed upon certain grounds that the person admitted hath right to the ordinance to be administred; but if positive signs of grace be required, a mans conscience cannot proceed upon any certainty, without infallible knowledge of anothers spiritual state, which I suppose none will pretend to. My meaning is, that which gives right, must be something evident to the person admitting into it, if it be his duty to inquire after it; but if only positive signs of grace be looked on, as giving right, the ground of right can never be so evident to another person, as to proceed with a good conscience, *i. e.* with a full persuasion of anothers right to the administration of any ordinance to him. If it be said, that these are required only as tokens of a true visible profession, and it is that which gives the right; I reply, our knowledge of, and assent to the conclusion, can be no stronger, nor more certain than to the premisses from whence it is inferred; if therefore true profession gives right, and our knowledge of that proceeds upon our knowledge of the work of grace, we are left at the same uncertainty we were at before. But if we say that an outward profession of the Gospel (where there is nothing rendring men uncapable of owning it, which is ignorance, nor declaring they do not own it, which is scandal) is that which

which gives a visible right to the ordinances of the Church as visible, we have something to fix our selves upon, and to bottom a persuasion of the right of persons to ordinances.

Christ when he instituted Churches, did institute them as visible societies, that is, to have marks whereby to be known and distinguished, as other societies in the world are; now that which puts a difference between this and other societies, is an open profession of Christianity, which profession is looked upon as the outward expression of the internal consent of the soul to the doctrine and laws of the Gospel. Which outward evidence of consent, where there is nothing evidently and directly oppugning it, is that which the Church of God in admission of visible members is to proceed upon. I no where find that ever Christ or his Apostles in making disciples, or admitting to Church membership, did exact any more than a professed willingness to adhere to the doctrine which they preached; nor that they refused any who did declare their desire to joyn with them. An owning Christianity is all we read of antecedent to admission of Church-members. And if any thing else be farther required as necessary, we must either say the word of God is defective in institutions of necessity to the Church, which I suppose the assertors of it will not be so inconsistent to their own principles, as to do; or else must produce where any thing farther is required by the word of God.

By this we may see what to answer those who require an explicite Covenant from all members of the Church, as that which gives the form and being to a Church. If they mean only in the first constitution of a visible Church, an express owning of the Gospel Covenant, there is none will deny that to be necessary to make one a member of the visible Church of Christ. If they farther mean that there must be a real confederation between those who joyn together in Gospel ordinances in order to their being a Church, I know none will question it that know what it is that makes a society to be so; which is such a real confederation with one another: If they mean farther, that though Christians be bound by vertue of their Gospel Covenant to joyn with some Church society, yet not being determined by Scripture to what particular Church they should joyn; therefore for Christians better understanding what their mutual duty is to one another; and who that Pastor is to whom they owe the relation of member, that there should be some significant declaration either by words or actions of their willingness to joyn with such a particular society in Gospel ordinances; I shall grant this to be necessary too. But if beyond this their meaning be, that a formal explicite covenant be absolutely necessary to make any one a member of a Church, I see no reason for it. For, §. 7.

1. If there may be a real confederation without this; then this is not necessary, but there may be a real confederation without this explicite Covenant; as appears in those Churches of Christ, both in the Primitive times, and since the Reformation, who have never used it, which none I suppose who maintain this opinion will deny to have been true visible Churches of Christ.

2. If the Gospel Covenant entred into by any, gives a right to Gospel ordinances by its self, then an explicite Covenant is not that which makes one a member of a Church; but the Gospel Covenant gives that right to all Gospel ordinances. If by baptism, the person baptized have a legal

a legal title to all Gospel ordinances, then, *&c.* the *Minor* appears in that they are admitted Church members by baptism; and how can any be a member of a Church, and not have right to all ordinances in it, supposing capacity to receive them? A right once received, continues till it be forfeited, especially when it is such a right as is not limited to any particular privileges, but to all the privileges of that society into which they are entred.

3. The reality of consent may be sufficiently manifested without an explicite Covenant, as in the joyning with those who are under the same profession in the common acts of the society and acceptance of, and submission to the rulers of that society, which implicitely is that Covenant which they would have expressed; and actions in this case are as declarative and significative as words.

4. If a Church may cease to be a true Church, without explicite disowning such a Covenant, then it is not explicite Covenanting which makes a Church; but a Church may cease to be a true Church without explicite disowning it; as in case of universal corruption, as to word and Sacraments; as in the Church of *Rome*, that still owns her self for a Church. The ground of the consequence, is from the parity of reason as to contraries.

§. 8. But though I see no reason at all, why an explicite Covenant should be so necessary to a Church, that we cannot suppose a true Church without it; yet I no ways deny the lawfulness or expediency, in many cases, of having a personal profession from all baptized in infancy, when they come to age (which we may if we please, call *Confirmation*) and the necessity of desiring admission, in order to participation of all Ordinances: which desire of admission doth necessarily imply mens consenting to the Laws of that society, and walking according to the duties of it; and so they are *consequentially* and *virtually*, though not *expresly* and *formally*, bound to all the duties required from them in that relation. When Churches are over-run with loosness, ignorance, and prophaneness, or when Christians are under persecution, an external profession of the Gospel Covenant, and declaring their owning the society they are entred into, and submitting to the Laws of it, may be, if not wholly necessary, yet very useful and expedient: And indeed, at all times we see people understand so little of their duty or engagements, and are so hardly brought under the exercise of Gospel discipline, that an open profession of their submission to the rules of the Gospel, seems the most likely way to advance the practice, power, and purity of Religion: But of this much is spoken by others lately, and therefore I supersede. From all this we see, that every society implying a joyning together in some common duties, Nature tells us there must be a real consenting together, explicite, or implicite in all persons, who enter into such a society.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

The laſt thing dictated by the Law of Nature, is, that every offender againſt the Laws of the ſociety, muſt give an account of his actions to the Governours of it, and ſubmit to the cenſures inflicted upon him by them. The original of penalties in ſocieties. The nature of them, according to the nature and ends of ſocieties. The penalty of the Church no civil mulct: becauſe its Laws and ends are different from civil ſocieties. The practice of the Druids *in excommunication. Among the Jews whether a mere civil or ſacred penalty. The latter proved by ſix arguments.* Cherem Col Bo *objections anſwered. The original of the miſtake ſhewed. The firſt part concluded.*

§. 1. *NAture dictates farther, that in a well ordered ſociety, every offender againſt the rules of that ſociety, muſt give an account of his actions to the Governours of that ſociety, and ſubmit to the cenſures of it, according to the judgment of the rulers of it.* In all ſocieties ſubſiſting by Laws, men being more ruled by hopes and fears, than by a ſenſe of duty, or love of goodneſs, it is neceſſary for maintaining a ſociety, that there muſt be not only a declaration of what men ought to do, but a ſetting forth the penalties which they muſt undergo upon violation of the Laws whereon the ſociety doth ſubſiſt: And as there muſt be penalties annexed, as the ſanction of the Law, ſo it muſt of neceſſity be implyed in a well ordered ſociety, that every perſon, as he doth promiſe obedience to the Laws, ſo by the ſame obligation he is bound to ſubmit to the penalties upon diſobedience: For whatever Law binds to duty where there is a penalty threatned, doth bind likewiſe to puniſhment upon neglect of duty: for no ſooner is the Law broken, but the offender lies under the penal ſanction of that Law, and is thereby bound to give an account of himſelf and actions, to thoſe Governours who are bound to ſee the Laws obeyed, or offenders puniſhed. Guilt follows immediately upon the breach of the Law, which is nothing elſe but the offenders obligation to puniſhment. From this obligation on the offenders part, ariſeth a new relation between the Governour of the ſociety and the offender. On the Governours part a right to puniſh, vindictive juſtice ſuppoſing offences committed; and on the offenders part, an obligation to undergo what ſhall be inflicted upon him for his offence: Puniſhment being nothing elſe, but *malum paſſionis ob malum actionis.* There muſt be then theſe things ſuppoſed in any well ordered ſociety; Laws to be governed by, Rulers to ſee the Laws kept, or offenders puniſhed, penalties made known for offenders, ſubmiſſion of the perſons in the ſocieties to the penalties, if they deſerve them. But now of what kind, nature, and degree the penalties muſt be, muſt be reſolved according to the nature, end, and deſign of the conſtitution of the ſociety. If it be a ſociety for preſervation of the rights of bodies, or eſtates, the penalties muſt be either pecuniary or corporal: And the ground is, becauſe the end of legal puniſhment is not properly revenge, but the preſervation of the ſociety, which without puniſhments could not be: A threefold end is therefore aſſigned to puniſhments; the reformation of the offending perſon, the prevention of farther offences in the ſociety of the ſame kind, and the being a terror and example to o-

thers; the first is called νουθεσία, κόλασις, or ἐπιτίμησις, the second πμωρία, being for the preservation of the honour of the Magistrate: the third παράδειγμα, when the punishment is inflicted upon one, that others should take notice of it; which must be always done in a publick manner: So παραδειγματίσαι in *Matthew*, is opposed to λάθρα ἀπολῦσαι.

Gellius Noct. Attic. l. 6. c. 16. V. Grotium de jure belli. l. 2. c. 20. §. 6, 7, 8. Matth. 1. 19.

§. 2. These things being thus in general considered, come we now to apply it to the Church considered as a society. That it hath peculiar Laws to be governed by, appears by the distinct nature, end, and design of the constitution of it; which is not to preserve any outward rights, but to maintain and keep up a religious society for the service of God; and therefore the penal sanctions of these Laws cannot properly be any corporal or pecuniary mulct, but somewhat answerable to the nature of the society. It must be then somewhat which implies the deprivation of that which is the chiefest benefit of that society. The benefits of it are the privileges and honour which men enjoy by thus associating themselves for so high an employment: That punishment then must be the loss of those privileges which the Corporation enjoys, which must be by exclusion of the offending person from communion with the society. Hence we see it is evident, that which we call excommunication is the greatest penalty which the Church, as a society, can inflict upon the members of it, considered as such. And hence it is likewise clear, that as the society of the Church is distinct from others, the Laws, Ends, Governours of a different nature, so the punishment must be a punishment distinct from civil, and ordained wholly in order to the peculiar ends of this society; which they do not well consider, who deny any such power as that of excommunication peculiar to the Church, which is as much as to deny that the Laws whereby the Church is ruled, are different from the civil Laws, or the ends of this society from the ends of civil societies: for the punishment must be proportioned to the Laws, and referred immediately to its proper ends. It were no ways difficult to answer the pretences brought against this: For although I acknowledge a subordination of this religious society to the supreme authority in the Commonwealth, and that the rules concerning the Government of the society in common must have their sanction from thence; yet this no ways implies but it may have its peculiar penalties and power to inflict them, any more than any Company of Tradesmen have not power to exclude any from their Company for breaking the rules of the Company, because they are subordinate to the Supreme Authority: or any College to expel any from thence, for breaking the local Statutes of it, which are distinct from the common Laws. Nor is it any argument, that because Christians had mutual confederations in times of persecution for the exercise of censures, therefore these censures were only arbitrary and humane; unless it be proved, that it was not a duty in them so to confederate and join together, nor was there any antecedent obligation to inflict those censures upon offenders. Much less, thirdly, because their jurisdiction is not civil and coactive, therefore they have none at all; which is as much as to say, the Laws of Scripture are not our common Laws, therefore they are none at all.

§. 3. I shall not here insist upon the divine right of a power to excommunicate offenders, founded upon the positive Laws of Christ, it being my only business now to shew what foundation such a power hath in the Law of nature; which we have seen doth follow upon the Churches being

being a distinct society ruled by other Laws, acting on other ends, subsisting upon differing grounds from any other society. A farther evidence we have of this, how consonant it is to the light of nature, from the practice of all societies pretending to be for the worship of God, who have looked upon this as the proper penalty of offenders among them, to be excluded out of those societies. Thus we find among the *Druids*, whose great office was to take care of the worship of their Gods, and to instruct the people in religion, as *Cæsar* relates, *illi rebus divinis interſunt, ſacrificia publica ac privata procurant, religiones interpretantur*; and accordingly the punishment of disobedience among them was excommunication from their sacrifices, which they looked upon as the greatest punishment could be inflicted upon them, as *Cæsar* at large describes it; *Si quis aut privatus aut publicus eorum decreto non ſtetit, ſacrificiis interdicunt: hæc pœna apud eos eſt graviſſima; quibus ita eſt interdictum ii numero impiorum & ſceleratorum habentur, iis omnes decedunt, additum eorum ſermonemque defugiunt, ne quid ex contagione incommodi accipiant, neque iis petentibus jus redditur, neque honos ullus communicatur.*

Cæſar de bello Gallico. l. 6. *V. Nicolaum Damaſcenum de moribus gentium de Cercetis,* τῶν ἀδικησάντων ὅτιῶν τῶν ἱερῶν ἀπείργουσιν.

§. 4. The practice of excommunication among the Jews is not questioned by any, but the right ground and original of that practice, with the effect and extent of it. Some conceive it to have been only taken up among the Jews after the power of capital punishments was taken from them; and that it was used by them, wholly upon a civil account, not extending to the exclusion of men from their worship in the Temple or Synagogues, but only to be a note of infamy upon offending persons. This opinion though entertained by persons of much skill and learning in the Jewish Antiquities, yet carries not that evidence with it to gain my assent to it. For first, the cause of excommunication were not such as were expressed by their Law to deserve such civil punishments as might have been inflicted by them upon offenders, nor were they generally matters of a civil nature, but matters of offence and scandal, as will appear to any that shall peruse the twenty four causes of excommunication related out of the Jewish Writers by *Selden* and *Joh. Coch.* Such were *the neglecting the precepts of the Scribes, the vain pronouncing the name of God, bearing witness against a Jew before Heathen tribunals, doing any common work in the afternoon of the day before the passover*, with others of a like nature. If Excommunication had been then taken up among them only *ex confederatâ disciplinâ*, to supply the defect of civil judicatories, at least all capital offenders must have lain under the sense of excommunication. But here we read not of any being excommunicated for those, but for other lesser matters, which were looked upon as matters of scandal among them; and though some of them were matters of civil injuries, yet it follows not that men were excommunicated for them as such, but for the scandal which attended them. As in the Christian Church, men are excommunicated for matters which are punishable by the civil Magistrate, but not under that notion, but as they are offences to that Christian society which they live among. *Secondly*, It appears that excommunication was not a mere civil penalty, because the increasing or abatement of that penalty did depend upon the person's repentance and desire of absolution. Now civil penalties do not regard the intention and mind of the person, but the quality and desert of the action; the reason is, because humane Laws do respect immediately *actionem ipſam*, and not *animum agentis*, unless it be only so

Selden de jure natur. &c. l. 4. cap. 8. Excerpt. Gem. Sanh. p. 147.

far as the mind hath influence upon the action. But now it is otherwise in such Laws which take immediate notice of the intention of the mind, and only of outward actions as they are significative and expressive of the inward intentions: for in these, though the ground of proceeding to penalties be from the notice taken of the outward action, yet that outward action being subject to penalty, as expressive of the minds intention; where there may be sufficient evidence given of the integrity and uprightness of the intention afterwards, there may be proportionably a relaxation of the penalty; because the end of the penalty inflicted was not to be an act of justice excluded from mercy in the end of administration as in civil judicatories, but an act of justice whose end was mercy, that is, the regaining and recovering the offenders soul from sin, by inflicting such a penalty upon him, as might humble him under the sense of it. Hence appears the great reasonableness of their proceedings in the managery of discipline in the primitive times, who did not fix a certain time as a standing Law for all offenders, but did increase, or lessen both the time and weight of their penance, according to the evidences given of their submission and true repentance for their miscarriages. That it was thus now in reference to excommunication among the Jews, appears from what is asserted by the Learned *Buxtorf* concerning the time of the lesser excommunication, called נדוי *Niddui*, which remained thirty days usually, but were shortned by confession and desire of absolution; *durat* 30. *dies, qui tamen pœnitentiâ & deprecatione decurtantur.* But if after thirty days past, he continue impenitent, the Judge as he sees fit, increaseth the punishment, so as to double or treble the time, or extend it to his whole life: if he died without repentance, a stone is laid upon his bier, to shew he deserved lapidation; they wept not for him, nor buried him in the common place of burial. Farther, *Buxtorf* there alledgeth this constitution of their Law: that if he that was under *Niddui*, and desired not absolution, was the second time under it, if that did no good on him, then he was excommunicated with the higher sort of excommunication, called חרם which is likewise observed by *Joh. Coch.* Mr. *Selden*, and others. From whence it is evident that this was an Ecclesiastical censure, and not merely civil, because the main end of it was not satisfaction to the Law, but the repentance of the person who lay under the fault; and according to the evidence given of it, the penalty was relaxed or increased; which argument not yet taken notice of nor improved by writers on this subject, seems to make the case clear, that excommunication among the Jews was not a mere *out-lawry*, as some conceive it to have been.

Epist. Hebr. Institut. p. 55.

V. Selden. de jure nat. &c. lib. 4. c. 8. p. 516.

Shulchan Aruch. Chosen hamishpat. sect. 100. Excerpt. Gem. Sanhed. p. 148, c. 11, 12.

§. 5. *Thirdly*, I argue, it was not the breach of the Law, but the publickness of the offence, or the scandal of it which was the ground of excommunication; then it was not a mere civil penalty, but an ecclesiastical censure: for civil penalties do proceed upon the breach of the Law, and alter not as to the publickness or privateness of the offence; but here it is evident, that the same offence deserving excommunication if done in publick, did not if done in private, or was left at the persons liberty to have the offender excommunicated or not. That which is reckoned as the first cause of excommunication, is affront or contempt put upon a wise man, or *Rabbi*, or one that was תלמיד חכם a student in the Law; now it is determined by them in this case, that if it were done in private, the *Rabbi* might pardon him: but if in publick,

lick, he could not. For as *Joh. Coch.* gives the reaſon, *publicum Doctoris ludibrium in legis contemptum redundat*: the contempt of publick teachers of the Law, redounds to the diſhonour of the Law its ſelf. Thus it was the ſcandal of the fault, and not the bare offence which made excommunication neceſſary among them; and not as that ſcandal was a mere defamation of the perſon, but as it redounded to the contempt of the Law. *Fourthly*, I argue from the form uſed in excommunication by them. There are two forms produced of their excommunications, the one by *Buxtorf* out of an old Hebrew Manuſcript, the beginning of which is *Ex ſententiâ Domini Dominorum, ſit in Anathemate Ploni filius Ploni, in utraque domo judicii, ſuperiorum, ſc. & inferiorum, &c.* where two things evidence, it was accounted a ſacred and no civil action doing it immediately in the name and authority of the Lord of Lords; and pronouncing him excommunicate both in heaven and earth. So *R. Elieſer* ſpeaking of the excommunication of the Cuthites or Samaritans: *atque anathemate devovebant Cuthæos myſterio nominis Amphoraſch, & Scriptura exarata in tabulis, & anathemate domus judicii ſuperioris, atque anathemate curiæ inferioris*, as it is tranſlated by *Guli. Vorſtius*, who in his notes upon that book produceth a moſt dreadful ſentence of excommunication uſed to this day in many Synagogues, which they call *Cherem Col. Bo.* from the book whence it is taken, which runs moſt ſolemnly in the ſeveral names of God, whereby they do *Schamatize*, curſe and devote the perſons againſt whom it is pronounced. *Fifthly*, It appears not to be a merely civil thing inſtead of civil power, becauſe they uſe it againſt thoſe over whom they have no civil juriſdiction, as appears by their *Schamatizing* the Chriſtians in their Liturgies, as *Buxtorf* obſerves. *Sixthly*, I argue from the effects of it, becauſe they who lay under it were excluded from publick worſhip, which is averred by *Buxtorf*, *Coch.* and others in the places forecited. It is acknowledged that he that was only under *Niddui*, might be preſent at publick worſhip, but even there he was under his ſeparation too, of four Cubits from any other Iſraelite.

Lex Rabbinic. p. 8, 28.

Pirk. R. Elieſer. c. 38. p. 161.

P. 226. ad 230.

And hence in probability might the miſtake ariſe, becauſe thoſe under *Niddui* might appear at the Temple or Synagogue; therefore excommunication was no prohibition *à ſacris*. But he that was under *Cherem, non docet, non docetur, neither teacheth others, nor is taught himſelf*, ſaith, *Joh. Cocceius*; and *Buxtorf* of one under *Cherem, omnino à cœtu ſacro excluditur*, and in this ſenſe *Buxtorf* expreſly takes the turning out of the Synagogue, *Joh. 9. 22.*——*12. 42.* which, ſaith he, is done by *Cherem*. But againſt this it is ſtrongly pleaded by our Learned Mr. *Selden*, that putting out of the Synagogue is nothing elſe but excommunicating רבדול סן הקהל *to ſeparate from the Congregations*, taking קהר and ſo συναγωγὴ in the civil and not ſacred ſenſe, as it denotes an excluding them from common ſociety; but though it be freely granted that that is ſometimes the ſignification of קהל and συναγωγὴ as *Mat. 10. 17.* yet thoſe particulars being conſidered, which are already laid down, I ſhall leave it to conſideration whether it be more probable to take the word *Synagogue* here in a civil or ſacred ſenſe; when the occaſion expreſſed is merely a matter of doctrine and opinion, and not any thing condemned by their Law. Another thing which hath been I believe a great ground of miſtaking, in this matter, is, that excluding from the civil ſociety among them was always conſequent upon

§. 6.

Ep. inſtitut. p. 56.

De Synedriis. lib. i. cap. 7.

upon excommunication; the reaſon whereof was, becauſe the Church and Commonwealth were not diſtinct among the Jews; and the ſame perſons who took care of ſacred, did likewiſe of civil things (there being no diſtinct *Sanhedrins* among them as ſome imagine) but from hence it no ways follows, but their excommunication might be an excluſion from ſacred worſhip as well as civil ſociety. However, were it as they pretend, that it was from civil commerce, yet the whole people of the Jews being סגולה God's peculiar people, and his only Church in being before the times of the Goſpel, an excluſion in that reſpect from the common ſociety of them might deſervedly be looked upon as a ſacred action, and not merely Civil, it being a ſeparation from a people whoſe main ligature was their being a Church of God, or a Community gathered together for God's worſhip and ſervice. Thus we ſee the Church of the Jews had this power among them; and for the Chriſtian Church, the practice of diſcipline upon offenders was never queſtioned, though the right hath been; ſo that from hence we gather, in that it hath been the practice of ſocieties conſtituted for the worſhip of God, to call offenders to an account for their offences, and if upon examination they be found guilty, to exclude them their ſociety; that it is a dictate of the Law of Nature, that every offender againſt the Laws of a ſociety muſt give an account of his actions to the rulers of it, and ſubmit to the cenſures inflicted on him by them. Thus I am now come to the end of my firſt ſtage, to ſhew how far Church Government is founded upon the Law and Light of Nature.

And ſo to the end of the firſt Part.

PART

A WEAPON-SALVE for the CHURCH'S-WOUNDS, &c.

PART II.

CHAP. I.

The other ground of Divine Right considered, viz. *God's positive Laws; which imply a certain knowledge of God's intention to bind men perpetually. As to which, the arguments drawn from Tradition, and the practice of the Church in after ages, proved invalid by several arguments. In order to a right stating the Question, some concessions laid down. First, That there must be some form of Government in the Church. The notion of a Church explained: whether it belongs only to particular Congregations, which are manifested not to be of God's primary intention, but for our necessity. Evidence for National Churches under the Gospel. A National Church-Government necessary.*

§. 1. I Now come to the second way, whereby any thing comes to be of unalterable Divine Right, which is by the positive Laws of God, which do bind universally to obedience. In the entrance into this discourse, it is necessary to lay down the ways, whereby we find out a Divine positive Law determining an unalterable obligation: which must be either by expres words of Scripture, or by some other certain way, whereby to gather from thence, that it was God's intention to bind men. For the main thing requisite to make a standing universal positive Law, is God's declaring his mind, that the thing inquired into, should unalterably bind men to the practice of it. Now whatever doth sufficiently manifest God's intention, is a *medium* to find out such a Law by, and nothing else: But it must be such a manifestation as gives a mans mind sufficient evidence and testimony whereon to build a true, certain, and divine assent to the thing, as revealed: So that whatsoever binds the Conscience as a Law, must first be entertained by the understanding as a matter of faith; not as it imports something merely *doctrinal* and *dogmatical*, but as it implies the *matter* of a *Divine Revelation*, and the object of an assent upon the credibility of a *Testimony*. For God having the only immediate authority over the consciences of men, nothing can bind immediately the conscience but a Divine Law, neither can any thing bind as such, but what the understanding assents unto, as revealed by God himself. Now the word of God being the only *Codex* and *Digests* of Divine Laws, whatever Law we look for, must either be found there in expres terms, or at least so couched therein, that every one by the exercise of his understanding, may by a certain and easy collection, gather the universal obligation of the thing inquired after. In this case then, whatsoever is not immediately founded upon a Divine *Testimony* cannot be made use of as a *Medium* to infer an universally binding Law by: So that all Traditions and historical evidence will be unserviceable to us, when we inquire

into God's intentions in binding mens conſciences. Matters of fact, and mere Apoſtolical practice, may I freely grant, receive much light from the Records of ſucceeding ages; but they can never give a man's underſtanding ſufficient ground to infer any Divine Law, ariſing from thoſe facts atteſted to by the practice or Records of ſucceeding ages.

§. 2. For *firſt*, the foundation and ground of our aſſent in this caſe, is not the bare teſtimony of antiquity; but the aſſurance which we have, either that their practice did not vary from what was Apoſtolical, or in their writings, that they could not miſtake concerning what they deliver unto us: And therefore thoſe who would infer the neceſſary obligation of men to any form of Government, becauſe that was practiſed by the Apoſtles, and then prove the Apoſtolical practice from that of the ages ſucceeding, or from their writings, muſt firſt of all prove, that what was done then, was certainly the Apoſtles practice, and ſo prove the ſame thing by its ſelf, or that it was impoſſible they ſhould vary from it, or that they ſhould miſtake in judging of it: For here ſomething more is required than a mere matter of fact, in which I confeſs their nearneſs to the Apoſtles times doth give them an advantage above the ages following, to diſcern what it was; but ſuch a practice is required, as infers an univerſal obligation upon all places, times, and perſons. Therefore theſe things muſt be manifeſted, *that ſuch things were unqueſtionably the practice of thoſe ages and perſons*; *that their practice was the ſame with the Apoſtles*; *that what they did was not from any prudential motives, but by vertue of a Law which did bind them to that practice.* Which things are eaſily paſſed over by the moſt eager Diſputers of the controverſie about Church Government, but how neceſſary they are to be proved before any form of Government be aſſerted, ſo neceſſary, that without it there can be no true Church, any weak underſtanding may diſcern.

Secondly, Suppoſing that Apoſtolical practice be ſufficiently atteſted by the following ages, yet unleſs it be cleared from Scripture that it was God's intention that the Apoſtles actions ſhould continually bind the Church, there can be nothing inferred that doth concern us in point of conſcience. I ſay, that though the matter of fact be evidenced by poſterity, yet the obligatory nature of that fact muſt depend on Scripture: and the Apoſtles intentions muſt not be built upon mens bare ſurmiſes, nor upon after-practices, eſpecially if different from the conſtitution of things during the Apoſtles times. And here thoſe have ſomewhat whereon to exerciſe their underſtandings, who aſſert an obligation upon men to any form of Government, by vertue of an Apoſtolical practice, which muſt of neceſſity ſuppoſe a different ſtate of things from what they were when the Apoſtles firſt eſtabliſhed Governours over Churches. As how thoſe who were appointed Governours over particular Congregations by the Apoſtles, come to be by vertue of that ordination, Governours over many Congregations of like nature and extent with that over which they were ſet: And whether, if it were the Apoſtles intention that ſuch Governours ſhould be always in the Church, is it not neceſſary that that intention of theirs be declared by a ſtanding Law, that ſuch there muſt be; for here matter of fact and practice can be no evidence, when it is ſuppoſed to be different from the Conſtitution of Churches afterward: But of this more hereafter.

Thirdly, Suppoſing any form of Government in its ſelf neceſſary, and that

that neceſſity not determined by a Law in the word of God; the Scripture is thereby apparently argued to be inſufficient for its end; for then *deficit in neceſſariis*; ſome things are neceſſary for the Church of God which the Scripture is wholly ſilent in. I ſay not, that every thing about Church Government muſt be written in Scripture; but ſuppoſing any one form neceſſary, it muſt be there commanded, or the Scripture is an imperfect rule, which contains not all things neceſſary by way of precept: For there can be no other neceſſity univerſal, but either by way of *means to an end*, or by way of *Divine command:* I know none will ſay that any particular form of Government is neceſſary abſolutely, by way of means to an end; for certainly, ſuppoſing no obligation from Scripture, Government by an equality of power in the officers of the Church, or by ſuperiority of one order above another, are indifferent in order to the general ends of Government, and one not more neceſſary than the other. If any one form then be neceſſary, it muſt be by that of command; and if there be a command univerſally binding, whoſe footſteps cannot be traced in the word of God, how can the Scriptures be a perfect rule, if it fails in determining binding Laws? So that we muſt, if we own the Scriptures ſufficiency as a binding rule; appeal to that about any thing pleaded as neceſſary, by virtue of any Divine command, and if ſuch a Law cannot be met with in Scripture, which determines the caſe in hand one way or other by way of neceſſary obligation, I have ground to look upon that which is thus left undetermined by God's poſitive Laws, to be a matter of Chriſtian liberty; and that neither part is to be looked upon as neceſſary for the Church of God, as excluſive of the other.

This I ſuppoſe is the caſe, as to particular forms of Government in the Church of God; but that I may not only ſuppoſe but prove it: I now come to the ſtating of the Queſtion, which if ever neceſſary to be done any where, it is in the Controverſie of Church Government, the moſt of mens heats in this matter ariſing from want of right underſtanding the thing in queſtion between them. In the ſtating the Queſtion I ſhall proceed by degrees, and ſhew how far we acknowledge any thing belonging to Government in the Church to be of an unalterable Divine Right. *Firſt*, That there muſt be a form of Government in the Church of God, is neceſſary by vertue, not only of that Law of Nature which provides for the preſervation of ſocieties, but likewiſe by vertue of that Divine Law, which takes care for the Churches preſervation in peace and unity. I engage not here in the controverſie, whether a particular Congregation be the firſt *Political* Church or no; it ſufficeth for my purpoſe that there are other Churches beſides particular Congregations: I mean, not only the *Catholick* viſible Church, which is the *firſt*, not only in *order* of *conſideration*, but *nature* too, as a *totum Integrale* before the *ſimilar parts* of it; but in reſpect of all other accidental modifications of Churches, from the ſeveral ways of their combination together. They who define a Church by ſtated worſhipping Congregations, do handſomely beg the thing they deſire, by placing that in their definition of a Church, which is the thing in queſtion: which is, whether there be no other Church but ſuch particular Congregations? Which is as if one ſhould go about to prove, that there were no civil ſocieties but in particular Corporations, and to prove it, ſhould give ſuch a definition of civil ſociety, that it is a company of men joyned together in a Corporation, for the preſervation of their Rights and §. 3.

Privileges, under the Governours of ſuch a place. It muſt be firſt proved, that no other company of men can be call'd a civil ſociety beſides a Corporation: and ſo that no other ſociety of men joyning together in the profeſſion of the true Religion, can be call'd a Church, but ſuch as join in particular Congregations.

§. 4. To which purpoſe it is very obſervable, that particular Congregations are not *de primariâ intentione divinâ*; for if the whole world could join together in the publick worſhip of God, no doubt that would be moſt properly a Church, but particular Congregations are only accidental, in reference to God's intention of having a Church, becauſe of the impoſſibility of all mens joyning together for the convenient diſtribution of Church-privileges, and adminiſtration of Goſpel-ordinances. For it is evident, that the Privileges and Ordinances, do immediately and primarily belong to the Catholick viſible Church, in which Chriſt to that end hath ſet officers, as the Apoſtle clearly expreſſeth, 1 *Corinth.* 12. 28. (for how Apoſtles ſhould be ſet as officers over particular Congregations, whoſe Commiſſion extended to the whole World, is, I think, ſomewhat hard to underſtand) but for the more convenient participation of Privileges and Ordinances, particular Congregations are neceſſary: This will be beſt illuſtrated by examples. We read that *Eſther* 1. 3. King *Ahaſhuerus* made a feaſt for all his Princes and Servants: Doubtleſs the King did equally reſpect them all as a body in the feaſting of them, and did beſtow his entertainment upon them all as conſidered together; but by reaſon of the great multitude of them, it was impoſſible that they ſhould all be feaſted together in the ſame room; and therefore for more convenient participation of the King's bounty, it was neceſſary to divide themſelves into particular companies, and to aſſociate as many as conveniently could in order to that end. So it is in the Church, Chriſt in donation of privileges equally reſpects the whole Church; but becauſe men cannot all meet together to participate of theſe privileges, a more particular diſtribution was neceſſary for that end. But a clearer example of this kind we have yet in Scripture, which is *Mark* 6. 39. in our Saviour's feeding the multitude with five loaves and two fiſhes; where we ſee our Saviour's *primary intention*, was to feed the whole multitude; but for their more convenient partaking of this food, our Saviour commands them to ſit down συμπόσια συμπόσια, according to the *Hebraiſm* of ingeminating the words, to note the diſtribution of them, and therefore the Vul. Lat. renders it *ſecundum contubernia*, that is κατὰ συμποσίας, as *Camerarius* expounds it, according to ſo many companies and diviſions as might conveniently ſit together, as at a table: Where we plainly ſee this diſtribution was only accidental, as to Chriſt's primary intention of feeding the multitude, but was only neceſſary for their own conveniency. Thus the caſe is evident, as to the Church of God, it is our neceſſity and conveniency which makes ſeveral congregations of the Catholick viſible Church, and not God's primary intention, when he beſtowed ſuch privileges upon the Church, that it ſhould be underſtood of particular Congregations.

§. 5. If then particular congregations be only accidental for our conveniency, it evidently follows that the primary notion of a Church, doth not belong to theſe; nor that theſe are the firſt ſubject of Government which belongs to a Church as ſuch, and not as crumbled into particular congregations; although the actual exerciſe of Government be moſt viſible

ſible and diſcernable there; Becauſe the joyning together for participation of Goſpel ordinances muſt be in ſome particular company or other aſſociated together for that end. Where ever then we find the notion of a Church particular, there muſt be government in that Church; and why a National ſociety incorporated into one civil Government, joyning in the profeſſion of Chriſtianity, and having a right thereby to participate of Goſpel ordinances in the convenient diſtributions of them in particular congregations, ſhould not be called a Church, I confeſs I can ſee no reaſon. The main thing objected againſt it, is, that a Church implies an actual joyning together for participation of all Goſpel ordinances; but as this, as I ſaid before, is only a begging the Queſtion, ſo I ſay now, that actual communion with any particular Congregation is not abſolutely neceſſary to a member of a Church; for ſuppoſing one baptized at ſea, where no ſetled Congregation is (nor any more ſociety than that which *Ariſtotle* calls συμπλοία) yet ſuch a one is thereby a member of the Church of God, though not of any Congregation; ſo likewiſe a Church then may conſiſt of ſuch as have a right to ordinances, without the inſerting their actual participation of them in fixed Congregations. A particular Church then I would deſcribe thus, that it is a *ſociety of men joyning together in the viſible profeſſion of the true Faith, having a right to, and enjoying among them the Ordinances of the Goſpel.* That a whole Nation profeſſing Chriſtianity, in which the ordinances of the Goſpel are duly adminiſtred in particular Congregations, is ſuch a ſociety, is plain and evident. A clear inſtance of ſuch a National conſtitution of a Church under the Goſpel, we have in the Prophecy of the converſion of *Egypt* and *Aſſyria* in Goſpel times. *Iſaiah* 19. 19, 21, 24, 25. *We have Egypts profeſſing the true Faith, and enjoying Goſpel ordinances, verſ.* 19, 21. which according to the prophetical ſtyle are ſet down under the repreſentation of ſuch things as were then in uſe among the Jews: *by an Altar in the midſt of the Land, v.* 19. The Altar noting the true worſhip of God; and being in the midſt of the Land, the univerſal owning of this worſhip by all the people of the Land. God owns them for a Church. *v.* 25. *Whom the Lord of Hoſts ſhall bleſs, ſaying, Bleſſed be Egypt my people.* The very name whereby Iſrael was called while it was a Church. עמי *Hoſea* 2. 1. and when God unchurched them, it was under this name עמי —— לא *ye are not my people.* As much then as *Iſrael* was a Church when God owned it for his people, ſo ſhould *Egypt* be upon their converſion to the Faith of Chriſt, which was done upon *Mark*'s preaching at *Alexandria* not long after the death of Chriſt.

§. 6. This then we have now briefly cleared, that a Nation joyning in the profeſſion of Chriſtianity, is a true Church of God; whence it evidently follows, that there muſt be a form of Eccleſiaſtical Government over a Nation as a Church, as well as of civil Government over it, as a ſociety governed by the ſame Laws. Therefore ſome make this neceſſary to a National Church, *National union in one Eccleſiaſtical body in the ſame community of Eccleſiaſtical Government.* For every ſociety muſt have its Government belonging to it as ſuch a ſociety; and the ſame reaſon that makes Government neceſſary in any particular congregation, will make it neceſſary for all the particular congregations joyning together in one viſible ſociety as a particular National Church. For the unity and peace of that Church, ought much more to be looked after than of any one particular Congregation, in as much as the peace of all the

Hudſon of the Church, cap. 1. *ſ.* 3.

particular combinations of men for participation of ordinances doth depend upon, and is comprehended in the peace of the whole. But though I say from hence, that some form of publick Government by the sub-ordination of particular assemblies to the Government of the whole body of them is necessary, yet I am far from asserting the necessity of any one form of that Government, much more, from saying that no National Church can subsist without one National officer, as the High-Priest under the Law, or one National place of worship, as the Temple was. The want of considering which, *viz.* that National Churches may subsist without that form of them under the Jews, is doubtless the great ground of mens quarrelling against them; but with what reason, let men impartially judge. This then we agree, that some form of Government is necessary in every particular Church, and so that Government in the Church of Divine and unalterable right; and that not only of particular Congregations, but of all societies which may be call'd Churches, whether Provincial, or National.

CHAP. II.

The second concession is, That Church government formally considered, must be administred by officers of Divine appointment. To that end, the continuance of a Gospel Ministry fully cleared from all those arguments, by which positive Laws are proved immutable. The reason of the appointment of it continues; the dream of a seculum Spiritus Sancti *discussed, first broached by the Mendicant Fryers. Its occasion and unreasonableness shewed. God's declaring the perpetuity of a Gospel Ministry,* Matth. 28. 19. *explained. A novel interpretation largely refuted. The World to come, what. A Ministry necessary for the Churches continuance,* Ephes. 4. 12. *explained, and vindicated.*

§. 1. *Secondly,* That the Government of the Church ought to be administred by officers of Divine appointment, is another thing I will yield to be of Divine Right: but the Church here, I take not in that latitude which I did in the former Concession, but I take it chiefly here for the members of the Church, as distinct from officers, as it is taken in *Acts* 15. 22. So that my meaning is, that there must be a standing perpetual Ministry in the Church of God, whose care and employment must be, to oversee and Govern the people of God, and to administer Gospel ordinances among them, and this is of Divine and perpetual Right. That Officers were appointed by Christ in the Church for these ends at first, is evident from the direct affirmation of Scripture. *God hath set in the Church, first Apostles, secondly Prophets, thirdly Teachers,* &c. 1 *Corinth.* 12. 28. *Eph.* 4. 8, 11. and other places to the same purpose. This being then a thing acknowledged, that they were at first of Divine institution, and so were appointed by a Divine positive Law, which herein determines and restrains the Law of Nature (which doth not prescribe the certain qualifications of the persons to govern this society, nor the instalment, or admission of them into this imployment, *viz.* by ordination.) The only inquiry then left is, whether a standing Gospel-ministry be such a positive Law, as is to remain perpetually in the Church, or no? which I shall make appear by those things

which I laid down in the entrance of this Treatiſe, as to the notes whereby to know when poſitive Laws are unalterable.

The firſt was when the ſame reaſon of the command continues ſtill; §. 2. and what reaſon is there why Chriſt ſhould appoint officers to rule his Church then, which will not hold now? Did the people of God need Miniſters then to be as *Stars* (as they are call'd in Scripture) to lead Rev. 1. 16. them unto Chriſt, and do they not as well need them now? Had people need of *guides* then, when the doctrine of the Goſpel *was confirmed* Heb. 13 7. *to them by miracles*, and have they not much more now? Muſt there Heb. 2. 3. be ſome then to *oppoſe gainſayers*, and muſt they have an abſolute liberty Titus 1. 9. of propheſying now, when it is foretold what times of ſeduction the 2 Tim. 3. 1. laſt ſhall be? Muſt there be ſome then *to rule over their charge, as* Heb. 13. 17. *they that muſt give an account*, and is not the ſame required ſtill? Were there ſome then *to reprove, rebuke, exhort, to preach in ſeaſon, out of* 2 Tim. 4. 2. *ſeaſon*, and is there not the ſame neceſſity of theſe things ſtill? Was it not enough then, that there were ſo many in all Churches that had extraordinary gifts of *tongues, propheſying, praying, interpretation of tongues*, 1 Cor. 14. but beſides thoſe there were *ſome Paſtors by office*, whoſe duty it was to 1 Tim. 4. *give attendance to reading, to be wholly in theſe things*, and now when 13. theſe extraordinary gifts are ceaſed, is not there a much greater neceſſity than there was then, for ſome to be ſet apart and wholly deſigned for this work? Were Ordinances only then adminiſtred by thoſe whom Mat 28. 18. *Chriſt commiſſioned*, and ſuch as derived their autliority from them; and what reaſon is there that men ſhould arrogate and take this employment upon themſelves now? If Chriſt had ſo pleaſed, could he not have left it wholly at liberty for all believers to have gone about Preaching the Goſpel? or why did he make choice of twelve Apoſtles chiefly for that work, were it not his will to have ſome particularly to diſpenſe the Goſpel? And if Chriſt did then ſeparate ſome for that work, what reaſon is there why that office ſhould be thrown common now, which Chriſt himſelf incloſed by his own appointment?

There can be no poſſible reaſon imagined, why a Goſpel Miniſtry §. 3. ſhould not continue ſtill, unleſs it be that Fanatick pretence of a *ſeculum Spiritus Sancti, a diſpenſation of the Spirit*, which ſhall evacuate the uſe of means of inſtruction, and the uſe of all Goſpel ordinances; which pretence is not ſo novel as moſt imagine it to be; for ſetting aſide the *Montaniſtical ſpirit* in the Primitive times, which acted upon principles much of the ſame nature with theſe we now ſpeak of; the firſt riſe of this *Ignis fatuus* was from the *bogs* of Popery, *viz.* from the orders of the *Dominicans* and *Franciſcans*, about the middle of the twelfth *Century*. For no ſooner did the *Pauperes de Lugduno*, or the *Waldenſes* appear, making uſe of the word of God to confute the whole Army of Popiſh traditions, but they, finding themſelves worſted at every turn while they diſputed that ground, found out a *Stratagem* whereby to recover their own credit, and to beat their adverſaries quite out of the field. Which was, that the Goſpel which they adhered to ſo much, was now out of date, and inſtead of that they broached another Goſpel out of the writings of the *Abbot Joachim*, and *Cyril's viſions*, which they blaſphemouſly named *Evangelium Spiritus Sancti*, *Evangelium Novum*, and *Evangelium Æternum*, as *Gulielmus de Sancto Amore*, their great Antagoniſt relates, in his Book *de periculis noviſſ. temporum*, purpoſely deſigned againſt the Impoſtures of the Mendicant Friers, who then like Locuſts, roſe in multitudes with their ſhaven crowns

Matthæus Paris. hiſt. Angl. in Hen. 3. A. 1257. p. 939. Ed. Vatſii. cap. 8. apud Balæum. App. de vitis Pontif. p. 480.

crowns out of the bottomleſs pit. This Goſpel of the ſpirit they ſo much magnified above the Goſpel of Chriſt, that the ſame Author relates theſe words of theirs concerning it; *Quod comparatum ad Evangelium Chriſti, tanto plus perfectionis ac dignitatis habet, quantum Sol ad Lunam comparatus, aut ad nucleum teſta*; that it exceeded it as much as the kernel doth the ſhell, or the Light of the Sun doth that of the Moon. We ſee then from what quarter of the world this new light began to riſe: but ſo much for this digreſſion. To the thing it ſelf.

§. 4. If there be ſuch a diſpenſation of the ſpirit which takes away the uſe of Miniſtry and Ordinances, it did either commence from the time of the effuſion of the Spirit upon the Apoſtles, or ſome time ſince. Not then; for even of thoſe who had the moſt large portion of the Spirit poured upon them, we read that they continued in all Goſpel-ordinances, *Acts* 2. 42. and among the chief, τῇ διδαχῇ τ῀ Ἀποστόλων, *under the Apoſtles Miniſtry*, it may be better rendred than *in the Apoſtles Doctrine*: And which is moſt obſervable, the prophecy of *Joel* about the Spirit, is then ſaid to be fulfilled, *Acts* 2. 17. Beſides, if either that place of *Joel*, or that of *Jeremy*, cited *Heb.* 8. 11. *or the Unction of the Spirit*, 1 Joh. 2. 20, 27. did take away the uſe of preaching, how did the Apoſtles themſelves underſtand their meaning, when they were ſo diligent in preaching and inſtructing others: *John* writes to thoſe *to try the Spirits*, of whom he ſaith, *they have an unction to know all things*; and thoſe to whom the Apoſtle writes, that *they need not teach every one his neighbour*: of them he ſaith, *that they had need be taught the firſt principles of the oracles of God.* And even in that very Chapter where he ſeems to ſay, they that are under the New Covenant, need not be taught, he brings that very ſpeech in as an argument, that the old diſpenſation of the Law was done away; And ſo goes *about to teach*, when he ſeems to *take away the uſe of it.* Theſe ſpeeches then muſt not be underſtood in their abſolute and literal ſenſe, but with a reflection upon, and compariſon with, the ſtate of things in the times wherein thoſe prophecies were utter'd: For God to heighten the Jews apprehenſions of the great bleſſings of the Goſpel, doth ſet them forth under a kind of Hyperbolical expreſſions, that the dull capacity of the Jews might at leaſt apprehend the juſt weight and magnitude of them, which they would not otherwiſe have done. So in that place of *Jeremy*, God to make them underſtand how much the knowledge of the Goſpel exceeded that under the Law, doth as it were ſet it down in this Hyperbolical way, that it will exceed it as much, as one that needs no teaching at all, doth one that is yet but in his rudiments of learning. So that the place doth not deny the uſe of teaching under the Goſpel, but becauſe teaching doth commonly ſuppoſe ignorance, to ſhew the great meaſure of knowledge, he doth it in that way, as though the knowledge ſhould be ſo great, that men ſhould not need be taught in ſuch a way of rudiments as the Jews were, *viz.* by Types and Ceremonies, and ſuch things. We ſee then no ſuch diſpenſation was in the Apoſtles times; for the ſame Apoſtle after this in Chap. 10. 25. bids them *not to forſake Aſſembling themſelves together as ſome did*: Wherefore were theſe Aſſemblies, but for inſtruction? and in the laſt Chapter, *bids them obey their rulers.* What need of rulers, if no need of teaching? But ſo ſenſleſs a dream will be too much honour'd with any longer confutation. In the Apoſtles times then, there was no ſuch diſpenſation of the Spirit, which did take away the uſe of Miniſtry and Ordinances. If it

1 Joh. 4. 1. 1 Joh. 2. 20. Heb. 5. 12. *Calvin in* Joel 2. 28. Jer. 31. 31. Heb. 10. 25. Heb. 13. 7.

be

be expected since their times, I would know whence it appears, that any have a greater measure of the Spirit than was poured out in the Apostles' times; for then the Ministry was joyned with the Spirit: and what prophecies are fulfilled now, which were not then? or if they pretend to a doctrine distinct from, and above what the Apostles taught, let them produce their evidences, and work those miracles which may induce men to believe them: Or let them shew what obligation any have to believe pretended new revelations, without a power of miracles, attesting that those revelations come from God? Or whereon men must build their faith, if it be left to the dictates of a pretended spirit of revelation? or what way is left to discern the good spirit from the bad, in its acting upon mens minds, if the word of God be not our rule still? Or how God is said to have spoken *in the last days by his Son*, if a farther speaking be yet expected? For the Gospel dispensation is therefore call'd the Last days, because no other is to be expected: Times being differenced in Scripture according to God's ways of revealing himself to men. But so much for this. Heb. 1. 1.

§. 5. The second way whereby to know when positive Laws are unalterable, is, when God hath declared that such Laws shall bind still. Two ways whereby God doth express his own will concerning the perpetuity of an office founded on his own institution. *First*, If such things be the work belonging to it, which are of necessary and perpetual use. *Secondly*, If God hath promised to assist them in it perpetually, in the doing of their work. *First*, The objects of the Ministerial office are such things which are of necessary and perpetual use; I mean the administration of Gospel-ordinances, *viz.* the Word and Sacraments, which were appointed by Christ for a perpetual Use. The Word as a means of conversion and edification; the Sacraments, not only as notes of distinction of Professors of the true faith from others, but as Seals to confirm the truth of the Covenant on God's part towards us, and as instruments to convey the blessings sealed in the Covenant to the hearts of belivers: Now the very nature of these things doth imply their perpetuity and continuance in the world, as long as there shall be any Church of God in it. For these things are not *typi rerum futurarum*, only Ceremonies to represent something to come, but they are *symbola rerum invisibilium*, signs to represent to our senses things invisible in their own nature; and between these two there is a great difference, as to the perpetuity of them: For Types of things as to come, must of necessity expire when the thing typified appears; but representation of invisible things cannot expire on that account, because the thing represented as invisible, cannot be supposed to be made visible, and so to evacuate the use of the signs which represent them to us. *Types* represent a thing which is at present invisible, but under the notion of it as future; *Symbols* represent a thing at present invisible, but as present, and therefore *Symbols* are designed by God's institution for a perpetual help to the weakness of our faith. And therefore the Lord's Supper is appointed *to set forth the Lord's death, till he come:* whereby the continuance of it in the Church of God is necessarily implied. Now then, if these things which are the proper object of the Ministerial function be of a perpetual nature, when these things are declared to be of an abiding nature, it necessarily follows, that that function to which it belongs to administer these things, must be of a perpetual nature. 1 Cor. 11. 26.

§. 6. Especially if we consider in the second place, that Christ hath promised to be with them continually in the administration of these things:

For that notwithstanding the dust lately thrown upon it, we have a clear place, *Matth.* 28. 19. *Go teach and baptize*, &c. *Lo I am with you always to the end of the World.* If πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας, did not signifie perpetuity, yet certainly the latter words do; for how could Christ be with the Apostles themselves personally to the end of the World? it must be therefore with them, and all that succeed them in the office of teaching and baptizing, to the world's end: For that I assert to be the meaning of ἕως τ συντελείας τ αἰῶνος. I insist not barely on the signification of the word αἰὼν, either as to its supposed Etymology, or as it answers the Heb. עול ם knowing how fallible the arguments drawn from thence are, when in the dispute of the eternity of the Law of *Moses* with the Jews, it is confessed that עולם relates only to a long continuance of time. But however, I suppose that it will hardly be found in Scripture, that either αἰὼν or עולם doth barely relate to the time of life of any individual persons, especially if absolutely put as it is here. One great signification of αἰὼν in the New Testament (which we are to inquire into, and not how it is used among Greek Authors) is that wherein αἰὼν is taken for the world its self, which *Vorstius* reckons among the Hebraisms of the N. Test. in which sense the Jews call God רב העולם and great persons גדולי העלם *Magnates mundi*; in which sense, in the N. Testament, the Devil is call'd ὁ ἄρχων τ αἰῶνος τούτου, *John* 12.31.——14.31. and ὁ θεὸς τ αἰῶνος τούτου, 2 *Cor.* 4. 4. And so God is said to create τοὺς αἰῶνας, *the world*, *Heb.* 1. 2.—11. 3. If we take it in this sense, Christ's promise must of necessity relate to the dissolution of the fabrick of the world, and that he would be with his servants in the Gospel, till all things be dissolved. Against this it is pleaded, that the συντέλεια here relates to the destruction of *Jerusalem*, and that αἰὼν implies the state of things under the Law, which would continue till *Jerusalem* was destroyed, from which time a new αἰὼν would commence. But to this I answer *first*, I absolutely deny that συντέλεια τ αἰῶνος, doth ever in Scripture relate to the destruction of the Jewish State. This will be best made out by a particular view of the places wherein this phrase occurs. The first time we meet with this phrase is in *Matthew* 13. where we have it thrice. *v.* 39. ὁ δὲ θερισμὸς συντέλεια τ αἰῶνός ἐστι. Now can any be so senseless, as to imagine that the harvest wherein the Tares shall be gathered, and cast into unquenchable fire, when the Angels are said to be the Reapers, and to gather out of Christ's Kingdom every thing that offends, should be attributed to the destruction of *Jerusalem?* And so *v.* 40. and *v.* 49. where the same phrase expresseth the same time, ὅταν ἔσται ἐν τῇ συντελείᾳ τ αἰῶνος, where the antecedents and consequents fully declare, what the time is there meant, which is the general judgment of the world. The only place pleaded for this sense is *Matth.* 24. 3. where the Disciples inquire of Christ what should be the sign, τ σῆς παρουσίας καὶ τ συντελείας τ αἰῶνος, where granting, that the former *Christ's coming* may respect his coming to alter the present state of things according to the Jews apprehension of the Messias; yet I deny that the latter doth, but it respects the general destruction of the world, consequent upon that alteration: for the Jews not only expect an alteration of the present state of things among them, but a consequent destruction of the world, after the coming of the Messias, according to that speech of theirs cited by Dr. *Lightfoot*, אלף שבים עולם זה חרב *This world shall be destroyed for* 1000 *years*, and after that עתיד לבוא *there should be the state of Eternity.* So that the Disciples,

Philolog. Sacr. de Hebr. N. T. cap. 2.

Horæ hebr. in Matth. 24. 3. *p.* 262.

ſciples, ſpeaking in the ſenſe of the Jews, do not only inquire of the ſigns of his altering the preſent ſtate of things among them, but likewiſe of the deſtruction of the whole world too. Accordingly it is obſervable, that throughout that Chapter, our Saviour intermixeth his anſwers to theſe two Queſtions. Sometimes ſpeaking in reference to the Jewiſh State, as it is plain he doth, *verſe* 15, 16. and ſo on; and when he ſaith, *that this Generation ſhall not paſs, till all theſe things be fulfilled*, ver. 34. But then it is as evident, that ſome places muſt relate to the deſtruction of the world, as when he ſaith, *of that day and hour knoweth no man, no not the Angels of heaven, but the Father only*, *v.* 36. which will appear more plainly, by comparing it with *Mark* 13. 32. *Where the Son is excluded from knowing that hour too*; But how can any ſay, that the Son did not know the time of the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, which he himſelf foretold when it ſhould be. And thoſe words *heaven and earth ſhall paſs away*, *v.* 35. ſeem to be our Saviour's tranſition to the Anſwer of the other Queſtion, about the final deſtruction of all things; however that be, we ſee no reaſon at all why συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος, ſhould only reſpect the ſubverſion of the Jewiſh ſtate: but ſuppoſing it ſhould, yet there is far leſs reaſon why it ſhould be ſo meant, in the place whoſe ſenſe we are inquiring into; for if by Chriſt's coming to deſtroy *Jeruſalem*, the old ſtate and diſpenſation ſhould be taken away, we muſt ſuppoſe a new ſtate under the Meſſias to begin from thence. And how rational doth this ſound, that Chriſt ſhould promiſe his peculiar preſence with his own Apoſtles, whom he imployed in erecting the Goſpel State, only till the old Jewiſh State be ſubverted; but his promiſe not at all to extend to that time, wherein the State of the Kingdom of the Meſſias ſhould be ſet up inſtead of it: And how could any of the Apoſtles, for example S. *John*, who ſurvived the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, expect Chriſt's preſence with him, by vertue of this promiſe, if it extended no farther than to the deſtruction of the Jewiſh State? Beſides, it is a mere groundleſs fancy, and ſavours of the Jewiſh apprehenſions of the State of the Meſſias Kingdom, to imagine that the temporal State of *Jeruſalem* muſt be firſt ſubverted before that αἰὼν or diſpenſation of things was at an end. For the Jewiſh State and diſpenſation did not lie in the *Jewiſh Polity*, but an obligation to the *Law of Moſes*, which expired together with Chriſt. And ſo the Goſpel State, which is call'd the *Kingdom of Heaven*, and the *Regeneration*, began upon Chriſt's Reſurrection and Aſcenſion, when he was ſolemnly (as it were) inaugurated in his Mediatory Kingdom. And preſently after ſends down his *Vice-Roy* upon the day of *Pentecoſt*, in the effuſion of the Spirit upon the Apoſtles, making good his Promiſe of the *Paraclet* to ſupply his abſence: Whereby the Apoſtles were more ſignally impowered for the advancing of the Goſpel State. Mat. 19. 28. Acts 2. 1.

§. 7. The αἰὼν then of the Goſpel commenceth from Chriſt's reſurrection, and to this αἰὼν I am very inclinable to think that our Saviour hath reference in theſe words, when he ſaith *he will be with his diſciples to the end of that* αἰὼν, if we take it for a ſtate of things, or the Goſpel diſpenſation; *that is*, as long as the Evangelical Church ſhall continue: For that in Scripture is ſometime called the world to come, and that Phraſe among the Jews of עולם הבא *the world to come* is ſet to expreſs the time of the Meſſias; and it may be the Apoſtle may refer to this, when he ſpeaks of Apoſtates taſting δυνάμεις τε μέλλοντος αἰῶνος, *that is*, the force and energy of the Goſpel preached; whence the Kingdom of God is Heb. 2. 5. *Lightfoot Horæ. Hebr. in* Mat. 12. 32. *p.* 173. Heb. 6. 5.

1 Cor. 4. 20. is said to be not ἐν λόγῳ, but ἐν δυνάμει, *not in word, but in power*; which is the ἀπόδειξις πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως; spoken of by the Apostle
1 Cor. 2. 4. elsewhere, *the powerful demonstration of the* spirit accompanying the preaching of the Gospel. When Christ is called by the Prophet אבי עד
Isai. 9. 5. *the everlasting Father*, the Septuagint renders it by πατὴρ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος, and so the Vulgar Latin. *Pater futuri sæculi, the Father of the world to come; that is, the Gospel State:* and to this sense Christ is
Heb. 9. 11. said to be made an High-Priest, τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν, and the Law to
Heb. 10. 1. be a shadow τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν, of *good things which should be under the new state of the Gospel.* And which is more plain to the purpose, the Apostle expresseth what was to come to pass in the days of the Gos-
Eph. 2. 7. pel, ἐν τοῖς αἰῶσι τοῖς ἐπερχομένοις, *in the Ages to come*, where the very word αἰὼν, is used to this sense. And according to this importance of
Mat. 12. 32. the word αἰὼν some very probably interpret that place of our Saviour concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost, that it should be forgiven
D. Reynolds on *Hosea* 14. 3. ἔτι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰῶνι, ἔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι, *neither in the present state of the Jewish Church, wherein there is no sacrifice of expiation for contumacious sinners*, but they that despised *Moses*'s Law died without mer-
Heb. 10. 26, 27, 28. cy; so neither shall there be any under the *World to come*, that is *the dispensation of Gospel Grace*, any pardon proclaimed to any such sinners who trample under foot the blood of the Covenant, and offer despight to the spirit of grace. Thus we see how properly the word αἰὼν may agree here to the Gospel state, and so Christ's promise of his presence doth imply the perpetuity of that office as long as the Evangelical state shall remain, which will be to the world's end.

§. 8. The third thing whereby to know when positive institutions are unalterable, is, when they are necessary to the being, succession, and continuance of the Church of God. Now this yields a farther evidence of the perpetuity of officers in the Church of God, seeing the Church itself cannot be preserved without the Government; and there can be no Government without some to rule the members of the Church of God, and to take care for a due administration of Church-privileges, and to inflict censures upon offenders, which is the power they are invested in by the same authority which was the ground of their institution at first. It is not conceivable how any society, as the Church is, can be preserved without the continuance of Church officers among them. As long as the body of Christ must be edified, there must be some καταρτισμοὶ εἰς ἔργον διακονίας, *fitted for the work of the Ministry*, which is appointed in order to that end; For that I suppose is the Apostles meaning in *Ephes.* 4. 12. πρὸς τὸν καταρτισμὸν τῶν ἁγίων εἰς ἔργον διακονίας, εἰς οἰκοδομὴν τοῦ σώματος τοῦ χριστοῦ, following the *Complutensian copy*, leaving out the *comma* between ἁγίων and εἰς ἔργον, which makes as though it were a distinct thing from the former; whereas the Original carries the sense on; for otherwise it should have been εἰς καταρτισμὸν τῶν ἁγίων εἰς ἔργον διακονίας, &c. and those who follow the ordinary reading, are much at a loss how to explain that εἰς ἔργον διακονίας coming in so in the midst without dependance upon the former. Therefore the *vulgar Latin* best renders it *ad consummationem sanctorum ad opus ministerii, for the compleating of the Saints for the work of the ministry in order to the building up of the body of Christ*; and to this purpose *Musculus* informs us the *German version* renders it. And so we understand the enumera-
Eph. 4. 11. tion in the verse before of *Apostles, Prophets, Evangelists, Pastors and Teachers*, not for the persons themselves, but for the gifts of those

persons, *the office of Apostles, Evangelists, Pastors, &c.* which is most suitable to the ἔδωκε δόματα in the *eighth verse*. *He gave gifts to men*; now these gifts, saith he, Christ gave to men πρὸς καταρτισμὸν τῶν ἁγίων εἰς ἔργον διακονίας, *for the fitting the Saints for the work of the Ministry*. Not as a late *Democratical writer* would persuade us, as though all the Saints were thereby fitted for this work of the Ministry; for that the Apostle excludes by the former enumeration; for are all the Saints fitted for Apostles? are all Prophets, are all Evangelists, are all Pastors and Teachers? as the Apostle himself elsewhere argues. And in the eighth *verse* of that Chapter he particularly mentions the several gifts qualifying men for several useful imployments in the Church of God, the Spirit dividing to every man severally as he will. Therefore it cannot be that all the Saints are hereby fitted for this work, but God hath scattered these gifts among the Saints, that those who have them might be fitted εἰς ἔργον διακονίας, because God would not leave his Church without persons qualified for the service of himself in the work of the Ministry, in order to the building up of the body of Christ. And by the τῶν ἁγίων here may be meant no other than those he speaks of in the Chapter before, when he speaks of the revelation made τοῖς ἁγίοις ἀποστόλοις αὐτοῦ καὶ προφήταις, to his holy Apostles and Prophets, and so God gave these gifts for the fitting the Holy Apostles, *&c.* for the work of the Ministry. It cannot be meant of all, so as to destroy a peculiar function of the Ministry; for *God's very giving these gifts to some and not to others*, is an evidence that the function is *peculiar*. For else had the gifts been common to all, every Saint had been an Apostle, every believer a Pastor, and Teacher, and then where had the People been that must have been ruled and governed? So that this very place doth strongly assert both the peculiarity of the function, from the peculiarity of gifts in order to fitting men for it, and the perpetuity of the function from the end of it, the building up of the body of Christ. Thus I have now asserted the *perpetual divine right of a Gospel Ministry*, not only for teaching the word, but administration of ordinances, and governing the Church as a society: which work belongs to none but such as are appointed for it, who are the same with the dispensers of the word, as appears from the titles of ἡγούμενοι, προεστῶτες ποιμένες, Governours, Rulers, Pastors, all which necessarily imply a Governing power, which having been largely proved by others, and yielded by me, I pass over.

1 Cor. 12. 29, 8, 9, 10, 11.

Eph. 3. 5.

Heb. 13. 7, 17. 1 Tim. 5. 17. Eph. 4. 11.

CHAP. III.

The Question fully stated. Not what form of Government comes the neerest to the Primitive practice, but whether any be absolutely determined. Several things propounded for resolving the Question. What the form of Church-Government was under the Law. How far Christians are bound to observe that. Neither the necessity of superiority, nor the unlawfulness can be proved thence.

§. 1. AND now I come to the main subject of the present controversie, which is acknowledging a form of Government necessary, and the Governours of the Church perpetual; whether the particular form

whereby the Church must be governed, be determined by any positive Law of God, which unalterably binds all Christians to the observation of it. By Church here I mean not a particular Congregation, but such a society which comprehends in it many of these lesser Congregations united together in one body under a form of Government. The forms of Government in controversie, the Question being thus stated, are only these two; the particular officers of several Churches acting in an equality of power, which are commonly called a *College of Presbyters*; or a superior order above the standing Ministry, having the power of jurisdiction and ordination belonging to it by vertue of a divine institution. Which order is by an *Antonomasia* called *Episcopacy*. The Question now is not which of these two doth come the *neerest* to *Apostolical practice*, and the first institution, which hath hitherto been the controversie so hotly debated among us; but whether either of these two forms be so settled by a *jus divinum*, *that is*, be so determined by a positive Law of God, that all the Churches of Christ are bound to observe that one form so determined, without variation from it: or whether Christ hath not in the setling of his Church (provided there be some form of Government, and a setled Ministry for the exercise of it,) left it to the prudence of every particular Church, consisting of many Congregations, to agree upon its own form which it judgeth most conducing to the end of Government in that particular Church. Αὐτῷ ῥόδος, αὐτῷ πήδημα. Here now we fix our selves, and the first thing we do is to agree upon our ways of resolution of this Question, whereby to come to an end of this debate. And the most probable way to come to an issue in it, is to go through all the ways whereon men do fix an unalterable divine right, and to see whether any of these do evince a divine right setled upon a positive Law or no, for one of these forms. The pleas then for such a divine right are these. Either some former Law standing in force under the Gospel, or some plain institution of a new Law by Christ in forming his Church, or the obligatory nature of Apostolical practice, or the General sense of the Primitive Church, to which we shall add by way of Appendix, the Judgment of the chief Divines and Churches since the Reformation; if we go happily through these, we may content our selves with having obtained the thing we aim at.

§. 2. The first inquiry then is, whether any former Law of God concerning a form of Government for his Church, either by persons acting in an equality of power, or subordination of one order to another, under the Gospel, doth remain in force or no, binding Christians to the observing of it. The Reason why I begin with this, is, because I observe the disputants on both sides make use of the Pattern under the Law to establish their form by. * Those who are for superiority of one order above another in the Government of the Church, derive commonly their first argument from the Pattern under the Law. † Those who are for an equality of power in the persons acting in Government, yet being for a subordination of Courts, they bring their first argument for that, from the Jewish Pattern. So that these latter are bound by their own argument, though used in another case, to be ruled in this Controversie by the Jewish Pattern. For why should it be more obligatory as to subordination of Courts, than as to the superiority of orders? If it holds in one case, it must in the other. And if there be such a Law for superiority standing unrepealed, there needs no new Law to inforce it under the Gospel. We shall therefore first inquire what foun-

* B. *Bilson Perpet. Govern. cap.* 2. B. *Andrews* Form of Government, in the old T. B. *Usher.* Original of Episc.

† *Herl.* of Indep. *p.* 4. *Apol. Spanheim. omnes.*

dation there is for either Form in that pattern, and how far the argument drawn from thence is obligatory to us now. For the practice then in the Jewish Church, That there was no universal equality in the Tribe of *Levi*, which God singled out from the rest for his own service, is obvious in Scripture. For there we find *Priests* above the *Levites*; the family of *Aaron* being chosen out from the other families of *Cohath* (one of the three Sons of *Levi*) to be employed in a nearer attendance upon God's service, than any of the other Families. And it must be acknowledged, that among both *Priests* and *Levites* there was a superiority; for God placed *Eleazar* over the *Priests*, *Elizaphan* over the *Cohathites*, Numb. 2. *Eliasaph* over the *Gershonites*; *Zuriel* over the *Merarites*, and these are v. 30, 34, 35. called נשיאים *the rulers over the several Families*; for it is said of every one of them ונשיא בית אב *he was the ruler over the house of his Father.* Numb. 4. Neither were these equal, for over *Eliasaph* and *Zuriel* God placed *Ithamar*, over *Elizaphan* and his own Family, God set *Eleazar*, who by reason of his authority over all the rest, is called נשיא נשיא *the Ruler of the rulers of Levi*; and besides these, there were under these rulers ראשי אבות *the chief fathers of the several distinct Families*, as they are called, *Exodus* 6. 25. Thus we briefly see the subordination that there was in the Tribe of *Levi*; the *Levites* first, over them the *heads of the Families*, over them the *Rulers* of the *chief* of the *heads*, over them *Ithamar*, over both *Priests* and *Levites*, *Eleazar*; over all, *Aaron* the *High-Priest*.

Numb. 28, 32. Numb. 4. 16.

There being then so manifest an inequality among them, proceed we to shew how obligatory this is under the Gospel. For that end it will be necessary to consider whether this imparity and superiority were peculiarly appointed by God for the Ecclesiastical Government of the Tribe of *Levi*, as it consisted of persons to be employed in the service of God, or it was only such an inequality and superiority as was in any other Tribe. If only common with other Tribes, nothing can be inferred from thence peculiar to Ecclesiastical Government under the Gospel, any more than from the Government of other Tribes to the same kind of Government in all civil States. We must then take notice that *Levi* was a particular distinct Tribe of its self, and so not in subordination to any other Tribe; for they had *the heads of their Fathers as well as others*, *Exodus* 6. 25. and although when they were setled in *Canaan*, their habitations were intermixt with other Tribes in their *forty eight* Cities, yet they were not under the Government of those Tribes among whom they lived, but preserved their Authority and Government entire among themselves. And therefore it was necessary there should be the same Form of Government among them, which there was among the rest. The whole body of the Nation then was divided into *thirteen Tribes*; these Tribes into their *several Families*; some say *seventy*, which they called משפחות. these Families were divided into so many households, בתים their households into persons נפשות over the several persons were the several Masters of Families; over the several households were the Captains of 1000 and 100, 50——10; over the Families, I suppose were the heads of the Fathers. And over the thirteen Tribes were the ראשי אבות המטות *the chief Fathers of the Tribes of the Children of Israel*, *Numb.* 32. 28. and we have the names of them set down, *Numb.* 34. 17, &c. So that hitherto we find nothing peculiar to this Tribe, nor proper to it as employed in the service of God. For their several Families had their several heads, and *Eleazar* over them as chief of the Tribe.

§. 3.

Tribe. And so we find throughout *Numbers* 2. all the heads of the several Tribes are named and appointed by God, as *Eleazar* was.

§. 4. The only things then which seem proper to this Tribe were, the superiority of the Priests over the Levites in the service of God, and the supereminent power of the High-Priest, as the Type of Christ. So that nothing can be inferred from the order under the Law, to that under the Gospel, but from one of these two. And from the *first* there can be nothing deduced but this, that as there was a superiority of Offices under the Law, so likewise should there be under the Gospel, which is granted by all in the superiority of *Priests* over *Deacons*, to whom these two answer in the Church of God, in the judgment of those who contend for a higher order by divine institution above Presbyters. And withal we must consider that there was under that order no power of jurisdiction invested in the Priests over the Levites, but that was in the heads of the Families; and ordination there could not be, because their office descended by succession in their several Families. Those who would argue from *Aaron*'s power, must either bring too little, or too much from thence: *Too little*, if we consider his office was typical and ceremonial, and as High-Priest, had more immediate respect to God than men, *Heb.* 5. 1. and therefore *Eleazar* was appointed over the several Families during *Aaron*'s life-time, and under *Eleazar*'s his son *Phinehas*. *Too much*, if a necessity be urged for the continuance of the same authority in the Church of God, which is the argument of the Papists, deriving the Pope's Supremacy from thence. Which was acutely done by Pope *Innocentius the third*, the Father of the *Lateran Council*, who proved that the Pope may exercise temporal jurisdiction from that place in *Deuteronomy* 17. 8. and that by this reason, because *Deuteronomy did imply the second Law, and therefore what was* there written, *in Novo Testamento debet observari*, must be observed under the Gospel, which according to them, is a new Law.

§. 5. All that can be inferred then from the Jewish pattern, cannot amount to any obligation upon Christians, it being, at the best, but a judicial Law, and therefore binds us not up as a positive Law, but only declares the equity of the thing in use then. I conclude then, that the Jewish pattern is no standing Law for Church-Government now, either in its common or peculiar Form of Government; but because there was some superiority of order then, and subordination of some persons to others, under that Government, that such a superiority and subordination is no ways unlawful under the Gospel, for that would destroy the equity of the Law. And though the Form of Government was the same with that of other Tribes, yet we see God did not bind them to an equality, because they were for his immediate service, but continued the same way as in other Tribes; thence I infer, that there is no necessary obligation upon Christians to continue that Form under the Jews, because their Laws do not bind us now; so neither is there any repugnancy to Law, in such a subordination, but it is very agreeable with the equity of it, being instituted for peace and order, and therefore ought not to be condemned for Antichristian. The Jewish pattern then of Government neither makes equality unlawful, because their Laws do not oblige now; nor doth it make superiority unlawful, because it was practised then. So that notwithstanding the Jewish Pattern, the Church of Christ is left to its own liberty for the choice of its Form of Government, whether by an equality of power in some persons, or superiority and subordination of one order to another.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Whether Christ hath determined the Form of Government by any positive Laws. Arguments of the necessity why Christ must determine it, largely answered; as, First, Christ's faithfulness compared with Moses, *answered, and retorted; and proved, that Christ did not institute any Form of Church-Government, because no such Law for it as* Moses *gave; and we have nothing but general rules, which are applyable to several Forms of Government. The Office of* Timothy *and* Titus, *what it proves, in order to this question: The Lawfulness of Episcopacy shewn thence, but not the Necessity. A particular Form; how far necessary, as Christ was the Governour of his Church; the similitudes the Church is set out by, prove not the thing in question. Nor the difference of Civil and Church-Government; nor Christ's setting Officers in his Church; nor the inconvenience of the Church's power in appointing new Officers. Every Minister hath a power respecting the Church in common, which the Church may restrain. Episcopacy thence proved lawful; the argument from the Scripture's perfection answered.*

§. 1. WE come then from the Type to the *Antitype*, from the *rod of Aaron* to the *root of Jesse*, *from the Pattern* of the Jewish Church, to the *Founder* of the Christian: To see whether our Lord and Saviour hath determined this Controversie, or any one Form of Government for his Church, by any universally binding Act or Law of his. And here it is pleaded more hotly by many, that *Christ must do it*, than *that he hath done it*. And therefore I shall first examine the pretences of the necessity of Christ's determining the particular Form; and then the arguments that are brought that he hath done it. The main Pleas that there must be a perfect Form of Church-Government laid down by Christ, for the Church of God, are *from the comparison of Christ with* Moses, *from the equal necessity of Forms of Government now, which there is for other Societies, from the perfection and sufficiency of the Scriptures*; all other arguments are reducible to these three heads. Of these in their order.

Heb. i. 2, 5, 6.

Arg. 1. First, *From the comparison of Christ with* Moses, they argue thus; *If* Moses *was faithful in his house as a servant, much more Christ as a son; now* Moses *appointed a particular Form of Government for the Church under the Old Testament, therefore Christ did certainly lay down a Form of Church-Government for the New Testament.*

Ans. 1. To this I answer, First: Faithfulness implies the discharge of a Trust reposed in one by another: so that it is said, *Ver.* 2. *he was faithful to him that appointed him*: Christ's faithfulness then lay in discharging the work which his Father laid upon him, which was the work of mediation between God and us; and therefore the comparison is here instituted between *Moses* as typical *Mediator*, and Christ as the true *Mediator*; that as *Moses* was faithful in his work, so was Christ in his. Now *Moses* his faithfulness lay in keeping close to the Pattern received in the Mount, that is, observing the commands of God: Now therefore if Christ's being faithful in his office, doth imply the setling any one form of Government in the Church, it must be made appear that the setling of this form was part of Christ's mediatory work, and that which the Father commanded him to do as Mediator; and that Christ received such a form

a form from the Father for the Christian Church, as *Moses* did for the Jewish. To this it is said, that the *Government is laid upon Christ's shoulders, and all power is in his hands*; and therefore it belongs to him as Mediator. Christ, I grant, is the King of the Church, and doth govern it outwardly by his Laws, and inwardly by the conduct of his spirit; but shall we say that therefore any one form of Government is necessary, which is neither contained in his Laws, nor dictated by his spirit? the main original of mistakes here, is, the confounding the *external* and *internal* Government of the Church of Christ, and thence whensoever men read of Christ's power, authority and government, they fansie it refers to the outward Government of the Church of God, which is intended of his internal mediatory power over the hearts and consciences of men. But, withal, I acknowledge, that Christ, for the better government of his Church and people, hath appointed officers in his Church, invested them by vertue of his own power, with an authority to preach and baptize, and administer all Gospel ordinances in his own name, *that is, by his authority*; for it is clearly made known to us in the word of God, that Christ hath appointed these things. But then, whether any shall succeed the Apostles in superiority of power over Presbyters, or all remain governing the Church in an equality of power, is no where determined by the will of Christ in Scripture, which contains his Royal-Law; and therefore we have no reason to look upon it as any thing flowing from the power and authority of Christ as mediator, and so not necessarily binding Christians.

Isa. 9. 6. Mat. 28. 18.

Mat. 28. 18, 19.

§. 2. Secondly, I answer, If the correspondency between Christ and *Moses* in their work, doth imply an equal exactness in Christ's disposing of every thing in his Church, as *Moses* did among the Jews; then the Church of Christ must be equally bound to all circumstances of worship as the Jews were. For there was nothing appertaining in the least to the worship of God, but was fully set down even to the pins of the Tabernacle in the Law of *Moses*; but we find no such thing in the Gospel. The main duties and ordinances are prescribed indeed, but their circumstances and manner of performance are left as matters of Christian liberty, and only couched under some general rules; which is a great difference between the Legal and Gospel state. Under the Law all ceremonies and circumstances are exactly prescribed; but in the Gospel we read of some general rules of direction for Christians carriage in all circumstantial things. These four especially contain all the directions of Scripture concerning circumstantials. *All things to be done decently and in order; all to be done for edification. Give no offence. Do all to the glory of God.* So that the particular circumstances are left to Christian liberty with the observation of general rules. It is evident as to Baptism and the Lord's-Supper, which are unquestionably of divine institution, yet as to the circumstances of the administration of them, how much less circumstantial is Christ than *Moses* was! as to Circumcision and the Passover under the Law, the age, time, persons, manner, place, form, all fully set down, but nothing so under the Gospel; whether Baptism shall be administred to infants or no, is not set down in express words, but left to be gathered by analogy and consequences; what manner it shall be administred in, whether by dipping or sprinkling, is not absolutely determined; what form of words to be used, whether in the name of all three persons, or sometimes in the name of Christ only, as in the *Acts* we read (if that be the sense, and not rather in Christ's

1 Cor. 14. 40.
1 Cor. 14. 26.
1 Cor. 10. 32.
1 Cor. 10. 31.
Rom. 14. 6, 7.
Acts 2. 38. 8. 12. 19. 5.

Christ's name, *i.e.* by Christ's authority) whether sprinkling or dipping shall be thrice, as some Churches use it, or only once, as others. These things we see relating to an ordinance of divine institution, are yet past over without any express command determining either way in Scripture. So as to the Lord's-Supper; what persons to be admitted to it, whether all visible professors, or only sincere Christians: upon what terms, whether by previous examination of Church-Officers, by an open profession of their faith, or else only by their own tryal of themselves, required of them as their duty by their Ministers; whether it should be always after supper, as Christ himself did it; whether taken fasting, or after meat; whether kneeling, or sitting, or leaning; whether to be consecrated in one form of words, or several: These things are not thought fit to be determined by any positive command of Christ, but left to the exercise of Christian liberty; the like is as to preaching the word, publick Prayer, singing of Psalms; the duties are required, but the particular modes are left undetermined. The case is the same as to Church-Government. That the Church be governed, and that it be governed by its proper Officers, are things of divine appointment; but whether the Church should be governed by many joining together in an equality, or by subordination of some persons to others, is left to the same liberty which all other circumstances are, this being not the substance of the thing its self, but only the manner of performance of it.

3. I answer, That there is a manifest disparity between the Gospel and Jewish Sate; and therefore reasons may be given why all punctilioes were determined then, which are not now; as, §. 3.

1. The perfection and liberty of the Gospel-state above the Jewish. The Law was only as a Pedagogy, the Church then in her infancy and nonage, and therefore wanted the *Fescues* of Ceremonies to direct her, and every part of her lesson set her, to bring her by degrees to skill and exactness in her understanding the mystery of the things represented to her. But must the Church now grown up under Christ, be still *sub ferulâ*, and not dare to vary in any circumstance, which doth not concern the thing it self. A boy at school hath his lesson set him, and the manner of learning it prescribed him in every mode and circumstance. But at the University hath his Lectures read him, and his work set, and general directions given, but he is left to his own liberty how to perform his work, and what manner to use in the doing of it. So it was with the Church under age, every mode and circumstance was determined; but when the fulness of time was come, the Church being then grown up, the main offices themselves were appointed, and general directions given; but a liberty left how to apply and make use of them, as to every particular case and occasion. Things moral remain still in their full force, but circumstantials are left more at liberty by the Gospel liberty; as a Son that is taught by his Father, while he is under his instruction, must observe every particular direction for him in his learning; but when he comes to age, though he observes not those things as formerly, yet his Son-ship continues, and he must obey his Father as a Child still, though not in the same manner. The similitude is the Apostles, *Galat.* 4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10. which he there largely amplifies to this very purpose of freeing Christians from Judaical ceremonies.

2. The form of Government among the Jews in the Tribe of *Levi*, was agreeable to the form of Government among the other Tribes;

and so *Moses* was not more exact in reference to that, than to any other; and those persons in that Tribe who were the chief before the institution of the Aaronical Priesthood, were so after; but now under the Gospel, people are not under the same restrictions for civil government by a Judicial Law, as they were then. For the form of Ecclesiastical Government then took place among them as one of their Judicial Laws; And therefore if the argument hold, Christ must as well prescribe a form for civil government as Ecclesiastical, if Christ in the Gospel must by his faithfulness follow the pattern of *Moses*. But if Christ be not bound to follow *Moses*'s Pattern as to Judicial Law for his Church and people, neither is he as to a form of Ecclesiastical Government, because that was a part of their civil and Judicial Law.

3. The people of the Jews was a whole and entire people, subsisting by themselves when one set form of Government was prescribed them; but it is otherwise now under the Gospel. The Church of Christ was but forming in Christ's own time, nor the Apostles, in whose time we read of but some Cities and no whole Nations converted to the Faith; and therefore the same form of Government would not serve a Church in its first constitution, which is necessary for it when it is actually formed. A Pastor and Deacons might serve the Church of a City while believers were few, but cannot when they are increased into many Congregations, and so proportionably when the Church is inlarged to a whole Nation, there must be another form of Government then. Therefore they who call for a National Church under the Gospel, let them first shew a Nation converted to the faith, and we will undertake to shew the other. And this is the chief reason why the Churches Polity is so little described in the New Testament, because it was only growing then: and it doth not stand to reason, that the coat which was cut out for one in his infancy, must of necessity serve him when grown a man; which is the argument of those who will have nothing observed in the Church, but what is expressed in Scripture. The Apostles looked at the present state of a Church in appointing officers, and ordered things according to the circumstances of them, which was necessary to be done in the founding of a Church; and the reason of Apostolical practice binds still, though not the individual action, that as they regulated Churches for the best conveniency of Governing them, so should the Pastors of Churches now. But of this largely afterwards.

4. Another difference is, that the people of the Jews lived all under one Civil Government; but it is otherwise with Christians who live under different forms of Civil Government. And then by the same reason, that in the first institution of their Ecclesiastical Government it was formed according to the Civil; by the same reason must Christians do under the Gospel, if the argument holds that Christ must be faithful as *Moses* was. And then because Christians do live under several and distinct forms of Civil Government, they must be bound by the Law of Christ, to contemperate the Government of the Church to that of the State. And what they have gained by this for their cause, who assert the necessity of any one form from this argument, I see not; but on the contrary this is evident, that they have evidently destroyed their own principle by it. For if *Moses* did prescribe a form of Government for *Levi* agreeable to the form of the Commonwealth, and Christ be as faithful as *Moses* was, then Christ must likewise order the Government of Christian Churches according to that of the State, and so must

have different forms as the other hath. Thus much will ſerve abundantly to ſhew the weakneſs of the argument drawn from the agreement of Chriſt and *Moſes*, for the proving any one form of Government neceſſary; but this ſhall not ſuffice. I now ſhall *ex abundanti* from the anſwers to this argument, lay down ſeveral arguments that Chriſt did never intend to inſtitute any one form of Government in his Church.

§. 4. 1. Whatever binds the Church of God as an inſtitution of Chriſt, muſt bind as an univerſal ſtanding Law; but one form of Government in the Church cannot bind it as a ſtanding Law. For whatever binds as a ſtanding Law, muſt either be expreſſed in direct terms as ſuch a Law; or deduced by a neceſſary conſequence from his Laws, as of an univerſally binding nature; but any one particular form of Government in the Church, is neither expreſſed in any direct terms by Chriſt, nor can be deduced by juſt conſequence; therefore no ſuch form of Government is inſtituted by Chriſt. If there be any ſuch Law, it muſt be produced, whereby it is determined in Scripture, either that there muſt be ſuperiority or equality among Church Officers as ſuch after the Apoſtles deceaſe. And though the Negative of a Fact holds not, yet the Negative of a Law doth, elſe no ſuperſtition. I have not yet met with any ſuch produced, and therefore ſhall ſee what conſequences can be made of a binding nature. To this I ſay, that no conſequences can be deduced to make an inſtitution, but only to apply one to particular caſes: becauſe poſitives are in themſelves indifferent without inſtitution and Divine appointment; and therefore that muſt be directly brought for the making a Poſitive univerſally binding, which it doth not in its own nature do. Now here muſt be an inſtitution of ſomething merely poſitive ſuppoſed, which in its ſelf is of an indifferent nature; and therefore no conſequence drawn can ſuffice to make it unalterably binding, without expreſs declaration that ſuch a thing ſhall ſo bind: for what is not in its own nature moral, binds only by vertue of a command, which command muſt be made known by the will of Chriſt, ſo that we may underſtand its obligatory nature. So that both a conſequence muſt be neceſſarily drawn, and the obligation of what ſhall be ſo drawn muſt be expreſſed in Scripture: which I deſpair of ever finding in reference to any one form of Government in the Church.

2. If the ſtanding Laws for Church Government be equally applyable to ſeveral diſtinct forms, then no one form is preſcribed in Scripture; but all the ſtanding Laws reſpecting Church Government, are equally applyable to ſeveral forms. All the Laws occurring in Scripture reſpecting Church Government, may be referred to theſe three heads. Such as ſet down the *Qualifications of the perſons for the office of Government, ſuch as require a right management of their office, and ſuch as lay down rules for the management of their office.* Now all theſe are equally appliable to either of theſe two forms we now diſcourſe of. We begin then with thoſe which ſet down the qualifications of the perſons imployed in Government; thoſe we have largely and fully ſet down by St. *Paul* in his *Ordo* to *Timothy* and *Titus*, preſcribing what manner of perſons thoſe ſhould be who are to be imployed in the Government of the Church. *A Biſhop muſt be blameleſs as the Steward of God not ſelf willed, not ſoon angry, not given to Wine, no ſtriker*, &c. All theſe and the reſt of the Qualifications mentioned, are equally required as neceſſary in a Biſhop, whether taken for one of a ſuperior order above Preſbyters, or elſe only for a ſingle Preſbyter; how ever

1 Tim. 3. 1, 8. Titus 1. 5, 10.

that be, if he hath a hand in Church Government, he must be such a one as the Apostle prescribes; And so these commands to *Timothy* and *Titus* given by *Paul*, do equally respect and concern them, whether we consider them as Evangelists acting by an extraordinary commission, or as fixed Pastors over all the Churches in their several precincts; so that from the commands themselves nothing can be inferred either way to determine the Question; only one place is pleaded for the perpetuity of the office *Timothy* was imployed in, which must now be examined: the place is 1 *Tim.* 6. 13, 14. *I give thee charge in the sight of God*, &c. *that thou keep this commandment without spot, unrebukeable, until the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ.* From hence it is argued thus: The commandment here was the charge which *Timothy* had of Governing the Church; this *Timothy* could not keep personally till Christ's second coming; therefore there must be a succession of Officers in the same kind till the second coming of Christ. But this is easily answered. For first, It is no ways certain what this command was which St. *Paul* speaks of; some understand it of fighting the good fight of Faith, others of the precept of love, others most probably the sum of all contained in this Epistle, which I confess implies in it (as being one great part of the Epistle) *Paul*'s direction of *Timothy* for the right discharge of his office; but granting that the command respects *Timothy*'s office, yet I answer, *secondly*, It manifestly appears to be something *personal*, and not *successive*, or at least nothing can be inferr'd for the necessity of such a succession from this place which it was brought for: Nothing being more evident than that this command related to *Timothy*'s personal observance of it. And therefore, *thirdly*, Christ's appearing here, is not meant of his second coming to judgment, but it only imports the time of *Timothy*'s decease; so *Chrysostome* μέχρι τ σῆς πλειτῆς, μέχρι τῆς ἐξόδυ. So *Estius* understands it, *usque ad exitum vitæ*; and for that end brings that speech of *Augustine*, *Tunc unicuique veniet dies adventus Domini, cum venerit ei dies, ut talis hinc exeat, qualis judicandus est illo die.* And the reason why the time of his death is set out by the coming of Christ, is ἵνα μᾶλλον αὐτὸν διεγείρῃ, as *Chrysostom*, and from him *Theophylact* observes; to incite him more, both to diligence in his work and patience under sufferings, from the consideration of Christ's appearance. The plain meaning of the words then is the same with that, *Revel.* 2. 10. *Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a Crown of life.* Nothing then can be hence inferred as to the necessary succession of some in *Timothy*'s office, whatever it is supposed to be.

Hom. 18. *in* 1 *Tim.* To. 4.

Epistol. So. *ad Hesych.*

§. 5. Secondly, The precepts of the Gospel requiring a right management of the work, are equally appliable to either form. *Taking heed to the flock over which God hath made them overseers*; is equally a duty, whether by *flock* we understand either the particular Church of *Ephesus*, or the adjacent Churches of *Asia*; whether by *Overseers* we understand some acting over others, or all joyning together in an equality. So *exhorting, reproving, preaching in season and out of season, doing all things* ἄνευ προκρίματος, *without rash censures and partiality*; *watching over the flock as they that must give an account: Laying hands suddenly on no man: rebuking not an elder, but under two or three witnesses.* And whatever precepts of this nature we read in the Epistles to *Timothy* and *Titus*, may be equally appliable to men acting in either of these two forms of Government: There being no precept occuring in all those Epistles prescribing to *Timothy*, whether he must act only as a *Consul in Senatu* with

Acts 20. 28.

2 Tim. 4. 2.
1 Tim. 5. 1. 21.
Heb. 13. 17.
1 Tim. 5. 22.
1 Tim. 5. 19.

with the consent of the Presbytery, or whether by his sole power he should determine what was the common interest, and concern of those Churches he was the Superintendent over. Neither doth the Apostle determine at all in those Epistles chiefly concerning Church Government, whether upon the removal of *Timothy* or *Titus* thence as Evangelists, as some pretend, or upon their death as fixed Pastors and Bishops, as others, any should succeed them in the power they enjoyed, or no: nor in what manner the Pastors of the several Churches should order things of common concernment. Which would seem to be a strange omission, were either of these two forms so necessary, taken exclusively of the other, as both parties seem to affirm. For we cannot conceive but if the being and right constitution of a Church did depend upon the manner of the Governours acting in it, but that care which *Paul* had over all the Churches, would have prompted him (especially being assisted and guided by an infallible spirit in the penning those Epistles) to have laid down some certain rules for the acting of the Pastors of the Churches after the departure of *Timothy* and *Titus*. Considering especially that the Epistles then written by him, were to be of standing perpetual use in the Church of God; and by which the Churches in after ages were to be guided as well as those that were then in being. The Apostle in both Epistles takes care for a succession of Pastors in those Churches: *Timothy* is charged to *commit the things that he had heard of* Paul *to faithful men, who shall be fit to teach others*. 2 Tim. 2. 2. Had it not been as requisite to have charged him to have committed his power of Government to men fit for that, had the Apostle looked on the form of Government to be as necessary as the office of preaching? *Paul*, saith he, left *Titus* in *Crete* Titus 1. 5. on purpose *to settle the Churches and ordain Presbyters in every City*: had it not been as necessary to have shewed in what order the Churches must be setled, and what power did belong to those Presbyters, and how they should act in the governing their Churches, had he thought the constitution of the Churches did depend upon the form of their acting? We see here then that St. *Paul* doth not express any thing necessarily inferring any one constant form to be used in the Church of God. And whence can we infer any necessity of it, but from the scriptures laying it down as a duty that such a form and no other there must be used in the Church of God? For all that we can see then by *Paul*'s direction for Church Government, (when if ever, this should have been expressed) it was left to the Christian wisdom and prudence of the Churches of *Ephesus* and *Crete* to consult and determine in what manner the Government of their Churches should be provided for, upon the departure of *Timothy* and *Titus* from them.

§. 6. But here it will be soon replyed, that though nothing be expressed in *Pauls* Epistles to *Timothy* and *Titus*, *yet* Paul's *appointing* Timothy *and* Titus *over those Churches, did determine the form of Government, and they were intrusted with a power to provide for future Governours after them.*

To this I answer: *First*, the superiority which *Timothy* and *Titus* had over those Churches, doth not prove that form of Government necessary in all Churches; I dispute not whether they were *Evangelists or no*, or acted as such in that superiority (of that afterwards) it is evident they might be so; there being no convincing argument to the contrary. And the bare possibility of the truth of the negative destroys the necessity of

the Affirmative of a Propoſition. As, *ſi poſſibile eſt hominem non eſſe animal*, then that propoſition is falſe *Neceſſe eſt hominem eſſe animal.* For *Neceſſe eſt eſſe*, and *Non poſſibile eſt non eſſe*, being *æquipollents* on the one ſide; and *Poſſibile eſt non eſſe*, *Et non neceſſe eſt eſſe*, being *æquipollents* on the other; *Poſſibile eſt non eſſe* muſt be contradictory to *neceſſe eſt eſſe*, as *Non poſſibile eſt non eſſe* is to *Non neceſſe eſt eſſe.* So that if only the poſſibility of their acting as *Evangeliſts*, that is, by an extraordinary commiſſion, be evicted, which I know none will deny, the neceſſity of their acting as fixed Biſhops is deſtroyed, and conſequently the neceſſity of the continuance of their office too, which depends upon the former. For if they acted not as Biſhops, nothing can be drawn from their example neceſſarily inforcing the continuance of the Superiority which they enjoyed. But though nothing can be inferred from hence as to the neceſſity of that office to continue in the Church, which *Timothy* and *Titus* were inveſted in; yet from the ſuperiority of that power which they enjoyed over thoſe Churches, whether as Evangeliſts, or as fixed Biſhops, Theſe two things may be inferred. *Firſt*, That the ſuperiority of ſome Church officers over others is not contrary to the rule of the Goſpel: for all parties acknowledge the ſuperiority of their power above the Preſbyters of the ſeveral Cities; only the continuance of this power is diſputed by many. But if they had any ſuch power at all, it is enough for my preſent deſign, *viz.* that ſuch a ſuperiority is not contrary to the Goſpel rule: or that the nature of the Government of the Church doth not imply a neceſſary equality among the Governours of it. *Secondly*, Hence I infer, that it is not repugnant to the conſtitution of Churches in Apoſtolical times, for men to have power over more than one particular congregation. For ſuch a power *Timothy* and *Titus* had; which had it been contrary to the nature of the regiment of Churches, we ſhould never have read of in the firſt planted Churches. So that if thoſe popular arguments of a neceſſary relation between a Paſtor and particular people, of perſonal knowledge, care and inſpection, did deſtroy the lawfulneſs of extending that care and charge to many particular congregations, they would likewiſe overthrow the nature, end and deſign of the office which *Timothy* and *Titus* acted in: which had a relation to a multitude of particular and congregational Churches. Whether their power was extraordinary or no, I now diſpute not; but whether ſuch a power be repugnant to the Goſpel or no; which from their practice is evident that it is not. But then others who would make this office neceſſary, urge farther, that *Timothy* or *Titus might ordain and appoint others to ſucceed them in their places and care over all thoſe Churches under their charge.* To which I anſwer firſt, What they might do is not the queſtion, but what they did; as they might do it, ſo they might not do it, if no other evidence be brought to prove it; for *Quod poſſibile eſt eſſe, poſſibile eſt non eſſe. Secondly*, Neither what they did, is the whole queſtion, but what they did with an opinion of the neceſſity of doing it, whether they were bound to do it or no? and if ſo, whether by any Law extant in Scripture and given them by *Paul* in his Epiſtles, or ſome private command and particular inſtructions when he deputed them to their ſeveral charges: If the former, that Law and command muſt be produced, which will hardly be, if we embrace only the received Canon of the Scripture. If the latter, we muſt then fetch ſome ſtanding rule and Law from unwritten traditions: for no other evidence can be given of the Inſtructions by word

of

of mouth given by *Paul* to *Timothy* and *Titus*, at the taking their charges upon them. But yet, *Thirdly*, Were it only the matter of fact that was disputed, that would hold a controversie still, *viz.* whether any did succeed *Timothy* and *Titus* in their offices. But this I shall leave to its proper place to be discussed, when I come to examine the argument from Apostolical succession. Thus we see then that neither the qualification of the persons, nor the commands for a right exercise of the office committed to them, nor the whole Epistles to *Timothy* or *Titus*, do determine any one form of Government to be necessary in the Church of God.

Thirdly, Let us see whether the general rules do require any one form; which rules, in that they are general, can determine nothing of the authority it self, as to its particular mode, being intended only for the regulation of the exercise of the authority in which Men are placed. And it is an evidence that nothing is particularly determined in this case, when the Spirit of God lays down such rules for Government which are appliable to distinct forms. Otherwise certainly some rule would have been laid down, which could have been applied to nothing but to that one form. *That none take the office of preaching without a call, nor go without sending*, will equally hold, whether the power of ordination lie in a Bishop with Presbyters, or in Presbyters acting with equality of power. *That offenders be censured, and complaints made to the Church in case of scandal*, determines nothing to whom the power of jurisdiction doth solely belong, nor what that Church is which must receive these complaints. *That all things be done with decency and order*, doth prescribe nothing wherein that decency lies, nor how far that order may extend; nor yet who must be the Judges of that decency and order. *That all be done for edification, and the common benefit of the Church*, doth no ways restrain the Church's freedom in disposing of its self as to the form of its Government, so the aim of the Church be for the better edification of the body of the Church, and to promote the benefit of it. But, methinks, these general orders and rules for discipline, do imply the particular manner of Government to be left at liberty to the Church of God, so that in all the several forms these general rules be observed. Whereas had Christ appointed a superior order to govern other subordinate officers and the Church together; Christ's command for governing the Church would have been particularly addressed to them; and again, had it been the will of Christ there should be no superior order above the Pastors of particular Churches, there would have been some express and direct prohibition of it; which because we no where read, it seems evident that Christ hath left both the one and the other to the freedom and liberty of his Church. So much shall serve, in this place, to shew how improbable it is that Christ did ever prescribe any one form of Government in his Church, since he hath only laid down general rules for the management of Church-Government. §. 7. Heb. 5. 2. Rom. 10. 14.

But this will not yet suffice those who plead that Christ must determine one immutable form of Government in his Church; but although it be a high presumption to determine first what Christ must do, before we examine what he hath done, yet we shall still proceed and examine all the pretences that are brought for this opinion. The next thing then which is generally urged for it, *is the equal necessity of Christ's instituting a certain form, as for any other Legislator who models a Common-wealth.* §. 8.

mon-wealth. Now, for anſwer to this, I ſay, *firſt*, That Chriſt hath inſtituted ſuch an immutable Government in his Church as is ſufficient for the ſucceſſion and continuance of it; which is all which Founders of Common-wealths do look after, *viz.* that there be ſuch an order and diſtinction of Perſons, and ſubordination of one to the other, that a ſociety may ſtill be preſerved among them; now this is ſufficiently provided for by Chriſt appointing officers continually to rule his Church, and eſtabliſhing Laws for the perpetuating of ſuch officers; ſo whatſoever is neceſſary in order to the general ends of Government, is acknowledged to be appointed by Jeſus Chriſt. Until then that it be proved that one form of Government is in it ſelf abſolutely neceſſary for the being of a Church, this argument can prove nothing; for what is drawn from neceſſity, will prove nothing but in a caſe of neceſſity. *Secondly*, I anſwer, That thoſe things which are not abſolutely neceſſary to the being of a Church, or left to Chriſt's liberty, whether he will determine them or no; and are no farther to be looked on as neceſſary than as he hath determined by his Laws whether they ſhall be or no in his Church. The thing will be thus cleared: When I read that *Zaleucus*, *Lycurgus*, or *Numa* did form a Common-wealth, and make Laws for it; I preſently conclude that there muſt be ſome order or diſtinction of perſons in this Common-wealth, and ſome rules whereby perſons muſt be governed, and whereby others muſt rule: But I cannot hence infer that *Zaleucus*, or *Lycurgus* did inſtitute Monarchical, Ariſtocratical, or Democratical Government, becauſe any of theſe forms might be agreeable to their deſign; and therefore what kind of Government they did appoint; can no otherwiſe be known than by taking a view of the Laws which they made in order thereto. So it is in reference to Chriſt; when we read that Chriſt hath inſtituted a Church always to continue in the world, we preſently apprehend that there muſt be ſome power and order in the members of that ſociety, and Laws for the governing it; but we cannot hence gather that he hath bound up his Officers to act in any one form, becauſe ſeveral forms might in themſelves equally tend to the promoting the end of Government in his Church. And therefore what Chriſt hath expreſly determined in his poſitive Laws, muſt be our rule of judging in this caſe, and not any preſumption of our own, that ſuch a form was neceſſary, and therefore Chriſt muſt inſtitute and appoint it. Which is fully expreſſed by judicious Mr. *Hooker*, whoſe words will ſerve as a ſufficient anſwer to this objection. *As for thoſe marvelous diſcourſes, whereby they adventure to argue that God muſt needs have done the thing which they imagine was to be done; I muſt confeſs I have often wonder'd at their exceeding boldneſs herein. When the queſtion is, whether God have delivered in Scripture, (as they affirm he hath) a complete particular immutable form of Church Polity: Why take they that other both preſumptuous and ſuperfluous labour to prove he ſhould have done it; there being no way in this caſe to prove the deed of God, ſaving only by producing that evidence wherein he hath done it? But if there be no ſuch thing apparent upon record, they do as if one ſhould demand a Legacy by force and vertue of ſome written Teſtament, wherein there being no ſuch thing ſpecified, he pleadeth that there it muſt needs be, and bringeth arguments from the love and good will which always the Teſtator bore, imagining that theſe or the like proofs will convict a Teſtament to have that in it, which other men can no where by reading find. In matters which concern the actions of God, the moſt dutiful way on our part, is to ſearch what God hath done,*

Eccleſiaſt. Polity, lib. 3. ſect. 11.

done, and with meekneſs to admire that, rather than to diſpute what he in congruity of reaſon ought to do. Thus he, with more to the ſame purpoſe. The ſum then of the anſwer to this Argument, is this, that nothing can be infer'd of what Chriſt muſt do, from his relation to his Church, but what is abſolutely neceſſary to the being of it; as for all other things, they being arbitrary conſtitutions, we can judge no more of the neceſſity of them, than as we find them clearly revealed in the Word of God. And therefore the Plea muſt be removed from what Chriſt muſt do, to what he hath done, in order to the determining the particular form of Government in his Church.

§. 9. *Parker de Polit. Eccleſ. lib. 2. c. 40.*

But ſtill it is argued for the neceſſity of a particular form of Government in the Church, from the ſimilitudes *the Church is ſet out by in Scripture*; *it is call'd a* Vine, *and therefore muſt have* Keepers; *an* Houſe, *and therefore muſt have* Government; *a* City, *and therefore muſt have a* Polity; *a* Body, *and therefore muſt have* Parts. I anſwer, *Firſt*, All theſe Similitudes prove only that which none deny, that there muſt be order, power, and a Government in the Church of God; we take not away the Keepers from the Vine, nor the Government from the Houſe, nor Polity from the City, nor diſtinction of Parts from the Body; we aſſert all theſe things as neceſſary in the Church of God. The Keepers of the Vine to defend and prune it; the Governours of the Houſe to rule and order it; the Polity of the City to guide and direct it; the Parts of the Body to compleat and adorn it. But, *Secondly*, None of theſe Similitudes prove what they are brought for; *viz.* that any one immutable form of Government is determined. For may not the Keepers of the Vine uſe their own diſcretion in looking to it, ſo the flouriſhing of the Vine be that they aim at? and if there be many of them, may there not be different orders among them, and ſome as Superviſors of the others work? The Houſe muſt have Governours, but thoſe that are ſo, are entruſted with the power of ordering things in the Houſe according to their own diſcretion; and where there is a multitude, is there not diverſity of offices among them? and is it neceſſary that every houſe muſt have officers of the ſame kind? In great and large Families there muſt be more particular diſtinct orders and offices, than in a ſmall and little one. The City muſt have its Polity; but all Cities have not the like, ſome have one form, and ſome another, and yet there is a City ſtill, and a Polity too. A Body muſt have all its Parts; but are all the Parts of the Body equal to one another? it ſufficeth that there be a proportion, though not equality in them; the ſeveral Parts of the Body have their ſeveral offices; and yet we ſee the Head is ſuperintendent over them all; and thus if we make every particular Church a Body, yet it follows not that the form of cloathing that Body muſt always be the ſame; for the manner of Government is rather the Cloathing to the Body, than the Parts of it; the Governours indeed are Parts of the Body, but their manner of governing is not; that may alter according to the proportion and growth of the Body, and its faſhion change for better conveniency.

§. 10. 1 Pet. 2. 13.

But if theſe Similitudes prove nothing, yet certainly, ſay they, *the difference as to Civil and Eccleſiaſtical Government will*; *for though there may be different forms in civil Government, which are therefore call'd an* Ordinance of man, *yet there muſt be but one in Church Government, which is an Ordinance of God, and Chriſt hath appointed Officers to rule it.* I anſwer, *Firſt*, We grant and acknowledge a difference between the Church

and the Common-wealth; they are conſtituted for other ends; the one Political, the other Spiritual; one Temporal, the other Eternal; they ſubſiſt by different Charters; the one given to men as men, the other to men as Chriſtians: They act upon different Principles, the one to preſerve civil Rights, the other to promote an eternal Intereſt; nay, their formal Conſtitution is different, for a man by being a member of a Common-wealth, doth not become a member of the Church, and by being excommunicated out of the Church, doth not ceaſe to be a member of the Common-wealth: The Officers of the one are clearly diſtinct from the other, the one deriving their power from the Law of Chriſt, the other from God's general Providence. The Magiſtrate hath no power to excommunicate formally out of the Church, any more than to admit into it, nor have Church-officers any power to caſt men out of the Common-wealth. We ſee then there is a difference between Civil and Eccleſiaſtical Government: But then I anſwer, *Secondly*, The power of the Magiſtrate is not therefore called an Ordinance of man, becauſe of the mutability of its form, and as diſtinguiſhed from the form of Church Government. For, *Firſt*, The Apoſtle ſpeaks not of the form of Government, but of the power; *ſubmit to every Ordinance of man, &c.* the ground of ſubmiſſion is not the form, but the power of Civil Government; and therefore there can be no oppoſition expreſſed here between the forms of Civil and Eccleſiaſtical Government: But if any ſuch oppoſition be, it muſt be between the powers; and if this be ſaid as to Civils, that the power is an ordinance of man in that ſenſe, (whereas Rom. 13. 1. *Paul* ſaith it is of God) yet as to the Church, it is freely acknowledged that the power is derived from God. *Secondly*, The Civil power is not called ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις, becauſe it is a creature of man's making, and ſo ſubject to mens power, but the ground of that ſpeech is, becauſe all Civil power reſpects men as men, without any farther connotation. *Humana dicitur, non quod ab hominibus ſit excogitata, ſed quod hominum ſit propria*, ſaith *Beza*. And to the ſame purpoſe *Calvin*, *Humana dicitur ordinatio, non quod humanitùs inventa fuerit; ſed quod propria hominum eſt digeſta & ordinata vivendi ratio. Piſcator*, *Humanam appellat, non quod magiſtratus homines authores habeat, ſed quod homines eam gerant*. So then the Civil power is not called an Ordinance of man, as it is of man's ſetting up, but as it is proper to man; and ſo if there be any oppoſition between the Civil and Church power, it is only this, that the one belongs to men as men, the other to men as Chriſtians. *Thirdly*, Although it be granted that Chriſt hath appointed and ſet up his own officers in his Church, yet it doth not thence follow, that he hath determined in what manner they ſhall rule his Church. It is true, Eph. 4. 12. Chriſt hath ſet up in his Church, *ſome Apoſtles, ſome Evangeliſts, and ſome Paſtors and Teachers*; but it doth not thence follow, that Chriſt hath determined, whether the power of Apoſtles and Evangeliſts ſhould continue in his Church or no, as it implyed ſuperiority over the ordinary Paſtors of the Churches; nor whether the Paſtors of the Church ſhould act in an equality in their governing Churches. I grant that all Church-Government muſt be performed by officers of Chriſt's appointing, but that which I ſay is not determined in Scripture, is the way and manner whereby they ſhall govern Churches in common.

§. 11. It is yet farther argued, *That if the form of Church-Government be not immutably determined in Scripture, then it is in the Church's power, to make new officers which Chriſt never made, which muſt be a plain addition* Parker Polit. Eccleſ. l. 2. c. 45. §. 6.

to the Laws of Christ, and must argue the Scripture of Imperfection. This being one of the main arguments, I have reserved it to the place of the *Triarii*, and shall now examine what strength there lies in it. To this therefore I answer, *First*, Those officers are only said to be new, which were never appointed by Christ, and are contrary to the first appointments of Christ for the regulating of his Church; such it is granted the Church hath no power to institute; but if by new officers be meant only such as have a charge over more than one particular congregation, by the consent of the Pastors themselves, then it is evident such an office cannot be said to be new; for besides the general practice of the Church of God, from the first Primitive Times, which have all consented in the use of such officers; we find the foundation of this power laid by Christ himself, in the power which the Apostles were invested in, which was extended over many, both Churches and Pastors; but if it be said, *The Apostolical power being extraordinary, must cease with the persons which enjoyed it*; I answer, *First*, What was extraordinary did cease; but all the dispute is, what was extraordinary, and what not; some things were ordinary in them, as Preaching, Baptizing, Ordaining, Ruling Churches, some things were again extraordinary, as immediate Mission from Christ, (the main distinguishing note of an Apostle) a power of working Miracles, to confirm the truth of what they preached: Now the Question is, whether the power which they enjoyed over Presbyters and Churches, be to be reckoned in the first or the second number. It must therefore be proved to be extraordinary, before it can be said to cease with them; and that must be done by some arguments proper to their persons; for if the arguments brought be of a common and moral nature, it will prove the office to be so too. *Secondly*, By ceasing may be meant, either ceasing as to its *necessity*, or ceasing as to its *lawfulness:* I say not, but that the *necessity* of the office, as in their Persons, for the first preaching and propagating the Gospel, did cease with them; but that after their death it became *unlawful* for any particular persons to take the care and charge of *Diocesan* Churches, I deny. For to make a thing unlawful which was before lawful, there must be some express prohibition forbidding any farther use of such a power, which I suppose men will not easily produce in the Word of God.

I answer therefore, *Secondly*, That the extending of any Ministerial power, is not the appointing of any new Office; because every Minister of the Gospel hath a relation *in actu primo* to the whole Church of God; the restraint and enlargement of which power is subject to positive determinations of prudence and conveniency *in actu secundo*; and therefore if the Church see it fit for some men to have this power enlarged for better government in some, and restrained in others, that enlargement is the appointing no new office, but the making use of a power already enjoyed for the benefit of the Church of God. This being a foundation tending so fully to clear the lawfulness of that Government in the Church which implies a superiority and subordination of the officers of the Church to one another; and the Churches using her prudence in ordering the bounds of her officers, I shall do these two things: *First*, Shew that the power of every Minister of the Gospel doth primarily and habitually respect the Church in common. *Secondly*, That the Church may in a peculiar manner single out some of its officers for the due administration of Ecclesiastical power. *First*, That §. 12.

every Minister of the Gospel hath a power respecting the Church in common: This I find fully and largely proved by those who assert the equality of the power of Ministers; *First*, From Christ's bestowing the several offices of the Church for the use of the whole Church, *Eph.* 4. 12, 13. Christ hath set Apostles, *&c.* Pastors and Teachers in his Church; now this Church must needs be the Catholick visible Church, because indisputably the Apostles office did relate thereto, and consequently so must that of Pastors and Teachers too: Again, The end of these offices is the building up the body of Christ, which cannot otherwise be understood than of his whole Church; else Christ must have as many bodies as the Church hath particular congregations. Which is a new way of *Consubstantiation*. *Secondly*, The ministerial office was in being before any particular congregations were gathered; for Christ upon his ascension to glory *gave these gifts to men*; and the Apostles were impowered by Christ before his ascension; either then they were no Church-officers, or if they were so, they could have no other *Correlate*, but the whole body of the Church of God then lying under the power of darkness, a few persons excepted. *Thirdly*, Because the main design of appointing a Gospel-Ministry, was the conversion of Heathens and Infidels; and if these be the proper object of the ministerial Function, then the office must have reference to the whole Church of Christ; else there could be no part of that office performed towards those who are not yet converted. *Fourthly*, Else a Minister can perform no office belonging to him as such, beyond the bounds of his particular congregation, and so can neither preach nor administer the Sacraments to any other but within the bounds of his own particular place and people. *Fifthly*, Because Ministers by baptizing do admit men into the catholick visible Church, (else a man must be baptized again every time he removes from one Church to another) and none can admit beyond what their office doth extend to; therefore it is evident that every particular Pastor of a Church hath a relation to the whole Church: To which purpose our former observation is of great use, *viz.* That particular Congregations are not of God's *primary intention*, but for *mens conveniency*, and so consequently is the fixedness of particular Pastors to their several places for the greater conveniency of the Church; every Pastor of a Church then hath a relation to the whole Church; and that which hinders him from the exercise of this power, is not any unlawfulness in the thing, but the preserving of order and conveniency in the Church of God. This being premised, I say, *Secondly*, That the officers of the Church may in a peculiar manner attribute a larger and more extensive power to some particular persons for the more convenient exercise of their common power. We have seen already that their power extends to the care of the Churches in common, that the restraint of this power is a matter of order and decency in the Church of God: Now in matters of common concernment, without all question, it is not unlawful when the Church judgeth it most for edification, to grant to some the *executive part* of that power, which is originally and fundamentally common to them all. For our better understanding of this, we must consider a twofold power belonging to Church-officers, *a power of order*, and *a power of jurisdiction*; for in every *Presbyter*, there are some things inseparably joined to his Function, and belonging to every one in his personal capacity, both in *actu primo*, and in *actu secundo*, both as to the *right and power* to do it, and the *exercise and execution* of

1 Cor. 12. 28, 29.

Eph. 4. 8. Mat. 28. 19.

of that power, such are Preaching the Word, visiting the sick, administring Sacraments, *&c.* but there are other things which every Presbyter hath an aptitude, and a *jus* to *in actu primo*, but the limitation and exercise of that power doth belong to the Church in common, and belong not to any one personally, but by a farther power of choice or delegation to it, such is the power of visiting Churches, taking care that particular Pastors discharge their duty; such is the power of ordination and Church censures, and making rules for decency in the Church; this is that we call the *power of jurisdiction.* Now this latter power, though it belongs habitually and *in actu primo* to every Presbyter; yet being about matters of publick and common concernment, some farther authority in a Church constituted is necessary besides the power of order; and when this power, either by consent of the Pastors of the Church, or by the appointment of a Christian Magistrate, or both, is devolved to some particular persons, though *quoad aptitudinem* the power remain in every Presbyter, yet *quoad executionem* it belongs to those who are so appointed. And therefore *Camero* determines that *Ordinatio non fit à pastore quatenus pastor est, sed quatenus ad tempus singularem authoritatem obtinet*, i. e. That Ordination doth not belong to the power of order but to the power of jurisdiction, and therefore is subject to positive restraints, by prudential determinations. By this we may understand how lawful the exercise of an Episcopal power may be in the Church of God, supposing an equality in all Church officers as to the power of order. And how incongruously they speak, who supposing an equality in the Presbyters of Churches at first, do cry out, that the Church takes upon her the office of Christ, if she delegates any to a more peculiar exercise of the power of jurisdiction.

De Ecclesia in Mat. 18. 15. *Tom.* 1. *op. in* 4. *p.* 27.

§. 13. The last thing pleaded why an immutable form of Church Government must be laid down in Scripture, is *from the perfection and sufficiency of the Scriptures; because otherwise the Scriptures would be condemned of imperfection.* But this will receive an easie dispatch: For, *First*, The controversie about the perfection of the Scriptures, is not concerning an essential or integral perfection, but a perfection *ratione finis & effectuum* in order to its end: now the end of it is to be an adæquate rule of faith and manners, and sufficient to bring men to salvation; which it is sufficiently acknowledged to be, if all things necessary to be believed or practised be contained in the Word of God: now that which we assert not to be fully laid down in Scripture, is not pleaded to be any ways necessary, nor to be a matter of faith, but something left to the Churches liberty; but here it is said by some, that this *is adding to the Law of God*, which destroys the Scriptures perfection: therefore I answer, *Secondly*, Whatever is done with an opinion of the necessity of doing it, destroys the Scriptures perfection if it be not contained in it: for that were to make it an imperfect rule; and in this sense every *additio perficiens* is *additio corrumpens*, because it takes away from the perfection of the rule which it is added to; and thus Popish traditions are destructiue of the Scriptures sufficiency. But the doing of any thing not positively determined in Scripture, not looking upon it as a thing we are bound to do from the necessity of the thing, and observing the general rules of Scriptures in the doing of it, is far from destroying the perfection or sufficiency of the Word of God. *Thirdly*, All essentials of Church Government, are contained clearly in Scripture: The essentials of Church Government, are such as are necessary to the preservation of such a society

Rivet. Isagog. ad Script. sacr. cap. 24. §. 3.

as the Church is; now all these things have been not only granted, but proved to be contained in Scripture; but whatever is not so necessary in its self, can only become necessary by vertue of God's expres command, and what is not so commanded, is accidental and circumstantial, and a matter of Christian liberty, and such we assert the form of Church Government to be. It is not our work to enquire, why God hath determined some things that might seem more circumstantial than this, and left other things at liberty, but whether God hath determined these things or no. Which determination being once cleared, makes the thing so commanded necessary as to our observance of it: but if no such thing be made appear, the thing remains a matter of liberty, and so the Scriptures perfection as to the necessaries in order to salvation, is no ways impeached by it. So much now for the necessity of Christ's determining the particular form of Government: we now proceed to the consideration of Christ's actions, whether by them the form of Church Government is determined or no?

CHAP. V.

Whether any of Christ's actions have determined the form of Government. All power in Christ's hands for Governing his Church: what order Christ took in order thereto when he was in the world. Calling Apostles the first action respecting outward Government; the name and office of Apostles cleared; an equality among them proved during our Saviour's life. Peter *not made Monarch of the Church by Christ. The Apostles power over the seventy Disciples considered, with the nature and quality of their office,* Matth. 20. 25, 26, 27. *largely discussed and explained. It makes not all inequality in Church officers unlawful; by the difference of Apostles and Pastors of Churches.* Matth. 18, 15. *How far that determines the form of Church Government. No evidence of any exact order for Church Government from thence,* Matth. 16. 15, 16, 17, 18. *considered how far that concerns the Government of the Church.*

§. 1. HAving considered and answered the Arguments which are brought, why Christ must determine the particular form of Government: Our next task will be to enquire into those actions of our Saviour which are conceived to have any plausible aspect towards the setling the form of Government in his Church. And were it not that men are generally so wedded to an *hypothesis* they have once drunk in by the prevalency of interest or education, we might have been superseded from our former labour, but that men are so ready to think that opinion to be most necessary, which they are most in love with, and have appeared most zealous for. Men are loth to be persuaded that they have spent so much breath to so little purpose, and have been so hot and eager for somewhat, which at last appears to be a matter of Christian liberty. Therefore we find very few that have been ever very earnest in the maintaining or promoting any matter of opinion, but have laid more weight upon it, than it would really bear; lest men should think, that with all their sweat and toil, they only beat the air, and break their teeth in cracking a nut, with a hole in it; which if they had been so wise as to discern before, they might have saved their pains for somewhat which would have better recompenced them. But thus it generally fares with men;

men; they ſuck in principles according as intereſt and education diſpoſeth them, which being once in, have the advantage of inſinuating themſelves into the underſtanding, and thereby raiſe a prejudice againſt what ever comes to diſturb them; which prejudice being the *Yellow Jaundiſe* of the ſoul, leaves ſuch a tincture upon the eyes of the underſtanding, that till it be cured of that *Icteriſm*, it cannot diſcern things in their proper colours. Now this prejudice is raiſed by nothing more ſtrongly, than when the opinion received is entertained upon a preſumption, that there is a *Divine ſtamp* and *Impreſs* upon it, though no ſuch *Effigies* be diſcernable there. Hence come all the ſeveral contending parties about Church Government, equally to plead an intereſt in this *Jus Divinum*, and whatever opinion they have *eſpouſed*, they preſently conceive it to be of no leſs than *Divine* extract and *Original*. And as it ſometimes was with great perſonages among the *Heathens*, when their miſcarriages were diſcernable to the eye of the world, the better to *palliate* them among the *vulgar*, they gave themſelves out to be impregnated by ſome of their adored Deities; ſo I fear it hath been among ſome whoſe Religion ſhould have taught them better things, when either faction, deſign, or intereſt, hath formed ſome conceptions within them ſuitable thereunto, to make them the more paſſable to the world, they are brought forth under the pretence of Divine truths. Far be it from me to charge any ſincere, humble, ſober Chriſtians with an offence of ſo high a nature, who yet may be poſſeſſed with ſome miſtakes and apprehenſions of this nature; but theſe are only wrought on by the *Maſters of parties*, who know, unleſs they fly ſo high, they ſhall never hit the game they aim at. This is moſt diſcernable in the *Factors* for the *Roman Omnipotency* (as *Paulus* the fifth was call'd *Omnipotentiæ Pontificiæ Conſervator*) they who ſee not that Intereſt and Faction upholds that *Court* rather than *Church*, may well be preſumed to be hoodwinked with more than an implicite faith; and yet if we believe the great ſupporters of that intereſt, the power they plead for is plainly given them from Chriſt himſelf, and not only offer to prove that it was ſo, but that it was not conſiſtent with the wiſdom of Chriſt that it ſhould be otherwiſe. Leſt I ſhould ſeem to wrong thoſe of any religion, hear what the author of the *Gloſs* upon the *Extravagancies* (ſo they may well be called) ſaith to this purpoſe, applying that place of our Saviour, *all power is given to me in heaven and earth*, *Matth.* 28. 18. to the *Pope*, adds theſe words, *Non videretur Dominus diſcretus fuiſſe, ut cum reverentia ejus loquar, niſi unicum poſt ſe talem vicarium reliquiſſet, qui hæc omnia poſſet.* We ſee by this what blaſphemies men may run into, when they argue from their private fancies and opinions, to what muſt be done by the Law of Chriſt. It therefore becomes all ſober Chriſtians impartially to inquire what Chriſt hath done, and to ground their opinions only upon that, without any ſuch preſumptuous intruſions into the Counſels of Heaven. We here therefore take our leave of the diſpute, why it was neceſſary a form of Government ſhould be eſtabliſhed, and now enter upon a ſurvey of thoſe grounds which are taken from any paſſages of our Saviour, commonly produced as a foundation for any particular Forms.

Extravag. unum ſanctum.

§. 2. I ſhall not ſtand to prove that *Chriſt* as *Mediator* hath all the power over the *Church* in his own hands, it being a thing ſo evident from Scripture, and ſo beyond all diſpute with thoſe whom I have to deal with. In which reſpect he is the only head of the Church, and from whom all divine right for authority in the Church muſt be derived. Which right

Mat. 28. 18. Iſa. 9. 6.

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can arise only from some actions or Laws of Christ, which we therefore now search into. The first publick action of Christ after his solemn entrance upon his office, which can be conceived to have any reference to the Government of his Church, was the calling the *Apostles*. In whom for our better methodizing this discourse, we shall observe these three several steps. First, When they were called to be Christ's Disciples. Secondly, When Christ sent them out with a power of Miracles. Thirdly, When he gave them their full Commission of acting with Apostolical power all the world over. These three seasons are accurately to be distinguished; for the Apostles did not enjoy so great power when they were disciples, as when they were sent abroad by Christ; neither had they any proper power of Church-Government after that sending forth, till after Christ's resurrection, when Christ told them, *all power was put into his hands*, and therefore gave them full commission to *go and preach the Gospel to all nations*. The *first step* then we observe in the Apostles towards their power of Church-Government, was in their first calling to be Disciples. Two several calls are observed in Scripture, concerning the Apostles; the first was more general, when they were called only to follow Christ; the second more special when Christ told them what he called them to, and specified and described their office to them, by telling them he would make them *Fishers of Men*. We shall endeavour to digest the order of their calling as clearly and as briefly as we can. Our blessed Saviour, about the thirtieth year of his age, solemnly entring upon the discharge of his prophetical office in making known himself to be the true *Messias* to the world, to make his appearance more publick, goes to *Jordan*, and is there baptized of *John*; presently after he is led up by the Spirit into the wilderness, where he continued forty days. In this space of time *John* removes from *Jordan* and comes on the other side to *Bethabara*; thither *Christ* comes to *John*; *John* not only owns *Christ* himself, but tells his disciples this was he into whose name he had baptized them. Upon this, two of *John*'s disciples leave their Master and follow *Christ*. These two are the first disciples we ever read our Saviour had; whereof the one was *Andrew*, *Peter*'s brother, and the other probably conceived to be *John* (it being his custom to conceal his name when he speaks of himself); *Andrew* calls his brother *Peter*; Christ next day calls *Philip*; *Philip* he finds *Nathaniel*. And this as far as we read, was the first number of Christ's disciples. Here we find *two or three gathered together in the name of Christ, and Christ* (truly) *in the midst of them*. These disciples it appears staid with Christ some time, for they went with him to the marriage in *Cana*: and after went up with him to *Jerusalem*, when many professed to be his disciples; from thence he goes into *Judea*, where he gathers many disciples, and baptizeth them. After this he returns with his disciples, by the way of *Samaria* into *Galilee*: and these disciples being now again at home, in probability did return for their livelihood to their old imployments for some small time, Christ having not yet commanded them to forsake all and follow him. Not long after (about a years space from the first calling them) *Jesus* being in *Galilee* goes to the lake of *Genezareth*, there he finds *Andrew* and *Peter* fishing: after the miracle there wrought, he then in a more solemn manner calls them to leave their imployment, for he had designed them for a greater, which was to be Fishers of men. Whereby *our Saviour* expresseth the care, pains, diligence,

Mar. 28. 18, 19.
Luke 3. 23.
Mat. 3. 13.
Mat. 4. 1.
John 1. 29.
John 1. 37.
John 2. 2.
John 2. 17, 23.
John 3. 22.
John 4. 1.
Luke 5. 1.
Matth. 4. 18, 19.
Mark 1. 16, 17.

gence, design and end of the Ministerial function he had appointed them for. *Andrew* and *Peter* presently leave all and follow Christ; the like do *James* and *John*, whom they met with a little farther upon the shore. And now those who were before but as common Disciples, are admitted into a higher order, and bred up by Christ, as persons designed for an employment of so high a nature. We see here a necessity of making a double call of the Apostles; else it were impossible to reconcile the narration of *John* with the other Evangelists. Therefore *Augustine* thinks their first being with *Christ* in *John*, was only for present satisfaction who he was, which as soon as they understood and admired, they returned to their own habitations. *Thomas* he makes three several callings of them, the first *ad agnitionem & familiaritatem*, which is that in *John*; the second *ad Discipulatum* that spoken of in *Luke* 5. 1. the third *ad adhesionem*, Mat. 4. 18. Mark 1. 16. 'But I see no reason to make the story in *Luke* to be different from that of *Matthew* and *Mark*; the former some say was *vocatio ad fidem*, a general preparatory call to the latter; the latter was *vocatio ad munus Apostolicum*; although they were not chosen to be Apostles till afterwards, yet now Christ made them *Candidates* of the Apostleship, *& amicos interioris admissionis*, in order to that great employment he had designed them for. Farther we must take notice that from the time of the Baptism of *John*, the *Apostles* did generally continue with *Christ*, which appears from the qualification of an Apostle given by *Peter* at the choice of *Matthias: Of those men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of* John, *unto the same day he was taken up from us.* The strength of which testimony is impregnable for proving that the Apostles did generally continue with Christ after their being called to follow him; but that time from the baptism of *John* must not be taken strictly, for many of the *Apostles*, as *Matthew*, *&c.* were not called till some time after. About four months after *Christ*'s more solemn calling of the *Apostles*, at the time of *Pentecost*, as *Chemnitius* conjectures, our Saviour proceeds to a solemn choice of them into their offices, which is described by *Luke* 6. 13. after he had prayed the whole night before, v. 12. *Mark* he acquaints us with the ends of Christ's chusing them: First, That they might continually attend upon him the better to be fitted for their employment afterwards; which he expresseth, when he adds, that he might send them out to preach, and to give them power over Devils and Diseases, to cast out the one, and to cure the other. Their actual sending out was not (say some) till half a year after, which is the story related by *Mat.* 10. 1. near a *twelve* month, (say others) but presently, upon their choice, *Christ* makes the Sermon in the Mount, as appears by the comparing *Luke* 6. 17, 20. with *Mat.* 5. 1. wherein, among other things, our Saviour takes occasion to declare their duty to them, telling them, they were the *Light of the world*, &c. which he doth the more to fit them for the discharge of their employment.

De Consensu Evan. l. 2. cap. 17.

V. Casaub. exer. in Bar. 13. s. 11. Montacut. Orig. Eccles. To. 1. p. 2. p. 41. Chemnit. Harm. Evan. c. 36.

Acts 1. 21, 22.

Harmon. cap. 50.

Mark 3. 14, 15.

Having thus laid these things together about the Apostles, from their first calling, to the time of their *mission*, we shall take notice of these things from them which may relate to the office which the Apostles were called to, and to the government of the Church by them. *First*, We here observe that our Saviour no sooner began to preach the Gospel himself, but he made choice of some persons as a peculiar order of men, for the propagation of the Gospel in the world. The peculiarity of the

§. 3.

Function of a Gospel-Ministry under Christ was, we see, designed from Christ's first publick appearance in his office; he might have left the *Apostles* in the common order of *Disciples*, had he not intended an office in his Church, distinct and peculiar from all other employments; and therefore it is observable that Christ did not call the *Apostles* off from their other employments, till he designed to make them *Apostles*; before, when they were only private Disciples, they did follow their employments at some times still; but when he calls them to be *Fishers of Men*, he bids them leave all and follow him. *Secondly*, We take notice of the admirable wisdom of our Saviour in the choice he made of the persons for first founding his Church; and the means he used to fit them for it. The persons were such as were most suitable to his design; the means such as were most suitable to the persons. The persons were such, who by reason of the known meanness of their condition, and supposed weakness of abilities, were the fittest to convince the world, that the doctrine which they preached was not the product of humane wisdom, but the *express Image* and *character* of *Divine Truth*; whose nakedness and simplicity would gain more upon mens belief by the power which accompanied the preaching of it, than the most refined and sublimated notions of their wise men should do, managed with the greatest subtilty and prudence by the maintainers of them. *Christ* would make men see that his doctrine stood not in need either of the wisdom or power of men, to defend or propagate it; and therefore made choice of the most unlikely instruments for that end; *that mens* 1 Cor. 2. 5. *faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God.* But withal we are to take notice of Christ's admirable wisdom in the means he used to fit and qualifie them for the first builders of his Church; for although the power and efficacy of their preaching was wholly from God, and not from themselves, yet our Saviour doth not presently, upon his calling them, place them in the highest office he intended them for, but proceeds gradually with them, and keeps them a long time under his own eye and instruction, before he sends them abroad; and that for two ends chiefly: First, *To be witnesses of his actions.* Secondly, *To be auditors of his doctrine. First*, To be witnesses of his actions, which was looked on by the Apostles, as the most necessary qualification for an Apostle, in the place fore-cited, *Acts* 1. 21, 22. *Peter* calls himself a *witness of the sufferings of Christ*, 1 Pet. 5. 1. *John* saith, *that which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life; that which we have seen and heard, declare we unto you*, 1 Joh. 1. 1, 3. whereby the *credibility* of the Gospel was sufficiently evidenced to the world, when the Preachers of it spake nothing but what their own senses were witnesses of, both as to the doctrines and actions of Christ; and therefore is no ways *credible*, they should be deceived themselves in what they spoke; and more *improbable* they would deceive others, whose *interest* lay wholly upon the *truth* of the doctrine which they preached; for by the very preaching of that doctrine they robb'd themselves of all the comforts of life, and exposed themselves to a thousand miseries in this life; so that unless their doctrine was true in order to another life, they were guilty of the greatest folly this world ever heard of. We see what care our Saviour took to satisfie the reasons of men concerniug the *credibility* of his doctrine, when the persons he employed in the founding of a Church upon it, were only such as were

were intimately converſant with the whole life, doctrine, and works of him from whom they received it; and thereby we cannot ſuppoſe any ignorance in them concerning the things they ſpoke; and leſt men ſhould miſtruſt they might have a deſign to impoſe on others, he made their faithfulneſs appear, by their expoſing themſelves to any hazards to make good the truth of what they preached. Eſpecially having ſuch a Divine power accompanying them in the miracles wrought by them, which were enough to perſuade any rational men, that they came upon a true *Embaſſie*, who carried ſuch *Credentials* along with them. Another end of our Saviour's training up his Apoſtles ſo long in his School before he ſent them abroad, was, that they might be auditors of his doctrine, and ſo might learn themſelves before they taught others. Chriſt was no friend to thoſe haſty births which run abroad with the ſhell on their heads; no, although it was in his power to confer the gifts of the Holy Ghoſt, as well at their firſt entrance into Diſcipleſhip as afterwards, yet we ſee he nurtures and trains them up gradually, teaching them as *Quintilian* would have Maſters do, *Guttatim*, acquainting them now with one, then with another of the Myſteries of the Goſpel. Chriſt doth not overwhelm them with floods and torrents of diſcourſes, but gently drops now one thing into them, then another, by which way ſuch narrow-mouth'd veſſels would be the ſooneſt filled. Yea our Saviour uſeth ſuch an οἰκονομία, as the Greek Fathers call it, ſuch a prudent Temper in inſtructing them, that it is matter of juſt admiration to conſider under how great and ſtupendous ignorance of the main points of redemption, (Chriſt's death and reſurrection, and the nature of Chriſt's Kingdom) they diſcovered, after they had been ſome years under Chriſt's Tutorage. And we ſee what induſtry and diligence was uſed in the training up of thoſe for the Apoſtleſhip, who were in an immediate way ſent out by Chriſt. And it is very probable that upon the firſt ſending abroad, they taught not by immediate revelation, but only what they had learned from Chriſt during their being with him. Whence we ſee what a ſubordination there is in acquired parts, labour, and induſtry, to the teachings and inſpirations of the Divine Spirit; our Saviour looked not on his labour as loſt, although afterwards the *Unction from the Holy One ſhould teach them all things*. It was Chriſt's deſign to have them go חיל —— מחיל אל *from ſtrength to ſtrength*, *à domo ſanctuarii in domum doctrinæ*, as the *Chaldee Paraphraſt* renders that place, *from one School of learning to another*. As under the Law, even thoſe that waited for the *Ruach-hakkodeſh*, *the inſpiration of the Divine Spirit*, were brought up in the *Schools* of the *Prophets* under inſtruction there; which was the place where they lay expecting the gentle gale of the Holy Spirit to carry them forth; which was the ground of *Amos* his complaint, *that he was neither a Prophet, nor the ſon of a Prophet*; by which it ſeems evident, that God's ordinary courſe was to take ſome of the Sons of the Prophets out of the Colleges where they lived, and employ them in the Prophetical-office. But of this largely elſewhere. Such a *School* of the *Prophets* did our Saviour now erect, wherein he entred his Diſciples as *Scholars*, and educated them in order to the office he intended them for.

Pſal. 84. 7.

Amos 7. 14.

§. 4. The next thing we take notice of, is the name and nature of that office which Chriſt call'd them to. They who derive the uſe of the name of Apoſtles, as apply'd by Chriſt to his Diſciples, either from the ἀποστολεῖς at *Athens*, by which name the Maſters of ſome Ships were

Suidas in v. Digeſt. l. 50. tit. 16. leg. 106. Cont. Ebionitas.

call'd, as the Ships ἀπόστολοι, or from *Heſychius* his ἀπόστολοι, which he interprets νυμφάγωγοι, or from the ἀπόστολοι, in the ſenſe of the *Civil Law*, which ſignifie the dimiſſory Letters granted for appeals; or from the Jewiſh שליחין as thereby were underſtood thoſe ἀπόστολοι, as *Epiphanius* calls them, who were as Aſſeſſors and Counſellors to the *Patriarch* of the Jews at *Tiberias*; or thoſe Officers who were ſent up and down by the *Patriarch* to gather up Tenths, firſt Fruits, and ſuch other things, who are call'd thence *Apoſtoli* in the *Codex Theod. tit. de Judæis*; all theſe, I ſay, do equally loſe their labour, and run far to fetch that which might be found much nearer home: Our Saviour taking the word from common uſe, but applying it in a ſpecial manner to a peculiar ſenſe, which is the cuſtom of the Scriptures. The original of the word properly imports ſuch as are employed by commiſſion from another, for the diſpatch of ſome buſineſs in his name. So *Caſaubon*, (who was ſufficiently able to judge of the uſe of a Greek word) *In communi Græcorum uſu* ἀπόστολοι *dicebantur certi homines, qui negotii gerendi gratiâ, magis quam deferendi nuntii, aliquo mittebantur.* And ſo it is taken, *John* 13. 16. οὐδὲ ἀπόστολος μείζων τοῦ πέμψαντος αὐτόν, *He that is ſent is not greater than he that ſent him.* Thence *Epaphroditus*, when employed upon a ſpecial meſſage to *Paul*, in the name of the Churches, is call'd ἀπόστολος ὑμῶν, *Phil.* 2. 25. which we tranſlate *your meſſenger.* And ſo *Titus*, and the two other, ſent to the Church of *Corinth*, to gather their charity, are call'd ἀπόστολοι ἐκκλησιῶν, *the meſſengers of the Churches.* Thence *Paul* fully renders the import and ſenſe of the word Apoſtle by πρεσβεύομεν, 2 *Corinth.* 5. 20. *We act as Ambaſſadors for Chriſt.* To which purpoſe it is obſervable, that the Septuagint, (whoſe Greek is moſt followed by the New Teſtament) do render the word שלח when it ſignifies to employ a meſſenger upon ſpecial ſervice, by ἀποστέλλειν, as 1 *Kings* 21. 11.——— 1 *Kings* 12. 18. *Exod.* 4. 30. and the very word ἀπόστολος is uſed in this ſenſe, 1 *Kings* 14. 6. where *Abijah* ſaith, *I am* ἀπόστολος πρὸς σὲ σκληρός, *a ſad meſſenger to thee; for thus ſaith the Lord.* Whereby the full ſenſe and importance of the word Apoſtle appears to be, one that is employed by a peculiar commiſſion from him that hath authority over him, for the doing ſome ſpecial ſervice. Thus were Chriſt's Diſciples called Apoſtles, from the immediate commiſſion which they had from Chriſt, for diſcharge of that work which he employed them in. Thence our Saviour makes uſe of the word *ſending* in the proper and peculiar ſenſe, when he gives the Apoſtles their commiſſions, in thoſe remarkable words of Chriſt to them. *As the Father hath ſent me, ſo ſend I you*, Joh. 20. 21. Whereby our Saviour delegates his power and authority which he had as Doctor of the Church, to his Apoſtles, upon his leaving the world, not in a *privative way*, ſo as to deſtroy his own authority over the Church, but in a *cumulative way*, inveſting them with that authority which they had not before, for both teaching and governing the Church. No argument then can be drawn for the right or form of Church-Government from Chriſt's actions towards his diſciples, before the laſt and full commiſſion was given unto them; becauſe they had no power of Church-Government before that time.

Exercit. 14. *Sect.* 4.

2 Cor. 8. 23.

§. 5. Which will be farther cleared, if we conſider their firſt ſending out, ſpoken of, *Mat.* 10. 1. *Mark* 6. 7. *Luke* 9. 1. Several things lie in our way to be obſerved, in reference to this *Miſſion* of the Apoſtles. *Firſt*, That though the Apoſtles had been now for ſome competent time, not only

only called to their office, but ſolemnly choſen to it; yet we no where read that they did ever exerciſe that office till now they were ſent forth by Chriſt. They remained ſtill at Chriſt's feet, learning for their own inſtruction, and fitting themſelves for their future employment, and thought it no inconvenience while they lay for a wind, to lay in ſufficient lading and proviſion for their voyage. Baptize indeed they did before, *Joh.* 4. 2. but that I ſuppoſe was done by them by an immediate preſent order from Chriſt himſelf, being by as the chief in the action; thence Chriſt in one place is ſaid to baptize, *Joh.* 3. 22. and yet he is ſaid not to baptize, but his diſciples, *Joh.* 4. 2. Chriſt did it *authoritatively*, the diſciples *miniſterially*. Yet if we ſhould grant the diſciples did then baptize as private men after the received cuſtom of the Jews, (among whom only a *Conſeſſus trium* was requiſite to baptize a Proſelyte) this doth not at all take off from the peculiarity of a Function both to preach and baptize, becauſe as yet the Goſpel-Miniſtry was not inſtituted; and therefore what might be lawful before reſtraint, doth not follow it ſhould be ſo after; when all thoſe ſcattered Rays and Beams which were diſperſed abroad before, were gathered into the Miniſterial-office upon Chriſt's appointing it, as that great *Hemiſphere* of Light in the Creation was after ſwallowed up in the body of the Sun. But now were the Apoſtles firſt ſent out to preach, and now God firſt begins to null the Jewiſh-Miniſtry, and ſet up another inſtead of it, and makes good that threatning, *that he was againſt the Shepherds, and would require the flock at their hand, and cauſe them to ceaſe to feed the flock*, &c. Here then we have the firſt exerciſe of the Apoſtles Miniſtry, for which we ſee, beſides their former call and choice, particular Miſſion was after neceſſary. *Secondly*, We obſerve, That the employment Chriſt ſent them upon now, was only a temporary employment, confined as to work and place, and not the full Apoſtolical work. The want of conſidering and underſtanding this, hath been the ground of very many miſtakes among men, when they argue from the occaſional precepts here given the *Apoſtles*, as from a ſtanding perpetual rule for a Goſpel-Miniſtry; whereas our Saviour only ſuited theſe inſtructions to the preſent caſe, and the nature and condition of the Apoſtles preſent employment; which was not to preach the Goſpel up and down themſelves, but to be as ſo many *John Baptiſts*, to call the people to the hearing of *Chriſt* himſelf; and therefore the doctrine they were to preach, was the ſame with his, *the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand*, whereby it appears their doctrine was only preparatory to Chriſt; it being only to raiſe up higher expectations of the Goſpel-ſtate under the *Meſſias*; and theſe were they *whom the King now ſent into the high-ways, to invite men to the marriage-feaſt, and to bid them to come in to him.* This was the only preſent employment of the Apoſtles in their firſt Miſſion, in which they were confined to the Cities of *Judæa*, that they might have the firſt refuſal of the Goſpel offers. This Miſſion then being *occaſional*, *limited*, and *temporary*, can yield no foundation for any thing *perpetual* to be built upon it. *Thirdly*, We obſerve, That thoſe whom Chriſt employed in the firſt diſperſing the Goſpel abroad, were furniſhed with arguments ſufficient to evince not only the *credibility*, but the certain *truth* of what they preached. Therefore Chriſt, when he now ſent them out, gave them ἐξουσίαν πνευμάτων, not only a *mere power to work miracles*, but *a right conferred on them to do it* as the *Apoſtles* of *Chriſt*. Theſe were the *Credentials* which the

Ezek. 34. 10.

Mat. 10. 7.

Mat. 22. 9

Mat. 10. 2.

Apoſtles carried along with them, to ſhew from whom they derived their power, and by whoſe authority they acted. And theſe were the moſt ſuitable to them, as making it appear that a divine preſence went along with them, and therefore they could not falſifie to the world in what they declared unto them; which was the beſt way for them to evidence the truth of their doctrine, becauſe it was not to be diſcovered by the evidence of the things themſelves, but it depended upon the teſtimony of the Author, and therefore the only way to confirm the truth of the doctrine, was to confirm the credibility of the Author, which was beſt done by doing ſomething above what the power of nature could reach unto. And this was the prerogative of the *Apoſtles* in their firſt Miſſion above *John the Baptiſt*; for of him it is ſaid, that he did no miracle. *Fourthly*, We obſerve, That the Apoſtles in this Miſſion were inveſted in no power over the Church, nor in any ſuperiority of order one over another. The firſt is evident, becauſe Chriſt did not now ſend them abroad to gather Churches, but only to call perſons to the doctrine of the *Meſſias*; and while Chriſt was in the world among them, he retained all Church power and authority in his own hand. When this temporary Miſſion expired, the Apoſtles lived as private perſons ſtill under Chriſt's Tutorage, and we never read them acting in the leaſt as Church-officers all that while. Which may appear from this one argument, becauſe all the time of our Saviour's being in the world, he never made a total ſeparation from the *Jewiſh Church*, but frequented with his diſciples the *Temple-worſhip* and ſervice to the laſt; although he ſuper-added many *Goſpel-obſervations* to thoſe of the *Law*. And therefore when no Churches were gathered, the Apoſtles could have no Church power over them. All that can be pleaded then in order to Church-Government, from the conſideration of the form of Government, as ſetled by our Saviour, muſt be either from *a ſuppoſed inequality among the Apoſtles themſelves, or their ſuperiority over the* LXX. *Diſciples*; *or from ſome rules laid down by Chriſt, in order to the Government of his Church, of which two are the moſt inſiſted on*, Mat. 20. 25. Mat. 18. 17. Of theſe then in their order.

§. 6. The firſt argument drawn for an eſtabliſhed form of Government in the Church, from the ſtate of the Apoſtles under Chriſt, is, *from a ſuppoſed inequality among the Apoſtles, and the ſuperiority of one as Monarch of the Church*; which is the Papiſts Plea from St. *Peter*, as the chief and head of the Apoſtles. Whoſe loud exclamations for St. *Peter*'s authority are much of the ſame nature with thoſe of *Demetrius* the Silver-ſmith at *Epheſus*, with his fellow Craftſmen, who cried up, Great is *Diana* of the *Epheſians*, not from the honour they bore to her as *Diana*, but from the gain which came to them from her worſhip at *Epheſus*. But I diſpute not now the *entail* of St. *Peter*'s *power*, what ever it was to the *Roman Biſhop*; but I only enquire into the *Pleas* drawn for his authority from the Scriptures, which are written in ſo ſmall a character, that without the *Spectacles* of an implicite Faith, they will ſcarce appear legible to the eyes of men. For what though *Chriſt changed St. Peter's name?* muſt it therefore follow that Chriſt baptized him Monarch of his Church? Were not *John* and *James* called by Chriſt *Boanerges?* and yet who thinks that thoſe *Sons of Thunder* muſt therefore overturn all other power but their own? *Chriſt* gave them new names, to ſhew his own *authority over them*, and not their *authority over others*; to be as *Monitors of their duty*, and not as *Inſtruments to convey power.*

power. So *Chryſoſtome* ſpeaks of the very name *Peter* given to *Simon*, it was to ſhew him his duty of being fixed and ſtable in the faith of Chriſt, ἵνα ἔχῃ διδάσκαλον διηνεχῆ τὴν προσηγορίαν τῆς τοιαύτης στερρότητος, *this name might be* (as a ſtring upon his finger) *a continual remembrancer of his duty.* And likewiſe, I conceive, as an encouragement to him after his fall, that he ſhould recover his former ſtability again; elſe it ſhould ſeem ſtrange, that he alone of the *Apoſtles*, ſhould have his name from *firmneſs* and *ſtability*, who *fell* the ſooneſt, and the fouleſt of any of the Apoſtles; unleſs it were κατ' ἀντίφρασιν, which would be worſe *Divinity* than Rhetorick. The change then of Saint *Peter*'s name imports no ſuch univerſal power, neither from the change, nor from the name. *But why then hath St.* Peter *the honour to be named firſt of all the Apoſtles? Firſt*, It ſeems to be implyed as an honour given to *Peter* above the reſt; but doth all honour carry an univerſal power along with it? There may be order certainly among equals; and there may be *firſt*, *ſecond* and *third*, *&c.* where there is no imparity and juriſdiction in the firſt over all the reſt. *A Primacy of order* as among equals, I know none will deny St. *Peter: A Primacy of power* as over Inferiors, I know none will grant, but ſuch as have ſubdued their reaſon to their paſſion and intereſt. Nay, a farther order of mere place, may without danger be attributed to him; a primacy *in order of time*, as being of the firſt called, and it may be the firſt who adhered to Chriſt, *in order of age*; of which *Jerom*, *ætati delatum quia Petrus ſenior erat*, ſpeaking of *Peter* and *John*, nay, yet higher, ſome *order of dignity* too; in regard of his θερμότης, which the *Greek Fathers* ſpeak ſo much of; the fervency and heat of his ſpirit, whence by *Euſebius* he is called προήγορος τῶν ἀποστόλων *the Prolocutor among the Apoſtles*, who was therefore moſt forward to enquire, moſt ready to anſwer, which *Chryſoſtome* elegantly calls προπηδᾶν alluding to the name κορυφαῖος and ἔξαρχος, which are frequently given to *Peter* by the Fathers, which import no more than *præſultor in choreâ*, he that led the dance among the Diſciples; but his being κορυφαῖος implies no ſuperiority of power. For *Dionyſſ. Halycarnaſſ.* calls *Appius Claudius* τὸν κορυφαιότατον τῆς δεκαρχίας, whereas all know that the *Decemviri* had an equality of power among themſelves. Neither doth his being as the mouth of the Diſciples imply his power; for *Aaron* was a mouth to *Moſes*, but *Moſes* was *Aaron*'s maſter. Neither yet doth this primacy of order always hold in reference to *Peter*; for although generally he is named firſt of the Apoſtles, as *Mat.* 10. 2. *Mark* 3. 16. *Acts* 1. 13. *Mark* 1. 36. *Luke* 8. 45. *Acts* 2. 14.———37. yet in other places of Scripture we find other Apoſtles ſet in order before him, as *James*, *Galat.* 2. 9. *Paul* and *Apollos*, and others, 1 *Cor.* 3, 22. 1 *Cor.* 1. 12.——9. 5. No argument then can be drawn hence, if it would hold, but only a primacy of order; and yet even that fails too in the Scriptures changing of the order ſo often. *But*, ſay they, *whatever becomes of this order, we have a ſtrong foundation for Saint* Peter's *power, becauſe Chriſt ſaid, He would build his Church upon him*, Mat. 16. 17. This were ſomething indeed, if it were proved; but I fear this *Rock* will not hold water, as it is brought by them; nor Saint *Peter* prove to be *that Rock.* For, indeed, was the Church built upon Saint *Peter?* then he muſt be the chief foundation-ſtone, and *Peter* muſt build upon himſelf, and not upon Chriſt, and all the Apoſtles upon him; and thus in exalting the Servant, we depreſs the Maſter; and ſetting a *new foundation*, we take away the *only foundation Jeſus Chriſt.* If by being built upon

Tom. 8. ed. Savil. p. 105.

Lib. 1. c. Jovin.

Hiſt. Eccleſiaſt. lib. 2. c. 14.

Chryſoſt. in Mat. 6. 16.

Hiſt. Rom. lib. 11.

1 Cor. 3. 12.

upon *Peter*, they mean no more than being built by him as the chief inſtrument; it is both a very incongruous ſpeech, and implies nothing more than what was common to him, and the reſt of the Apoſtles, who were all Maſter-builders in the Church of Chriſt, as *Paul* calls himſelf; Rev. 21. 19. and in that reſpect are ſet forth as *the twelve foundation-ſtones*, in the walls of the *New-Jeruſalem*.

The rock then ſpoken of by Chriſt, in his ſpeech to *Peter*, if taken *doctrinally*, was St. *Peter*'s confeſſion, as many of the Fathers interpret it; if taken *perſonally*, it was none other but Chriſt himſelf, who uſed Joh. 2. 19. a like ſpeech to this, when he ſaid, *Deſtroy this Temple, and in three days I will raiſe it up.* Which words, though ſpoken by occaſion of the material Temple, (as thoſe were of *Peter*'s name) yet Chriſt underſtood them of the temple of his body, (as here likewiſe he doth of his perſon.) *But ſtill they urge, Chriſt put the Keys into Saint* Peter's *hands*, Mat. 16. 19. *Now the power of the Keys doth denote regal authority.* I anſwer, *Firſt*, The Keys may be given two ways, either *from a Prince to a Subject*, or *from a City to a Prince.* In this latter acception, they denote principality in the receiver, but withal inferiority and ſubjection in the Giver; and in this ſenſe, I am ſo charitable, as to think they will not ſay that Chriſt gave the Keys to *Peter*; it muſt be then as a Prince to a Subject; and when they are ſo given, it doth not imply any univerſal power in the perſons to whom they are given, but an inveſting them in that particular place he hath appointed them to; the office which the power of the Keys implies, is *Miniſterial*, and not *Authoritative*, *Declarative*, and not *Juridical*, *over perſons committed to their charge, and not over officers joined in equality of power with them.* For ſo were the reſt of the Apoſtles with *Peter* in the ſame power of the Keys, *Mat.* 18. 18. *John* 20. 23. This power of the Keys then was given to *Peter* in a *peculiar manner*, but *nothing peculiar* to him given thereby. *But ſtill there remains another Ward in Saint* Peter's *Keys, and the laſt Foot to the Pope's Chair*; *which is* Paſce oves, *Feed my ſheep*; *a charge given particularly to* Peter, *John* 21. 15. Thence they infer *his power over the whole Church.* But this *Foot* hath neither *Joints* nor *Sinews* in it, and is as infirm as any of the reſt; for neither did this *command*, rather than *commiſſion*, belong only to *Peter*; for Chriſt had before given them all their general commiſſion; *As the Father hath ſent me, even ſo ſend I you, John* 20. 21. whereby is implied an inveſting all the Apoſtles equally, with the power and authority of governing the Church of God; although this charge be peculiarly renewed to *Peter*, becauſe as he had particularly fall'n, ſo he ſhould be particularly reſtored; neither yet did we grant this: doth the word πιμαίνειν, imply ſuch a *power* and authority as they plead for, *viz.* a ſupreme power over the Church of God? for this even by *Peter* himſelf is attributed to the fixed *Preſbyters* of the *Churches*, who by this argument have as much authority conveyed them, as Saint *Peter* had, 1 *Pet.* 5. 2. and yet, ſhould we grant this, it would not infer what they deſire; for theſe *Sheep* were not the whole Church of Chriſt, taken *abſolutely*, but *indefinitely.* For all the Apoſtles had a command *to preach to every creature*, Mat. 28. 18. which was, as to the words, larger, as to the ſenſe the ſame with Gal. 2. 7. that to Saint *Peter* here. And afterwards we find *Peter* called *the Apo-* Acts 8. 14. *ſtle of Circumciſion*, and *the Apoſtles ſending him to* Samaria, *and* Paul Gal. 2. 9. *in the right-hand of fellowſhip with* Peter, which had been certainly diſhonourable to *Peter*, had he been inveſted with ſuch an univerſal

ſupreme

ſupreme power over the Apoſtles and the whole Church. Such pretences then as theſe are, for ſuch an extravagant power in the Church of God, from ſuch miſerably weak foundations, for the upholding a corrupt intereſt, have given the occaſion to that tart *Sarcaſm*, *In Papatu ſub* Petri *nudo nomine Satan non amplius Larvæ.* But that which would ſeem ſufficient to awaken any out of this dream of Saint *Peter*'s power over the reſt of the Apoſtles, is, the frequent contendings of the twelve Apoſtles, one among another, who ſhould be greateſt, and that even after that Chriſt had ſaid, *Upon this rock will I build my Church*, as we may ſee, *Mat.* 20. 24. If Chriſt had conferred ſuch a power on Saint *Peter*, what little ground had there been for the requeſt of *James* and *John*? and would not our Saviour rather have told them, the chiefeſt place was conferred on *Peter* already, than have curbed their ambition in ſeeking who ſhould be greateſt; and would have bid them be ſubject to *Peter* as their Head and Ruler. We ſee not then the leaſt foundation for an univerſal *Monarchy* in the Church of God; and ſo this form of Government is not determined by any actions or commands of Chriſt.

Mat. 18. 1. Mark 9. 34. Luke 9. 46.

§. 7. We come now to conſider the Pleas of others, who join in renouncing any ſupreme power under Chriſt, over the Church of God; but differ as to the particular forms of Government in the Church; thoſe who are for an *inequality*, uſually fix on the *imparity between the Apoſtles and the LXX.* Thoſe that are for a *parity* upon *Mat.* 20. 25. and *Mat.* 18. 17. I ſhall here proceed in the former method, to ſhew that none of thoſe can prove the form they contend for as only *neceſſary*, nor their adverſaries prove it *unlawful.* *Firſt* then, for the inequality between the Apoſtles and the *LXX.* Diſciples: By that inequality is meant, either only *an inequality of order*, or elſe, an *inequality carrying ſuperiority and ſubordination.* It is evident that the *LXX. Diſciples* were not of the ſame *Order* with the *twelve Apoſtles*, whom Chriſt had deſigned for the chief Government of his Church, after his *Aſcenſion*; and in this reſpect the compariſon of the *twelve Heads of the Tribes*, and the *ſeventy Elders*, ſeems parallel with the *twelve Apoſtles*, and the *LXX. Diſciples*; but if by imparity, be meant, that the twelve Apoſtles had a *ſuperiority of power and juriſdiction* over the *LXX.* Diſciples, there is not the leaſt evidence or foundation in Reaſon or Scripture for it. For the *LXX.* did not derive their power from the *Apoſtles*, but immediately from *Chriſt*, they enjoyed the ſame privileges, were ſent upon the ſame meſſage, (making way for Chriſt's entertainment in the ſeveral Cities they went to) yea all things were parallel between them and the Apoſtles in their Miſſion, (unleſs any difference be made in the Cities they went to, and their number.) So that there is no ſuperiority of office in the Apoſtles, above the *LXX.* nor of power and juriſdiction over them; their Commiſſions being the ſame: And it ſeems moſt probable, that both their Miſſions were only temporary, and after this the *LXX.* remained in the nature of private Diſciples, till they were ſent abroad by a new Commiſſion after the reſurrection, for preaching the Goſpel, and planting Churches. For we ſee that the Apoſtles themſelves were only *Probationers*, till Chriſt ſolemnly authorized them for their *Apoſtolical employment*, *Mat.* 28. 18. *John* 20. 21. when their full Commiſſions were granted to them, and then indeed they acted with a *plenitude of power*, as Governours of the Church, but not before. Nothing can be inferred then for any neceſſary ſtanding rule for

Luke 10. 1.

Church-Government, from any compariſon between the Apoſtles and the *LXX.* during the life of Chriſt, becauſe both their Miſſions were temporary and occaſional. Only we ſee, that becauſe Chriſt did keep up the number of the *Twelve* ſo ſtrictly, that as the *LXX.* were a diſtinct number from them, ſo when one was dead, another was to be choſen in his ſtead, (which had been needleſs, if they had not been a diſtinct Order and College by themſelves) it is thence evident that the Apoſtolical power, was a ſuperior power to any in the Church; and that ſuch an inequality in Church-Officers as was between them and particular Paſtors of Churches, is not contrary to what our Saviour ſaith, when he forbids that dominion and authority in his Diſciples, which was exerciſed by the Kings of the earth, *Mat.* 20. 25. *Luke* 22. 25. which places, becauſe they are brought by ſome, to take away all inequality among Church-Officers, I ſhall ſo far examine the meaning of them, as they are conceived to have any influence thereupon. *Firſt* then, I ſay, That it is not only the *abuſe of civil power*, which our Saviour forbids his Diſciples, but the *exerciſe of any ſuch power as that is*: And therefore the *Papiſts* are miſtaken, when from the words of *Luke*; *Vos autem non ſic*, they conclude *all power* is not forbidden, but only *ſuch a tyrannical power*, as is here ſpoken of. For thoſe words are not a *limitation* and *modification* of the *power* ſpoken of, but a *total prohibition* of it; for, *Firſt*, The compariſon is not between the *Apoſtles* and *Tyrants*, but between *them and Princes*; yea ſuch as *Luke* calls εὐεργέται. Indeed had Chriſt ſaid, The Kings of the earth abuſe their authority, *vos autem non ſic*, then it would have been only a limitation of the exerciſe of power; but the mere exerciſe of civil authority being ſpoken of before, and then it being ſubjoined, *but you not ſo*; it plainly implies a forbidding of the power ſpoken of, in the perſons ſpoken to. But, *ſay they*, the words uſed in *Matthew* are κατακυριεύουσιν and κατεξουσιάζουσιν, which import the abuſe of their power which is forbidden; but I anſwer, *Firſt*, In *Luke* it is otherwiſe, for there it is the ſimple κυριεύουσιν and ἐξουσιάζοντες, when it follows, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐχ οὕτως. So that if the abuſe be forbidden in one, the uſe is in the other: But, *Secondly*, κατακυριεύειν, by the *LXX.* is uſed frequently for κυριεύειν, and רדה is often rendred by that word, as *Pſalm* 72. 7. *He ſhall have dominion*, καὶ κατακυριεύσει, *Pſalm* 110. 2. κατακυρίευε, *Rule thou in the midſt of thine enemies*; in both which places it is ſpoken of Chriſt's Kingdom. So in *Geneſis* 1. 28. πληρώσατε τὴν γῆν καὶ κατακυριεύσατε αὐτῆς. *Repleniſh the earth, and have dominion over it.* In all which places it is uſed ſimply for dominion, and not for tyrannical power.

Luk. 22. 25.

v. Pſal 109. Jer. 3. Numb. 23—32.

It is not then the abuſe of civil power, but the uſe of it, which is here forbidden; which will be more evident, *Secondly*, From the importance of the Phraſe οὐχ οὕτως; which anſwers to the Hebrew לאכן and ſimply denies what went before; as when *Cain* expreſſeth his fear of being kill'd, *Gen.* 4. 14. the *Septuagint* render God's anſwer by οὐχ οὕτως, whereby is not denyed only the manner of his death to be as *Abel*'s was, but it is ſimply denied; and ſo *Pſalm* 1. 4. the *LXX.* render לא כן הרשעים by οὐχ οὕτως οἱ ἀσεβεῖς· οὐχ οὕτως, *the wicked are not ſo.* So, when Chriſt ſaith, *Mat.* 19. 8. ἀπ' ἀρχῆς δὲ οὐ γέγονεν οὕτω, *from the beginning it was not ſo*; it imports an abſolute denial of giving Bills of divorce from the beginning. *Thirdly*, This no ways anſwers to the ſcope of the Apoſtle's contention, which was merely about primacy and power, and not at all about the abuſe of this power. So that by this

place,

place, all affectation and use of a civil, co-active, external power is forbidden to the Officers of the Church; the power of the Church being only a directive, voluntary power; and is rather a *Ministry* than a *power*, as our Saviour expresseth there, *Mat.* 20. 26. *Luke* 22. 26. But having thus excluded all Civil Power from the Governours of the Church, as such: I say, *Secondly*, That this place doth no ways imply a prohibition of all inequality among the Governours of the Church; which is abundantly cleared by this reason, because by the acknowledgment of all parties, the Apostles had a superior power over the ordinary Pastors of Churches: Now if the exercise of all superiority had been forbidden, this must have been forbidden too, as implying plainly an exercise of authority in some over others in the Church. And therefore *Musculus* thus explains the place, *Non exigit hoc Christus ut omnes in regno suo sint æquales, sed nè quispiam cupiat magnus & primus haberi & videri.* It is not an inequality of Order, but Ambition, which Christ forbids; and therefore he observes, that Christ saith not, Let none be great among you, and none first; which should have been, if all primacy and superiority had been forbidden, and a necessity of an equality among Church-Officers; *but he that will be great among you, let him be your Minister.* Let those that are above others, look upon themselves as the servants of others, and not as their masters. For God never bestows any power on any, for the sake of those that have it, but for the sake of those for whom they are employed: When men seek then their own greatness, and not the service of the Church, they flatly contradict this precept of Christ, *But with you it shall not be so.* But however an inequality of power and Order for the Church's good is not thereby prohibited; which is sufficient for my purpose.

§. 8. The next place to be considered is that in *Mat.* 18. 15, 16, 17. *If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone; if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it to the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican.* It seems a very strange thing to consider, that this one place hath been *pressed* by all parties, to *serve* under them, for the maintenance of their own particular form of Government; so that, (as the *Jews* fable of the *Manna*) it hath had a different taste, according to the diversity of the palates of men. Those that are for a *Congregational Church*, being the first receptacle of Church power, set this place in the front of their arguments; those who plead for *Standing Presbyteries*, *Lay-Elders*, *subordination of Courts*, fetch all these out of this place; those that are for a *power of Church Discipline* to be only lodged in a *higher Order of Church-Officers* succeeding the Apostles, derive the succession of that power from this place; nay, lest *quidlibet* should not be proved *è quolibet*, the Papists despair not of proving the *constant visibility of the Church*, *the subordination of all to the Pope*, *the infallibility of general Councils*, all out of this place. Methinks then it might be argument enough of the incompetency of this place to determine any one particular form, when it is with equal confidence on all sides brought to prove so many; especially if it be made appear, that the general rule laid down in these words, may be observed under a diversity of forms of Government. For whether by the Church we mean the community of

the faithful in a particular Congregation, or the ſtanding Officers of ſuch a Church, or a Conſiſtorial-Court, or Synodical-Aſſembly, or higher Church-Officers, it is ſtill the duty of men, in caſe of offences, to tell the Church for redreſs of grievances, or vindication of the perſon himſelf, that he hath diſcharged his duty.

This place then determines not what this Church is, nor what the form of its Government ſhould be, when the ſenſe of it holds good and true under ſuch diverſity of forms. But we ſhall farther enquire, what influence this place can have upon the modelling the Government in the Church of God. For *Chamier* tells us, the *prima Politiæ Eccleſiaſticæ origo* is to be found in theſe words; it will be then worth our enquiry to ſee what foundation for Church-Government can be drawn out of theſe words. In which the variety of Expoſitions, (like a multitude of Phyſicians to a diſtempe'd Patient) have left it worſe than they found it; I mean more difficult and obſcure. We ſhall therefore endeavour to lay aſide all pre-conceptions by other mens judgments and opinions, and ſee what innate light there is in the Text it ſelf, to direct us to the full ſenſe and meaning of it. Two things the great difficulty of the place lies in, *What the offences are here ſpoken of? What the Church is which muſt be ſpoken to?* For the *Firſt*, I conceive it evident to any unprejudicated mind, that the matter our Saviour ſpeaks of, is a matter of private offence and injury, and not a matter of ſcandal, as ſuch conſidered in a Church-ſociety; which I make appear thus: *Firſt*, From the parallel place to this, *Luke* 17. 3. *If thy brother treſpaſs againſt thee, rebuke him, and if he repent, forgive him.* This can be nothing elſe but a matter of private injury, becauſe it is in the power of every private perſon to forgive it; which it was not in his power to do, were it a matter of ſcandal to the whole Church; unleſs we make it among Chriſtians, (as it was among the Jews) that every private perſon might excommunicate another, and ſo releaſe him afterward. *Secondly*, It manifeſtly appears from St. *Peter*'s words next after this Paragraph, *Mat.* 18. 20. *Lord, how often ſhall my brother ſin againſt me, and I forgive him, till ſeven times?* &c. Chriſt anſwers him, *till ſeventy times ſeven*, that is, as often as he doth it. And thence Chriſt brings the parable of the King forgiving his ſervants, *v.* 23. *Thirdly*, Were it meant of any ſcandalous ſin committed with the privacy of any particular perſon, (as many underſtand treſpaſſing *againſt thee*, that is, *te conſcio*) then this inconvenience muſt neceſſarily follow, that matters of ſcandal muſt be brought to the Church's cognizance, when there can be no way to decide them, that is, when one offends, and only one perſon knows it; here will be a ſingle affirmation on one ſide, and denial on the other ſide, and ſo there can be no way to decide it; the matter here ſpoken of then is ſomewhat only relating to the offence or injury of ſome particular perſon, and not a matter of ſcandal to the whole Church. The Queſtion then as propounded to be ſpoken to by our Saviour, is, *What is to be done in caſe of private offences between man and man?* and not in caſe of ſecret ſins againſt God, and ſcandalous to the Church: Now to this our Saviour lays down his anſwer gradually: Firſt, There muſt be *private admonition*; if that ſucceed not, *admonition before witneſſes*; if not that, *telling the Church*; if not that neither, *reputing him as a Heathen and Publican.* Now in this anſwer we muſt conceive our Saviour ſpeaks as to an ordinary caſe, ſo in a way eaſie to be underſtood by all that heard him; and there-

To. 2. *l.* 10. *c.* 5. *ſ.* 2.

fore he must speak in allusion to what was at that time among the Jews in such cases, which is freely acknowledged both by *Calvin* and *Beza* upon the place. *Nam certè tanquam de Judæis hæc dici apparet, saltem ex eo quod addit, sit tibi sicut Ethnicus & Publicanus.* We must then see what the custom was among the Jews in such cases, and how far our Saviour doth either approve the custom received, or appoint new. The Law was very strict in case of offences, *for every man in any wise to rebuke his neighbour, and not to suffer sin upon him*; *Arguendo argues*, our old Translation renders it, *Thou shalt plainly rebuke thy Neighbour.* Now this piece of necessary Discipline our Saviour endeavours to recover among them, which it seems was grown much out of use with them. For *Rabbi Chanina*, as Mr. *Selden* observes, gave this as one reason of the destruction of *Jerusalem, because they left off reproving one another: Non excisa fuissent Hierosolymæ, nisi quoniam alter alterum non coarguebat.* Our Saviour therefore enforceth this Law upon them in case of offences; first to deal plainly with their Neighbour in reproving him; but our Saviour rests not here, but being himself a pattern of meekness and charity, he would not have them to rest in a bare private admonition, but to shew their own readiness to be reconciled, and willingness to do good to the soul of the offending party thereby, he adviseth farther, to take two or three witnesses with them, hoping thereby to work more upon him; but if still he continues refractory, and is not sensible of his miscarriage, *tell it the Church.* What the Church here is, is the great Controversie; some, as *Beza*, and his followers, understand an Ecclesiastical *Sanhedrin* among the Jews, which had the proper cognizance of Ecclesiastical causes; but it will be hard to prove any such *Sanhedrin* in use among them; the Priests and Levites indeed were very often chosen into the *Sanhedrin*, (which it may be is the ground of the mistake) but there was no such *Sanhedrin* among them, which did not respect matters criminal and civil; so we must understand what *Josephus* speaks of the Priests among the Jews. Τέτοις ὃ ἦν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀκριβὴς ἐπιμέλεια· καὶ γὰρ ἐπόπται πάντων, καὶ δικασταὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων, καὶ κολασταὶ τῶν κατεγνωσμένων οἱ ἱερεῖς ἐτάχθησαν. *The Priests were always very studious of the Law, and other matters of concernment. These were appointed as the Overseers of all things, Judges of Controversies, and the Punishers of condemned Persons.* Thus we see he is so far from attributing a distinct Ecclesiastical-Court to them, that he seems to make them the only Judges in civil and criminal causes. Others by the Church, understand the Christian Church, but herein they are divided, some understand by it only the Officers of the Church, so *Chrysostome* τοῖς προεδρεύουσι. *Euthymius Ecclesiam nunc vocat præsides fidelium Ecclesiæ.* Others understand it not in its representative notion, but in its diffusive capacity, as taking in all the members. But our Saviour speaking to a present case, must be supposed to lay down a present remedy, which could not be, if he gave only rules for governing his Church, which was not as yet gathered nor formed, there being then no *Court Ecclesiastical* for them to appeal unto. Suppose then this case to have fallen out immediately after our Saviour's speaking of it, that one brother should trespass against another, either then notwithstanding our Saviour's speech, (which speaks to the present time, *Go and tell the Church*) the offended brother is left without a power of redress, or he must understand it in some sense of the word Church, which was then in use among the Jews. And these who tell us, *That unless* ἐκκλησία *be understood*

Beza in loc.

Lev. 19. 17.

De Syned. l. 1. c. 9. In Gemar. Babyl. ad tit. Shabbath. f. 119. 1. 16.

V. Grotium in Mat. 5. 12. Selden de Syned. l. 2. c. 8. Joseph. l. 2. cont. Appion.

Gelleſpy Aaron's rod, lib. 3. c. 2. p. 552. l. 2. c. 9. p. 296.

underſtood for a Church as we underſtand it, it would be no eaſie matter for us now to conceive what the Holy Ghoſt meant by it, would do well withal to conſider how thoſe to whom Chriſt ſpoke, ſhould apprehend his meaning, if he ſpoke in a ſenſe they never heard of before. And certainly our beſt way to underſtand the meaning of Scripture, is to conſider, *what*, *of whom*, *to whom* the Scripture ſpeaks; for although the Scripture, as a rule of faith for us, be ſuppoſed to be ſo written, as to be eaſily underſtood by us, yet as the parcels of it were ſpoken upon ſeveral occaſions, they muſt be ſuppoſed to be ſo ſpoken, as to be apprehended by them to whom they were ſpoken in the common ſenſe of the words, if nothing peculiar be expreſſed in the ſpeech, whereby to reſtrain them to another ſenſe. And therefore the *Church* muſt be underſtood in the ſame ſenſe wherein the word קהל or the *Syriack* anſwering to it was apprehended among the Jews in our Saviour's time. Which could not be for any new Conſiſtory or *Sanhedrin* to be erected under the Goſpel. Thence others conceiving that Chriſt did ſpeak according to the cuſtom of the Jews, by the *Church*, underſtand nothing elſe but the *Sanhedrin*, and ſo make the ſenſe of the words to be this. The caſe our Saviour ſpeaks to is that of private quarrels, wherein our Saviour lays down two Directions in a way of charity, *private admonition*, and *before witneſſes*; but if the party continues refractory, then it may be lawful to convent him before the Courts of Judicature among them, the *Triumvirate*, the Twenty three, or the great *Sanhedrin*; for although the *Romans* had taken away the power of the *Jews* in capital matters, yet they allowed them liberty of judging in caſe of private quarrels; but if he neglect to hear the *Sanhedrin*, then it may be lawful to implead him before the *Governour* of the *Province* in his Court of Judicature, by which Heathens and Publicans were to be judged; which is meant by *let him be to thee*, not as a brother Jew, *but as a Heathen and a Publican*. This Expoſition is ſaid to be firſt broached by *Eraſtus*, but much improved and enlarged by *Rev. Biſhop Bilſon*, who ſpends a whole Chapter upon it. But this Expoſition, though it ſeems fair and plauſible, yet there are ſeveral things in it which keep me from embracing it; as *Firſt*, It ſeems not very probable that our Saviour ſhould ſend his Diſciples to whom he ſpeaks, to the Jewiſh *Sanhedrin*, for the ending any controverſies ariſing among themſelves; knowing how bitter enemies they were to all who were followers of Chriſt. *Secondly*, It ſeems not very agreeable with the ſcope of our Saviour's ſpeech, which was to take up differences as much as may be among his diſciples, and to make them ſhew all lenity and forbearance towards thoſe that had offended them, aud to do good to the ſouls of thoſe that had injured and provoked them; whereas this command of telling the *Sanhedrin*, and impleading offenders before Heathen-Courts, tends apparently to heighten the bitterneſs and animoſities of mens ſpirits one againſt another, and lays Religion ſo open to obloquies, which makes *Paul* ſo ſeverely reprove the *Chriſtians* at *Corinth*, *for going to Law before Heathen Magiſtrates*; therefore to ſay that *Chriſt* allows their going to Law before Heathens, and *Paul* to forbid it, were inſtead of finding a way to end the differences among *Chriſtians*, to make one between *Chriſt* and *Paul*. *Thirdly*, The thing chiefly aimed at by *Chriſt*, is not a man's vindication of himſelf, or recovering loſſes by injuries received, but the recovering and *gaining the offending brother*? which evidently appears by what our Saviour adds to the uſing admonition in private, *if he ſhall hear thee*, *thou*

Theſ. 41. Perpetual Government. c. 4.

1 Cor. 6. 1——6.

thou hast gained thy brother. Now κερδαίνειν in the New Testament is used for the conversion and turning others from sin. *That I might gain them that are under the Law,* 1 *Corinth.* 9. 19, 20, *&c.* so 1 *Pet.* 3. 1. explained by *Jam.* 5. 20. Our Saviour then speaks not to the manner of proceeding as to civil injuries, which call for *restitution*, but to such as call for *reconciliation.* And so the case I conceive is that of *private differences and quarrels* between men, and not *Law suits, nor civil causes:* I mean such *differences* as respect *persons*, and not *things*, which our Saviour lays down these rules for the ending of. And therefore I cannot but wonder to see some men insist so much on that place against such an Exposition of this *Luke* 12. 14. where Christ saith, *Who made me a judge and a divider among you?* For doth it any ways follow, because Christ would not take upon him to be a temporal Judge among the Jews, therefore he should take no course for the ending differences among his Disciples, and the taking away all animosities from among them? Nay, on the contrary, doth not our Saviour very often designedly speak to this very purpose, to root out all bitterness, malice, envy, and rancour from mens spirits, and to persuade them to forgive injuries, even to pray for persecutors, and by any means to be reconciled to their Brethren. Which he makes to be a duty of so great necessity, that *if a man had brought his gift to the Altar, and remembred his brother had ought against him, he bids him leave his gift there, and go, and be reconciled to his brother, and then offer up the gift.* We see hereby how suitable it was to our Saviour's Doctrine and design, to lay down rules for the ending any differences arising among his Disciples; and this being now cleared to be the state of the case, it will not be difficult to resolve what is meant by *telling the Church.* Which I make not to be any *appeal* to a *juridical Court*, acting *authoritatively* over the persons brought before it, but the *third* and *highest step of charity* in a man towards a person that hath offended him, *viz.* that when neither private admonition, nor before two or three witnesses would serve to reclaim the offender, *then to call a select company together*, (which is the natural importance of the word ἐκκλησία) and before them all to lay open the cause of the breach and difference between them, and to refer it to their arbitration to compose and end it. Which Sense of the place, I humbly conceive to have the least force in it, and in every part of it to be most genuine and natural, and fully agreeable to the received practice among the Jews; which the Author of the Book *Musar*, cited by *Drusius*, fully acquaints us with, whose words I shall transcribe, as being a plain Paraphrase on these of our Saviour. *Qui arguit socium suum, debet primum hoc facere placide inter se & ipsum solum verbis mollibus, Ita ut non pudefaciat eum. Si resipiscit bene est; sin, debet eum acritèr arguere & pudefacere inter se & ipsum. Si non resipiscit, debet adhibere socios, ipsumque coram illis pudore afficere; si nec hoc modo quicquam proficit, debet eum pudefacere coram multis, ejusque delictum publicare: Nam certè detegendi sunt hypocritæ.* That which this Author calls *pudefacere eum coram multis*, is that which our Saviour means when he bids him *tell the Church*, or the *Congregation*, as our old translation renders it. This the Jews called reproving of men כרכים before a multitude, as the *Vulg. Latin*, though fallly renders that place *Leviticus* 19. 17. *publice argue eum*, and to this the Apostle may allude, when he speaks of the ἡ ἐπιτιμία ἡ ὑπὸ τῶν πλειόνων, 2 Cor. 2. 6. *the censure of many*; and the reproof

Mat. 5. 23, 24.

Præterit. lib. 1. *p.* 43.

ἐνώπιον

ἐνώπιον πάντων *before all*, 1 *Tim.* 5. 20. which was to be in matters of publick ſcandal *upon Religion*, שמום ברבים as the Jews call them, but in caſe the offender ſhould ſtill παρακούειν *ſlight this overture of reconciliation*, before the company ſelected for hearing the caſe, then ſaith our Saviour, look upon him as an obſtinate refractory creature, and have no more to do with him, than with a *Heathen* and *a Publican*; by which terms the moſt wilful obſtinate ſinners were ſet out among the Jews, and by which our Saviour means a man's withdrawing himſelf, as much as in him lies, from all familiar ſociety from ſuch a perſon. And thus ſaith Chriſt, *Whatſoever you bind in earth, ſhall be bound in heaven, and whatſoever you looſe on earth ſhall be looſed in heaven*, v. 18. *that is*, if after all your endeavours of reconciliation, the offender will hearken to no agreement, it is an evidence and token That man's ſin is *bound upon him*, (that is, *ſhall not be pardoned* ſo long as he continues impenitent) but if he repent of his offence, and you be reconciled, as the offence is removed on earth thereby, ſo the ſin is *looſed in* heaven, that is, *forgiven*. The guilt of ſin that *binds*, it being an obligation to puniſhment; and ſo the pardon of ſin that *looſeth*, as it cancels that obligation. And ſo *Grotius* obſerves, that δεῖν is the ſame with κρατεῖν, and λύειν with ἀφιέναι; what is called *retaining* in one place, is *binding* in another; and what is *looſing* in one place, is *remitting* in the other. But now, although I aſſert this to be the true, proper, genuine meaning of this difficult place, yet I deny not but that this place hath influence upon Church-Government; but I ſay, the influence it hath, is only by way of Accommodation, and by Analogy deduced from it. According to which, theſe things, I conceive, have foundation in theſe words, *Firſt*, *Gradual Appeals* from the method here laid down by our Saviour. *Secondly*, *Church-Cenſures*, and the duty of ſubmitting to Church-Authority; for although before any Church-power was actually ſet up, (as when our Saviour ſpake theſe words then there was none) yet after that Church-Government was fixed and ſet up, it muſt in reaſon be ſuppoſed that all matters of the nature of ſcandals to the Church, muſt be decided there. *Thirdly*, *The lawfulneſs of the uſe of excommunication* in Chriſtian Churches; for if every particular perſon might withdraw from the ſociety of ſuch a one as continues refractory in his offences, then much more may a whole ſociety, and the officers of it declare ſuch a one to be avoided both in religious and familiar civil ſociety, which is the formal nature of excommunication. Herein we ſee the wiſdom of our Saviour, who in ſpeaking to a particular caſe, hath laid down ſuch general rules as are of perpetual uſe in the Church of God for accommodating differences ariſing therein. Thus have we hitherto cleared, that our Saviour hath determined no more of Church-Government, than what is appliable to a diverſity of particular forms, and ſo hath not, by any Law or practice of his own, determined the neceſſity of any one form.

V. Rainold's Conf. with Hart. cap. 2. div. 3. Grot. in Mat. 16.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

The next thing pleaded for determining the form of Government, is Apostolical practice; two things enquired into concerning that, what it was? how far it binds? The Apostles invested with the power and authority of governing the whole Church of Christ by their Commission, John 20. 21. Mat. 28. 18. *What the Apostles did in order to Church-Government before Pentecost,* κλῆρος ἀποστολῆς, τόπος ἴδιος *explained. How the Apostles did divide Provinces; whether* Paul *and* Peter *were confined to the circumcision and uncircumcision, and different Churches erected by them in the same Cities? What the Apostles did in order to setling particular Churches? the names and office of Bishops, Presbyters, Deacons considered. Four general considerations laid down about the Apostles practice. First, It cannot be fully known what it was.* 2. *Great probability they observed no one certain form in setling Churches; proved from* Epiphanius, Jerome, Ambrose *or* Hilary. 3. *Their case different from ours in regard of the paucity of believers.* 4. *If granted for any form, yet proves not the thing in question. For,* 1. *Offices appointed by them are ceased. Widows, Deaconesses abolished. Rites and Customs Apostolical grown out of use.* 1. *Such as were founded upon Apostolical precept,* Acts 15. 29. *considered.* 2. *Such as were grounded on their practice, Holy-kiss, Love-feasts, dipping in Baptism, community of goods, with several others.*

HAving found nothing, either in our Saviour's practice, or in the rules laid down by him, (conceived to respect Church-Government) which determines any necessity of one particular form; the only argument remaining, which can be conceived of sufficient strength to found the necessity of any one form of Government, is, *the practice of the Apostles*, who were by their employment and commission entrusted with the Government of the Church of God. For our Saviour after his resurrection taking care for the planting and governing of his Church after his ascension to Glory, doth at two several times call his Apostles together, and gives now their full *Charter* and Commission to them; *the first*, containing chiefly the power it self conferred upon them, *Joh.* 20. 21. the other the extent of that power, *Mat.* 28. 19. in the former our Saviour tells them, *As the Father had sent him, so did he send them.* Which we must not understand of a parity and equality of power, but in a similitude of the Mission; that as Christ before had managed the great affairs of his Church in his own person, so now (having according to the Prophecies made of him at the *end of seventy weeks, made reconciliation for iniquity by his death, and brought in everlasting righteousness by his resurrection,*) he dispatched abroad his Gospel-Heralds to proclaim the *Jubilee* now begun, and the *Act of Indempnity* now past upon all penitent offenders, which is the sense of the other part of their commission, *Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted, and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained,* Joh. 20. 23. *i. e.* as many as upon the preaching the Gospel by you, shall come in and yield up themselves to the tenders of Grace proclaimed therein, shall have their former rebellions pardoned; but such as will still continue obstinate, their former guilt shall still continue to bind them over to deserved punishment. And to the end the *Apostles* might have some evidence of the power thus conferred

§. 1.

Dan. 9. 24. *with* Rom. 4. 25.

Joh.20.22. ferred upon them, *he breaths the Holy Ghoſt on them, and ſaid, receive ye the Holy Ghoſt*; which we are not to underſtand of the extraordinary Gifts of the *Holy Ghoſt*, which were not received till the day of *Pentecoſt*, Acts 2. 1. but of the *Authoritative power* of preaching the Goſpel, which was now conferred upon them, by this ſolemn rite of breathing the Holy Ghoſt on the Apoſtles. In which ſenſe the *Church of England* underſtands that expreſſion in the Ordination of Miniſters, as it implies only the conferring thereby an authority for the preaching of the Goſpel, which being conveyed by Ordination, is fitly expreſſed by the ſame words which our Saviour uſed in the conferring the ſame power upon his Apoſtles at his ſending them forth to be Goſpel Preachers.

After this comes the ſolemn appointed meeting of Chriſt with his Mat.28.16. Diſciples at the mountain of *Galilee*, (where in probability, beſides the 1Cor.15.6. eleven, were preſent the five hundred brethren at once.) And here Chriſt more ſolemnly inaugurates the Apoſtles in their office, declaring all power to be in his hands, and therefore appoints the Apoſtles *to preach the* Mar.16.15. *Goſpel to every creature*, that is, to all men indefinitely, Gentiles as well Mat.18.19. as Jews, which *Matthew* fully expreſſeth by all *Nations*. Now are the Apoſtles left as chief Governours of the Church under Chriſt, and in this laſt Commiſſion, wherein the extent of the Apoſtles power is more fully expreſſed, there is nothing mentioned of any order for the Government of the Church under them, nor what courſe ſhould be taken by the Church after their deceaſe. All that remains then to be enquired into, is what the Apoſtles practice was, and how far they acted for the determining any one form of Government as neceſſary for the Church.

§. 2. The Apoſtles being thus inveſted in their authority, we proceed to conſider the exerciſe of this authority for the governing the Church. And here we are to conſider, that the Apoſtles did not preſently, upon their laſt Commiſſion from Chriſt, go forth abroad in the world to preach, but were commanded by Chriſt to go firſt to *Jeruſalem*, and there to expect the coming of the Holy Ghoſt, according to our Saviour's own appointment, *Luke* 24. 49. And therefore what *Mark* adds, *Mark* 16. 20. that after Chriſt's appearance to them, *the Apoſtles went abroad, and preached every where, working miracles*, muſt either be underſtood of what they did only in their way returning from *Galilee* to *Jeruſalem*; or elſe, more probably, of what they did indefinitely afterwards, For preſently after we find them met together at *Jeruſalem*, whence Luk.24.52. Acts 1. 12. they came from Mount *Olivet*, where Chriſt's Aſcenſion was. Here Luk.24.53. we find them employed ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ, ſaith St. *Luke* in his Goſpel, which we render the *Temple*, but I underſtand it rather as referring to the action than the place, and is beſt explained by what *Luke* ſaith in *Acts* 1. 14. they were προσκαρτερῦντες τῇ προσευχῇ καὶ τῇ δεήσει, *continuing in prayer and ſupplication*. And that it cannot be meant of the Tem- Acts 1. 13. ple, appears by the mention of the ὑπερῶον, *an upper room*, where they continued together. For that it ſhould be meant of any of the ὑπερῶα, about the Temple, is moſt improbable to conceive, becauſe not only *V. L'Emper. in Cod. Middoc. c.4. Sect. 5.* thoſe ninety *Cells* about the Temple were deſtined and appointed for the Prieſts in their ſeveral ἐφημερίαι, or times of Miniſtration; and it is moſt unlikely the chief Prieſts and Maſters of the Temple ſhould ſuffer thoſe whom they hated ſo much, to continue ſo near them, without any moleſtation or diſturbance. While the Apoſtles continue here, they proceed to the choice of a new Apoſtle, inſtead of *Judas*, thereby making it appear how neceſſary that number was to the firſt forming

of Churches; when the vacant place must be supplied with so great solemnity. Which office of Apostleship, (which *Judas* once had, and *Matthias* was now chosen into) is call'd by *Peter* κλῆρος διακονίας καὶ ἀποστολῆς. *Acts* 1. 25. which a learned Interpreter renders *the portion of his Apostolacy*, or the *Province* which fell to *Judas* his lot in the distribution of them among the Apostles, which, saith he, is call'd ὁ τόπος ὁ ἴδιος, into which *Matthias* did παρελθεῖν *go, and from which* Judas *fell by his sin.* This Exposition is very often suggested by that learned Author (but with all due reverence to his name and memory) I cannot see any such evidence either from Scripture or reason, to enforce any such Exposition of either phrase, yielding us sufficient ground to forsake the received sense of both of them. For κλῆρος ἀποστολῆς is plainly nothing else but that *Office of Apostleship* which belonged to *Judas*, without any relation to a Province; and ὁ τόπος ὁ ἴδιος, is that proper place which belonged to *Judas*, as he is call'd υἱὸς ἀπωλείας, *the Son of perdition*, and no other. But the very foundation of this mistake, is, that the several *Provinces* into which the Apostles were to go for preaching the Gospel, were distributed among them before they were filled with the *Holy Ghost*, which is an *Hypothesis* will not easily be granted by any one that doth but impartially consider these things. That if the *Provinces* were so distributed among them, it must be either before the death of Christ, or after; and it must be before, if *Judas* had a peculiar *Province* assigned to him, which this Exposition necessarily implies; but how *Provinces* could be divided among them before they had their Commission given them to preach to all Nations, is somewhat hard to understand. It must be then immediately after Christ had bid them preach to every creature, that they thus distributed the *Provinces* among them; but several things make this very improbable. *First*, The gross mistake of the Apostles concerning the very nature of Christ's Kingdom, which we read, *Acts* 1. 16. when they jointly ask Christ, *Lord wilt thou at this time restore the Kingdom to* Israel? They dreamt still of a temporal Kingdom, according to the common opinion of the Jews; and is it probable they should distribute among themselves the several *Provinces* for preaching the Gospel, who thought that Christ's Kingdom would have been established by other means than going up and down the world? They looked that Christ himself should do it by his own power, *Wilt thou at this time*, &c. and did not think it must be done by their means, much less by their single going into such vast parts of the world, as the twelve divisions of the world would be. *Secondly*, It appears very improbable any such division of *Provinces* should be made then, when they were commanded to stay at *Jerusalem*, and not to stir thence till the promise of the Spirit was fulfilled upon them. *Tarry ye in the City of* Jerusalem, *till ye be endued with power from on high*, Luke 24. 49. *And being assembled together with them, he commanded them not to depart from* Jerusalem, *but wait for the promise of the Father*, Acts 1. 4. Is it likely, the Apostles, when they were thus straightly charged not to leave *Jerusalem* till they were endued with the power of the Holy Ghost, should contrive the dispersing themselves abroad all over the world? especially when Christ told them, that it should be after the coming of the Spirit that they should go abroad, *Acts* 1. 8. and that the Spirit should fit them for their work, (*Joh.* 15. 26, 27. *Joh.* 16. 13.) *by teaching them, and testifying of Christ. Thirdly*, If such a distribution of *Provinces* had been made so early among the Apostles,

Annot. in loc. Dissert. 3. c. 4. *Schism*, c. 4. *Sect.* 13. *Answ.* to the Cath. c. 4. §. 2. Schism disarmed. *Answ.* c. 3. §. 4.

how comes it to pass, that after they were endued with the Holy Ghost, they did not every one betake himself to his several *Province?* There could have been then no plea nor excuse made for their stay any longer at *Jerusalem*, after the promise of the Spirit was fulfilled upon them. And yet after the persecution raised at *Jerusalem*, when most of the Church were dispersed abroad, we find the Apostles remaining still at *Jerusalem*, Acts 8. 1, 14. would they have been so long absent from their charge, if any such distribution had been made among themselves? *Fourthly*, The Apostles occasional going to places as they did, argues there was no such set division of *Provinces* among them. The first departure of any of the Apostles from *Jerusalem*, was that of *Peter* and
Acts 8. 14. *John*, who were sent by common order of the Apostles to *Samaria*, after they heard that by *Philip*'s preaching, they had received the word of God. Not the least mention of any peculiar *Province* of theirs, which they were sent to. So *Peter*'s going from *Joppa* to *Cæsarea*, was occasi-
Acts 10. 5. oned by *Cornelius* his sending for him. *Fifthly*, That *Provinces* were
32. not divided, appears, because of so frequent reading of many of the Apostles being together in one place; first the whole twelve at *Jerusalem*, after that, *Peter* and *John* together at *Samaria*; about four years after *Paul*'s conversion, we meet with *James* and *Peter* together at *Jeru-*
Gal. 1. 18, *salem*; fourteen years after this, we find *James*, *Peter*, and *John* there.
19.
Gal. 2. 1, 9. Is it any ways probable, if all these had their distinct *Provinces* assigned then, they should be so often found together at *Jerusalem*, which certainly must belong but to the Province of one of them. *Sixthly*, It seems evident, that they divided not the world into Provinces among them, because it was so long before they thought it to be their duty to preach unto the *Gentiles*; *Peter* must have a vision first before he will go to
Acts 10. 11. *Cornelius*; and as yet we see they retained that persuasion, *that it is unlawful for a Jew to keep company, or come unto one that is of another Nation*, *Acts* 10. 28. Nay, more than this, *Peter* is accused for this very action, before the Apostles at *Jerusalem*, *Acts* 11. 2, 3. and they laid this as the ground of their quarrel, that he went in to men uncircumcised, and did eat with them; how this is reconcilable with the whole world's being divided into *Provinces* so early among the Apostles, is not easie to conceive; unless some of them thought it unlawful to go to their own *Provinces*, which certainly must be of the *Gentiles* most of them. *Seventhly*, Another evidence that Provinces were not divided so soon, is, that *Peter*'s *Province*, so much spoken of, *viz.* that of the circumcision, fell not to his share, till near twenty years after this time we
Gal. 2. 7, 8, 9. now speak of, upon the agreement between *Paul* and *Peter*, at *Jerusalem*. If Provinces had been so soon divided, how comes the Apostleship
Answer to *Cath. Gent.* *chap.* 4. *f.* 3. *numb.* 7. of the circumcision to be now at last attributed to *Peter?* was it not known what *Peter*'s Province was before this time? and if it was, how come *Paul* and he now to agree about dividing their Provinces? Nay, farther, *Eighthly*, These Provinces, after all this time were not so divided, as to exclude one from another's Province, which is requisite for a distribution of them; much less were they so at first; for as to this division of the Jews and Gentiles between *Paul* and *Peter*, it cannot be understood *exclusively of others*, for what work then had the rest of the Apostles to do? Neither taking them distributively, was *Paul* excluded from preaching to the *Jews*, or *Peter* to the *Gentiles*. We see *Paul* was at first
Acts 9. 15. chosen *to be a vessel to bear Christ's name before the Gentiles, and Kings,*
Acts 9. 20, 22. *and the Children of Israel.* We see hereby he was appointed an Apostle

as well to Jews as Gentiles; and accordingly we find him presently *preaching Christ in the Synagogues, and confounding the Jews.* So in all places where *Paul* came, he first preached to the Jews in the Synagogues; and when they would not hearken to him, then he turned to the Gentiles. Neither was this done only before the Apostles meeting at Jerusalem, supposed to be that spoken of *Acts* 15. but after at *Ephesus* we find him entering into the Synagogues there, and preaching to the Jews. So likewise he did at *Corinth*, Acts 18. 4. *And he reasoned in the Synagogue every Sabbath, and persuaded the Jews and the Greeks.* *Paul* then we see thought not himself excluded from preaching to the Jews, because they were St. *Peter*'s Province. Neither did *Peter* think himself excluded from the *Gentiles*; he was the first that opened the door of faith to them by preaching to them; in which respect it is not altogether improbably conceived by some, that the power of the Keys was peculiarly given to him. And afterwards in the open Council at *Jerusalem*, he owns himself as the Apostle to the Gentiles; *God made choice among us, that the Gentiles by my mouth should hear the word of the Gospel and believe.* This then evidently destroys any such early distinction of Provinces; when *Peter*, whose Province seems most express in Scripture, *viz. the circumcision*, yet we find him him acting as an Apostle to the *Gentiles* too. I deny not but at the meeting of *Paul* and *Peter* at *Jerusalem*, when they observed how God did bless the one most in the circumcision, the other in the uncircumcision, there was an agreement between them for the one to lay out his pains chiefly upon the *Jews*, and the other upon the *Gentiles*; and in probability where they met in any City, the one gathered a *Church* of the *Jews*, and the other of the *Gentiles*; but this makes no such distinction of Provinces, as to exclude the one from the other's charge; and farther this agreement between *Paul* and *Peter* then after both had preached so many years, makes it fully clear, that the pretended division of Provinces so early among the Apostles, is only the wind-egg of a working fancy, that wants a shell of reason to cover it. As for that division of Provinces mentioned in Ecclesiastical writers, though as to some few they generally agree; as that *Thomas* went to *Parthia*, *Andrew* went to *Scythia*, *John* to the lesser *Asia*, &c. yet as to the most, they are at a loss where to find their Provinces, and contradict one another in reference to them; and many of them seem to have their first original from the fables of *Doratheus*, *Nicephorus*, and such writers.

Acts 13. 5, 14. Acts 19. 8. Acts 18. 19. Acts 10. 28. Mat. 16. 19. Acts 15. 7. *Euseb. lib. 3. cap. 1.*

§. 3. Having shewed that the Apostles observed no set order for distributing *Provinces*, we come to shew what course they took for the setling of Churches in the places they went to. In the clearing of which, nothing is more necessary than to free our Judgments of those prejudices and prepossessions which the practice either of the former ages of the Church, or our own have caused within us. For it is easie to observe, that nothing hath been a more fruitful mother of mistakes, and errors, than the looking upon the practice of the primitive Church through the glass of our own customs. Especially when under the same name, (as it is very often seen) something far different from what was primarily intended by the use of the word, is set forth to us. It were no difficult task to multiply examples in this kind; wherein men meeting with the same names, do apprehend the same things by them, which they now through custom signifie, without taking notice of any alteration in the things themselves signified by those names. Thus since the name

Missa

Miſſa was appropriated by the *Papiſts* to that which they call the ſacrifice of the Altar, wherever they meet among ancient writers with that name, they preſently conceive the ſame thing was underſtood by it then. Whereas it was then only taken for the publick ſervice of the Church, ſo called from the diſmiſſion of the people after it, with an *Ite, Miſſa eſt*; and from the different forms of Chriſtians they had two ſeveral ſervices, the one called *Miſſa Catechumenorum*, becauſe at the end of that the *Catechumeni* were diſmiſſed out of the Aſſembly; the other *Miſſa fidelium*, at which they received the Lord's-Supper; which afterwards (the former diſcipline of the Church decaying) engroſſed the name *Miſſa* to its ſelf; and when the ſacrifice of the Altar came up among the Papiſts, it was appropriated to that: For though they innovated things never ſo much, yet it hath been always the Policy of that Church not to innovate names, that ſo the incautelous might be better deceived with a pretence of antiquity; and thus under the anciently ſimple name of *Miſſa* lies at this day couched a *Maſs* of errors. So after the word λειτουργεῖν was applied by them to that ſacrifice, wherever they meet that word in Scripture, they interpret it in that ſenſe; and hence when we only read of the teachers at *Antioch*, λειτουργούντων αὐτῶν, no other rendering of the words will be taken but *Sacrificantibus illis*, although it be not only contrary to the ſenſe of the word in the New Teſtament, but to the Expoſition of *Chryſoſtome*, *Theophylact*, and *Œcumenius*, who expound it by κηρυττόντων. Thus when publick Liturgies were grown into uſe in the Church after the decay of the Gifts of the firſt primitive Church, *Euſebius* his bare calling St. *James* λειτουργὸς (tho' he relates only to his *Miniſtry* in the Church of *Jeruſalem*) is enough to entitle him Father to a *Liturgy*, which ſoon crept forth under his name; by an argument much of the ſame ſtrength with that which ſome have brought for reading Homilies, becauſe it is ſaid of St. *Paul*, Acts 20. 11. ὁμιλήσας ἄχρις αὐγῆς. Of the ſame ſtamp is *Bellarmine*'s argument for invocation of Saints, becauſe of *Jacob*'s ſaying *invocetur ſuper eos nomen meum.* But we need not go far for examples of this kind. The buſineſs we are upon, will acquaint us with ſome of them. As the argument for popular election of Paſtors, from the Grammatical ſenſe of the word χειροτονία, for Lay-elders from the name πρεσβύτεροι, and modern Epiſcopacy from the uſe of the word ἐπίσκοπος in Scriptures. Names and things muſt then be accurately diſtinguiſhed, and the ſenſe of the names muſt neither be fetched from the cuſtom now uſed, nor from the Etymology of the word, but from the undoubted practice of Apoſtolical times, if that can be made appear what it was, Which will be beſt done, if we can once find out what courſe and order the Apoſtles took in the forming and modelling the Churches by them planted.

V. Picherellum de Miſſa, cap. 1. Caſaub. Exercit. 16. §. 58.

Acts 13. 2.

§. 4. That which we lay then as a foundation, whereby to clear what Apoſtolical practice was, is, that the Apoſtles in the forming Churches did obſerve the cuſtoms of the Jewiſh Synagogue. *Totum regimen Eccleſiarum Chriſti conformatum fuit ad Synagogarum exemplar*, ſaith *Grotius* truly. *Præſides & curatores Eccleſiarum ad inſtar Preſbyterorum Synagogæ Judaicæ conſtitutos fuiſſe conſtat*, as *Salmaſius* often affirms. In which ſenſe we underſtand that famous ſpeech of the Author of the Commentary on St. *Paul*'s Epiſtles, which goes under the name of *Ambroſe*, but now judged by moſt to be done by *Hilary*, a Deacon of the Church of *Rome*, under which name St. *Auguſtine* quotes ſome words

V. Bezam in Acts 13. 15. in Acts 11. 30.—6. 3. —14. 12. —20. 28. Apparat. ad lib. de Prim. Pap. p. 151, 220.

on the fifth to the *Romans*, which are found ſtill in thoſe Commentaries. *Nam apud omnes utique gentes honorabilis eſt ſenectus; unde & Synagoga & poſtea Eccleſia Seniores habuit, ſine quorum conſilio nihil agebatur in Eccleſiâ*, which words are not to be underſtood of a diſtinct ſort of Preſbyters from ſuch as were employed in preaching the Word, but of ſuch Preſbyters as were the common Council of the Church, for the moderating and ruling the affairs of it, which the Church of Chriſt had conſtituted among them, as the Jewiſh Synagogue had before. And from hence we obſerve, that the *Ebionites*, who blended Judaiſm and Chriſtianity together, (whence *Jerome* ſaith of them, *Dum volunt & Judæi eſſe & Chriſtiani, nec Judæi ſunt nec Chriſtiani*, they made a *Linſey-woolſey*-Religion, which was neither *Judaiſm* nor *Chriſtianity*.) Theſe, as *Epiphanius* tells us, called their publick meeting-place συναγωγὴ and the Paſtors of their Churches Ἀρχισυναγώγους. Thereby implying the reſemblance and analogy between the form of Government in both of them. But this will beſt be made appear by comparing them both together. For which we are to take notice how much our Saviour, in the New Teſtament, did delight to take up the received practices among the Jews only, with ſuch alterations of them as were ſuitable to the nature and doctrine of Chriſtianity; as hath been abundantly manifeſted by many learned men, about the Rites of the Lord's-Supper, taken from the *poſt-cœnium* among the Jews; the uſe of Baptiſm, from the Baptiſms uſed in initiating Proſelytes; Excommunication from their putting out of the Synagogue. As to which things, it may be obſerved, that thoſe Rites which our Saviour tranſplanted into the Goſpel-ſoil, were not ſuch as were originally founded on *Moſes* his Law, but were introduced by a confederate Diſcipline among themſelves. And thus it was in reference to the Government of the Synagogues among them; for although the reaſon of erecting them was grounded on a command in the Levitical Law, *Levit.* 23. 3. where holy Convocations are required upon the Sabbath-days; yet the building of Synagogues in the Land, was not, as far as we can find, till a great while after. For although *Moſes* required the duty of aſſembling, yet he preſcribes no orders for the place of meeting, nor for the manner of ſpending of thoſe days in God's ſervice, nor for the perſons who were to ſuper-intend the publick worſhip performed at that time. Theſe being duties of a moral nature, are left more undetermined by *Moſes* his Law, which is moſt punctual in the Ceremonial part of Divine ſervice. And therefore even then when God did determine the poſitives of worſhip, we ſee how much he left the performance of morals to the wiſdom and diſcretion of God's people, to order them in a way agreeable to the mind and will of God. We ſhall not here diſcourſe of the more elder cuſtoms and obſervations of the Synagogues, but take the draught of them by the beſt light we can about our Saviour's time, when the Apoſtles copied out the Government of Chriſtian Churches by them.

In 1 Tim. 5. 1. *v. etiam* in 1 Cor. 12. 28. *Aug. lib. 4. ad Bonif. cap. 4.*

Ep. ad Aug. C. Ebion.

V. Scaliger. de Emend. temp. l. 6. & Lud. Capelli vind. c. Buxtorfii diſſ. Selden. Com. in Eutychium. p. 25.

§. 5. About the time of Chriſt we find Synagogues in very great requeſt among the Jews; God ſo diſpoſing it, that the moral part of his ſervice ſhould be more frequented now the Ceremonial was expiring; and by thoſe places ſo erected, it might be more facile and eaſie for the Apoſtles to diſperſe the Goſpel by preaching it in thoſe places, to which it was the cuſtom of the people to reſort. And as *Paul* at *Athens* obſerving the Altar inſcribed, Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ, *To the unknown God*, takes his Text

Acts 17. 23.

Text from thence, and begins to preach God and Christ to them; so the Apostles in every Synagogue meet with a copy of the Law, from whence they might better take their rise to discover him *who was the end of the Law for righteousness to all that believe. For* Moses *of old* Acts 15.21. *time hath in every City them that preach him, being read in the Synagogues every Sabbath-day.* It was their constant custom then every Sabbath-day to have the Law publickly read; for which every Synagogue was *V. Buxtorf. Synag. Jud. c. 9. p. 216.* furnished with a most exact copy, which was looked upon as the great treasure and glory of their Synagogue, in the copying out of which, the greatest care and diligence was used. In their Synagogues they read on- *V. Lud. de Dieu in Acts 13.15.* ly the Law and the Prophets, the כתובים or *Hagiographa* were not ordinarily read in publick; the Law for the more convenient reading it, was distributed into twenty four *Sections*, which they call'd פרשיות every week one Section being read, (joining twice two lesser Sections together) the whole Law was read through once every eear.

But here I cannot say that the Jews were absolutely bound up to read the several Sections appointed for the days, as it is commonly thought, *V. Cloppenb. tract. de sab. deuteroproto & Lud. Capelli ep. ad Clopp. p. 74. cum resp. Clop. p. 143.* (from which *Parascha* and the times prefixed of reading them, *Cloppenburgh* fetcheth a new interpretation of the Σάββατον δευτεροπρῶτον, which is, that the first *Sabbath* was that of the civil year, which began with the Section בראשית upon the twenty fourth of the month *Tisri*; but the *second Sabbath after the first*, was the first Sabbath of the sacred year, which began with the Section החדש upon the Calends of *Nisan*) Luke 4. 17. but I do not see any such evidence of so exact and curious a division of the several Sections so long since as the time of our Saviour is, which appears by our Saviour's reading in the *Synagogue* at *Nazareth*, where it seems he read after the *Synagogue*-custom, as one of the seven call'd out by the חזן to read before the people, but we find no Section assigned him by him that delivered the book to him (the office of the מגן) but it is said of him, ἀναπτύξας τὸ βιβλίον εὗρε τὸν τόπον, *when he had unfolded the book, he found out that place in* Isaiah. So that then it seems there was no such precise observation of the several Sections to be read. And our Saviour's reading the book of the Prophets in the Synagogue, puts us in mind of the הפטרות the Sections of the Prophets answer- *In Thisbi v.* פטר. able to those of the Law; which *Elias Levita* tells us came up after the time of *Antiochus Epiphanes*, who so severely prohibited the Jews the reading of their Law, but from that time hath been observed ever since, Acts 13.27. of which we read in *Paul*'s Sermon at *Antioch* in *Pisidia*, speaking of Christ: *For they that dwell at* Jerusalem *and their Rulers, because they knew him not, nor the voices of the Prophets, which are read every Sab-* *Itiner. p. 114. ed. L'Emper.* *bath-day. Benjamin Tudelensis*, in his *Itinerary*, tells us, that the same custom was not observed among all the Jews for the reading the Sections *V. L'Emper. in Not. p. 220.* of the Law. For in *Mitsraim*, (which he there takes not for *Egypt* it self, as it is commonly taken, but for *Grand Cairo*) where there were near two thousand Jews, there were two *Synagogues*, the one of *Syrian*, the other of *Babylonian Jews*. The latter read over every week an entire Section of the Law, (as the Jews in *Spain* in his time did) and so finished the Law in a year's space. The *Syrian* Jews, or those that were born in *Judæa*, divided every Section into three parts, and read not the Law through but in three years time. These Synagogues were very much multiplied, both in *Jerusalem* and elsewhere, about the time of our Saviour's being in the world. When the common tradition of the Jews is, that in *Jerusalem* it self, there were Four hundred and

eighty

eighty one Synagogues, which they ridiculouſly obſerved by their *Gematry*, from the word מלאתי uſed *Iſa.* 1. 20. whoſe numeral Letters being put together, amount to that number; but a clearer evidence of the multitude of *Synagogues*, is our *Saviour*'s ſo often appearing in them; and ſo likewiſe the Apoſtles when they went abroad to preach the Goſpel, we find in moſt places that they firſt entred into the Synagogues, which were, by the liberty given to the Jews, allowed them in all the Cities where they inhabited by the *Roman* Governours. And ſo in all their diſperſions, both in *Babylon*, *Egypt*, and the *Weſtern* Parts, we read of the Synagogues which the Jews enjoyed, and the liberty they had therein, for exerciſe of their own way of worſhip and diſcipline. And therefore even at *Rome* we read of their *Proſeuchæ*,

V. Serrarium Rabb. prior. c. 32.
Mat. 4. 9.
Mark 1. 23.
Luke 4. 17.
John 6. 59.
——18. 20.
Acts 13. 14.
——14. 1.
——17. 10.
——18. 4.
——19. 8.

Ede ubi conſiſtas; in quâ te quæro proſeucha? *Juvenal, ſat. 3.*

Which by the old Scholiaſt upon *Juvenal*, is ſaid to be the place *ad quem convenire ſolebant mendici ad ſtipem petendam*, of which *Turnebus* gives this account, *Proſeuchæ fanà Judæorum erant, ut Alexandriæ & Romæ, alibique, ſic nomen adeptæ quod oracula quædam eſſent, vel (ut Chriſtiani loquuntur) oratoria. Cum autem ad Eleemoſynam Judæi dandam eſſent propenſiſſimi, eò ceu mendicorum conventus coibat; ſed & Judæi & ipſi mendici, inviſi erant omnibus, & mendici ea loca quod domicilia non haberent, diverſores interdum occupabant, in iiſque cubabant; ideoque Proſeuches nomen in contemptum abierat.* *Scaliger* thinks that the *Proſeucha* differed from the Synagogue; for which he is checked by *Grotius*, from that place of *Philo*, where he ſpeaks of *Auguſtus* giving the Jews the liberty of their *Proſeuchæ*, for the learning the Religion of their Country, Τὰ γὰρ κατὰ πόλεις προσευκτήρια τί ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ διδασκαλεῖα φρονήσεως καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, εὐσεβείας τε καὶ ὁσιότητος καὶ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς, which in brief is that the *Proſeuchæ were the Schools of all Religion and Learning*, by which words he ſeems to confound not only the *Synagogue* and the *Proſeucha* together, but the Synagogue and the בית מדרש which was their *Divinity-School*, whither they uſed to repair after dinner, upon Sabbath-days, and where the Queſtions about their Law were diſcuſſed; but though I cannot ſay theſe were always diſtinguiſhed, yet in ſome places they were. Such ſeems the *School of Tyrannus* to be, where *Paul* taught, having withdrawn himſelf from the Synagogue. And ſo ſometimes the *Proſeuchæ* were diſtinguiſhed from *the Synagogues*, as *Grotius* himſelf elſewhere acknowledgeth, *viz.* either where there was not a competent number of Jews, (for ten Students in the Law were required to make a Synagogue) or elſe where the Magiſtrate would not permit the uſe of them, in which caſe the poor Jews were fain to content themſelves with a place remote from the City, either by ſome river, as that προσευχή, mentioned *Acts* 16. 13. or by ſome Grove or Wood, whence that of *Juvenal.*

Adverſ. l. 1. cap. 19.
Not. in Frag. Græc. p. 25. in Mat. 4. 23. Leg. ad Caium.
Acts 19. 9.
Annot. in Acts 16. 13.

Nunc ſacri fontis nemus, & delubra locantur
Judæis, quorum cophinus fœnumque ſupellex.

Which Fountain, as *Voſſius* obſerves, was *extra portam Capenam in luco quem medium irrigabat*; and from hence *Scaliger* gathers *Judæos in nemoribus proſeuchas collocâſſe.* Thus it appears now what privileges

De Idol. l. 2. c. 80. p. 715. In Fragm. Gr. p. 15.

the Jews generally enjoyed in their diſperſion, for their Synagogues and publick places, to meet, pray, and diſcourſe in.

§. 6. We now come to enquire after what manner the Government of the Synagogue was modell'd. Wherein we muſt firſt enquire whether there were any peculiar Government belonging to the Synagogue, diſtinct from the civil Conſiſtories which were in uſe among them. This is often left untouched by learned men in their diſcourſe of Synagogues; ſome indeed make the leaſt Conſiſtory or *Sanhedrin* in uſe among the Jews, *viz.* the *Triumvirate*, to be the rulers of the Synagogue, and part of the *ten*, who were to be where-ever there was a Synagogue. But although I cannot ſee ſufficient evidence for a great Eccleſiaſtical *Sanhedrin* founded by *Moſes*, anſwering to the great *Sanhedrin* of *LXXI.* yet I conceive it probable, that when Synagogues were ſo multiplied both at home and abroad, there was a diſtinct *Bench* of Officers, who did particularly belong to the Synagogue to ſuperintend the affairs of that, which I ſhall now endeavour to make out by theſe following reaſons, *Firſt*, Becauſe the *Ten* required for the Synagogue are ſet down by Jewiſh writers, as diſtinct from the number required for the civil Conſiſtory. For in the *Gemara Babylonia* (cited by *Selden*) the account given why there muſt be 120 inhabitants where there was to be a *Sanhedrin*, of twenty three, is this, *There muſt be twenty three to make up the* Sanhedrin, *and three orders of twenty three*, (who ſat in a hemicycle under the Sanhedrin, in the ſame form as they ſat) *and beſides theſe, the ten who were to be employed wholly in the affairs of the Synagogue*, for the Gloſs there explains them to be עשרה בני ארם כטילין מכל מלאכה *decem filii hominis vacantes ab omni operi ut parati ſint* וערבית לבית הכנסת שחרית *domui Synagogæ manè & veſperi*, and there adds, that every City, though it be wall'd, where ten ſuch perſons are wanting, is looked on only as a village, and thought unworthy to have a *Sanhedrin* of twenty three.) So that by this it appears the number of the *Decemvirate* for the Synagogue, was diſtinct from the Perſons employed in the civil Courts. To the ſame purpoſe *Maimonides* gives the account of the number of 120; who likewiſe requires the ten for the Synagogue as a diſtinct and peculiar number. *Atque hi erant viri qui vacabant tantum rebus divinis, nimirum lectioni legis & ſeſſioni in ſynagogis*, as Mr. *Selden* quotes it from another place in him; whereby it is evident that thoſe who were employed in the Synagogue, did make a peculiar Bench and Conſiſtory, diſtinct from the civil Judicature of the place. And therefore the Ἀρχισυνάγωγοι are nor the civil Rulers, but ſome peculiar Officers belonging to the ſervice of the Synagogue. And thence when all civil Power and Government was taken from the Jews, yet they retained their *Archiſynagogues* ſtill. Whence we read of *Archiſynagogues, Patriarchs and Preſbyters* among the Jews in the times of *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, when all civil Power and Juriſdiction was taken from them. The *Second* reaſon is from the peculiar ordination of thoſe who were the Rulers of the Synagogues. This I know is denied by many, becauſe, ſay they, ordination was proper only to the *Preſbyters* among the Jews, who were thereby made capable of being members of the *Sanhedrin*, thence it was called סמיכה זקנים *ordinatio preſbyterorum*, i. e. *impoſitio manuum quâ preſbyteri fiunt*. This ordination was I grant primarily uſed in order to the making men members of the great *Sanhedrin*, and therefore the Jews derive the cuſtom of ordaining them, from *Moſes* his firſt conſtituting the *LXX.* elders, which, ſay they, was done

Dr. Lightfoot Horæ Hebr. in Mat. 2. 23. p. 70.

De Syned. l. 2. c. 5. ſ. 4.

In Jud. tit. Sanhed. c. 1. ſect. 5.

Ad Miſn. tit. Sanhed. c. 1. ſect. 6.

Cod. Theod. l. 16. tit. 8. l. 13. & 14.

done by impoſition of hands; which was ſeconded by the example of *Moſes* laying his hands on *Joſhua*, from whence the cuſtom was continued down among them till the time of *Adrian*, who ſeverely prohibited it by an Edict, That whoſoever ſhould ordain another, ſhould forfeit his Life, and ſo every one that was ſo ordained. Thence the Jews tell us that *R. Jehuda Ben Baba* is called הסימך *the Ordainer*, becauſe in the time of that Edict he ordained five *Preſbyters*, without which they had wholly loſt their ſucceſſion of Preſbyters for Courts of Judicature. But though it be thus evident that their ordination was chiefly uſed in order to the fitting men to be members of the *Sanhedrin*, yet that beſides this, there was a peculiar ordination for perſons not employed in civil matters, will appear, *Firſt*, From the different *forms* of their ordination; ſome were general, without any reſtriction or limitation at all; which power was conferred in words to this purpoſe, *Ordinatus jam ſis, & ſit tibi facultas judicandi etiam cauſas pœnales.* He that was thus ordained, was fit for any court of Judicature; but there was another form of ordination, which was more particular and reſtrained; a form limiting the general power, either to pecuniary caſes, or criminal, or only to the power of binding and looſing, without any judiciary power at all. Now thoſe that were thus ordained, were the Jewiſh Caſuiſts, reſolving men only *in foro conſcientiæ* of the lawfulneſs and unlawfulneſs of things propounded to them. This they called רשות להוריות באיסר והתר *Facultas decernendi circa ligatum & ſolutum*, that is, *a power of decreeing what was lawful or unlawful.* For in that ſenſe binding and looſing is uſed by the Jewiſh writers. In which ſenſe they tell us commonly that one School, as that of *Hillel* אוסר *binds*, that is, judgeth a thing unlawful, another מותר looſeth, (as that of *Schammai*) that is, judgeth it lawful and free to be done. Now the perſons thus ordained with this power only, were thereby no members of any civil Court of Judicature, nor thereby made capable of it; it appears then that this ordination was peculiar to a particular function, which exactly anſwers to the miniſterial Office under the Goſpel. And that thoſe who were thus ordained, either might not, or did not exerciſe that Office of theirs in the Synagogue, I can ſee no reaſon; I am ſure it was moſt ſuitable to that place, or at leaſt to the בית מדרש where there was ſuch a one diſtinct from the Synagogue.

Numb. 13. Numb. 37. 18. *Gem. Babyl. ad tit. anhed. c. 1. f.* 13, 14. *Scaliger Elench. Trither. c.* 10. *Tzemach. David. p.* 1. *mil.* 4. *An.* 880. *Selden. ad Eutych. p.* 19. *de Syned. l.* 2. *c.* 7. *f.* 2. *V. Lightfoot Horæ Hebr. in Mar.* 18. 19.

But a clearer evidence of the particular ordination of thoſe employed in the Synagogue, we have from *Benjamin* in his *Itinerary*, for granting his palpable miſtakes about the civil power of the Jews in his time, (which was about the middle of the twelfth Century) ſufficiently diſcovered by the learned *L'Empereur*, yet as to the ordaining of perſons for the ſeveral Synagogues, we have no ground to ſuſpect his Teſtimony, which is very plain and evident. For ſpeaking of *R. Daniel Ben Haſdai*, who was the ראש הגולה or the ἀϊχμαλωτάρχης, *the Head of the Captivity*, then reſiding at *Bagdad:* He tells us the Synagogues of *Babylon*, *Perſia*, *Choreſan*, *Sheba*, *Meſopotamia*, and many other places, derived power from him על כל קהל וקהל רבוחון *of ordaining a Rabbi and Preacher over every Synagogue*, which he tells us was done *by laying on his hands upon them.* Theſe two the *Rabbi* and the חזן he makes to be the fixed Officers of every Synagogue, and the office of the latter lay chiefly in expounding the Scriptures. The like he hath of *R. Nathaniel* the ראש הישיבה to whoſe office it belonged to ordain in all the Synagogues in *Egypt* רבנים וחזנין *the Rabbies and Lecturers of the Synagogue:*

Diſſertat. ad Lectorem & in not. 193, &c. *P.* 73. *ad. L'Emper. Heb. Lat.* *P.* 115.

By which we see clearly, that there was a peculiar ordination for the Ministers belonging to the Synagogue. Thence *Scaliger* wonders how Christ at twelve years old should be permitted to sit among the Doctors asking Questions, when he was no ordained *Rabbi* to whom that place belonged. But although ἐν μέσῳ τῶν διδασκάλων may possibly mean no more than sitting on one of the lower seats belonging to those who were yet in their קטנות or *Minority*, where they sat at the feet of their Teachers, which was not within the Temple its self, but as *Arias Montanus* thinks, was at the East-Gate of the Temple, where the Doctors sat; yet this is evident by *Scaliger*, that he looked on an ordination for that end, as necessary to those who sat in the Synagogues, as the Doctors there; which is likewise affirmed by *Grotius*, who tells us, that among the Jews, not only all publick civil Offices were conferr'd by imposition of hands, *Sed & in Archisynagogis & senioribus Synagogæ, idem observatum, unde mos χειροθεσίας ad Christianos transiit*; *but likewise all the Rulers and Elders of the Synagogue were so ordained, from whence the custom was translated into Christianity*, (of which afterwards.) Thus now we have cleared that there was a peculiar Government belonging to the Synagogue, distinct from the civil judicatures.

Elench. Trither. c. 10. Luke 2. 46. *In Appar. de Templo.* *Annot. in Evang. p. 39.*

§. 7. Having thus far proceeded in clearing that there was a peculiar form of Government in the Synagogue; we now enquire what that was, and by what Law and rule it was observed. The Government of the Synagogue, either relates to the publick service of God in it, or the publick rule of it as a society. As for the service of God to be performed in it, as there were many parts of it, so there were many Officers peculiarly appointed for it. The main part of publick service lay in the reading and expounding the Scriptures: For both, the known place of *Philo* will give us light for the understanding them. Εἰς ἱερὰς ἀφικνέμενοι τόπους οἱ καλοῦνται συναγωγαὶ κατ' ἡλικίας ἐν τάξεσιν ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέροις νέοι καθέζονται μετὰ πάσης εὐσχημοσύνης, ἔχοντες ἀκεραιοτάτως· εἶτ' ὁ μὲν τὰς βίβλους ἀναγινώσκει λαβὼν ἕτερος δὲ τῶν ἐμπειροτάτων, ὅσα μὴ γνώριμα, παρελθὼν ἀναγινώσκει. *Coming to their holy places call'd Synagogues, they sit down in convenient order, according to their several forms, ready to hear, the young under the elder; then one taketh the book and readeth, another of those best skill'd comes after and expounds it,* For so *Grotius* reads it ἀναδιδάσκει for ἀναγινώσκει, out of *Eusebius*. We see two several Offices here, the one of the *Reader* in the Synagogue, the other of him that did interpret what was read. Great difference I find among learned men about the חזן of the Synagogue; some by him understand the ἀναγνώστης, call'd sometimes in Scripture ὑπηρέτης, and so make him the under Reader in the Synagogue; and hence I suppose it is (and not from looking to the poor, which was the Office of the *Parnasim*) that the Office of *Deacons* in the primitive Church, is supposed to be answerable to the חזנים among the Jews; for the *Deacon*'s Office in the Church, was the publick reading of the Scriptures: And hence *Epiphanius* parallels the ἀρχισυναγώγους, πρεσβυτέρους and Ἀζανίτας among the Jews, to the Bishop, Presbyters and Deacons among the Christians. But others make the Office of the חזן to be of a higher nature, not to be taken for the Reader himself, (for that was no set Office, but upon every Sabbath-day seven were call'd out to do that work, as *Buxtorf* tells us; first a Priest, then a Levite, and after, any five of the people; and these had every one their set parts in every Section to read, which are still marked

Lib. omnem probum liberum esse. *In Luc. 4. 16.* Luke 4. 20. *6. Ebionites.* *Synag. Jud. lib. 11.*

by the numbers in some Bibles.) But the חזן was he that did call out every one of these in their order to read, and did observe their reading, whether they did it exactly or no. So *Buxtorf* speaking of the חזן *Hic maximè oratione sive precibus & cantu Ecclesiæ præibat, præerat lectioni legali, docens quod & quomodo legendum, & similibus quæ ad sacra pertinebant.* So that according to him the חזן was the Superintendent of all the publick service, thence others make him parallel to him they call'd שליח ציבור *the Angel of the Church*, *Legatus Ecclesiæ L'Empereur* renders it, as though the name were imposed on him, as acting in the name of the Church, which could only be in offering up publick prayers; but he was *Angelus Dei*, as he was *inspector Ecclesiæ*, because the Angels are supposed to be more immediately present in, and Supervisors over the publick place, and duties of worship; see 1 *Cor.* 11. 10. this חזן is by *L'Empereur* often rendred *Concionator Synagogæ*, as though it belonged to him to expound the meaning of what was read in the Synagogue, but he that did that, was call'd דרשן from דרש *to enquire*; thence συζητητὴς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου *the enquirer, or disputer of this world*, thence *R. Moses Haddarsan*; but it is in vain to seek for several Offices from several names; nay, it seems not evident, that there was any set Officers in the Jewish Church for expounding Scriptures in all Synagogues, or at least not so fixed, but that any one that enjoyed any repute for Religion, or knowledge in the Law, was allowed a free liberty of speaking for the instruction of the people, as we see in Christ and his Apostles; *for the Rulers of the Synagogue sent to* Paul *and* Barnabas, *after the reading of the Law, that if they had any word of exhortation, they should speak on.* From hence it is evident, that there were more than one who had rule over the Synagogues, they being call'd Rulers here. It seems very probable, that in every City where there were *ten wise men*, (as there were supposed to be in every place where there was a Synagogue) that they did all jointly concur for the ruling the affairs of the Synagogue. But what the distinct Offices of all these were, it is hard to make out, but all joining together seem to make the *Consistory*, or *Bench*, as some call it, which did unanimously moderate the affairs of the Synagogue, whose manner of sitting in the Synagogues, is thus described by Mr. *Thorndike* out of *Maimonides*, whose words are these: *How sit the people in the Synagogue? The Elders sit with their faces towards the people, and their backs towards the* Hecall, (the place where they lay the copy of the Law) *and all the people sit rank before rank, the face of every rank towards the back of the rank before it, so the faces of all the people are towards the Sanctuary, and towards the Elders, and towards the Ark; and when the Minister of the Synagogue standeth up to prayer, he standeth on the ground before the Ark, with his face to the Sanctuary, as the rest of the people.* Several things are observable to our purpose in this Testimony of *Maimonides:* First, That there were so many Elders in the Synagogue, as to make a Bench or Consistory, and therefore had a place by themselves, as the Governours of the Synagogue. And the truth is, after their dispersion we shall find little Government among them, but what was in their Synagogues, unless it was where they had liberty for erecting Schools of learning. Besides this College of Presbyters, we here see the publick Minister of the Synagogue, the חזן הכנסת *i. e. Episcopus congregationis, the Superintendent over the Congregation*, whose peculiar Office it was to pray for, and to bless the people. We are here farther to take notice of the form of their sitting in the Synagogue;

Lex Rabb. ad verb.

In Benjam. not. p. 149.

1 Cor. 1. 20.

Acts 13. 15.

Service of God at *Rel. As. c. 3. p. 56.*

gogue; the Presbyters sat together upon a Bench by themselves, with their faces towards the people, which was in an *Hemicycle*, the form wherein all the Courts of Judicature among them sat; which is fully described by Mr. *Selden* and Mr. *Thorndike* in the places above-cited. This was afterwards the form wherein the Bishop and Presbyters used to sit in the primitive Church, as the last named learned Author largely observes and proves. Besides this College of Presbyters, there seems to be one particularly call'd the *Ruler of the Synagogue*, ראש הקהל in the Scriptures ἀρχισυνάγωγος or ἄρχων τῆς συναγωγῆς, which in the importance of the New Testament Greek, (following that of the *Alexandrian Jews*, in the Version of the Old Testament) implies no more than a primacy of order in him above the rest he was joined with. And thence sometimes we read of them in the plural number, οἱ ἀρχισυνάγωγοι, *Acts* 13. 15. implying thereby an equality of power in many; but by reason of the necessary primacy of one in order above the rest, the name may be appropriated to the President of the College. *Acts* 18. 8, 17, we read of two, *viz. Crispus* and *Sosthenes*, and either of them is call'd Ἀρχισυνάγωγος, which could not be, did the name import any peculiar power of Jurisdiction lodged in one exclusive of the rest; unless we make them to be of two Synagogues, which we have no evidence at all for; I confess *Beza* his argument from εἷς τῶν ἀρχισυναγώγων, *Mark* 5. 22. for a multitude of those so called in the same Synagogue, is of no great force, where we may probably suppose there were many Synagogues. But where there is no evidence of more than one in a place, and we find the name attributed to more than one, we have ground to think that there is nothing of power or Jurisdiction in that one, which is not common to more besides himself. But granting some peculiarity of honour belonging to one above the rest in a Synagogue, which in some places, I see no great reason to deny, yet that implies not any power over and above the Bench, of which he was a Member, though the first in order; much as the נשיא the *Prince* of the *Sanhedrin*, whose place imported no power peculiar to himself, but only a priority of dignity in himself above his fellow Senators; as the *Princeps Senatûs* in the *Roman* Republick, answering to the אבכיתרין in the great *Sanhedrin*, who was next to the *Nasi*, as the *Princeps Senatûs* to the Consuls, which was only an honorary Dignity, and nothing else: Under which disguise that politick Prince *Augustus* ravished the *Roman* Common-wealth of its former liberty. The name ἀρχισυνάγωγος, may, I suppose, in propriety of speech, be rendred in Latin, *Magister ordinis*, he being by his Office *Præsul*, a name not originally importing any power, but only dignity: Those whom the Greeks call ἀρχιερέας, the Latins render *Magistros sui ordinis*, and so *Suetonius* interprets ἀρχιερωσύνην by *Magisterium Sacerdotii*. They who meet then with the name *Archisynagogues* either in *Lampridius*, *Vopiscus*, *Codex Theodosii*, *Justinian's Novels*, in all whom it occurs, and in some places as distinct from Presbyters, will learn to understand thereby only the highest honour in the Synagogue, considering before how little, yea nothing of power the Jews enjoyed under either the Heathen or Christian Emperors.

De synod. l. 2. c. 6. s. 2. Thorndike, *Rel. Assem.* cap. 3.

Mark 5.35. Luke 8.49. —13. 14.

Mark 2. 25.

Annot. in Luc. 13.14.

In Caligula Lampr. vit. Alex. Sever. Vopiscus in Saturn.

Cod. de Jud. Colic. & Eam. l. 13. Cod. Jud. l. 17. c. de Judæis.

One thing more we add, touching this honour of the Rulers of the Synagogue among the Jews, that whatever honour, title, power or dignity is imported by that name, it came not from any Law enforcing or commanding it, but from mutual confederation and agreement among the persons employed in the Synagogue, whose natural reason did dictate,

that

that where many have an equality of power, it is moſt convenient, (by way of accumulation upon that Perſon, of a power more than he had, but not by deprivation of themſelves of that inherent power which they enjoyed) to entruſt the management of the executive part of Affairs of common concernment to one perſon eſpecially choſen, and deputed thereunto. So it was in all the *Sanhedrins* among the Jews, and in all well-ordered Senates and Councils in the world. And it would be very ſtrange, that any Officers of a religious ſociety, ſhould upon that account be out-Lawed of thoſe natural Liberties, which are the reſults and products of the free actings of reaſon. Which things, as I have already obſerved, God hath looked on to be ſo natural to man, as when he was moſt ſtrict and punctual in ceremonial commands, he yet left theſe things wholly at liberty. For we read not of any command, that in the *Sanhedrin* one ſhould have ſome peculiarity of honour above the reſt; this mens natural reaſon would prompt them to, by reaſon of a neceſſary priority of order in ſome above others; which the very inſtinct of nature hath taught irrational creatures, much more ſhould the light of reaſon direct men to. But yet all order is not power, nor all power juridical, nor all juridical power a ſole power; therefore it is a meer Paralogiſm in any from order to infer power, or from a delegated power by conſent, to infer a juridical power by Divine right; or laſtly, from a power in common with others, to deduce a power excluding others. All which they are guilty of, who merely from the name of an *Archiſynagogue*, would fetch a perpetual neceſſity of juriſdiction in one above the elders joined with him, or from the חנשיא in the *Sanhedrin*, a power of a ſole ordination in one without the conſent of his fellow Senators. But of theſe afterwards. Thus much may ſuffice for a draught, in little, of the Government of the Jewiſh Synagogue.

§. 8. Having thus far repreſented the Jewiſh Synagogue that the Idea of its Government may be formed in our underſtandings, we now come to conſider how far, and in what the Apoſtles in forming Chriſtian Churches, did follow the pattern of the Jewiſh Synagogue. Which is a notion not yet ſo far improved, as, I conceive it may be, and I know no one more conducible to the happy end of compoſing our differences, touching the Government of the Church, than this is. I ſhall therefore, for the full clearing of it, premiſe ſome general conſiderations to make way for the entertainment of this *Hypotheſis* in mens minds, at leaſt as probable; and then endeavour particularly to ſhew how the *Apoſtles* did obſerve the model of the Synagogue, *in its publick ſervice, in ordination of Church-officers, in forming Preſbyteries in the ſeveral Churches, in ruling and governing thoſe Preſbyteries.* The general conſiderations I premiſe, to ſhew the probability of what I am aſſerting, ſhall be from theſe things, *from the community of name and cuſtoms between the believing Jews and others, at the firſt forming Churches; from the Apoſtles forming Churches out of Synagogues in their travelling abroad; from the agreeableneſs of that model of Government to the State of the Chriſtian Churches at that time.* I begin with the firſt, *From the community of names and cuſtoms, between the believing and unbelieving Jews, at the firſt forming Churches.* All the while our bleſſed Saviour was living in the world, Chriſt and his Diſciples went ſtill under the name of Jews; they neither renounced the name, nor the cuſtoms in uſe among them. Our Saviour goes up to the *Feaſts* at *Jeruſalem*, conforms to all the

the rites and cuſtoms in uſe then; not only thoſe commanded by God himſelf, but thoſe taken up by the Jews themſelves, if not contrary to God's commands, as in obſerving the Feaſt of Dedication, in going into their Synagogues, and teaching ſo often there, in waſhing the Feet of the Diſciples, (a cuſtom uſed by them before the Paſſover) in uſing Baptiſm, for proſelyting men to the profeſſion of Chriſtianity, *&c.* In theſe and other things our Saviour conformed to the received practice among them, though the things themſelves were no ways commanded by the Law of *Moſes*. And after his reſurrection, when he took care for the forming of a Church upon the doctrine he had delivered, yet we find not the Apoſtles withdrawing from communion with the Jews, but, on the contrary, we find the Diſciples frequenting the Temple, *Acts* 2. 46. *Acts* 3. 1. *Acts* 5. 20, 21, 26. whereby it appears how they owned themſelves as Jews ſtill, obſerving the ſame both time and place for publick worſhip which were in uſe among the Jews. We find *Paul*, Acts 9. 20. preſently after his converſion, in the Synagogues, preaching that Chriſt whom he had before perſecuted; and where ever he goes abroad afterwards, we find him ſtill entring into the Synagogues to preach; where Acts 13. 5. we cannot conceive he ſhould have ſo free and eaſie admiſſion, unleſs 14. —17. 10. the Jews did look upon him as one of their own religion, and obſerv- —18. 4. ing the ſame cuſtoms in the Synagogues with themſelves, only differing —19. 8. in the point of the coming of the *Meſſias*, and the obligation of the ceremonial Law, the leaſt footſteps of which were ſeen in the Synagogue worſhip. But that which yet farther clears this, is the general prejudice of the Diſciples againſt the Gentiles, even after the giving the Acts 11. 3. *Holy Ghoſt*, as appears by their contending with *Peter* for going in to men uncircumciſed. It is evident that then the Apoſtles themſelves did not clearly apprehend the extent of their commiſſion; for elſe what Acts 10. 28. made *Peter* ſo ſhy of going to *Cornelius?* But by *every creature*, and *all nations*, they only apprehended the Jews in their diſperſions abroad, or at leaſt that all others who were to be ſaved, muſt be by being *proſelyted* to the Jews, and obſerving the Law of *Moſes*, together with the Goſpel of Chriſt. And therefore we ſee the neceſſity of circumciſion Acts 15. 1. much preſſed by the believing Jews which came down from *Jeruſalem*, which raiſed ſo high a diſpute, that a convention of the Apoſtles together at *Jeruſalem* was called for the ending of it: And even there we —15. 7. find great heats before the buſineſs could be decided πολλῆς δὲ συζητήσεως γενομένης, *After there had been much diſputing*. Nay, after this Council, and the determination of the Apoſtles therein, all the eaſe and releaſe that was granted, was only to the Gentile-converts, but the Jews ſtick cloſe to their old Principles ſtill, and are as zealous of the cuſtoms of the Jews as ever before: For which we have a pregnant teſtimony in *Acts* 21. 20, 21, 22. where the Elders of the Church of Jeruſalem tell *Paul there were many myriads* Ἰουδαίων τῶν πεπιστευκότων *of believing Jews, who were* πάντες ζηλωταὶ τοῦ νόμου, *all very zealous for the Law ſtill*, and therefore had conceived a ſiniſter opinion of *Paul*, as one who taught a defection from the Law of *Moſes*, *ſaying*, *They might not circumciſe their Children, nor walk after the cuſtoms.* One copy reads it as *Beza* tells us, τοῖς ἔθεσι τοῖς πατρώοις πορεύεσθαι *to follow the cuſtom of their Fathers.* We ſee how equally zealous they are for the cuſtoms obtaining among them as for the Law its ſelf. And is it then any ways probable that theſe would have continued ſuch zealots for the cuſtoms among them, ſhould not obſerve thoſe cuſtoms in uſe in the Synagogues for the Government

vernment of the Church? Might not they have been charged as well as *Paul*, with relinquishing *the customs*, if they had thrown off the model of the Jewish Synagogue, and taken up some customs different from that? And that which farther confirms this, is, that this Church of *Jerusalem* continued still in its zeal for the Law, till after the destruction of the Temple; and all the several Pastors of that Church, (whom Ecclesiastical Writers call Bishops) were of the circumcision. For both we have the testimony of *Sulpicius Severus*, speaking of the time of *Adrian. Et quia Christiani ex Judæis potissimum putabantur, (namque tum Hierosolymæ, non nisi ex circumcisione habebat Ecclesia sacerdotem) militum cohortem custodias in perpetuum agitare jussit, quæ Judæos omnes Hierosolymæ aditu arceret. Quod quidem Christianæ fidei proficiebat; quia tum penè omnes Christum Deum, sub legis observatione, credebant.* We see hereby that the Christians observed still the Law with the Gospel; and that the Jews and Christians were both reckoned as one body, which must imply an observation of the same rites and customs among them: For those are the things whereby Societies are distinguished most. Now it is evident that the *Romans* made no distinction at first between the Jews and Christians. Thence we read in the time of *Claudius*, when the Edict came out against the Jews, *Aquila* and *Priscilla*, though converted to Christianity, were forced to leave *Italy* upon that account, being still looked on as Jews; yet these are called by *Paul*, *his helpers in Christ Jesus*. For which *Onuphrius* gives this reason, *Nullum adhuc inter Judæos & Christianos discrimen noscebatur*, which account is likewise given by *Alphonsus Ciaconius*, *Congeneres & comprofessores ejusdem religionis gentilibus censebantur, (Christiani pariter ac Judæi.)* The Edict of *Claudius* we may read still in *Suetonius*, *Judæos impulsore Chresto assidue tumultuantes Roma expulit.* We find here the Edict fully expressed for banishing the Jews, and the occasion set down; which most interpret of the doctrine of Christ, as the occasion of the stirs between the Jews and Christians. For the *Romans* called Christ *Chrestus*, and Christians, *Chrestiani*, as the Authors of the Christians *Apologies* against the Heathens often tell us. But *Marcellus Donatus* conjectures this *Chrestus* to have been some seditious Jew called by that name, for which he brings many *Inscriptions* wherein the name occurs, but none wherein it is given to a Jew; which should be first produced, before we leave the received interpretation of it. However that be, we see the Jews and Christians equally undergo the punishment, without any difference observed in them; and therefore when *Paul* was brought before *Gallio* the *Proconsul* of *Achaia*, he looked upon the difference between the Jews and *Paul* to be only *a Question of words and names, and of their Law*, and thereupon refused to meddle in it. And so *Celsus* upbraids both Jews and Christians, as though their contentions were about a matter of nothing. By all this we may now consider how little the Christians did vary from the customs and practice of the Jews, when they were thought by those who were equally enemies to both, to be of the same body and community. Which consideration will make the thing I aim at, seem more probable, when withal we observe that the Jewish customs in their Synagogues were those whereby they were most known among the *Romans*; and therefore when they looked on the Christians as of the same religion with the Jews, it is evident they observed no difference as to their publick practices in their religious Societies. Which is the first consideration, to shew how probable it is that Christians

Euseb. hist. l. 4. c. 6. & Chronic.

Hist. sacr. l. 2. p. 281. ed. Horn.

Acts 18. 2.

Rom. 16. 3.

Annot. in vit. Petri ap. Platin. in vit. Petri.

In Claud. cap. 25.

Lactant. l. 4. c. 7. Tertul. Apol. cap. 3. V. Pet. Pithæum Hor. subseciv. l. 2. cap. 3. Donatus dilucid. in Sue. et in Claud. cap. 25.

Acts 18. 15.

Apud Orig. lib. 3. cont. Celf.

obſerved the ſame form in Government with what they found in the Synagogues.

§. 9. To which I add a *Second* Conſideration, which is the Apoſtles forming Chriſtian Churches out of Jewiſh Synagogues. We have already ſhewed how much their reſort was to them in their preaching from the conſtant practice of *Paul*, although he was in a more peculiar manner the *Apoſtle of the uncircumciſion*; much more then is it probable that the others, eſpecially *Peter*, *James* and *John* did reſort to the circumciſion. And in the ſetling things at firſt, we ſee how fearful the Apoſtles were of giving offence to the Jews, how ready to condeſcend to them in any thing they lawfully might. And can we think that *Paul* would yield
Acts 16. 3. ſo far to the Jews, as to circumciſe *Timothy*, rather than give offence to the Jews in thoſe parts where he was, (and that in a thing which ſee-
Gal. 5. 2. med moſt immediately to thwart the deſign of the Goſpel, as circumciſion did, witneſs the Apoſtle himſelf) that yet he would ſcruple the retaining the old model of the Synagogue, when there was nothing in it at all repugnant to the doctrine of the Goſpel, and the nature and conſtitution of Chriſtian Churches? When the Apoſtles then, did not only gather Churches out of Synagogues, but at ſome places, in probability, whole Synagogues were converted, as well as whole Churches formed: What ſhew of reaſon can be given why the Apoſtles ſhould ſlight the conſtitution of the Jewiſh Synagogue, which had no dependence on the Jewiſh Hierarchy, and ſubſiſted not by any command of the ceremonial Law? The work of the Synagogue not belonging to the Prieſts as ſuch, but as perſons qualified for inſtructing others; and the firſt model of the Synagogue-Government, is with a great deal of probability derived from the *School of the Prophets*, and the Government thereof. This conſideration would be farther improved, if the notion of diſtinct *Cœtus* of the Jewiſh and Gentile-Chriſtians in the ſame places could be made out by any irrefragable teſtimony of Antiquity, or clear evidence of reaſon drawn from Scripture: Becauſe the ſame reaſon which would ground the diſtinction of the Jewiſh Church from the Gentile, would likewiſe hold for the Jewiſh Church to retain her old form of Government in the Synagogue-way. For it muſt be ſome kind of peculiarity ſuppoſe by the Jews in themſelves as diſtinct from the Gentiles, which did make them form a diſtinct congregation from them; which peculiarity did imply the obſerving thoſe cuſtoms among them ſtill; by which that peculiarity was known to others; among which thoſe of the Synagogue were not the leaſt known or taken notice of. But I muſt freely confeſs, I find not any thing brought
Dr. *Ham.* of Schiſm, *ch.* 4. §. 6, 7, *&c.* by that learned perſon who hath managed this *Hypotheſis* with the greateſt dexterity, to have that evidence in it which will command aſſent from an unprejudicated mind. And it is pity that ſuch infirm *Hypotheſes* ſhould be made uſe of for the juſtifying our ſeparation from *Rome*, which was built upon reaſons of greater ſtrength and evidence, than thoſe which have been of late pleaded by ſome aſſertors of the Proteſtant cauſe, though men of excellent abilities and learning. For there are many reaſons convictive enough that *Peter* had no univerſal power over the Church, ſuppoſing that there was no ſuch thing as a diſtinction between the Jewiſh and the Gentile *Cœtus*. I deny not but at firſt, before the Jews were fully ſatisfied of the Gentiles right to Goſpel-privileges, they were very ſhy of communicating with them, eſpecially the believing Jews of the Church of *Jeruſalem:* Upon the occaſion of ſome

of

of whom coming down to *Antioch* from *James*, it was that *Peter withdrew, and ſeparated himſelf from the Gentiles*, with whom before he familiarly converſed. Which action of his is ſo far from being an *argument* of the ſetling any diſtinct Church of the Jews from the Gentiles there, that it yields many reaſons againſt it. For, *Firſt*, *Peter*'s withdrawing was only occaſional, and not out of deſign; whereas, had it been part of his commiſſion to do it, we cannot conceive *Peter* ſo mindleſs of his Office, as to let it alone till ſome Jews came down from *Jeruſalem* to tell him of it. *Secondly*, It was not for the ſake of the Jews at *Antioch* that he withdrew, but for the Jews which came down from *Jeruſalem*; whereas had he intended a diſtinct Church of the Jews, he would before have ſetled and fixed them as members of another body; but now it evidently appears, that not only *Peter* himſelf, but the Jews with him, did before thoſe Jews coming to *Antioch*, aſſociate with the Gentiles, which is evident by v. 13. *And other Jews diſſembled likewiſe with him, in ſo much that* Barnabas *alſo was carried away with their diſſimulation.* Whereby it is clear that theſe Jews did before join with the Gentile Chriſtians, or elſe they could not be ſaid to be led away with the diſſimulation of *Peter*. *Thirdly*, St. *Paul* is ſo far from looking upon this withdrawing of *Peter*, and the *Jews* from the *Gentiles* ſociety, to be a part of St. *Peter*'s Office, that he openly and ſharply reproves him for it. What then, was *Paul* ſo ignorant, that there muſt be two diſtinct Churches of *Jews* and *Gentiles* there, that he calls this action of his *diſſimulation?* In all reaſon then, ſuppoſing this notion to be true, the blame lights on *Paul*, and not on *Peter*, as not underſtanding that the Jews were to be formed into diſtinct bodies from the Gentile Chriſtians. And therefore it is obſervable, that the ſame Author who is produced, as aſſerting that *ſeorſim quæ ex Judæis erant Eccleſiæ habebantur, nec his quæ erant ex gentibus miſcebantur*, is he who makes this reproof of *Peter* by *Paul*, to be a mere matter of diſſimulation between them both; which ſenſe of that action, whoſoever will be ſo favourable to it as to embrace it, (as ſome ſeem inclinable to do it) will never be able to anſwer the arguments brought by St. *Auguſtine* againſt it. This place then was unhappily light upon to ground a diſtinction of the ſeveral *Cœtus*, or diſtinct Churches of Jews and Chriſtians at *Antioch*. But it may be, more evidence for it may be ſeen in the *Reſcript* of the Council of *Jeruſalem*, which is directed τοῖς κατ' ἀντιόχειαν ——— ἀδελφοῖς τοῖς ἐξ ἐθνῶν, *To the brethren at Antioch, thoſe of the Gentiles.* But leaſt ſome hidden myſteries ſhould lie in this *curtailing* the words, let us ſee them at large: *Unto the Brethren, which are of the Gentiles in* Antioch, *and* Syria, *and* Cilicia. There was nothing then peculiar to thoſe of the Gentiles at *Antioch*, more than in *Syria* and *Cilicia*; and if thoſe words τοῖς ἐξ ἐθνῶν imply a *Cœtus* diſtinct of Gentile Chriſtians, from the Jews at *Antioch*, it muſt do ſo through all *Syria*, and *Cilicia*, which was *Paul*'s *Province*, and not *Peter*'s, as appears by his travels in the *Acts*. Either then the Apoſtle of the uncircumciſion muſt form diſtinct Churches of *Jews* and *Gentiles* in his preaching through *Syria* and *Cilicia*, (which is irreconcilable with the former pretence of diſtinct Provinces, aſſerted by the ſame Author, who pleads for diſtinct *Cœtus*) or the τοῖς ἐξ ἐθνῶν can imply no ſuch thing as a diſtinct Church of *Gentiles*, to whomſoever it is ſpoken; and ſo not at *Antioch* more than through all *Syria* and *Cilicia*. The plain ground then of the Apoſtles inſcribing the order of the Council to the *Brethren of the Gentiles*, was,

Gal. 2. 12. *Schiſm. f.* 8. *Anſwer to Schiſ. Diſ. ch.* 2. §. 58 *Hieronym. in* Gal. 1. 22. Reply to Cath. Gent. *ch.* 4. §. 6. *n.* 6. *Aug. ep.* 8. 9. 19. *Hier.* Acts 15. 23. *Schiſm. p.* 75. Acts 15. 41. ——18. 18. ——21. 3.

becauſe the matter of that order did particularly concern them, and not the Jews, as is obvious to any that will but caſt an eye upon the 23, 24, 29 Verſes of the 15th of the *Acts*. As well might then an order ſuppoſed from the Apoſtles to the ſeveral Paſtors of Churches in things concerning them as ſuch, imply that they make diſtinct Churches from their people, as this order concerning the *Gentile Brethren*, being therefore directed to them, doth imply their making diſtinct Churches from the Jewiſh Brethren in the Cities where they lived together. What is farther produced out of *Antiquity* to this purpoſe, hath neither evidence nor pertinency enough, to ſtop the paſſage of one who is returning from this digreſſion to his former matter. Although then we grant not any ſuch diſtinct *Cœtus* of the Jews from the Chriſtians, yet that hinders not, but that both Jews and Chriſtians joining together in one Church, might retain ſtill the *Synagogue* form of Government among them; which there was no reaſon at all, why the Chriſtians ſhould ſcruple the uſing of, either as Jews or Gentiles; becauſe it imported nothing, either Typical and Ceremonial, or heavy and burdenſome, which were the grounds, why former cuſtoms, in uſe among the Jews, were laid aſide by the Chriſtians. But inſtead of that, it was moſt ſuitable and agreeable to the ſtate of the Churches in Apoſtolical times, which was the *third conſideration* to make it probable that the Synagogue form of Government was uſed by the Chriſtians. And the ſuitableneſs of this Government to the Churches, lay in the conveniency of it for the attaining all ends of Government in that condition wherein the Churches were at that time. For Church Officers acting then either in gathering or governing Churches, without any authority from Magiſtrates, ſuch a way of Government was moſt ſuitable to their ſeveral Churches, as whereby the Churches might be governed, and yet have no dependency upon the ſecular power, which the way of Government in the Synagogues was moſt convenient for; for the Jews, though they enjoyed a bare permiſſion from the civil ſtate where they lived, yet by the exerciſe of their Synagogue Government, they were able to order all affairs belonging to the ſervice of God, and to keep all members belonging to their ſeveral Synagogues in unity and peace among themſelves. The caſe was the ſame as to Synagogues and Churches; theſe ſubſiſted by the ſame permiſſion which the others enjoyed; the end of theſe was the ſervice of God, and preſerving that order among them, which might beſt become Societies ſo conſtituted; there can be no reaſon then aſſigned, why the Apoſtles in ſetling particular Churches ſhould not follow the Synagogue in its model of Government. Theſe things may ſuffice to make it appear probable that they did ſo, which is all theſe Conſiderations tend to.

§. 10. Having thus prepared the way by making it probable, I now farther enquire into the particular parts of Government, and what orders in the Synagogue were, which there is any evidence for, that the Apoſtles did take up and follow. Here I begin with the thing firſt propounded, *The orders of publick Worſhip*, which did much reſemble thoſe of the Synagogue; Only with thoſe alterations which did ariſe from the advancing of Chriſtianity. That the Chriſtians had their publick and ſet meetings for the ſervice of God, is evident from the firſt riſing of a ſociety conſtituted upon the account of Chriſtianity. We read of the *Three thouſand* converted by *Peter*'s Sermon, *That they continued in the Apoſtles doctrine and fellowſhip, and breaking of bread and prayers.* Acts 2. 42.

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Where we have all that was obſerved in the Synagogue; and ſomewhat more; here there is publick joining together, implied in the word κοινωνία, their ſolemn prayers expreſſed, which were conſtantly obſerved in the Synagogue; inſtead of reading the Sections of the Law and Prophets, we have the Apoſtles teaching by immediate inſpiration; and to all theſe as the proper ſervice of Chriſtianity, is ſet down the celebration of the Lord's Supper, which we ſhall ſeldom or never in the Primitive Church read the publick ſervice on Lords days performed without. During the Apoſtolical times, in which there was ſuch a Land-flood of extraordinary gifts overflowing the Church, in the publick meeting we find thoſe perſons who were indued with thoſe gifts, to be much in exerciſing them (as to the cuſtom, agreeing with the Synagogue, but as to the gifts exceeding it) concerning the ordering of which for the publick edification of the Church, the Apoſtle *Paul* lays down ſo many rules in the fourteenth Chapter to the *Corinthians*; but aſſoon as this flood began to abate, which was then neceſſary for the quicker ſoftening the world for receiving Chriſtianity, the publick ſervice began to run in its former channel as is apparent from the unqueſtionable teſtimonies of *Juſtin Martyr* and *Tertullian*; who moſt fully relate to us, the order of publick worſhip uſed among the Chriſtians at that time. *Juſtin Martyr* the moſt ancient (next to *Clemens* whoſe Epiſtle is lately recovered to the Chriſtian world) of the unqueſtionable writers of the Primitive Church, gives us a clear narration of the publick orders obſerved by the Church in his time: Τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου λεγομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ πάντων κατὰ πόλεις ἢ ἀγρὸς μενόντων ὅπου τὰ αὐτὰ συνέλευσις γίνεται, καὶ τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων, ἢ τὰ συγγράμματα τῶν προφητῶν ἀναγινώσκεται μέχρις ἐγχωρεῖ· εἶτα παυσαμένου τοῦ ἀναγινώσκοντος, ὁ προεστὼς διὰ λόγου τὴν νουθεσίαν καὶ πρόκλησιν τῶν καλῶν τούτων μιμήσεως ποιεῖται· ἔπειτα ἀνιστάμεθα κοινῇ πάντες, καὶ εὐχὰς πέμπομεν καὶ ὡς προέφημεν, παυσαμένων ἡμῶν τῆς εὐχῆς ἄρτος προσφέρεται καὶ οἶνος καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ὁ προεστὼς εὐχὰς ὁμοίως καὶ εὐχαριστίας ὅση δύναμις αὐτῷ ἀναπέμπει, καὶ ὁ λαὸς ἐπευφημεῖ λέγων τὸ Ἀμήν. *Upon the day call'd Sunday, all the Chriſtians whether in Town or Country aſſemble in the ſame place, wherein the* Memoires *or Commentaries of the Apoſtles and the Writings of the Prophets are read as long as the time will permit; Then the Reader ſitting down, the Preſident of the Aſſembly ſtands up and makes a Sermon of Inſtruction and Exhortation to the following ſo good Examples. After this is ended, we all ſtand up to prayers; prayers ended, the Bread, Wine and Water are all brought forth; then the Preſident again praying and praiſing to his utmoſt ability, the People teſtifie their conſent by ſaying* Amen. *Juſt. Mart Apol. 2. p. 98 ed. Par.*

What could have been ſpoken with greater congruity or correſpondency to the Synagogue, abating the neceſſary obſervation of the Euchariſt as proper to Chriſtianity?

Here we have the Scriptures read by one appointed for that purpoſe, as it was in the Synagogue; after which follows the word of Exhortation in uſe among them by the Preſident of the Aſſembly anſwering to the Ruler of the Synagogue; after this, the publick prayers performed by the ſame Preſident, as among the Jews by the publick Miniſter of the Synagogue (as is already obſerved out of *Maimoni*,) then the ſolemn acclamation of *Amen*, by the people, the undoubted practice of the *Synagogue*. To the ſame purpoſe *Tertullian*, who if he had been to ſet forth the practice of the Synagogue, could ſcarce have made choice of words more accommodated to that purpoſe.

Apologet. cap. 39. *Coimus* (saith he) *in cœtum & congregationem, ut ad Deum quasi manu factâ precationibus ambiamus orantes — Cogimur ad divinarum literarum Commemorationem, si quid præsentium temporum qualitas aut præmonere cogit aut recognoscere. Certè fidem sanctis vocibus pascimus, spem erigimus, fiduciam figimus, disciplinam præceptorum nihilominus inculcationibus densamus; ibidem etiam exhortationes, castigationes & censura divina. Nam & judicatur magno cum pondere, ut apud certos ne Dei conspectu, summumque futuri judicii præjudicium est, si quis ita deliquerit, ut à communicatione orationis & conventûs & omnis sancti commercii relegetur. Præsident probati quique seniores, honorem, istum non pretio sed testimonio adepti.* Where we have the *same orders for prayers, reading the Scriptures according to occasions, and Sermons made out of them for increase of faith, raising hope, strengthening confidence.* We have *the Discipline of the Church* answering the admonitions and excommunication of the Synagogue; and last of all we have the *Bench of Elders sitting in these Assemblies, and ordering the things belonging to them.*

Thus much for the general correspondency between the publick service of the Church and Synagogue; they that would see more particulars, may read our learned Mr. *Thorndike*'s *Discourse of the service of God in Religious Assemblies.* Whose design throughout is to make this out more at large; But we must only touch at these things by the way, as it were, look into the Synagogue, and go on our way.

§. 11. We therefore proceed from their service, to their *custom of ordination*, which was evidently taken up by the Christians, from a correspondency to the Synagogue. For which we are first to take notice, that the Rulers of the Church under the Gospel do not properly succeed the Priests and Levites under the Law, whose office was Ceremonial, and who were not admitted by any solemn ordination into their function, but succeeded by birth into their places; only the great *Sanhedrim* did judge of their fitness, as to birth and body, before their entrance upon their function. So the Jewish Doctors tell us לשכת הגזית בה היתה סנהדרין גדולה של ישראל ישבת ודנה את הכהונה i. e. *In the stone Parlour, the great* Sanhedrim *of* Israel *sat and did there judge the Priests. The Priest that was found defective, put on mourning garments, and so went forth; he that was not, put on white, and went in and ministred with the Priests his Brethren. And when no fault was found in the sons of* Aaron, *they observed a Festival solemnity for it. Three* things are observable in this Testimony, *First*, That the inquiry that was made concerning the Priests, was chiefly concerning the purity of their birth, and the freedom of their bodies from those defects which the Law mentions, unless in the case of grosser and more scandalous sins, as *Idolatry, Murther*, &c. by which they were excluded from the Priestly office. The *Second*, is, that the great *Sanhedrim* had this inspection over, and examination of the Priests before their admission; For what that learned man *Const. L'empereur* there conjectures, that there was an *Ecclesiastical Sanhedrim* which did pass judgment on these things, is overthrown by the very words of the *Talmudists* already cited. The last thing observable, is, the garments which the Priests put on, *viz. white raiment* upon his approbation by the *Sanhedrim*, and soon after they were admitted into the Temple with great joy; to which our Saviour manifestly alludes, *Revel.* 3. 4, 5. *Thou hast a few names even in* Sardis *which have not defiled their garments, and they shall walk with*

Cod. Middoth. cap. 5. sect. 3.

V. Selden. de succes. ad Pontif. Ebre. l. 2 c. 2, 3, 5, & 6.

Not. in Cod. Middoth. p. 187, 188.

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me in white, for they are worthy. He that overcometh, the same shall be cloathed in white raiment. But the Priests under the Law, were never ordained by imposition of hands, as the Elders and Rulers of the Synagogue were; and if any of them came to that office, they as well as others had peculiar designation and appointment to it. It is then a common mistake to think that the Ministers of the Gospel succeed by way of correspondence and Analogy to the Priests under the Law; which mistake hath been the foundation and original of many errors. For when in the Primitive Church, the name of Priests came to be attributed to Gospel Ministers from a fair compliance (as was thought then) of the Christians only to the name used both among Jews and Gentiles; in process of time, corruptions increasing in the Church, those names that were used by the Christians by way of Analogy and Accommodation, brought in the things themselves primarily intended by those names; so by the Metaphorical names of Priests and Altars, at last came up the sacrifice of the Mass; without which, they thought the names of Priest and Altars were insignificant. This mistake we see run all along through the writers of the Church, assoon as the name Priests was applyed to the Elders of the Church, that they derived their succession from the Priests of *Aaron*'s order. *Presbyterorum ordo exordium sumpsit à filiis Aaron. Qui enim sacerdotes vocabantur in veteri Testamento, hi sunt qui nunc appellantur Presbyteri: & qui nuncupabantur principes sacerdotum, nunc Episcopi nominantur:* as *Isidorus* and *Ivo* tells us. So before them both, *Jerome* in his known Epistle to *Evagrius*. *Et ut sciamus traditiones Apostolicas sumptas de veteri Testamento, Quod Aaron & filii ejus atque Levitæ in Templo fuerunt; hoc sibi Episcopi & Presbyteri atque Diaconi vendicent in Ecclesia.* From which words a learned Doctor, and strenuous asserter of the *jus divinum* of Prelacy, questions not but to make *Jerome* either apparently contradictious to himself, or else to assert that the superiority of Bishops above Presbyters, was by his Confession an Apostolical tradition. For saith he, *Nihil manifestus dici potuit*; and *S.* 2. *Quid ad hoc responderi possit, aut quo σοφῶ φαρμάκῳ artificio deliniri aut deludi tam diserta affirmatio, fateor ego me divinando assequi non posse; sed è contra & iis quæ D. Blondellus, quæ Walo, quæ Ludov. Capellus hâc in re præstiterunt, mihi persuasissimum esse, Nihil uspiam contra apertam lucem obtendi posse.* In a case then so desperate as poor *Jerome* lyes in, by a wound he is supposed to have given himself; when the Priest and the Levite hath passed him by, it will be a piece of Charity in our passing by the way a little to consider his case, to see whether there be any hopes of recovery. We take it then for granted, that *Jerome* hath already said, that *Apostolus perspicuè docet eosdem esse Presbyteros quos & Episcopos*, in the same Epistle which he proves there at large; and in another place; *Sicut ergo Presbyteri sciunt se ex Ecclesiæ consuetudine, ei qui sibi præpositus fuerit, esse subjectos; ita Episcopi noverint se magis consuetudine, quam dispositionis Dominicæ veritate Præsbyteris esse majores, & in communè debere Ecclesiam regere.* The difficulty now lies in the reconciling this with what is before cited out of the same Author; some solve it by saying, that in *Jerom*'s sense, *Apostolical tradition and Ecclesiastical custome* are the same; as *ad Marcellum*, he saith the observation of Lent is *Apostolica Traditio*, and *adverss. Luciferian.* saith it is *Ecclesiæ consuetudo*; so that by Apostolical tradition, he meant not an Apostolical institution, but an Ecclesiastical custom. And if *Jerome* speak according to the general

Isid. Hisp. de Eccles. offic. l. 2. c. 7. Ivo Carnot. decret p. 6. c. 11. Ep. 85.

Dissert. 2. cap. 28.

Comment. in 1 Tit.

neral vogue, this ſolution may be ſufficient notwithſtanding what is ſaid againſt it; for according to that common rule of *Auſtin*, *Things that were generally in uſe, and o certain Author aſſigned of them, were attributed to the Apoſtles.* Two things therefore I ſhall lay down for reconciling *Jerome* to himſelf: the *firſt* is, the difference between *Traditio Apoſtolica*, and *Traditio Apoſtolorum*; this latter doth indeed imply the thing ſpoken of to have proceeded from the Apoſtles themſelves, but the former may be applyed to what was in practice after the Apoſtles times; and the reaſon of it is, that whatever was done in the Primitive Church, ſuppoſed to be agreeable to Apoſtolical practice, was call'd Apoſtolical. Thence the Biſhops *See* was call'd *Sedes Apoſtolica*, as *Tertullian* tells us, *ob conſanguinitatem doctrinæ.* So *Sidonius Apollinaris* calls the See of *Lupus* the Biſhop of *Tricaſſium* in *France*, *Sedem Apoſtolicam.* And the Biſhops of the Church were call'd. *Viri Apoſtolici*, and thence the *Conſtitutions* which go under the Apoſtles names, were ſo call'd, ſaith *Albaſpinæus*, *ab antiquitate; nam cum eorum aliquot ab Apoſtolorum Succeſſoribus (qui teſte Tertulliano Apoſtolici viri nominabantur) facti eſſent, Apoſtolicorum primùm Canones, deinde nonnullorum Latinorum ignorantiâ, aliquot literarum detractione, Apoſtolorum dicti ſunt.* By which we ſee whatever was conceived to be of any great antiquity in the Church, though it was not thought to have come from the Apoſtles themſelves yet it was call'd *Apoſtolical*, ſo that in that ſenſe, *traditio Apoſtolica* is no more than *traditio antiqua*, or *ab Apoſtolicis viris profecta*, which was meant rather of thoſe that were conceived to ſucceed the Apoſtles, than of the Apoſtles themſelves. But I anſwer, *Secondly*, that granting *traditio Apoſtolica* to mean *traditio Apoſtolorum*, yet *Jerome* is far from contradicting himſelf, which is obvious to any that will read the words before, and conſider their coherence. The ſcope and drift of his Epiſtle is to chaſtiſe the arrogance of one who made Deacons ſuperiour to Preſbyters. *Audio quendam in tantam erupiſſe vecordiam, ut Diaconus Preſbyteris*, i. e. *Epiſcopis anteferret*, and ſo ſpends a great part of the Epiſtle, to prove that a Biſhop and Preſbyter are the ſame; and at laſt brings in theſe words; giving the account, why *Paul* to *Timothy* and *Titus* mentions no Preſbyters, *Quia in Epiſcopo & Preſbyter continetur. Aut igitur ex Preſbytero ordinetur Diaconus, ut Preſbyter minor Diacono comprobetur, in quem creſcat ex parvo; aut ſi ex Diacono ordinatur Preſbyter, noverit ſe lucris minorem, ſacerdotio eſſe majorem.* And then preſently adds, *Et ut ſciamus traditiones Apoſtolicas ſumptas de veteri Teſtamento, Quod Aaron & filii ejus atque Levitæ in Templo fuerunt, hoc ſibi Epiſcopi & Preſbyteri atque Diaconi vendicent in Eccleſiâ.* Is it imaginable that a man who had been proving all along the ſuperiority of a Preſbyter above a Deacon, becauſe of his Identity with a Biſhop in the Apoſtles times, ſhould at the ſame time ſay, that a Biſhop was above a Preſbyter by the Apoſtles inſtitution, and ſo directly overthrow all he had been ſaying before? Much as if one ſhould go about to prove that the *Præfectus urbis*, and the *Curatores urbis*, in *Alexander Severus* his times were the ſame office, and to that end ſhould make uſe of the Conſtitution of that Emperour whereby he appointed fourteen *Curatores urbis*, and ſet the *Præfectus* in an office above them. Such an incongruity is ſcarce incident to a man of very ordinary eſteem for intellectuals, much leſs to ſuch a one as *Jerome* is reputed to be. The plain meaning then of *Jerome* is no more but this, that *as* Aaron

De præſcrip. adv. hæret. c. 32.

Epiſt. lib. 6. Ep. 1.

Obſervat. lib. 1. c. 13.

and his ſons in the order of Prieſt-hood were above the Levites under the Law: ſo the Biſhops and Preſbyters in order of the Evangelical Prieſt-hood are above the Deacons under the Goſpel. For the compariſon runs not between *Aaron* and his Sons under the Law, and Biſhops and Preſbyters under the Goſpel; but between *Aaron* and his Sons, as one part of the compariſon under the Law, and the Levites under them as the other; ſo under the Goſpel, Biſhops and Preſbyters make one part of the compariſon anſwering to *Aaron* and his Sons, in that wherein they all agree, *viz. the Order of Prieſthood*; and the other part under the Goſpel, is that of Deacons, anſwering to the Levites under the Law. The oppoſition is not then in the power of Juriſdiction between Biſhops and Prieſts, but between the ſame power of order, which is alike both in Biſhops and Preſbyters, (according to the acknowledgment of all) to the Office of Deacons, which ſtood in competition with them. Thus I hope we have left *Jerome* at perfect harmony with himſelf, notwithſtanding the attempt made to make him ſo palpably contradict himſelf; which having thus done, we are at liberty to proceed in our former courſe; only hereby we ſee how unhappily thoſe arguments ſucceed, which are brought from the Analogy between the *Aaronical* Prieſthood, to endeavour the ſetting up of a *jus Divinum* of a parallel ſuperiority under the Goſpel. All which arguments are taken off by this one thing we are now upon, *viz.* that the orders and degrees under the Goſpel, were not taken up from Analogy to the Temple, but to the Synagogue; which we now make out as to ordination, in three things: *The manner of conferring it. The Perſons authorized to do it. The remaining effect of it upon the perſon receiving it.*

Firſt, For the manner of conferring it; that under the Synagogue was done by laying on of hands; which was taken up among the Jews, as a ſignificative rite in the ordaining the Elders among them, and thereby qualifying them either to be members of their *Sanhedrins*, or Teachers of the Law. A twofold uſe I find of this Symbolical-rite, beſide the ſolemn deſignation of the perſon on whom the hands are laid. The *firſt* is to denote the delivery of the perſon or thing thus laid hands upon, for the right, uſe, and peculiar ſervice of God. And that, I ſuppoſe was the reaſon of laying hands upon the beaſt under the Law, which was to be ſacrificed, thereby noting their own parting with any right in it, and giving it up to be the *Lord*'s, for a ſacrifice to him. Thus in the civil Law, this delivery is requiſite in the transferring dominion, which they call *tranſlatio de manu in manum.* The *ſecond* end of laying on of hands, was the ſolemn invocation of the *Divine preſence* and *aſſiſtance* to be upon, and with, the perſon upon whom the hands are thus laid. For the hands with us being the inſtruments of action, they did by ſtretching out their hands upon the perſon, repreſent the efficacy of Divine power which they implored in behalf of the perſon thus deſigned. *Tunc enim orabant ut ſic Dei efficacia eſſet ſuper illum, ſicut manus efficaciæ ſymbolum, ei imponebatur*, as *Grotius* obſerves. Thence in all ſolemn prayers, wherein any perſon was particularly deſigned, they made uſe of this cuſtom of impoſition of hands; from which cuſtom *Auguſtine* ſpeaks, *Quid aliud eſt manum impoſitio niſi oratio ſuper hominem?* Thence when *Jacob* prayed over *Joſeph*'s Children, he laid his hands upon them; ſo when *Moſes* prayed over *Joſhua.* The practice likewiſe our Saviour uſed in bleſſing Children, healing the ſick; and the Apoſtles in conferring the gifts of the Holy-Ghoſt; and from thence

§. 12.

Lev. 16. 21.

Ep. ad Galatas, ep. 154, & 166. Joh. Cord. & V. in Mat. 9. 19.

Gen. 48. 14.

Numb. 27. 23.

it was conveyed into the practice of the primitive Church, who used it in any more solemn invocation of the name of God in behalf of any particular persons, *as over the sick, upon repentance and reconciliation to the Church, in Confirmation, and in Matrimony*; which, (as *Grotius* observes) is to this day used in the *Abissine* Churches. But the most solemn and peculiar use of this Imposition of hands among the Jews was in the designing of any persons for any publick employment among them: Not as though the bare imposition of hands, did confer any power upon the person, (no more than the bare delivery of a thing in Law gives a legal title to it, without express transferring dominion with it) but with that ceremony they joined those words whereby they did confer that Authority upon them; which were to this purpose הרי את סמוך *Ecce sis tu Ordinatus*, or אני סומך אותך *ego ordino te*, or תהוה סמוך *sis ordinatus*, to which they added according to the authority they ordained them to, some thing peculiarly expressing it, whether it was for causes finable, or pecuniary, or binding and loosing, or ruling in the Synagogue. Which is a thing deserving consideration by those who use the rite of imposing hands in ordination, without any thing expressing that authority they convey by that Ordination. This custom being so generally in use among the Jews in the time when the Apostles were sent forth with authority for gathering and setling Churches, we find them accordingly making use of this, according to the former practice, either in any more solemn invocation of the presence of God upon any persons, or designation and appointing them for any peculiar service or function: For we have no ground to think that the Apostles had any peculiar command for laying on their hands upon persons in prayer over them, or ordination of them: But the thing its self being enjoined them, *viz.* the setting apart some persons for the peculiar work of attendance upon the necessities of the Churches by them planted, they took up and made use of a laudable rite and custom then in use upon such occasions. And so we find the Apostles using it in the solemn designation of some persons to the Office of Deacons, answering to the
Acts 6. 6. פרנסין in the Synagogue, whose Office was to collect the monies for the poor, and to distribute it among them. Afterwards we read it used upon an occasion not heard of in the Synagogue, which was for
Acts 8. 17. the conferring the gifts of the Holy-Ghost; but although the occasion was extraordinary, yet supposing the occasion, the use of that rite in it, was very suitable, in as much as those gifts did so much answer to the שכינה and the רוח הקודש which the Jews conceived did rest upon those who were so ordained by imposition of hands. The next time we
Acts 13. 3. meet with this rite, was upon a peculiar designation to a particular service of persons already appointed by God for the work of the *Ministry*, which is of *Paul* and *Barnabas*, by the Prophets and Teachers at *Antioch*; whereby God doth set forth the use of that rite of ordination to the Christian Churches. Accordingly we find it after practised in
1 Tim. 4. 14. the Church, *Timothy* being ordained *by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery*. And *Timothy* hath direction given him for the right management
1 Tim. 5. 22. of it afterwards, *Lay hands suddenly on no man*. For they that would interpret that of reconciling men to the Church by that rite, must first give us evidence of so early an use of that custom, which doth not yet appear. But there is one place commonly brought to prove that the Apostles in ordaining Elders in the Christian Churches, did

did not obſerve the Jewiſh form of laying on of hands, but obſerved a way quite different from the Jewiſh practice, *viz.* appointing them by the choice, conſent and ſuffrages of the people. Which place is *Acts* 14. 23. where it is ſaid of *Paul* and *Barnabas*, χειροτονήσαντες δ' αὐτοῖς πρεσβυτέρους κατ' ἐκκλησίαν, we render it, *Ordaining them Elders in every Church.* But others from the ſignification of the word χειροτονεῖν, would have it rendred, *when they had appointed Elders by the ſuffrages of the people.* But how little the peoples power of ordination can be inferred from theſe words, will be evident to any one that ſhall but conſider theſe things. *Firſt*, That though χειροτονεῖν did originally ſignifie the chuſing by way of ſuffrage among the Greeks, yet before the time of *Luke*'s writing this, the word was uſed for ſimple deſignation without that ceremony. So *Heſychius* interprets it by καθιστᾶν, the word uſed of *Titus* for ordaining Elders in every City; and in *Demoſthenes*, and others, it occurs for νομοθετεῖν; and διατάττειν, *to decree and appoint*; and that ſenſe of the word appears in Saint *Luke* himſelf, *Acts* 10. 41. μάρτυσι τοῖς προκεχειροτονημένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, *Witneſſes fore-appointed of God.* Many examples of this ſignification are brought by learned men of writers before, and about the time when *Luke* writ, from *Philo Judæus*, *Joſephus*, *Appian*, *Lucian*, and others. But, *Secondly*, grantiug it uſed in the primary ſignification of the word, yet it cannot be applied to the people, but to *Paul* and *Barnabas*; for it is not ſaid that the people did χειροτονεῖν, but that *Paul* and *Barnabas* did χειροτονεῖν; now wherever that word is uſed in its firſt ſignification, it is implied to be the action of the perſons themſelves giving ſuffrages, and not for other perſons appointing by the ſuffrages of others. *Thirdly*, χειροτονεῖν may import no more then χειροθετεῖν, in that laying on of the hands muſt ſuppoſe the ſtretching them out; which is only a common figure in Scripture, for the Antecedent to be put for the Conſequent, or one part for the whole action; and concerning this Senſe of the word in Eccleſiaſtical Writers, ſee the large Quotations in Biſhop *Bilſon* to this purpoſe. *Fourthly*, It ſeems ſtrangely improbable that the Apoſtles ſhould put the choice at that time into the hands of the people, when there were none fitted for the work the Apoſtles deſigned them for, but whom the Apoſtles did lay their hands on, by which the Holy Ghoſt fell upon them, whereby they were fitted and qualified for that work. The people then could no ways chuſe men for their abilities, when their abilities were conſequent to their ordination. So much to clear the manner of ordination to have been from the Synagogue.

Titus 1. 5. *V. Demoſt. Phil.* 1. & *adver. Simon, & Ulpian. in Schol.*

V. Selden de Syned. l. 1. *cap.* 14. *Grot. de Imp. Sum. Poteſt. c.* 10. §. 5.

Perpet. Govern of Chriſt's Church, c. 7.

The *Second* thing we conſider, is, *The perſons authorized to do it.* §. 13. Whom we conſider under a double reſpect, *before their liberties were bound up by compact among themſelves*, and *after*. *Firſt*, Before they had reſtrained themſelves of their own liberty, then the general rule for ordinations among them was כל כיי שנסמך סומך לתלמידיו *every one regularly ordained, himſelf had the power of ordaining his Diſciples*, as *Maimonides* affirms. To the ſame purpoſe is that teſtimony of the *Gemara Babylonia* in Mr. *Selden* אחד ואחר מסנה את תלמידיו אמר רבי בא בראשונה היה כל *Rabbi Abba Bar Jonah ſaid that in times of old, every one was wont to ordain his own Diſciples*; to which purpoſe many inſtances are there brought. But it is generally agreed among them, that in the time of *Hillel* this courſe was altered, and they were reſtrained from their former liberty; in probability finding the many inconveniencies of

Tract. San. cap. 4. §. 5. *Ad tit. Sanhed. c.* 1. *De Syned. l.* 2. *c.* 7. §. 1.

ſo common ordinations; or, as they ſay, out of their great revérence to the houſe of *Hillel*, they then agreed that none ſhould ordain others without the preſence of the נשיא the Prince of the *Sanhedrin*, or a licenſe obtained from him for that end; and it was determined that all ordinations without the conſent of the Prince of the *Sanhedrin*, ſhould be looked upon as null and void, which is atteſted by the former Authors. The ſame diſtinction may be obſerved under the Goſpel in reference to the fixed Officers of the Church; for we may conſider them in their firſt ſtate and period, as the Preſbyters did rule the Churches in common, as *Jerome* tells us, *communi Preſbyterorum concilio Eccleſiæ gubernabantur*; before the juriſdiction of Preſbyters was reſtrained by mutual conſent, in this inſtant, doubtleſs, the Preſbyters enjoyed the ſame liberty that the Preſbyters among the Jews did, of ordaining other Preſbyters, by that power they were inveſted in at their own ordination. To which purpoſe we ſhall only at preſent take notice of the Confeſſion of two Canoniſts, who are the higheſt among the Papiſts, for defence of a diſtinct order of Epiſcopacy. Yet *Gratian* himſelf confeſſeth, *Sacros ordines dicimus Diaconatum & Preſbyteratum; hos quidem ſolos Eccleſia primitiva habuiſſe dicitur.* And *Johannes Semeca*, in his *Gloſs* upon the *Canon-Law*; *Dicunt quidem quod in Eccleſia prima primitiva commune erat officium Epiſcoporum & Sacerdotum, & nomina erant communia.——— Sed in ſecundâ primitivâ cœperunt diſtingui & nomina & officia.* Here we have a diſtinction of the Primitive Church very agreeable both to the opinion of *Jerome*, and the matter we are now upon; in the firſt Primitive Church, the Preſbyters all acted in common for the welfare of the Church, and either did or might ordain others to the ſame authority with themſelves; becauſe the intrinſecal power of order is equally in them, and in thoſe who were after appointed Governours over Preſbyteries. And the collation of orders doth come from the power of order, and not merely from the power of juriſdiction. It being likewiſe fully acknowledged by the Schoolmen, that Biſhops are not ſuperior above Preſbyters as to the power of order. But the cleareſt evidence of this, is in the Church of *Alexandria*, of which *Jerome* ſpeaks; *Nam* & Alexandria *à* Marco *Evangeliſtâ uſq*; *ad* Heraclam & Dionyſium *Epiſcopos, Preſbyteri ſemper unum ex ſe electum, in excelſiori gradu collocatum, Epiſcopum nominabant*; *quomodo ſi exercitus imperatorem faciat, aut Diaconi eligant de ſe quem induſtrium noverint, & Archidiaconum vocent.* That *learned Doctor*, who would perſuade us that the Preſbyters did only make choice of the perſon, but the ordination was performed by other Biſhops, would do well *firſt* to tell us who and where thoſe Biſhops in *Egypt* were, who did conſecrate or ordain the Biſhop of *Alexandria* after his election by the Preſbyters; eſpecially, while *Egypt* remained but one Province, under the Government of the *Præfectus Auguſtalis*. *Secondly*, How had this been in the leaſt pertinent to *Jerome*'s purpoſe, to have made a particular Inſtance in the Church of *Alexandria*, for that which was common to all other Churches beſides? For the old rule of the *Canon-Law* for Biſhops was, *Electio clericorum eſt, conſenſus principis, petitio plebis.* *Thirdly*, This election in *Jerome* muſt imply the conferring the power and authority whereby the Biſhop acted. For, *Firſt*, The firſt ſetting up of this power is by *Jerome* attributed to this choice, as appears by his words, *Quod autem poſtea unus electus eſt qui cæteris præponeretur, in ſchiſmatis*

Hieronym. in 1 Tit.

Diſt. 60. c. *Mull. ex. urb. Pap.*

Diſt. 95. *Gloſs.*

V. Francis Maſon's defence of Ordination of Presbyters.

Ep. 85. *ad Evagrium.*

V. Selden ad Eutych. n. 22. *p.* 143.

Diſt. 62. *Sicher.*

Adverſ. Lucif.

matis remedium factum est, ne unusquisque ad se trahens Christi Ecclesiam rumperet. Whereby it is evident *Jerome* attributes the first original of that *Exsors potestas*, as he calls it elsewhere in the Bishop above Presbyters, not to any Apostolical institution, but to the free choice of the Presbyters themselves: which doth fully explain what he means by *consuetudo Ecclesiæ*, before spoken of, *viz.* that which came up by a voluntary act of the Governours of Churches themselves. *Secondly*, It appears, that by election, he means conferring authority, by the instances he brings to that purpose, as the *Roman* Armies chusing their Emperours, who had then no other power but what they received by the length of the sword; and the Deacons chusing their Archdeacon, who had no other power, but what was merely conferred by the choice of the College of Deacons. To which we may add what *Eutychius*, the *Patriarch* of *Alexandria*, saith in his *Origines Ecclesiæ Alexandrinæ*, published in *Arabick*, by our most learned *Selden*, who expresly affirms, *that the twelve Presbyters constituted by* Mark, *upon the vacancy of the See, did chuse out of their number one to be head over the rest, and the other eleven did lay their hands upon him, and blessed him, and made him Patriarch.* Neither is the authority of *Eutychius* so much to be slighted in this case, coming so near to *Jerome* as he doth, who, doubtless, had he told us that *Mark* and *Anianus*, *&c.* did all there without any Presbyters, might have had the good fortune to have been quoted with as much frequeney and authority as the *Anonymous Author* of the martyrdom of *Timothy* in *Photius*, (who there unhappily follows the story of the seven Sleepers) or the Author of the *Apostolical Constitutions*, whose credit is everlastingly blasted by the excellent Mr. *Daillè*, *De Pseudepigraphis Apostolorum*; so much doth mens interest tend to the inhancing or abating the esteem and credit both of the dead and the living. By this we see that where no positive restraints from consent and choice, for the unity and peace of the Church, have restrained mens liberty, as to their external exercise of the power of order or jurisdiction, every one being himself advanced into the authority of a Church Governour, hath an internal power of conferring the same upon persons fit for it. To which purpose *the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery*, is no wise impertinently alledged, although we suppose St. *Paul* to concur in the action, (as it is most probable he did) because if the Presbytery had nothing to do in the ordination, to what purpose were their hands laid upon him? Was it only to be witnesses of the fact, or to signifie their consent? both those might have been done without their use of that ceremony; which will scarce be instanced in, to be done by any but such as had power to confer what was signified by that ceremony. We come therefore to the *second* period or state of the Church, when the former liberty was restrained, by some act of the Church it self, for preventing the inconveniencies which might follow the too common use of the former liberty of ordinations. So *Antonius de Rossellis* fully expresseth my meaning in this; *Quilibet Presbyter & Presbyteri ordinabant indiscretè, & schismata oriebantur. Every Presbyter and Presbyters did ordain indifferently, and thence arose schisms.* Thence the liberty was restrained, and reserved peculiarly to some persons who did act in the several Presbyteries, as the נשיא or Prince of the *Sanhedrin*, without whose presence no ordination by the Church was

Orig. p. 29, 30.

Biblioth. Cod. 254.

1 Tim. 4. 14.

Rossellis de pot. Imper. & Papæ. p. 4. c. 18.

was to be looked on as regular. The main controverſie is when this reſtraint began, and by whoſe act; whether by any act of the Apoſtles, or only by the prudence of the Church it ſelf, as it was with the *Sanhedrin.* But in order to our peace, I ſee no ſuch neceſſity of deciding it, both parties granting that in the Church ſuch a reſtraint was laid upon the liberty of ordaining Preſbyters: and the exerciſe of that power may be reſtrained ſtill, granting it to be radically and intrinſecally in them. So that this controverſie is not ſuch as ſhould divide the Church. For thoſe that are for ordinations only by a Superiour order in the Church acknowledging a radical power for ordination in Preſbyters, which may be exerciſed in caſe of neceſſity, do thereby make it evident, that none who grant that, do think that any poſitive Law of God hath forbidden Preſbyters the power of ordination; for then it muſt be wholly unlawful, and ſo in caſe of neceſſity it cannot be valid. Which doctrine I dare with ſome confidence aſſert to be a ſtranger to our Church of *England*, as ſhall be largely made appear afterwards. On the other ſide, thoſe who hold ordinations by Preſbyters lawful, do not therefore hold them neceſſary, but it being a matter of liberty, and not of neceſſity (Chriſt having no where ſaid that none but Preſbyters ſhall ordain) this power then may be reſtrained by thoſe who have the care of the Churches peace, and matters of liberty being reſtrained, ought to be ſubmitted to, in order to the Churches peace. And therefore ſome have well obſerved the difference between the opinions of *Jerome* and *Aërius.* For as to the matter it ſelf, I believe upon the ſtricteſt inquiry *Medina's* judgement will prove true, that *Jerome*, *Auſtin*, *Ambroſe*, *Sedulius*, *Primaſius*, *Chryſoſtome*, *Theodoret*, *Theophylact*, were all of *Aërius* his judgement, as to the Identity of both name and order of Biſhops and Preſbyters in the Primitive Church; but here lay the difference; *Aërius* from hence proceeded to ſeparation from Biſhops and their Churches, becauſe they were Biſhops. And *Blondell* well obſerves that the main ground why *Aërius* was condemned, was for unneceſſary ſeparation from the Church of *Sebaſtia*, and thoſe Biſhops too who agreed with him in other things, as *Euſtathius* the Biſhop did: Whereas had his mere opinion about Biſhops been the ground of his being condemned, there can be no reaſon aſſigned, why this hereſie if it were then thought ſo, was not mentioned either by *Socrates*, *Theodoret*, *Sozomen*, or *Evagrius*, before whoſe time he lived; when yet they mention the *Euſtathiani*, who were Contemporaries with him. But for *Epiphanius* and *Auguſtine* who have liſted him in the roll of hereticks it either was for the other heretical opinions maintained by him, or they took the name *heretick* (as it is evident they often did) for one who upon a matter of different opinion from the preſent ſenſe of the Church, did proceed to make ſeparation from the Unity of the Catholick Church; which I take to be the trueſt account of the reputed hereſie of *Aërius.* For otherwiſe is it likely that *Jerom* who maintained ſo great correſpondency and familiarity with *Epiphanius*, and thereby could not but know what was the cauſe why *Aërius* was condemned for hereſie, ſhould himſelf run into the ſame hereſie, and endeavour not only to aſſert, but to avouch and maintain it againſt the Judgment of the whole Church? *Jerome* therefore was not ranked with *Aërius*, becauſe though he held the ſame opinion as to Biſhops and Preſbyters, yet he was far from the Conſequence of *Aërius*

Mich. Medinas de ſacr. hom. orig. & contin. l. 1. cap. 5.

Præf. p. 58.

that

that therefore all Bishops were to be separated from; nay he was so far from thinking it necessary to cause a schism in the Church, by separating from Bishops, that his opinion is clear, that the first institution of them, was for preventing schism, and therefore for peace and unity he thought their institution very useful in the Church of God. And among all those fifteen testimonies produced by a learned Writer out of *Jerome* for the superiority of Bishops above Presbyters, I cannot find one that doth found it upon any *divine right*, but only upon the conveniency of such an order for the peace and unity of the Church of God: which is his meaning in that place most produced to this purpose; *Ecclesiæ salus in summi sacerdotis dignitate pendet, cui si non exsors quædam & ab omnibus eminens detur potestas, tot in Ecclesiis efficientur schismata, quot sacerdotes.* Where nothing can be more evident than that he would have some supereminent power attributed to the Bishop for preventing schisms in the Church. But granting some passages may have a more favourable aspect towards the superiority of Bishops over Presbyters in his other writings, I would fain know whether a man's judgment must be taken, from occasional and incidental passages, or from designed and set discourses; which is as much as to ask, whether the lively representation of a man by picture, may be best taken, when in haste of other business he passeth by us, giving only a glance of his Countenance, or when he purposely and designedly sits in order to that end, that his countenance may be truly represented? Besides, it is well known that *Jerome* in his *Commentaries* on Scripture, (where he doth not expresly declare his own opinion) doth often transcribe what he finds in others without setting down the name of any Author he had it from. For which we have his ingenuous confession in his Epistle to *Augustine, Itaque ut simpliciter fatear, legi hæc omnia* (speaking of former Commentaries) *& in mente mea plurima conservans, accito notario, vel mea vel aliena dictavi, nec ordinis, nec verborum interdum, nec sensuum memor.* A strange way of writing Commentaries on Scripture, wherein a man having jumbled other mens notions together in his brain, by a kind of lottery draws out what comes next to hand, without any choice: yet this we see was his practice, and therefore, he puts *Austin* to this hard task of examining what all other men had writ before him, and whether he had not transcribed out of them, before he would have him charge him with any thing which he finds in his Commentaries. How angry then would that hasty Adversary have been, if men had told him he had contradicted himself in what he writes on the forty fifth *Psalm* about Bishops, if it be compared with his Commentaries on *Titus*, where he professeth to declare his opinion, or his Epistles to *Evagrius* and *Oceanus!* But yet something is pleaded even from those places in *Jerome*, wherein he declares his opinion more fully, as though his opinion was only, that Christ himself did not appoint Episcopacy, which (they say) he means by *Dominica dispositio*, but that the Apostles did it, which in opposition to the former he calls *Ecclesiæ consuetudo*, but elsewhere explains it by *traditio Apostolica*; and this they prove by two things; *First*, The occasion of the institution of Episcopacy, which is thus set down by him, *antequam Diaboli instinctu, studia in religione fierent, & diceretur in populis, Ego sum* Pauli, *ego* Apollo, *ego autem* Cephæ, *communi Presbyterorum consilio Ecclesiæ gubernabantur.* Thence it is argued that the time of this Institution of Bishops was when it was said at *Corinth, I am of* Paul, *I of* Apollos,

Dial. ad Lucifer.

Ep. August. ep. 11.

pollos, *and I of* Cephas; which was certainly in Apoſtolical times. But to this it is anſwered; *Firſt*, that it is impoſſible *Jerome*'s meaning ſhould be reſtrained to that individual time, becauſe the Arguments which *Jerome* brings that the name and office of Biſhops and Preſbyters were the ſame, were from things done after this time. *Paul*'s firſt Epiſtle to the *Corinthians*, wherein he reproves their ſchiſms, was written according to *Ludovicus Capellus* in the twelfth year of *Claudius*, of Chriſt fifty one, after which *Paul* writ his Epiſtle to *Titus*, from whoſe words *Jerome* grounds his diſcourſe; but moſt certainly *Paul*'s Epiſtle to the *Philippians* was not written, till *Paul* was priſoner at *Rome*; the time of the writing of it is placed by *Capellus* in the third of *Nero*; of *Chriſt* 56. by *Blondell* 57. by our *Lightfoot* 59, by all, long after the former to the *Corinthians*; yet from the firſt verſe of this Epiſtle, *Jerome* fetches one of his Arguments. So *Paul*'s charge to the Elders at *Miletus*, *Peter*'s Epiſtle to the diſperſed Jews, were after this time too, yet from theſe are fetched two more of *Jerome*'s Arguments. Had he then ſo little common ſenſe, as to ſay that Epiſcopacy was inſtituted upon the ſchiſm at *Corinth*, and yet bring all his Arguments for parity, after the time, that he ſets for the Inſtitution of Epiſcopacy? But *ſecondly*, *Jerome* doth not ſay, *cum diceretur apud Corinthios, Ego ſum* Pauli, *&c.* but *cum diceretur in populis, Ego ſum* Pauli, *&c.* ſo that he ſpeaks not of that particular ſchiſm, but of a general and univerſal ſchiſm abroad among moſt people, which was the occaſion of appointing Biſhops; and ſo ſpeaks of others imitating the ſchiſm and language of the *Corinthians*. *Thirdly*, had Epiſcopacy been inſtituted on the occaſion of the ſchiſm at *Corinth* certainly of all places we ſhould the ſooneſt have heard of a Biſhop at *Corinth* for the remedying of it; and yet almoſt of all places, thoſe *Heralds* that derive the ſucceſſion of Biſhops from the Apoſtles times, are the moſt plunged whom to fix on at *Corinth*. And they that can find any one ſingle Biſhop at *Corinth* at the time when *Clemens* writ his Epiſtle to them (about another ſchiſm as great as the former, which certainly had not been according to their opinion, if a Biſhop had been there before) muſt have better eyes and judgment, than the deſervedly admired *Grotius*, who brings this in his Epiſtle to *Bignonius* as one argument of the undoubted antiquity of that Epiſtle: *Quod nuſquam meminit exſortis illius Epiſcoporum auctortatis, quæ Eccleſiæ conſuetudine, poſt* Marci *mortem* Alexandriæ, *atque eo exemplo alibi, introduci cœpit; ſed plane ut* Paulus *Apoſtolus oſtendit, Eccleſias communi Preſbyterorum, qui iidem omnes & Epiſcopi ipſi Paulóque dicuntur, conſilio fuiſſe gubernatas.* What could be ſaid with greater freedom, that there was no ſuch Epiſcopacy then at *Corinth*? *Fourthly*, They who uſe this argument, are greater ſtrangers to St. *Jerome*'s language than they would ſeem to be: whoſe cuſtome it is upon incidental occaſions to accomodate the Phraſe and language of Scripture to them: as when he ſpeaks of *Chryſoſtome*'s fall, *Cecidit Babylon, cecidit*; of the *Biſhops* of *Paleſtine*, *Multi utroque claudicant pede*; of the Roman Clergy, *Phariſæorum conclamavit Senatus*; but which is moſt clear to our purpoſe, he applyes this very ſpeech to the men of his own time; *Quando non id ipſum omnes loquimur, & alius dicit, Ego ſum* Pauli, *ego* Apollo, *ego* Cephæ, *dividimus ſpiritus unitatem, & eam in partes & membra diſcerpimus.* All which inſtances are produced by *Blondell*, but have the good fortune to be paſt over without being taken notice of. But ſuppoſing, *ſay they*, that it was not till after the ſchiſm

Hiſt. Apoſtolica. p. 70.

Ep. ad Gal. ep. 162.

Apol. p. 4.

at

at *Corinth*, yet it must needs be done by the Apostles; else how could it be said to be *toto orbe decretum, ut unus de Presbyteris electus superponeretur cæteris? Quomodo enim* (saith a learned man) *fieri potuit, ut toto hoc orbe decerneretur, nullo jam Oecumenico Concilio ad illud decernendum congregato, si non ab Apostolis ipsis, fidem toto orbe promulgantibus, & cum fide hanc regendi Ecclesias formam constituentibus factum sit?* So that he conceives, so general an order could not be made, unless the Apostles themselves at that time were the authors of it.

But *First*, *Jerom*'s *in toto orbe decretum est*, relates not to an antecedent order which was the ground of the institution of Episcopacy, but to the universal establishment of that order which came up upon the occasion of so many schisms; it is something therefore consequent upon the first setting up Episcopacy, which is the general obtaining of it in the Churches of Christ, when they saw its usefulness in order to the Churches peace; therefore the Emphasis lies not in *decretum est*, but *in toto orbe*; noting how suddenly this order met with universal acceptance when it first was brought up in the Church after the Apostles death. Which that it was *Jerom*'s meaning, appears by what he saith after, *paulatim verò (ut dissentionum plantaria evellerentur) ad unum omnem, solicitudinem esse delatam:* Where he notes the gradual obtaining of it: which I suppose was thus, according to his opinion; first, in the College of Presbyters appointed by the Apostles, there being a necessity of order, there was a President among them who had αὐθεντίαν τῷ πράγματος, as the President of the Senate, *i. e.* did moderate the affairs of the Assembly, by proposing matters to it, gathering voices, being the first in all matters of concernment, but he had not αὐθεντίαν τῆς συνέδρων, as *Casaubon* very well distinguisheth them, *i. e.* had no power over his fellow-Presbyters, but that still resided in the College or body of them. After this when the Apostles were taken out of the way, who kept the main power in their own hands of ruling the several Presbyteries, or delegated some to do it (who had a main hand in the planting Churches with the Apostles, and thence are called in scripture sometimes Fellow-labourers in the Lord, and sometimes Evangelists, and by *Theodoret* Apostles, but of a second order) after I say, these were deceased, and the main power left in the Presbyteries, the several Presbyters enjoying an equal power among themselves, especially being many in one City, thereby great occasion was given to many schisms, partly by the bandying of the Presbyters one against another, partly by the sidings of the people with some against the rest, partly by the too common use of the power of ordinations in Presbyters, by which they were more able to increase their own party, by ordaining those who would joyn with them, and by this means to perpetuate schisms in the Church; upon this, when the wiser and graver sort considered the abuses following the promiscuous use of this power of ordination; and withal having in their minds the excellent frame of the Government of the Church under the Apostles, and their Deputies, and for preventing of future schisms and divisions among themselves, they unanimously agreed to choose one out of their number, who was best qualified for the management of so great a trust, and to devolve the exercise of the power of ordination and jurisdiction to him; yet so as that he act nothing of importance, without the consent and concurrence of the Presbyters, who were still to be as the Common Council to the Bi-

Exercit. ad Annal. Eccl. 15. s. 12.

ſhop. This I take to be the true and juſt account of the Original of Epiſcopacy in the Primitive Church according to *Jerome:* Which model of Government thus contrived and framed, ſets forth to us a moſt lively character of that great Wiſdom and Moderation, which then ruled the heads and hearts of the Primitive Chriſtians; and which, when men have ſearched and ſtudied all other ways, (the abuſes incident to this Government, through the corruptions of men and times being retrenched) will be found the moſt agreeable to the Primitive form, both as aſſerting the due intereſt of the Preſbyteries, and allowing the due honour of Epiſcopacy, and by the joynt harmony of both carrying on the affairs of the Church with the greateſt Unity, Concord, and Peace. Which form of Government I cannot ſee how any poſſible reaſon can be produced by either party, why they may not with chearfulneſs embrace it.

Secondly, Another evidence that *Jerome* by *decretum eſt* did not mean an order of the Apoſtles themſelves, it is by the words which follow the matter of the decree, *viz. Ut unus de Preſbyteris electus ſuperponeretur cæteris*, one choſen not only *out of*, but *by* the Preſbyters, ſhould be ſet above the reſt; for ſo *Jerome* muſt be underſtood; for the Apoſtles could not themſelves chooſe out of all Preſbyteries one perſon to be ſet above the reſt; and withal the inſtance brought of the Church of *Alexandria* makes it evident to be meant of the chooſing by the Preſbyters, and not by the Apoſtles. Beſides, did *Jerome* mean chooſing by the Apoſtles, he would have given ſome intimations of the hand the Apoſtles had in it: which we ſee not in him the leaſt ground for. And as for that pretence, that *Eccleſiæ conſuetudo* is *Apoſtolica Traditio*, I have already made it appear that *Apoſtolica Traditio* in *Jerome*, is nothing elſe but *Conſuetudo Eccleſiæ*, which I ſhall now confirm by a pregnant and unanſwerable teſtimony out of *Jerome* himſelf. *Unaquæque provincia abundet in ſenſu ſuo, & precepta majorum leges Apoſtolicas arbitretur. Let every province abound in its own ſenſe, and account of the ordinances of their Anceſtors as of Apoſtolical Laws.* Nothing could have been ſpoken more fully to open to us what *Jerome* means by Apoſtolical traditions, *viz.* the practice of the Church in former ages, though not coming from the Apoſtles themſelves. Thus we have once more cleared *Jerome* and the truth together; I only wiſh all that are of his judgment for the practice of the Primitive Church, were of his temper for the practice of their own; and while they own not Epiſcopacy as neceſſary by a divine right, yet (being duly moderated, and joyned with Preſbyteries) they may embrace it, as not only a lawful, but very uſeful conſtitution in the Church of God. By which we may ſee what an excellent temper may be found out, moſt fully conſonant to the primitive Church for the management of ordinations, and Church power, *viz.* by the Preſidency of the Biſhop and the concurrence of the Preſbytery. For the Top gallant of Epiſcopacy can never be ſo well managed for the right ſteering the ſhip of the Church, as when it is joyned with the under ſails of a moderate Preſbytery. So much ſhall ſuffice to ſpeak here as to the power of ordination, which we have found to be derived from the Synagogue, and the cuſtoms obſerved in it, tranſplanted into the Church.

Hieronym. ep. 20. ad Lucinum.

There

There are yet some things remaining as to ordination, wherein the Church did imitate the Synagogue; which will admit of a quick dispatch, as *the number of the persons*, which under the Synagogue were always to be at least *three*. This being a fundamental constitution among the Jews, as appears by their writings, סמיכה זקנים בשלשה *Ordination of Presbyters, by laying on of hands, must be done by three at the least.* To the same purpose *Maimonides*, אין סומכין סמיכה שהיא מינוי הזקנים לריינות אלא בשלשה *They did not ordain any by imposition of hands into a power of judicature without the number of three.* Which number *Peter Gallatinus* and *Postellus* conceive necessary to be all ordained themselves; but Mr. *Selden* thinks it was sufficient if there were but one of that number so ordained, who was to be as principal in the action; whose opinion is favoured by *Maimonides*, who adds to the words last cited out of him: *Of which Three, one at the least must be ordained himself.* Let us now see the parallel in the Church of God. The first solemn ordination of Elders under the Gospel, which some think to be set down as a pattern for the Church to follow, is that we read of, *Acts* 13. 1, 2, 3. which was performed by three; for we read in the first verse, that there were in the Church at *Antioch*, five Prophets and Teachers, *Barnabas*, *Simeon*, *Lucius*, *Manaen*, and *Saul*, of these five the Holy Ghost said, *that two must be separated for the work whereto God had called them*, which were *Barnabas* and *Saul*; there remain only the other three, *Simeon*, *Lucius*, and *Manaen*, to lay their hands on them, and ordain them to their work. Accordingly those who tell us that *James* was ordained Bishop of *Jerusalem*, do mention the three Apostles, who concurred in the ordaining of him. But most remarkable for this purpose is the Canon of the *Nicene Council*, wherein this number is set down as the regular number for the ordination of Bishops, without which it was not accounted Canonical. The words are these, Ἐπίσκοπον προσήκει μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐπαρχίᾳ καθίστασθαι· εἰ δὲ δυσχερὲς εἴη τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἢ διὰ κατεπείγουσαν ἀνάγκην, ἢ διὰ μῆκος ὁδοῦ, ἐξ ἁπλῆς τριῶν ὄντων τὸ αὐτὸ συναγομένων, συμψήφων γινομένων καὶ τῶν ἀπόντων καὶ συντιθεμένων διὰ γραμμάτων, τότε τὴν χειροτονίαν ποιεῖσθαι. *i. e. The ordination of a Bishop should, if possible, be performed by all the Bishops of the Province; which if it cannot easily be done, either through some urgent necessity, or the tediousness of the way, three Bishops, at least, must be there, for the doing it, which may be sufficient for the ordination, if those that are absent do express their consent, and by Letters approve of the doing of it.* To the same purpose *Theodoret*, Κανόνες πάντας συγκαλεῖσθαι τῆς ἐπαρχίας τοὺς ἐπισκόπους κελεύουσι, καὶ οὐ πάλιν δίχα τριῶν ἐπισκόπων ἐπισκόπῳ χειροτονίαν ἀπαγορεύουσι γίνεσθαι. *The Canons enjoin all the Bishops of the Province to be present at the ordination of one; and forbid the ordination of any, without three being present at it.* Thus we see how the constitution of the Synagogue was exactly observed in the Church, as to the number of the persons concurring to a regular ordination. The last thing as to ordination, bearing Analogy to the Synagogue, is the *effect of this ordination upon the person.* It was the custom of the Jews, to speak of all that were legally ordained among them, ושרתה עליהן שכינה *and the Divine presence or* Shechinah *rested upon them*, which sometimes they called רוח הקודש the *Holy Spirit*, supposed to be in a peculiar manner present after this solemn separation of them from others in the world, and dedication of them unto God. Answerable to this may that of our Saviour be, when he gives his Apostles authority to preach the Gospel, he

§. 14.

Misna &c. Gemar. tit. Sanhed. c. 1. Tit. Sanhed. cap. 4. §. 3. Arcan. Cath. Veritat. l. 4. cap. 6.

De Concord. orbis, p. 377.

Euseb. hist Eccles. lib. 2. cap. 1.

Can. 4.

Hist. Eccles. lib. 5. c. 23.

V. Justell. not. in Canon. Universæ Eccles. p. 140.

Joh. 20. 21. doth it in that form of words, *Receive ye the Holy Ghoſt*; and then gives them the power of binding and looſing, uſually conveyed in the Jewiſh ordinations. *Whoſe ſins ye remit, they are remitted; and whoſe ſins ye retain, they are retained.* So that as under the Law, they by their ordination received a moral faculty or right to exerciſe that power they were ordained to; ſo under the Goſpel, all who are ordained according to Goſpel rules, have a right, authority, and power conveyed thereby, for the diſpenſing of the Word and Sacraments. Which right and power muſt not be conceived to be an internal indelible character, as the Papiſts groundleſly conceive, but a moral legal right, according to the Laws of Chriſt, becauſe the perſons ordained do not act in it in a natural, but a moral capacity, and ſo the effect muſt be moral, and not phyſical, which they muſt ſuppoſe it to be, who make it a Character, and that indelible. Thus much may ſerve to clear how ordination, in all its circumſtances, was derived from the Jewiſh Synagogue.

v. 29.

§. 15. The other thing remaining to be ſpoken to, as to the correſpondence of the Church with the Synagogue in its conſtitution, is, what order the Apoſtles did ſettle in the ſeveral Churches of their plantation, for the ruling and ordering the affairs of them. Before I come to ſpeak ſo much to it as will be pertinent to our preſent purpoſe and deſign, we may take notice of the ſame name for Church-rulers under the Goſpel, which there was under the Synagogue, *viz.* that of *Preſbyters*. The name *Preſbyter*, as the Heb. זקן though it originally import age, yet by way of connotation it hath been looked on as a name both of dignity and power. Becauſe Wiſdom was ſuppoſed to dwell with a multitude of years, therefore perſons of age and experience were commonly choſen to places of honour and truſt, and thence the name importing age, doth likewiſe carry dignity along with it. Thence we read in the time of *Moſes*, how often the *Elders* were gathered together. Thence *Eliezer* is called זקן ביתו *Gen.* 24. 2. which the Greek renders πρεσβύτερος τῆς οἰκίας, the *Seignior Domo*, the chief Officer in his houſe; and ſo we read, *Gen.* 50. 6. זקני ארץ מצרים *the Elders of the Land of Egypt*. So the *Elders of* Midian, the *Elders of* Iſrael, the *Elders of the Cities*; ſo among the Greeke, γερουσία for their Council of State; and among the Latins *Senatus*, and our Saxon *Aldermen*, in all importing both age and honour and power together. But among the Jews, in the times of the Apoſtles, it is moſt evident that the name πρεσβύτεροι imported not only dignity, but power; the Preſbyters among the Jews having a power both of judging and teaching given them by their *Semicha* or ordination. Now under the Goſpel the Apoſtles retaining the name and the manner of ordination, but not conferring that judiciary power by it, which was in uſe among the Jews, to ſhew the difference between the Law and the Goſpel, it was requiſite ſome other name ſhould be given to the Governours of the Church, which ſhould qualifie the importance of the word Preſbyters to a ſenſe proper to a Goſpel-ſtate; which was the original of giving the name ἐπίσκοποι to the Governours of the Church under the Goſpel: A name importing duty more than honour, and not a title above *Preſbyter*, but rather uſed by way of diminution and qualification of the power implied in the name of *Preſbyter*. Therefore to ſhew what kind of power and duty the name Preſbyter imported in the Church, the Office conveyed by that name is call'd ἐπισκοπή, and Preſbyters are ſaid ἐπισκοπεῖν, 1 *Pet.* 5. 2. where it is oppoſed to that κατακυριεύειν τῶν κλήρων, *Lording it over the people*, as was the cuſtom of

Exod. 3. 16. 18. 4. 29. 12. 21. 17. 5. 18. 12, &c.

the Presbyters among the Jews. So that if we determine things by importance of words, and things signified by them, the power of ordination was proper to the name πρεσβύτερος and not ἐπίσκοπος, because the former name did then import that power, and not the latter. We come therefore from the names to the things then implyed by them, and the Offices established by the Apostles for the ruling of Churches. But my design being not to dispute the arguments of either party, (*viz.* those who conceive the Apostles setled the Government of the Church in an absolute parity; or else by superiority and subordination among the settled Officers of the Church) but to lay down those Principles which may equally concern both, in order to accommodation: I find not my self at present concerned to debate what is brought on either side for the maintaining their particular opinion, any farther than thereby the Apostles intentions are brought to have been to bind all future Churches to observe that individual form they conceived was in practice then. All that I have to say then concerning the course taken by the Apostles in setling the Government of the Churches, (under which will be contained the full resolution of what I promised, as to the correspondency to the Synagogue in the Government of Churches) lies in these three Propositions, which I now shall endeavour to clear, *viz.* *That neither can we have that certainty of Apostolical practice, which is necessary to constitute a Divine right: Nor*, Secondly, *is it probable that the Apostles did tie themselves up to any one fixed course in modelling Churches: Nor*, Thirdly, *if they did, doth it necessarily follow that we must observe the same.* If these three considerations be fully cleared, we may see to how little purpose it is to dispute the significancy and importance of words and names, as used in Scripture, which hitherto the main quarrel hath been about. I therefore begin with the *First* of these, *That we cannot arrive to such an absolute certainty what course the Apostles took in governing Churches, as to infer from thence the only divine right of that one form which the several parties imagine comes the nearest to it.* This I shall make out from these following arguments. *First*, From the equivalency of the names, and the doubtfulness of their signification from which the Form of Government used in the New Testament should be determined. That the form of Government must be derived from the importance of the names of Bishop and Presbyter, is hotly pleaded on both sides. But if there can be no certain way found out whereby to come to a determination of the certain sense of those names in Scripture, we are never like to come to any certain knowledge of the things signified by those names. Now there is a fourfold equivalency of the names Bishop and Presbyter taken notice of. 1. That both should signifie the same thing, *viz.* a Presbyter in the modern notion, *i. e.* one acting in a parity with others for the Government of the Church. And this sense is evidently asserted by *Theodoret*, ἐπισκόπους τὸς πρεσβυτέρους καλεῖ· ἄλλως τε ἐδὲ οἷόν τε ἦν πολλὲς ἐπισκόπους μίαν πόλιν ποιμαίνειν. *The Apostle*, Acts 20. 28. Phil. 1. 1. Titus 1. 5. 1 Tim. 3. 1. *doth by Bishops mean nothing else but Presbyters; otherwise it were impossible for more Bishops to govern one City.* 2. That both of them should signifie promiscuously sometimes a Bishop, and sometimes a Presbyter; so *Chrysostome*, and after him *Œcumenius* and *Theophylact*; in Phil. 1. ἐπισκόπους τὸς πρεσβυτέρους καλεῖ, τότε γὰρ ἐκοινώνουν τοῖς ὀνόμασι· and in *Acts* 20. 28. ἐπειδὴ τὸς πολλὸς λανθάνει ἡ συνήθεια μᾶλλον τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης τὸς ἐπισκόπους πρεσβυτέρους ὀνομάζουσα, καὶ τὸς πρεσβυτέρους ἐπισκόπους;

Dissert. de jure Epis. 3. cap. 6. Vindicat. cap. 2. §. 1. Theodoret. in 1 Tim. 3. 1.

ἐπισκόπους, σημειωτέον τοῦτο ἐνταῦθεν, καὶ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Τίτον ἐπιστολῆς, ἐπὶ ᾗ καὶ πρὸς Φιλιππησίους, καὶ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Τιμόθεον πρώτης. Where they assert the Community and promiscuous use of the Names in Scripture; so that a Bishop is sometimes called a Presbyter, and a Presbyter sometimes called a Bishop. 3. That the Name Bishop, always imports a singular Bishop; but the name Presbyter is taken promiscuously both for Bishop and Presbyter. 4. That both the Names Bishop and Presbyter, do import only one thing in Scripture, *viz.* the Office of a singular Bishop in every Church; which Sense, though a Stranger to Antiquity, is above all other embraced by a late very learned Man, who hath endeavoured by set Discourses to reconcile all the Places of Scripture where the Names occur to this Sense, but with what Success it is not here a Place to examine. By this Variety of Interpretation of the Equivalency of the Names of Bishop and Presbyter, we may see how far the Argument from the promiscuous use of the Names is from the Controversie in hand; unless some evident Arguments be withal brought, that the Equivalency of the Words cannot possibly be meant in any other Sense, than that which they contend for. Equivocal Words can never of themselves determine what Sense they are to be taken in, because they are equivocal, and so admit of different senses. And he that from the use of an equivocal word would infer the necessity only of one sense, when the word is common to many, unless some other argument be brought inforcing that necessity, will be so far from persuading others to the same belief, that he will only betray the weakness and shortness of his own reason. When *Augustus* would be called only *Princeps Senatus*, could any one infer from thence, that certainly he was only the πρωτὸς in the Senate, or else that he had superiority of power over the Senate, when that title might be indifferent to either of those senses? All that can be infer'd from the promiscuous sense of the words, is that they may be understood only in this sense; but it must be proved that they can be understood in no other sense, before any one particular form of Government as necessary can be inferred from the use of them. If notwithstanding the promiscuous use of the name Bishop and Presbyter, either that Presbyter may mean a Bishop, or that Bishop may mean a Presbyter, or be sometimes used for one, sometimes for the other; what ground can there be laid in the equivalency of the words which can infer the only divine right of the form of Government couched in any one of those senses? So likewise it is in the titles of *Angels of the Churches*; If the Name Angel imports no incongruity, though taken only for the שליח צבור in the Jewish Synagogue, the publick Minister of the Synagogue, called the *Angel of the Congregation*, what power can be inferred from thence, any more than such an officer was invested with? Again if the πρωτὸς or President of the Assembly of Presbyters, might be so called: what superiority can be deduced thence, any more than such a one enjoys? Nay if in the Prophetical stile, an unity may be set down by way of Representation of a Multitude: what Evidence can be brought from the name, that by it some one particular Person must be understood? And by this means *Timothy* may avoid being charged with *leaving his first love*, which he must of necessity be, by those that make him the Angel of the Church of *Ephesus* at the time of writing these Epistles. Neither is this any ways solved by the Answer given, that the name Angel is representative of the whole Church, and so there is no necessity, the Angel should be personally guilty of it. For *first*,

Tacitus hist. lib. 1.

Rev. 2. 4.

it seems strange that the whole diffusive body of the Church should be charged with a crime by the name of the *Angel*, and he that is particularly meant by that name should be free from it. As if a Prince should charge the Major of a Corporation as guilty of rebellion, and by it should only mean that the Corporation was guilty, but the Major was innocent himself. *Secondly*, if many things in the Epistles be directed to the Angel, but yet so as to concern the whole body, then of necessity the Angel must be taken as representative of the body; and then why may not the word Angel be taken only by way of representation of the body it self, either of the whole Church, or which is far more probable, of the *Consessus* or order of Presbyters in that Church? We see what miserably unconcluding arguments those are which are brought for any form of Government from Metaphorical or Ambiguous expressions, or names promiscuously used, which may be interpreted to different senses. What certainty then can any rational man find what the form of Government was in the Primitive times, when only those arguments are used which may be equally accommodated to different forms? And without such a *certainty* with what confidence can men speak of a Divine right of any one particular form? *Secondly*, the uncertainty of the Primitive form is argued, from the places most in controversie about the form of Government; because that without any apparent incongruity they may be understood of either of the different forms. Which I shall make out by going through the several places. The Controversy then on foot is this, (as it is of late stated) whether the Churches in the Primitive times were governed by a Bishop only and Deacons, or by a College of Presbyters acting in a parity of power? The places insisted on, on both sides are these, *Act.* 11. 30. *Acts* 14. 23. *Acts* 28. 17. 1 *Tim.* 3. 1. *Titus* 1. 5. the thing in controversy is, whether Bishops with *Deacons*, or Presbyters in a parity of power, are understood in these places? I begin then in order with *Acts* 11. 30. the first place wherein the name πρεσβύτεροι occurs, as applied to the officers of the Christian Church. Those that are for a College of Presbyters, understand by these Elders those of the Church of *Jerusalem*, who did govern the Affairs of that Church; those that are for a solitary Episcopacy by these Elders understand not the local Elders of *Jerusalem*, but the several Bishops of the Churches of *Judea*. Let us now see whether there be any evidence from the place to determine which of these two must necessarily be understood. There is nothing at all mentioned in the place, but only that *upon the occasion of the Famine they sent relief to the Brethren of* Judea, *and sent it to the Elders by the hands of* Barnabas *and* Saul; Which might either be to the Elders of the Church at *Jerusalem* to be distributed to the several Churches of *Judea*, or else to the several Pastors of those Churches either collectively as met together at *Jerusalem* to receive this contribution, or distributively as they were in their several Churches. The relief might be sent to all the Brethren of *Judea*, and yet either be conveyed to the particular Elders of *Jerusalem* to send it abroad, or to the several Elders of the Churches within the circuit of *Judea*. But other places are brought by both parties for their particular sense in this; As *Acts* 15. 6. here indeed mention is made of the Apostles and Elders together at *Jerusalem*, but nothing expressed whereby we may know whether the fixed Elders of that Church, or else the Elders of all the Churches of *Judea* assembled upon this solemn occasion of the Council of the Apostles there. So *Acts* 21. 11. when *Paul* went in to

James,

James, it is said that *All the Elders were present.* No more certainty here neither; for either they might be the fixed officers of that Church, meeting with *James* upon *Paul*'s coming; or else they might be the Elders of the several Churches of *Judea* met together, not to take Account of *Paul*'s Ministry (as some improbably conjecture,) but assembled together there at the Feast of Pentecost, *at which* Paul came to *Jerusalem*, which is more probable upon the account of what we read, *v.* 20. of the *many thousand believing Jews then at* Jerusalem *who were zealous of the Law:* who in all probability were the believing Jews of *Judea*, who did yet observe the annual Festivals of *Jerusalem*, and so most likely their several Elders might go up together with them, and there be with *James* at *Paul*'s coming in to him. No certainty then of the Church of *Jerusalem* how that was governed; whether by Apostles themselves, or other unfixed Elders, or only by *James* who exercised his Apostle-ship most there, and thence afterwards called the Bishop of *Jerusalem.* We proceed therefore to the government of other Churches; and the next place is, *Acts* 14. 23. *And when they had ordained them Elders in every Church.* Here some plead for a plurality of Elders as fixed in every Church; but it is most evident, that the words hold true if there was but one in each Church. For κατ' ἐκκλησίαν here and κατὰ πόλιν *Titus* 1. 5. (for both places will admit of the same answer) doth signifie no more then *oppidatim*, or *Ecclesiatim*, as κατὰ βαθμὸν *gradatim*, κατ' ἄνδρα, *viritim*, κατὰ μέρος *particulatim*, κατὰ κώμην *vicatim.* No more then is imported than that Elders were ordained, *City by City*, or *Church by Church*, as we would render it, and thereby nothing is expressed but that no Church wanted an Elder, but not that every Church had more Elders than one. But the place most controverted is, *Acts* 20. 17. *And from Miletus, Paul sent to Ephesus, and called the Elders of the Church.* Those that say these Elders were those only of the Church of *Ephesus*, seem to be most favoured by the article τῆς ἐκκλησίας as seeming to apply it to that particular Church of *Ephesus*, and by the *Syriack version* which renders it, *Venire fecit Presbyteros Ecclesiæ Ephesi*; to the same purpose likewise *Hierome* understands it. On the contrary those that say that these Elders were those of the several Churches of *Asia*, are favoured by *v.* 18. *that from the first day he came into* Asia, *he had been with them at all seasons.* Now *Paul* did not remain all the time at *Ephesus*, as appears by *Acts* 19. 10, 22, 26. where he is said to preach the word abroad in *Asia* and so in probability Churches were planted, and Rulers setled in them; and that these were at this time called to *Miletus* by *Paul*, is the express affirmation of *Irenæus*; *In Mileto enim convocatis Episcopis & Presbyteris, qui erant ab Epheso & à reliquis proximis civitatibus, quoniam ipse festinavit Hierosolymis Pentecostem agere.* Here is nothing then either in the text or antiquity, that doth absolutely determine whence these Elders came; but there may be a probability on either side; and so no certainty or necessity of understanding it either way. And so for the other places in *Timothy* and *Titus*, it is certain the care of those Persons did extend to many places; and therefore the Elders or Bishops made by them are not necessarily to be understood of a Plurality of Elders in one place. Thus we see that there is no incongruity in applying either of these two forms to the sense of the places in Question. I dispute not which is the true, or at least more probable sense, but that we can find nothing in the several places which doth necessarily determine how they are to be understood as to one particular

Adversf. hæres. l. 1. cap. 14.

form

form of Government, which is the thing I now aim at the proving of. And if neither form be repugnant to the ſenſe of theſe places, how can any one be neceſſarily inferred from them? As if the ſeveral motions and *phænomena* of the Heavens may be with equal probability explained according to the *Ptolemaick* or *Copernican* Hypotheſis, *viz.* about the reſt or motion of the Earth; then it neceſſarily follows, that from thoſe *Phænomena* no argument can be drawn evincing the neceſſity of the one *Hypotheſis*, and overturning the probability of the other. If that great wonder of Nature the flux and reflux of the Sea, might with equal congruity be ſolved according to the different opinions, of its being cauſed by ſubterraneous fires, or from the motion of the Moon, or the depreſſion of the Lunar *vortex*, or (which to me is far the moſt probable) by a motion of conſent of the Sea with all the other great bodies of the world, we ſhould find no neceſſity at all of entertaining one opinion above another, but to look upon all as probable, and none as certain. So likewiſe for the compoſition and motion of all natural bodies, the ſeveral *Hypotheſes* of the old and new *Philoſophy* implying no apparent incongruity to nature, do make it appear that all or any of them, may be embraced as ingenious *Romances* in Philoſophy (as they are no more) but that none of them are the certain truth; or can be made appear ſo to be to the minds of men. So it is in controverſies in *Theology*, if the matter propounded to be believed, may as to the truth and ſubſtance of it be equally believed under different ways of explication, then there is no neceſſity as to the believing the truth of the thing, to believe it under ſuch an explication of it, more than under another. As for inſtance, in the caſe of Chriſt's deſcent εἰς ᾅδου, if I may truly believe that Chriſt did deſcend εἰς ᾅδου, whether by that we underſtand the ſtate of the dead, or a local deſcent to hell, then there is no neceſſity in order to the belief of the ſubſtance of that article of the ancient Creed (called the Apoſtles) under that reſtriction of a local deſcent. By this time I ſuppoſe it is clear, that if theſe places of Scripture may be underſtood in theſe two different ſenſes of the word *Elders*, *viz.* either taken collectively in one City, or diſtributively in many, then there is no certainty which of theſe two ſenſes muſt be embraced, and ſo the form of Church Government, which muſt be thence derived, is left ſtill at as great uncertainty as ever, notwithſtanding theſe places of Scripture brought to demonſtrate it; ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι.

Thirdly, The uncertainty of the primitive Form of Government will be made appear from the *Defectiveneſs*, *Ambiguity*, *Partiality* and *Repugnancy* of the records of the ſucceeding ages which ſhould inform us what Apoſtolical practice was. When men are by the force of the former arguments driven off from Scripture, then they preſently run to take ſanctuary in the records of ſucceeding ages to the Apoſtles. Thus *Eſtius* no mean School-man, handling this very queſtion of the difference of Biſhops and Preſbyters, very fairly quits the Scriptures, and betakes himſelf to other weapons. *Quod autem jure divino ſint Epiſcopi Preſbyteris ſuperiores, etſi non ita clarum eſt è ſacris literis, aliunde tamen ſatis efficaciter probari poteſt.* Ingenuouſly ſaid however; but all the difficulty is how a *Jus divinum* ſhould be proved when men leave the Scriptures, which makes others ſo loth to leave this hold; although they do it in effect, when they call in the help of ſucceeding ages to make the Scripture ſpeak plain for them. We follow therefore the ſcent of the Game into this Wood of Antiquity, wherein it will be eaſier to loſe our

§. 16.

In Sentent. lib. 4. diſt. 4. ſect. 25.

our ſelves then to find that which we are upon the purſuit of, a *Jus Divinum* of any one particular form of Government. I handle now only the teſtimony of Antiquity (for the practice of it will call for a particular diſcourſe afterwards) and herein I ſhall endeavour to ſhew the incompetency of this Teſtimony as to the ſhewing what certain form of Church Government was practiſed by the Apoſtles; for that I ſhall make uſe of that fourfold argument from the *defectiveneſs* of this Teſtimony, from the *Ambiguity* of it, from the *Partiality* of it, and from the *Repugnancy* of it to its ſelf. *Firſt*, then for the defectiveneſs of the teſtimony of Antiquity in reference to the ſhewing what certain form the Apoſtles obſerved in ſetling the Government of Churches; A threefold defectiveneſs I obſerve in it, as to *places*, as to *times*, as to *Perſons*. *Firſt* defectiveneſs as to *places*; for him that would be ſatisfied what courſe the Apoſtles took for governing Churches, it would be very requiſite to obſerve the uniformity of the Apoſtles practice in all Churches of their plantation. And if but one place varied, it were enough to overthrow the neceſſity of any one form of Government, becauſe thereby it would be evident, that they obſerved no certain or conſtant courſe, nor did they look upon themſelves as obliged ſo to do. Now the ground of the neceſſity of ſuch an univerſal Teſtimony as to places, is this; We have already made it appear, that there is no Law of Chriſt abſolutely commanding one form, and forbidding all other. We have no way then left to know whether the Apoſtles did look upon themſelves as bound to ſettle one form, but by their practice; this practice muſt be certain and uniform in them; this uniformity muſt be made known to us by ſome unqueſtionable way: the Scriptures they are very ſilent in it, mentioning very little more than *Paul*'s practice, nor that fully and clearly; therefore we muſt gather it from antiquity, and the records of following ages: if theſe now fall ſhort of our expectation, and cannot give us an account of what was done by the Apoſtles in the ſeveral Churches planted by them, how is it poſſible we ſhould attain any certainty of what the Apoſtles practice was? Now that antiquity is ſo defective as to places, will appear from the general ſilence as to the Churches planted by many of the Apoſtles. Granting the truth of what *Euſebius* tells us, That *Thomas* went into *Parthia*, *Andrew* into *Scythia*, *John* into the leſſer *Aſia*, *Peter* to the Jews in *Pontus*, *Galatia*, *Bythinia*, *Cappadocia*, *Aſia*; beſides what we read in Scripture of *Paul*, what a pitiful ſhort account have we here given in, of all the Apoſtles travels, and their ſeveral fellow-labourers! And for all theſe, little or nothing ſpoke of the way they took in ſetling the Churches by them planted. Who is it will undertake to tell us what courſe *Andrew* took in *Scythia*, in governing Churches? If we believe the records of after-ages, there was but one Biſhop, *viz.* of *Tomis* for the whole Countrey; how different is this from the pretended courſe of *Paul* ſetting up a ſingle Biſhop in every City? where do we read of the Preſbyteries ſetled by *Thomas* in *Parthia* or the *Indies?* what courſe *Philip*, *Bartholomew*, *Matthew*, *Simon Zelotes*, *Mathias* took: might not they for any thing we know, ſettle another kind of Government from what we read *Paul*, *Peter* or *John* did, unleſs we had ſome evidence that they were all bound to obſerve the ſame? nay, what evidence have we what courſe *Peter* took in the Churches of the circumciſion? Whether he left them to their Synagogue way or altered it, and how and wherein? Theſe things ſhould be made appear, to give men a certainty of the way and courſe the A-

Hiſt. Eccleſ. lib. 3. c. 1.

poſtles

poſtles did obſerve in the ſetling Churches by them planted. But inſtead of this, we have a general ſilence in antiquity, and no hing but the forgeries of latter ages to ſupply the vacuity: whereby they filled up empty places as *Plutarch* expreſſeth it, as Geographers do maps with ſome fabulous creatures of their own invention. Here is work now for a *Nicephorus Calliſtus*, a *Simeon Metaphraſtes*, the very *Jacobus de Voragine* of the Greek Church, (as one well calls him) thoſe hiſtorical Tinkers, that think to mend a hole where they find it, and make three inſtead of it. This is the firſt defect in antiquity as to places. The *ſecond* is as obſervable as to *times*; and what is moſt conſiderable: Antiquity is moſt defective where 'tis moſt uſeful, *viz.* in the time immediately after the Apoſtles, which muſt have been moſt helpful to us in this inquiry. For who dare with confidence believe the conjectures of *Euſebius* at three hundred years diſtance from Apoſtolical times, when he hath no other teſtimony to vouch, but the *Hypotypoſes* of an uncertain *Clement* (certainly not he of *Alexandria*, if *Joſ. Scaliger* may be credited) and the Commentaries of *Hegeſippus*, whoſe relation and authority are as queſtionable as many of the reports of *Euſebius* himſelf are in reference to thoſe elder times: for which I need no other Teſtimony, but *Euſebius* in a place enough of its ſelf to blaſt the whole credit of antiquity, as to the matter now in debate. For ſpeaking of *Paul* and *Peter*, and the Churches by them planted, and coming to enquire after their ſucceſſors, he makes this very ingenuous confeſſion. Ὅσοι δ' τότων, καὶ τινες γνήσιοι ζηλωταὶ γεγονότες τὰς παρὰ ἀποσ. ἱδρυθείσας ἱκανοὶ ποιμαίνειν ἐδοκιμάσθησαν ἐκκλησίας, ἐ ῥάδιον εἰπεῖν· μὴ ὅτι γε ὅσους ἂν τις ἐξ τῶν Παύλε φωνῶν ἀνελέξοιτο. *Eccl. Hiſt. l. 3. c. 4.* Say you ſo? *Is it ſo hard a matter to find out who ſucceeded the Apoſtles in the Churches planted by them, unleſs it be thoſe mentioned in the writings of* Paul? What becomes then of our unqueſtionable line of ſucceſſion of the Biſhops of ſeveral Churches, and the large Diagramms made of the Apoſtolical Churches, with every ones name ſet down in his order, as if the Writer had been *Clarenceaux* to the Apoſtles themſelves? Is it come to this at laſt that we have nothing certain, but what we have in Scriptures? and muſt then the Tradition of the Church be our rule to interpret Scriptures by? An excellent way to find out the truth doubtleſs, to bend the rule to the crooked ſtick; to make the Judge ſtand to the opinion of his Lacquey, what ſentence he ſhall paſs upon the cauſe in queſtion: to make Scripture ſtand cap in hand to tradition to know whether it may have leave to ſpeak or no? Are all the great outcries of Apoſtolical tradition, of perſonal ſucceſſion, of unqueſtionable records reſolved at laſt into the Scripture its ſelf by him from whom all theſe long pedegrees are fetched? then let ſucceſſion know its place, and learn to vail bonnet to the Scriptures? And withal let men take heed of over-reaching themſelves when they would bring down ſo large a Catalogue of ſingle Biſhops from the firſt and pureſt times of the Church? for it will be hard for others to believe them, when *Euſebius* profeſſeth it is ſo hard to find them. Well might *Scaliger* then complain that the Interval from the laſt chapter of the Acts to the middle of *Trajan*, in which time *Quadratus* and *Ignatius* began to flouriſh, was *tempus ἄδηλον*, as *Varro* ſpeaks, a meer Chaos of time filled up with the rude conceptions of *Papias*, *Hermes* and others, who like *Hannibal* when they could not find a way through, would make one either by force or fraud. But yet, *Thirdly*, here is another defect conſequent to *Plut. in Theſeo.* *Proleg. in Chron. Euſ.*

that of time, which is that of persons; arising not only from a defect of records, the *Diptychs* of the Church being lost, which would have acquainted us with the times of suffering of the several Martyrs (by them called their Natalitia) at which times their several names were inrolled in these Martyrologies, which some as *Junius* observes, have ignorantly mistaken for the time of their being made Bishops of the places wherein their names were entred, as *Anacletus*, *Cletus*, and *Clemens* at *Rome*; I say the defect as to persons not only ariseth hence, but because the Christians were so much harrassed with persecutions, that they could not have that leisure then to write those things which the leisure and peace of our ages have made us so eagerly inquisitive after. Hence even the Martyrologies are so full stuffed with Fables, witness one for all, the famous Legend of *Catharina* who suffered, say they, in *Diocletian*'s time. And truly the story of *Ignatius* (as much as it is defended with his Epistles) doth not seem to be any of the most probable. For wherefore should *Ignatius* of all others be brought to *Rome* to suffer, when the *Proconsuls* and the *præsides provinciarum* did every where in time of persecution execute their power in punishing Christians at their own tribunals, without sending them so long a journey to *Rome* to be martyr'd there? And how came *Ignatius* to make so many and such strange excursions as he did by the story, if the soldiers that were his guard were so cruel to him, as he complains they were? Now all those uncertain and fabulous narrations as to persons then, arising from want of sufficient records made at those times, make it more evident how incompetent a Judge Antiquity is as to the certainty of things done in Apostolical times. If we should only speak of the Fabulous Legends of the first planters of Churches in these Western parts, we need no farther evidence of the great defect of Antiquity as to persons. Not to go out of our own nation; Whence come the stories of *Peter*, *James*, *Paul*, *Simon*, *Aristobulus*, besides *Joseph* of *Arimathea*, and his company, all being preachers of the Gospel, and planters of Churches here, but only from the great defect in Antiquity as to the Records of Persons imployed in the several places for preaching the Gospel? Thus much to shew the defectiveness as to the records of antiquity, and thereby the incompetency of them for being a way to find out the certain course the Apostles took in settling and governing Churches by them planted.

Cont. 3. *l.* 2. *c.* 5. *not.* 18.

V. Chamier. Tom. 1. *l.* 2. *cap.* 16.

§. 17. The next thing shewing the incompetency of the records of the Church for deciding the certain form of Church Government in the Apostles times, is, the *Ambiguity* of the Testimony given by those records. A Testimony sufficient to decide a controversie, must be plain and evident, and must speak full and home to the case under debate. Now if I make it appear that antiquity doth not so; nothing then can be evident from thence, but that we are left, to as great uncertainties as before. The matter in controversie is, whether any in a superiour order to Presbyters were instituted by the Apostles themselves for the regulating of the Churches by them planted? for the proving of which, *three* things are the most insisted on; *first*, the Personal succession of some persons to the Apostles and Churches by them planted; *Secondly*, the appropriating the name ἐπίσκοποι to Bishops in a superiour order to Presbyters, after the Apostles decease; *Thirdly*, the Churches owning the order of Episcopacy as of Divine institution. If now we can make these three things evident; *First*, *that personal succession*

might be without such superiority of order; Secondly, that the names of Bishop and Presbyters were common after the distinction between them was introduced; and *Thirdly, that the Church did not own Episcopacy as a Divine institution, but Ecclesiastical; and those who seem to speak most of it, do mean no more*; I shall suppose enough done to invalidate the Testimony of Antiquity as to the matter in hand. *First*, then for the matter of *succession in Apostolical Churches*, I shall lay down these four things, to evince that the argument drawn from thence, cannot fully clear the certain course which the Apostles took in settling the Government of Churches. *First, that the succession might be only as to different* degree, *and not as to a different* order; where the succession is clear nothing possibly can be inferred from it beyond this. For bare succession implies no more than that there was one in those Churches succeeding the Apostles, from whom afterwards the succession was derived. Now then, supposing only at present, that it was the custom in all the Churches at that time to be ruled by a college of Presbyters acting in a parity of power, and among these, one to sit as the *Nasi* in the *Sanhedrin*, having a priority of order above the rest in place, without any superiority of power over his Colleagues; will not the matter of succession be clear and evident enough notwithstanding this? *Succession* of *persons* was the thing inquired for, and not a *succession* of *power*; if therefore those that would prove a succession of Apostolical power, can only produce a list and Catalogue of names in Apostolical Churches, without any evidence of what power they had, they apparently fail of proving the thing in question, which is not, whether there might not be found out a list of persons in many Churches derived from the Apostles times; but whether those persons did enjoy by way of peculiarity and appropriation to themselves, that power, which the Apostles had over many Churches while they lived? Now this, the meer succession will never prove, which will best appear by some Parallel instances. At *Athens* after they grew weary of their ten years Ἄρχοντες, the people chose nine every year to govern the affairs of the Common-wealth; these nine enjoyed a Parity of power among themselves, and therefore had a place where they consulted together about the matters of State, which was called Στρατήγιον, as * *Demosthenes*, *Plutarch* and others tell us: Now although they enjoyed this equality of power, yet one of them had greater dignity than the rest, and therefore was called Ἄρχων by way of excellency, and his name was only set in the publick Records of that year, and there was called Ἄρχων ἐπώνυμος, and the year was reckoned from him, as † *Pausanias* and *Julius Pollux* inform us. Here we see now the succession clear in one single person and yet no superiority of power in him over his Colleagues: The like may be observed among the *Ephori* and *Bidiæj* at *Sparta*; the number of the *Ephori* was always five from their first institution by *Lycurgus*, and not nine (as the Greek Etymologist imagines) these enjoyed likewise a parity of power among them; but among these to give name to the year, they made choice of one who was called ἐπώνυμος. here too, as the ἄρχων at *Athens*, and him they called πρέσβυτα τῶν ἐφόρων, as *Plutarch* tells us. Where we have the very name πρέσβυς attributed to him that had only this primacy of order without any superiority of power, which is used by *Justin Martyr* of the President of Assemblies among the Christians. Now from hence we may evidently see

* *Demost. in Midiam. Plut. in Per. Cyrvit. Nicii. V. Meursium de Archont. Ath. l. 1. c. 9. Ennium de Ep. Ath.*

† *Paus. in Lacon. Pollux. Onom. lib. 8. c. 9.*

Paus. Lacon. V. Nic. Cragium de Rep. Laced. lib. 2. c. 4.

ſee that meer ſucceſſion of ſingle perſons named above the reſt, in the ſucceſſions in Apoſtolical Churches, cannot inforce any ſuperiority of power in the perſons ſo named, above others ſuppoſed to be as joint-Governours of the Churches with them. I diſpute not whether it were ſo or no; whether according to *Blondel* the ſucceſſion was from the πρωτοχειροτονηθεὶς, or whether by choice as at *Alexandria*; but I only now ſhew that this argument from ſucceſſion is weak, and proves not at all the certainty of the power thoſe perſons enjoyed. *Secondly, This ſucceſſion is not ſo evident and convincing in all places as it ought to be, to demonſtrate the thing intended.* It is not enough to ſhew a liſt of ſome perſons in the great Churches of *Jeruſalem*, *Antioch*, *Rome*, and *Alexandria*, (although none of theſe be unqueſtionable) but it ſhould be produced at *Philippi*, *Corinth*, *Cæſarea*, and in all the ſeven Churches of *Aſia* (and not only at *Epheſus*) and ſo likewiſe in *Creet* ſome ſucceeding *Titus*, and not think men will be ſatisfied with the naming a Biſhop of *Gortyna* ſo long after him. But as I ſaid before, in none of the Churches moſt ſpoken of is the ſucceſſion ſo clear as is neceſſary. For at *Jeruſalem* it ſeems ſomewhat ſtrange how fifteen Biſhops of the circumciſion ſhould be crouded into ſo narrow a room as they are, ſo that many of them could not have above two years time to rule in the Church. And it would bear an inquiry where the ſeat of the Biſhops of *Jeruſalem* was from the time of the deſtruction of the City by *Titus*, (when the walls were laid even with the Ground by *Muſonius*) till the time of *Adrian*; for till that time the ſucceſſion of the Biſhops of the circumciſion continues. For *Antioch*, it is far from being agreed, whether *Evodius* or *Ignatius* ſucceeded *Peter*, or *Paul*, or the one *Peter* and the other *Paul*; much leſs at *Rome*, whether *Cletus*, *Anacletus*, or *Clemens* are to be reckon'd firſt (but of theſe afterwards) At *Alexandria* where the ſucceſſion runs cleareſt, the original of the power is imputed to the choice of Preſbyters, and to no divine inſtitution. But at *Epheſus* the ſucceſſion of Biſhops from *Timothy* is pleaded with the greateſt confidence, and the teſtimony brought from it is from *Leontius* Biſhop of *Magneſia* in the Council of *Chalcedon*, whoſe words are theſe ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου Τιμοθέου μέχρι νῦν εἴκοσι ἑπτὰ ἐπίσκοποι ἐγένοντο. πάντες ὁν ἐφέσῳ ἐχειροτονήθησαν. *From* Timothy *to this day there hath been a ſucceſſion of ſeven and twenty Biſhops, all of them ordained in* Epheſus. I ſhall not inſiſt ſo much on the incompetency of this ſingle witneſs to paſs a judgement upon a thing of that nature, at the diſtance of four hundred years; in which time records being loſt, and Biſhops being after ſettled there, no doubt they would begin their account from *Timothy*, becauſe of his imployment there once for ſettling the Churches thereabout. And to that end we may obſerve that in the after-times of the Church, they never met with any of the Apoſtles, or Evangeliſts in any place, but they preſently made them Biſhops of that place. So *Philip* is made Biſhop of *Trallis*, *Ananias* Biſhop of *Damaſcus*, *Nicolaus* Biſhop of *Samaria*, *Barnabas* Biſhop of *Milan*, *Silas* Biſhop of *Corinth*, *Sylvanus* of *Theſſalonica*, *Creſcens* of *Calcedon*, *Andreas* of *Byzantium*, and upon the ſame grounds *Peter* Biſhop of *Rome*. No wonder then if *Leontius* make *Timothy* Biſhop of *Epheſus*, and derive the ſucceſſion down from him. But again, this was not an act of the Council its ſelf, but only of one ſingle perſon delivering his private opinion in it; and that which is moſt obſervable is,

Conc. Chalcedon par. 2. Act. 11. ad Bin. Concil. Gr. La. To. 3. f. 410.

is, that in the thing mainly insisted on by *Leontius*, he was contradicted in the face of the whole Council, by *Philip* a Presbyter of *Constantinople*. For the case of *Bassianus* and *Stephen* about their violent intrusion into the Bishoprick of *Ephesus*, being discussed before the Council; a question was propounded by the Council where the Bishop of *Ephesus* was to be regularly ordained, according to the *Canons*. *Leontius* Bishop of *Magnesia* saith, that there had been twenty seven Bishops of *Ephesus* from *Timothy*, and all of them ordained in the place. His business was not to derive exactly the succession of Bishops, but speaking according to vulgar tradition, he insists that all had been ordained there. Now if he be convicted of the *crimen falsi* in his τὸ ἔργον, no wonder if we meet with a mistake in his παράργον, *i.* e. if he were out in his allegation, no wonder if he were deceived in his tradition. Now as to the ordination of the Bishops in *Ephesus*, *Philip*, a Presbyter of *Constantinople* convicts him of falshood in that; For, saith he, *John*, Bishop of *Constantinople* going into *Asia*, deposed fifteen Bishops there, and ordained others in their room. And *Aetius*, Archdeacon of *Constantinople*, instanceth in *Castinus*, *Heraclides*, *Basilius*, Bishops of *Ephesus*, all ordained by the Bishop of *Constantinople*. If then the certainty of succession relies upon the credit of this *Leontius*, let them thank the Council of *Chalcedon*, who have sufficiently blasted it, by determining the cause against him in the main evidence produced by him. So much to shew how far the clearest evidence for succession of Bishops from Apostolical times, is from being convincing to any rational man. *Thirdly*, The succession so much pleaded by the Writers of the primitive Church, was *not a succession of persons in Apostolical power, but a succession in Apostolical doctrine*; which will be seen by a view of the places produced to that purpose. The first is that of *Irenæus*. *Quoniam valdè longum est in hoc tali volumine omnium Ecclesiarum enumerare successiones, maximæ & antiquissimæ, & omnibus cognitæ à gloriosissimis duobus Apostolis* Petro & Paulo Romæ *fundatæ & constitutæ Ecclesiæ, eam quam habet ab Apostolis traditionem, & annunciatam hominibus fidem, per successiones Episcoporum pervenientes usque ad nos, indicantes, confundimus omnes eos, &c.* Where we see *Irenæus* doth the least of all aim at the making out of a succession of Apostolical power in the Bishops he speaks of, but a conveying of the doctrine of the Apostles down to them by their hands; (which doctrine is here called tradition, not as that word is abused by the Papists to signifie something distinct from the Scriptures, but as it signifies the conveyance of the doctrine of the Scripture its self) which is cleared by the beginning of that *Chapter*, *Traditionem itaq; Apostolorum in toto mundo manifestatam in Ecclesia adest perspicere omnibus qui vera velint audire; & habemus annumerare eos qui ab Apostolis instituti sunt Episcopi in Ecclesiis, & successores eorum usq; ad nos qui nihil tale docuerunt neq; cognoverunt, quale ab his deliratur.* His plain meaning is, that those persons who were appointed by the Apostles to oversee and govern Churches, being sufficient witnesses themselves of the Apostles doctrine, have conveyed it down to us by their successors, and we cannot learn any such thing of them, as *Valentinus* and his followers broached. We see it is the doctrine still he speaks of, and not a word what power and superiority these Bishops had over Presbyters in their several Churches. To the same purpose *Tertullian*, in that known speech of his; *Edant origines Ecclesiarum suarum, evolvant ordinem Episcoporum suorum, ita per succes-*

Adversus hæres. l. 3. cap. 3.

De præscrip. adversus hæret. cap. 32.

ſucceſſiones ab initio decurrentem, ut primus ille Epiſcopus aliquem ex Apoſtolis aut Apoſtolicis viris habuerit authorem & anteceſſorem. Hoc modo Eccleſiæ Apoſtolicæ cenſus ſuos deferunt; ſicut Smyrnæorum Eccleſia habens Polycarpum à Johanne conlocatum refert, ſicut Romanorum Clementem à Petro ordinatum edit; proinde utiq; & cæteræ exhibent, quos ab Apoſtolis in Epiſcopatum conſtitutos Apoſtolici ſeminis traduces habeant. A ſucceſſion I grant is proved in Apoſtolical Churches by theſe words of *Tertullian*, and this ſucceſſion of perſons, and thoſe perſons Biſhops too; but then it is only ſaid, that theſe perſons derived their Office from the Apoſtles, but nothing expreſſed what relation they had to the Church, any more than is implied in the general name of *Epiſcopi*, nor what power they had over Preſbyters, only that there were ſuch perſons, was ſufficient to his purpoſe, which was to *preſcribe againſt Hereticks*, *i. e.* to non-ſuit them, or to give in general reaſons why they were not to be proceeded with as to the particular debate of the things in queſtion between them. For *præſcribere* in the civil Law, (whence *Tertullian* tranſplanted that word as many other into the Church) is, *cum quis adverſarium certis exceptionibus removet à lite conteſtandâ, ita ut de ſummâ rei neget agendum, eamve cauſam ex juris præſcripto judicandam:* three ſorts of theſe preſcriptions *Tertullian* elſewhere mentions: *Hoc exigere veritatem cui nemo præſcribere poteſt, non ſpatium temporum, non patrocinia perſonarum, non privilegium regionum.* Here he ſtands upon the firſt, which is a preſcription of time, becauſe the doctrine which was contrary to that of the Hereticks, was delivered by the Apoſtles, and conveyed down by their ſucceſſors, which was requiſite to be ſhewed, in order to the making his preſcription good. Which he thus farther explains: *Age jam qui voles curioſitatem melius exercere in negotio ſalutis tuæ; percurre Eccleſias Apoſtolicas, apud quas ipſæ adhuc Cathedræ Apoſtolorum ſuis locis preſidentur, apud quas ipſæ authenticæ eorum literæ recitantur, ſonantes vocem & repræſentantes faciem uniuſcujuſque. Proxime eſt tibi Achaia; habes Corinthum. Si non longe es à Macedonia, habes Philippos, habes Theſſalonicenſes. Si potes in Aſiam tendere, habes Epheſum. Si autem Italiæ adjaces, habes Romam, unde nobis quoque auctoritas preſto eſt.* What he ſpoke before of the perſons, he now ſpeaks of the Churches themſelves planted by the Apoſtles, which by retaining the authentick Epiſtles of the Apoſtles ſent to them, did thereby ſufficiently preſcribe to all the novel opinions of the Hereticks. We ſee then evidently, that it is the doctrine which they ſpeak of as to ſucceſſion, and the perſons no farther than as they are the conveyers of that doctrine; either then it muſt be proved, that a ſucceſſion of ſome perſons in Apoſtolical power is neceſſary for the conveying of this doctrine to men, or no argument at all can be inferred from hence for their ſucceeding the Apoſtles in their power, becauſe they are ſaid to convey down the Apoſtolical doctrine to ſucceeding ages. Which is *Auſtin*'s meaning, in that ſpeech of his, *Radix Chriſtianæ ſocietatis per ſedes Apoſtolorum & ſucceſſiones Epiſcoporum, certa per orbem propagatione diffunditur. The root of Chriſtian ſociety,* (i. e. *the doctrine of the Goſpel*) *is ſpread abroad the world, through the channels of the Apoſtolical Sees, and the continued ſucceſſions of Biſhops therein.* And yet if we may believe the ſame *Auſtin*, *Secundum honorum vocabula quæ jam Eccleſiæ uſus obtinuit, Epiſcopatus Preſbyterio major eſt.* The difference between Epiſcopacy and Preſbytery riſes from the cuſtom of the Church, attributing a name of greater honour to thoſe it had ſet above others. And as for *Tertullian*, I believe neither party will ſtand to his judg-

De Virgin. veland. c. 1.

Cap. 36. *de præſcript.*

Aug. Ep. 42.

Aug. Ep. 29.

ment as to the original of Church-power: For he saith expressly, *Differentiam inter ordinem & plebem constituit Ecclesiæ auctoritas*; *all the difference between Ministers and people comes from the Church's authority*; unless he means something more by the following words, *& honor per Ordinis consessum sanctificatus à Deo, viz.* that the honour which is received by ordination from the bench of Church-Officers, is sanctified by God, *i. e.* by his appointment as well as blessing. For otherwise I know not how to understand him. But, however, we see here he makes the Government of the Church to lie in a *Consessus ordinis*, which I know not otherwise to render, than by a *bench of Presbyters*; because only they were said *in ordinem cooptari*, who were made Presbyters, and not those who were promoted to any higher degree in the Church. By the way we may observe the original of the name of *Holy-Orders* in the Church, not as the Papists, and others following them, as tho' it noted any thing inherent, by way of (I know not what) character in the person, but because the persons ordained were thereby admitted *in Ordinem* among the number of Church-Officers. So there was *Ordo Senatorum, Ordo Equestris, Ordo Decurionum*, and *Ordo Sacerdotum* among the *Romans*, as in this Inscription. *Exhort. Castil. c. 7.* *V. Seldenin Eutych. p. 28, &c.*

ORDO SACERDOT. DEI
HERCULIS INVICTI.

From hence the use of the word came into the Church, and thence Ordination, *ex vi vocis* imports no more than solemn admission into this order of Presbyters; and therefore it is observable, that laying on of hands never made men Priests under the Law, but only admitted them into publick Office. So much for *Tertullian*'s *Consessus ordinis*, which hath thus far drawn us out of our way, but we now return: And therefore, *Fourthly, This personal succession, so much spoken of, is sometimes attributed to Presbyters, even after the distinction came into use between Bishops and them.* And that even by those Authors who before had told us the succession was by Bishops, as *Irenæus*. *Cum autem ad eam iterum traditionem, quæ est ab Apostolis, quæ per successiones Presbyterorum in Ecclesiis custoditur, provocamus eos qui adversantur traditioni, dicent se non solum Presbyteris sed etiam Apostolis existentes sapientiores, &c.* Here he attributes the keeping of the tradition of Apostolical doctrine to the succession of Presbyters, which before he had done to Bishops. And more fully afterwards, *Quapropter iis qui in Ecclesiâ sunt Presbyteris obaudire oportet, his qui successionem habent ab Apostolis, sicut ostendimus, qui cum Episcopatûs successione, charisma veritatis certum secundum placitum patris acceperunt.* In this place he not only asserts the succession of Presbyters to the Apostles, but likewise attributes the *successio Episcopatûs* to these very Presbyters. What strange confusion must this raise in any one's mind, that seeks for a succession of Episcopal power above Presbyters from the Apostles, by the Testimony of *Irenæus*, when he so plainly attributes both the succession to Presbyters, and the Episcopacy too, which he speaks of? And in the next Chapter adds, *Tales Presbyteros nutrit Ecclesia, de quibus & Propheta ait. Et dabo principes tuos in pace, & Episcopos tuos in justitiâ.* Did *Irenæus* think that Bishops in a superior order to Presbyters were derived by an immediate succession from the Apostles, and yet call the Presbyters by the name of Bishops? It is said indeed, that in the Apostles times the names *Adver. hæres. l. 3. c. 2.* *Lib. 4. cap. 43.* *Cap. 44.*

Biſhop and Preſbyter were common, although the Office was diſtinct; but that was only during the Apoſtles life, ſay ſome, when after the name Biſhop was appropriated to that order that was in the Apoſtles (ſo called before) but, ſay others, it was only till ſubject Preſbyters were conſtituted, and then grew the difference between the names. But neither of theſe σοφὰ φάρμακα can draw forth the difficulty in theſe places of *Irenæus*: for now both the Apoſtles were dead, and ſubject Preſbyters certainly in ſome of theſe Apoſtolical Churches were then conſtituted; whence comes then the community of names ſtill, that thoſe who are ſaid to ſucceed the Apoſtles, are called Biſhops in one place, but Preſbyters in another, and the very ſucceſſion of Epiſcopacy attributed to Preſbyters? Can we then poſſibly conceive that theſe teſtimonies of *Irenæus* can determine the point of ſucceſſion, ſo as to make clear to us what that power was which thoſe perſons enjoyed, whom he ſometimes calls Biſhops, and ſometimes Preſbyters. But it is not *Irenæus* alone who tells us that Preſbyters ſucceed the Apoſtles; even *Cyprian* who pleads ſo much for obedience to the Biſhops as they were then conſtituted in the Church, yet ſpeaks often of his *compreſbyteri*;
Ep. 69. ed. Pamel. ſ. 4. and in his Epiſtle to *Florentius Papianus*, who had reproached him, ſpeaking of thoſe words of Chriſt, *He that heareth you, heareth me*, &c. *Qui dicit ad Apoſtolos, ac per hoc ad omnes præpoſitos qui Apoſtolis vicaria ordinatione ſuccedent*, where he attributes Apoſtolical ſucceſſion to all that were *præpoſiti*, which name implies not the relation to Preſbyters as over them, but to the people, and is therefore common both to Biſhops and
**V. Cyprian. ep. 3. à Cleto. Rom. ep. 62. & 65.* Preſbyters; * for ſo afterwards he ſpeaks, *nec fraternitas habuerit Epiſcopum, nec plebs Præpoſitum, &c.* *Jerome* ſaith that Preſbyters are *loco Apoſtolorum*, and that they do *Apoſtolico gradui ſuccedere*; and the ſo
in Mich. 2. epiſt. 1. Ep. ad Mag. p. much magnified *Ignatius*, πρεσβύτεροι εἰς τόπον συνεδρίου τῶν Ἀποστόλων *that the Preſbyters ſucceeded in the place of the Bench of Apoſtles*; and
33. ed. If. elſewhere of *Sotion* the Deacon ὅτι ὑποτάσσεται τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ ὡς χάριτι Θεοῦ καὶ τῷ πρεσβυτερίῳ ὡς νόμῳ Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, as it is read in the *Florentine* co-
Voſſii p. 31. Vedel. p. 50. py ſet out by *Voſſius*; but in the former Editions both by *Vedelius* and the moſt learned *Primate* of *Armagh* it is read, ὅτι ὑποτάσσεται τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ καὶ τῷ πρεσβυτερίῳ χάριτι Θεοῦ ἐν νόμῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ· but that of *Voſſius* ſeems to be the true reading, to which the old Latin verſion in
Uſſer, p. 49. *Biſhop Uſher* fully agrees; *Quoniam ſubjectus eſt Epiſcopo ut gratiæ Dei, & preſbyterio ut legi Jeſu Chriſti.* It might be no improbable conjecture to gueſs from hence at *Ignatius* his opinion concerning the original both of Epiſcopacy and Preſbytery. The former he looks on as an excellent gift of God to the Church; ſo a learned Doctor paraphraſeth
Ep. 69. *gratiæ dei.* i. e. *Dono à Deo Eccleſiæ indulto*; ſo *Cyprian* often *Divina dignatione*, ſpeaking of Biſhops; *i. e.* that they looked on it as an act of God's ſpecial favour to the Church, to find out that means for unity in the Church, to pitch upon one among the Preſbyters who ſhould have the chief rule in every particular Church; but then for Preſbytery, he looks on that as νόμῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, *an Inſtitution and Law of Jeſus Chriſt*, which muſt, on that account always continue in the Church. And ſo *Sotion* did commendably in ſubmitting to the Biſhop as a favour of God to the Church for preventing ſchiſms; on which account it is, and not upon the account of divine inſtitution, that *Ignatius* is ſo earneſt in requiring obedience to the Biſhop, becauſe, as *Cyprian* ſaith, *Eccleſia eſt plebs Epiſcopo coadunata, & grex Paſtori adhærens*; and the Biſhops then being orthodox, he lays ſuch a charge upon the people to adhere to

them, (for it is to the people, and not to the Presbyters he speaks most) which was as much as to bid them hold to the unity of the faith, and avoid those pernicious heresies which were then abroad; and so *Ignatius* and *Jerome* may easily be reconciled to one another; both owning the Council of Presbyters as of divine institution, and both requiring obedience to Bishops as a singular privilege granted to the Church, for preventing Schisms, and preserving unity in the Faith. And in all those thirty five testimonies produced out of *Ignatius* his Epistles for Episcopacy, I can meet but with one which is brought to prove the least semblance of an Institution of Christ for Episcopacy; and if I be not much deceived, the sense of that place is clearly mistaken too. The place is *Ep. ad Ephesios*: He is exhorting the Ephesians, συμφέρειν τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ, which I suppose may be rendred *to fulfil the will of God*, so ποιῆσαι τὸ γνώμιμον signifies *Apocalyps.* 17. 17. and adds, ὃς γὰρ Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς τὸ ἀδιάκριτον ἡμῶν ζῆν, τοῦ πατρὸς ἡ γνώμη, ὡς καὶ οἱ ἐπίσκοποι οἱ κατὰ τὰ πέρατα ὁρισθέντες ἐν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ γνώμῃ, εἰσίν· ὅθεν πρέπει ὑμῖν συντρέχειν τῇ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου γνώμῃ, ὅπερ καὶ ποιεῖτε. He begins to exhort them *to concur with the will of God*, and concludes his exhortation, *to concur with the will or council of the Bishop*; and in the middle he shews the ground of the connexion of these two together; *for Christ*, saith he, *who is our inseparable Life, is the counsel of the Father, and the Bishops, who are scattered abroad to the ends of the earth, are the Counsel of Jesus Christ*, i. e. do concur with the will of Christ; *therefore follow the Counsel of your Bishop, which also you do.* Every thing is plain and obvious in the sense here, and very coherent to the expressions both before and after; only the ὄν must be left out as plainly redundant, and ὁρισθέντες must not be rendred *determinati*, but rather *disterminati*, because it refers to a place here, and so it notes their being dispersed into several places, and separated from one another, thereby implying the unity of their Faith, and the *coagulum fidei*, notwithstanding their distance from one another, as to place in the world, which in *Cyprian*'s words is, *Ecclesiæ universæ per totum mundum unitatis vinculo copulatæ.* And certainly a stronger argument than this could not have been given for the *Ephesians* chearful obedience to their Bishop, (which is the thing he aims at) than the universal consent of all the Bishops in the Christian World in the unity of the Faith of Christ; so that as Christ is the will and counsel of the Father, because of that harmony and consent which is between their wills; so the Bishops are the will and counsel of Christ, as chearfully uniting in the profession of his Faith. So that we see *Ignatius* himself cannot give a doubting mind satisfaction of the Divine institution of Bishops, when in the only place brought to that purpose, his sense is quite different from what it is brought for. So that the Records of the Church are far from deciding this controversie as to the certainty of the form of Government instituted by Christ, because of the ambiguity of those Records as to the point of succession to the Apostles, in that this succession might be only of a different degree, in that it is not clear and convincing in all places; in that where it is cleareſt, it is meant of a succession of doctrine, and not of persons; in that if it were of persons, yet Presbyters are said to succeed the Apostles as well as Bishops, by the same persons who speak of these. By which last thing we have likewise cleared the *Second* thing propounded, to shew the ambiguity of the testimony of Antiquity, which was *the promiscuous use of the names of Bishops and Presbyters, after the distinction*

P. 19. Vid.

between their Office was brought in by the Church. For we have made it appear that the names are promiſcuouſly uſed, when that ſucceſſion which is ſometimes attributed to Biſhops, is at other times given to Preſbyters. Other inſtances might be brought of that nature, as, firſt, that of *Clemens Romanus*, in his excellent Epiſtle, which like the River *Alpheus* had run under ground for ſo many centuries of years, but hath now in theſe laſt times of the world appeared publickly to the view of the world, to make it appear how true that is which he ſaith the Apoſtles did foreſee, ὅτι ἔρις ἔσται περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς, *that there would be great contention about the name of Epiſcopacy*; and ſo there are ſtill, and that from his Epiſtle too. For when in one place he tells us, *that the Apoſtles ordained their firſt fruits to be Biſhops and Deacons,* τῶν μελλόντων πιστεύειν, *of thoſe that ſhould believe*; afterwards he makes no ſcruple of calling thoſe Biſhops *Preſbyters* in ſeveral places, μακάριοι οἱ προοδοιπορήσαντες πρεσβύτεροι, &c. and ſpeaking of the preſent ſchiſm at *Corinth*, he ſaith, *it was a moſt ſhameful thing, and unworthy of Chriſtians.* Αἰσχρὰ ἀγαπητοὶ καὶ λίαν αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ ἀγωγῆς ἀκούεσθαι τὴν βεβαιωτάτην καὶ ἀρχαίαν Κορινθίων ἐκκλησίαν δι' ἓν ἢ δύο πρόσωπα στασιάζειν πρὸς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους. *To hear the firm and ancient Church of* Corinth, *for the ſake of one or two perſons to raiſe a ſedition againſt the Preſbyters*; and afterwards, μόνον τὸ ποίμνιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰρηνευέτω μετὰ τῶν καθεσταμένων πρεσβυτέρων, *Only let the flock of Chriſt enjoy its peace with the Preſbyters which are ſet over it.* But becauſe this is ſaid to be ſpoken before the time of diſtinction between Biſhops and Preſbyters, it being ſuppoſed that there were no ſubject Preſbyters then, (although no reaſon can be aſſigned why the Apoſtles ſhould ordain Biſhops τῶν μελλόντων πιστεύειν *of thoſe that ſhould believe*, and ſhould not likewiſe ordain Preſbyters for them) yet to take away all ſcruple, we ſhall go farther; when ſubject Preſbyters, as they are called, are acknowledged to be, and yet Biſhops are call'd Preſbyters then too: For which we have the clear teſtimony of the Martyrs of the Gallican Church, in their Epiſtle to *Eleutherius*, Biſhop of *Rome*, who call *Irenæus* Πρεσβύτερον ἐκκλησίας, when as *Blondell* obſerves, he had been nine years Biſhop of *Lyons*, in the place of *Pothinus*; neither doth *Blondell*'s argument lie here, that becauſe they call him the Preſbyter of the Church, therefore he was no Biſhop, as his Antagoniſt ſuppoſeth; but he freely acknowledgeth him to have ſucceeded *Pothinus* there in his Biſhoprick; but becauſe after the difference aroſe between Biſhop and Preſbyters, yet they called him by the name of Presbyter, it ſeems very improbable, that when they were commending one to the Biſhop of another Church, they ſhould make uſe of the loweſt name of honour then appropriated to ſubject Presbyters, which, inſtead of commending, were a great debaſing of him, if they had looked on a ſuperior order above thoſe Presbyters, as of divine inſtitution, and thought there had been ſo great a diſtance between a Biſhop and ſubject Presbyters, as we are made to believe there was. Which is, as if the Maſter of a College, in one Univerſity, ſhould be ſent by the Fellows of his Society, to the Heads of the other, and ſhould in his Commendatory-Letters to them, be ſtiled a Senior-Fellow of that Houſe: Would not any one that read this, imagine that there was no difference between a Senior-Fellow and a Maſter, but only a primacy of order, that he was the firſt of the number, without any power over the reſt? This was the caſe of *Irenæus*; he is ſuppoſed to be Biſhop of the Church of *Lyons*; he is

Ep. gr. lat. p. 57.

Page 54.

Page 57.

Page 69. & p. 73. p. 2, 3.

Apol. p. 31.

Euſeb. l. 5. cap. 3.

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ſent by the Church of *Lyons* on a Meſſage to the Biſhop of *Rome*; when notwithſtanding his being Biſhop, they call him *Preſbyter of that Church*, (when there were other Presbyters who were not Biſhops) what could any one imagine by the reading of it, but that the Biſhop was nothing elſe but the Senior-Presbyter, or one that had a primacy of order among, but no divine right to a power of juriſdiction over his fellow-Presbyters? More inſtances of this nature are brought there by that learned Author, which the Reader may compare with the anſwers, and then let him judge whether the Teſtimony of Antiquity have not too much ambiguity in it to decide the Controverſie clearly on either ſide. But that which ſeems yet more material, is that which we obſerved in the *third place, that thoſe who acknowledge the ſuperiority of Biſhops over Preſbyters, do impute it to an act of the Church, and not aſcribe it to any divine inſtitution.* The teſtimony of *Jerome* to this purpoſe is well known, and hath been produced already; that of the counterfeit *Ambroſe*, but true *Hilary*, is in every one's mouth upon this controverſie; *Quia primum Preſbyteri Epiſcopi appellabantur, ut recedente uno ſequens ei ſuccederet; ſed quia cœperunt ſequentes Preſbyteri indigni inveniri ad primatus tenendos, immutata eſt ratio, proſpiciente Concilio ut non ordo ſed meritum crearet Epiſcopum multorum Sacerdotum judicio conſtitutum, ne indignus temerè Uſurparet & eſſet multis ſcandalum.* Very ſtrange that an opinion ſo directly contrary to the divine right of Epiſcopacy ſhould be publiſhed by a Deacon of the Church of *Rome*, and theſe Commentaries cited by *Auſtin*, with applauſe of the Perſon, without ſtigmatizing him, for a heretick with *Aerius*, if it had been then the opinion of the Church, that Biſhops in their power over Preſbyters did ſucceed the Apoſtles by a divine right. Nothing more clear, than that he aſſerts all the difference between a Biſhop and Preſbyters to ariſe from an act of the Church chuſing men for their deſerts, when before they ſucceeded in order of place; it is a miſtake of *Blondel*'s, to attribute this to the *Nicene Council*; doubtleſs he means no more than that *Hierom* calls *Concilium Preſbyterorum*, or which he himſelf means by *judicium Sacerdotum*. The teſtimony of *Auſtin* hath been already mentioned. *Secundum honorum vocabula quæ jam Eccleſiæ uſus obtinuit, Epiſcopatus Preſbyterio major eſt.* Thereby implying it was not ſo always; elſe to what purpoſe ſerves that *jam obtinuit*, and that the original of the difference was from the Church? But more expreſs and full is *Iſidore* himſelf, the Biſhop of *Sevil* in *Spain* ſpeaking of Preſbyters: *His ſicut Epiſcopis diſpenſatio myſteriorum Dei commiſſa eſt; præſunt enim Eccleſiis Chriſti, & in confectione corporis & ſanguinis conſortes cùm Epiſcopis ſunt; ſimiliter & in doctrina populi & in officio prædicandi, ſed ſola propter auctoritatem ſummo ſacerdoti Clericorum ordinatio reſervata eſt, ne à multis Eccleſiæ diſciplina vindicata concordiam ſolveret, ſcandala generaret.* What could be ſpoken more to our purpoſe than this is? he aſſerts the identity of power, as well as name, in both Biſhops and Preſbyters, in governing the Church, in celebrating the Euchariſt, in the Office of preaching to the people, only for the greater honour of the Biſhop, and for preventing ſchiſms in the Church, the power of ordination was reſerved to the Biſhop; by thoſe words *propter auctoritatem*, he cannot poſſibly mean the authority of a divine command, for that his following words contradict, that it was to prevent ſchiſms and ſcandals, and after produceth the whole place of *Jerome* to that purpoſe. Agreeable to this, is the judgment of the ſecond Council of *Sevil*

In Eph. 4.

De Eccleſ. Officiis, l. 2. cap. 7.

in *Spain*, upon the occasion of the irregular proceedings of some Presbyters ordained by *Agapius* Bishop of *Corduba*. Their words are these: *Nam quamvis cum Episcopis plurima illis Ministeriorum communis sit dispensatio, quædam novellis & Ecclesiasticis regulis sibi prohibita noverint, sicut Presbyterorum & Diaconorum & Virginum consecratio*, &c. *Hæc enim omnia illicita esse Presbyteris, quia Pontificatus apicem non habent, quem solis deberi Episcopis authoritate Canonum præcipitur: ut per hoc & discretio graduum, & dignitatis fastigium summi Pontificis demonstretur.* How much are we beholding to the ingenuity of a *Spanish Council*, that doth plainly disavow the pretence of any divine right to the Episcopacy by them so strenuously asserted? All the right they plead for, is from the *novellæ & Ecclesiasticæ regulæ*, which import quite another thing from divine institution; he that hath not learnt to distinguish between the authority of the Canons of the Church, and that of the Scriptures, will hardly ever understand the matter under debate with us: and certainly it is another thing to preserve the honour of the different degrees of the Clergy, but especially of the chief among them, *viz.* the Bishop, than to observe a thing merely out of obedience to the command of Christ; and upon the account of divine institution. That which is rejoyned in answer to these testimonies, as far as I can learn, is only this, *that the Council and* Isidore *followed* Jerome, *and so all make up but one single testimony.* But might it not as well be said, that all that are for Episcopacy did follow *Ignatius* or *Epiphanius*, and so all those did make up but one single testimony on the other side? yea I do as yet despair of finding any one single testimony in all antiquity, which doth in plain terms assert Episcopacy, as it was setled by the practice of the Primitive Church in the ages following the Apostles, to be of an unalterable divine right. Some expressions I grant in some of them seem to extol Episcopacy very high; but then it is in order to the peace and unity of the Church, and in that sense they may sometimes be admitted to call it *Divine* and *Apostolical*, not in regard of its institution, but of its end, in that it did in their opinion tend as much to preserve the unity of the Church, as the Apostles power did over the Churches while they were living. If any shall meet with expressions seeming to carry the fountain of Episcopal power higher, let them remember to distinguish between the power it self, and the restrained exercise of that power; the former was from the Apostles, but common to all dispensers of the word; the latter was appropriated to some, but by an act of the Church, whereby an eminency of power was attributed to one for the safety of the whole. And withal let them consider that every Hyperbolical expression of a Father will not bear the weight of an argument: and how common it was to call things Divine, which were conceived to be of excellent use, or did come from persons in authority in the Church. One would think that should meet with θεῖον γράμμα in the Acts of the Council of *Chalcedon*, it could be rendred by nothing short of the Scriptures: whereas they mean no more by it, but only the Emperour's letters to the Council. It hath been already observed how ready they were to call any custom of the Church before their times an Apostolical tradition. And as the Heathens when they had any thing which they knew not whence it came, they usually call it Διοπετὲς as though it came immediately from heaven; so the Fathers when traditions were conveyed to them, without the names of the Authors, they conclude they could have no other fountain but the Apostles. And thus we see many traditions in several Churches di-

Conc. Hispal. secundum decret. 7. apud Bin T. 4. p. 560.

Con. Chal. Part. 2. Act. 11.

directly contrary to one another, were looked on as Apoſtolical, only from the prevalency of this perſwaſion, that whatever they derived from their Fathers, was of that nature. But then for that anſwer to the *Council*, and *Iſidore*, and *Jerome*, that they make but one teſtimony; I ſay, that although the words be of the ſame ſenſe, yet they have the nature of a different teſtimony, upon theſe accounts. *Firſt*, as produced by perſons of different condition in the Church; ſome think they are even with *Jerome* when they tell us what a *pique* there was between him and *John* Biſhop of *Jeruſalem*, and that he might have the better advantage of his adverſary, when he could not raiſe himſelf up to the honour of Epiſcopacy, he would bring that down to the State of Preſbytery; but, as ſuch entertain too unworthy thoughts of one of thoſe Fathers, whom they profeſs themſelves admirers of; ſo this prejudice cannot poſſibly lie againſt *Iſidore*, or the *Council:* For the firſt was himſelf a Biſhop of no mean account in the Church of God; and the *Council* was compoſed of ſuch; it could be no bias then of that nature could draw them to this opinion: and no doubt they would have been as forward to maintain their own authority in the Church, as the truth and conſcience would give them leave. Therefore on this account one teſtimony of a ſingle Biſhop, much more of a whole Council of them, againſt their acting by divine authority in the Church, is of more validity than ten for it, in as much as it cannot but be in reaſon ſuppoſed that none will ſpeak any thing againſt the authority they are in, or what may tend in the leaſt to diminiſh it, but ſuch as make more conſcience of the truth, than of their own credit and eſteem in the world. *Secondly*, In that it was done in different ages of the Church; *Jerome* flouriſhed about 380. *Iſidore* ſucceeded *Leander* in *Sevil*, 600. the Council ſat, 619. the Council of *Aquen* which tranſcribes *Iſidore* and owns his doctrine, 816. So that certainly ſuppoſing the words of all to be the ſame, yet the Teſtimony is of greater force, as it was owned in ſeveral Ages of the Church, by whole Councils, without any the leaſt control that we read of. And if this then muſt not be looked on as the ſenſe of the Church at that time, I know not how we can come to underſtand it: if what is poſitively maintained by different perſons in different ages of the Church, and in different places without any oppoſing it by Writers of thoſe ages, or condemning it by Councils, may not be conceived to be the ſenſe of the Church at that time. So that laying all theſe things together, we may have enough to conclude the *Ambiguity* at leaſt, and thereby *incompetency* of the *Teſtimony* of *Antiquity*, for finding out the certain form which the Apoſtles obſerved in planting Churches.

We proceed to the *third* thing to ſhew the incompetency of Antiquity for deciding this controverſy, which will be from the *Partiality* of the Teſtimony brought from thence. Two things will ſufficiently manifeſt the *Partiality* of the judgment of Antiquity in this caſe. *Firſt*, Their apparent judging of the practice of the firſt primitive Church, according to the cuſtoms of their own. *Secondly*, Their ſtiff and pertinacious adhering to private traditions contrary to one another, and both ſides maintaining theirs as Apoſtolical. Firſt, *judging the practice of the Apoſtles by that of their own times*; as is evident by *Theodoret*, and the reſt of the Greek Commentators, aſſigning that as the reaſon why the Preſbyters ſpoken of in the Epiſtles to *Timothy* and *Titus*, were not Biſhops in the ſenſe of their age, becauſe there could be but one Biſhop in a City, whereas there are more expreſſed in thoſe places, as being in the §. 18.

the ſeveral Cities: whereas this is denied of Apoſtolical times by the late pleaders for Epiſcopacy; and it is ſaid of them, that they ſpoke according to the Cuſtom of their own time. And it is now thought there were two Biſhops in Apoſtolical times in ſeveral Cities; the one the head of the Jewiſh *Cœtus*, and the other of the Gentile. I enter not the diſpute again here, whether it were ſo or no, only I hence manifeſt, how far thoſe perſons themſelves who plead for the judgment of the Fathers as deciding this controverſy, are from thinking them impartial judges, when as to the grounds of their ſentence they are confeſſed to ſpeak only of the practice of their own time. Who can imagine any force in *Chryſoſtome*'s argument, *that the Preſbyters who laid hands on* Timothy *muſt needs be Biſhops, becauſe none do ordain in the Church but Biſhops*, unleſs he makes this the *medium* of his argument, that whatever was the practice of the Church in his days, was ſo in Apoſtolical times. There is, I know not what ſtrange influence in a received Cuſtom, if generally embraced, that doth poſſeſs men with a fancy it was never otherwiſe than it is with them; nay when they imagine the neceſſity of ſuch a cuſtom at preſent in the Church, they preſently think it could never be otherwiſe than it is. But of this I have ſpoken ſomewhat already. *Secondly*, that which makes it appear how *partial* the judgment of Antiquity is, *in adhering to their particular traditions, and calling them Apoſtolical, though contrary to one another.* How can we then fix upon the teſtimony of antiquity as any thing certain or impartial in this caſe? when it hath been found ſo evidently partial in a caſe of leſs concernment than this is. A Witneſs that hath once betrayed his faithfulneſs in the open court, will hardly have his evidence taken in a caſe of moment, eſpecially when the cauſe muſt ſtand or fall according to his ſingle teſtimony. For my part, I ſee not how any man that would ſee reaſon for what he doth, can adhere to the Church for an unqueſtionable tradition received from the Apoſtles; when in the caſe of keeping Eaſter, whether with the Jews on the fourteenth Moon, or only on the Lord's day, there was ſo much unreaſonable heat ſhewed on both ſides, and ſuch confidence that on either ſide their tradition was Apoſtolical. The ſtory of which is related by *Euſebius*, and *Socrates* and many others. They had herein all the advantages imaginable in order to the knowing the certainty of the thing then in queſtion among them. As their nearneſs to Apoſtolical times, being but one remove from them: yea the perſons contending pleaded perſonal acquaintance with ſome of the Apoſtles themſelves, as *Polycarp* with *John*, and *Anicetus* of *Rome*, that he had his tradition from St. *Peter*; and yet ſo great were the heats, ſo irreconcilable the controverſy, that they proceeded to dart the Thunderbolt of excommunication in one anothers faces; as *Victor* with more zeal than piety, threw preſently the *Aſiatick* Churches all out of Communion, only for differing as to this tradition. The ſmall coals of this fire kindled a whole *Ætna* of contention in the Chriſtian world, the ſmoak and aſhes, nay the flames of which, by the help of *the Prince of the air* were blown over into the boſom of the then almoſt infant Northern Churches of *Britain*, where a ſolemn diſpute was cauſed upon this quarrel between *Colmannus* on one ſide, and *Wilfride* on the other. The like conteſt was upon this occaſion between *Auguſtine* the Monk, and the *Britiſh Biſhops*. The obſervation of this ſtrange combuſtion in the primitive Church upon the account of ſo vain, frivilous, unneceſſary a thing as this was, drew this note from a learned and judicious man, formerly quoted,

Eccleſ. hiſt. l. 5. c. 15. Socrat. l. 25. c. 21.

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in his *Tract of Schism*; *By this we may plainly see the danger of our appeal to antiquity, for resolution in controverted points of faith, O how small relief we are to expect from thence! for if the discretion of the chiefest Guides and Directors of the Church did in a point so trivial, so inconsiderable, so mainly fail them, as not to see the truth in a subject, wherein it is the greater marvail how they could avoid the sight of it, can we without the imputation of great grossness and folly, think so poor-spirited persons, competent judges of the questions now on foot betwixt the Churches?* P. 5. Thus that person, as able to make the best improvement of the Fathers as any of those who profess themselves the most superstitious admirers of antiquity. But if we must stand to the judgment of the Fathers, let us stand to it in this, that no tradition is any farther to be embraced, than as it is founded on the word of God. For which purpose those words of *Cyprian* are very observable; *In compendio est autem apud religiosas & simplices mentes, & errorem deponere, & invenire atque eruere veritatem: Nam si ad divinæ traditionis caput & originem revertamur, cessat error humanus.* He asserts it an easie matter for truly religious and plain-hearted men to lay aside their error, and to find out the truth, which is by returning to the head and spring of divine tradition, *viz.* the Scriptures; Which he expresseth farther, with an elegant similitude; *Si Canalis aquam ducens, qui copiose prius & largiter profluebat, subito deficiat, nonne ad fontem pergitur ut illic defectionis ratio noscatur; utrumne arescentibus venis, in capite undâ siccaverit; an verò integra deinde & plena procurrens, in medio itinere destiterit? ut si vitio interrupti aut bibuli canalis affectum est, quò minus aqua continua perseveranter & jugiter flueret, refecto & confirmato canali ad usum atque ad potum civitatis aqua collecta eadem ubertate atque integritate representaretur, qua de fonte proficiscitur, Quod & nunc facere oportet Dei sacerdotes præcepta divina servantes, ut si in aliquo mutaverit (l. nutaverit) & vacillaverit veritas, ad originem Dominicam, & Evangelicam, & Apostolicam traditionem revertamur, & inde surgat actus nostri ratio, unde & ordo & origo surrexit.* His meaning is; That as when a channel suddenly fails, we presently enquire where and how the breach was made, and look to the spring and fountain, to see the waters be fully conveyed from thence as formerly; so upon any failure in the tradition of the Church, our only recourse must be to the true fountain of tradition the word of God, and ground the reason of our actions upon that which was the foundation of our profession. And when *Stephen* the Bishop of *Rome* would tedder him to tradition, *Cyprian* keeps his liberty by this close question, *unde illa traditio? utrumne de Dominica & Evangelica auctoritate descendens, an de Apostolorum mandatis atque Epistolis veniens.—Si ergo aut Evangelio præcipitur, aut in Apostolorum Epistolis, aut actibus continetur—observetur Divina hæc & sancta traditio.* We see this good man would not baulk his way one foot for the great bug-bear of Tradition, unless it did bear the character of a divine truth in it, and could produce the *credentials* of Scripture to testifie its authority to him. To the same purpose that stout Bishop of *Cappadocia*, *Firmilian*, whose unhappiness with *Cyprian*'s, was only that of *Job*'s friends, that they excellently managed a bad cause, and with far more of the spirit of Christianity, than *Stephen did*, who was to be justified in nothing but the truth he defended. *Eos autem*, saith *Firmilian*, *qui Romæ sunt, non ea in omnibus observare quæ sint ob origine tradita, & frustra Apostolorum auctoritatem prætendere*, which he there makes out at large, *viz.* that the Church of *Rome* had gathered corruption betimes,

Cyprian ep. 74. *n.* 13.

ib. n. 14.

Firmil. ep. inter ep. Cyprian. 75. *n.* 5.

which after broke out into an *Impoſthume* in the *head* of it. Where then muſt we find the certain way of reſolving the controverſy we are upon? the Scriptures determine it not, the Fathers tell us there is no believing tradition any farther than it is founded in Scripture; thus are we ſent back from one to the other, till at laſt we conclude there is no certain way at all left to find out a deciſion of it. Not that we are left at ſuch uncertainties, as to matters of faith, (I would not be ſo miſtaken) we have *Archimedes* his *Poſtulatum* granted us for that, a place to fix our faith on, though the world be moved out of its place, I mean the undoubted word of God; but as to matters of fact not clearly revealed in Scripture, no certainty can be had of them, from the hovering light of unconſtant tradition. Neither is it only unconſtant, but in many things repugnant to its ſelf, which was the laſt conſideration to be ſpoke to in reference to the ſhewing the incompetency of antiquity for deciding our Controverſie. Well then, ſuppoſe we our ſelves now waiting for the final *verdict* of Church tradition to determine our preſent cauſe: If the *Jury* cannot agree, we are as far from ſatisfaction as ever; and this is certainly the caſe we are now in. The main difficulty lies in the immediate ſucceſſiom to the Apoſtles; if that were but once cleared, we might bear with interruptions afterwards; but the main ſeat of the controverſie lies there, whether the Apoſtles upon their withdrawing from the Government of Churches, did ſubſtitute ſingle perſons to ſucceed them or no; ſo that unleſs that be cleared, the very *Deed* of *gift* is queſtioned; and if that could be made appear, all other things would ſpeedily follow. Yes, *ſay ſome*, that is clear: For at *Jeruſalem*, *Antioch*, and *Rome*, it is evident that ſingle perſons were entruſted with the Government of Churches. In *Jeruſalem*, ſay they, *James*, the brother of our Lord, was made Biſhop by the Apoſtles: But whence doth that appear? it is ſaid from *Hegeſippus* in *Euſebius*: But what if he ſay no ſuch thing? his words are theſe, διαδέχεται τὴν ἐκκλησίαν μετὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων, which is there interpreted, *Eccleſiæ adminiſtrationem una cum cæteris Apoſtolis ſuſcepit*. And no more is thereby meant, but that this *James*, who is by the Ancients conceived to be only a Diſciple before, is now taken into a higher charge, and inveſted in a power of governing the Church as the Apoſtles were. His power it is plain was of the ſame nature with that of the Apoſtles themſelves; and who will go about to degrade them ſo much as to reduce them to the Office of ordinary Biſhops? *James* in probability did exerciſe his Apoſtleſhip the moſt at *Jeruſalem*, where by the Scriptures we find him *Reſident*, and from hence the Church afterwards, becauſe of his not travelling abroad, as the other Apoſtles did, according to the language of their own times, they fixed the title of Biſhop upon him. But greater difference we ſhall find in thoſe who are pleaded to be ſucceſſors of the Apoſtles. At *Antioch* ſome, as *Origen* and *Euſebius*, make *Ignatius* to ſucceed *Peter*; *Jerome* makes him the third Biſhop, and placeth *Evodius* before him; others therefore to ſolve that, make them cotemporary Biſhops, the one of the Church of the Jews, the other of the Gentiles; with what congruity to their *Hypotheſis* of a ſingle Biſhop and Deacons placed in every City, I know not, but that *Salvo* hath been diſcuſſed before. Come we therefore to *Rome*, and here the ſucceſſion is as muddy as the *Tiber* it ſelf; for here *Tertullian*, *Rufinus*, and ſeveral others, place *Clement* next to *Peter*. *Irenæus* and *Euſebius*, ſet *Anacletus* before him: *Epiphanius* and *Optatus* both *Anacletus* and *Cletus*; *Auguſtinus* and *Damaſus*, with others, make *Anacletus*, *Cletus*, and *Linus* all

Hiſt. Eccl. l. 2. cap. 22.

V. Magdeburg Cent. 1. l. 2. c. 10.

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to precede him. What way ſhall we find to extricate our ſelves out of this Labyrinth, ſo as to reconcile it with the certainty of the form of Government in the Apoſtles times? Certainly, if the *Line of ſucceſſion* fail us here, when we moſt need it, we have little cauſe *to pin our faith* upon it, as to the certainty of any particular form of Church-Government ſetled in the Apoſtles times, which can be drawn from the help of the Records of the primitive Church; which muſt be firſt cleared of all *Defectiveneſs*, *Ambiguity*, *Partiality* and *Confuſion*; before the thing we enquire for, can be extracted out of them.

Having thus far ſhewed that we have no abſolute certainty of what §. 19. form of Government was ſetled by the Apoſtles in the ſeveral Churches of their plantation: The next *Conſideration* which follows to be ſpoken to, is, *That the Apoſtles, in probability, did not obſerve any one fixed courſe of ſetling the Government of Churches, but ſetled it according to the ſeveral circumſtances of places and perſons which they had to deal with.* This will be *ex abundanti* as to the thing by me deſigned, which would be ſufficiently cleared without this; and therefore I lay it not as the foundation of my *Theſis*, but only as a doctrine of probability, which may ſerve to reconcile the Controverſies on foot about Church-Government. For if this be made appear, then it may be both granted that the Apoſtles did ſettle the Government in the Church in a College of Preſbyters, and in a Biſhop and Deacons too, according to the diverſity of places, and the variety of circumſtances. It is eaſie to obſerve, that as to rites and cuſtoms in the Church, the original of moſt mens miſtakes is, concluding that to be the general practice of the Church, which they meet with in ſome places, whereas that is moſt true which *Firmilian* tells us, *In plurimis provinciis, multa pro locorum & nominum* (*l. hominum*) *diverſitate, variantur; nec tamen propter hoc Eccleſiæ Catholicæ pace atque unitate diſceſſum eſt. Thoſe rites varied in divers places, retaining ſtill the Unity of the Faith.* So as to matter of Government, mens miſtakes do ariſe from an univerſal concluſion deduced out of particular premiſes; and what they think was done in one place, they conclude muſt be done in all: Whereas theſe are the grounds inducing me probably to conclude, that they obſerved not the ſame courſe in all places. Which when an impartial Reader hath ſoberly conſidered, (with what hath gone before) I am in hopes, the *Novelty* of this opinion may not prejudicate its entertainment with him. My grounds are theſe, *Firſt, From the different ſtate, condition and quantity of the Churches planted by the Apoſtles. Secondly, From the multitude of unfixed officers in the Church then, which acted with authority over the Church where they were reſident. Thirdly, From the different cuſtoms obſerved in ſeveral Churches, as to their Government, after the Apoſtles deceaſe.* I begin with the *Firſt, The different ſtate, condition and quantity of the Churches planted by the Apoſtles:* For which we are to conſider theſe things; *Firſt*, That God did not give the Apoſtles alike ſucceſs of their labours in all places. *Secondly*, That a ſmall number of believers did not require the ſame number, which a great Church did, to teach and govern them. *Thirdly*, That the Apoſtles did ſettle Church-Officers according to the probability of increaſe of believers, and in order thereto, in ſome great places. *Firſt, That God did not give the Apoſtles equal ſucceſs to their labours in all places.* After God called them to be *Fiſhers of men*, it was not every draught which filled their net with whole ſhoals of fiſhes; ſometimes they might toil all night ſtill and catch nothing, or very little. It was not every Sermon of *Peter*'s which converted three thou-

Cypr. Ep. 75. n. 5.

ſand; the whole world might at that rate ſoon have become Chriſtian, although there had been but few Preachers beſides the Apoſtles. God gave them ſtrange ſucceſs at firſt, to encourage them the better to meet with difficulties afterwards: In ſome places God told them he had much people, in others, we read but of few that believed. *At* Corinth Paul *plants, and* Apollos *waters, and God gives an abundant increaſe*; but at *Athens*, (where if moral diſpoſitions had fitted men for grace, and the improvements of nature, we might have expected the greateſt number of Converts) yet here we read of many mocking, and others delaying,
Acts 17.34. and but of very few believing: *Dionyſius* and *Damaris*, and ſome others with them. The plantations of the Apoſtles were very different, not from the nature of the ſoil they had to deal with, but from the different influence of the Divine Spirit upon their endeavours in ſeveral pla-
Rom. 16.2. ces. We cannot think that the Church at *Cenchrea*, (for ſo it is called) was as well ſtockt with believers as that at *Corinth*. Nay the Churches generally in the Apoſtles times were not ſo filled with numbers, as men are apt to imagine them to be. I can as ſoon hope to find in the Apoſtolical times *Dioceſan* Churches, as *Claſſical* and *Provincial*; yet this doth not much advantage the Principles of the Congregational men, as I have
Par. 1. *c.* 6. §. 8. *p.* 129. already demonſtrated. Yet I do not think that all Churches in the Apoſtles times were but one Congregation; but as there was in Cities many Synagogues, ſo there might be many Churches out of thoſe Synagogues, enjoying their former liberties and privileges. And they that will ſhew me where five thouſand Jews, and more, did ordinarily meet in one of their Synagogues for publick worſhip, may gain ſomething upon me, in order to believing the Church of *Jeruſalem* to be one congregation, and yet not perſuade me, till they have made it appear, that the Chriſtians then had as publick ſolemn ſet meetiugs as the Jews had; which he that underſtands the ſtate of the Churches at that time, will hardly yield to the belief of. I confeſs, I cannot ſee any rule in Scripture laid down for diſtributing congregations; but this neceſſity would put them upon; and therefore it were needleſs to preſcribe them; and very little, if any reaſon, can I ſee on the other ſide, why, where there were ſo much people as to make diſtinct congregations, they muſt make diſtinct Churches from one another; but of that largely in the next Chapter. All Churches then we ſee were not of an equal extent. The *Second* premiſal reaſon will grant, *viz.* that a ſmall Church doth not require the ſame number of Officers to rule it, which a great one did. For the duty of Officers lying in reference to the people, where the people was but few, one conſtant ſetled Officer, with Deacons under him, might with as much eaſe diſcharge the work, as in a numerous Church, the joint help of many Officers was neceſſary to carry it on. The ſame reaſon that tells us that a large flock of ſheep, conſiſting of many thouſands, doth call for many Shepherds to attend them, doth likewiſe tell us that a ſmall flock may be governed with the care of one ſingle Shepherd watching continually over them. The *Third* premiſal was, that in great Cities the Apoſtles did not only reſpect the preſent guidance of thoſe that were converted, but eſtabliſhed ſuch as might be uſeful for the converting, and bringing in of others to the faith, who were as yet *ſtrangers to the Covenant of promiſe, and aliens from the* πολιτεία, *ſociety of Chriſtians*. And here I conceive a miſtake of ſome men lies, when they think the Apoſtles reſpected only the ruling of thoſe which were already converted; for though this were one part of their work, yet they had an eye

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to the main design then on foot, the subjecting the world to the obedience of Faith, in order to which it was necessary in places of great resort and extent, to place not only such as might be sufficient to superintend the affairs of the Church, but such as might lay out themselves the most in preaching the Gospel, in order to converting others. Having laid down these things by way of premisal, we shall see what advantage we can make of them, in order to our purpose. *First*, then, I say, *That in Churches consisting of a small number of believers, where there was no great probability of a large increase afterwards, one single Pastor, with Deacons under him, were only constituted by the Apostles for the ruling of those Churches.* Where the work was not so great, but a Pastor and Deacons might do it, what need was there of having more? And in the great scarcity of fit persons for settled rulers then, and the great multitude and necessity of unfixed Officers for preaching the Gospel abroad, many persons fit for that work could not be spared to be constantly resident upon a place. Now that in some places at first there was none placed but only a Pastor and Deacons, I shall confirm by these following Testimonies. The first is that of *Clement*, in his Epistle. Κατὰ χώρας οὖν κηρύσσοντες, κατίσταν τὰς ἀπαρχὰς αὐτῶν, δοκιμάσαντες τῷ πνεύματι, εἰς ἐπισκόπους καὶ διακόνους τῶν μελλόντων πιστεύειν. *The Apostles therefore preaching abroad through Countries and Cities, ordained the First-fruits of such as believed, having proved them by the Spirit to be Bishops and Deacons for them that should afterwards believe.* Whether by χῶραι we understand *Villages*, or *Regions*, is not material; for it is certain here the Author takes it as distinct from Cities; and there is nothing I grant, expressed where the Apostles did place Bishops and Deacons exclusive of other places, *i.e.* whether only in Cities or Countries; but it is evident by this, that wherever they planted Churches, they ordained Bishops and Deacons, whether those Churches were in the City or Country. And here we find no other Officers settled in those Churches but Bishops and Deacons; and that there were no more in those Churches than he speaks of, appears from his design of parallelling the Church-Officers in the Gospel, to those under the Law; and therefore it was here necessary to enumerate all that were then in the Churches. The main controversie is, what these Bishops were; whether many in one place, or only one; and if but one, whether a Bishop in the modern sense or no. For the first, here is nothing implying any necessity of having more than one in a place, which will farther be made appear by and by, out of other Testimonies, which will help to explain this. As for the other thing, we must distinguish of the notion of a Bishop: For he is either such a one as hath none over him in the Church; or he is such a one as hath a power over Presbyters acting under him, and by authority derived from him. If we take it in the first sense, so every Pastor of a Church, having none exercising jurisdiction over him, is a Bishop; and so every such single Pastor in the Churches of the primitive times was a Bishop in this sense, as every Master of a Family before Societies for Government were introduced, might be called a King, because he had none above him to command him: But if we take a Bishop in the more proper sense, for one that hath power over Presbyters and people, such a one these single Pastors were not, could not be. For it is supposed that these were only single Pastors; but then it is said, that after other Presbyters were appointed, then these single Pastors were properly Bishops? But to that I answer, *First*, They could not be proper Bishops by vertue

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of their firſt conſtitution, or then they had no power over any Preſbyters, but only over the Deacons and People; and therefore it would be well worth conſidering how a power of juriſdiction over Preſbyters can be derived from thoſe ſingle Paſtors of Churches that had no Preſbyters joined with them. It muſt be then clearly and evidently proved that it was the Apoſtles intention that theſe ſingle Paſtors ſhould have the power over Preſbyters, when the Church's neceſſity did require their help, which intention muſt be manifeſted and declared by ſome manifeſtation of it as a Law of Chriſt, or nothing can thence be deduced of perpetual concernment to the Church of Chriſt. *Secondly.* Either they were Biſhops before, or only after the appointment of Preſbyters; if before, then a Biſhop, and a Presbyter having no Biſhop over him, are all one; if after only, then it was by his communicating power to Presbyters to be ſuch, or their choice which made him their Biſhop; if the firſt, then Presbyters, *quoad ordinem* are only a humane inſtitution, it being acknowledged that no evidence can be brought from Scripture for them; and for any act of the Apoſtles not recorded in Scripture for the conſtituting of them, it muſt go among unwritten Traditions; and if that be a Law ſtill binding the Church, then there are ſuch which occur not in the word of God, and ſo that muſt be an imperfect copy of divine Laws; if he were made Biſhop by an act of the Presbyters, then Presbyters have power to make a Biſhop, and ſo Epiſcopacy is an humane inſtitution, depending upon the voluntary act of Presbyters. But the cleareſt evidence for one ſingle Paſtor with Deacons in ſome Churches at the beginning of Chriſtianity, is that of *Epiphanius*, which though ſomewhat large, I ſhall recite, becauſe, if I miſtake not, the curtailing of this Teſtimony, hath made it ſpeak otherwiſe than ever *Epiphanius* meant. Καὶ οὐκ οἶδεν ὁ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῆς ἀληθείας ἀγνοήσας, καὶ ἱστορίας βαθυτάταις μὴ ἐντυχὼν, ὅτι νέου ὄντος κηρύγματος, πρὸς τὰ ὑποπίπτοντα ἔγραφεν ὁ ἅγιος ἀπόστολος· ὅπου μὲν ἦσαν ἐπίσκοποι ἤδη καταστάθεντες, ἔγραφεν ἐπισκόποις καὶ διακόνοις· οὐ γὰρ πάντα εὐθὺς ἐδυνήθεσαν οἱ ἀπόστολοι καταστῆσαι πρεσβυτέρων γὰρ ἐγίνετο χρεία καὶ διακόνων· διὰ γὰρ τῶν δύο τούτων τὰ ἐκκλησιαστικὰ δύναται πληροῦσθαι; ὅπου δὲ οὐκ εὑρέθη τὶς ἄξιος ἐπισκοπῆς, ἔμεινεν ὁ τόπος χωρὶς ἐπισκόπου· ὅπου δὲ γέγονε χρεῖα καὶ ἦσαν ἄξιοι ἐπισκοπῆς, κατεστάθησαν ἐπίσκοποι πλήθους δὲ μὴ ὄντος, οὐχ εὑρέθησαν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρεσβύτεροι καταστάθηναι, καὶ ἠρκέσθησαν ἐπὶ τῷ κατὰ τόπων μόνῳ ἐπισκόπῳ· ἄνευ δὲ διακόνου ἐπίσκοπον ἀδύνατον εἶναι, &c. The ſenſe of *Epiphanius* is very intricate and obſcure; we ſhall endeavour to explain it: He is giving *Aerius* an account why *Paul* in his Epiſtle to *Timothy* mentions only Biſhops and Deacons, and paſſeth over Presbyters. His account is this, *firſt he chargeth* Aerius *with ignorance of the ſeries of hiſtory*, (which he calls ἀκολουθία τῆς ἀληθείας *and the profound and ancient records of the Church, wherein it is expreſſed that upon the firſt preaching the Goſpel, the Apoſtle writ according to the preſent ſtate of things. Where Biſhops were not yet appointed*, (for ſo certainly it ſhould be read ὅπου μὴ ἦσαν ἐπίσκοποι, not ὅπου μὲν, for then he muſt contradict himſelf? *the Apoſtle writes to Biſhops and Deacons; (for the Apoſtles could not ſettle all things at firſt) for there was a neceſſity of Preſbyters, and Deacons; for by theſe two orders all Eccleſiaſtical offices might be performed; for where* (ſo I read it ὅπου γὰρ, not ὅπου δὲ, as the ſenſe clearly carries it) *there was not found any worthy of being a Biſhop, the place remained without one: But where neceſſity required one, and there were ſome found fit for that Office, there ſome were ordained Biſhops; but for want of convenient number, there could be no Preſbyters found out to be ordained,*

Epiph. c. Aerium hæreſ. 75. p. 905, &c. ed. Petav.

and

and in ſuch places they were contented with the Biſhop and Deacons; for without their miniſtry the Biſhop could not be. So that according to *Epiphanius*, there were three ſeveral ſtates of Churches in the Apoſtles times; firſt ſome Churches where there were only Preſbyters and Deacons without a Biſhop. For if *Epiphanius* ſpeaks not at firſt of places where Preſbyters were without a Biſhop, he muſt be guilty of a vain and empty *Tautology*, for he after tells us where the neceſſity of the Church required it; a Biſhop was made; therefore he ſpeaks of places only where Preſbyters and Deacons were; and otherwiſe he would not anſwer *Aerius* about 1 *Tim.* 4. 14. which it is his deſign to do, about *The laying on of the hands of the Preſbytery*; he grants then that at firſt in ſome places there were only Preſbyters and Deacons, as when the Apoſtle writes to *Biſhops and Deacons*, (where Biſhops at that time of the Church were only Preſbyters) of which two orders, Preſbyters and Deacons, there was an abſolute neceſſity; and the account he gives why they ſetled no higher orders above them is, ἐ γὰρ πάντα ἐθὺς ἠδυνήθησαν οἱ ἀπόστολοι καταστῆσαι, *The Apoſtles could not ſettle all things at firſt*; which words are to be read with a *Parentheſis*, giving an account why ſometimes only Biſhops and Deacons were ſettled, that is, Preſbyters ſo called. But, ſaith he, where neceſſity called for a higher order of Biſhops above Preſbyters, and any were found qualified for it, there ſuch were appointed; and if by reaſon of the want of Perſons of ſufficient abilities to be made Preſbyters in thoſe places, there they were contented with ſuch a ſuperiour Biſhop and Deacons aſſiſting of him; Some Churches then according to his judgment, had a Company of Preſbyters to rule them being aſſiſted with Deacons; others had only a ſingle Biſhop with Deacons, and after when the numbers were increaſed, and perſons qualified were found, there were both Biſhop, Preſbyters and Deacons. For the account which he gives of the former want of ſome officers in ſome Churches, is this, ἕτω (Read ἕπω, as the learned Dr. well corrects it) τῆς ἐκκλεσίας λαβέσης τὰ πληρώματα τῆς οἰκονομίας, ἕτω κατ' ἐκείνα καίρα ἦσαν οἱ τόποι· ἐ γὰρ ἔργον πρᾶγμα ἐκ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὰ πάντα ἔχει, ἀλλὰ προβαίνοντος τοῦ χρόνου τὰ πρὸς τελείωσιν τῶν χρειῶν καταρτίζεται· *For the Church not yet having all her offices filled, things were fain to remain in that ſtate. For nothing can be compleated at firſt, but in proceſs of time every thing receives its due perfection.* So that *Epiphanius* doth not (as it is thought by ſome) ſay, that in the firſt times of the Church, there were none but Biſhops and Deacons in all Churches, but in ſome Churches there were Preſbyters and Deacons, in others Biſhops and Deacons, according to the ſtate, condition and neceſſity of the Churches. *Epiphanius* then fully and clearly expreſſeth my opinion in reference to the Apoſtles not obſerving any one conſtant courſe in all Churches, but letting ſometimes many Preſbyters with Deacons, ſometimes only one Paſtor (who is therefore called a Biſhop) with Deacons, and ſo ſetling officers according to the particular occaſions of every Church. The next conſiderable teſtimony to our purpoſe is that of *Clemens Alexandrinus* in *Euſebius* concerning St. *John* after his return out of the Iſle of *Patmos* to *Epheſus*, upon the death of *Domitian*. Ἀπίει παρακαλούμενος ἐ ἐπὶ τὰ πλησιόχωρα τῶν ἐθνῶν, ὅπου μὲ ἐπισκόπους καταστήσων, ὅπου ὅλας ἐκκλησίας ἁρμόσων, ὅπου ὅ γε κλῆρον ἕνα τινὰ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος σημαινομένων κληρώσων. *He went abroad upon invitation into the neighbour provinces, in ſome places conſtituting Biſhops, in ſome ſetting in order whole Churches, in o-*

thers choosing out one from among the rest of those who were designed by the spirit of God, whom he set over the Church. So *Salmasius* contends it must be translated, κλῆρον ἕνα τίνα κληρώσων, *choosing one into the Clergy*; for those who were chosen Bishops are said κληρῶσθαι ἐπισκοπὴν and they that choose are said κληροῦσθαι. Whence *Salmasius* gathers out of these words the very thing I am now upon. *In majoribus urbibus plures, in minoribus pauciores Presbyteros ordinari solitos probabile est; In pagis autem aut vicis, vel pusillis oppidis, quales κώμας vel κωμοπόλεις vocabant Græci, unum aliquem Presbyterum per illa præcipuè tempora quibus non magnus erat numerus fidelium, sufficisse verisimile est. That the Apostles set a greater number of Presbyters in great Cities, fewer in less, and in small villages but one, when the number of believers was but small.* We have yet one Author more who speaks fully to our purpose. It is the Author of the *Commentaries* under *Ambrose* his name, who frequently asserts this opinion I am now making good. Upon the *fourth of Ephesians* he largely discourseth how things were settled at first, by the Apostles, by degrees, in the Church of God, evidently shewing that the Apostles did not at first observe any settled constant course, but acted according to the present conveniency, as they saw good, in order to the promoting and advancing the Churches interest. *Postquam omnibus locis Ecclesiæ sunt constitutæ, & officia ordinata, aliter composita res est quam cœperat.* Thereby declaring his opinion that while Churches were constituting, no certain course was observed. For as he goes on, *Primum enim omnes docebant, & omnes baptizabant, quibuscunque diebus vel temporibus fuisset occasio,* &c. *Ut ergo crescret plebs & multiplicaretur, Omnibus inter initia concessum est & evangelizare, & baptizare, & scripturas in Ecclesia explanare. At ubi omnia loca circumplexa est Ecclesia, conventicula constituta sunt, & rectores & cætera officia in Ecclesiis sunt ordinata; ut nullus de Clero auderet qui ordinatus non esset, præsumere officium quod sciret non sibi creditum vel concessum; & cœpit alio ordine & providentiâ gubernari Ecclesia; quia si omnes eadem possent, irrationabile esset, & vulgaris res, & vilissima videretur,* &c. *Ideò non per omnia conveniunt scripta Apostoli ordinationi quæ nunc est in Ecclesia, quia hæc inter primordia sunt scripta; Nam & Timotheum, (Presbyterum à se creatum) Episcopum vocat; quia primum Presbyteri Episcopi appellabantur, ut recedente uno sequens ei succederet,* &c. *At first* he saith, *all Church Offices lay open to all persons, and every one did preach and baptize upon all occasions; but afterwards when Congregations were established and Churches setled, then none undertook that office but those that were ordained to it. Thence it is that the Apostles writings are not suitable to the present state of the Church, because they were penned in the time when things were not fully setled. For he calls* Timothy, *who was made a Presbyter by him, Bishop; for so at first the Presbyters were called, among whom this was the course of governing Churches, that as one withdrew, another took his place.* This opinion of his he takes occasion to speak of him in several other places. Upon Rom. 16. *Adhuc rectores Ecclesiæ paucis erant in locis, Governours of Churches were as yet set up but in few places.* And upon 1 Cor 1. *Propterea Ecclesiæ scribit, quia adhuc singulis Ecclesiis rectores non erant instituti.* And on 1 *Cor.* 11. *Convenientibus Presbyteris, quia adhuc rectores Ecclesiis non omnibus locis erant constituti.* By all which it is most evident, that this both learned and ancient Author, cited with no small respect by St. *Austin*, doth not conceive that the Apostles did observe any setled form in the governing Churches,

Walo. Mes. sal. cap. 4. p. 224, &c.

Churches, but acted according to principles of prudence, according to the neceſſities and occaſions of the ſeveral Churches by them planted: So that where there were ſmall Churches, one Paſtor with Deacons might ſuffice: in greater Churches ſome were governed by Preſbyters acting in Common Council: others, though very few at firſt, had Rectors placed over them, for ſuperintending the Affairs of the Church.

Secondly, In Churches conſiſting of a multitude of believers, or where there was a probability of great increaſe by preaching the Goſpel, the Apoſtles did ſettle a College of Preſbyters whoſe office was partly to govern the Church already formed, and partly to labour in the converting more. So that in all great Cities where either the work was already great, by the number of believers, in order to the diſcharging of Paſtoral duties to them; or where it was great in reference to the number they laboured in converting of, it ſeems moſt conſonant to reaſon and Scripture, that the work ſhould be carried on by the joynt aſſiſtance of many aſſociated in the ſame work. For, is it any ways probable that the Apoſtle ſhould ordain Biſhops πρὸς μελλόντων πιστεύειν, as *Clement* ſpeaks, of ſuch as ſhould believe, and not ordain perſons in order to the making them believe? They have either a very low opinion of the work of a Goſpel Biſhop, or very little conſideration of the zeal, activity and diligence which was then uſed in preaching, reproving, exhorting, in ſeaſon, out of ſeaſon, that think one ſingle perſon was able to undergo it all. Diſcipline was a great deal more ſtrict then, preaching more diligent, men more apprehenſive of the weight of their function, than for any to undertake ſuch a care and charge of Souls, that it was impoſſible for them, ever to know, obſerve, or watch over, ſo as to give an account for them. Beſides, while we ſuppoſe this one perſon imployed in the duties of his flock, what leiſure or time could ſuch a one have to preach to the Gentiles and unbelieving Jews in order to their Converſion? The Apoſtles did not certainly aim at the ſetting up the honour of any one perſon, making the office of the Church a matter of State and Dignity more than imployment; but they choſe men for their activity in preaching the Goſpel, and for their uſefulneſs in labouring to add continually to the Church. Men that were imployed in the Church then, did not conſult for their eaſe or honour, and thought it not enough for them to ſit ſtill and bid others work; but they were of *Paul*'s mind, *Neceſſity was laid upon them, yea, Woe was unto them if they preached not the Goſpel.* 1 Cor. 9. 16. Publick prayers were not then looked on as the more principal end of Chriſtian Aſſemblies than preaching, nor conſequently that it was the more principal office of the *Stewards of the myſteries of God*, to read the publick prayers of the Church, than *to preach in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon.* And is it not great pity two ſuch excellent and neceſſary duties ſhould ever be ſet at variance, much leſs one ſo preferred before the other, that the one muſt be eſteem'd as *Sarah*, and the other almoſt undergo the hardſhip of *Hagar*, to be looked on as the Bond-woman of the Synagogue, and be turned out of doors? Praying and preaching are the *Jachin* and *Boaz* of the *Temple*, like *Rachel* and *Leah*, both which built up the houſe of *Iſrael:* but though *Rachel* be fair and beautiful, yet *Leah* is the more fruitful: though prayer be lovely and amiable in the ſight of God, when it comes from a heart ſeriouſly affected with what it ſpeaks, yet preaching tends more to the turning mens ſouls from ſin unto God. Were the Apoſtles commiſſioned by Chriſt to go pray or preach? and what is it wherein the Miniſters of the Goſpel ſucceeded the Apoſtles? is

it in the office of praying, or preaching? Was *Paul* ſent not to baptize but to preach the Goſpel? and ſhall we think thoſe who ſucceed *Paul* in his office of preaching, are to look upon any thing elſe as more their work than that? Are Miniſters in their ordination ſent forth to be readers of publick prayers, or to be Diſpenſers of God's holy word? Are they ordained wholly to this, and ſhall this be the leſs principal part of their work? I, but the reaſon is unanſwerable, that praying is the more principal end of Chriſtian Aſſemblies than preaching; For the one is the end, and the other the means. If by end be meant the ultimate end of all Chriſtian duties, that cannot be prayer: for that is a means it ſelf in order to that; but the chief end is the fitting ſouls for eternal praiſes; if then this unanſwerable reaſon hold good, the principal end of Chriſtian Aſſemblies muſt be only praiſes of God, and not prayers; if by the end be meant the immediate end of preaching as that it refers to, that cannot be; for the immediate end of preaching, if the Apoſtle may be judge, is inſtruction and edification in the faith; Rather preaching is the end of praying, in as much as the bleſſings conveyed by preaching are the things which men pray for. But this is but one of thoſe unhappy conſequences which follows mens judging of the ſervice of God rather by the practices of the Church, when it came to enjoy eaſe and plenty, than by the ways and practices of the firſt and pureſt Apoſtolical times: when the Apoſtles who were beſt able to judge of their own duty, looked upon themſelves as moſt concerned in the preaching of the Goſpel. But to this it is commonly ſaid that *there was great reaſon for it then, becauſe the world was to be converted to Chriſtianity, and therefore preaching was the more neceſſary work at that time; but when a Nation is converted to the faith, that neceſſity ceaſeth.* It is granted that the preaching of the Goſpel, in regard of its univerſal extent was more neceſſary then, which was the foundation of Chriſt's inſtituting the Apoſtolical office with an unlimited Commiſſion: but if we take preaching as referring to particular Congregations, there is the ſame neceſſity now that there was then. People need as much inſtruction as ever, and ſo much the more in that they are apt to think now the name of Chriſtians will carry them to heaven. It is a too common and very dangerous deceit of men to look upon Religion more as a profeſſion, than matter of Life, more as a Notion than an inward temper. Men muſt be beat off from more things which they are apt to truſt to for Salvation now, than in thoſe times: Men could not think ſo much then, that diligence in publick Aſſemblies, and attendance at publick prayers was the main of Religion. Few would profeſs Chriſtianity in thoſe times, but ſuch as were reſolved before-hand rather to let go their lives than their profeſſion; but the more profeſs it now, without underſtanding the terms of ſalvation by it; the greater neceſſity of preaching to inſtruct men in it. But I think more need not be ſaid of this to thoſe that know it is another thing to be a Chriſtian than to be called ſo. But however it is granted, that in the Apoſtles times preaching was the great work; and if ſo, how can we think one ſingle perſon in a great City was ſufficient, both to preach to, and rule the Church, and to preach abroad in order to the converſion of more from their Gentiliſm to Chriſtianity? Eſpecially if the Church of every City was ſo large as ſome would make it, *viz.* to comprehend all the believers under the civil juriſdiction of the City, and ſo both City and Country the only charge of one ſingle Biſhop. I think the vaſtneſs of the work, and the Impoſſibility of a right diſ-

charge of it by one ſingle perſon, may be argument enough to make us interpret the places of Scripture which may be underſtood in that ſenſe; as of more than one Paſtor in every City; as when the Apoſtles are ſaid to ordain Elders in every City, and *Paul*'s calling for the Elders from *Epheſus*, and his writing to the Biſhops and Deacons of the Church of *Philippi*; this conſideration, I ſay, granting that the texts may be otherwiſe underſtood, will be enough to incline men to think that in greater Cities there was a Society of Preſbyters acting together for the carrying on the work of the Goſpel, in converting ſome to, and building up of others in the faith of Chriſt. And it ſeems not in the leaſt manner probable to me that the care of thoſe great Churches ſhould at firſt be intruſted in the hands of one ſingle Paſtor and Deacon, and afterwards a new order of Preſbyters erected under them, without any order or rule laid down in Scripture for it, or any mention in Eccleſiaſtical writers of any ſuch after Inſtitution. But inſtead of that in the moſt populous Churches we have many remaining footſteps of ſuch a College of Preſbyters there eſtabliſhed in Apoſtolical times. Thence *Ignatius* ſays the Preſbyters are ὡς συνέδριον θεοῦ καὶ ὡς σύνδεσμον Ἀποστόλων *the* Sanhedrin *of the Church appointed by God; and the Bench of Apoſtles ſitting together for ruling the affairs of the Church.* And *Origen* calls it σύστημα ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει κατὰ λόγον θεοῦ, *a College in every City of God's appointing*; and *Victor* Biſhop of *Rome*, *Collegium noſtrum*, and *Collegium fratrum*; *Pius*, *Pauperem Senatum Chriſti apud Romam conſtitutum*. *Tertullian*, *Probatos ſeniores*; *Cyprian*, *Cleri noſtri ſacrum venerandumque Conſeſſum*; and to *Cornelius* Biſhop of *Rome* and his Clergy, *Florentiſſimo Clero tecum præſidenti*; *Jerome*, *Senatum noſtrum*, *cœtum Preſbyterorum*, *& commune conſilium Preſbyterorum quo Eccleſiæ gubernabantur*; *Hilary*, *Seniores ſine quorum conſilio nihil agebatur in Eccleſia*; the Author *de ſeptem ordinibus ad Ruſticum*, calls the Preſbyters *negotiorum judices*. *Eutychius* tells us there were twelve Preſbyters at *Alexandria* to govern the Church; and the author of the Itinerary of *Peter*, of as many conſtituted at *Cæſarea*, who though counterfeit, muſt be allowed to ſpeak, though not *vera*, yet *veri ſimilia*; though not true, yet likely things. Is it poſſible all theſe authors ſhould thus ſpeak of their ſeveral places, of a College of Preſbyters acting in power with the Biſhop, if at firſt Churches were governed only by a ſingle Biſhop, and afterwards by ſubject Preſbyters that had nothing to do in the rule of the Church; but were only deputed to ſome particular offices under him, which they were impowered to do only by his authority? But the joynt rule of Biſhop and Preſbyters in the Churches will be more largely deduced afterwards. Thus we ſee a Company of Preſbyters ſetled in great Churches; now we are not to imagine that all theſe did equally attend to one part of their work, but all of them according to their ſeveral abilities laid out themſelves; ſome in overſeeing and guiding the Church; but yet ſo as upon occaſion to diſcharge all paſtoral acts belonging to their function; others betook themſelves chiefly to the converſion of others to the faith, either in the Cities or the adjacent Countries. By which we come to a full, clear and eaſie underſtanding of that ſo much controverted place, 1 *Tim.* 5. 17. Οἱ καλῶς προεστῶτες πρεσβύτεροι διπλῆς τιμῆς ἀξιούσθωσαν, μάλιστα οἱ κοπιῶντες ἐν λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ, *The Elders that rule well are counted worthy of double honour, eſpecially they that labour in the word and doctrine.* Not as though it implied a diſtinct ſort of Elders from the Paſtors of Churches, but among thoſe Elders that were ordained in the great Churches, ſome attended moſt to ruling

Ep. ad Tral.

Contra Celſ. l. 3. p. 129.

Pius ep ad Juſt Vien. Apol. c. 39. Cypri. ep. 550. ſ. 19. ſ. 21. Hieronym. in Iſ. l. 2. c. 3. Ep. ad. Evag. in 1 Tim. 5.

the flock already converted, others laboured most in converting others to the faith by preaching; though both these being entered into this peculiar function of laying themselves forth for the benefit of the Church, did deserve both respect and maintenance; yet especially those who imployed themselves in converting others, in as much as their burden was greater, their labours more abundant, their suffering more; and their very office coming the nearest to the Apostolical function. So *Chrysostome* resolves it upon the fourth of the *Ephesians*, that those who were κατὰ κώμας καὶ πόλεις ἀφωρισμένοι, as *Theodoret* expresseth it, the ποιμένες καὶ διδάσκαλοι, the fixed officers of particular Churches were inferior to those who went abroad preaching the Gospel; καὶ πάνυ, saith he, τῶν περιιόντων καὶ εὐαγγελιζομένων οἱ καθήμενοι καὶ περὶ ἕνα τόπον ἠσχολημένοι. An evident argument that the Apostle doth not intend any sort of Elders distinct from these ordained Presbyters of the Cities, is from that very argument which the greatest friends to Lay-Elders draw out of this Epistle, which is from the promiscuous acception of the words πρεσβύτερος and ἐπίσκοπος in this very Epistle to *Timothy*: The argument runs thus: The Presbyters spoken of by *Paul* in his Epistle to *Timothy*, are Scripture-Bishops; but Lay-Elders are not Scripture-Bishops; therefore these cannot here be meant. The *major* is their own, from 1 *Tim.* 3. 1. compared with 4. 14. Those which are called Presbyters in one place, are Bishops in another; and the main force of the argument lies in the promiscuous use of Bishop and Presbyter; now then if Lay-Elders be not such Bishops, then they are not *Paul*'s Presbyters; now *Paul*'s Bishops must be διδακτικοὶ fit to teach, and therefore no Lay-Elders. Again we may consider where *Timothy* now was, *viz.* at *Ephesus*, and therefore if such Lay-Elders any-where, they should be there; Let us see then whether any such were here. It is earnestly pleaded by all who are for Lay-Elders, that the *Elders* spoken of *Acts* 20. 17. were the particular *Elders* of the Church of *Ephesus*, to whom *Paul* spoke, *v.* 28. where we find their office at large described. *Take heed therefore unto your selves, and all the flock over which God hath made you* ἐπισκόπους *Bishops or overseers.* Here both we see the names *Elders* and *Bishops* confounded again, so that he that was an *Elder* was a *Bishop* too; and the office of such *Elders* described to be a *Pastoral charge over a flock*, which is inconsistent with the notion of a Lay-Elder. *Paul* sent indefinitely for the *Elders of the Church* to come to him; if any such then at *Ephesus*, they must come at this summons; all the *Elders* that came were such as were *Pastors* of Churches; therefore there could be no *Lay-Elders* there. I insist not on the argument for maintenance implyed in double honour, which *Chrysostome* explains by τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων χορηγίαν a supply of necessaries to be given to them, as appears by *v.* 18. which argument *Blondel* saw such strength in, that it brought him quite off from Lay-Elders in that place of *Timothy*. And he that will remove the controversy from the Scriptures, to the Primitive Church, (as we have no reason to think that if such were appointed, they should be so soon laid aside) will find it the greatest difficulty to trace the footsteps of a Lay-Elder, through the records of antiquity for the three first centuries especially. The writers of the Church speak of no Presbyters but such as preached, as appears by *Origen*, *Cyprian* and *Clement* of *Alexandria*; *Origen* saith, *Omnes Episcopi atque omnes Presbyteri vel Diaconi erudiunt nos, & erudientes adhibent correptionem, & verbis austerioribus increpant.* We see all Bishops, Presbyters, and Dea-

Chrysost. in 4. Eph. hom. 11.

De jure plebis in regim. Eccles. p. 79. &c.

Orig. hom. 1. in Psal. 37.

Deacons were in his time preachers. So *Cyprian*, *Et credideram quidem Presbyteros & Diaconos qui illic præsentes sunt, monere vos & instruere plenissime circà Evangelii legem, sicut semper ab antecessoribus nostris factum est*; and in another Epistle about making *Numidicus* a Presbyter, he thus expresseth it, *ut ascribatur Presbyterorum Carthaginensium numero, & nobiscum sedeat in Clero*; where to sit as one of the Clergy, and to be a Presbyter, are all one. Again, had there been any such Elders, it would have belonged to them to lay hands on those that were reconciled to the Church after Censures; now hands were only laid on *ab Episcopo & Clero*, as the same *Cyprian* tells us. *Clemens Alexandrinus* describing the Office of a Presbyter, hath these words, ὅτ⊙ πρεσβύτερ⊙ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι τῆς ἐκκλησίας, &c. ἐὰν ποιῇ καὶ διδάσκῃ τὰ τοῦ κυρίου, where teaching is looked on as his proper work; and elsewhere more fully and expresly, discoursing of the service of God, and distinguishing it according to the twofold service of men, βελτιωτικὴ καὶ ὑπηρετικὴ, he applies these to the Church, ὁμοίως ὃ καὶ κατ' τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τὴν μὲ βελτιωτικὴν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι σώζουσιν εἰκόνα τὴν ὑπηρετικὴν ὃ οἱ διάκονοι. The former he explains afterwards, ὅπως ἂν καὶ παιδεύειν ἡ πεπαιδευμέν⊙ εἰς τὸ τῶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπανόρθωσιν. *A Presbyter is one that is ordained or appointed for the instruction of others in order to their amendment*, implying thereby the Office of a Presbyter to be wholly conversant about teaching others, to whom, on that account, the art of making others better doth properly belong. So much may suffice for those first times of the Church, that there were no Presbyters then, but such as had the Office of teaching. And for the times afterwards of the Church, let it suffice at present to produce the testimony of a Council held in the beginning of the seventh Century, who absolutely decree against all Lay-persons medling in Church-affairs; *Nona actione didicimus, quosdam ex nostro Collegio contra mores Ecclesiasticos, laicos habere in rebus divinis constitutos Œconomos. Proinde pariter tractantes eligimus ut unusquisque nostrum secundum Chalcedonensium Patrum decreta, ex proprio Clero Œconomum sibi constituat. Indecorum est enim Laicum esse vicarium Episcopi, & seculares in Ecclesia judicare; in uno enim eodemq; officio non debet esse dispar professio.* A Canon directly level'd against all *Lay-Chancellors in Bishops-Courts*, and such *Officials*: But doth with the same force take away all Lay-Elders, as implying it to be wholly against the rule of the Church to have secular persons to judge in the Church. But although I suppose this may be sufficient to manifest the no divine right of Lay-Elders; yet I do not therefore absolutely condemn all use of some persons chosen by the people to be as their representatives, for managing their interest in the affairs of the Church. For now the voice of the people, (which was used in the primitive times) is grown out of use: Such a constitution, whereby two or more of the people's choice might be present at Church debates, might be very useful; so they be looked upon only as a prudential humane constitution, and not as any thing founded on Divine right. So much may serve for the first ground of the probability of the Apostles not observing one setled form of Church-Government, which was from the different state, quantity and condition of the Churches by them planted. The *second* was *from the multitude of unfixed Officers residing in some places, who managed the affairs of the Church in chief during their Residence.* Such were the Apostles and Evangelists and all persons almost of note in Scripture. They were but very few, and those in probability not the ablest, who were left at home to take care of the spoil;

Ep. 33.

Ep. 12.

Strom. l. 6. *p.* 667. *ed. Heinf.*

Strom. l. 7. *p.* 700.

Concil. Hispal. 2. *decret.* 9.

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the ſtrongeſt and ableſt like *Commanders in an Army*, were not ſetled in any *Troop*, but went up and down from this company to that, to order them, and draw them forth: and while they were, they had the chief authority among them; but as Commmanders of the Army, and not as Officers of the Troop. Such were Evangeliſts who were ſent ſometimes into this Country to put the Churches in order there, ſometimes into another; but where ever they were, they acted as Evangeliſts, and not as fixed Officers. And ſuch were *Timothy* and *Titus*, notwithſtanding all the oppoſition made againſt it, as will appear to any that will take an impartial ſurvey of the arguments on both ſides. Now where there were in ſome places Evangeliſts, in others not; and in many Churches it may be no other Officers but theſe, it will appear, that the Apoſtles did not obſerve one conſtant form, but were with the Evangeliſts, travelling abroad to the Churches, and ordering things in them as they ſaw cauſe. But as to this I have anticipated my ſelf already. The *laſt* ground was from the *different cuſtom obſerved in the Churches, after the Apoſtles times*. For no other rational account can be given of the different opinions of *Epiphanius*, *Jerome* and *Hilary*, but this, that one ſpeaks of the cuſtom of ſome Churches, and the other of others. In ſome, as at *Alexandria*, the Presbyters might chuſe their Biſhop; in other places it might be as *Hilary* ſaith, that when the firſt withdrew, another ſucceeded him. Not by a monthly or annual *rotation* of *Preſidents*, as ſome have imagined, but by a preſidency for Life of one, upon whoſe death another ſucceeded in his room. For the former opinion hath not any evidence at all for it in Scripture or Antiquity, or in the place brought to prove it. For according to this opinion, *Timothy* muſt have but his courſe in the *rotation of Elders at Epheſus*, which ſeems very incongruous to the Office of *Timothy*. I conclude then, that in all probability the Apoſtles tied not themſelves up to one certain courſe, but in ſome Churches ſetled more or fewer Officers, as they ſaw cauſe, and in others governed themſelves during Life; and that at their death they did not determine any form, is probably argued from the different cuſtoms of ſeveral Churches afterwards.

§. 20. The third Conſideration touching Apoſtolical practice, is concerning the obligatory force of it in reference to us; which I lay down in theſe terms, *That a mere Apoſtolical practice being ſuppoſed, is not ſufficient of it ſelf for the founding an unalterable and perpetual right, for that form of Government in the Church, which is ſuppoſed to be founded on that practice.* This is a propoſition, I am ſure, will not be yielded without proving it, and therefore I ſhall endeavour to do it by a fourfold argument. *Firſt*, Becauſe many things were done by the Apoſtles without any intention of obliging any who ſucceed them afterwards to do the ſame: As for inſtance, the twelve Apoſtles going abroad ſo unprovided as they did when Chriſt ſent them forth at firſt, which would argue no great wiſdom or reaſon in that man, that ſhould draw that practice into conſequence now. Of the like nature was *Paul*'s preaching ἀδάπανον διαϛγέλιον to ſome Churches, receiving no maintenance at all from ſome Churches, as that at *Corinth*. Which inſtance is a manifeſt evidence of the monſtrous weakneſs of diſcourſe in thoſe who would make that example of *Paul* obligatory to all Miniſters of the Goſpel now. And while they would by this argument take away their Lands and Tythes, inſtead of them, they give them *Plauſtra convitiorum*, whole loads

loads of the moſt reproachful ſpeeches that ever were given to any but Chriſt and his Apoſtles. For my part, I think the Miniſters of the Goſpel would want one of the badges of Honour belonging to their Office, were they not thus reproachfully uſed: It is part of the State which belongs to the true Miniſters of the Goſpel to be followed by ſuch black-mouthed Lacquies, who by their virulent ſpeeches are ſo far their friends, as to keep them from that curſe which our Saviour pronounceth, *Woe be unto you when all men ſpeak well of you.* But let us ſee how much wooll there is after all this cry; too little to cloath the backs of Miniſters, if ſuch perſons might be their Tythe-men; but it is well they are ſo little be-friended, yea ſo much oppoſed by the great Apoſtle, in that ſingular practice of his. For doth he ſay it was unlawful for him to receive a maintenance from the Churches he preached to? Nay, doth he not ſet himſelf to prove not only the lawfulneſs of Miniſters taking it, but the duty of the peoples giving it, 1 *Cor.* 9. from the ſeventh to the fifteenth verſe, giving many pregnant arguments to that purpoſe? Doth he not ſay that all the Apoſtles beſides him and *Barnabas*, did forbear working, and conſequently had all their neceſſities ſupplied by the Churches? Nay, doth not *Paul* himſelf ſay, *that he robbed other Churches, taking wages of them, to do ſervice to them?* What! *Paul* turned hireling, and in the plaineſt terms take wages of Churches? Yet ſo it is, and his forbearing it at *Corinth*, was apt to be interpreted as an argument that he did not love them, 2 *Cor.* 11. 11. So far were they from looking upon *Paul* as a hireling in doing it. *Paul* is ſtrong and earneſt in aſſerting his right; he might have done it at *Corinth*, as well as elſewhere; but from ſome prudent conſiderations of his own, mentioned 2 *Cor.* 11. 12. he forbore the exerciſe of his right among them, although at the ſame time he received maintenance from other places. As for any divine right of a particular way of maintenance, I am of the ſame opinion as to that which I am in reference to particular forms of Church-Government; and thoſe that are of another opinion, I would not wiſh them ſo much injury, as to want their maintenance till they prove it. But then, I ſay, theſe things are clear in themſelves, and, I think, ſufficient grounds for conſcience as to the duty of paying on the one ſide, and the lawfulneſs of receiving it on the other. Firſt, That a maintenance in general be given to Goſpel Miniſters, is of Divine right, *elſe the labourer was not worthy of his hire*; nor could that be true which *Paul* ſaith, *that our Lord hath ordained, that they which preach the Goſpel ſhould live of the Goſpel.* *Secondly*, A maintenance in general being due, lawful Authority may determine the particular way of raiſing it; the equity of which way may be beſt derived from what was the moſt ancient practice of the world in dedicating things to God, and was approved by God himſelf, among his own people the Jews: So that the way of maintenance by *Tythes* is the moſt juſt and equitable way. *Thirdly*, It being in the Magiſtrate's power to determine the way of maintenance, what is ſo determined, doth bind the conſciences of all ſubject to that power, to an obedience to it for conſcience ſake: In as much as all men are bound thus to obey the Magiſtrate in all things eſtabliſhed by him as Laws; and the very ſame reaſons any can plead for diſobedience as to this, may equally ſerve for diſobedience to any other Laws made by the ſupreme Magiſtrate. This I ſuppoſe is the cleareſt reſolution of that other more vexed than intricate controverſie about the right of Tythes; which I have

1 Cor. 9. 6.
2 Cor. 11. 8.
2 Cor. 11. 9.
1 Cor. 9. 14.

here

here ſpoken of by occaſion of the mention of the Apoſtles practice, and becauſe it is reſolved upon the ſame principles with the ſubject I am upon. Mere Apoſtolical practice we ſee doth not bind, becauſe the Apoſtles did many things without intention of binding others. *Secondly*, The Apoſtles did many things upon particular occaſions, emergences and circumſtances, which things ſo done, cannot bind by virtue of their doing them, any farther than a parity of reaſon doth conclude the ſame things to be done in the ſame circumſtances. Thus *Paul*'s *Cœlibate* is far from
1 Cor. 9. 5. binding the Church, it being no univerſal practice of the Apoſtles by a Law, but only a thing taken up by him upon ſome particular grounds, not of perpetual and univerſal concernment. So community of goods was uſed at firſt by the Church of *Jeruſalem*, as moſt ſuitable to the preſent ſtate of that Church; but as far as we can find, did neither per-
1 Cor. 6. 1. petually hold in that Church, nor univerſally obtain among other Chur-
11. 21, 22. —— 16. 2. ches, as is moſt clear in the Church at *Corinth* by their Law-ſuits, by the different offerings of the rich and poor at the Lord's-Supper, and by their perſonal contributions. So the Apoſtles preaching from houſe to houſe, was for want of conveniency then of more publick places as free only for Chriſtians; although that practice binds now as far as the reaſon doth; *viz.* in its tendency to the promoting the work of Salvation of mens ſouls. Laying on hands for conferring the gifts of the Holy Ghoſt can never certainly bind where the reaſon of it is ceaſed, but may ſtill continue as a rite of ſolemn prayer, and not by virtue of that practice. Obſerving the Apoſtolical decrees of *abſtaining from blood, and things ſtrangled and offered to idols*, did hold as long as the ground of making them did, which was condeſcenſion to the Jews, although it muſt be withal acknowledged, that the primitive Chriſtians of the ſecond and third Centuries did generally obſerve them, and the Greek
Exercit. Theol. n. 26. Church to this day, and ſome men of note and learning have pleaded
Curcellæus de eſu ſanguinis, &c. for the neceſſary obſervation of them ſtill, as *Chriſt. Beoman*, *Steph. Curcellæus* in a *Diatriba* lately publiſhed to this purpoſe; to which
Grotius in Acts 15. 29. *Grotius* is likewiſe very inclinable. Their arguments are too large here to examine, although I ſee not how poſſibly that place of *Paul*
1 Cor. 10. 25. can be avoided, *Whatever is ſet in the ſhambles eat, making no ſcruple for conſcience ſake.*

Part 1. *ch.* 1. §. 6. I conclude this with what I laid down at the entrance of this Treatiſe, that where any act or Law is founded upon a particular reaſon or occaſion as the ground of it, it doth no farther oblige, than the reaſon or occaſion of it doth continue. Therefore before an acknowledged Apoſtolical practice be looked on as obligatory, it muſt be made appear, that what they did, was not according as they ſaw reaſon and cauſe for the doing it, depending upon the ſeveral circumſtances of time, place, and perſons, but that they did from ſome unalterable Law of Chriſt, or from ſome ſuch indiſpenſable reaſons, as will equally hold in all times, places, and perſons. And ſo the obligation is taken off from Apoſtolical practice, and laid upon that Law and reaſon which was the ground of it. *Thirdly*, Offices that were of Apoſtolical appointment, are grown wholly out of uſe in the Church,
1 Tim. 5. 9. without mens looking upon themſelves as bound now to obſerve them. As the Widows of the Churches, afterwards from their Office called
Rom. 16. 1. Deaconeſſes of the Church, of which number *Phebe* was one, whom *Paul* calls the Deaconeſs of the Church at *Cenchrea*: ſo both *Origen* and *Chryſoſtome* underſtand it. Of them and their continuance in the Church

for

for some Centuries of years, much is spoken by several Writers, and resolved by several Councils; and yet we see these are laid aside by the pretenders to hold close to Apostolical practice: If that binds, certainly it doth in its plain institutions; if it doth not bind in them, how can it in that which is only gathered but by uncertain conjectures to have been ever their practice? So that in the issue, those who plead so much for the obligatory nature of Apostolical practice, do not think it obligatory; for if they did, how comes this Office of Widows and Deaconesses to be neglected? If it be answered, that these are not useful now; then we must say, that we look upon Apostolical practice to be binding no farther than we judge it useful, or the reason of it holds, which is as much as to say, of its self it binds not. *Fourthly*, rites and customs Apostolical are altered; therefore men do not think that Apostolical practice doth bind. For if it did, there could be no alteration of things agreeable thereunto. Now let any one consider but these few particulars, and judge how far the pleaders for a divine right of Apostolical practice do look upon themselves as bound now to observe them; as Dipping in Baptism, the use of Love-feasts, Community of Goods, the Holy-kiss, by **Tertullian* called *signaculum orationis*: yet none look upon themselves as bound to observe them now, and yet all acknowledge them to have been the practice of the Apostles; and therefore certainly though when it may serve for their purpose, men will make Apostolical practice to found a Divine right, yet when they are gone off from the matter in hand, they change their opinion with the matter, and can then think themselves free as to the observation of things by themselves acknowledged to be Apostolical. Thus we are at last come to the end of this Chapter, which we have been the longer upon, because the main hinge of this controversie did lie in the practice of the Apostles, which I suppose now so far cleared, as not to hinder our progress towards what remains; which we hope will admit of a quicker dispatch. We come therefore from the Apostles, to the Primitive Church, to see whether by the practice of what we can find any thing whereby they looked on themselves as obliged by an unalterable Law to observe any one particular form of Church-Government.

Plin. ep. l. 10. ep. 97. Theod. l. 3. cap. 14. Sozom. l. 4. cap. 24. Codex. Theo. leg. 27. tit. de Epis. Con. Chal. c. 14. Conc. Normat. c. 73. Epiph. hær. 79. V. Justell. Not. in Can. Univers. Eccles. p. 154, &c. Vossium in Plin. ep. 97. l. 10. Salmas. in Apparat. p. 176.

* *De Orat.*

CHAP. VII.

The Church's Polity, in the ages after the Apostles, considered. Evidences thence, that no certain unalterable form of Church-Government was delivered to them. 1. *Because Church power did enlarge as the Churches did. Whether any Metropolitan Churches established by the Apostles. Seven Churches of* Asia, *whether Metropolitical*; Philippi *no Metropolis, either in Civil or Ecclesiastical sense. Several degrees of enlargement of Churches. Churches first the Christians in whole Cities proved by several arguments; the Eulogiæ an evidence of it. Churches extended into the neighbour territories by the preaching there of City Presbyters; thence comes the subordination between them. Churches by degrees enlarged to Dioceses; from thence to Provinces. The original of Metropolitans and Patriarchs.* 2. *No certain form used in all Churches. Some Churches without Bishops,* Scots, Goths. *Some with but one Bishop in their whole Country.* Scythian, Æthiopian *Churches how governed.*

verned. Many Cities without Biſhops. Dioceſes much altered. Biſhops diſcontinued in ſeveral Churches for many years. 3. *Conforming Eccleſiaſtical Government to the Civil, in the extent of Dioceſes. The ſuburbicarian Churches what. Biſhops anſwerable to the civil Governours. Churches power riſe from the greatneſs of Cities.* 4. *Validity of ordination by Preſbyters in places where Biſhops were. The caſe of* Iſchyras *diſcuſſed; inſtances given of ordination by Preſbyters not pronounced null.* 5. *The Churches prudence in managing its affairs, by the ſeveral Canons, Provincial Synods,* Codex Canonum.

§. 1. HAving largely conſidered the actions of Chriſt, and the practice of the Apoſtles, ſo far as they are conceived to have reference to the determining the certain form of Government in the Church; our next Stage is, according to our propounded method, to examine what light the practice of the Church in the Ages ſucceeding the Apoſtles will caſt upon the controverſy we are upon. For although according to the principles eſtabliſhed and laid down by us, there can be nothing ſetled as an univerſal Law for the Church but what we find in Scriptures; yet becauſe the general practice of the Church is conceived to be of ſo great uſe for underſtanding what the Apoſtles *intentions* as well as *actions* were, we ſhall chearfully paſs over this *Rubicon*, becauſe not with an intent to increaſe diviſions, but to find out ſome farther evidence of a way to compoſe them. Our Inquiry then is whether the primitive Church did conceive its ſelf obliged to obſerve unalterably one individual form of Government, as delivered down to them either by a Law of Chriſt, or an univerſal conſtitution of the Apoſtles; or elſe did only ſettle and order things for Church Government, according as it judged them tend moſt to the peace and ſettlement of the Church, without any antecedent obligation, as neceſſarily binding to obſerve only one courſe. This latter I ſhall endeavour to make out to have been the only Rule and Law which the Primitive Church obſerved as to Church-Government, *viz.* the tendency of its conſtitutions to the peace and unity of the Church; and not any binding Law or practice of Chriſt or his Apoſtles. For the demonſtrating of which I have made choice of ſuch arguments as moſt immediately tend to the proving of it. For *if the power of the Church and its officers did increaſe merely from the inlargement of the bounds of Churches; if no one certain form were obſerved in all Churches; but great varieties as to officers and Dioceſes; if the courſe uſed in ſettling the power of the chief officers of the Church was from agreement with the civil government; if notwithſtanding the ſuperiority of Biſhops, the ordination of Preſbyters was owned as valid; if in all other things concerning the Churches Polity, the Churches prudence was looked on as a ſufficient ground to eſtabliſh things*, then we may with reaſon conclude that nothing can be inferred from the practice of the Primitive Church, Demonſtrative of any one fixed form of Church Government delivered from the Apoſtles to them. Having thus by a light σκιαγραφία drawn out the ſeveral lines of the pourtraicture of the Polity of the ancient Church, we now proceed to fill them up, though not with that *life* which it deſerves, yet ſo far as the model of this diſcourſe will permit. Our firſt argument then is *from the riſe of the extent of the power of Church Governours*, which I aſſert not to have been from any order of the Apoſtles, but from the gradual increaſe of the Churches committed to their charge. This

will be beſt done by the obſervation of the growth of Churches, and how proportionably the power of the Governours did increaſe with it, As to that, there are four obſervable ſteps or periods as ſo many ages of growth in the Primitive Churches. *Firſt*, When Churches and Cities were of the ſame extent. *Secondly*, When Churches took in the adjoyning territories with the villages belonging to the Cities. *Thirdly*, When ſeveral Cities with their villages did aſſociate for Church-Government in the ſame province. *Fourthly*, When ſeveral provinces did aſſociate for Government in the *Roman* Empire. Of theſe in their Order.

The firſt Period of Church-Government obſervable in the primitive Church, was *when Churches were the ſame with Chriſtians in whole Cities.* §. 2. For the clearing of this, I ſhall *firſt* ſhew that the primitive conſtitution of Churches was in a ſociety of Chriſtians in the ſame City. *Secondly*, I ſhall conſider the form and manner of Government then obſerved among them. *Thirdly*, Conſider what relation the ſeveral Churches in Cities had to one another. *Firſt, That the Primitive Churches were Chriſtians of whole Cities.* It is but a late and novel acception of the word *Church*, whereby it is taken for ſtated fixed congregations for publick worſhip; and doubtleſs the original of it is only from the diſtinction of Churches in greater Cities into their ſeveral προσευχὰς or publick places for meeting, whence the Scotch *Kirk*, and our Engliſh *Church*; ſo that from calling the place *Church* they proceed to call the perſons there meeting by that name; and thence ſome think the name of Church ſo appropriated to ſuch a ſociety of Chriſtians as may meet at ſuch a place, that they make it a matter of religion not to call thoſe places *Churches*, from whence originally the very name, as we uſe it, was derived. But this may be pardoned among other the religious weakneſſes of well meaning but leſs knowing people. A Church in its primary ſenſe as it anſwers to the Greek ἐκκλησία, applied to Chriſtians, is a Society of Chriſtians living together in one City; whether meeting together in many Congregations or one, is not at all material; becauſe they were not called a Church as meeting together in one place, but as they were a ſociety of Chriſtians, inhabiting together in ſuch a City: not but that I think a ſociety of Chriſtians might be called a Church, where ever they were, whether in a City or Country, but becauſe the firſt and chief mention we meet with in Scripture of Churches, is of ſuch as did dwell together in the ſame Cities; as is evident from many pregnant places of Scripture to this purpoſe. As *Acts* 14. 23. compared with *Titus* 1. 5. κατ' ἐκκλησίαν in one place, is the ſame with κατὰ πόλιν in the other. *Ordaining Elders in every Church, and ordaining Elders in every City*; which implies that by Churches then were meant the body of Chriſtians reſiding in the Cities: over which the Apoſtles ordained Elders to rule them. So *Acts* 16. 4, 5. *As they went through the Cities*, &c. *and ſo were the Churches eſtabliſhed in the faith.* The Churches here were the Chriſtians of thoſe Cities which they went through. So *Act.* 20. 17. *He ſent to* Epheſus *and called the Elders of the Church.* If by the Elders we mean as all thoſe do we now deal with, the Elders of *Epheſus*, then it is here evident that the Elders of the Church and of the City are all one; but what is more obſervable, *verſ.* 28. he calls the Church of that City, τὸ ποίμνιον· προσέχετε ὑμῖν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ παντὶ τῷ ποιμνίῳ ἐν ᾧ ὑμᾶς τὸ πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἔθετο ἐπισκόπους, ποιμαίνειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ θεοῦ. *Take heed to your ſelves, and to the flock over which God hath made you overſeers, to feed the Church of God.* Where ſeveral things are obſervable to our purpoſe;

firſt, that the body of Chriſtians in *Epheſus* is called τὸ ποίμνιον and ἡ ἐκκλησία, the flock and the Church, and not the ſeveral flocks and Churches, over which God hath made you Biſhops. *Secondly*, That all theſe ſpoken to were ſuch as had a paſtoral charge of this one flock; *Paul* calls them ἐπισκόπους, and chargeth ποιμαίνειν, *to do the work of a Paſtor* towards it. So that either there muſt be ſeveral Paſtors taking the paſtoral charge of one congregation which is not very ſuitable with the principles of thoſe I now diſpute againſt; or elſe many congregations in one City are all called but one Church, and one flock, which is the thing I plead for. And therefore it is an obſervation of good uſe to the purpoſe in hand, that the New Teſtament ſpeaking of the Churches in a Province, always ſpeaks of them in the Plural number as *the Churches of Judæa*, 1 Gal. 22. 1 Theſ. 2. 14. *The Churches of* Samaria *and* Gallilee. Act. 9. 31. *The Churches of* Syria *and* Cilicia. Act. 15. 41. *The Churches of* Galatia, 1 Cor. 16. 1. Gal. 1. 1, 2. *The Churches of* Aſia. Rom. 16. 16. Rev. 1. 11. But when it ſpeaks of any particular City, then it is always uſed in the Singular number, *as the Church at* Jeruſalem. Act. 8. 1.———15. 4. 22. *The Church at* Antioch. Act. 11. 26.———13. 1. *The Church at* Corinth. 1 Cor. 1. 2. 2 Cor. 1. 1. and ſo of all *the ſeven Churches of* Aſia, *the Church of* Epheſus, Smyrna, *&c.* So that we cannot find in Scripture the leaſt footſtep of any difference between a Church and the Chriſtians of ſuch a City; whereas had the notion of a Church been reſtrained to a particular congregation, doubtleſs we ſhould have found ſome difference as to the Scriptures ſpeaking of the ſeveral places. For it is ſcarce imaginable that in all thoſe Cities ſpoken of, as for example *Epheſus*, where *Paul* was for above two years together, that there ſhould be no more converts than would make one Congregation. Accordingly in the times immediately after the Apoſtles, the ſame language and cuſtom continued ſtill. So *Clement* inſcribes his Epiſtle ἡ ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ παροικοῦσα Ῥώμην τῇ ἐκκλεσία τοῦ θεοῦ παροικούσῃ Κόρινθον, *The Church of God which is at* Rome, *to the Church of God which is at* Corinth. So by that it is plain that all the believers at that time in *Rome*, made up but one Church, as likewiſe did they at *Corinth*. So *Polycarp* in the Epiſtle written by him from the Church at *Smyrna* to the Church at *Philomilium*, Ἡ ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ παροικοῦσα Σμύρναν τῇ παροικούσῃ ἐν Φιλομιλίῳ· and ſo in his Epiſtle to the *Philippians*, Πολύκαρπος καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ πρεσβύτεροι, τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ παροικούσῃ Φιλίππους. *Polycarp and the Elders with him to the Church which is at Philippi.* *Origen* compares the Church of God at *Athens*, *Corinth*, *Alexandria*, and other places with the people of thoſe ſeveral Cities; and ſo the Churches *Senate* with the peoples, and the Churches ἄρχον (that is his word) *chief ruler*, with the *Major* of thoſe Cities; implying thereby, that as there was one civil ſociety in ſuch places to make a City, ſo there was a ſociety of Chriſtians incorporated together to make a Church. So that a Church ſetled with a full power belonging to it, and exerciſing all acts of Church-Diſcipline within it ſelf, was anciently the ſame with the ſociety of Chriſtians in a City. Not but that the name Church is attributed ſometimes to families, in which ſenſe *Tertullian* ſpeaks, *ubi duo aut tres ſunt, ibi Eccleſia eſt, licet Laici:* And may on the ſame account be attributed to a ſmall place, ſuch as many imagine the Church of *Cenchrea* to be, it being a Port to *Corinth* on the *Sinus Saronicus*; but *Stephanus Byzantinus* calls it πόλις καὶ δῆμον Κορίνθου. *Suidas* ſaith no more of it than that it is ὄνομα τόπου. *Strabo* and *Pauſanias* only ſpeak of the ſituation of it,

Euſeb. l. 4. cap. 13.

Uſſer. Ignat. ep. p. 13.

C. Celſum. l. 3. p. 128.

Exhort. ad cal. lit.

Steph. de Urbibus.

Strabo Geogr. l. 8.

Pauſ. Corinth. p. 44, 45.

as

as one of the ports of *Corinth*, lying in the way from *Tegæa* to *Argos*; nor is any more ſaid of it by *Pliny*, than that it anſwers to *Lechæum* the port on the other ſide upon the *Sinus Corinthiacus*. *Ubbo Emmius* in his deſcription of old *Greece* calls both of them *oppidula duo cum duobus præcläris portubus in ora utriuſq; maris*, but withal adds, that they were *duo urbis emporia*, the two *Marts* of *Corinth*; therefore in probability, becauſe of the great Merchandiſe of that City, they were much frequented. *Cenchrea* was about twelve furlongs diſtance from *Corinth*; Where *Pareus* conjectures the place of the meeting of the Church of *Corinth* was, becauſe of the troubles they met with in the City, and therefore they retired thither for greater conveniency and privacy: which conjecture will appear not to be altogether improbable, when we conſider the furious oppoſition made by the *Jews* againſt the *Chriſtians* at *Corinth*, *Acts* 18. 12. and withal how uſual it was both for Jews and Chriſtians to have their place of meeting at a diſtance from the City. As *Acts* 16. 13. *They went out from* Philippi *to the rivers ſide, where there was a Proſeucha, or a place of prayer, where the Jews of* Philippi *accuſtomed to meet.* According to this interpretation the Church at *Cenchrea* is nothing elſe but the Church of *Corinth* there aſſembling: as the *Reformed Church* at *Paris* hath their meeting place at *Charenton*, which might be called the Church of *Charenton* from their publick Aſſemblies there, but the Church of *Paris* from the Reſidence of the chief officers and people in that City. So the Church of *Corinth* might be called the Church at *Cenchrea* upon the ſame account, there being no evidence at all of any ſettled Government there at *Cenchrea* diſtinct from that at *Corinth*. So that this place which is the only one brought againſt that poſition I have laid down, hath no force at all againſt it. I conclude then that Churches and Cities were originally of equal extent, and that the formal conſtitution of a Church lies not in their capacity of aſſembling in one place, but acting as a ſociety of Chriſtians imbodied together in one City, having Officers and Rulers among themſelves, equally reſpecting the whole number of believers: Which leads to the *ſecond* thing, *the way and manner then uſed for the modelling the government of theſe Churches:* Which may be conſidered in a double period of time, either before ſeveral Congregations in Churches were ſetled, or after thoſe we now call *Pariſhes*, were divided. Firſt, Before diſtinct Congregations were ſetled; and this as far as I can find, was not only during the Apoſtles times, but for a competent time after, generally during the perſecution of Churches. For we muſt diſtinguiſh between ſuch a number of believers as could not conveniently aſſemble in one place, and the diſtributing of believers into their ſeveral diſtinct Congregations. I cannot ſee any reaſon but to think that in the great Churches of *Jeruſalem*, *Antioch*, *Epheſus* and the like, there were more believers than could well meet together, conſidering the ſtate of thoſe times; but that they were then diſtributed into their ſeveral δήμοι or *Centuries* (as the *Athenians*, and *Romans* divided their people) *i. e.* into ſeveral worſhipping Congregations with peculiar officers, I ſee no reaſon at all for it. They had no ſuch conveniencies then of ſetling ſeveral Congregations under their particular Paſtors: but all the Chriſtians in a City looked upon themſelves as one body, and met together as occaſion ſerved them, where either the chief of the Governours of the Church, the προεστὼς in *Juſtin Martyr*'s language, did perform the ſolemn part of divine worſhip, or ſome other of the *Elders* that were preſent with them.

Plin. Hiſt. l. 4. c. 4. Emmius de Græc. Vet. l. 2.

Pareus in Rom. 16. 1.

V. Heinſ. Exercit. ſacr. l. 5. cap. 10.

them. Is it not ſtrange for men to dream of ſet times, and Canonical hours, and publick places of Aſſemblies at that time, when their chief times of meeting were in the night, or very early in the morning, which *Pliny* calls *conventus antelucanos*, whence they were called *latebroſa & lucifugax natio*; and were fain to make uſe of wax-lights: (which from that cuſtom the Papiſts continue ſtill in their *Tapers* always burning upon the *Altar*, from what reaſon I know not, unleſs to ſhew the darkneſs of error and ſuperſtition which that Church lies under ſtill) and the places of the Chriſtians meetings were generally either ſome private rooms, or ſome *grotts* or *Cryptæ*, vaults under ground where they might be leaſt diſcerned or taken notice of; or in the *Cœmeteria*, the *Martyrum memoriæ*, as they called them, where their common aſſemblies were. Thence *Pontius Paulinus*, ſpeaking of the Edict of *Valerian* againſt the Chriſtians, *Juſſum eſt ut nulla conciliabula faciant, neque cœmeteria ingrediantur.* Indeed when they had any publick liberty granted them, they were ſo mindful of their duties of publick profeſſion of the faith, as to make uſe of publick places for the worſhip of God, as appears by *Lampridius* in the life of *Alexander Severus*. *Quum Chriſtiani quendam locum qui publicus fuerat occupaſſent, contra popinarii dicerent, ſibi eum deberi, reſcripſit melius eſſe ut quomodocunque illic Deus colatur, quam popinariis dedatur.* But in times of perſecution it is moſt improbable that there ſhould be any fixed Congregations and places, when the Chriſtians were ſo much hunted after, and inquired for, as appears by the former Epiſtle of *Pliny* and the known *Reſcript of Trajan* upon it, ſo much exagitated by *Tertullian*. They did meet often it is certain, *ad confœderandam diſciplinam*; at which meetings *Tertullian* tells us, *Præſident probati quique ſeniores*, which he elſewhere explains by *Conſeſſus ordinis, the bench of officers* in the Church, which did in common conſult for the good of the Church, without any *Cantonizing* the Chriſtians into ſeveral diſtinct and fixed Congregations. But after that believers were much increaſed, and any peace or liberty obtained, they then began to contrive the diſtribution of the work among the ſeveral Officers of the Church, and to ſettle the ſeveral bounds over which every Preſbyter was to take his charge; but yet ſo, as that every Preſbyter retained a double aſpect of his office, the one particular to his charge, the other general reſpecting the Church in common. For it is but a weak conceit to imagine that after the ſetling of Congregations, every one had a diſtinct Preſbytery to rule it, which we find not any obſcure footſteps of in any of the ancient Churches; but there was ſtill one *Eccleſiaſtical Senate* which ruled all the ſeveral Congregations of thoſe Cities in common, of which the ſeveral Preſbyters of the Congregations were members, and in which the *Biſhop* acted as the *Preſident* of the *Senate*, for the better governing the affairs of the Church. And thus we find *Cornelius* at *Rome* ſitting there *cum florentiſſimo Clero*: thus *Cyprian* at *Carthage*, one who pleads as much as any for obedience to Biſhops, and yet none more evident for the preſence and joint concurrence and aſſiſtance of the Clergy at all Church debates; whoſe reſolution from his firſt entrance into his Biſhoprick was to do all things *communi concilio Clericorum*, with the Common-Council of the Clergy; and ſays they were *cum Epiſcopo ſacerdotali honore conjuncti*. *Victor* at *Rome* decreed *Eaſter* to be kept on the Lord's day, *collatione facta cum Preſbyteris & Diaconibus* (according as the Latin in that age) as *Damaſus* the ſuppoſed Author of the lives of the Popes tells us. In the proceedings a-

gainſt

Ep. 95. l. 10. *Tertul. de Cor. Militis.* *ad Uxor. l. 2. c. 4.* *V. Voſſium in Plin. ep. p. 45.* *V. Gerſom. Bucer. de gubern. eccl. p. 220, &c.* *V. Juſtell. Not. in Cod. Can. Eccleſ. Un. p. 200.* *& Blondell Ap. ſ. 3. de Baſil. origine p. 216. p. 243. p. 131. ed. Cl. Salmaſ.*

Apol. c. 2.

Epigr. ep. l. 21.

Ep. 6. 10. 18, 24, 33, 34, 28, 32. Ep. 58.

Apud Bin. To. 1. Conc. p. 92.

gainſt *Novatus* at *Rome*, we have a clear teſtimony of the concurrence of Preſbyters: where a great Synod was called, as *Euſebius* expreſſeth it, of *ſixty Biſhops*, but more *Preſbyters* and *Deacons*: and what is more full to our purpoſe, not only the ſeveral Preſbyters of the City, but the Country Paſtors (τῶν κατὰ χώραν ποιμένων διασκεψαμένων) did likewiſe give their advice about that buſineſs. At this time *Cornelius* tells us there were forty ſix Preſbyters in that one City of *Rome*, who concurred with him in condemning *Novatus*. So at *Antioch* in the caſe of *Paulus Samoſatenus* we find a Synod gathered, conſiſting of *Biſhops*, *Preſbyters*, and *Deacons*, and in their name the *Synodal* Epiſtle is penned and directed by the ſame in all the Catholick Church. At the Council of *Eliberis* in *Spain*, were preſent but nineteen Biſhops and twenty ſix Preſbyters. The caſe between *Sylvanus* Biſhop of *Cirta* in *Africk*, and *Nundinarius* the Deacon, was referred by *Purpurius* to the Clergy to decide it. For the preſence of Preſbyters at Synods, inſtances are brought ὅλῳ τῷ θυλάκῳ by *Blondel* in his *Apology*. And that they concurred in governing the Church, and not only by their *counſel* but *authority*, appears from the general ſenſe of the Church of God, even when Epiſcopacy was at the higheſt: *Nazianzen* ſpeaking of the office of Preſbyters, εἴτε λειτουργίαν χρὴ λέγειν εἴτε ἡγεμονίαν, he knew not whether to call it, *Miniſtry* or *Superintendency*, and thoſe who are made Preſbyters, ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἀναβαίνουσι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι, *from being ruled, they aſcend to be rulers themſelves*. And their power by him is in ſeveral places called Ψυχῶν ἡγεμονία, προστασία, προεδρία· they are called by him, ποιμένες, ἱερεῖς, προεστότες προστάται, ἄρχοντες. *Chryſoſtome* gives this as the reaſon of *Paul*'s paſſing over from *Biſhops* to *Deacons* without naming Preſbyters, ὅτι οὐ πολὺ τὸ μέσον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ διδασκαλίαν εἰσιν ἀναδεδειγμένοι, καὶ προστασίαν τῆς ἐκκλησίας. *Becauſe there is no great matter of difference between a Biſhop and Preſbyters, for theſe likewiſe have the inſtruction and charge of the Church committed to them*; which words *Theophylact*, *Chryſoſtome*'s *Eccho*, repeats after him, which the Council of *Aquen* thus expreſſeth, *Preſbyterorum vero qui præſunt Eccleſiæ Chriſti, miniſterium eſſe videtur, ut in doctrina præſint populis & in officio prædicandi, nec in aliquo deſides inventi appareant*. *Clemens Alexandrinus* before all theſe, ſpeaking of himſelf and his fellow Preſbyters, Ποιμένες ἔσμεν οἱ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν προηγούμενοι. *We are Paſtors and Rulers of the Churches*. And that proper acts of diſcipline were performed by them, appears both by the Epiſtles of the *Roman Clergy* about their preſerving diſcipline to *Cyprian*, and likewiſe by the act of that Clergy in excluding *Marcion* from communion with them. So the Preſbyters of the Church of *Epheſus* excommunicated *Noetus*; for after they had cited him before them, and found him obſtinate in his hereſie, ἐξέωσαν αὐτὸν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἅμα τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δόγμα μεμαθητευμένοις; they put both him and his Diſciples out of the Church together. Thus we ſee what the manner of Government in the Church was now: The Biſhop ſitting as in the נשא in the *Sanhedrin*, and the Preſbyters ὡς συνεδρευτοὶ τῶν ἐπισκόπων, as *Ignatius* expreſſeth it, acting as the *Common-council* of the Church to the Biſhop, the Biſhop being as the ἄρχων τῆς ἐκκλησίας, anſwering to the ἄρχων τῆς πόλεως and the Preſbytery as the βουλὴ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, anſwering to the βουλὴ καθ' ἑκάστην πόλιν, as *Origen* compares them. Whereby he fully deſcribes the form of Government in his time in the Church, which was by an *Eccleſiaſtical Senate*, and a *Preſident* in it, ruling the Society of Chriſtians in every City. So that the Preſbytery of a great City joyning together for government, were never

Eccleſ. hiſt. l.6. cap.43.

Eccleſ. hiſt. l.7. cap. 30.

Apud. Nun. ſub Zenoph. Conſul.

P. 200.

Orat. p. 3.

P. 24. 37, 41.

P. 29. 42.

In 1 Tim. hom. 11.

Con. Aquiſ. cap. 5.

Pædag. l. 1. cap. 6.

Epiph. hær. 42.

Id. hæreſ. 57. c. 1.

C. Celſum. l. 3. p. 129.

never accounted a *Provincial Assembly*, but only the *Senate* for government of the Church in the whole City. The erecting Presbyteries for every particular congregation in a City, is a stranger to the ancient constitution of Churches, and hath given the greatest rise to the independency of particular congregations. For if every particular congregation be furnished with a government within its self, then men are apt presently to think that there is no necessity of subordination of it to any higher Church-power. Whereas if that primitive constitution of Churches be held, that they are societies of Christians under an *Ecclesiastical Senate* in a City, then it is evident that the congregations must *truckle* under the great body, as receiving their government by, and their officers from that Senate of the Church, which superintends, and orders the affairs of that whole body of Christians residing in such a place. And this crumbling of Church power into every congregation is a thing absolutely disowned by the greatest, and most learned *Patrons* of *Presbytery* beyond the Seas: as may be seen both in *Calvin*, *Beza*, *Salmasius*, *Blondel*, *Gerſome*, *Bucer* and others. It is much disputed when the first division of Parochial congregations in Cities began; *Platina* attributes it to *Evaristus*, and so doth *Damasus*, *Hic titulos in urbe Roma divisit Presbyteris. He divided the several Parish Churches to the Presbyters*, these were called then *tituli*; *Baronius* gives a double reason of the name; either from goods belonging to the Prince's *Exchequer*, which have some sign imprinted upon them that it may be known whose they are; so saith he, the sign of the Cross was put upon the Churches to make it known that they were devoted to God's service; or else they are called *Tituli*, because the several Presbyters did receive their titles from them; but by the Leave of the great *Cardinal*, another reason may be given of the name more proper than either of these. It hath been observed by learned men, that the general meetings of the Christians were in the *Cœmeteriæ* or dormitories of Christians; so they called the Sepulchres then, which were great and capacious *vaults* fit to receive many people in them; two chief grounds of the Christians meeting in those places; the first was their own security, because the Heathens looked on it as a matter of religion ——— *manes temerare sepultos*, to disturb the ashes of the dead; but the chief reason was to encourage themselves to suffer martyrdom by the examples of those who had gone before them, and lay buried there; thence they were called *Martyrum memoriæ*, because they did call to mind their actions and constancy in the faith. Now from these *Cœmeteria* was afterwards the original of Churches (whence persons most reverenced for piety, were wont still to be buried in Churches, not for any holiness of the place, but because in such places the Martyrs lay buried) the Churches being raised over the vaults wherein the Martyrs lay intombed. Now Churches being raised from these *Cœmeteries*, which were called *memoriæ martyrum*, that they might still retain somewhat intimating their former use, were called *Tituli*. For *Titulus* as *Santius* observes, is *signum aliquod aut monumentum, quod docet ibi latere aliquid aut accidisse, cujus nolumus perire memoriam*; thence statues are called *Tituli*. So *Gen.* 35. 20. *erexit Jacob titulum super sepulchrum*, as the Vulg. Latin renders it: and Gen. 28. 18. *Surgens ergo Jacob mane tulit lapidem quem supposuerat capiti suo, & erexit in Titulum.* So *Absalom* 2 Sam. 18. 18. *erexit sibi titulum.* So that what was erected to maintain and preserve the memory of any thing, was called *Titulus*; and

A. Dom. 112. n. 4, 5, 6.

In Ezek. 39. 15.

and thence the Churches being built upon the *Cœmeteries* of the Martyrs, were on that account called *Tituli*, becauſe intended for the preſervation of their memories. This account of the original of the name I leave to the judgment of learned men; but to proceed, I confeſs it ſeems not probable to me, that theſe *tituli* were ſo ſoon divided as the time of *Evariſtus*, who lived in the time of *Trajan*, when the perſecution was hot againſt the Chriſtians; but *Damaſus* ſeems not to believe himſelf; for in the life of *Dionyſius*, he ſaith, *Hic Preſbyteris eccleſias diviſit, cœmeteria, paroecias, & diœceſes inſtituit*; but moſt probably it began as ſoon as the Churches enjoyed any eaſe and peace, it being ſo neceſſary for the convenient meeting of ſuch a multitude of Chriſtians as there was then. In the life of *Marcellus*, about forty years after *Dionyſius*, we read of twenty five *Titles* in the Church of *Rome*; of which number what uſe is made for interpreting the number 666, may be ſeen in Mr. *Potter*'s ingenious tract on that ſubject. But when afterwards theſe *titles* were much increaſed, thoſe Preſbyters that were placed in the ancient *titles* which were the chief among them, were called *Cardinales Preſbyteri*, which were then looked on as chief of the Clergy, and therefore were the chief members of the Council of Preſbyters to the Biſhop. So that at this day, the *Conclave* at *Rome*, and the Pope's *Conſiſtory*, is an evident argument in this great degeneracy of it, of the primitive conſtitution of the Government of the Church there, by a Biſhop acting with his College of Preſbyters. Neither was this proper to *Rome* alone, but to all other great Cities, which when the number of Preſbyters was grown ſo great, that they could not conveniently meet, and join with the Biſhop, for ordering the Government of the Church, there were ſome, as the chief of them, choſen out from the reſt, to be as the Biſhop's Council, and theſe in many places, as at *Milan*, *Ravenna*, *Naples*, &c. were called *Cardinales preſbyteri*, as well as at *Rome*; which were abrogated by *Pius Quintus*, 1568, but the memory of them is preſerved ſtill in Cathedral-Churches, in the *Chapter* there, where the *Dean* was nothing elſe but the *Archi-preſbyter*, and both Dean and Prebendaries were to be aſſiſtant to the Biſhop in the regulating the Church-affairs belonging to the City, while the Churches were contained therein. So much ſhall ſuffice for the model of Government in the Churches while they were contained within the ſame precincts with the City it ſelf.

V. Onuphrium de Epiſc. tit. & Div. Cardinalium.

§. 3. We come in the third place to conſider what relation theſe Churches in great Cities had one to another, and to the leſſer Cities which were under them. And here the grand queſtion to be diſcuſſed is this, Whether the Churches in greater Cities by Apoſtolical inſtitution, had the Government Eccleſiaſtical, not only of the leſſer Villages under them, but likewiſe of all leſſer Cities under the civil juriſdiction of the *Metropolis*. The affirmative is of late aſſerted by ſome perſons of great renown and learning. The firſt I find maintaining this *Hypotheſis* of the divine right of *Metropolitans*, is *Fregevilæus Gantius*, one of the Reformed Church of *France*, who hath ſpent a whole Chapter in his *Palma Chriſtiana* to that purpoſe, and hath made uſe of the ſame arguments which have been ſince improved by all the advantages which the learning of a *Reverend Doctor* could add to them. But becauſe this principle manifeſtly deſtroys the main foundation of this diſcourſe, it is here requiſite to examine the grounds on which it ſtands, that thereby it may be fully cleared whether the ſubordination of leſs Churches to

Palma Chriſtiana c. 42

greater, did only arise from the mutual association of Churches among themselves, or from Apostolical appointment and institution. The two pillars which the divine right of *Metropolitans* is built upon, are these. First, That the Cities spoken of in the New Testament, in which Churches were planted, were *Metropoles* in the civil sense. *Secondly*, That the Apostles did so far follow the model of the civil Government as to plant *Metropolitan* Churches in those Cities. If either of these prove infirm, the fabrick erected upon them, must needs fall; and I doubt not but to make it appear that both of them are. I begin with the first. The notion of a *Metropolis* is confessed to be this, a City wherein the Courts of a Civil Judicature were kept by the Roman Governours, under whose jurisdiction the whole Province was contained. The Cities chiefly insisted on, are the seven Cities of the *Lydian Asia*, and *Philippi*, which is called πρώτη πόλις Μακεδονίας. As for the Cities of the *Proconsular Asia*, although the bounds and limits of it are not so clear as certainly to know whether all these Cities were comprehended under it or no, *Strabo* telling us that *Phrygia*, *Lydia*, *Caria* and *Mysia* are δυσδιάκριτα διὰ πάντων εἰς ἄλληλα very hard to be distinguished from one another; it being true of all four which was said of *Mysia* and *Phrygia*,

Geogr. l. 13.

Χωρὶς τὰ Μυσῶν καὶ Φρυγῶν ὁρίσματα
Τὸ δ' διορίζειν χαλεπόν.

The *Phrygian* and *Mysian* borders are distinct, but it is hard to find them out. For *Laodicea* is by *Ptolomy* referr'd to *Caria*, *Strabo* and many others place it in *Phrygia*, only *Stephanus Bizantinus* placeth it in *Lydia*; but granting all that is produced by the late most excellent Primate of *Armagh*, in his learned discourse of the *Proconsular Asia*, to prove all these seven Cities to be in the bounds of this *Lydian Asia*, yet it is far from being evident that all these Cities were *Metropoles* in the civil sense. For *Strabo* tells us, *that the Romans did not divide these places by Nations, but according to the Dioceses wherein they kept their Courts and exercised judicature.* These Cities wherein the Courts of judicature were kept, were the *Metropoles*, and mother Cities. Of five of them, *Laodicea*, *Smyrna*, *Sardis*, *Ephesus*, and *Pergamus*, *Pliny* saith that the *conventus*, the civil Courts, were kept in them; and they had jurisdiction over the other places by him mentioned; but for the other two, *Thyatira* and *Philadelphia*, *Philadelphia* is expressly mentioned as one of those Cities which were under the *jurisdictio Sardiana*, so far was it from being a *Metropolis* of its self, and *Thyatira* mentioned as one of the ordinary Cities, without any addition of honour at all to it. And for *Philadelphia*, it was so far unlikely to be a *Metropolis*, that *Strabo* tells us it was σεισμῶν πλήρης, very subject to earthquakes, and therefore had very few inhabitants, those that are, live most part in the fields, where they have εὔδαιμονα γῆν, a very rich soil: but *Strabo*, for all that, wonders at the boldness of the men that durst to venture their lives there; and most of all admires what was in those mens heads who first built a City there. Is it then any ways probable that this should be chosen for a *Metropolis*, in such an abundance of fair and rich Cities as lay thereabout? But a *Salvo* is found out for *Pliny*'s not mentioning them as *Metropoles*, because the addition of these two in other Cities, seemeth to have been made when *Vespasian* added those many new *Provinces* to

Geogr. l. 13. p. 432. ed. Is. Casaub.

Nat. hist. l. 5. c. 29, & 30.

the

the old Government which *Suetonius* ſpeaks of; but this *Salvo* doth not reach the ſore; for firſt *Pliny* wrote his natural Hiſtory, not in the beginning, but toward the latter end of the Empire of *Flavius Veſpaſianus*, when *Titus* had been ſix times *Conſul*, as he himſelf ſaith in his Preface; therefore if there had been any ſuch change, *Pliny* would have mentioned it. *Secondly*, The *Provinces* added by *Veſpaſian* are expreſly ſet down by *Suetonius*, viz. *Achaia*, *Lycia*, *Rhodus*, *Byzantium*, *Samos*, *Thracia*, *Cilicia*, *Comagena*; not the leaſt mention of the *Lydian* or *Proconſular Aſia*, or any alteration made in the *Metropolis* there. But yet there is a farther attempt made to make *Philadelphia* a *Metropolis*, which is from a ſubſcription of *Euſtathius* in the Council of *Conſtantinople ſub Menna*, *Act.* 5. who calls himſelf the Biſhop of the *Metropolis* of *Philadelphia*; but what validity there is in ſuch a ſubſcription in the time of the fifth Century, to prove a *Metropolis* in the firſt, let any one judge, that doth but conſider how common a thing it was to alter *Metropoles*, eſpecially after the new diſpoſition of the Roman Empire by *Conſtantine*: But if we do ſtand to the *Notitiæ* to determine this controverſie, which are certainly more to be valued than a ſingle ſubſcription, the *Metropolitanſhip* of theſe Cities of the *Lydian Aſia* will be irrecoverably overthrown. For in the old *Notitiæ* taken out of the *Vatican MS.* and ſet forth with the reſt by *Carolus à Sancto Paulo* in his *Appendix* to his *Geographia ſacra*, *Epheſus* is made the *Metropolis* of the Province of *Aſia*, *Sardis* of *Lydia*, *Laodicea* of *Phrygia Capatiana*, as it is there written for *Pacatiana*; but *Pergamus* placed in the Province of *Cæſarea Cappadocia*, *Philadelphia* under *Sardis*, with *Thyatyra*. In the *Notitia* attributed to *Hierocles* under the *Metropolis* of *Epheſus* is placed *Smyrna* and *Pergamus*, under *Sardis Thyatyra* and *Philadelphia*; ſo likewiſe in the *Notitia* of the *French* King's Library. So that neither in the Civil nor Eccleſiaſtical ſenſe can we find theſe ſeven Cities to be all *Metropoles*. We therefore obſerve St. *Paul*'s courſe, and leaving *Aſia*, we come into *Macedonia*, where we are told that *Philippi* was the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia*: I know not whether with greater incongruity to the Civil or Eccleſiaſtical ſenſe; in both which I doubt not but to make it appear that *Philippi* was not the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia*, and therefore the Biſhops there mentioned could not be the Biſhops of the ſeveral Cities under the juriſdiction of *Philippi*, but muſt be underſtood of the Biſhops reſident in that City. We begin with it in the civil ſenſe, which is the foundation of the other. It is confeſſed not to have been a *Metropolis* during its being called Κρηνῖδες and Δάτος, it being by *Pauſanias* called νεωτάτη τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πόλεων. By *Theophylact* out of an old Geographer, (as it is ſuppoſed) it is ſaid to be μικρὰ πόλις ὑπὸ μητροπόλεως Θεσσαλονίκης τελοῦσα; and is it not very improbable that ſo ſmall a City as it is acknowledged to be by *Dio*, and others, ſhould be the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia*, where were at leaſt one hundred and fifty Cities, as *Pliny* and *Pomponius Mela* tell us, by both whom *Philippi* is placed in *Thracia*, and not in *Macedonia*? But two arguments are brought to prove *Philippi* to have been a *Metropolis*; the firſt is from St. *Luke*, calling it πρώτης τῆς μερίδος Μακεδονίας πόλιν. Acts 16. 12. *The firſt City of that part of* Macedonia: but rendred by the learned Doctor, *the prime City of the Province of* Macedonia; but it would be worth knowing where μερὶς, in all the *Notitiæ* of the *Roman* Empire, was tranſlated a *Province*: and it is evident that *Luke* calls it the firſt City, not *ratione dignitatis*, but *ratione ſitûs*, in regard of its ſituation,

Sueton. in Veſpat. c. 8.

Phil. 1. 1.

Eliac. B. p. 182.

Dio, l. 47.

L. 4. c. 11.

L. 2. c. 2.

and not its dignity. So *Camerarius* underſtands *Luke*, *hanc eſſe primam coloniam partis ſeu Plagæ Macedonicæ; nimirum à Thraciæ vicinia iter in Macedoniam ordiens.* It is the firſt City of that part of *Macedonia* when one goes from *Thracia* into it. And ſo it appears by *Dio* deſcribing the ſituation of *Philippi*, that it was the next Town to *Neapolis*, only the mountain *Symbolon* coming between them, and *Neapolis* being upon the ſhore, and *Philippi* built up in the plain near the mountain *Pangæus*, where *Brutus* and *Caſſius* encamped themſelves: its being then the firſt City of entrance into *Macedonia*, proves no more that it was the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia*, than that *Calice* is of *France*, or *Dover* of *England*. But it is farther pleaded, that *Philippi* was a *Colony*, and therefore it is moſt probable that the ſeat of the *Roman* judicature was there. But to this I anſwer, firſt, that *Philippi* was not the only *Colony* in *Macedonia*, for *Pliny* reckons up *Caſſandria*, *Paria*, and others, for which we muſt underſtand that *Macedonia* was long ſince made a *Province* by *Paulus*: And in the diviſion of the *Roman Provinces* by *Auguſtus*, *Strabo* reckons it with *Illyricum*, among the Provinces belonging to the *Roman* people and Senate, and ſo likewiſe doth *Dio*. But it appears by *Suetonius*, that *Tiberius*, (according to the cuſtom of the *Roman* Emperors in the danger of war in the Provinces) took it into his own hands, but it was returned by *Claudius* to the *Senate* again, together with *Achaia*; thence *Dio* ſpeaking of *Macedonia* in the time of *Tiberius*, ſaith it was governed ἀκληρωτὶ, that is, by thoſe who were ἄρχοντες αἱρετοὶ, the *præfecti Cæſaris*, ſuch as were ſent by the Emperor to be his *Preſidents* in the Provinces: the ἄρχοντες κληρωτοὶ were the *Proconſuls*, who were choſen by lot after their *Conſulſhip* into the ſeveral Provinces; and therefore *Dio* expreſſeth *Claudius* his returning *Macedonia* into the *Senates* hands by ἀπέδωκεν τότε τῷ κλήρῳ, *he put it to the choice of the Senate again.* Now *Macedonia* having been thus long a Province of the *Roman* Empire, what probability is there, becauſe *Philippi* was a *Colony*, therefore it muſt be the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia*? *Secondly*, We find not the leaſt evidence, either in Scripture, or elſewhere, that the *Proconſul* of *Macedonia* had his reſidence at *Philippi*, yea we have ſome evidence againſt it out of Scripture, *Acts* 16. 20, 22. ἠγαγον τοὺς στρατηγοῖς *and brought them to the Magiſtrates*; if there had been the tribunal of a *Proconſul* here, we ſhould certainly have had it mentioned, as *Gallio Proconſul* of *Achaia* is mentioned in a like caſe at *Corinth*, *Acts* 18. 12. Two ſorts of Magiſtrates are here expreſſed, the ἄρχοντες, which ſeem to be the rulers of the City, the στρατηγοὶ to be the *Duumviri* of the Colony, or elſe the Deputies of the *Proconſul* reſiding there: but I incline rather to the former, στρατηγὸς κολωνίας being only a *Duumvir*, but στρατηγὸς Ρώμης is a *Prætor*, as *Heinſius* obſerves from the *Gloſſary* of *H. Stephens*. For every Colony had a *Duumvirate* to rule it, anſwering to the *Conſuls* and *Prætors* at *Rome*. But all this might have been ſpared, when we conſider how evident it is that *Theſſalonica* was the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia*, as appears by *Antipater* in the Greek Epigram.

Lib. 47. *p.* 397.

Paterc. l. 2. *c.* 37.

Geog. l. 17.

Hiſt. l. 53. *V. Claudii, cap.* 25.

Hiſt. l. 57.

V. Pancir. de Magiſt. Municipal. cap. 8.

Exerc. ſacr. l. 5. *c.* 10.

Antholog. l. 1.

Σοί με Θρηικίης σκυληφόρε Θεσσαλονίκη
Μήτηρ ἡ πάσης πέμψε Μακεδονίης.

And the *Præfectus prætorio Illyrici* had his Reſidence at *Theſſalonica*, as *Theodoret* tells us, Θεσσαλονίκη πόλις ἐστι μεγίστη καὶ πολυάνθρωπος, &c.

ὅσα τῆς Ἰλλυριῶν ἐπαρχίας ἡγέμενον ἔχει. *Theſſalonica* was a great populous City, where the *Lieutenant* of *Illyricum* did reſide: and ſo in probability did the *Vicarius Macedoniæ*. It is called the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia* likewiſe by *Socrates*, and in the Eccleſiaſtical ſenſe it is ſo called by *Ætius* the Biſhop thereof in the Council of *Sardica*; and *Carolus à Sancto Paulo* thinks it was not only the *Metropolis* of the *Province* of *Macedonia*, but of the whole *Dioceſe* (which in the Eaſt was much larger than the Province) I ſuppoſe he means that which anſwered to the *Vicarius Macedoniæ*. And thence in the Councils of *Epheſus* and *Chalcedon* the ſubſcription of the Biſhop of *Theſſolonica* was next to the Patriarchs. But for *Philippi* the ſame Author acknowlegeth it not to have been a *Metropolitan* Church in the firſt ſix Centuries; but after that *Macedonia* was divided into *prima* and *ſecunda* (which was after the diviſion of it in the Empire into *prima* and *ſalutaris*) then *Philippi* came to have the honorary title of a *Metropolitan:* although in *Hierocles* his *Notitia*, *Philippi* is placed as the twenty firſt City under the *Metropoles* of *Theſſalonica*. So much to evidence the weakneſs of the firſt pillar, *viz.* that theſe Cities were *Metropoles* in the Civil ſenſe: and this being taken away, the other falls of its ſelf; for if the Apoſtles did model the Eccleſiaſtical Government according to the Civil, then Metropolitan Churches were planted only in Metropolitan Cities, and theſe being cleared not to have been the latter, it is evident they were not the former. But however let us ſee what evidence is brought of ſuch a ſubordination of all other Churches to the Metropolitans, by the inſtitution of the Apoſtles. The only evidence produced out of Scripture for ſuch a ſubordination and dependence of the Churches of leſſer Cities upon the greater, is from *Act.* 16. 1, 4. compared with *Act.* 15. 23. the argument runs thus, The queſtion was ſtarted at *Antioch*, *Act.* 14. 26. with *Act.* 15. 2. from thence they ſent to *Jeruſalem* for a reſolution: the decree of the Council there concerns not only *Antioch*, but *Syria* and *Cilicia*, which were under the Juriſdiction of *Antioch:* and therefore Metropolitan Churches are *jure divino*. I am afraid the argument would ſcarce know its ſelf in the dreſs of a *Syllogiſm*. Thus it runs; If upon the occaſion of the queſtion at *Antioch*, the decree of the Apoſtles made at *Jeruſalem*, concern all the Churches of *Syria* and *Cilicia*, then all theſe Churches had a dependence upon the *Metropolis* of *Antioch*; but the *antecedent* is true, therefore the conſequent. Let us ſee how the argument will do in another form. If upon the occaſion of the queſtion of *Antioch*, the decree of the Apoſtles concerned all the Churches of Chriſtians converſing with Jews; then all theſe Churches had dependence upon the Church of *Antioch*; but, &c. How thankful would the *Papiſts* have been, if only *Rome* had been put inſtead of *Antioch!* and then the concluſion had been true, whatever the premiſes were. But in good earneſt, doth the Churches of *Syria* and *Cilicia* being bound by this decree, prove their ſubordination to *Antioch*, or to the Apoſtles? were they bound becauſe *Antioch* was ther *Metropolis*, or becauſe they were the Apoſtles who reſolved the queſtion? but were not the Churches of *Phrygia*, and *Galatia* bound to obſerve theſe decrees as well as others? For of theſe it is ſaid that the Apoſtles went through the Cities of them, delivering the decrees to keep, as it is expreſſed *Act.* 16. 4. compared with the 6 verſe. Or do the decrees of the Apoſtles concern only thoſe to whom they are inſcribed, and upon whoſe occaſion they are penned? Then by the ſame reaſon *Paul*'s Epiſtles

Hiſt. Eccleſ. l. 1. *c.* 17. *V. Berter. Pithan. Dial. c.* 2. *L.* 2. *c.* 12. *Conc. Sard. cap.* 16. *Georgr. ſacr. l.* 8. *ſ.* 14.

piſtles being written many of them upon occaſion, as that to the *Corinthians* being directed to the *Metropolis* of *Corinth*, doth only concern the Church of that City, and thoſe of *Achaia* that were ſubject to the juriſdiction of the City; and ſo for the reſt of the Epiſtles. A fair way to make the word of God of no effect to us; becauſe forſooth, we live not in obedience to thoſe *Metropoles* to which the Epiſtles were directed! From whence we are told how many things we may underſtand by this notion of *Metropolitans:* Eſpecially why *Ignatius* ſuperſcribes his Epiſtle to the *Romans* ἐκκλησία ἥτις προκάθηται ἐν τόπῳ χωρίς Ρωμαίων, *to the Church which preſides in the place of the Roman region, or the ſuburbicarian Provinces.* But let us ſee whether this place may not be underſtood better without the help of this notion. *Caſaubon* calls it *locutionem barbaram*; *Vedelius* is more favourable to it, and thinks *ſi non elegans, ſaltem vitii libera eſt*, and explains it by the ſuburbicarian Provinces.: and makes the ſenſe of it to be ἐν τόπῳ ὅς ἐστι χωρίων τῶν Ρωμαίων, *in the place which is the Roman region*, and parallels it with the τόπος πόλεως καλουμένης Βηθσαιδὰ Luk. 9. 10. *Bellarmine* thinks he hath found the Pope's univerſal power in this τόπος, but methinks the χωρίον Ρωμαίων ſhould hardly be rendered *Orbis univerſus*, unleſs *Bellarmine* were no more skill'd in *Greek*, than *Caſaubon* thinks he was, whom he calls in the place forecited, *hominem Græcarum literarum prorſus ἀμύητον.* The moſt ingenuous conjecture concerning this place, is that of our learned Mr. *Thorndike. The word* τόπος, *ſaith he, is here uſed as many times beſides, ſpeaking of thoſe places which a man would neither call Cities nor Towns, as* Act. 27. 2. μέλλοντες πλεῖν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν τόπους, *being to ſail by the places of* Aſia. χώρα, *it is plain it ſignifies the countrey,* τόπος χωρὶς Ρωμαίων *then muſt neceſſarily ſignifie here the* Vatican *lying in the Fields as a ſuburb to* Rome, *and being the place where St.* Peter *was buried, and where the Jews of* Rome *then dwelt, as we learn by* Philo, *legatione ad Caium*, out of whom he produceth a large place to that purpoſe, and ſo makes this the Church of the Jewiſh Chriſtians, *the Vatican being then the Jewry of Rome*; but there being no clear evidence of any ſuch diſtinction of Churches there, and as little reaſon why *Ignatius* ſhould write to the Church of Jewiſh Chriſtians, and not to the Church of the Gentile Chriſtians, I therefore embrace his ſenſe of the τόπος χωρὶς Ρωμαίων for the *Vatican*, but explain it in another way, *viz.* we have already ſhewed that the chief places of meeting for the Chriſtians in *Gentile Rome*, was in the *Cœmeteries* of the Martyrs; now theſe *Cœmeteria* were all of them without the City; and the *Cœmeteria* where *Peter*, *Linus*, *Cletus*, and ſome other of the Primitive Martyrs lay inter'd in the *Vatican*, beyond the river *Tiber*. So *Damaſus* in the life of *Cletus*, *Qui etiam ſepultus eſt juxta corpus B. Petri in Vaticano.* The Church then in the place of the region of the *Romans* is the Chriſtian Church of *Rome*, aſſembling chiefly in the *Cœmeteries* of the *Vatican*, or any other of thoſe vaults which were in the Fields at a good diſtance from the City. But yet there is one argument more for *Metropolitans*, and that is from the importance of the word παροικία, which is taken to ſignifie both the City and Countrey; and ſo the inſcription of *Clemens* his Epiſtle is explained ἐκκλησία θεοῦ ἡ παροικοῦσα Ρώμην, ἐκκλησία θεοῦ τῇ παροικούσῃ Κόρινθον, i. e. *the Church of God dwelling about* Rome *to the Church dwelling about* Corinth, whereby is ſuppoſed to be comprehended the whole territories, which (being theſe were *Metropoles*) takes in the whole Province. And ſo *Polycarp*, τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ παροικούσῃ

Exercit. 16. *n.* 150. *Exercit. in ep. Ignat. ad Rom. c.* 2.

Laws of the Chur. *cap.* 18. *p.* 164.

κὴν Φιλίπποις, But all this ariſeth from a miſtake of the ſignification of the word παροικεῖν, which ſignifies not ſo much *accolere* as *incolere:* and therefore the old Latin verſion renders it *Eccleſiæ Dei quæ eſt Philippis.* Πάροικος is παρ' ἄλλης πόλεως ἄλλην οἰκῶν, one that removes from one City to ſojourn in other. And the ground of attributing that name to the Chriſtian Churches, was either becauſe that many of the firſt Chriſtians being Jews, they did truly παροικεῖν, being as ſtrangers out of their own countrey, or elſe among the Chriſtians, becauſe by reaſon of their continual perſecutions they were ſtill put in mind of their flitting uncertain condition in the world, their πολίτευμα, *countrey, citizenſhip* being in heaven. Of this the Apoſtles often tell them: from hence it came to ſignifie the ſociety of ſuch Chriſtians ſo living together; which as it increaſed ſo the notion of the word παροικία increaſed, and ſo went from the City into the countrey, and came not from the countrey into the City; for if παροικεῖν ſhould be taken for *accolere*, then it neceſſarily follows that ἐκκλησία παροικοῦσα Ῥώμην cannot ſignifie the Church of *Rome*, and the territories belonging to it, but the Church adjacent to *Rome*, diſtinct from the City, and the Church in it. For in that ſenſe παροικεῖν is oppoſed to living in the City, and ſo πάροικοι are diſtinct from the Citizens, as in *Thucydides* and others; but I believe no inſtance can poſſibly be produced wherein παροικία taken in that ſenſe doth comprehend in it both City and countrey. But being taken in the former ſenſe, it was firſt applied to the whole Church of the City: but when the Church of the City did ſpread its ſelf into the Countrey, then the word παροικία comprehended the Chriſtians both in City and Countrey adjoyning to it. Phil. 3. 20.

Which leads me to the *ſecond ſtep* of Chriſtian Churches, *when Churches took in the Villages and Territories adjoyning to the Cities:* For which we muſt underſtand that the ground of the ſubordination of the Villages and Territories about, did primarily ariſe from hence, that the Goſpel was ſpread abroad from the ſeveral Cities into the Countries about. The Apoſtles themſelves preached, as we read moſt in Scripture, in the Cities, becauſe of the great reſort of people thither; there they planted Churches, and ſetled the Government of them in an *Eccleſiaſtical Senate*, which not only took care for the government of Churches already conſtituted, but for the gathering more. Now the perſons who were imployed in the converſion of the adjacent Territories, being of the *Clergy* of the City, the perſons by them converted were adjoyned to the Church of the City; and all the affairs of thoſe leſſer Churches were at firſt determined by the Governours of the City; Afterwards when theſe Churches increaſed, and had peculiar officers ſet over them by the Senate of the City Church, although theſe did rule and govern their flock, yet it always was with a ſubordination to, and dependence upon the government of the City Church. So that by this means, he that was Preſident of the Senate in the City, did likewiſe ſuperintend all the Churches planted in the adjoyning Territories, which was the original of that which the Greeks call παροικία, the Latins the *Dioceſe* of the Biſhop. The Church where the Biſhop was peculiarly reſident with the Clergy, was called *Matrix Eccleſia*, and *Cathedra principalis*, as the ſeveral Pariſhes which at firſt were divided according to the ſeveral *regions* of the City, were called *Tituli*, and thoſe planted in the Territories about the City, called *Paræciæ*, when they were applied to the *Preſbyters*; but when to the Biſhop, it noted a Dioceſe: thoſe that were §. 4. *Cod. Eccleſ. Afric. c.* 33. *can.* 71.

planted

planted in these countrey parishes, were called πρεσβύτεροι ἐπ.χώριοι, ὁι ἐν χώραις by the Greeks, and by the Latins *Presbyteri regionarii, conregionales, foraslici, ruris agrorum Presbyteri*; from whom the χωρεπίσκοποι were distinct, as evidently appears by the thirteenth Canon of the *Council* of *Neocæsarea: where the Country Presbyters are forbidden to administer the Lord's Supper in the presence of the Bishop or the Presbyters of the City; but the Chorepiscopi were allowed to do it.* *Salmasius* think these χωρεπίσκοποι were so called as τῶν χωρῶν ἐπίσκοποι, the *Episcopi villani*, such as were only Presbyters, and were set over the Churches in Villages; but though they were originally Presbyters, yet they were raised to some higher authority over the rest of the Presbyters; and the original of them seems to be, that when Churches were so much multiplyed in the Countries adjacent to the Cities, that the Bishop in his own person could not be present to oversee the actions and carriages of the several Presbyters of the Country Churches, then they ordained some of the fittest in their several *Dioceses* to super-intend the several Presbyters lying remote from the City; from which Office of theirs they were called περιοδεῦται, because they did περιοδεύειν, go about, and visit the several Churches. This is the account given of them by *Beza* and *Blondel* as well as others. All these several places that were conveyed to the Faith by the assistance of the Presbyters of the City, did all make but one Church with the City. Whereof we have this two-fold evidence. *First*, From the *Eulogiæ* which were at first parcels of the Bread consecrated for the Lord's Supper, which were sent by the *Deacons* or *Acoluthi* to those that were absent, in token of their Communion in the same Church. *Justin Martyr* is the first who acquaints us with this custom of the Church; *After*, saith he, *the President of the Assembly hath consecrated the Bread and the Wine, the Deacons stand ready to distribute it to every one present,* καὶ τοῖς μὴ παροῦσιν ἀποφέρουσι, *and carry it to those that are absent.* *Damasus* attributes the beginning of this custom to *Miltiades* Bishop of *Rome*. *Hic fecit ut oblationes consecratæ per ecclesias ex consecratione Episcopi dirigerentur: quod declaratur fermentum.* So *Innocentius ad Decentium*; *De fermento vero quod die Dominica per titulos mittimus,* &c. *ut se à nostra communione maxime illa die non judicent separatos.* Whereby it appears to have been the custom at *Rome* and other places to send from the Cathedral Church the Bread consecrated to the several Parish Churches, to note their joint-communion in the faith of the Gospel. Neither was it sent only to the several *tituli* in the City, but to the Villages round about, as appears by the *Question* propounded by *Decentius*; although at *Rome* it seems they sent it only to the Churches within the City, as appears by the Answer of *Innocentius:* but *Albaspinæus* takes it for granted as a general custom upon some set days to send these *Eulogiæ* through the whole *Diocese. Nam cum per vicos & agros sparsi & diffusi, ex eadem non possint sumere communione, cuperentque semper unionis Christianæ, & Christi corporis speciem quam possint maximam retinere, solennissimis diebus & festivis ex matrice per parochias benedictus mittebatur panis, ex cujus perceptione communitas quæ inter omnes fideles ejusdem Diœcesis intercedere debet, intelligebatur & representabatur.* Surely then their Dioceses were not very large; if all the several Parishes could communicate on the same Day with what was sent from the Cathedral Church. Afterwards they sent not part of the Bread of the Lord's Supper, but some other in Analogy to that, to denote their mutual contesseration in the faith and communion in the

Apparatus p. 240. de primat. c. 1. p. 10. c. 11. p. 164.

Beza de Minis. grad. c. 2. 24. Blondel. Ap. p. 94.

Apol. 2. p. 97.

Cap. 5.

Observat. L. 1. c. 8.

V. Casaub. Exercit. 16. s. 33. Salmas. App. p. 243.

ſame Church. *Secondly*, It appears that ſtill they were of the ſame Church, by the preſence of the *Clergy* of the Country at the choice of the Biſhop of the City, and at Ordinations, and in Councils. So at the choice of *Boniface*, *Relictis ſinguli titulis ſuis Preſbyteri omnes aderunt qui voluntatem ſuam, hoc eſt Dei judicium proloquantur*, whereby it is evident that all the Clergy had their voices in the choice of the Biſhop. And therefore *Pope Leo* requires theſe things as neceſſary to the ordination of a Biſhop, *Subſcriptio clericorum, Honoratorum teſtimonium, ordinis conſenſus & plebis:* and in the ſame Chapter, ſpeaking of the choice of the Biſhop, he ſaith it was done *ſubſcribentibus plus minus ſeptuaginta Preſbyteris.* And therefore it is obſerved that all the Clergy concurred to the choice even of the Biſhop of *Rome*, till after the time of that *Hildebrand* called *Greg.* 7. in whoſe time *Popery* came to *Age:* thence *Caſaubon* calls it *Hereſin Hildebrandinam.* *Cornelius* Biſhop of *Rome* was choſen *Clericorum pene omnium teſtimonio*; and in the Council at *Rome* under *Sylveſter* it is decreed, that none of the Clergy ſhould be ordained, *niſi cum tota adunata Eccleſia.* Many inſtances are brought from the Councils of *Carthage* to the ſame purpoſe, which I paſs over as commonly known. It was accounted the matter of an accuſation againſt *Chryſoſtom* by his enemies, ὅτι ἄνευ συνεδρίου καὶ παρὰ γνώμην τοῦ κλήρου ποιεῖ τὰς χειροτονίας, *that he ordaineth without the Councel and Aſſiſtance of his Clergy.* The Preſence of the Clergy at Councils hath been already ſhewed. Thus we ſee how, when the Church of the City was enlarged into the Country, the power of the Governors of the Church in the City was extended with it.

Ep. ad Honor. à Preſbyt. Rom.

Ep. 90.

Cypr. ep. 52.

Concil. 3. c. 4. & 5. Con. 2. c. 10, 11.

Photius Cod. 59. n. 15.

§. 5.

The next ſtep obſervable in the Churches increaſe, was *when ſeveral of theſe Churches lying together in one Province did aſſociate one with another.* The Primitive Church had a great eye to the preſerving unity among all the members of it, and thence they kept ſo ſtrict a correſpondency among the ſeveral Biſhops in the *Commercium Formatarum* (the *formula* of writing, which to prevent deceit, may be ſeen in *Juſtellus* his Notes on the *Codex Canonum Eccleſiæ Africanæ*) and for a maintaining of nearer correſpondency among the Biſhops themſelves of a Province, it was agreed among themſelves for the better carrying on of their common Work, to call a Provincial Synod twice every Year to debate all cauſes of concernment there among themſelves, and to agree upon ſuch ways as might moſt conduce to the advancing the common intereſt of Chriſtianity. Of theſe *Tertullian* ſpeaks, *Aguntur præcepta per Græcias illas certis in locis Concilia ex univerſis Eccleſiis, per quæ & altiora quæq; in communi tractantur, & ipſa repreſentatio nominis Chriſtiani magna veneratione celebratur.* Of theſe the *thirty eighth Canon Apoſtolical* (as it is called) expreſly ſpeaks (which Canons though not of authority ſufficient to ground any right upon, may yet be allowed the place of a Teſtimony of the practice of the Primitive Church, eſpecially towards the third Century) Δεύτερον τοῦ ἔτους συνόδους γινέσθω τῶν ἐπισκόπων, καὶ ἀνακρινέτωσαν ἀλλήλως τὰ δόγματα τῆς εὐσεβείας καὶ τὰς ἐμπιπτούσας ἐκκλησιαστικὰς ἀντιλογίας διαλεύετωσαν. *Twice a year a Synod of Biſhops was to be kept for diſcuſſing matters of Faith, and reſolving matters of Practice.* To the ſame purpoſe the Council of *Antioch*, *A. D.* 343. Διὰ τὰς ἐκκλησιαστικὰς χρείας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων διαλύσεις, καλῶς ἔχειν ἔδοξε συνόδους καθ' ἑκάστην ἐπαρχίαν τῶν ἐπισκόπων γίνεσθαι δεύτερον τοῦ ἔτους. To theſe Councils the Preſbyters and Deacons came, as appears by that Canon of the Council of *Antioch*; and in the ſeventh Canon of the *Nicene* Council by *Alphonſus Piſanus* the ſame cuſtom is decreed, but no

Pag. 127.

De jejunio adverſ. Pſych.

Can. Apoſt. cap. 18.

Can. 20. in Cod. Can. 99.

ſuch thing occurs in the *Codex Canonum*, either of *Tilius* or *Juſtellus* his Edition; and the *Arabick* Edition of that Council is conceived to have been compiled above Four hundred years after the Council ſet. But however we ſee evidence enough of this practice of celebrating Provincial Synods twice a year; now in the Aſſembling of theſe Biſhops together for mutual council in their affairs, there was a neceſſity of ſome order to be obſerved. There was no difference as to the power of the Biſhops themſelves, who had all equal authority in their ſeveral Churches, and none over one another. For *Epiſcopatus unus eſt cujus à ſingulis in ſolidum pars tenetur*, as *Cyprian* ſpeaks; and as *Jerome*, *Ubicunq; Epiſcopus fuerit, ſive Romæ, ſive Eugubii, ſive Conſtantinopolis, ſive Rhegii, ſive Alexandriæ, ſive Tanis, ejuſdem eſt meriti, ejuſdem eſt Sacerdotii. Potentia divitiarum & paupertatis humilitas, vel ſublimiorem, vel inferiorem Epiſcopum non facit: Cæterum omnes Apoſtolorum ſucceſſores ſunt.* There being then no difference between them, no man calling himſelf *Epiſcopum Epiſcoporum*, as *Cyprian* elſewhere ſpeaks, ſome other way muſt be found out to preſerve order among them, and to moderate the affairs of the Councils; and therefore it was determined in the Council of *Antioch*, that he that was the Biſhop of the *Metropolis*, ſhould have the honour of Metropolitan among the Biſhops, Διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ μητροπόλει πανταχόθεν συντρέχειν πάντας τοὺς τὰ πράγματα ἔχοντας, ὅθεν ἔδοξε καὶ τῇ τιμῇ προηγεῖσθαι αὐτόν· *becauſe of the great confluence of the people to that City, therefore he ſhould have the preheminence above the reſt.* We ſee how far they are from attributing any Divine Right to *Metropolitans*; and therefore the Rights of Metropolitans are called by the ſixth *Canon* of the *Nicene Council*, τὰ ἀρχαῖα ἔθη, which had been a diſhonourable introduction for the Metropolitan rights, had they thought them grounded upon Apoſtolical inſtitution. Nothing more evident in Antiquity than the honour of *Metropolitans* depending upon their *Sees*; thence when any Cities were raiſed by the Emperor to the honour of *Metropoles*, their Biſhop became a Metropolitan, as is moſt evident in *Juſtiniana prima*, and for it there are *Canons* in the Councils decreeing it; but of this more afterwards. The chief Biſhop of *Africa* was only called *primæ ſedis Epiſcopus:* thence we have a *Canon* in the *Codex Eccleſiæ Africanæ*, Ὥστε τὸν τῆς πρώτης καθέδρας ἐπίσκοπον μὴ λέγεσθαι ἔξαρχον τῶν ἱερέων ἢ ἄκρον ἱερέα, ἢ τοιουτότροπόν τί ποτε· ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐπίσκοπον τῆς πρώτης καθέδρας. *That the Biſhop of the chief See ſhould not be called the Exarch of the Prieſts, or chief Prieſt, or any thing of like nature, but only the Biſhop of the chief Seat.* Therefore it hath been well obſerved, that the *African* Churches did retain longeſt the Primitive ſimplicity and humility among them; and when the voice was ſaid to be heard in the Church upon the flowing in of Riches, *Hodie venenum effuſum eſt in Eccleſiam*, by the working of which poyſon the ſpirits of the Prelates began to ſwell with pride and ambition (as is too evident in Church-Hiſtory) only *Africa* eſcaped the infection moſt, and reſiſted the tyrannical incroachments of the *Roman* Biſhop, with the greateſt magnanimity and courage, as may be ſeen by the excellent Epiſtle of the *Council* of *Carthage*, to *Boniface* Biſhop of *Rome* in the *Codex Eccleſiæ Africanæ*. So that however *Africa* hath been always fruitful of monſters; yet in that ambitious age it had no other wonder but only this, that it ſhould eſcape ſo free from that *typhus ſæcularis* (as then they called it) that monſtrous itch of pride and ambition. From whence we may well riſe to the laſt ſtep of the power of the Church, which was after the Empire

De veritate Eccleſ.

Ep. ad Evagrium.

Can. 17.

Can 39.

Pag. 341.

grew Christian, and many Provinces did associate together, then the honour and power of *Patriarchs* came upon the stage. And now began the whole Christian world to be the *Cock-pit*, wherein the two great *Prelates* of *Rome* and *Constantinople* strive with their greatest force for mastery of one another, and the whole world with them; as may be seen in the actions of *Paschasinus* the *Roman Legat* in the *Council* of *Chalcedon*. From whence forward the great *Leviathan* by his tumbling in the Waves, endeavoured to get the Dominion of all into his hands: but God hath at last put a hook into his nostrils, and raised up the great instruments of Reformation, who like the Sword-fish have so pierced into his Bowels, that by his tumbling he may only hasten his approaching ruine, and give the Church every day more hopes of seeing its self freed from the tyranny of an usurped power. By this scheme and draught now of the increase of the Churches power, nothing can be more evident, than that it rose not from any divine institution, but only from positive and Ecclesiastical Laws made according to the several states and conditions wherein the Church was; which as it gradually grew up, so was the power of the Church by mutual consent fitted to the state of the Church in its several ages. Which was the first argument that the Primitive Church did not conceive it self bound to observe any one unalterable form of Government. This being the chief, the rest that follow, will sooner be dispatched.

The *second* is from the great varieties as to Government which were in several Churches. What comes from Divine right is observed unalterably in one uniform and constant tenour: but what we find so much diversified according to several places, we may have ground to look on only as an Ecclesiastical constitution, which was followed by every Church as it judged convenient. Now as to Church Government we may find some Churches without Bishops for a long time, some but with one Bishop in a whole Nation, many Cities without any, where Bishops were common; many Churches discontinue Bishops for a great while where they had been; no certain rule observed for modelling their Dioceses where they were still continued. Will not all these things make it seem very improbable that it should be an Apostolical institution, that no Church should be without a Bishop? First then some whole Nations seem to have been without any Bishops at all, if we may believe their own Historians. So if we may believe the great *Antiquaries* of the Church of *Scotland*, that Church was governed by their *Culdei*, as they called their Presbyters, without any Bishop over them, for a long time. *Johannes Major* speaks of their instruction in the Faith, *Per Sacerdotes & Monachos sine Episcopis Scoti in fide eruditi*; but lest that should be interpreted only of their conversion, *Johannes Fordonus* is clear and full as to their Government, from the time of their conversion about *A. D.* 263. to the coming of *Palladius A. D.* 430. that they were only governed by Presbyters and Monks. *Ante Palladii adventum habebant Scoti fidei Doctores ac Sacramentorum Ministratores Presbyteros solummodo, vel Monachos ritum sequentes Ecclesiæ primitivæ.* So much mistaken was that learned man, who saith, that neither *Bede* nor any other affirm that the *Scots* were formerly ruled by a Presbytery, or so much as that they had any Presbyter among them. Neither is it any ways sufficient to say that these Presbyters did derive their authority from some Bishops: For however we see here a Church governed without such, or if they had any, they were only chosen from their *Culdei*, much after the custom

§. 6.

De gestis Scot. lib. 1. cap. 2.

Scot. chron. lib. 3. c. 8.

V. Blondel. Apol. f. 3. pag. 314.

of the Church of *Alexandria*, as *Hector Boethius* doth imply. And if we believe *Philostorgius*, the *Gothick* Churches were planted and governed by Presbyters for above seventy years; for so long it was from their first conversion to the time of *Ulphilas*, whom he makes their first Bishop. And great probability there is, that where Churches were planted by Presbyters, as the Church of *France* by *Andochius* and *Inigmus*, that afterwards upon the increase of Churches and Presbyters to rule them, they did from among themselves chuse one to be as the Bishop over them, as *Pothinus* was at *Lyons*. For we no where read in those early plantations of Churches, that where there were Presbyters already, they sent to other Churches to derive Episcopal ordination from them. Now for whole Nations having but one Bishop, we have the testimony of *Sozomen*, that in *Scythia*, which by the *Romans* was called *Masia inferior*, πολλαὶ πόλεις ὄντες ἕνα πάντες ἐπίσκοπον ἔχουσιν. *Although there were many Cities they had but one Bishop.* The like *Godignus* relates of the Abassine Churches, though their Territories be of vast extent, there is but only one Bishop in all those Dominions, who is the Bishop of *Abuna*. And where Bishops were most common, it is evident they looked not on it as an Apostolical rule for every City to have a Bishop, which it must have if it was an Apostolical institution for the Church to follow the Civil Government. *Theodoret* mentions 800 Churches under his charge, in whose *Diocese Ptolomy* placeth many other Cities of note besides *Cyrus*, as *Ariseria*, *Regia*, *Ruba*, *Heraclea*, &c. In the Province of *Tripoly* he reckons nine Cities which had but five Bishops, as appears by the *Notitia Ecclesiæ Africanæ*. In *Thracia* every Bishop had several Cities under him. The Bishop of *Heraclea* that and *Panion*; the Bishop of *Byze* had it and *Arcadiopolis*; of *Cela* had it and *Callipolis*; *Sabsadia* had it and *Aphrodisias*. It is needless to produce more instances of this nature, either ancient or modern, they being so common and obvious. But farther we find Bishops discontinued for a long time in the greatest Churches. For if there be no Church without a Bishop, where was the Church of *Rome* when from the Martyrdom of *Fabian*, and the banishment of *Lucius*, the Church was governed only by the Clergy? So the Church of *Carthage* when *Cyprian* was banished; the Church of the East, when *Meletius* of *Antioch*, *Eusebius*, *Samosatenus*, *Pelagius* of *Laodicea*, and the rest of the orthodox Bishops were banished for ten years space, and *Flavianus* and *Diodorus*, two Presbyters, ruled the Church of *Antioch* the mean while. The Church of *Carthage* was twenty four years without a Bishop in the time of *Humerik*, King of the *Vandals*; and when it was offered them that they might have a Bishop upon admitting the *Arians* to a free exercise of their Religion among them, their answer was upon those terms, *Ecclesia Episcopum non delectatur habere*; and *Balsamon* speaking of the Christian Churches in the East, determines it neither safe nor necessary in their present state to have Bishops set up over them. And lastly, for their *Dioceses*, it is evident there was no certain rule for modelling them. In some places they were far less than in others. Generally in the Primitive and Eastern Churches they were very small and little, as far more convenient for the end of them in the Government of the Churches under the Bishop's charge; it being observed out of *Walafridus Strabo* by a learned man, *Fertur in Orientis partibus per singulas urbes & præfecturas singulas esse Episcoporum gubernationes.* In *Africk*, if we look but into the writings of *Augustine*, we may find hundreds of Bishops resorting to one Council. In *Ireland* alone, St. *Patrick* is

Scot. hist. lib. 6. Eclog. l. 2. cap. 5.

Hist. eccles. l. 7. cap. 19. De rebus Abassin. l. 1. c. 32.

Ep. 113. Geog. l. 5. cap. 15.

Ephes. Synod. 1. ad fin. Act. 7.

Cyprian. ep. 3. 26. 30, 31.

Theodoret. l. 4. c. 22.

Victor. l. 2. de pers. Vand.

In Can. 57. Laod.

Therndike's right of the Ch. p. 62.

De rebus Eccles. ast.

ſaid by *Ninius*, at the firſt Plantation of Chriſtianity, to have founded 365 Biſhopricks. So *Sozomen* tells us, that among the *Arabians* and *Cyprians*, *Novatians* and *Montaniſts*, Ἐν κώμαις ἐπίσκοποι ἱερᾶνται, the very Villages had Biſhops among them. *Lib. 7. c. 19.*

§. 7. The next evidence that the Church did not look upon it ſelf as bound by a Divine Law to obſerve any one Model of Government, is the conforming the Eccleſiaſtical Government to the Civil. For if the obligation aroſe from a Law of God, that muſt not be altered according to civil Conſtitutions, which are variable according to the different ſtate and conditions of things. If then the Apoſtles did ſettle things by a ſtanding Law in their own times, how comes the Model of Church-Government to alter with the Civil Form? Now that the Church did generally follow the Civil Government, is freely acknowledged and inſiſted on by learned perſons of all ſides; eſpecially after the diviſion of the *Roman* Empire by *Conſtantine* the Great. The full making out of which is a work too large to be here undertaken, and hath been done to very good purpoſe already, by *Berterius*, *Salmaſius*, *Gothofred*, *Blondel*, and others, in their learned Diſcourſes of the *Suburbicarian Provinces*. Which whether by them we underſtand that which did correſpond to the Præfecture of the *Provoſt* of *Rome*, which was within a hundred miles compaſs of the City of *Rome*, or that which anſwered to the *Vicarius Urbis*, whoſe Juriſdiction was over the Ten Provinces diſtinct from *Italy*, properly ſo called, whoſe *Metropolis* was *Milan*; or, which is moſt probable, the Metropolitan Province anſwering to the Juriſdiction of the *Præfectus Urbis*, and the *Patriarchate* of the *Roman* Biſhop to the *Vicarius Urbis*: which way ſoever we take it, we ſee it anſwered to the Civil Government. I ſhall not here enter that debate, but only briefly at preſent ſet down the Scheme of both Civil and Eccleſiaſtical Government, as it is repreſented by our learned *Breerwood*. The whole Empire of *Rome* was divided into Thirteen Dioceſes, whereof ſeven belonged to the *Eaſt* Empire, and ſix (beſide the Præfecture of the City of *Rome*) to the *Weſt*. Thoſe Thirteen *Dioceſes*, together with that Præfecture, contained among them 120 Provinces, or thereabout; ſo that to every Dioceſe belonged the adminiſtration of ſundry Provinces: Laſtly, Every Province contained many Cities within their Territories. The Cities had for their Rulers thoſe inferior Judges, which in the Law are called *Defenſores Civitatum*; and their Seats were the Cities themſelves, to which all the Towns and Villages in their ſeveral Territories were to reſort for Juſtice. The Provinces had for theirs, either *Proconſules*, or *Conſulares*, or *Præſides*, or *Correctores*; four ſundry appellations, but almoſt all of equal Authority, and their Seats were the chiefeſt Cities or *Metropoles* of the Provinces, of which in every Province there was one, to which all inferior Cities for judgment in matters of importance did reſort. Laſtly, The Dioceſes had for theirs the Lieutenants called *Vicarii*, and their Seats were the *Metropoles* or principal Cities of the *Dioceſe*, whence the Edicts of the Emperour or other Laws were publiſhed and ſent abroad into all the Provinces of the *Dioceſe*, and where the *Prætorium* and chief Tribunal for Judgment was placed to determine Appeals, and miniſter Juſtice (as might be occaſion) to all the Provinces belonging to that Juriſdiction. And this was the diſpoſition of the *Roman* Governours.——— And truly it is wonderful, (ſaith that learned Author) how nearly and exactly the Church in her Government did imitate this civil Ordination of the

Berteri. Pithanöv. Diatribæ. Salmaſ. ep. ad Am. Euchariſti. adver. Sirmond. De prim. Pan. Jac. Gothof. Conjectur. Vindiciæ Conjectur. Blondel. de la primauté en la egliſe, &c.

Diſcourſe of the Patriarchal Government of the ancient Chur. *q. 1.*

the *Roman* Magiſtrates. For firſt in every City, as there was a *Defenſor Civitatis* for ſecular Government, ſo was there placed a Biſhop for Spiritual Regiment, (in every City of the Eaſt, and in every City of the Weſt, almoſt a ſeveral Biſhop) whoſe Juriſdiction extended but to the City, and the places within the Territory. For which cauſe the Juriſdiction of a Biſhop was anciently called Παροικία, ſignifying not (as many ignorant Noveliſts think) *a Pariſh:* as now the word is taken, that is, the Places or Habitations near a Church, but the Towns and Villages near a City: all which, together with the City, the Biſhop had in charge. *Secondly*, In every Province, as there was a Preſident, ſo there was an Archbiſhop, and becauſe his Seat was the principal City of the *Province*, he was commonly known by the name of *Metropolitan*. *Laſtly*, In every *Dioceſe*, as there was a *Lieutenant-General*, ſo was there a Primate ſeated alſo in the principal City of the *Dioceſe*, as the *Lieutenant* was, to whom the laſt determining of *Appeals* from all the Provinces in differences of the Clergy, and the ſovereign care of all the *Dioceſes*, for ſundry points of Spiritual Government did belong. By this you may ſee that there were Eleven Primates beſides the Three Patriarchs for the Thirteen *Dioceſes*, (beſides the Præfecture of the City of *Rome*, which was adminiſtred by the Patriarch of *Rome*) that of *Egypt* was governed by the Patriarch of *Alexandria*, and that of the *Orient* by the Patriarch of *Antiochia*, and all the reſt by the *Primates*, between whom and the Patriarchs was no difference of Juriſdiction and Power, but only of ſome Honour which accrued to them by the dignity of their *Sees*; as is clearly expreſſed in the third *Canon* of the Council of *Conſtantinople*, Τὸν μὲν τοι Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ἐπίσκοπον ἔχειν τὰ πρεσβεῖα τῆς τιμῆς μετὰ τὸν τῆς Ῥώμης ἐπίσκοπον. διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν νέαν Ῥώμην, whereby *Conſtantinople is advanced to the Honorary Title of a Patriarchat next to* Rome, *becauſe it was New* Rome. Whereby it is evident that the Honour belonging to the Biſhop of Old *Rome*, did ariſe from its being the Imperial City. The Honour of the Biſhop riſing, as *Auſtin* ſaith, that of the *Deacons* of *Rome* did, *propter magnificentiam Urbis Romanæ quæ caput eſſe videtur omnium Civitatum.* Hereby now we fully ſee what the original was of the power of *Archbiſhops*, *Metropolitans* and *Patriarchs* in the Church, *viz.* the contemperating the Eccleſiaſtical Government to the Civil.

In Cod. Can. 166.

Queſt. ex utroq. Teſt. q. 101.

§. 8. The next evidence that the Church did not look upon its ſelf as bound by a Divine Law to a certain form of Government, but did order things its ſelf in order to peace and unity, is, that after Epiſcopal Government was ſetled in the Church, yet Ordination by Preſbyters was looked on as valid. For which theſe inſtances may ſuffice. About the year 390, *Johannes Caſſianus* reports, that one *Abbot Daniel*, inferior to none of thoſe who lived in the Deſart of *Scetis*, was made a Deacon, *à B. Paphnutio ſolitudinis ejuſdem Preſbytero: In tantum enim virtutibus ipſius adaugebat, ut quem vitæ meritis ſibi & gratiâ parem noverat, coæquare ſibi etiam Sacerdotii honore feſtinaret. Siquidem nequaquam ferens in inferiore eum miniſterio diutius immorari, optanſque ſibimet ſucceſſorem digniſſimum providere, ſuperſtes cum Preſbyterii honore provexit.* What more plain and evident, than that there a Preſbyter ordained a Preſbyter, which we no where read was pronounced null by *Theophilus*, then Biſhop of *Alexandria*, or any others at that time? It is a known inſtance, that in the ordination of *Pelagius*, firſt Biſhop of *Rome*, there were only two Biſhops concurred, and one Preſbyter, whereas, according to the fourth

Collat. 4. c. 1.

fourth *Canon* of the *Nicene* Council, three Biſhops are abſolutely required for ordination of a Biſhop; either then *Pelagius* was no Canonical Biſhop, and ſo the point of Succeſſion thereby fails in the Church of *Rome*, or elſe a Preſbyter hath the ſame intrinſecal power of ordination which a Biſhop hath, but it is only reſtrained by Eccleſiaſtical Laws. In the time of *Euſtathius*, Biſhop of *Antioch*, which was done *A. D.* 328, as *Jacobus Gothofredus* proves, till the time of the ordination of *Paulinus*, *A. D.* 362. which was for thirty four years ſpace, when the Church was governed by *Paulinus* and his Colleagues withdrawing from the publick Aſſemblies; it will be hard to ſay by whom the ordinations were performed all this while, unleſs by *Paulinus* and his Colleagues. In the year 452, it appears by *Leo* in his Epiſtle to *Ruſticus Narbonenſis*, that ſome Preſbyters took upon them to ordain as Biſhops, about which he was conſulted by *Ruſticus* what was to be done in that caſe with thoſe ſo ordained: *Leo* his reſolution of that caſe is obſervable, *Si qui autem Clerici ab iſtis pſeudo-Epiſcopis in iis Eccleſiis ordinati ſunt, quæ ad proprios Epiſcopos pertinebant, & ordinatio eorum cum conſenſu & judicio præſidentium facta eſt, poteſt rata haberi, ita ut in ipſis Eccleſiis perſeverent.* "Thoſe Clergy-men who were ordained by ſuch as took upon them "the Office of Biſhops, in Churches belonging to proper Biſhops, if the "Ordination were performed by the conſent of the Biſhops, it may be "looked on as valid, and thoſe Preſbyters remain in their Office in the "Church. So that by the conſent *ex poſt facto* of the true Biſhops, thoſe Preſbyters thus ordained, were looked on as lawful Preſbyters, which could not be, unleſs their Ordainers had an intrinſecal power of Ordination, which was only reſtrained by the Laws of the Church; for if they have no power of Ordination, it is impoſſible they ſhould confer any thing by their ordination. If to this It be anſwered, that the validity of their ordination did not depend upon the conſent of the Biſhops, and that Preſbyters may ordain, if delegated thereto by Biſhops, as *Paulinus* might ordain on that account at *Antioch*. It is eaſily anſwered, that this very power of doing it by delegation, doth imply an intrinſecal power in themſelves of doing it. For if Preſbyters be forbidden ordaining others by Scriptures, then they can neither do it in their own perſons, nor by delegation from others. For *quod alicui ſuo nomine non licet, nec alieno licebit:* And that rule of *Cyprian* muſt hold true, *Non aliquid cuiquam largiri poteſt humana indulgentia, ubi intercedit & legem tribuit divina præſcriptio.* There can be no diſpenſing with Divine Laws, which muſt be, if that may be delegated to other perſons, which was required of men in the Office wherein they are. And if Preſbyters have power of conferring nothing by their Ordination, how can an after-conſent of Biſhops make that act of theirs valid, for conferring right and power by it? It appears then, that this power was reſtrained by the Laws of the Church, for preſerving Unity in its ſelf; but yet ſo, that in caſe of neceſſity, what was done by Preſbyters, was not looked on as invalid. But againſt this the caſe of *Iſchyras*, ordained, as it is ſaid, a Preſbyter by *Colluthus*, and pronounced null by the Council of *Alexandria*, is commonly pleaded. but there is no great difficulty in anſwering it. For, *Firſt*, The pronouncing ſuch an Ordination null, doth not evidence that they looked on the power of Ordination, as belonging of divine right only to Biſhops; for we find by many inſtances, that acting in a bare contempt of Eccleſiaſtical Canons was ſufficient to degrade any from being Preſbyters. *Secondly*, If *Iſchyras* had been ordained

Anaſt. Bibl. vit. Pelag. Prim.

Diſſert. in Philoſt. l. 2. cap. 7.

Ep. 92. c. 1.

Reg. juris 67.

Epiſt. 68.

V. Blondel. Ap. p. 325.

dained by a Biſhop, there were circumſtances enough to induce the Council to pronounce it null. *Firſt*, As done out of the Dioceſe, in which caſe Ordinations were nulled by *Concil. Arel. c.* 13. *Secondly*, Done by open and pronouuced Schiſmaticks. *Thirdly*, Done *ſine titulo* ἀπολελυμμένως, and ſo nulled by the Canons then. *Fourthly*, *Colluthus* did not act as a Preſbyter in ordaining, but as a Biſhop of the *Meletian* party in *Cynus*, as the Clergy of *Mareotis* ſpeaking of *Iſchyras* his Ordination, ὑπὸ Κολλούθου τοῦ Πρεσβυτέρου φανταζομένου Ἐπισκοπὴν by *Colluthus* a Preſbyter, making ſhew of being a Biſhop; and is ſuppoſed to have been ordained a Biſhop by *Meletius*. More concerning this may be ſeen in *Blondel*, who fully clears all the particulars here mentioned. So that notwithſtanding this Inſtance, nothing appears, but that the power of Ordination was reſtrained only by Eccleſiaſtical Laws.

Apol. S. 3. à 317. *ad.* 327.

§. 9. The laſt thing to prove that the Church did act upon prudence in Church-Government, is, from the many reſtraints in other caſes made by the Church, for reſtraint of that liberty which was allowed by Divine Laws. He muſt be a ſtranger to the ancient Canons, and Conſtitutions of the Church, that takes not notice of ſuch reſtraints made by Canons, as in reference to obſervation of ſeveral Rites and Cuſtoms in the Churches, determined by the Provincial Synods of the ſeveral Churches; for which purpoſe their Provincial Synods were ſtill kept up in the Eaſtern Church, as appears by the Teſtimony of *Firmilian* in his Epiſtle to *Cyprian*: *Qua ex cauſa neceſſariò apud nos ſit ut per ſingulos annos ſeniores & præpoſiti in unum conveniamus ad diſponenda ea quæ curæ noſtræ commiſſa ſunt. Ut ſi quæ graviora ſunt communi conſilio dirigantur, lapſis quoque fratribus, &c. medela quæratur, non quaſi à nobis remiſſionem peccatorum conſequantur; ſed ut per nos ad intelligentiam delictorum ſuorum convertantur, & Domino pleniùs ſatisfacere cogantur.* The ſeveral Orders about the Diſcipline of the Church were determined in theſe *Synods*; as to which, he that would find a command in Scripture for their Orders about the *Catechumeni*, and *Lapſi*, will take pains to no purpoſe, the Church ordering things it ſelf for the better regulating the ſeveral Churches they were placed over. A demonſtrative argument, that theſe things came not from Divine command, is, from the great diverſity of theſe cuſtoms in ſeveral places: of which beſides *Socrates*, *Sozomen* largely ſpeaks, and may be eaſily gathered from the Hiſtory of the ſeveral Churches: When the Church began to enjoy eaſe and liberty, and thereby had opportunity of enjoying greater conveniency for Councils; we find what matters were determined by thoſe Councils, were entered into a *Codex Canonum* for that purpoſe, which was obſerved next to the Scriptures, not from any obligation of the things themſelves, but from the conduceableneſs of thoſe things (as they judged them) to the preſerving the peace and unity of the Church.

Hiſt. lib. 7. *cap.* 19. *V. Juſtel. Præfat. in Cod. Canonum Univerſ. Eccl.*

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

An Inquiry into the Judgment of Reformed Divines concerning the unalterable Divine Right of particular Forms of Church-Government: wherein it is made appear, that the moſt eminent Divines of the Reformation did never conceive any one Form neceſſary; manifeſted by three Arguments. 1. *From the Judgment of thoſe who make the Form of Church-Government mutable, and to depend upon the Wiſdom of the Magiſtrate and Church. This cleared to have been the Judgment of moſt Divines of the* Church of England *ſince the Reformation. Archbiſhop* Cranmer's *Judgment, with others of the Reformation in* Edward the Sixth's *time, now firſt publiſhed from his authentick* M. S. *The ſame ground of ſetling* Epiſcopacy *in Q.* Elizabeth's *time. The Judgment of Archbiſhop* Whitgift, *Biſhop* Bridges, *Dr.* Loe, *Mr.* Hooker, *largely to that purpoſe, in* King James *his time. The* King's *own opinion. Dr.* Sutcliffe. *Since of* Crakenthorp, *Mr.* Hales, *Mr.* Chillingworth. *The Teſtimony of Foreign Divines to the ſame purpoſe.* Chemnitius, Zanchy. *French Divines,* Peter Moulin, Fregevil, Blondel, Bochartus, Amyraldus. *Other learned Men,* Grotius, *Lord* Bacon, &c. 2. *Thoſe who look upon Equality as the Primitive Form, yet judge Epiſcopacy lawful.* Auguſtane Confeſſion, Melanchton, Articuli Smalcaldici, *Prince of* Anhalt, Hyperius, Hemingius: *The practice of moſt Foreign Churches.* Calvin *and* Beza *both approving Epiſcopacy, and Dioceſan Churches.* Salmaſius, &c. 3. *Thoſe who judge Epiſcopacy to be the Primitive Form, yet look not on it as neceſſary. Biſhop* Jewel, Fulk, Field, *Biſhop* Downham, *Biſhop* Bancroft, *Biſhop* Morton, *Biſhop* Andrews. Saravia, Francis Maſon, *and others. The Concluſion hence laid in order to peace. Principles conducing thereto.* 1. *Prudence muſt be uſed in Church-Government, at laſt confeſſed by all parties. Independents in elective Synods, and Church Covenants, admiſſion of Members, number in Congregations. Preſbyterians in Claſſes and Syniods, Lay-elders,* &c. *Epiſcopal in Dioceſes, Cauſes, Rites,* &c. 2. *That prudence beſt, which comes neareſt Primitive Practice. A Preſidency for life over an Eccleſiaſtical Senate ſhewed to be that form, in order to it. Preſbyteries to be reſtored. Dioceſes leſſened. Provincial Synods kept twice a year. The reaſonableneſs and eaſineſs of Accommodation ſhewed. The whole concluded.*

§. 1. HAving thus far proceeded, through Divine aſſiſtance, in our intended method, and having found nothing determining the neceſſity of any one Form of Government in the ſeveral Laws of Nature and Chriſt, nor in the practice of Apoſtles, or Primitive Church; the only thing poſſible to raiſe a ſuſpition of novelty in this opinion, is, that it is contrary to the judgment of the ſeveral Churches of the Reformation. I know it is the laſt *Aſylum* which many run to, when they are beaten off from their imaginary fancies, by pregnant teſtimonies of Scripture and Reaſon, to ſhelter themſelves under the Αὐτὸς ἔφη of ſome particu-

lar perſons, to whom their underſtandings are bored in perpetual ſlavery: But if Men would but once think their Underſtandings at age to judge for themſelves, and not make them live under a continual Pupillage, and but take the pains to travel over the ſeveral Churches of the Reformation, they would find themſelves freed of many ſtrange miſpriſions they were poſſeſſed with before, and underſtand far better the ground and reaſon of their pitching upon their ſeveral Forms, than they ſeem to do, who found all things upon a Divine Right. I believe there will, upon the moſt impartial ſurvey, ſcarce be one Church of the Reformation brought, which doth imbrace any Form of Government, becuſe it looked upon that Form as only neceſſary by an unalterable ſtanding Law; but every one took up that Form of Government which was judged moſt ſuitable to the ſtate and condition of their ſeveral Churches: But that I may the better make this appear, I ſhall make uſe of ſome arguments whereby to demonſtrate, that the moſt eminent Divines that have lived ſince the Reformation, have been all of this mind, *That no one Form is determined as neceſſary for the Church of God in all Ages of the World.* For if many of them have *in theſi* aſſerted *the Form of Church-Government mutable*; if *thoſe who have thought an equality among Miniſters the Primitive Form, have yet thought a Government by Epiſcopacy lawful and uſeful:* If, laſtly, *thoſe who have been for Epiſcopacy, have not judged it neceſſary*, then I ſuppoſe it will be evident, that none of them have judged any one Form taken excluſively of others, to be founded upon an unalterable right: For whatſoever is ſo founded, is made a neceſſary duty in all Churches to obſerve it, and it is lawful to vary from it, or to change it according to the prudence of the Church, according to the ſtate and condition of it. I now therefore undertake to make theſe things out in their order.

§. 2. Firſt, I begin with thoſe who have *in theſi* aſſerted the mutability of the Form of Church Government. Herein I ſhall not follow the Engliſh humour, to be more acquainted with the ſtate of Foreign places than their own; but it being of greateſt concernment to know upon what accounts Epiſcopal Government was ſetled among our ſelves, in order to our ſubmiſſion to it; I ſhall therefore make enquiry into the judgment of thoſe perſons concerning it, who either have been inſtrumental in ſetling it, or the great defenders of it after its ſettlement. I doubt not but to make it evident, that before theſe late unhappy times, the main ground for ſetling Epiſcopal Government in this Nation, was not accounted any pretence of Divine Right, but the conveniency of that Form of Church Government to the ſtate and condition of this Church at the time of its Reformation: For which we are to conſider, that the Reformation of our Church was not wrought by the Torrent of a popular fury, nor the Inſurrection of one part of the Nation againſt another; but was wiſely, gravely, and maturely debated, and ſetled with a great deal of conſideration. I meddle not with the times of *Henry* 8. when I will not deny but the firſt *quickning* of the Reformation might be, but the matter of it was as yet rude and undigeſted; I date the birth of it from the firſt ſettlement of that moſt excellent Prince *Edward* 6. the *Phoſphorus* of our Reformation. Who *A. D.* 1547. was no ſooner entered upon his Throne, but ſome courſe was preſently taken in order to Reformation. Commiſſioners with Injunctions were diſpatched to the ſeveral parts of the Land; but the

the main buſineſs of the Reformation was referred to the Parliament call'd *November* 4. the ſame year, when all former Statutes about Religion were recall'd, as may be ſeen at large in Mr. *Fox*, and Liberty allowed for profeſſing the Goſpel according to the principles of Reformation, all baniſhed perſons for Religion being call'd home. Upon this, for the better eſtabliſhing of Religion, and the publick Order for the Service of God, an *Aſſembly* of ſelect Divines is call'd, by ſpecial order from the King's Majeſty, for debating of the ſetlement of things according to the Word of God, and the practice of the Primitive Church. Theſe ſate, as Mr. *Fox* tells us in *Windſor-Caſtle*; where, as he expreſſeth it, after long, learned, wiſe, and deliberate Adviſes, they did finally conclude and agree upon one uniform order, *&c.* No more is ſaid by him of it, and leſs by the late Hiſtorian. The proceedings then in order to Reformation, being ſo dark hitherto, and obſcure, by what is as yet extant, much light may accrue thereto by the help of ſome authentick MSS: which by a hand of Providence, have happily come into my hands; wherein the manner and method of the Reformation will be more evident to the World, and the grounds upon which they proceeded. In the *Convocation* that year ſitting with the Parliament, I find two Petitions made to the Archbiſhop and the Biſhops of the Upper Houſe, for the calling an Aſſembly of ſelect Divines, in order to the ſettling Church Affairs, and for the King's Grant for their acting in Convocation. Which not being yet to my knowledge extant in publick, and conducing to our preſent buſineſs, I ſhall now publiſh from the MS. of *Biſhop Cranmer*'s.

Acts and Mon. *Tom* 2. *p.* 657.

Martyrol. in. Tom. 2. *p.* 658,659.

They run thus:

Certeyne Petitions and Requeſts made by the Clergy of the Lower Houſe of the Convocation, to the moſt Reverend Father in God, the Arch-Biſhop of Canterbury*'s Grace, and the Reſidue of the Prelates of the Higher Houſe, for the furtherance of certeyne Articles following.*

Firſt, " That Eccleſiaſtical Laws may be made and eſtabliſhed in this " Realm, by xxxij. perſons, or ſo many as ſhall pleaſe the King's Ma- " jeſty to name and appoint, according to the effect of a late Statute " made in the Thirty fifth year of the moſt noble King, and of moſt " famous memory, King *Henry* the Eighth. So that all Judges Eccle- " ſiaſtical proceeding after thoſe Laws, may be without danger and " peril.

" Alſo that according to the ancient cuſtom of this Realm, and the " Tenor of the King's Writs for the ſummoning of the Parliament, " which be now and ever have been directed to the Biſhops of every " Dioceſe, the Clergy of the Lower Houſe of the Convocation may be " adjoined and aſſociate with the Lower Houſe of Parliament, or elſe " that all ſuch Statutes and Ordinances as ſhall be made concerning all " matters of Religion and Cauſes Eccleſiaſtical, may not paſs without " the ſight and aſſent of the ſaid Clergy.

" Alſo that whereas by the commandment of King *Henry* the Eighth, " certeyne Prelates and other Learned men were appointed to alter the " Service in the Church, and to deviſe other convenient and uniform " order therein, who according to the ſame appointment did make cer- " teyne Books as they be enformed, their requeſt is that the ſaid Books " may be ſeen and peruſed by them for a better expedition of Divine " Service to be ſet furthe accordingly.

" Alſo that Men being called to Spiritual Promotions or Benefices, " may have ſome allowance for their neceſſary living, and other charges " to be ſuſteyned and born concerning the ſaid Benefices in the firſt " year wherein they pay the Firſt-Fruits.

The other is,

" Where the Clergy in the preſent Convocation Aſſembled have made " humble ſuite unto the moſt Reverend Father in God my Lord Arch- " Biſhop of *Canterbury*, and all other Biſhops, That hit may pleaſe " them to be a mean to the King's Majeſty, and the Lord Protector's " Grace, that the ſaid Clergy, according to the tenor of the King's " Will, and the auncient Laws and Cuſtoms of this noble Realm, " might have their rowme and Place, and be aſſociated with the Com- " muns in the nether Houſe of this preſent Parliament, as Members of " the Communwealth, and the King's moſt humble Subjects, and if " this may not be permitted and granted to them, that then no Laws " concerning the Chriſtian Religion, or which ſhall concern eſpecially " the perſons, poſſeſſions, rowmes, lyveings, juriſdictions, goods, or " cattals of the ſaid Clergy may paſs nor be enacted, the ſaid Clergy not " being made privy thereunto, and their anſwers and reaſons not heard. " The ſaid Clergy do moſt humbly beſeech an anſwer and declaration " to be made unto them, what the ſaid moſt Reverend Father in God, " and all other the Biſhops have done in this their humble ſuit and re- " queſt, to the end that the ſaid Clergy, if nede be, may choſe of " themſelf ſuch able and diſcrete perſons which ſhall effectually follow " the ſame ſuite in name of them all.

" And where in a Statute ordained and eſtabliſhed by auctorite of Par- " liament at *Weſtminſter*, in the twenty fifth year of the reign of the " moſt excellent Prince, King *Henry* the Eighth, the Clergy of this " Realm ſubmitting themſelf to the King's Highneſs, did knowledge " and confeſs according to the truth, that the Convocations of the ſame " Clergy hath ben and ought to be aſſembled by the King's Writ; And " did promiſe further *in verbo ſacerdotii*, that they never from thence " forth wolde preſume to attempt, allege, clayme, or put in ure or enact, " promulge or execute any new Canons, Conſtitutions, Ordinances, Pro- " vincials, or other, or by whatſoever other name they ſhall be called " in the Convocation, oneleſs the Kings moſt Royal Aſſent and Liſence " may to them be had, to make, promulge, and execute the ſame. And " his Majeſty to give his moſt Royal Aſſent and Auctorite in that be-

" half

" half upon peyne of every one of the Cleregie doeing the contrary,
" and beinge thereof convict, to ſuffre empriſonment, and make Fine at
" the Kings Will. And that noe Canons, Conſtitutions, or Ordinances
" ſhall be made or put in execution within this Realm by auctorite of
" the Convocation of the Clergy, which ſhall be repugnant to the
" Kings Prerogative Royal, or the Cuſtomes, Laws or Satutes of this
" Realm. Which Statute is eftſoon renewed and eſtabliſhed in the xxvij.
" yere of the Reign of the ſaid moſt noble Kinge, as by the tenor of
" both Statutes more at large will appear, the ſaid Clergie being pre-
" ſently aſſembled in Convocation by auctority of the Kings Writ, doe
" deſire that the Kings Majeſties licence in writeing may be for them ob-
" tained and granted according to the effect of the ſaid Statutes aucto-
" riſeing them to attempt, entreate, and commune of ſuch matters, and
" thetein freely to give their conſents, which otherwiſe they may not
" do, upon paine and peril premiſed.

" Alſo the ſaid Clergie deſireth that ſuch matters as concerneth Re-
" ligione which be diſputable, may be quietly, and in good order rea-
" ſond and diſputed amongſt them in this howſe, whereby the verites
" of ſuch matters ſhall the better appear. And the dowbtes being open-
" ed and reſolutely diſcuſſed, men may be fully perſuaded with the quy-
" etneſs of their Conſciences, and the time well ſpent.

Thus far thoſe Petitions, containing ſome excellent propoſals for a through Reformation. Soon after were called together by the King's ſpecial order, the former ſelect Aſſembly at *Windſor* Caſtle, where met (as far as I can gueſs by the ſeveral Papers delivered in by every one of them ſingly, and ſubſcribed with their own hands, all which I have peruſed) theſe following perſons. *Thomas* Archbiſhop of *Canterbury*, *Edward* Archbiſhop of *Yorke*, the Biſhop of *Rocheſter*, *Edmund* Biſhop of *London*, *Robert* Biſhop of *Carliſle*, Dr. *George Day*, Dr. *Thomas Robertſon*, Dr. *I. Redmayne*, Dr. *Edward Leighton*, Dr. *Symon Matthew*, Dr. *William Treſham*, Dr. *Richard Cozen*, Dr. *Edgeworth*, Dr. *Owen Oglethorp*, Dr. *Thyrleby*. Theſe all gave in their ſeveral reſolution in papers, to the Queſtions propounded, with their names ſubſcribed, (a far more prudent way then the confuſion of verbal and tedious diſputes) all whoſe judgments are accurately ſummed up, and ſet down by the Archbiſhop of *Canterbury* himſelf. Their reſolutions contain diſtinct anſwers to ſeveral ſets of queſtions propounded to them. The firſt Set contained ſeveral queſtions about the Maſs, about the inſtituting, receiving, nature, celebration of it; and whether in the Maſs it be convenient to uſe ſuch ſpeech as the people may underſtand, whether the whole were fit to be tranſlated, or only ſome part of it; with ſeveral other queſtions of the ſame nature. The ſecond Set is more pertinent to our purpoſe, wherein are 17 Queſtions propoſed to be reſolved; Ten of them belong to the number of Sacraments, the other 7 concern Church-Government. The Queſtions are theſe.

" Whether the Apoſtells lacking a higher Power, as in not having a Q. 9.
" Chriſtian King among them, made Biſhoppes by that neceſſity, or by
" auctorite given them of God?

" Whether

10. " Whether Biſhops or Prieſts were firſt; and if the Prieſts were firſt " then the Prieſt made the Biſhop?

11. " Whether a Biſhop hath auctorite to make a Prieſt by the Scrip- " tureor no, and whether any other but only a Biſhop may make a " Prieſt?

12. " Whether in the New-Teſtament be required any Conſecration of a " Biſhop and Prieſt, or only appointeinge to the Office be ſufficient?

13. " Whether (if it be fortuned a Prince Chriſten learned to conquer "" certen domynyons of Infidells, having non but the Temporal lerned " men with him) it be defended by Gods Law, that he and they ſhould " preche and teche the Word of God there or no, and alſo make and " conſtitute Prieſts or no?

14. " Whether it be forfended by Goddes Law, that if it ſo fortuned " that all the Biſhopps and Prieſts were dedde, and that the Word of " God ſhuld there unpreached, the Sacrament of Baptiſme and others " unminiſtred, then the King of that Region ſhulde make Biſhoppes and " Prieſts to ſupply the ſame or noe?

16. " Whether a Biſhop or a Prieſt may excommunicate, and for what " Crimes, and whether they only may excommunicate by Goddes " Law?

Archbiſh. Cranmer's anſw. *ex ipſo ejus autographo.*

Theſe are the Queſtions, to which the Anſwers are ſeverally returned in diſtinct Papers, all of them bound together in a large Volume by Archbiſhop *Cranmer*; and every one ſubſcribed their Names, and ſome their Seals, to the Papers delivered in. It would be too tedious a work to ſet down their ſeveral opinions at large; only for the deſerved reverence all bear to the name and memory of that moſt worthy Prelate, and glorious Martyr, *Archbiſhop Cranmer*, I ſhall ſet down his Anſwer diſtinctly to every one of theſe Queſtions, and the Anſwers of ſome others to the more material queſtions to our purpoſe.

To the 9. Q. " All Chriſtian Princes have committed unto them im- " mediately of God the holle cure of all their ſubjects, as well concerning " the adminiſtration of Goddes Word for the cure of Soul, as concern- " ing the miniſtration of things Political, and civil Governaunce.

" And in both theis Miniſtrations thei muſt have ſondry Miniſters " under them to ſupply that which is appointed to their ſeveral Office.

" The Cyvile Miniſters under the Kings Majeſty in this Realm of " *England*, be thoſe whom yt ſhall pleaſe his Highneſs for the tyme to " put in auctorite under him; as for example, the Lord Chancellor, " Lord Treaſurer, Lord Greate Maſter, Lord Privy Seal, Lord Admy- " rall, Mayres, Shryves, *&c.*

" The Miniſters of Gods Wourde under His Majeſty be the Biſhops,
" Parſons, Vicars, and ſuch other Prieſts as be appointed by his High-
" neſs, to that Miniſtration; as for example, the Biſhop of *Canterbury*,
" the Biſhop of *Dureſme*, the Biſhop of *Wincheſter*, the Parſon of *Wyn-*
" *wicke*, &c.

" All the ſaid Officers and Miniſters, as well of th'one ſorte as the
" other, be appointed, aſſigned, and elected in every place, by the Laws
" and Orders of Kings and Princes.

" In the admiſſion of many of theſe Officers bee divers comely Cere-
" monies and Solemnities uſed, which be not of neceſſity, but only for
" a goodly order and ſemely faſhion. For if ſuch Offices and Miniſtra-
" tions were committed without ſuch ſolemnitye, thei were nevertheles
" truely committed.

" And there is no more promiſe of God, that Grace is given in the
" committing of the Eccleſiaſtical Office, then it is the committing of
" the Cyvile. In the Apoſtles time, when there was no Chriſtien Prin-
" ces by whoſe authority Miniſters of Gods Word might be appointed,
" nor ſynnes by the ſword corrected; there was no remedy then for the
" correction of Vice, or appointeinge of Miniſters, but only the conſent
" of Chriſtien multitude amonge themſelfe, by an uniform conſent to
" follow the advice and perſwaſion of ſuch perſons whom God had moſt
" endued with the ſpirit of Wiſdom and Counſaile. And at that time,
" for as much as Chriſtien people had no Sword nor Governour among
" them, thei were conſtrained of neceſſity to take ſuch Curates and
" Prieſts, as either they knew themſelfes to be meet thereunto, or elſe
" as were commended unto them by other, that were ſo replete with
" the Spirit of God, with ſuch knowledge in the profeſſion of Chriſt,
" ſuch Wiſdom, ſuch Converſation and Councell, that they ought even
" of very Conſcience to give credit unto them, and to accept ſuch as
" by theym were preſented. And ſo ſome tyme the Apoſtles and other
" unto whom God had given abundantly his Spirit, ſent or appointed
" Miniſters of Gods Word, ſometime the people did choſe ſuch as they
" thought meet thereunto. And when any were appointed or ſent by
" the Apoſtles or other, the People of their awne voluntary will with
" thanks did accept them; not for the Supremitie, Imperie, or Domini-
" on, that the Apoſtells had over them to command as their Princes,
" or Maſters: but as good people, ready to obey the advice of good
" Counſellors, and to accept, any thing that was neceſſary for their edi-
" fication and benefit.

" The Biſhops and Prieſts were at one time, and were not two things, Anſwer to the 10 Q.
" but both one Office in the beginning of Chriſts Religion.

" A Biſhop may make a Prieſt by the Scriptures, and ſo may Prin- 11.
" ces and Governors alſoe, and that by the auctority of God committed
" them, and the People alſoe by their Election. For as we reade that
" Biſhops have done it, ſo Chriſtien Emperors and Princes uſually have
" done

" done it. And the people before Chriſtien Princes were, commonly " did elect their Biſhops and Prieſts.

12. " In the New Teſtament, he that is appointed to be a Biſhop or a " Prieſt, needeth no conſecration by the Scripture; for election or ap- " pointing thereto is ſufficient.

13. " It is not againſt Gods Law, but contrary they ought indede ſo to " do, and there be hiſtoryes that witneſſeth, that ſome Chriſtien Princes " and other Lay-men unconſecrate have done the ſame.

14. " It is not forbidden by Gods Law.

16. " A Byſhop or a Prieſt by the Scripture, is neither commanded nor " forbidden to excommunicate. But where the Laws of any Region " giveth him authoritie to excommunicate, there thei ought to uſe the " ſame, in ſuch crimes as the Laws have ſuch authoritie in. And " where the Laws of the Region forbiddeth them, there they have none " authoritie at all. And thei that be no Prieſts may alſo excommuni- " cate, if the Law allow thereunto. Thus far that excellent perſon, in whoſe judgment nothing is more clear, than his aſcribing the particular form of Government in the Church to the determination of the Supreme Magiſtrate. This judgment of his, is thus ſubſcribed by him with his own hand.

T. Cantuarienſ. *This is mine opinion and ſentence at this preſent, which I do not temerariouſly define, but do remitt the judgment thereof holly to your Majeſty.*

Which I have exactly tranſcribed out of the Original, and have obſerved generally the form of writing at that time uſed. In the ſame MS. it appears, that the *Biſhop of St. Aſaph*, *Therleby*, *Redman*, and *Cox*, were all of the ſame opinion with the Archbiſhop, that at firſt Biſhops and Preſbyters were the ſame; and the two latter expreſly cite the opinion of *Jerome* with approbation. Thus we ſee by the teſtimony, chiefly of him who was inſtrumental in our Reformation, that he owned not Epiſcopacy as a diſtinct order from Preſbytery of Divine Right, but only as a prudent conſtitution of the Civil Magiſtrate for the better governing in the Church.

§. 3. We now proceed to the re-eſtabliſhment of Church-Government under our moſt happy Queen *Elizabeth*. After our Reformation had truly undergone the fiery tryal in Queen *Mary*'s days, and by thoſe flames was made much more refined and pure, as well as ſplendid and illuſtrious: In the articles of Religion agreed upon, our Engliſh Form of Church-Government was only determined to be agreeable to God's Holy Word, which had been a very low and diminiſhing expreſſion, had they looked on it as abſolutely preſcribed and determined in Scripture, as the only neceſſary Form to be obſerved in the Church. The firſt who ſolemnly appeared in vindication of the Engliſh *Hierarchy* was *Arch-Biſhop Whitgift*, a ſage and prudent perſon, whom we cannot ſuppoſe either

either ignorant of the ſenſe of the Church of *England*, or afraid or unwilling to defend it. Yet he frequently againſt *Cartwright* aſſerts, *that the form of diſcipline is not particularly and by name ſet down in Scripture:* And again, *No kind of Government is expreſſed in the word, or can neceſſarily be concluded from thence*, which he repeats over again. *No form of Church-Government is by the Scriptures preſcribed to, or commanded the Church of God.* And ſo Dr. *Coſins* his *Chancellor*, in *Anſwer to the Abſtract. All Churches have not the ſame form of Diſcipline, neither is it neceſſary that they ſhould, ſeeing it cannot be proved that any certain particular form of Church-Government is commended to us by the Word of God.* To the ſame purpoſe Dr. *Loe*, *Complaint of the Church. No certain form of Government is preſcribed in the Word, only general Rules laid down for it.* Biſhop *Bridges*, *God hath not expreſſed the form of Church-Government, at leaſt not ſo as to bind us to it.* They who pleaſe but to conſult the *third* Book of learned and judicious Mr. *Hooker*'s *Eccleſiaſtical Polity*, may ſee the mutability of the form of Church-Government largely aſſerted and fully proved. Yea this is ſo plain and evident to have been the chief opinion of the Divines of the Church of *England*, that *Parker* looks on it as one of the main foundations of the *Hierarchy*, and ſets himſelf might and main to oppoſe it, but with what ſucceſs, we have already ſeen. If we come lower, to the time of King *James*, His Majeſty himſelf declared it in print, as his judgment; *Chriſtiano cuiq; Regi, Principi ac Reipublicæ conceſſum, externam in rebus Eccleſiaſticis regiminis formam ſuis præſcribere, quæ ad civilis adminiſtrationis formam quam proximè accedat.* That the Civil power in any Nation, hath the right of preſcribing what external form of Church-Government it pleaſe, which doth moſt agree to the Civil Form of Government in the State. Dr. *Sutcliffe de Preſbyterio* largely diſputes againſt thoſe who aſſert that Chriſt hath laid down certain immutable Laws for Government in the Church. *Crakanthorpe* againſt *Spalatenſis* doth aſſert the mutability of ſuch things as are founded upon Apoſtolical tradition; *Traditum igitur ab Apoſtolis, ſed traditum & mutabile, & pro uſu ac arbitrio Eccleſiæ mutandum.* To the like purpoſe ſpeak the forecited Authors, as their teſtimonies are extant in *Parker*, *Biſhop Bridges*, *Num unumquodq; exemplum Eccleſiæ Primitivæ præceptum aut mandatum faciat?* And again, *Forte rerum nonnullarum in Primitiva Eccleſia exemplum aliquod oſtendere poſſunt, ſed nec id ipſum generale, ne ejuſdem perpetuam regulam aliquam, quæ omnes Eccleſias & ætates omnes ad illud exemplum aſtringat.* So *Archbiſhop Whitgift. Ex facto aut exemplo legem facere iniquum eſt. Nunquam licet, inquit Zuinglius, à facto ad jus argumentari.* By which principles the Divine Right of Epiſcopacy as founded upon Apoſtolical practice, is quite ſubverted and deſtroyed. To come nearer to our own unhappy times: Not long before the breaking forth of thoſe never ſufficiently to be lamented inteſtine Broils, we have the judgment of two learned, judicious, rational Authors fully diſcovered as to the point in queſtion. The firſt is that incomparable man, Mr. *Hales*, in his often cited *Tract of Schiſm*, whoſe words are theſe: *But that other head of Epiſcopal Ambition concerning Supremacy of Biſhops in divers Sees, one claiming*

Pag. 3. *Pag.* 77. *Pag.* 81, 82, 83, 84. *Pag.* 658. *Pag.* 58. *P.* 64, 66. *Church Gov. pag.* 164. *De Polit. Eccleſ. l.* 2. *c.* 39, *&c.* *C.* 11. *p.* 66. *Defen. Eccl. Angl. c.* 28. §. 12. *De Polit. Eccleſ. l.* 2. *c.* 42. *Page* 13.

ming Supremacy over another, as it hath been from time to time a great treſpaſs againſt the Church's peace, ſo it is now the final ruin of it: The Eaſt and Weſt through the fury of the two prime Biſhops, being irremediably ſeparated without all hope of reconcilement. And beſides all this miſchief, it is founded on a Vice contrary to all Chriſtian humility, without which no man ſhall ſee his Saviour. For they do but abaſe themſelves and others, that would perſuade us, that Biſhops by Chriſt's inſtitution have any ſuperiority over men, farther than of Reverence, or that any Biſhop is ſuperior to another, farther than poſitive order agreed upon among Chriſtians hath preſcribed: for we have believed him that hath told us, that in Jeſus Chriſt there is neither high nor low: and that in giving honours every man ſhould be ready to prefer another before himſelf: which ſaying cuts off all claim certainly of ſuperiority, by title of Chriſtianity, except men think that theſe things were ſpoken only to poor and private men. Nature and Religion agree in this, that neither of them hath a hand in this Heraldry of ſecundum ſub & ſupra; *all this comes from compoſition and agreement of men among themſelves; wherefore this abuſe of Chriſtianity to make it a Lacquey to Ambition, is a Vice for which I have no extraordinary name of ignominy, and an ordidinary I will not give it, leſt you ſhould take ſo tranſcendent a Vice to be but trivial.* Thus that grave and wiſe perſon, whoſe words favour of a more than ordinary tincture of a true ſpirit of Chriſtianity, that ſcorns to make Religion a footſtool to pride and ambition. We ſee plainly he makes all difference between Church-Officers to ariſe from conſent of parties, and not from any Divine Law. To the ſame purpoſe Mr. *Chillingworth* propounds this Queſtion among many others to his Adverſary: *Whether any one kind of theſe external Forms and Orders and Government be ſo neceſſary to the being of a Church, but that they may be diverſe in diverſe places, and that a good and peaceable Chriſtian may and ought to ſubmit himſelf to the Government of the place where he lives, whoſoever he be?* Which Queſtion according to the tenour of the reſt to which it is joined, muſt as to the former part be reſolved in the Negative, and as to the latter in the *Affirmative*. Which is the very thing I have been ſo long in proving of, *viz.* that no one form of Church-Government is ſo neceſſary to the being of a Church, but that a good and peaceable Chriſtian may and ought to conform himſelf to the Government of that place where he lives. So much I ſuppoſe may ſuffice to ſhew that the opinion which I have aſſerted, is no ſtranger in our own Nation, no not among thoſe who have been profeſſed defenders of the Eccleſiaſtical Government of this Church.

Chillingw. Ep. 1. ch. 6. §. 39.

§. 4. Having thus far acquainted our ſelves with the ſtate and cuſtoms of our own Country, we may be allowed the liberty of viſiting foreign Churches, to ſee how far they concur with us in the matter in queſtion. The firſt perſon whoſe judgment we ſhall produce aſſerting the mutability of the form of Church-Government, is that great light of the *German* Church, *Chemnitius*, whom *Brightman* had ſo high an opinion of as to make him to be one of the Angels in the Churches of the *Revelation*. He diſcourſing about the Sacrament of Order, as the *Papiſts* call it, lays down theſe following

Hypotheſes

Hypotheſes as certain truths. 1. *Non eſſe Dei verbo mandatum qui vel quot tales gradus ſeu ordines eſſe debent.* 2. *Non fuiſſe tempore Apoſtolorum in omnibus Eccleſiis & ſemper eoſdem & totidem gradus ſeu ordines, id quod ex Epiſtolis Pauli ad diverſas Eccleſias ſcriptis manifeſtè colligitur.* 3. *Non fuit tempore Apoſtolorum talis diſtributio graduum illorum, quin ſæpius unus & idem omnia illa officia, quæ ad miniſterium pertinent, ſuſtineret. Liberæ igitur fuerunt Apoſtolorum tempore tales ordinationes habitâ ratione ordinis, decori & ædificationis, &c. Illud Apoſtolorum exemplum Primitiva Eccleſia eadem ratione & ſimili libertate imitata eſt. Gradus enim officiorum miniſterii diſtributi fuerunt: non autem eadem plane ratione ſicut in Corinthiaca vel Epheſina Eccleſia, ſed pro ratione circumſtantiarum cujuſq; Eccleſiæ, unde colligitur quæ fuerit in diſtributione illorum graduum libertas.* Exam. Con. Trid. cap. 2. de ſacram. ord. can. 1. 413, 414.

The main thing he aſſerts, is, the Churches freedom and liberty as to the orders and degrees of thoſe who ſuperintend the affairs of the Church, which he builds on a threefold foundation, 1. *That the word of God no where commands, what or how many degrees and orders of Miniſters there ſhall be.* 2. *That in the Apoſtles times, there was not the like number in all Churches, as is evident from* Paul's *Epiſtles.* 3. *That in the Apoſtles times, in ſome places, one perſon did manage the ſeveral Offices belonging to a Church.* Which three Propoſitions of this *learned Divine*, are the very baſis and foundation of all our foregoing diſcourſe, wherein we have endeavoured to prove theſe ſeveral things at large. The ſame learned perſon hath a ſet diſcourſe to ſhew how by degrees the offices in the Church did riſe, not from any ſet or ſtanding Law, but for the convenient managery of the Church's affairs, and concludes his diſcourſe thus, *Et hæc prima graduum ſeu ordinum origo in Eccleſia Apoſtolica oſtendit quæ cauſa, quæ ratio, quis uſus & finis eſſe debeat hujuſmodi ſeu graduum, ſeu ordinum; ut ſcilicet pro ratione cœtûs Eccleſiaſtici, ſingula officia qua ad miniſterium pertinent, commodius, rectius, diligentius, & ordine cum aliqua gravitate ad ædificationem obeantur.* Pag. 413. The ſum is, *It appears by the practice of the Apoſtolical Church, that the ſtate, condition and neceſſity of every particular Church, ought to be the Standard and Meaſure what Offices and degree of perſons ought to be in it.* As to the uncertain number of Officers in the Churches in Apoſtolical times, we have a full and expreſs teſtimony of the famous *Centuriators* of *Magdeburge*. *Quot vero in qualibet Eccleſia perſonæ Miniſterio functiæ ſint, non eſt in hiſtoriis annotatum, nec uſquam eſt præceptum, ut æque multi in ſingulis eſſent, ſed prout paucitas aut multitudo cœtus poſtulavit, ita pauciores aut plures ad miniſterium eccleſiæ ſunt adhibiti.* Cent. 1. l. 2. cap. 7. We ſee by them there is no other certain rule laid down in Scripture, what number of perſons ſhall act in the governing every Church; only general prudence according to the Churches neceſſity, was the ground of determining the number then, and muſt be ſo ſtill. The next perſon whoſe judgment is fully on our ſide, is a perſon both of learning and moderation, and an earneſt reſtorer of Diſcipline as well as Doctrine in the Church. I mean *Hieron Zanchy*, who in ſeveral places hath expreſſed his judgment to the purpoſe we are now upon. The fulleſt place is in his *Confeſſion of Faith*,

penned by him in the seventieth year of his age; and if ever a man speaks his mind, it must be certainly when he professeth his judgment in a solemn manner by way of his last Will and Testament to the world (that when the *Soul* is going into another world, he may leave his *mind* behind him.) Thus doth *Zanchy* in that Confession, in which he declares this to be his judgment as to the form of Church-Government; That in the Apostles times there were but two orders under them, *viz.* of Pastors and Teachers: but presently subjoyns these words, *Interea tamen non improbamus Patres, quod juxta variam, tum verbi dispensandi, tum regendæ Ecclesiæ rationem, varios quoque ordines ministrorum multiplicârint, quando id iis liberum fuit, sicut, & nobis; & quando constat id ab illis factum honestis de causis, ad ordinem, ad decorum & ad ædificationem ecclesiæ pro eo tempore pertinentibus.* And in the next Section, *Novimus enim Deum nostrum Deum esse ordinis non confusionis, & ecclesiam servari ordine, perdi autem* ἀταξία, *qua de causa multos etiam & diversos, non solum olim in Israele, verum etiam post in ecclesia ex Judæis & Gentibus collecta, ministrorum ordines instituit; & eandem etiam ob causam, liberum reliquit Ecclesiis, ut plures adderent vel non adderent, modo ad ædificationem fieret.* He asserts it to be in the Church's power and liberty to add several orders of Ministers according as it judgeth them to tend to edification; and saith, he is far from condemning the Course of the Primitive Church in erecting one as Bishop over the Presbyters, for better managing Church affairs; yea Arch-Bishops, Metropolitans, and Patriarchs as instituted by the Primitive Church before the *Nicene Council*, he thinks may be both excused and defended, although afterward they degenerated into Tyranny and Ambition. And in his *observations* upon his *confession*, penned chiefly upon the occasion of the exceptions of *Magnus quidem Vir* (some will guess who that was) taken at the free delivery of his mind concerning the Polity of the Primitive Church, he hath expressions to this purpose: That what was unanimously determined by the Primitive Church without any contradiction to Scripture, did come from the Holy Spirit. *Hinc fit*, saith he, *ut quæ sint hujuscemodi, ea ego improbare nec velim, nec audeam bona conscientia. Quis autem ego sim, qui, quod tota ecclesia approbabit, improbem?* Such things, saith he, as are so determined, I neither will nor can with a safe conscience condemn. For who am I, that I should condemn that which the whole Church of God hath approved? A sentence as full of judgment as modesty. And that he might shew he was not alone in this opinion, he produceth two large and excellent discourses of *Martin Bucer* concerning the Polity of the ancient Church, which he recites with approbation; the one out of his Commentaries on the *Ephesians*, the other *de disciplina Clericali*, whereby we have gained another testimony of that famous and peaceable Divine, whose judgment is too large to be here inserted. The same opinion of *Zanchy* may be seen in his Commentaries upon the fourth Command, wherein he asserts no particular form to be prescribed, but only general rules laid down in Scripture, that all be done to edification; speaking of the original of Episcopacy which came not *dispositione Divina*, but

Confess. fidei cap. 25. s. 10, 11. Tom. 7. op. Miscel.

Tom. 4. op. l. 1. in 4. præcept. q. 2.

but *consuetudine Ecclesiastica, atque ea quidem minime improbanda; neque enim hunc ordinem prohibuit Christus, sed potius regulam generalem reliquit per Apostolum, ut in Ecclesia omnia fiant ad ædificationem.* It is then most clear and evident that neither *Bucer*, *Chemnitius* or *Zanchy* did look upon the Church as so bound up by any immutable form of Church-Government laid down in Scripture, but it might lawfully and laudably alter it for better edification of the Church: For these learned Divines conceiving that at first in the Church there was no difference between Bishop and Presbyter, and commending the Polity of the Church when Episcopacy was set in a higher order, they must of necessity hold that there was no obligation to observe that Form which was used in Apostolical times.

Our next enquiry is into the opinion of the *French Church* and the eminent Divines therein. For *Calvin* and *Beza*, we have designed them under another rank. At present we speak of those who in *these* assert the form of Church-Government mutable. The first we meet with here who fully lays down his opinion as to this matter, is, *Joh. Fregevil*, who although in his *Palma Christiana* he seems to assert the Divine right of primacy in the Church, yet in his *Politick Reformer*, he asserts both forms of Government by equality and inequality, to be lawful. And we shall the rather produce his testimony, because of the high character given of him by the late *Rev. Bishop* Hall. *Wise* Fregevil, *a deep head, and one that was able to cut even betwixt the League, the Church and State*; His words are these, *As for the English-Government, I say it is grounded upon God's word so far forth as it keepeth the state of the Clergy instituted in the Old Testament, and confirmed in the New. And concerning the Government of the French Church, so far as concerneth the equality of Ministers, it hath the like foundation in God's Word: namely in the example of the Apostles; which may suffice to authorize both these Forms of estate; albeit in several times and places none can deny but that the Apostles among themselves were equal, as concerning authority, albeit there were an order for their precedency. When the Apostles first planted Churches, the same being small and in affliction, there were not as yet any other Bishops, Priests, or Deacons but themselves; they were the Bishops and Deacons, and together served the Tables. These men therefore whom God raiseth up to plant a Church, can do no better, than after the examples of the Apostles to bear themselves in equal authority. For this cause have the French Ministers, planters of the Reformed Church in* France *usurped it, howbeit provisionally —— reserving liberty to alter it, according to the occurrences. But the equality that rested among the Bishops of the Primitive Church, did increase as the Churches increased; and thence proceeded the Creation of Deacons, and afterwards of other Bishops and Priests; yet ceased not the Apostles equality in authority; but they that were created, had not like authority with the Apostles; but the Apostles remained as Sovereign Bishops, neither were any greater than they. Hereof I do infer that in the state of a mighty and peaceable Church, as is the Church of* England, *or as the Church of* France *(or such might be if God should call*

P. 70. &c.

Episcopacy by Divine right. *f.* 5. *p.* 20.

call it to reformation) the ſtate of the Clergy ought to be preſerved. For equality will be hurtful to the State, and in time breed confuſion. But as the Apoſtles continued Churches in their equality ſo long as the Churches by them planted were ſmall; ſo ſhould equality be applied in the planting of a Church, or ſo long as the Church continueth ſmall, or under perſecution; yet may it alſo be admitted as not repugnant to God's Word in thoſe places where already it is received, rather than to innovate any thing. I ſay therefore that even in the Apoſtles times the ſtate of the Clergy increaſed as the Church increaſed. Neither was the Government under the Bondage of Egypt, *and during the peace of the Land of* Canaan *alike; for* Iſraelites *had firſt Judes, and after their ſtate increaſed, Kings.* Thus far that *Politique Reformer.* Whoſe words are ſo full and pertinent to the ſcope and drift of this whole Treatiſe, that there is no need of any Commentary to draw them to my ſenſe. The next I ſhall pitch upon in the French Church, is, a *Triumvirate* of three as learned perſons in their ſeveral ways as moſt that Church or any ſince the Reformation hath bred; they are *Blondel*, *Bochartus*, and *Amyraldus*. The firſt is that Church Antiquary *Blondel*, the known and learned Aſſertor of *Jerome*'s opinion concerning the Primitive equality of Preſbyters, who was likewiſe of *Jerome*'s mind as to the mutability of that form, if the Church ſaw fit, as appears by theſe words of his, ſpeaking of that form of Eccleſiaſtical Polity which *Hilary* ſpeaks of, *viz.* the eldeſt Preſbyters having the Primacy of Order above the reſt. *Fac tamen*, ſaith he, *Apoſtolis non modo non improbantibus, ſed palam, laudantibus ortam, ego ſanè liberè ab initio obſervatam, Chriſtianiſque, ſive ab Apoſtolis, ſive ab eorum diſcipulis traditam, ſed ut mutabilem & pro uſu ac arbitrio Eccleſiæ mutandam (prout in cauſâ conſimili piæ memoriæ* Crakanthorpius *ſenſit) crediderim:* and not long after, *Nec confeſſus capite carentes, aut multipliciter minùs horrendus, quàm fervidiores Hierarchici; quibus indagandum curatiùs incumbit; An paſtorum cuiquam quocunque titulo nunc gaudeat, divino jure* πρεσβεία *eaque perpetua decreta ſit; An verò in Arbitrio Eccleſiæ, ipſe (qui præeſt Eccleſiæ) ſpiritus reliquerit, ut quocunque modo liberet, ſibi de capite* ἰσοτίμων *collegia proviserent.* Whereby that moſt learned Writer for Preſbytery (as ſome have called him) evidently aſſerts the mutability of the particular Form of Church-Government, and that it is left to the prudence and arbitrement of the Church, to conclude and determine, in what way and manner the Rulers of the Church ſhall act, for moderating the common concernments of the Church. The next is the learned and ingenuous *Bochartus*, who *ex profeſſo*, doth aſſert the opinion I have been pleading thus long in the behalf of, in his Epiſtle to Dr. *Morley*. He having declared himſelf to be of *Jerome*'s mind, as to the Apoſtles times, that the Churches were governed *communi conſilio Preſbyterorum*; and withal, aſſerting the great antiquity of Epiſcopacy, as ariſing ſoon after the Apoſtles times, and that *magno cum fructu*, as a very uſeful form of Government: He ſubjoins theſe words directly, overthrowing the Divine Right of either form of Government, by Epiſcopacy or Preſbytery. *Nec Apoſtolorum praxim puto vim habuiſſe legis, in rebus ſuâ naturâ* ἀδιαφόροις. *Proinde tam qui Preſbyteralem,*

Apol. pro Hieron. ſ. 2. p. 53.

Ad. q. 1. p. 5.

Presbyteralem, quam Episcopalem ordinem juris divini esse asserunt, videntur τῆς ἀνθολκῆς ἀμετρία τοῦ μέσου διαμαρτεῖν. And therefore asserts, that the Form of Government must be determined, as that in the State is, according to the suitableness of it to the state, temper and condition of the People it is intended for. The last is, judicious *Amyraldus*, whom one deservedly calls, *one of the greatest wits of this Age*, in his proposals for peace with the *Lutherans*, speaking of the different Forms of Church Government in the several Churches of the Reformation, he lays down this for a foundation of union among the several Churches. *Quando igitur Christus quidem & Apostoli hoc disertè constituerunt, debere particulares Ecclesias omnes gubernari à Pastoribus, & aliquâ regiminis formâ temperari, quod ipsa rei necessitas flagitat; quæ verò regiminis ista forma potissimùm esse debeat, utrum alii aliis auctoritate præcellant, necne, neque rei natura definivit, neque à Christo aut Apostolis æque disertè constitutum est; id primò in pacificatione statuendum esse videtur, ut quo jure hactenus fuerunt Ecclesiarum Evangelicarum Pastores, eodem porrò esse pergant, neque aliæ aliarum statum convellere nitantur.* " That every Church be permitted freely to enjoy its " own Form, since some kind of Government is necessary in all " Churches, but no one Form is prescribed by Christ or his Apostles; and more fully afterwards to the same purpose. *Quemadmodum etsi igitur Politiarum formæ aliæ aliis aptiores ad finem illum Politicum obtinendum, & accommodatiores esse videntur; Deus tamen qui omnis societatis auctor est atque custos, noluit omnes hominum cœtus eodem jure teneri, sed cuique communitati potestatem esse voluit suas leges sibi condendi, quas ipse Divinâ suâ auctoritate sancit; sic dubitandum quidem non est quin ex variis illis administrandarum Ecclesiarum rationibus, nonnullæ sint aliquanto quam aliæ conducibiliores ad eum finem adipiscendum quem religio constitutum habet: At voluit tamen sapientissimus indulgentissimusque Deus, cuiq; Ecclesiæ jus esse sibi leges eas ferendi quæ ad disciplinam spectant, & ad ordinem conservandum.* Whereby he " grants as much freedom and liberty to every Church, to prescribe " Laws to its self, for the regulating the affairs of the Church, as " to any State to pitch upon its particular rules and ways of Govern- " ment; so the Church doth in its orders but observe the general rules laid down in Scripture. Having thus fully shewed how many of the most eminent Divines of the Reformation have embraced this opinion of the mutability of the Form of Church-Government, both in our own and foreign Churches, who were far from being the *Proselytes* of *Erastus*; it were easie to add *Mantissæ loco* the concurrent judgment of many very learned Men, as the excellent *Hugo Grotius*, my *Lord Bacon*, Sir *Will. Morrice*, and others, who have in print delivered this as their judgment; but seeing such is the temper of many, as to cast by their judgments with an opinion of their partiality towards the Government of the Church; I have therefore contented my self with the judgment of *Divines*, most of them of the highest rank since the Reformation: whose judgments certainly will be sufficient to remove that prejudice, wherewith this opinion hath been entertained among the blind followers of the several parties. So much for those, who in terms assert the Form of Church-Government not to

De successione ab Ecclesiâ Rom. Deq; pace cum Evang. const. p. 29, &c.

De Imperio summ. Potest. circa sacra c. 11.

L. *Bacon* Considerat. touching Ch. Gov.

Sir *Will. Morrice* of the Sacrament, in sect. 9.

Mr. *Pryn's* 12 queries to the Assembly.

to depend upon an unalterable Law, but to be left to the prudence and discretion of every particular Church, to determine it according to its suitableness to the state, condition, and temper of the people whereof it consists, and conduceableness to the ends for which it is instituted.

§. 6. We come now in the second place to those, who though they look upon equality of Ministers as the Primitive Form, yet do allow Episcopal Government in the Church as a very lawful and useful constitution. By which it is evident, that they did not judge the Primitive Form to carry an universal obligation along with it, over all Churches, Ages, and Places. Upon this account our learned *Crakanthorp* frees all the Reformed Churches from the charge of *Aërianism*, laid upon them by the *Archbishop* of *Spalato* (when he licked up his former vomit in his *Consilium reditûs*) *Crakanthorp*'s words are these, speaking of *Luther*, *Calvin*, *Beza*, and all the Reformed Churches; *Non habent illi scio, distinctos à Presbyteris, eisque in ordinandi & excommunicandi potestate superiores Episcopos. At Imparitatem istam quod fecit Aërius, non verbo Dei repugnare docent; non damnant eam vel in nostrâ, vel in universali per annos super mille quingentos Ecclesiâ. Per verbum Dei & Jus Divinum, liberum & licitum utrumvis censent, vel Imparitatem istam admittere vel Paritatem; In Arbitrio hoc esse ac potestate cujusvis Ecclesiæ censent, utrum Paritatem ordinum admittunt, an Imparitatem.* So that according to the opinion of this learned Divine, all the *Reformed* Churches were free from the Imputation of *Aërianism*, because they asserted not an *Imparity* among the Ministers of the Gospel to be unlawful; but thought it was wholly in the Churches *liberty*, to settle either a *Parity* or *Imparity* among them, as they judged convenient. But to descend more particularly to the *Heroes* of the Reformation, we have a whole *Constellation* of them together in the *Augustane Confession*, where they fully express their minds to this purpose; *Hâc de re in hoc conventu sæpe testati sumus nos summâ voluntate cupere, conservare Politiam Ecclesiasticam, & gradus in Ecclesiâ factos etiam humanâ authoritate. Scimus enim bono & utili consilio à Patribus Ecclesiasticam disciplinam, hoc modo, ut veteres Canones describunt, constitutam esse.* And afterwards, *Sævitia Episcoporum in causâ est, quare alicubi dissolvitur illa Canonica Politia, quam magnopere cupiebamus conservare.* And again, *Hic iterum volumus testatum, nos libentèr conservaturos esse Ecclesiasticam & Canonicam Politiam, si modo Episcopi desinant in Ecclesias nostras sævire. Hac nostra voluntas, & coram Deo & apud omnes gentes ad omnem posteritatem excusabit nos, nè nobis imputari possit, quod Episcoporum authoritas labefactetur.* And yet farther, *Sæpe jam testati sumus, nos non solum potestatem Ecclesiasticam, quæ in Evangelio instituta est, summâ pietate venerari, sed etiam Ecclesiasticam Politiam, & gradus in Ecclesiâ magnoperè probare, & quantùm in nobis est conservare cupere.* We see with what industry they purge and clear themselves from the imputation of bearing any ill will to the several degrees that were instituted by the Church; nay they profess themselves desirous of retaining them, so the Bishops would not force

Defens. Eccles. Angl. cap. 42. s. 6.

Apolog. Confess. Aug. ad art. 14.

Confess. Aug. per Chry. p. 365.

force them to do any thing againſt their Conſciences. To the ſame purpoſe they ſpeak in the *Smaraldian* Articles. None ſpeaks more fully of the agreeableneſs of the Form of Government uſed in the Ages after the Apoſtles to the Word of God, then that excellent ſervant of God, as Biſhop *Downam* often calls him, *Calvin* doth: For in his *Inſtitutions* he ſpeaks thus of the Polity of the Primitive Church; *Tametſi enim multos Canones ediderunt illorum temporum Epiſcopi quibus plus viderentur exprimere quàm ſacris literis expreſſum eſſet*; *ea tamen cautione totam ſuam Œconomiam compoſuerunt ad unicam illam verbi Dei normam, ut facile videas nihil fere hâc parte habuiſſe à verbo Dei alienum.* Although the Biſhops of thoſe times did make many Canons, wherein they did ſeem to expreſs more than was in the Word of God; yet they uſed ſuch caution and prudence in the eſtabliſhing the Church's Polity according to the Word of God, that hardly will any thing be found in it diſagreeing to God's holy Word. And afterwards ſpeaking of the Inſtitution of Archbiſhops and Patriarchs, he ſaith it was *ad Diſciplinæ conſervationem*, for preſerving the Church's Diſcipline: and again, *Si rem omiſſo vocabulo intuemur, reperiemus veteres Epiſcopos non aliam regendæ Eccleſiæ formam voluiſſe fingere, ab ea quam Deus verbo ſuo præſcripſit.* If we conſider the matter it ſelf of the Church's Polity, we ſhall find nothing in it deſcrepant from, or repugnant to that Form which is laid down in the Word of God: *Calvin* then, whatever Form of Government he judged moſt ſuitable to the ſtate and temper of the Church wherein he was placed, was far from condemning that Polity which was uſed in the Primitive Church by a difference as to degrees among the Miniſters of the Goſpel. He did not then judge any form of Government to be ſo deliver'd in Scriptures as unalterably to oblige all Churches and Ages to obſerve it. *Beza* ſaith, *he was ſo far from thinking that the humane order of Epiſcopacy was brought into the Church through raſhneſs or ambition, that none can deny it to have been very uſeful as long as Biſhops were good. And thoſe that both will and can, let them enjoy it ſtill.* His words are theſe, *Abſit autem ut hunc ordinem, etſi Apoſtolica & mere divina diſpoſitione non conſtitutum, tamen ut temere aut ſuperbe invectum reprehendam; cujus potius magnum uſum fuiſſe quamdiu boni & ſancti Epiſcopi Eccleſiis præfuerunt, quis inficiari poſſit? Fruantur igitur illo qui volent & poterunt.* And elſewhere profeſſeth *all reverence, eſteem, and honour to be due to all ſuch modern Biſhops, who ſtrive to imitate the example of the Primitive Biſhops in a due reformation of the Church of God, according to the rule of the Word. And looks on it as a moſt falſe and impudent Calumny of ſome that ſaid as though they intended to preſcribe their form of Government to all other Churches; as though they were like ſome ignorant fellows who think nothing good but what they do themſelves.* How this is reconcileable with a novel pretence of a *jus divinum*, I cannot underſtand. For certainly if *Beza* had judged that only Form to be preſcribed in the Word which was uſed in *Geneva*, it had been but his duty to have deſired all other Churches to conform to that. Neither ought *Beza* then to be looked on as out-going his Maſter *Calvin* in the opinion about the right of Church-Government. For we ſee he goes no farther in it than *Calvin* did. All that either of them maintained, was, that the form of Government in uſe among them,

Inſtitut. lib. 4. cap. 4. ſ. 1.

Sect. 4.

De Miniſtr. gradibus. c. 23. p. 144.

Cap. 21. p. 126, 127.

was more agreeable to the Primitive form, than the modern Episcopacy was, and that Episcopacy lay more open to Pride, Lasciness, Ambition, and Tyranny, as they had seen and felt in the Church of *Rome*. Therefore not to give occasion to such incroachments upon the liberty of mens Consciences, as were introduced by the tyranny of the *Roman* Bishops, they thought it the safest way to reduce the Primitive parity; but yet so, as to have an Ecclesiastical Senate for one Church containing Cities and Territories, as is evident at *Geneva*, and that Senate to have a President in it; and whether that President should be for life, or only by course, they judged it an accidental and mutable thing; but that there should be one, essential and necessary. This is expressly and fully the judgment of that most Reverend and Learned man, *Th. Beza*, as he declares it himself. *Essentiale fuit in eo de quo hic agimus, quod ex Dei Ordinatione perpetua necesse fuit, est, & erit, ut in Presbyterio quispiam & loco & dignitate primus actioni gubernandæ præsit, cum eo quod ipsi divinitus attributum est jure. Accidentale autem fuit, quod Presbyteri in hac προεδρία alii aliis per vices initio succedebant; qui προεδρίας modus paulatim postea visus est mutandus, ut unus quispiam judicio cæterorum compresbyterorum delectus, Presbyterio πρόεδρος esset, & permaneret.* It will be worth our while truly to state the Question of Church-Government between the *Church* of *England*, and that of *Geneva*, in the time of Queen *Elizabeth*, and thereby we shall see how small the difference was between them. That the Churches in the Primitive times, did take in the Christians in whole Cities, and adjoining Territories, is acknowledged on both sides; *Calvin* and *Beza* being both express in it, and the Constitution of the Church of *Geneva* speaks as much. *Unicuique civitati* (saith *Calvin*) *erat attributa certa regio, quæ Presbyteros inde sumeret, & velut corpori Ecclesiæ illius accenserentur. In oppido cujusque Diœceseos,* (saith *Beza*) *præcipuo primus Presbyter,* &c. *in quotidiana communi jurisdictione præerat cæteris tum urbanis, tum aliis ejus Regionis cum Presbyteris,* i. e. *toti Diœcesi.* That the Government of the City did take in the City and Territories, is likewise acknowledged by them. That for more convenient order, there was one to preside over the Ecclesiastical Senate, is confessed as essential by *Beza*; and *Calvin* acknowledgeth that even in Apostolical times, *non eam fuisse tunc æqualitatem inter Ecclesiæ ministros, quin unus aliquis authoritate & consilio præesset.* There was no such equality among the Ministers of the Church, but that some one was over the rest in Authority and Counsel. Wherein then lay the difference? For we have already seen that our Great Divines then, did not look upon their form of Government as necessary, but only lawful; and *Calvin* and *Beza* would not be thought to prescribe their form to other Churches. All the difference then was, not whether their form of Government was founded on Divine Right? not whether Episcopacy in the Church was lawful or no? not whether Diocesan Churches were unlawful? or whether every Congregation should have an Ecclesiastical Senate? But whether it were more agreeable to the Primitive form, that the President of the Ecclesiastical Senate should have only an order among, or a degree above the Senate its self? But chiefly it was, whether in the present state of the *Reformed Churches*

De Minist. gradibus, cap. 23. p. 153.

Instit. l. 4. c. 4. §. 2. De Minist. grad. cap. 24. p. 167.

In Tit. 1. 5.

Churches it were more convenient wholly to lay aſide the form of Government by *Biſhops*, which hath been ſo much abuſed in the *Roman Church*; and to reduce all Miniſters of the Goſpel to an equality, with only a precedency of order, thereby to free *themſelves* from the imputation of Ambition, and to prevent it in *others*; or elſe it were more prudent only to retrench the abuſes of *Epiſcopacy* under the *Papacy*, and to reduce it to that form wherein it was practiſed in the *Church*, before the *tyranny* and *uſurpation* of the *Roman Biſhop* had engroſſed all *Eccleſiaſtical power* into his own hands? The former part was embraced generally by the *Reformed Churches*, the latter by our *Church of England*; ſo that the Queſtion was not about Divine Right, but about a matter of Prudence; not what form was ſetled by a Law of Chriſt, but what form was ſuitable to the preſent ſtate of the Churches of the Reformation. Therefore we ſee none of the foreign Divines did charge the Government of this Church with *unlawfulneſs* but *inconveniency*, as it was a ſtep to pride and ambition, and an occaſion whereby men might do the Church injury by the exceſs of their power, if they were not men of an excellent temper and moderation. Thence that prediction of *Padre Paulo*, that the Church of *England* would then find the inconveniency of Epiſcopacy, when a high-ſpirited Biſhop ſhould once come to rule that Church; and ſo *Beza*, when he had freed the Biſhops of the Reformation from that imputation, of *Lording it over their Brethren*, which he had charged the Roman Biſhops with, yet he adds, that he would beg them rather to lay down their power, than to tranſmit that power to thoſe after them, *hanc ipſorum moderationem & æquitatem minime forſan ſequuturis*, who it may be were not like to ſucceed them in their meekneſs and moderation. What juſt reaſon were there was for ſuch fears, or may be ſtill, let thoſe judge who are fitteſt to do it; thoſe I mean who have the power not only to redreſs, but prevent abuſes encroaching by an irregular power. It was not then any unlawfulneſs in the Government of Epiſcopacy it ſelf, but its liableneſs to abuſes, which made the Reformed Churches reduce modern Epiſcopacy into a mere Preſidency of Order, which was not ſo liable to the ſame inconveniencies. A clear evidence that they judged not the Government unlawful, is, their often profeſſion of a ready and chearful obedience to Biſhops, if they would embrace the Goſpel, and ſtand up in defence of the true Doctrine. For which we have the teſtimony of *George* Prince of *Anhalt*, in the Preface to his Sermon about falſe Prophets, ſpeaking of Biſhops and Archbiſhops: " Utinam ſicut nomina gerunt & titulos, ita ſe reipſa præſta-
" rent Epiſcopos Eccleſiæ. Utinam Evangelio docerent conſona, ip-
" ſoque Eccleſias fideliter regerent. O quam libenter, quantaque
" cum cordis lætitia, pro Epiſcopis ipſos habere, revereri, morem
" gerere, debitam juriſdictionem, & ordinationem eis tribuere, eaque
" ſine recuſatione frui vellemus: id quod nos ſemper, & *D. Lutherus*
" etiam ſæpiſſime tam ore quam ſcriptis, imo & in concione publica
" in Cathedrali Templo Marſburgenſi conteſtati promiſimus. He profeſſeth it to be both his own judgment and *Luther*'s, that if Biſhops would but teach and rule their Churches, according to the

De Miniſtr. grad. p. 158.

Super Mat. tit. de Ordinat.

Word of God, they would obey them with all chearfulneſs and joy of heart. To the ſame purpoſe *Melanæthon* writing to *Camerarius*: " By what Right or Law may we diſſolve the Eccleſiaſtical Polity, if " the Biſhops will grant us that which in reaſon they ought to grant? " and though it were lawful for us ſo to do, yet ſurely it were not " expedient. *Luther* was ever of this opinion. The ſame is profeſſed by *Calvin*, and that according to his temper in a higher manner; " Verum autem nobis ſi contribuant Hierarchiam in qua eminent Epiſcopi, ut Chriſto ſubeſſe non recuſent, ut ab illo tanquam " ab unico capite pendeant, & ad ipſum referantur, in qua ſi fraternam charitatem inter ſe colant & non alio modo quam ejus veritate " colligati, tum vero nullo non Anathemate dignos fatemur, ſi qui " erunt, qui eam non reverenter & ſumma cum obedientia obſervent. If Biſhops would but ſubmit themſelves to Chriſt, thoſe that would not then ſubmit themſelves to them, he thinks there is no *Anathema* of which they are not worthy. *Jacobus Heerbrandus*, Divinity-Profeſſor at *Tubinge*, profeſſeth it to be the moſt ſound Conſtitution of Church-Government, wherein every Dioceſe had its Biſhops, and every Province an Archbiſhop. *Saluberrimum eſſet ſi ſingulæ Provinciæ ſuos Epiſcopos, & Epiſcopi ſuos Archiepiſcopos haberent.* *Hemingius* acknowledgeth a diſparity among Church-Officers, and accounts it a piece of barbariſm to remove it. " Quanquam enim poteſtas " omnium eadem eſt miniſtrorum quantum ad ſpiritualem juriſdictionem attinet; tamen diſpares dignitatis ordines & gradus ſunt; " idq; partim jure divino, partim Eccleſiæ approbatione. But he qualifies what he had ſaid of *Jus divinum* by his following words; " Eccleſia cui Dominus poteſtatem dedit in ædificationem, ordinem " miniſtrorum inſtituit pro commodo ſuo, ut omnia ſint ritè ordinata " ad inſtaurationem corporis Chriſti. Hinc Eccleſia purior ſecuta " tempora Apoſtolorum, fecit alios Patriarchas, alios Chorepiſcopos, alios Paſtores & Catechetas; *and afterwards*, Inter miniſtros agnoſcit etiam Eccleſia noſtra gradus dignitatis, & ordines " pro diverſitate donorum, laborum magnitudine, ac vocationum " diverſitate ac judicat Barbaricum eſſe de Eccleſia hunc ordinem " tollere velle. Three things he placeth a ſuperiority of dignity in; *Excellency of Gifts*, *Greatneſs of Labours*, *Difference of Calling*: And the truth is, the two former ought to be the meaſure of dignity in the Church, the Eminence of mens abilities, and the abundance of their labours above others. The neceſſity of a *Superintendent*, or an *Inſpector* over other Miniſters, is largely diſcovered by *Zepper de Politia Eccleſiaſtica*, who likewiſe agrees with the former Divines in his judgment of the firſt inſtitution of Epiſcopacy. " Eadem officia " in primitiva etiam Eccleſia, poſt Apoſtolorum tempora in uſu manſerunt, paucis quibuſdam gradibus, pro illorum temporum neceſſitate additis, qui tamen nihil fere à mente D. Pauli & verbi divini " alienum habuerunt. Whereby he both aſſerts it to be in the power of the Church to add diſtinct degrees from what were in the primitive Church; and that ſuch ſo added, are no ways repugnant to the Word of God. According to this judgment of their Divines is the practice of the Foreign Proteſtant Churches; in *Sweden* there is one *Archbiſhop*,

Ep. ad Camer. A. D. 1530.

Tom. 7. ad Sadoletum. & de neceſ. Reform. Eccl. p. 69.

In loc. com. de Eccl. p. 767.

Opuſcul. Theol. Claſ. 3. cap. 10. p. 439.

Lib. 2. c. 10.

De Politi. Eccleſ. l. 2. cap. 1.

Archbiſhop, and ſeven *Biſhops*; and ſo in *Denmark*, though not with ſo great authority in *Holſtein*, *Pomeren*, *Mecklenburgh*, *Brunſwick*, *Luneburgh*, *Bremen*, *Oldenburgh*, *Eaſt-Friezeland*, *Heſſen*, *Saxony*, and all the upper part of *Germany*, and the Proteſtant Imperial Cities, Church-Government is in the hands of *Superintendents*. In the *Palatinate* they had *Inſpectores* and *Præpoſiti*, over which was the Eccleſiaſtical Conſiſtory of three Clergy-men, and three Counſellors of State with their Preſident; and ſo they have their *Præpoſitos* in *Wetteraw*, *Heſſen*, and *Anhalt*. In *Tranſylvania*, *Polonia*, and *Bohemia*, they have their *Seniores* enjoying the ſame power with ancient Biſhops. So that we ſee all theſe *Reformed Churches* and *Divines*, although they acknowledge no ſuch thing as a Divine right of *Epiſcopacy*, but ſtiffly maintain *Jerome*'s opinion of the primitive equality of Goſpel Miniſters; yet they are ſo far from accounting it unlawful to have ſome Church-Officers, acting in a higher degree above others, that they themſelves embrace it under different names and titles, in order to the Peace, Unity and Government of their ſeveral Churches; whereby they give us an evident demonſtration, that they looked not upon the Primitive Form to be immutable, but that the orders and degrees of Miniſters is only a prudential thing, and left in the liberty of every particular Church, to be determined according to their tendency to preſerve the peace and ſettlement of a Church.

See Mr. *Durce*, the Government of Proteſtant Churches beyond the Seas.

§. 7.

We come in the laſt place to thoſe who hold Epiſcopacy to be the Primitive Form, yet not unalterably binding all Churches and places, but that thoſe Churches who are without it, are truly conſtituted Churches; and Miniſters are lawfully ordained by mere Preſbyters. This is largely proved by Mr. *Francis Maſon*, in his excellent *Defence of the Ordination of Miniſters beyond the Seas:* to which I refer the Reader. Only I ſhall ſhew out of him how the ſtate of the Queſtion about the *Jus divinum* of Epiſcopacy is formed: "Firſt, If by "*jure divino* you mean that which is according to Scripture, then the "preheminence of Biſhops is *jure divino*; for it hath been already "proved to be according to Scripture. Secondly, If by *jure divino* "you mean the Ordinance of God, in this ſenſe alſo it may be "ſaid to be *jure divino*. For it is an Ordinance of the Apoſtles, "whereunto they were directed by God's Spirit, even by the Spirit "of Prophecy, and conſequently the Ordinance of God. But if by "*jure divino* you underſtand a Law and Commandment of God, binding all Chriſtian Churches univerſally, perpetually, unchangably, "and with ſuch abſolute neceſſity, that no other form of Regiment "may in any caſe be admitted; in this ſenſe neither may we grant "it, nor yet can you prove it to be *jure divino*.

Certain brief treatiſes, &c. *Oxford*, 1641. *Sect.* 18.

Whereby we ſee this learned and moderate man was far from unchurching all who wanted Biſhops; and abſolutely declares, that though he looks on Epiſcopacy as an Apoſtolical Inſtitution, yet that no unalterable divine right is founded thereupon. So before him the both learned and pious Biſhop, *G. Downam*, explains himſelf concerning the right of *Epiſcopacy*, in theſe remakable words; "Though "in

Defence of Sermon, *l.* 4. *cap.* 6. *p.* 139.

" in reſpect of the firſt Inſtitution, there is ſmall difference between " an Apoſtolical and Divine Ordinance, becauſe what was ordained " by the Apoſtles, proceeded from God, (in which ſenſe, and no " other, I do hold the Epiſcopal Function to be a Divine Ordinance, " I mean in reſpect of the firſt Inſtitution) yet in reſpect of perpe- " tuity, difference by ſome is made between thoſe things which be " *divini*, and thoſe which be *Apoſtolici juris*; the former in their un- " derſtanding being perpetually, generally, and immutably neceſſary, " the latter not ſo. So that the meaning of my defence plainly is, " that the Epiſcopal Government hath this commendation above " other forms of *Eccleſiaſtical Government*, that in reſpect of the firſt " Inſtitution, it is a Divine Ordinance; but that it ſhould be ſuch a " Divine Ordinance as ſhould be generally, perpetually, immutably, " neceſſarily obſerved, ſo as no other form of Government may in " no caſe be admitted, I did not take upon me to maintain: With more to the ſame purpoſe in ſeveral places of that defence. And from hence it is acknowledged by the ſtouteſt Champions for Epiſcopacy, before theſe late unhappy diviſions, that Ordination performed by Preſbyters, in caſes of neceſſity, is valid; which I have already ſhewed doth evidently prove that Epiſcopal Government is not founded upon any unalterable Divine Right: For which purpoſe many evidences are produced from *Dr. Field of the Church, lib.* 3. *c.* 39. *B. Downam, l.* 3. *c.* 4. *B. Jewel, P.* 2. *p.* 131. *Saravia, cap.* 2. *p.* 10, 11. *B. Alley, Prælect.* 3. *&* 6. *B. Pilkington, B. Bridges, B. Bilſon, D. Nowel, B. Davenant, B. Prideaux, B. Andrews*, and others; by our Reverend and Learned Mr. *Baxter* in his *Chriſtian Concord*, to whom may be added the late moſt Reverend and Eminent the Biſhop of *Durham, Apol. Cathol. p.* 1. *l.* 1. *c.* 21. and the *Primate of Armagh*, whoſe Judgment is well known as to the point of Ordination. So much may ſuffice to ſhew, that both thoſe who hold an equality among Miniſters to be the Apoſtolical form, and thoſe that do hold Epiſcopacy to have been it, do yet both of them agree at laſt in this, that no one form is ſetled by an unalterable Law of Chriſt, nor conſequently founded upon Divine Right. For the former, notwithſtanding their opinion of the Primitive Form, do hold Epiſcopacy lawful; and the latter, who hold Epiſcopacy to have been the Primitive Form, do not hold it perpetually and immutably neceſſary, but that Preſbyters, (where Biſhops cannot be had) may lawfully diſcharge the Offices belonging to Biſhops; both which Conceſſions do neceſſarily deſtroy the perpetual Divine Right of that Form of Government they aſſert; which is the thing I have been ſo long in proving, and I hope made it evident to any unprejudicated mind.

L. 4 *c.* 7 *p.* 145.

From *p.* 53. to *p.* 63.

Having laid down this now as a ſure foundation for peace and union, it were a very eaſie matter to improve it in order to an Accommodation of our preſent differences about Church-Government. I ſhall only lay down three general Principles deducible from hence, and leave the whole to the mature conſideration of the Lovers of Truth and Peace. The firſt Principle is, *That Prudence muſt be uſed in ſetling the Government of the Church.* This hath been the whole deſign

design of this Treatise, to prove that the Form of Church-Government is a mere matter of prudence, regulated by the Word of God. But I need not insist on the Arguments already brought to prove it: for as far as I can find, although the several parties in their contentions with one another plead for Divine Right, yet when any one of them comes to settle their own particular Form, they are fain to call in the help of Prudence, even in things supposed by the several parties, as necessary to the establishment of their own Form. The *Congregational* men may despair of ever finding *Elective Synods, an explicite Church-Covenant*, or *positive signs of Grace* in admission of Church-Members in any Law of Christ: nay, they will not generally plead for any more for them, than general rules of Scriptures, fine Similitudes, and Analogies, and evidence of natural reason; and what are all these at last to an express Law of Christ, without which it was pretended nothing was to be done in the Church of God? The *Presbyterians* seem more generally to own the use of General Rules, and the Light of Nature, in order to the Form of Church-Government, as in the *Subordination of Courts, Classical Assemblies*, and the more moderate sort, as to *Lay-Elders*. The *Episcopal* men will hardly find any evidence in Scripture, or the practice of the Apostles, for *Churches consisting of many fixed Congregations for Worship, under the charge of one Person*, nor in the Primitive Church, for *the Ordination of a Bishop without the preceding election of the Clergy, and at least consent and approbation of the People*; and neither in Scripture, nor Antiquity, the least footstep of a *delegation of Church-power*. So that upon the matter at last, all of them make use of those things in Church Government, which have no other foundation but the Principles of *Humane Prudence*, guided by the Scriptures; and it were well if that were observed still. The second Principle is, *That Form of Government is the best according to Principles of Christian Prudence, which comes the neareſt to Apostolical practice, and tends most to the advancing the peace and unity of the Church of God.* What that Form is, I presume not to define and determine, but leave it to be gather'd from the evidence of Scripture and Antiquity, as to the Primitive practice, and from the nature, state and condition of that Church wherein it is to be setled, as to its tendency to the advancement of peace and unity in it. In order to the finding out of which, that Proposal of his late most excellent Majesty of glorious memory, is most highly just and reasonable. *His Majesty thinketh it well worthy the studies and endeavours of Divines of both Opinions, laying aside emulation and private interests, to reduce Episcopacy and Presbytery into such a well-proportion'd Form of Superiority and Subordination, as may best resemble the Apostolical and Primitive times, so far forth as the different condition of the times, and the exigences of all considerable circumstances will admit.* His Majesty's second Paper to the Ministers at *Newport. ad fin.*

If this Proposal be embraced, as there is no reason why it should not; then, all such things must be retrieved which were unquestionably of the Primitive practice, but have been grown out of use through the length and corruption of times. Such are the *restoring*

of

of the Preſbyteries of the ſeveral Churches, as the *Senate* to the Biſhop, with whoſe council and advice all things were done in the Primitive Church. *The contracting of Dioceſes into ſuch a compaſs as may be fitted for the perſonal inſpection of the Biſhop, and care of himſelf and the* Senate; *the placing of Biſhops in all great Towns of reſort*, eſpecially *County Towns*; that according to the ancient courſe of the Church, its Government may be proportioned to the Civil Government. *The conſtant preaching of the Biſhop in ſome Churches of his charge, and reſidence in his Dioceſe*; *The ſolemnity of Ordinations, with the conſent of the People*; *The obſerving Provincial Synods twice every Year. The imploying of none in judging Church-Matters but the Clergy.* Theſe are things unqueſtionably of the Primitive practice, and no argument can be drawn from the preſent ſtate of things, why they are not as much, if not more neceſſary than ever. And therefore all who appeal to the practice of the Primitive Church, muſt condemn themſelves, if they juſtifie the neglect of them. But I only touch at theſe things, my deſign being only to lay a foundation for a happy union. *Laſtly, What Form of Government is determined by lawful Authority in the Church of God, ought ſo far to be ſubmitted to, as it contains nothing repugnant to the Word of God.* So that let mens judgments be what they will concerning the Primitive Form, ſeeing it hath been proved, that that Form doth not bind unalterably and neceſſarily, it remains that the determining of the Form of Government is a matter of liberty in the Church; and what is ſo, may be determined by lawful Authority; and what is ſo determined by that Authority, doth bind men to obedience, as hath been proved by the 5 *Hypotheſis*, in the entrance of this Treatiſe. I conclude all with this earneſt deſire, *That the Wiſe and Gracious God would ſend us one heart and one way, that he would be the Compoſer of our differences, and the Repairer of our breaches, that of our ſtrange diviſions and unchriſtian animoſities, while we pretend to ſerve the Prince of Peace, we may at laſt ſee*

V. Biſhop *Uſher's* reduction of Epiſcopacy, *&c.*

Par. 1. ch. 2. ſ. 12.

THE END.

Glory to God on high, on earth peace, good will towards men, Luke 2. 14.

A

DISCOURSE

Concerning the

Power of Excommunication

IN A

Chriſtian Church.

The Name of Power in a Church explained. The miſtake of which, the Foundation of Eraſtianiſm. The Notion of the Church opened, as it is the ſubject of Power. The Church proved to be a Society diſtinct from the Commonwealth; by reaſon of its different Nature, and Divine Inſtitution; diſtinct Officers, different Rights, and Ends, and peculiar Offences. The Power of the Church doth not ariſe from mere confederation. The Church's Power founded on the nature of the Chriſtian Society, and not on particular Precepts. The Power of Church-Officers not merely Doctrinal, proved by ſeveral Arguments. Church Power as to particular perſons antecedent to confederation. The Power of the Keys relates to Baptiſm. The Church's Power extends to Excommunication: what it is, and what grounds it had under the Law. No excluſion from Temple-worſhip among the Jews. Excommunication neceſſary in a Chriſtian Church, becauſe of the conditions ſuppoſed to communion in it: Of the Inceſtuous perſon, and the Grounds of the Apoſtolical Cenſure: Objections againſt Excommunication anſwered. The fundamental Rights of the Church continue after its being incorporated into the Civil State. The Magiſtrate's Power, as to Excommunication cleared.

IT is a matter of daily obſervation and experience in the World, how hard it is to keep the *eyes* of the underſtanding *clear* in its judgment of things, when it is too far engaged in the *duſt* of Controverſie. It being ſo very difficult to well *manage* an impetuous *purſuit* after any Opiuion; nothing being more common than to ſee men *out-run* their *mark*, and through the *force* of their ſpeed to be carried as far *beyond it*, as others in their Opinion *fall ſhort* of it. There is certainly a kind of *ebriety* of the mind, as well as of the body, which makes it ſo *unſtable* and *pendulous*, that it oft times *reels* from one extream unto the quite contrary. This as it is obvious in moſt eager *controvertiſts* of all Ages, ſo eſpecially in ſuch, who have diſcovered the falſity of an opinion they were once confident of, which they think they can never after run far enough from: So that while they *ſtart* at an *apparition* they ſo much dread, they run into thoſe *untrodden paths*, wherein they *loſe* both themſelves and the *Truth* they ſought for.

Append. to c. 8. part. 8. §. 1.

§. 2. Thus we find it to be in the present *controversie*, for many out of their just *zeal* against the *extravagancies* of those who screwed up *Church-Power* to so high a peg, that it was thought to make perpetual discord with the *Commonwealth*, could never think themselves free from so great an inconvenience, till they had *melted down* all *Spiritual Power* into the *Civil State*, and dissolved the *Church* into the *Commonwealth*. But that the World may see I have not been more forward to assert the just power of the *Magistrate* in *Ecclesiasticals*, as well as *Civils*, than to defend the Fundamental *Rights* of the *Church*, I have taken this opportunity more fully to explain and vindicate that part of the *Church's Power*, which lies in reference to *Offenders*; it being the main think struck at by those who are the followers of that noted *Physitian*, who handled the Church so ill, as to deprive her of her expulsive faculty of *Noxious humours*, and so left her under a *Miserere mei*.

§. 3. I shall therefore endeavour to give the *Church* her due, as well as *Cæsar* his, by making good this following *Principle* or *Hypothesis*, upon which the whole hinge of this Controversie *turns*, viz. *That the power of inflicting Censure, upon Offenders in a Christian Church, is a fundamental Right, resulting from the constitution of the Church, as a Society by Jesus Christ; and that the seat of this Power is in those Officers of the Church, who have derived their power originally from the Founder of this Society, and act by vertue of the Laws of it.*

§. 4. For the clear *stating* of this *Controversie*, it will be necessary to explain, what that *Power* is, which I attribute to the *Church*, and in what notion the *Church* is to be considered as it *exerciseth* this Power. *First*, concerning the proper notion of *Power*, by it I cannot see any thing else to be understood, than a *right of governing or ordering things which belong to a Society*. And so *Power* implies only a *moral faculty* in the person enjoying it, to take care *ne quid civitas detrimenti capiat*, whereby it is evident that every well constituted Society must suppose a Power within its self of ordering things belonging to its welfare, or else it were impossible, either the *being*, or the *rights* and *privileges* of a *Society* could be long preserved. *Power* then in its general and abstracted notion, doth not necessarily import either *mere Authority*, or *proper Coaction*; for these, to any impartial judgment, will appear to be rather the several *modes* whereby power is exercised, than any proper ingredients of the *specifick Nature* of it: which in general, imports no more than *a right to govern a constituted Society*; but how that right shall be exercised, must be resolved not from the notion of Power, but from the *nature* and *constitution* of that particular Society in which it is *lodged* and *inherent*.

§. 5. It appears then from hence to be a great *mistake* and abuse of well-natured Readers, when all power is necessarily restrained, either to that which is *properly Coercive*, or to *that* which is *merely Arbitrary*, and only from consent. The Original of which mistake is, the stating the Notion of *Power* from the use of the *Word*, either in ancient *Roman Authors*, or else in the *Civil Laws*, both which are freely acknowleged to be strangers to the exercise of any other *Power*, than that which is *merely authoritative* and *perswasive*, or that which is *Coactive* and *Penal*. The ground of which is, because they were ignorant of any other way of *conveyance* of *Power*, besides *external force*, and *arbitrary consent*; the one in those called *Legal Societies*, or *Civitates*, the other *Collegia* and *Hæteriæ*. But so as that do acknowledge that *God* hath a *right* of *commanding* men to what Duty he please himself, and *appointing* a *Society* upon what terms best please him, and giving a *Power* to *particular persons* to

govern that *Society*, in what *way* shall tend most *to advance* the Honour of such a *Society*, may easily be *made appear*, that there is a kind of *Power* neither properly *Co-active*, nor merely *Arbitrary*, viz. such a one as *immediately results* from Divine *Institution*, and doth suppose *consent* to submit to it as a *necessary Duty* in all the *Members* of this Society.

This *Power*, it is evident, is not *merely Arbitrary* either in the *Governours* or *Members*; for the *Governours* derive their *Power* or Right of Governing from the *Institution of Christ*, and are to be *regulated* by his *Laws* in the Execution of it, and the *Members*, though their *consent* be *necessarily supposed*, yet that *consent* is a *Duty* in them, and that Duty doth imply their *submission* to the *Rulers* of this Society: Neither can this Power be called *Co-active*, in the sense it is commonly taken; for *co-active power*, and *external force* are necessary *correlates* to each other, but we suppose no such thing as a power of outward force to be given to the *Church* as such, for that properly belongs to a *Commonwealth*. But the power which I suppose to be lodged in the *Church*, is such a power as *depends* upon a *Law* of a *Superiour*, *giving right to Govern*, *to particular Persons over such a Society*, *and making it the Duty of all Members of it to submit unto it*, *upon no other Penalties*, *than the exclusion of them from the Privileges*, *which that Society enjoys*. So that supposing such a *Society* as the *Church* is, to be of Divine Institution, and that *Christ* hath appointed *Officers* to rule it, it necessarily follows, that those *Officers* must derive their *power*, i. e. their right of Governing this Society, not merely from *consent* and *confederation* of Parties, but from that Divine Institution, on which the Society depends. The want of understanding the right Notion of Power in the sense here set down, is certainly the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of *Erastianism*, and that which hath given occasion to so many to question any such thing as *Power* in the *Church*, especially, when the more *zealous* than *judicious* Defenders of it have rather chosen to hang it upon some *doubtful places* of *Scripture*, than on the very *Nature* and *Constitution* of the *Christian Church*, as a Society instituted by *Jesus Christ*. §. 6.

This being then the nature of *power* in general, it is I suppose clear, that an outward co-active *force* is not *necessary* in order to it, for if some may have a *Right* to *Govern* and others may be obliged to Obedience to those *Persons antecedently*, to any Civil Constitution; then such *Persons* have a *just power* to *inflict censures* upon such as transgress the Rules of the Society, without any outward force. It is here very impertinent to dispute, what *effects* such *censures* can have upon wilful Persons without a *Co-active power*; If I can prove, that there is a right to inflict them in *Church-Offices*, and an *Obligation* to *submit* to them in all Offenders; I am not to trouble my self with the Event of such things as depend upon *Divine Institutions*. I know it is the great *Objection* of the Followers of *Erastus*, that *Church-censures* are inflicted upon *Persons* unwilling to receive them, and therefore must imply *external co-active force*, which is repugnant to the Nature of a *Church*. But this admits (according to the Principles here established) of a very easie solution; for I deny not that *Church Power* goes upon *consent*, but then it's very plain here was an *antecedent consent* to *submit* to *censures* in the very *entrance* into this *Society*, which is sufficient to denominate it a *voluntary act* of the Persons undergoing it; and my reason is this, every Person entring into a Society, parts §. 7.

with his own *freedom* and *liberty*, as to *matters* concerning the *governing* of it, and *profeſſeth ſubmiſſion* to the *Rules* and *Orders* of it: Now a Man having *parted* with his freedom already, cannot *re-aſſume it* when he pleaſe, for then, he is under an *Obligation* to *ſtand* to the *Covenants* made at his *entrance*; and conſequently his *undergoing* what ſhall be laid upon him by the *Laws* of this *Society*, muſt be ſuppoſed to be *voluntary*, as depending upon his *conſent* at firſt entrance, which in all Societies muſt be ſuppoſed to hold ſtill, elſe there would follow nothing but *confuſion* in all Societies in the World, if every Man were at liberty to *break* his *Covenants*, when any thing comes to lie upon him according to the Rules of the Society, which he out of ſome private *deſign* would be *unwilling* to *undergo*. Thus much may ſerve to ſettle a-right the *Notion* of *Power*; the want of underſtanding which hath cauſed all the confuſion of this Controverſie.

§. 8. The next thing is, In what Notion we are to conſider the *Church*, which is made the *ſubject* of this *Power*. As to which we are to conſider this *Power*; either as to its *right*, or *in actu primo*; or as to its *exerciſe*, or *in actu ſecundo*: Now if we take this *Power* as to the *fundamental Right* of it; then it belongs to the *Univerſal Church* of *Chriſt*, which *ſubſiſts* as a viſible *Society*, by vertue of that *Law* of *Chriſt*, which makes an *owning* the *Profeſſion* of *Chriſtianity* the *Duty* of all *Church-members*. If we conſider this *Power* in the *exerciſe* of it, then (it being impoſſible that the Univerſal Church ſhould perform the *executive* part of this power relating to Offences) I ſuppoſe it *lodged* in that *particular Society* of Chriſtians, which are united together in one *body* in the *community* of the ſame *Government*; but yet, ſo, as that the *adminiſtration* of this *Power*, doth not belong to the body of the Society conſidered *complexly*, but to thoſe *Officers* in it, whoſe care and charge it is, to have a *peculiar overſight* and *inſpection* over the Church, and to *redreſs* all *diſorders* in it. Thus the *viſive faculty* is fundamentally *lodged* in the *Soul*, yet all *exterior acts of ſight* are performed by the *Eyes*, which are the ἐπίσκοποι *Overſeers* of the *Body*, as the other are of the *Church*, ſo that the *exerciſe* and *adminiſtration* of this *power*, belongs to the ſpecial *Officers* and *Governours* of the Church; none elſe being capable of exerciſing this *Power* of the Church as ſuch, but they on whom it is *ſetled* by the *Founder* of the Church it ſelf.

§. 9. This *Society* of the *Church* may be again conſidered, either as *ſubſiſting* without any *influence* from the *civil Power*, or as it is *owned by*, and *incorporated into* a *Chriſtian State*. I therefore demand, Whether it be abſolutely neceſſary for the *ſubſiſtance* of this *Chriſtian Society*, to be upheld by the *Civil Power*, or *no*? And certainly none who conſider the *firſt* and *pureſt Ages* of the *Chriſtian Church*, can give any *entertainment* to the *Affirmative*, becauſe then the *Church* flouriſhed in its greateſt *purity*, not only when not *upheld*, but when moſt violently *oppoſed* by the *Civil Power*; If ſo then its being *united* with the *Civil State* is only accidental as to the *conſtitution* of a *Church*; and if this be only accidental, then it muſt be ſuppoſed *furniſhed* with every thing *requiſite* to its well ordering accidentally to any ſuch *Union*, and *abſtractly* from it. For can we imagine our *Bleſſed Saviour* ſhould *inſtitute* a *Society*, and leave it *deſtitute* of *Means* to *uphold* its *ſelf*, unleſs it fell into the *Hands* of the *Civil Power*? or that he left every thing tending thereto, merely to *Prudence*, and the *Arbitrary Conſtitutions* of the

Persons joining together in this *Society?* Did our *Saviour* take care there should be a *Society*, and not provide for *Means* to *uphold* it? Nay, it is evident, he not only *appointed* a *Society*, but *Officers* to rule it. Had those *Officers* then a *Right* to *Govern* it or *no*, by vertue of *Christ's institution* of them? if not, they were rather *Bibuli* than *Cæsares*, *Cyphers* than *Consules* in the *Church of God.* If they had a *power* to *Govern*, doth not that necessarily imply a *Right* to inflict *Censures* on *Offenders*, unless we will suppose that either there can be no *Offenders* in a *Christian Church*, or that those *Offenders* do not *violate* the *Laws* of the Society, or there be some *Prohibition* for them to exercise their power over them (which is to give power with one Hand, and take it away with the other) or that this power cannot *extend* so far as to *exclude* any from the *Privileges* of the Church: Which is the thing to be discussed.

Having thus cleared our way, I now come to the *Resolution* of the *Question* it self, in order to which I shall endeavour to *demonstrate*, with what *Evidence* the *Subject* is *capable* of, these following things. First, *That the Church is a peculiar Society in its own Nature, distinct from the Commonwealth.* Secondly, *That the power of the Church over its Members doth not arise from mere confederation or consent of Parties.* Thirdly, *That this Power of the Church doth extend to the Exclusion of Offenders from the Privileges of it.* Fourthly, *That the Fundamental Rights of the Church do not escheat to the Commonwealth upon their being* united *in a Christian State.* If these *Principles* be established, the *Churches Power* will stand upon them, as on a *firm* and *unmoveable Basis.* §. 10.

I begin with the *first. That the Church is a peculiar Society in its own Nature,* distinct *from the Commonwealth,* which I prove by these Arguments. §. 11.

1. Those Societies, which are *capable* of *subsisting apart* from *each other*, are *really*, and in their own *Nature* distinct from one another; but so it is with the *Church* and *Commonwealth.* For there can be no greater Evidence of a *Real* Distinction than *Mutual Separation*; and I think the proving the *possibility* of the *Souls existing, separate* from the *body*, is one of the strongest *Arguments* to prove it to be a *substance really distinct* from the *body*, to which it is united; although we are often fain to go the other way to work, and to prove *possibility* of *Separation* from other Arguments evincing the Soul to be a *distinct substance*; but the reason of that is for want of evidence as to the *state* of *separate Souls*, and their *visible existence*, which is *repugnant* to the *immateriality* of their *Natures.* But now, as to the matter in hand, we have all *evidence* desirable; for we are not put to prove *possibility* of *Separation*, merely from the *different constitution* of the things united, but we have evidence to Sense of it, that the *Church* hath *subsisted* when it hath been not only *separated* from, but *persecuted* by all *Civil Power.* It is with many Men as to the Union of *Church* and *State*, as it is with others, as to the Union of the *Soul* and *Body*; when they observe how *close* the *Union* is, and how much the *Soul* makes *use* of the *Animal Spirits* in most of its *Operations*, and how great a *Sympathy* there is between them, that, like *Hippocrates* his *Twins*, they *laugh* and *weep* together, they are shrewdly put to it, how to *fancy* the *Soul* to be any thing else than a more *vigorous mode* of *matter*; so these observing how close an *Union* and *Dependence* there is between the *Church*

and

and *State* in a *Chriſtian Commonwealth*, and how much the *Church* is beholding to the *Civil Power* in the *Adminiſtration* of its *Functions*, are apt to think that the *Church* is nothing but a *higher mode* of a *Commonwealth*, conſidered as *Chriſtian*. But when it is ſo evident that the *Church* hath, and may *ſubſiſt*, ſuppoſing it abſtracted from all *Civil Power*, it may be a ſufficient *demonſtration* that however *near* they may be when *united*, yet they are *really*, and in their own *nature*, diſtinct from each other. Which was the thing to be proved.

§. 12. 2. Thoſe are diſtinct *Societies*, which have every thing diſtinct in their *nature* from each other, which belong to the *Conſtitution* or *Government* of them; but this is evident, as to the *Church* and *Commonwealth*, which will appear, becauſe their *Charter* is diſtinct, or that which gives them their Being as a Society: *Civil Societies* are *founded* upon the *neceſſity* of particular Mens *parting* with their peculiar *Rights*, for the *preſervation* of themſelves, which was the *impulſive cauſe* of their *entring* into *Societies*; but that which actually ſpeaks them to be a *Society*, is the *mutual conſent* of the *ſeveral Parties* joining together, whereby they make themſelves to be *one Body*; and to have one *common Intereſt*. So *Cicero de Repub.* defines *Populus*, to be *cœtus multitudinis, juris conſenſu & utilitatis communione ſociatus.* There is no doubt, but *God*'s general *providence* is as evidently ſeen in bringing the *World* into *Societies*, and making them live under *Government*, as in diſpoſing all particular *Events* which happen in thoſe *Societies*; but yet the *way*, which Providence uſed in the *conſtitution* of theſe *Societies*, is by *inclining Men* to *conſent* to *aſſociate* for their *mutual benefit* and *advantage*: So that natural *Reaſon* conſulting for the *good* of *Mankind*, as to thoſe *Rights* which Men enjoy in common with each other, was the main foundation upon which all *Civil Societies* were erected. We find no poſitive *Law* enacting the *being* of *Civil Societies*, becauſe Nature its ſelf would prompt Men for their own Conveniences to enter into them. But the ground and foundation of that Society, which we call a *Church*, is a matter which *natural Reaſon* and *common Notions* can never reach to: And therefore an aſſociating for the preſerving of ſuch, may be a *Philoſophical Society*, but a *Chriſtian* it cannot be: And they that would make a *Chriſtian Church* to be nothing elſe but a *Society* of *Eſſens*, or an ὁμακοεῖον of *Pythagoreans*, do either not underſtand, or not conſider whereon this *Chriſtian Society* is founded; for it is evident they look on it as a merely voluntary thing, that is not at all ſeiled by any *Divine poſitive Law.*

Apud. Auguſt. de Civit. Dei l. 2. c. 21.

§. 13. The truth is, there is no *principle* more conſiſtent with the Opinion of thoſe who deny any *Chriſtian power* in a *Chriſtian ſtate*, than this is, and it is that, which every one, who will make good his ground muſt be driven to; for it is evident, that in matters merely voluntary, and depending only on *confederation*, ſuch things being liable to a *Magiſtrate's power*, there can be no *plea* from mutual conſent, to juſtifie any oppoſition to *ſupream Authority* in a *Commonwealth.* But then, how ſuch perſons can be *Chriſtians*, when the *Magiſtrates* would have them to be otherwiſe, I cannot underſtand; nor how the *primitive Martyrs* were any other than a company of Fools or Madmen, who would hazard their Lives for that which was a mere Arbitrary thing, and which they had no neceſſary Obligation upon them to profeſs. Miſtake me not, I ſpeak not here of mere acts of Diſcipline, but of the Duty of outward profeſſing *Chriſtianity*; if this be a Duty, then a Chriſtian Society,

Society is setled by a *positive Law*; if it be not a Duty, then they are Fools who suffer for it: So that this Question resolved into its Principles, leads us higher than we think for, and the main thing in debate must be, Whether there be an *Obligation* upon *Conscience* for Men to associate in the Profession of *Christianity*, or no? If there be, then the *Church*, which is nothing else but such an *association*, is established upon a *Positive Law of Christ*; if there be not, then those Inconveniences follow, which are already mention'd.

§. 14. We are told indeed by the *Leviathan* with confidence enough, that no Precepts of the *Gospel* are *Law*, till *enacted* by *Civil Authority*; but it is little wonder, that he, who thinks an immaterial substance implies a contradiction, should think as much of calling any thing a *Law*, but what hath a Civil Sanction. But I suppose all those who date freely own a supream and infinite Essence to have been the Creator, and to be the Ruler of the *World*, will acknowledge his Power to oblige *Conscience*, without being beholding to his own Creature to *Enact* his *Laws*, that Men might be bound to obey them. Was the great God fain to be beholding to the *Civil Authority* he had over the *Jewish Commonwealth* (their Government being a Θεοκρατία) to make his *Laws* obligatory to the *Consciences* of the *Jews?* What, had not they their Beings from God? and can there be any greater ground of obligation to Obedience, than from thence? Whence comes *Civil Power* to have any Right to *oblige* Men more, than *God*, considered as *Governour* of the *World*, can have? Can there be indeed no other *Laws* according to the *Leviathan's Hypothesis*, but only the *Law* of *Nature* and *Civil Laws?* But I pray whence comes the Obligation to either of these, that these are not as Arbitrary as all other Agreements are? And is it not as strong a dictate of Nature as any can be (supposing that there is a *God*) that a Creature which receives its Being from another, should be bound to obey him, not only in the Resultancies of his own Nature, but with the arbitrary Constitutions of his Will: Was *Adam* bound to obey *God* or no, as to that positive Precept of eating the Forbidden Fruit, if no *Civil Sanction* had been added to that *Law?* The truth is, such *Hypotheses* as these are, when they are followed close home, will be found to kennel in that black Den, from whence they are loath to be thought to have proceeded.

§. 15. And now, supposing that every full Declaration of the Will of *Christ*, as to any positive Institution, hath the force and power of a Law upon the Consciences of all, to whom it is sufficiently proposed: I proceed to make appear, that such a divine positive Law there is, for the existence of a Church, as a visible Body and Society in the World: By which I am far from meaning such a conspicuous Society, that must continue in a perpetual visibility in the same place; I find not the least intimation of any such thing in *Scripture*; but that there shall always be some where or other, in the World, a *Society owning* and *professing Christianity*, may be easily deduced from thence; and especially on this account, that our *Saviour* hath required this, as one of the Conditions in order to eternal Felicity, that all those who believe in their Hearts, that *Jesus* is the *Christ*, must likewise confess him with their *Mouths* to the World: And therefore, as long as there are Men to believe in *Christ*, there must be Men that will not be *ashamed* to associate, on the account of the *Doctrine* he hath promulged to the World. That one *Phrase* in the *New Testament*, so frequently used by our Blessed Saviour,

of

of *the Kingdom of Heaven* (importing a *Gospel-state*) doth evidently declare a Society, which was constituted by him, on the *principles* of the *Gospel-Covenant*. Wherefore should our *Saviour* call *Disciples*, and make *Apostles*, and send them abroad with full *commission* to gather and initiate *Disciples* by *Baptism*; did he not intend a *visible society* for his *Church?* Had it not been enough for Men to have *cordially believed* the Truth of the *Gospel*, but they must be entred in a *solemn visible way*, and join in *participation* of *visible Symbols of Bread and Wine*, but that our *Saviour* required *external profession* and *Society* in the *Gospel* as a necessary *duty*, in order to *obtaining* the *privileges* conveyed by his *Magna Charta* in the *Gospel*. *I would fain know by what argument we can prove, that any humane Legislator, did ever intend a Commonwealth to be governed according to his mode*, by which we cannot prove that *Christ by a positive Law, did command such a society, as should be governed in a visible manner, as other societies are?* Did he not appoint Officers himself in the *Church*, and that of many ranks and degrees? Did he not invest those Officers with authority to rule his *Church?* Is it not laid as a charge on them, *to take heed to that flock, over which God had made them Overseers?* Are there not *Rules* laid down for the peculiar exercise of their *Government* over the *Church* in all the parts of it? Were not these *Officers* admitted into their function by a most solemn visible Rite of Imposition of Hands? And are all these solemn transactions a mere piece of *sacred Pageantry?* And they will appear to be little more, if the *Society* of the *Church* be a mere *Arbitrary* thing, depending only upon consent and confederation, and not subsisting by vertue of any *Charter* from *Christ*, or some *positive Law*, requiring all *Christians* to join in *Church society* together.

§. 16. But if now from hence it appears (as certainly it cannot but appear) that this *Society* of the *Church* doth subsist by vertue of a *Divine positive Law*, then it must of necessity be distinct from a *Civil Society*, and that on these *Accounts: First*, because there is an antecedent obligation on Conscience to associate on the account of *Christianity*, whether *Humane Laws prohibit* or *command* it. From whence, of necessity it follows, that the constitution of the *Church* is really different from that of the *Commonwealth*; because whether the *Commonwealth* be for, or against this *Society*, all that own it are bound to profess it openly, and declare themselves Members of it. Whereas, were the *Church* and *Commonwealth* really and formally the same, all obligation to *Church society*, would arise merely from the *Legislative Power* of the *Commonwealth*. But now there being a *Divine Law*, binding in Conscience, whose obligation cannot be superseded by any *Humane Law*, it is plain and evident, where are such vastly different obligations, there are different Powers; and in this sense I know no incongruity, in admitting *Imperium in Imperio*, if by it we understand no *external coactive power*, but an *internal power laying obligation on Conscience*, distinct from the power lodged in a *Commonwealth* considered as such. An *outward coactive power* was always disowned by *Christ*, but certainly not an *internal Power* over *Conscience* to oblige all his *Disciples* to what Duties he thought fit.

Secondly, I argue from those Officers, whose rights to govern this Society are founded on that *Charter*, whereby the *Society* it self subsists. Now I would willingly know why, when our *Saviour* disowned all *outward power* in the World, yet he should constitute a *Society*, and appoint Officers in it, did he not intend a peculiar distinct *Society*, from the other *Societies* of the World. And therefore the argument frequently

uſed againſt *Church-power*, becauſe it hath no outward force with it by the conſtitution of *Chriſt*, is a ſtrong argument to me of the peculiarity of a *Chriſtian Society* from a *Commonwealth*; becauſe *Chriſt* ſo inſtituted it, as not to have it ruled at firſt by any outward force or power. When *Chriſt* ſaith his *Kingdom was not of this World*; he implies, that he had a *Society* that was governed by his *Laws* in the World, yet diſtinct from all *mundane Societies:* had not our *Saviour* intended his *Church* to have been a peculiar *Society* diſtinct from a *Commonwealth*, it is hard to conceive why our *Saviour* ſhould *interdict* the *Apoſtles* the uſe of a *civil coactive power:* Or why inſtead of ſending abroad *Apoſtles* to *preach* the *Goſpel*, he did not employ the Governors of Commonwealths to have enforced *Chriſtianity* by *Laws* and *temporal Edicts*, and the ſeveral *Magiſtrates* to have impowered ſeveral perſons under them to preach the *Goſpel* in their ſeveral *Territories?* And can any thing be more plain, by our *Saviour*'s taking a contrary courſe, than that he intended a *Church Society* to be diſtinct from *Civil*, and the power belonging to it (as well as the *Officers*) to be of a different nature from that which is ſetled in a *Commonwealth*. I here ſuppoſe, that *Chriſt* hath by a *poſitive Law* eſtabliſhed the Government of his *Church* upon Officers of his own appointment; which I have largely proved elſewhere, and therefore ſuppoſe it now. *Thirdly*, I argue from the peculiar rights belonging to theſe *Societies:* For if every one born in the *Commonwealth*, have not thereby a right to the privileges of the *Church*; nor every one by being of the *Church*, any right to the benefits of the *Commonwealth*; it muſt neceſſarily follow, that theſe are diſtinct from one another. If any one by being of the *Commonwealth*, hath right to *Church-privileges*, then every one born in a *Commonwealth* may challenge a right to the *Lord's-Supper* without *Baptiſm*, or open *profeſſing Chriſtianity*, which I cannot think any will be very ready to grant. Now there being by *Divine appointment* the ſeveral rights of *Baptiſm* and the *Lord's-Supper*, as peculiar Badges of the Church as a viſible Society, it is evident, *Chriſt* did intend it a Society diſtinct from the Commonwealth. *Iren. p. 2. cap. 2.*

Fourthly, I argue from the different ends of theſe Societies. A Commonwealth is conſtituted for civil ends, and the Church for ſpiritual: for ends are to be judged by the primary conſtitution, but now it is plain, the end of civil ſociety is for preſervation of mens rights as men (therefore *Magiſtracy* is calledby St. *Peter* ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις:) but this Chriſtian Society doth not reſpect men under the connotation of Men, but as *Chriſtians*. The anſwer given to this is very ſhort and inſufficient, when it is ſaid, that every man in a Commonwealth, is to act upon ſpiritual accounts and ends: For there is a great deal of difference between *Chriſtianities* having an influence upon mens actings in a Common-wealth, and making a ſociety the ſame with a Commonwealth. To argue therefore from one to another, is a ſhortneſs of diſcourſe I cannot but wonder at: unleſs it could be proved, that *Chriſtianity* aimed at nothing elſe but regulating Men in the affairs of a Commonwealth, which is a task I ſuppoſe will not be undertaken.

Laſtly, I argue from the peculiar offences againſt this Society, which are, or may be diſtinct from thoſe againſt a Commonwealth. I deny not, but moſt times they are the ſame, but frequently theydiffer, and when they are the ſame, yet the conſideration of them is different in the Church and

Commonwealth, for which I shall suppose the Six Arguments produced
Iren. p. 1. c. 8. in the last *chapter* of the first part to stand good, which will strongly hold to *excommunication* in the *Christian Church*, though there produced only for the *Jewish*. I would fain know what is to be done in many *Offences*, known to be against the *Laws* of *Christ*, and which tend to the Dishonour of the *Christian Society*, which the Civil and *Municipal Laws*, either do not, or may not take cognizance of? Thus much may serve, as I think, to make evident, that the *Church* in its own Nature, is a Peculiar Society distinct from a Commonwealth, which was the first Proposition to be proved.

§. 17. The *Second* is, *That the power of the Church over its Members in case of Offences, doth not arise merely from confederation and consent, though it doth suppose it.* This Church power may be considered two ways. Either, *first*, as it implies the *Right in some Inflicting Censures*. Or, *secondly*, as it implies in *others*, *the Duty of submitting to censures inflicted*; now as to both these, I shall prove that their original is higher than mere Confederation.

1. *As to the Right of inflicting Censures* on these accounts. *First*, What ever Society doth subsist by vertue of a Divine Constitution, doth by vertue thereof derive all power for its Preservation, in peace, unity, and purity; but it is plain, that a power of censuring Offenders, is necessary for the Churches preservation in peace and purity; and it is already proved, that the Church hath its Charter from *Christ*, and therefore from him it hath a power to inflict Punishments on Offenders, suitable to the Nature of the Society they are of. I am very prone to think, that the ground of all the Mistakes on this Subject have risen from hence, that some, imprudently enough, have fixt the Original of this Power on some ambiguous places of Scripture, which may, and it may be, ought to be taken in a different sense; and their Adversaries, finding those places weak and insufficient proofs of such a power, have from thence rejected any such kind of power at all; But certainly, if we should reject every Truth that is weakly proved by some who have undertaken it, I know no Opinion would bid so fair for acceptance as *Scepticism*, and that in reference to many weighty and important Truths; for how weakly have some proved the Existence of a *Deity*, the Immortality of the *Soul*, and the Truth of the *Scriptures* by such Arguments, that if it were enough to overthrow an Opinion to be able to answer some *Arguments* brought for it, *Atheism* it self would become plausible. It can be then no Evidence, that a thing is not true, because some *Arguments* will not prove it; and truly, as to the matter in hand, I am fully of the Opinion of the excellent *H. Grotius*, speak-
In *Luc.* 6. 22. ing of *Excommunication* in the *Christian Church*: *Neque ad eam rem peculiare præceptum desideratur, cum Ecclesiæ cœtu à Christo semel constituto, omnia illa imperata censeri debent, sine quibus ejus cœtus puritas retineri non potest.* And therefore Men spend needless pains to prove an *Institution* of this *power* by some positive *Precept*, when *Christ*'s founding his *Church* as a peculiar *Society*, is sufficient proof he hath endowed it with this fundamental *Right*, without which the *Society* were *arena sine calce*, a company of Persons without any common tye of Union among them; for if there be any such Union, it must depend on some Conditions, to be performed by the Members of that Society, which how could they require from them, if they have not power to exclude them upon *non performance?*

2. I

2. I prove the Divine Original of this power from the *special appointment* and *designation* of particular *Officers* by *Jesus Christ*, for the ruling of this *Society*. Now I say, that *Law* which provides there shall be *Officers* to *govern*, doth give them power to govern, suitable to the nature of their *Society:* Either then you must deny, that *Christ* hath by an *unalterable Institution* appointed a *Gospel Ministry*, or that this *Ministry* hath no Power in the *Church*, or that their Power extends not to *Excommunication*. The first I have already proved, the second follows from their appointment: For by all the Titles given to *Church-Officers* in Scripture, it appears they had a power over the *Church*, (as ἐπίσκοποι, πρεσβύτεροι, ἡγούμενοι, ποιμένες.) All which, as you well know, do import a right to govern the Society over which they are set. And that this power should not extend to a power to exclude convict Offenders, seems very strange, when no other Punishment can be more suitable to the nature of the Society than this is; which is a debarring him from the Privileges of that Society, which the Offender hath so much dishonoured. Can there be any Punishment less imagined towards contumacious Offenders than this is, or that carries in it less of outward and co-active force, it implying nothing but what the Offender himself freely yielded to at his entrance into this Society.

All that I can find replied by any of the Adversaries of the Opinion I here assert, to the Argument drawn from the Institution and Titles of the Officers of the Church, is, that all those Titles which are given to the Ministers of the Gospel in the *New Testament*, that do import *Rule* and *Government*, are all to be taken in a *Spiritual Sense*, as they are *Christ's Ministers* and *Ambassadors* to preach his *Word* and *declare his Will* to his Church. So that all power such Persons conceive to lye in those Titles, is only *Doctrinal* and *Declarative*; but how true that is, let any one judge that considers these things. §. 18.

1. That there was certainly a power of *Discipline* then in the *Churches constituted* by the *Apostles*, which is most evident, not only from the Passages relating to Offenders in Saint *Paul's Epistles*, especially to the *Corinthians* and *Thessalonians*, but from the continued Practice of succeeding Ages manifested by *Tertullian*, *Cyprian*, and many others. There being then a power of *Discipline* in *Apostolical Churches*, there was a *Necessity* it should be administred by some *Persons* who had the care of those *Churches*; and who were they but the several *Pastors* of them? It being then evident that there was such a Power, doth it not stand to common sense it should be implied in such *Titles*, which in their natural Importance do signifie a Right to govern, as the names of *Pastors* and *Rulers* do?

2. There is a *diversity* in Scripture made between *Pastors* and *Teachers*, *Ephes.* 4. 11. Tho' this may not (as it doth not) imply a *necessity* of *Two distinct Offices* in the *Church*, yet it doth a *different respect* and *connotation* in the same Person, and so imports that *Ruling* carries in it somewhat more than mere Teaching, and so the power implied in *Pastors* to be more than merely *Doctrinal*, which is all I contend for, *viz.* a Right to govern the Flock committed to their charge.

3. What possible difference can be assigned between the *Elders that Rule well, and those which labour in the Word and Doctrine*, (1 Tim. 5. 17.) if all their *Ruling* were merely *labouring in the Word and Doctrine?* and all their *Governing* nothing but *Teaching?* I intend not

to prove an Office of Rulers diſtinct from Teachers from hence (which I know neither this place nor any other will do) but that the *formal Conception* of *Ruling*, is different from that of *Teaching*.

4. I argue from the *Analogy* between the Primitive *Churches* and the *Synagogues*, that as many of the names were taken from thence where they carried a *power* of *Diſcipline* with them, ſo they muſt do in ſome *proportion* in the *Church*; or it were not eaſie underſtanding them. It is moſt certain the *Preſbyters* of the *Synagogue* had a *power* of *Ruling*, and can you conceive the *Biſhops* and *Preſbyters* of the Church had none, when the *Societies* were much of the ſame Conſtitution, and the *Government* of the one was tranſcribed from the other, as hath been already largely proved?

5. The *acts* attributed to *Paſtor* in *Scripture*, imply a *power* of *Governing*, diſtinct from mere *Teaching*; ſuch are ποιμαίνειν, uſed for a *Right to Govern*, Matth. 2. 6. Revel. 12. 5. ——— 19. 15. which Word is attributed to *Paſtors of Churches* in reference to their Flocks, *Acts*, 20. 28. 1 Pet. 5. 2. and προσασία, is applied to Miniſters, when they are ſo frequently called προεστῶτες, which notes *præſidentiam cum poteſtate*; for *Heſychius* renders it by κυβέρνησιν, and the προεδρία at *Athens* had certainly a power of Government in them.

6. The very word κυβερνήσεις, is attributed to thoſe who have *overſight of Churches*, 1 Cor. 12. 8. by which it is certainly evident, that a power more than *Doctrinal* is underſtood, as that it could not then be *underſtood of* a *power merely civil*. And this I ſuppoſe may ſuffice to *vindicate* this *Argument* from the *Titles of Church-Officers*, in the *New Teſtament*, that they are not *inſignificant things*; but the Perſons who enjoyed them had a *Right to govern* the Society over which the *Holy Ghoſt* hath made them *Overſeers*.

§. 19. 3. I argue that the *Church-Power* ariſeth not merely from *conſent*, becauſe the *Church* may *exerciſe* her *Power* on ſuch, who have not *actually confederated* with her; which is in admitting Members into the Church: For if the *Church-Officers* have power to *judge* whether *Perſons* are *fit* to be *admitted*, they have *power* to *exclude* from *admiſſion* ſuch whom they judge unfit, and ſo their *power* is *exerciſed* on thoſe who are not *confederated*. To this it may be anſwered, *That the conſent to be judged, gives the Church power over the Perſon ſuing for admiſſion*. I grant it doth, as to that particular *perſon*; but the *Right* in general of *judging concerning Admiſſion*, doth argue an *antecedent* power to an *actual confederation*. For I will ſuppoſe that *Chriſt* ſhould now appoint ſome *Officers* to found a *Church*, and gather a *Society* of *Chriſtians* together, where there hath been none before: I now aſk Whether theſe "Officers have power to admit any into the "Church or no? This I ſuppoſe cannot be denied, for to what End "elſe were they appointed? If it be granted they have power to admit "perſons, and thereby make a Church, then they had power antece-"dently to any Confederation, for the Confederation was ſubſequent "to their Admiſſion: And therefore they who had power to admit, "could not derive their power from Confederation. This Argument, "to me, puts the Caſe out of diſpute, that all Church power cannot a-"riſe from mere Confederation.

And that which farther evidenceth that the *Power* of the *Church* doth not ariſe from mere *conſent*, is that *Deed* of *Gift* whereby our *Bleſſed Saviour* did confer the *Power* of the *Keys* on the *Apoſtle Peter*,

as

as the *representative* in that Action of the whole *College* of the *Apostles* and *Governours* of the *Church*, of which power all the *Apostles* were actually *infeoffed*, John 20. 23. By which *Power* of the *Keys* is certainly meant some *Administration* in the *Church*, which doth respect it as a visible *Society*, in which Sense the *Church* is so frequently called, as in that place, *the Kingdom of Heaven*; and in all probability the *Administration* intended here by the *Power* of the *Keys*, is that we are now discoursing of, *viz.* the *Power* of *Admission* into the *Church* of *Christ*, in order to the Pardon of the Sins of all *penitent Believers*, and the *shutting out* of such who were manifestly *unworthy* of so holy a *Communion*. So that the *power* of the *Keys* doth not *primarily* respect *exclusion* out of the *Church*, and *receiving* into it again upon *Absolution*, but it chiefly respects the *power* of *Admission* into the *Church*, though by way of *connotation* and *analogy of Reason* it will carry the other along with it. For if the *Apostles*, as *Governours* of the *Church*, were *invested* with a *power* of *judging* of Men's *fitness* for *Admission* into the *Church* as *Members* of it, it stands to the *highest Reason* that they should have thereby likewise a *power* conveyed to them, of *excluding* such as are *unworthy* after their *Admission*; to maintain *communion* with the *Church*. So that this Interpretation of the *Power of the Keys*, is far from *invalidating the Power of the Church*, as to its *censuring Offenders*; all that it pretends to, is only giving a more natural and genuine Sense of the *Power of the Keys*, which will appear so to be, if we consider these things. 1. That this *Power* was given to Saint *Peter*, before any *Christian Church* was actually *formed*, which (as I have elsewhere made manifest) was not done till after *Christ's Resurrection*; when *Christ* had given the *Apostles* their Commission *to go to Preach and Baptize*, &c. *Matth.* 28. 10. Is it not therefore far more *rational*, *that the Power of the Keys* here given, should respect the *founding* of a *Church*, and *admission* into it, than *ejection* out of it (before it was in being) and receiving into it again? And this we find likewise remarkably fulfilled in the Person of the *Apostle Peter*, who opened *the Door of admission into the Christian Church*, both to *Jews* and *Gentiles*. To the *Jews* by his *Sermon* at *Pentecost*, when about 3000 *Souls* were brought into the *Church of Christ*; to the *Gentiles*, as is most evident in the Story of *Cornelius*, Acts, 10. 28. who was *the first Fruits of the Gentiles*. So that if we should yield so far to the great *Inhancers* of Saint *Peter's Power*, that something was intended *peculiar* to his *Person* in the *Keys* given him by our *Saviour*, we hereby see how *rationally* it may be understood without the least Advantage to the extravagant Pretensions of Saint *Peter's* pretended Successors. 2. The *pardon of sin* in *Scripture* is most annexed to *Baptism* and *Admission into the Church*, and thence it seems evident, *that the loosing of sin* should be by *admitting into the Church* by *Baptism*, in the same sense by which *Baptism* is said *to save us*, and it is called the *washing of Regeneration*; respecting the Spiritual *Advantages* which come by *Admission into the Church of Christ*; and so they are said to have their *Sins bound* upon them, who continue *refractory* in their *Sins*, as *Simon Magus* is said *to be in the bond of iniquity*. 3. *The Metaphor of the Keys* refers most to *admission* into the House, and *excluding* out of it, rather than *ejecting* any out of it, and *re-admitting* them. Thus when *Eliakim* is said to have *the Keys of the House of* David, it was in regard of his *Power* to *open* and *shut* upon whom he pleased. And thus *Cyprian*, as our learned Mr. *Thorndike* observes,

Mar. 16. 19.

Iren. p. 2. ch. 5. §. 5. p. 212.

Act. 2. 41.

1 Pet. 3. 21. Tit. 3. 5.

Acts 8. 33.

Isa. 22. 20.

Cypr. Ep. 73. Sect. 6.

understands the *power of binding and loosing* in this sense, in his *Epistle* to *Jubaianus*, where speaking of the *Remission of sins* in *Baptism*, he brings these very words of our *Saviour to Peter* as the evidence of it; *That what he should loose on Earth, should be loosed in Heaven:* and concludes with this Sentence, *Unde intelligimus non nisi in Ecclesiâ præpositis & in Evangelicâ lege ac Dominicâ ordinatione fundatis, licere baptizare, & remissionem peccatorum dare; foris autem nec ligari aliquid posse nec solvi, ubi non sit qui ligare possit aut solvere.* That which I now infer from this discourse is, that the *power* of the *Church* doth not arise from mere *consent* and *confederation*, both because this *power doth respect* those who have not actually consented to it, and because it is setled upon the *Governors of the Church* by *Divine Institution.* Thus it appears that the *right of inflicting censures* doth not result merely *ex confederatâ Disciplinâ*, which was the thing to be proved.

§. 20. (2.) The like evidence may be given, for *the duty of submitting to penalties or Church-censures in the Members of the Church:* which that it ariseth not from mere consent of parties, will appear on these accounts.

1. Every person who enters this *Society is bound to consent* before he doth it, because of the *Obligation* lying upon Conscience to an open *profession of Christianity*, presently upon *conviction* of the *understanding of the truth* and *certainty of Christian Religion.* For when once the mind of any *rational* man is so far wrought upon by the influence of the *Divine Spirit*, as to discover the most *rational and undoubted evidences*, which there are of the *truth of Christianity*, he is presently *obliged to profess Christ openly*, to *worship him solemnly*, to *assemble* with others for *instruction* and *participation* of *Gospel Ordinances*; and thence it follows, that there is an *antecedent Obligation* upon *Conscience* to *associate* with others, and *consequently to consent* to be governed by the *Rulers* of the *Society* which he enters into. So that this *submission to the power of Church-Officers* in the *exercise of Discipline* upon *Offenders*, is implied in the very *conditions* of *Christianity*, and the *solemn professing* and *undertaking* of it. 2. It were *impossible* any *Society* should be upheld, if it be not *laid* by the *founder* of the *Society* as the necessary *Duty* of all *members* to *undergo* the *penalties* which shall be inflicted by those who have the care of governing that Society, so they be not contrary to the *Laws*, *Nature* and *Constitution* of it. Else there would be no *provision* made for *preventing divisions* and *confusions* which will happen upon any *breach* made upon the Laws of the Society. Now this *Obligation* to *submission* to *censures*, doth speak something antecedentally to the *confederation*, although the *expression* of it lies in the *confederation* its self. By this I hope we have made it evident that it is nothing else but a *mistake* in those otherwise Learned persons, who make the *power* of *censures* in the *Christian Church* to be nothing else but a *Lex confederatæ Disciplinæ*, whereas this *power* hath been made appear to be derived from a *higher Original* than the mere *Arbitrary consent* of the several *Members* of the *Church associating* together: And how far the examples of the *Synagogues* under the *Law*, are from reaching that of *Christian Churches* in reference to this, because in these the *power* is conveyed by the *Founder* of the *Society*, and not left to any Arbitrary *Constitutions*, as it was among the *Jews* in their *Synagogues.* It cannot be denied but *consent* is *supposed*, and *confederation necessary* in order to *Church power*; but that is rather in regard of the *exercise*, than the original of it; For although I affirm the original of this *power* to be of *Divine Institution*, yet in order

der to the *exerciſe* of it in reference to *particular perſons* (who are not mentioned in the Charter of the *power* its ſelf) it is *neceſſary* that the *perſons* on whom it is exerted, ſhould *declare* their conſent and ſubmiſſion either by *words* or *actions*, to the *Rules* and *Orders* of this Society.

Having now proved that the *Power* of the *Church* doth not ariſe from mere conſent of parties, the next grand Inquiry is concerning the *extent* of this *power*, Whether it doth reach ſo far as to *Excommunication?* For ſome men who will not ſeem wholly to deny all Power in the Church over Offenders, nor that the Church doth ſubſiſt by Divine Inſtitution, yet do wholly deny any ſuch Power as that of *Excommunication*, and ſeem rather to ſay that Church-Officers may far more congruouſly to their Office inflict any other mulct upon Offenders, than exclude them from participation of Communion with others in the Ordinances and Sacraments of the Goſpel: In order therefore to the clearing of this, I come to the third Propoſition. §. 21.

That the power which Chriſt hath given to the Officers of his Church, doth extend to the excluſion of contumacious Offenders from the privileges which this Society enjoys. In theſe terms I rather chooſe to fix it, than in thoſe crude expreſſions, wherein *Eraſtus* and ſome of his *followers* would *ſtate* the *queſtion*, and ſome of their *imprudent adverſaries* have accepted it, *viz.* Whether *Church-Officers* have *power* to exclude any from the *Euchariſt*, *ob moralem impuritatem?* and the reaſons why I wave thoſe terms, are,

1. I muſt confeſs my ſelf yet unſatisfied as to any convincing *Argument*, whereby it can be *proved* that any were denied *admiſſion* to the *Lord's Supper*, who were *admitted* to all other *parts* of *Church-Society*, and owned as *Members* in them. I cannot yet ſee any particular *Reaſon* drawn from the *Nature* of the *Lord's Supper* above all other *parts* of *Divine Worſhip*, which ſhould confine the *cenſures* of the *Church* merely to that *Ordinance*; and ſo to make the *Euchariſt* bear the ſame *Office* in the *Body* of the *Church*, which our *new Anatomiſts* tell us the *parenchyme* of the *Liver*, doth in the *natural Body*, viz. to be *colum ſanguinis*, to ſerve as a kind of *ſtrainer* to *ſeparate* the more *groſs* and *fæculent* parts of the *Blood* from the more *pure* and *ſpirituous*; ſo the *Lord's Supper* to *ſtrain* out the more *impure* members of the *Church* from the more *Holy* and *Spiritual*. My judgment then is, that Excommunication relates immediately to the *cutting* a *perſon* off from *Communion* with the *Churches viſible Society*, conſtituted upon the ends it is; but becauſe *Communion* is not viſibly diſcerned but in *Adminiſtration* and *Participation* of *Goſpel Ordinances*, therefore Excluſion doth chiefly refer to theſe: and becauſe the *Lord's Supper* is *one* of the *higheſt privileges* which the *Church* enjoys; therefore it ſtands to reaſon that Cenſures ſhould begin there. And in that ſenſe *ſuſpenſion* from the *Lord's Supper* of Perſons apparently unworthy, may be embraced as a prudent, lawful, and convenient abatement of the greater penalty of Excommunication, and ſo to ſtand on the ſame general grounds that the other doth; for *Qui poteſt majus, poteſt etiam minus*, which will hold as well in *moral* as *natural* power, if there be no *prohibition* to the *contrary*, nor *peculiar reaſon* as to the one more than to the other. 1.

2. I diſlike the terms *ob moralem impuritatem*, on this account, Becauſe I ſuppoſe they were taken up by *Eraſtus*, and from him by others as the *Controverſy* was managed concerning *Excommunication* among the *Jews*, *viz.* whether it were merely becauſe of *Ceremonial*, or elſe likewiſe 2.

wiſe becauſe of *moral impurity*. As to which I muſt ingenuouſly acknowledge *Eraſtus* hath very much the advantage of his adverſaries, clearly proving that no perſons under the *Law*, were excluded the *Temple Worſhip* becauſe of *moral impurity*. But then withal I think he hath gained little advantage to his *cauſe* by the great and ſucceſsful pains he hath taken in the proving of that; My reaſon is, becauſe the *Temple-Worſhip* or the *Sacrifices* under the *Law* were in ſome ſenſe *propitiatory*, as they were the *adumbrations* of that grand *Sacrifice* which was to be offered up for the *appeaſing* of *God's wrath*, viz. *The Blood of Chriſt*; therefore to have excluded any from *participation* of them, had been to *exclude* them from the *viſible way of obtaining pardon of ſin* (which was not to be had *without ſhedding of Blood*, as the *Apoſtle* tells
Heb. 9.23. us) and from *teſtifying their faith towards God* and *Repentance from dead works*. But now under the Goſpel thoſe *Ordinances*, which ſuppoſe *admiſſion* into the *Church* by *Baptiſm*, do thereby ſuppoſe an *all-ſufficient Sacrifice* offered for the *expiation of ſin*, and conſequently the *ſubſequent privileges* do not immediately *Relate to the obtaining of that*, but a *grateful commemoration* of *the Death of Chriſt*, and a *celebration of the infinite mercy* and *goodneſs of God* in the way of *Redemption* found out by the death of his *Son*. And therefore it ſtands to great reaſon that ſuch *Perſons*, who by their *profane* and *unworthy lives* diſhonour ſo Holy a *profeſſion*, ſhould not be *owned* to be as *good* and *ſound Members* of the *Society*, founded on ſo Sacred a *Foundation*, as the moſt *Chriſtian* and *Religious* Perſons. To this I know nothing can be objected, but that, firſt, The *Paſſover was commemorative among the Jews*; and *Secondly*, *That the privileges of that people were then very great above other people, and therefore if God had intended any ſuch thing as Excommunication among his people, it would have been in uſe then.* To theſe I anſwer.

1. I grant, the Paſſover was commemorative as to the occaſion of its Inſtitution: but then it was withal Typical and Annunciative of that *Lamb of God who was to take away the Sins of the World*; therefore no perſon who deſired expiation of ſins, was to be debarred from it; but the *Lord's Supper* under the Goſpel hath nothing in it propitiatory, but is intended as a Feaſt upon a Sacrifice and a Federal Rite, as hath been fully cleared by a very learned Perſon in his diſcourſe about the true notion of the Lord's Supper.

2. I grant the Jews had very many privileges above other Nations: Nay ſo far, that the whole body of the people were looked upon as God's choſen, and peculiar and holy people; and from thence I juſtly infer, that whatever excluſion was among the people of the Jews from their Society, will far better hold as an argument for Excommunication under the Chriſtian Church, than if it had been a mere *debarring* from their Levitical Worſhip. And that I ſhould far ſooner inſiſt upon, from the reaſon aſſigned, as the ground of Excommunication, than the other infirm and profligated Argument; and ſo the Excluſion out of the Camp of *Iſrael* and the *Cerith* among the *Jews*, (whatever we underſtand by it) may *à pari* hold to be a ground of excluſion from the Chriſtian Society: In Imitation of which, I rather ſuppoſe that excluſion out of the Synagogues was after taken up, rather than as a meer *Outlawry*, when they were deprived of Civil Power.

The

The Queſtion then being thus clearly ſtated, it amounts to this, whether under the Goſpel, there be any power in the Officers of the Church by virtue of divine Inſtitution to exclude any Offenders out of the Chriſtian Society, for tranſgreſſing the Laws of it? And according to our former Propoſitions, I ſuppoſe it will be ſufficient to prove that *power* to be of divine Inſtitution, if I prove it to be fundamentally and intrinſecally reſident in the Society its ſelf. For whatever doth immediately reſult from the Society its ſelf, muſt have the ſame Original which the ſubject hath, becauſe this hath the nature of an inſeparable property reſulting from its Conſtitution. For the clearing of which, I ſhall lay down my thoughts of it as clearly and methodically as I can; and that in theſe following *Hypotheſes.*

1. *Where there is a power of declaring any Perſon to be no true member of the Society he is in, there is a formal power of Excommunication:* For this is all which I intend by it, *viz.* An Authoritative pronouncing *virtute officii*, any Convict Offender to have forfeited his intereſt in the Church as a Chriſtian Society: and to loſe all the Privileges of it: So that if this power be lodged in any *Church Officer*, then he hath power formally to *Excommunicate.*

2. *Where the enjoyment of the privileges of a Society is not abſolute and neceſſary, but depends upon conditions to be performed by every Member, of which the Society is Judge, there is a power in the Rulers of that Society to debar any perſon from ſuch privileges, upon non-performance of the Conditions.* As ſuppoſing the *jus Civitatis* to depend upon defending the Rights of the City; upon a *failing* in reference to this, in any perſon admitted to *Citizen-ſhip*, the *Rulers* of the *City* have the ſame *power* to take that *Right* away, which they had at firſt to give it; becauſe that Right was never abſolutely given, but upon ſuppoſition that the perſon did not overthrow the ends for which it was beſtowed upon him.

3. *The Church is ſuch a Society, in which Communion is not abſolute and neceſſary, but it doth depend upon the performance of ſome Conditions, of which the Governours of it are the competent Judges:* And that appears,

1. Becauſe the admiſſion into the Church, depends upon conditions to be judged by Paſtors, as in caſe of *adult perſons* requiring *Baptiſm*, and the Children of *Infidels* being *Baptized:* in both which caſes it is evident, that Conditions are pre-requiſite, of which the *Paſtors* are *Judges.*

2. Becauſe the Privileges of this Society do require a Separation from other Societies in the World, and call for greater holineſs and purity of life; and thoſe very Privileges are pledges of greater benefits which belong only to perſons qualified with ſuitable conditions; it would therefore be a very great diſhonor to this Society, if it lay as common and open as other Societies in the World do, and no more *qualifications* required from the Members of it.

3. We have inſtances in the ſacred Records of Apoſtolical times, of ſuch ſcandals which have been the ground of the excluſion of the perſons guilty of them from the privileges of the Chriſtian ſociety. And here I ſuppoſe we may (notwithſtanding all the little evaſions which have been found out) fix on the inceſtuous perſon in the Church of *Corinth.* As to which, I lay not the force of the argument upon the manner of execution of the cenſure then, *viz.* by delegation from an Apoſtle, or the Apoſtolical Rod, or *delivering to Satan*; for I freely grant

that theſe did then import an extraordinary power in the Apoſtles over Offenders; but I ſay, the ground and reaſon of the exerciſe of that power in ſuch an extraordinary manner at that time, doth ſtill continue, although not in that viſible extraordinary effect which it then had. And whatever practice is founded upon grounds perpetual and common, that practice muſt continue as long as the grounds of it do, and the Churches capacity will admit; (which Hypotheſis is the only rational Foundation on which Epiſcopal Government in the Church doth ſtand firm and unſhaken, and which in the former Diſcourſe I am far from undermining of, as an intelligent Reader may perceive;) now I ſay that it is evident, that the reaſons of the Apoſtles cenſure of that perſon, are not *fetched* from the want of Chriſtian Magiſtrates, but from ſuch things which will hold as long as any Chriſtian Church: which are the diſhonour of the Society, 1 *Cor.* 4. 1. *the ſpreading of ſuch corruptions farther*, if they paſs uncenſured, 1 *Cor.* 5. 6. and *amendment of the perſon*, 1 Cor. 5. 5. Upon theſe Pillars the *power of cenſures reſts it ſelf in the Church of God*, which are the main grounds *of penalties* in all Societies whatſoever, *viz. the preſervation of the honour of them, and preventing of farther miſchief, and doing good to the offending party.* And that which ſeems to add a great deal of weight to this inſtance, is, that the Apoſtle checks the *Corinthians*, that before the exerciſe *of* the Apoſtolical Rod, they were not *of* themſelves ſenſible *of* ſo great diſhonour to the Church as that was, and had not uſed ſome means *for* the *removing* ſuch a perſon *from* their Society; *And ye are puffed up, and have not rather mourned, that he that hath done this deed, may be taken away from among you*, 1 Corinth. 5. 2. Therein implying, that whether there had been ſuch a thing in the Church, or no, as the Apoſtolical Rod, it had been the duty of a Chriſtian Society to have done their endeavour in order to the removing ſuch a perſon from their number. But farther, I cannot underſtand how it ſhould be a duty in Chriſtians to *withdraw from every brother who walketh diſorderly*, and Church-Officers not to have power to pronounce ſuch a perſon to be withdrawn from, which amounts to Excommunication. It is not to me at all material, whether they did immediately relate to civil or ſacred converſe, (concerning which there is ſo much diſpute) for in which ſoever we place it, if Church-Officers have a power to pronounce ſuch a perſon to be withdrawn from, they have a power of Excommunication; ſo we conſider this penalty as inflicted on the perſon in his relation to the Society as a Chriſtian; and withal, how nearly conjoined their civil and ſpiritual eating were together, 1 *Corinth.* 11. 20, 21. and how ſtrongly the Argument will hold from Civil to Sacred, viz. *à remotione unius ad remotionem alterius*, not from any fancied *pollution in Sacris* from the company of wicked men, but from the diſhonour reflecting on the Society from ſuch unworthy perſons partaking of the higheſt privileges of it. Thus from theſe three *Hypotheſes* this *Corollary* follows, that where any perſons in a Church do by their open and contumacious offences, declare to the World that they are far from being the perſons they were ſuppoſed to be in their admiſſion into the Church, there is a power reſident in the Paſtors of the Church to debar ſuch perſons from the privileges of it; and conſequently from Communion in the Lord's Supper. 1. Becauſe this expreſſeth the neareſt union, and cloſeſt confederation, as the Συσσίτια among the *Grecians* Commonwealth did. 2. Becauſe this hath been always looked on with greateſt veneration in the Church of God; and therefore it is leaſt of

2 Cor. 5. 11.
2 Theſſ. 3. 14.

all fit those persons should be admitted to the highest privileges of the Church, which are unworthy of the lowest of them.

There remain only some few Objections which are levelled against this opinion concerning the power of Excommunication, which from the Question being thus stated and proved, will be soon removed. The *first* is, *that this Excommunication is an outward punishment, and therefore belongs not to Church-Officers, but to the Magistrate.* 2. *Because it neither is, nor ever was in the power of any Church-Officer to debar any offending member from publick Worship, because any Heathens may come to it.* 3. *It cannot lie as to exclusion from the Lord's Supper, because Christ is offered as spiritual food as well in the Word preached as in the Sacrament.* To these I answer, 1. I do not well understand what the Objectors mean by an outward punishment; for there can be no punishment belonging to a visible Society, (such as the Church is here considered to be) but it must be visible, *i. e.* outward, or a thing to be taken notice of in the World; and in this sense I deny that all visible punishment belongs only to the Magistrate; but if by outward, be meant forcible punishment, then I grant that all coactive power belongs to the Magistrate; but I deny that Excommunication formally considered, is a forcible punishment. 1. Because every person at his entrance into this Society, is supposed to declare his submission to the rules of the Society; and therefore whatever he after undergoes by way of penalty in this Society, doth depend upon that consent. 2. A person stands Excommunicate legally and *de jure*, who is declared authoritatively to be no Member of the Society, though he may be present at the acts of it, as a disfranchised person may be at those of a Corporation. 3. A person falling into those offences which merit Excommunication, is supposed in so doing, voluntarily to renounce his interest in those privileges, the enjoyment of which doth depend upon abstaining from those offences which he wilfully falls into, especially if contumacy be joyned with them, as it is before Excommunication; for then nothing is done forcibly towards him; for he first relinquisheth his right, before the Church-Governor declares him excluded the Society. So that the offendor doth meritoriously excommunicate himself, the Pastor doth it formally, by declaring that he hath made himself no member by his offences and contumacy joyned with them. To the second I answer, That I do not place the formality of Excommunication in exclusion from hearing the Word, but in debarring the person from hearing *tanquam pars Ecclesiæ*, as a member of the Church, and so his hearing may be well joyned with that of Heathens and Infidels, and not of Members of the Church. To the third I answer, That exclusion from the Lord's Supper is not on the accounts mentioned in the Objection, but because it is one of the chiefest privileges of the Church, as it is a visible Society. §. 23.

Having thus cleared and asserted the power of Excommunication in a Christian Church, there remains only one enquiry more, which is, Whether this power doth remain formally in the Church, after its being incorporated into the Commonwealth, or else doth it then escheat wholly into the civil Power? The resolution of which question mainly depends on another spoken to already, *viz.* Whether this power was only a kind of Widows Estate, which belonged to it only during its separation from the civil Power, or was the Church absolutely infeoffed of it as its perpetual Right, belonging to it in all conditions whatsoever it should be in? Now that must appear by the Tenure of it, and the

Grounds on which it was conveyed, which having been proved already to be perpetual and univerſal, it from thence appears that no acceſſion to the Church can invalidate its former Title. But then as in caſe of Marriage, the right of diſpoſal and well management of the Eſtate coming by the Wife, belongs to the Huſband; ſo after the Church is married into the Commonwealth, the right of ſupream management of this power in an external way doth fall into the Magiſtrates hands. Which may conſiſt in theſe following things. 1. A right of preſcribing Laws for the due management of Church-cenſures. 2. A right of bounding the manner of proceeding in cenſures, that in a ſetled Chriſtian-ſtate, matters of ſo great weight be not left to the Arbitrary pleaſure of any Church-Officers, nor ſuch cenſures inflicted but upon an evident conviction of ſuch great offences which tend to the diſhonour of the Chriſtian Church, and that in order to the amendment of the Offenders life. 3. The right of adding temporal and civil Sanctions to Church cenſures, and ſo enforcing the ſpiritual Weapons of the Church, with the more keen and ſharp ones of the Civil State. Thus I aſſert the force and efficacy of all Church cenſures *in foro humano* to flow from the Civil Power, and that there is no proper effect following any of them as to Civil Rights, but from the Magiſtrates Sanction. 4. To the Magiſtrate belongs the Right of appeals in caſe of unjuſt cenſures, not that the Magiſtrate can repeal a juſt cenſure in the Church, as to its ſpiritual effect; but he may ſuſpend the temporal effect of it: in which caſe it is the duty of Paſtors to diſcharge their office and acquieſce. But this power of the Magiſtrate in the ſupreme ordering of Eccleſiaſtical as well as Civil Cauſes, I have fully aſſerted and cleared already. From which it follows, That as to any outward effects of the power of Excommunication, the perſon of the ſupreme Magiſtrate muſt be exempted, both becauſe the *force* of theſe cenſures both flow from him in a Chriſtian State, and that there otherwiſe would be a *progreſs in infinitum*, to know whether the cenſure of the Magiſtrate were juſt or no. I conclude then, that though the Magiſtrate hath the main care of ordering things in the Church, yet (the Magiſtrates power in the Church being cumulative, and not privative) the Church and her Officers retain the Fundamental Right of inflicting cenſures on offenders: Which was the thing to be proved.

Iren. p. 1. c. 2. ſect. 7.

Dedit Deus his quoque finem.

The

The Unreasonableness of Separation:

OR, AN

IMPARTIAL ACCOUNT

OF THE

History, Nature, and *Pleas*

OF THE

Present Separation

FROM THE

COMMUNION

OF THE

CHURCH of *ENGLAND.*

To which, several late LETTERS are Annexed, of Eminent *Protestant Divines* Abroad, concerning the *Nature* of our *Differences*, and the *Way* to *Compose Them.*

The PREFACE.

IT *is reported by Persons of unquestionable credit, that after all the Service B.* Jewel *had done against the* Papists, *upon his preaching a Sermon at St.* Paul's-Cross, *in defence of the* Orders *of this* Church, *and of Obedience to them, he was so* ungratefully and spitefully used *by the* Dissenters *of that Time, that for his own Vindication he made a solemn Protestation on his Death-bed*, That what he then said, was neither to please some, nor to displease others, but to promote Peace and Unity among Brethren. *I am far from the vanity of thinking, any thing I have been able to do, in the same* Cause, *fit to be compared with the excellent Labours of that Great Light, and Ornament of this Church, (whose Memory is preserved to this day, with due Veneration in all the* Protestant Churches;) *but the hard Usage I have met with, upon the like occasion, hath made such an Example more observable to me; especially when I can make the same Protestation, with the same sincerity as he did. For, however it hath been maliciously suggested by some, and too easily believed by others, that I was put upon that* Work, *with a design to inflame our Differences, and to raise a fresh persecution against* Dissenting Protestants;

Arch-Bishop Whitgift's *Defence of the* Answer *to the* Admonition. *p.* 423.

Life of Bishop Jewel *before his* Works, *n.* 34.

Vita Juelli *per* Humfred. *p.* 255.

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I was so far from any thought tending that way, that the only Motive *I had to undertake it, was, my just Apprehension, that the Destruction of the* Church *of* England, *under a Pretence of Zeal against* Popery, *was one of the most likely ways to bring it in. And I have hitherto seen no cause (and I believe I shall not) to alter my opinion in this matter; which was not rashly taken up, but formed in my mind from many years observation of the Proceedings of that* Restless Party *(I mean the* Papists) *among us; which hath always aimed at the Ruin of this* Church, *as one of the most probable Means, if others failed, to compass their Ends. As to their secret and more compendious ways of doing Mischief, they lie too far out of our view, till the* Providence *of* God, *at the same time, discovers and disappoints them; but this was more open and visible, and although it seemed the farther way about, yet they promised themselves no small success by it. Many Instruments and Engines they made use of in this design; many ways and times they set about it, and although they met with several disappointments, yet they never gave it over; but, would it not be very strange, that when they can appear no longer in it, others, out of mere Zeal against* Popery, *should carry on the Work for them?*

This seems to be a great Paradox *to unthinking People, who are carried away with mere Noise and Pretences, and hope those will secure them most against the* Fears *of* Popery, *who talk with most Passion, and with least Understanding against it; whereas no persons do really give them greater advantages than these do. For, where they meet only with intemperate Railings, and gross Misunderstandings of the* State *of the* Controversies *between them and us (which commonly go together) the more subtle Priests let such alone to spend their Rage and Fury; and when the heat is over, they will calmly endeavour to let them see, how grossly they have been deceived in some things, and so will more easily make them believe, they are as much deceived in all the rest. And thus the* East *and* West *may meet at last; and the most furious* Antagonists *may become some of the easiest* Converts. *This I do really fear will be the case of many thousands among us, who now pass for most* zealous Protestants; *if ever, which* God forbid, *that* Religion *should come to be uppermost in* England. *It is therefore of mighty consequence for preventing the* Return *of* Popery, *that men rightly understand what it is. For, when they are as much afraid of an* innocent Ceremony, *as of real* Idolatry; *and think they can* worship Images, *and* adore *the* Host *on the same grounds, that they may* use the Sign of the Cross, *or* kneel at the Communion; *when they are brought to see their mistake in one case, they will suspect themselves deceived in the other also. For they who took that to be* Popery *which is not, will be apt to think* Popery *it self not so bad as it was represented, and so from want of right understanding the* Differences *between us, may be easily carried from one* Extreme *to the other. For, when they find the undoubted* Practices *of the* Ancient Church *condemned as* Popish *and* Antichristian *by their* Teachers, *they must conclude* Popery *to be of much greater* Antiquity *than really it is; and when they can trace it so very near the* Apostles *times, they will soon believe it settled by the* Apostles *themselves. For, it will be very hard to persuade any considering Men that the* Christian Church *should degenerate so soon, so unanimously, so universally, as it must do, if* Episcopal Government, *and the use of some* significant Ceremonies *were any parts of that* Apostacy. *Will it not seem strange to them, that when some human* Polities *have preserved their* first Constitution *so long, without any considerable Alteration, that the* Government *instituted by* Christ, *and settled by his* Apostles, *should so soon after be changed into another kind,*

and that ſo eaſily, ſo inſenſibly, that all the Chriſtian Churches *believed, they had ſtill the very* ſame Government *which the* Apoſtles *left them? Which is a matter ſo incredible, that thoſe who can believe ſuch a part of* Popery *could prevail ſo ſoon in the* Chriſtian Church, *may be brought upon the like grounds to believe, that many others did. So mighty a prejudice doth the Principles of our* Churches Enemies, *bring upon the* Cauſe *of the* Reformation. *And thoſe who forego the* Teſtimony *of* Antiquity, *as all the Oppoſers of the* Church *of* England *muſt do, muſt unavoidably run into inſuperable* difficulties *in dealing with the* Papiſts, *which the* Principles *of our* Church *do lead us through. For we can juſtly charge* Popery *as an unreaſonable* Innovation, *when we allow the undoubted* Practices *and* Government *of the* Ancient Church, *for many* Ages *after* Chriſt. *But it is obſerved by Biſhop* Sanderſon, *That thoſe who reject the* Uſages *of our* Church *as* Popiſh *and* Antichriſtian, *when aſſaulted by* Papiſts, *will be apt to conclude* Popery to be the old Religion, which in the pureſt and primitive Times was profeſſed in all Chriſtian Churches throughout the World. Whereas the ſober Engliſh Proteſtant, is able, by the Grace of God, with much evidence of Truth, and without forſaking his Old Principles, to juſtifie the Church of *England* from all imputation of Hereſie or Schiſm, and the Religion thereof, as it ſtood by Law eſtabliſhed, from the like imputation of Novelty. Wherein *he profeſſes* to lay open the inmoſt thoughts of his heart in this ſad buſineſs before God and the World. *I might ſhew, by particular Inſtances, from my preſent* Adverſaries, *that to defend their own* practices *they are driven to maintain ſuch* Principles, *as by evident* conſequences *from them, do overthrow the* Juſtice *and* Equity *of the* Reformation; *but I leave thoſe things to be obſerved in their proper places: Yet I do not queſtion the* Sincerity *of many Mens* Zeal *againſt* Popery, *who, out of a too eager a deſire of upholding ſome particular Fancies of their own, may give too great advantage to our common Enemies.* *Preface to 2d Vol. of Serm. Sect. 11.*

Three ways Biſhop Sanderſon *obſerves, our* Diſſenting Brethren, tho' not intentionally and purpoſely, yet really and eventually have been the great Promoters of the Roman Intereſt among us. (1.) By putting to their helping hand to the pulling down of Epiſcopacy. And, *ſaith he*, it is very well known to many what rejoycing that Vote brought to the Romiſh Party: How even in *Rome* it ſelf they ſung their Iö-Pæans upon the Tidings thereof, and ſaid triumphantly, Now the day is ours; Now is the Fatal-Blow given to the Proteſtant Religion in *England*. (2) By oppoſing the Intereſt of *Rome* with more violence than reaſon. (3) By frequent miſtaking the Queſtion; but eſpecially through the neceſſity of ſome falſe Principle or other, which, having once imbibed, they think themſelves bound to maintain: *whatever becomes of the common* Cauſe *of our* Reformation. *Which may at laſt ſuffer as much through ſome Mens folly and indiſcretion, who pretend to be the moſt* Zealous Proteſtants, *as by all the Arts and Deſigns of our open Enemies. For, as the ſame learned and judicious Biſhop, hath ſaid in this caſe,* Many a man, when he thought moſt to make it ſure, hath quite marred a good buſineſs, by over-doing it. *Thus when the* Papiſts *of late years, have not been able to hinder the taking many things into conſideration, againſt their intereſt, it hath been obſerved, that their Inſtruments have been for the moſt violent Counſels, knowing, that either they would be wholly ineffectual, or if they were purſued, they might in the end bring more advantage than prejudice to their Cauſe. And it is to be feared, they may ſtill hope to do* *Preface to the First Volume, Sect. 18.*

their

their buſineſs, as Divines *obſerve the* Devil *doth; who, when he finds one extreme will not do, he tries whether he can compaſs his end by the other: And no doubt they will extremely rejoyce, if they can make ſome Mens fears of* Popery, *prove at laſt an effectual means to bring it about. As ſome of the* Jews *of old, out of a raſh and violent zeal for the preſervation of the* purity *of their* Religion *(as they pretended) by oppoſing the Sacrifices offer'd by Strangers, and denying the uſe of the lawful Cuſtoms of their Country, brought the* Roman *Power upon them, and ſo haſten'd the deſtruction both of their* Religion *and* Country *too. I do not mention this, as though we could take too great care by good and wholſome Laws to ſtrengthen the* Proteſtant Intereſt, *and by that means, to keep out* Popery; *but only to ſhew, what mighty prejudice an indiſcreet Zeal at this time may bring upon us; if Men ſuffer themſelves to be tranſported ſo far as to think that overthrowing the* Conſtitution *of this* Church *will be any Means to ſecure the* Proteſtant Religion *among us.*

For, What is it which the Papiſts *have more envied and maligned than the* Church *of* England? *What is it they have more wiſhed to ſee broken in pieces? As the late* Cardinal Barberini *ſaid in the hearing of a* Gentleman *who told it me.* He could be contented there were no Prieſts in *England*, ſo there were no Biſhops; *for then he ſuppoſed their Work would do it ſelf. What is it they have uſed more Arts and Inſtruments to deſtroy, than the* Conſtitution *and* Government *of this* Church? *Did not* Cranmer *and* Ridley, *and* Hooper, *and* Farrar, *and* Latimer, *all* Biſhops *of this* Church, *ſuffer* Martyrdom *by their means? Had not they the ſame* kind of Epiſcopacy *which is now among us; and which ſome now are ſo buſie in ſeeking to deſtroy; by publiſhing one Book after another, on purpoſe to repreſent it as* unlawful *and* inconſiſtent *with the* Primitive Inſtitution? *Is all this done for the* honour *of our* Reformation? *Is this the way to preſerve the* Proteſtant Religion *among us; to fill Mens minds with ſuch prejudices againſt the firſt ſettlement of it; as to go about to make the World believe that the* Church-Government *then eſtabliſhed was repugnant to the* Inſtitution *of* Chriſt; *and that our* Martyr-Biſhops *exerciſed an unlawful Authority over* Dioceſan Churches? *But, Whither will not Mens indiſcreet Zeal, and lovers of their own Fancies carry them, eſpecially after* 40 years preſcription? *I do not ſay ſuch Men are ſet on by the* Jeſuits, *but I ſay, they do their Work as effectually, in blaſting the credit of the* Reformation, *as if they were. And yet after all theſe pains, and* forty *years meditations, I do not queſtion but I ſhall make it appear, that our preſent* Epiſcopacy, *is agreeable to the* Inſtitution *of* Chriſt, *and the beſt and moſt flouriſhing Churches. And, wherein doth our* Church *differ from its firſt Eſtabliſhment? Were not the ſame* Ceremonies *then appointed? the ſame* Liturgy *in Subſtance then uſed? concerning which Dr.* Taylor *who then ſuffered* Martyrdom, *publickly declared*; That the whole Church-Service was ſet forth in King *Edward*'s days, with great deliberation, by the Advice of the beſt learned Men in the Realm, and authorized by the whole Parliament, and received and publiſhed gladly through the whole Realm; which Book was never reformed but once, and yet by that one Reformation, it was ſo fully perfected, according to the Rules of our Chriſtian Religion in every behalf, that no Chriſtian Conſcience could be offended with any thing therein contained, I mean, *ſaith he*, of that Book reformed. *Yet this is that Book, whoſe* conſtant uſe *is now pleaded by ſome, together with our* Ceremonies, *as a ground for the neceſſity of* Separation *from our* Churches *Communion.*

Acts and Monuments Tom. 3. p. 171.

But

But if we trace the Footſteps of this Separation *as far as we can, we may find ſtrong probabilities, that the* Jeſuitical Party *had a great influence on the very firſt beginnings of it. For which, we muſt conſider, that when the* Church *of* England *was reſtored in Queen* Elizabeth's *Reign, there was no open* Separation *from the* Communion *of it, for ſeveral years, neither by* Papiſts, *nor* Non-conformiſts: *At laſt, the more Zealous Party of the Foreign* Prieſts *and* Jeſuits, *finding this Compliance would in the end utterly deſtroy the* Popiſh Intereſt *in* England, *they began to draw off the ſecret* Papiſts *from all* Conformity *with our* Church, *which the old Queen* Mary's *Prieſts allowed them in: this raiſed ſome heat among themſelves, but at laſt the way of* Separation *prevailed, as the more* pure *and* perfect way. *But this was not thought ſufficient by theſe buſie Factors for the Church of* Rome, *unleſs they could, under the ſame pretence of* purity *and* perfection, *draw off* Proteſtants *from the* Communion *of this* Church *too. To this purpoſe Perſons were imployed under the diſguiſe of* more zealous Proteſtants, *to ſet up the way of* more ſpiritual Prayer, *and greater* Purity *of* Worſhip *than was obſerved in the* Church *of* England: *that ſo the People, under theſe Pretences, might be drawn into* Separate Meetings: *Of this we have a conſiderable Evidence lately offer'd to the World, in the* Examination *of a* Prieſt *ſo employ'd at the* Council-Table, *A. D.* 1567. *being the 9th of Q.* Elizabeth, *which is publiſhed from the* Lord Burleigh's *Papers, which were in the hands of* Arch-Biſhop Uſher, *and from him came to Sir* James Ware, *whoſe Son brought them into* England, *and lately cauſed them to be Printed. Two years after, one* Heath *a* Jeſuit *was ſummon'd before the* Biſhop *of* Rocheſter *on a like account, for diſparaging the* Prayers *of the* Church, *and ſetting up* Spiritual Prayers *above them*; *and he declared to the Biſhop,* That he had been ſix years in *England,* and that he had laboured to refine the Proteſtants, and to take off all ſmacks of Ceremonies, and to make the Church purer. *When he was ſeized on, a* Letter *was found about him from a* Jeſuit *in* Spain, *wherein he takes notice,* how he was admired by his Flock; *and tells him, they looked on this way of* dividing Proteſtants *as the moſt effectual to bring them all back to the* Church *of* Rome; *and in his Chamber, they found a* Bull *from* Pius V. *to follow the* Inſtructions *of the* Society *for* dividing the Proteſtants in England; *and the* Licenſe *from his* Fraternity. *There is one thing in the* Jeſuit's Letter *deſerves our farther conſideration, which the Publiſher of it did not underſtand: which is, that* Hallingham, Coleman, *and* Benſon *are there mentioned, as Perſons imploy'd* to ſow a Faction among the German Hereticks; *which he takes to be ſpoken of the* Sects in Germany; *but by the* German Hereticks *the* Engliſh Proteſtants *are meant,* i. e. Lutherans: *and theſe very Men are mentioned by our Hiſtorians, without knowing of this* Letter, *as the moſt active and buſie in the beginning of the* Separation. Of theſe *(ſaith Fuller)* Coleman, Button, Hallingham and Benſon were the chief. At which time *(ſaith* Heylin) Benſon, Button, Hallingham, and Coleman, and others taking upon them to be of more ardent Zeal then others, *&c. That time is* 1568, *which agrees exactly with the Date of that* Letter *at* Madrid, October 26. 1568. *And both theſe had it from a much better Author than either of them*; Camden *I mean*; *who ſaith*, That while Harding, Sanders, and others attacked our Church on one ſide; Coleman, Button, Hallingham, Benſon, and others were as buſie on the other; who, under pretence of a purer Reformation, oppoſed the Diſcipline, Liturgy, and Calling of our Biſhops, as approaching too near to the Church of Rome. *And he makes*

Foxes and Firebrands; 1680.

Church Hiſtory, l. 9. p. 81.

Hiſtory of Presbyter, l. 6. p. 257

Annales Elizabethæ. A.D. 1568.

theſe the Beginners *of thoſe* Quarrels *which afterwards brake out with great violence. Now, that there is no improbability in the thing, will appear by the ſuitableneſs of theſe Pretences about* Spiritual Prayer, *to the* Doctrine *and* Practices *of the* Jeſuits. *For they are profeſſed deſpiſers of the* Cathedral Service, *and are excuſed from their attendance on it by the* Conſtitutions *of their* Order; *and are as great admirers of* Spiritual Prayer, *and an* Enthuſiaſtick way *of* Preaching, *as appears by the Hiſtory of the firſt Inſtitution of their Order, by* Orlandinus *and* Maffeius. *They who are acquainted with their* Doctrine *of* Spiritual Prayer, *will find that which is admired and ſet up here, as ſo much above* Set-Forms, *to be one of the loweſt of* three ſorts *among them. That* Gift of Prayer *which Men have, but requires the* Exerciſe *of their* own Gifts *to ſtir it up, they call* Oratio acquiſita, acquired Prayer; *although they ſay, the* Principle *of it is* infuſed. *The Second is, by a* ſpecial immediate influence of the Holy Ghoſt upon the Mind, with the concurrence of infuſed habits. *The Third is far above either of theſe, which they call the* Prayer *of* Contemplation, *and is never given by way of* habit *to any; but lies in* immediate *and* unexpreſſible unions. *All theſe I could eaſily ſhew to be the Doctrine received and magnified in the* Roman *Church, eſpecially by thoſe who pretend to greater* Purity *and* Spirituality *than others. But this is ſufficient to my purpoſe, to prove, that there is no improbability that they ſhould be the firſt ſetters up of this way in* England. *And it is obſervable, that it was never known here, or in any other* Reformed Church *before this time: and therefore the beginning of it is unjuſtly father'd by ſome on* T. C. *But by whomſoever it was begun, it met with ſuch great ſucceſs in the zeal and warmth of devotion which appeared in it, that no* Charm *hath been more effectual, to draw injudicious* People *into a contempt of our* Liturgy, *and admiring the* Way *of* Separation. *When by ſuch Arts the People were poſſeſſed with an Opinion of a more* pure *and* Spiritual Way of Worſhip *than was uſed in our* Church, *they were eaſily drawn into the admiration of thoſe, who found fault with the* Liturgy *and* Ceremonies *that were uſed among us; and ſo the* Diviſions *wonderfully increaſed in a very ſhort time. And the* Papiſts *could not but pleaſe themſelves to ſee that other Men did their Work ſo effectually for them. For the Authors of the* Admonition 14 Elizab. *declared,* They would have neither Papiſts nor others conſtrained to Communicate: which although, *as* Arch-Biſhop Whitgift *ſaith,* they intended as a Plea for their own Separation from the Church, yet, *ſaith he,* the Papiſts could not have met with better Proctors. *And elſewhere he tells them,* That they did the Pope very good ſervice, and that he would not miſs them for any thing. For what is his deſire but to have this Church of *England* (which he hath Accuſed) utterly defaced and diſcredited, to have it by any means overthrown, if not by Foreign Enemies, yet by Domeſtical Diſſention. And, What fitter and apter Inſtruments could he have had for that purpoſe than you, who under pretence of zeal, overthrow that which other Men have builded, under colour of Purity ſeek to bring in Deformity, and under the Cloke of Equality and Humility, would uſurp as great Tyranny and lofty Lordlineſs over your Pariſhes, as ever the Pope did over the whole Church? *And in another place, he ſaith,* They were made the Engines of the Roman Conclave, whereby they intend to overthrow this Church by our own Folly, which they cannot compaſs by all their Policy. *Arch-Biſhop* Grindal *(as I find in a* Letter *of his)* expreſſed his great fear of two things, Atheiſm and Popery, and both ariſing out of our needleſs Diviſions and Differences, fomented,

V. Thom. à Jeſu, de natura divinæ Orationis.

Defence of the Anſwer, p. 605.

Page 55.

Fair warning ſecond Part Printed by H. March. 1663.

fomented, he doubts not by Satan the Enemy of Mankind, and the Pope the Enemy of Chriſtendom. By theſe differences, the Enemies of our Religion gain this, That nothing can be eſtabliſhed by Law in the Proteſtant Religion, whoſe every part is oppoſed by one or other of her own Profeſſors; ſo that things continuing looſe and confuſed, the Papiſts have their opportunity to urge their way, which is attended with Order and Government, and our Religion continuing thus diſtracted and divided, ſome vile Wretches lay hold of the Arguments on one ſide to confute the other, and ſo hope at laſt to deſtroy all. *Dr.* Sutcliffe *ſaid long ago*, That Wiſe Men apprehended theſe unhappy Queſtions about indifferent things to be managed by the ſubtle Jeſuits, thereby to diſturb the Peace and Settlement of our Church, until at laſt they enjoy their long expected opportunity to ſet up themſelves, and reſtore the exploded Tyranny and Idolatry of the Church of *Rome*. *Among Mr.* Selden's MSS. *there is mentioned an odd* Prophecy, That Popery ſhould decay about 1500, and be reſtored about 1700, which is there ſaid to be moſt likely by means of our Diviſions, which threaten the Reformation, upon the Intereſt of Religion, and open advantages to the Enemies of it, and nothing is there ſaid to be ſo likely to prevent it as a firm eſtabliſhment of ſound Doctrine, Diſcipline, and Worſhip in this Church.

Among the Jeſuit Contzen's *directions for* reducing Popery into a Country, *the moſt conſiderable are*, *Contzen Politic. l. 2. c. 18. Sect. 6.*

(1.) That it be done under a pretence of eaſe to tender Conſciences, which will gain a reputation to the Prince, and not ſeem to be done from his own Inclination, but out of kindneſs to his People.

(2.) That when Liberty is granted, then the parties be forbid to contend with each other, for that will make way the more eaſily for one ſide to prevail, and the Prince will be commended for his love of Peace.

(3.) That thoſe, who ſuſpect the Deſign, and preach againſt it, be traduced as Men that Preach very unſeaſonable Doctrine, that they are Proud, Self-opiniators, and Enemies to Peace and Union.

But, the ſpecial Advice he gives to a Catholick Prince, is,

(4.) To make as much uſe of the Diviſions of his Enemies, as of the Agreement of his Friends. *How much the* Popiſh Party *here hath followed theſe Counſels, will eaſily appear by reflection upon their behaviour theſe laſt twenty years.* *Sect. 9.*

But that which more particularly reaches to our own caſe, is, the Letter *of* Advice *given to* F. Young, *by* Seignior Ballarini, *concerning* the beſt way of managing the Popiſh Intereſt in *England*, upon His Majeſty's Reſtauration, *wherein are ſeveral very remarkable things. This Letter was found in* F. Young's *Study, after his death, and was tranſlated out of* Italian, *and printed in the Collection before mention'd*;

The Firſt Advice *is*, To make the Obſtruction of Settlement their great deſign, eſpecially upon the fundamental Conſtitutions of the Kingdom, whereunto if things ſhould fall, they would be more firm than ever.

(2.) *The next thing is*, To remove the jealouſies raiſed by *Prin, Baxter, &c.* of their deſign upon the late Factions; and to ſet up the proſperous way of Fears and Jealouſies of the King and Biſhops.

(3.) To make it appear under-hand, how near the Doctrine, Worſhip, and Diſcipline of *England* comes to us: at how little diſtance their Common-Prayer is from our Maſs; and that the wiſeſt and ableſt Men

of that way are so moderate, that they would willingly come over to us, or at least meet us half way; hereby the more stayed Men will become more odious, and others will run out of all Religion for fear of Popery.

(4.) Let there be an Indulgence promoted by the Factious, and seconded by you.

(5.) That the Trade and Treasure of the Nation may be engrossed between themselves and other discontented Parties.

(6.) That the Bishops and Ministers of the Church of *England* be aspersed, as either worldly and careless on the one hand; or so factious on the other, that it were well they were removed.

These are some of those excellent Advices *then given, and how well they have been followed we all know.*

For, according to this Counsel, when they could not hinder the Settlement *then, The great thing they aimed at for many years, was, the* breaking in pieces *the* Constitution *of this* Church *by a* General Toleration.

Coleman's *Tryal, p.* 101. *This* Coleman *owned at his* Tryal, *and after Sentence, declared*, That possibly he might be of an opinion, that Popery might come in, if Liberty of Conscience had been granted. *The Author of the* Two Conferences between *L'Chese* and the four Jesuits, *owns* the Declaration *of* Indulgence, 167$\frac{1}{2}$, to be of the Papists procuring; *but he saith*, the Presbyterians presently suspected the Kindness, and like wise Men closed with the Conformists; and refused the Bait, however specious it seemed, when they saw the Hook that lay under it. *It was so far from this, that when one of the furious Dissenters, suspected the kindness, and made* Queries *upon the* Declaration, *wherein he represented it* as a Stratagem to introduce Popery, and Arbitrary Government; *one of the more moderate Party among them, Wrote a Publick* Vindication of their accepting the Licences, *wherein he declared to the World, in their Name*, That they were not concerned what the secret design might be, so long as the thing was good. And why, *saith he*, do you insinuate Jealousies? Have not we publick, and the Papists only private, Allowance? In fine, we are thankful for the honor put upon us to be publick in our Meetings. *Was this the Suspicion they had of the* Kindness, *and their* Wisdom *in joyning with the* Conformists? *If such bold and notorious Untruths are published now, when every one that can remember but eight years backward, can disprove them, what account may we expect will be given to Posterity of the Passages of these Times, if others do not take care to set them right? And I am so far from believing that they then closed with the* Conformists, *that I date* Presbyterian Separation *chiefly from that time. For, did not they take out* Indulgences, build Meeting Places, *and* keep up separate Congregations *ever since? And did not those, who before seem'd most inclinable to hold Communion with our Churches, then undertake in Print to defend the* lawfulness *of these* separate Meetings *upon such* Principles *as will justifie any* Separation? *Upon this, many of those who frequented our* Churches *before, withdrew themselves; and since they have formed and continued* separate Bodies; *and upon the death of one* Minister *have chosen another in his room. And, what is a* formal Separation *if this be not? Then the Ejected* Ministers *resorted to* Cities *and* Corporations, *not to supply the necessities of those who wanted them, but to* gather Churches *among them. For a very credible Person informs us*, That in the City he lived in, where there were not above 30 or 40 that ordinarily refused the publick, and met privately before the Indulgence; there were ten Non-conformist

Vindiciæ libertatis Evangelii; Or a Justification of our present Indulgence and acceptance of Licences, 1672. p. 12.

Sacrilegious desertion rebuked, and Tolerated Preaching Vindicated, 1672.

Answer to Sacrileg. desert. p. 171. 1672.

miſt Miniſters that came into their City. *And, What could this be for, but to draw People from their* Churches, *to make up* Separate Congregations? *And ever ſince that time, they have been hammering out* Principles, *ſuch as they are, to juſtifie their own practices.* But the Presbyterians did not join with the Papiſts for a General Toleration. *I grant ſome of them did not, although very powerful* Charms *were at that time uſed to draw them in: and not a few ſwallowed the* Specious Bait, *although ſome had the* Skill *to diſentangle themſelves from the Hook which went along with it. But that this honour doth not belong univerſally to them, I ſhall thus evidently prove.*

In A. D. 1675. *there was a* Book *Printed, Entituled,* The Peaceable Deſign, or an account of the Non-conformiſts Meetings, by ſome Miniſters of *London. In it an* Objection *is thus put*; But What ſhall we ſay then to the Papiſts? *The Anſwer is,* The Papiſt in our account is but one ſort of Recuſants, and the conſcientious and peaceable among them, muſt be held in the ſame Predicament with thoſe among our ſelves, that likewiſe refuſe to come to Common Prayer. *What is this, but joining for a* Toleration of Popery? *If this be not plain enough, theſe words follow,* But as for the common Papiſt, who lives innocently in his way, he is to us as other Separatiſts, and ſo comes under the like Toleration. Page 71. Page 72.

This notable Book, *with ſome few Additions and Alterations, hath been ſince Printed, and with great ſincerity called,* An Anſwer to my Sermon. *And the Times being changed ſince, the former Paſſage is thus alter'd,* The Papiſt is one, whoſe Worſhip to us is Idolatry, and we cannot therefore allow them the liberty of publick Aſſembling themſelves, as others of the Separation. *Is it* Idolatry, *and not to be* tolerated *in* 1680? *And was it* Idolatry *and to be* tolerated *in* 1675? *Or was it* no Idolatry *then, but is become ſo now, and* intolerable Idolatry *too? The latter paſſage hath theſe Alterations*; *in ſtead of,* He is to us as other Separatiſts, and ſo comes under the like Toleration; *theſe are put in,* He is to us, in regard of what he doth in private, in the matter of his God, as others who likewiſe refuſe to come to Common Prayer. *Now we ſee* Toleration *ſtruck out for the* Papiſts; *but it was not only viſible enough before, but that very* Book *was Printed with a Deſign to preſent it to the* Parliament, *which was the higheſt way of owning their* Concurrence *with the* Papiſts *for a general* Toleration. *And the true reaſon of this alteration is, that then was then, and now is now.* Page 32.

And to ſhew yet farther, what influence the Jeſuitical Councils *have had upon their* People, *as to the* Courſe *of* Separation; *I ſhall produce the* Teſtimony *of a very conſiderable Perſon among them, who underſtood thoſe affairs as well as any Man, viz. Mr.* Ph. Nye. *Who, not long before his Death, foreſeeing the miſchievous conſequence of thoſe extravagant Heats, the People were running into, wrote a* Diſcourſe *on purpoſe,* to prove it lawful to hear the Conforming Miniſters, *and anſwers all the common Objections againſt it; towards the Concluſion he wonders,* how the differing Parties came to be ſo agreed, in thinking it unlawful to hear us preach; *but he ſaith,* He is perſuaded it is one conſtant deſign of Satan in the variety of ways of Religion he hath ſet on foot by Jeſuits among us. Let us therefore be more aware of whatſoever tends that way. *Here we have a plain Confeſſion of a Leading Man among the* Diſſenters, *That the* Jeſuits *were very buſie among them, and that* they and the Devil joined together *in ſetting them at the greateſt diſtance poſſible* Page 25.

possible from the Church *of* England; *and that those who would countermine the* Devil and the Jesuits, *must avoid whatever tends to that height of* Separation *the* People *were run into. And Mr.* Baxter, *in those days.* viz. *but a little before the* Indulgence *came out, was so sensible of the* Mischief *of* Separation, *that he saith,* Our Division gratifieth the Papists, and greatly hazardeth the Protestant Religion, and that more than most of you seem to believe, or to regard. *Where he speaks to the* Separating People. *And among other great inconveniences of* Separation, *which he mentions, this is one,* That Popery will get by it so great advantage as may hazard us all, and we may lose that, which the several Parties do contend about.

Preface to the Defence of the Cure, p.17.

Defence of the Cure of Divisions, Introduction p.52, &c.

Two ways especially Popery will grow out of our Divisions.

(1.) By the odium and scorn of our disagreements, inconsistency, and multiplied Sects: They will persuade People, that we must come for Unity to them, or else run mad, and crumble into dust and individuals. Thousands have been drawn to Popery, or confirmed in it by this Argument already; and I am persuaded, that all the Arguments else in *Bellarmin*, and all other Books that ever were written, have not done so much to make Papists in *England*, as the Multitude of Sects among our selves. Yea, some Professors of religious strictness, of great esteem for Godliness, have turned Papists themselves, when they were giddy and wearied with turnings; and when they had run from Sect to Sect, and found no consistency in any.

(2.) Either the Papists by increasing the Divisions, would make them be accounted seditious, rebellious, dangerous to the publick Peace; or else when so many Parties are constrained to beg and wait for liberty, the Papists may not be shut out alone, but have Toleration with the rest. And, *saith he*, Shall they use our hands to do their Works, and pull their Freedom out of the Fire? We have already unspeakably served them, both in this, and in abating the Odium of the Gun-powder Plot, and their other Treasons, Insurrections, and Spanish Invasion.

Thus freely did Mr. Baxter *write at that time; and even after the* Indulgence, *he hath these passages, concerning the* separating *and* dividing Humour *of their* People; It shameth, it grieveth us to see and hear from *England*, and from *New England* this common cry, We are endanger'd by Divisions, principally because the Self-conceited part of the religious People, will not be ruled by their Pastors, but must have their way, and will needs be Rulers of the Church and them. *And soon after he saith to them,* You have made more Papists than ever you or we are like to recover. Nothing is any whit considerable that a Papist hath to say, till he cometh to your case, and saith, Doth not experience tell you, that without Papal unity and force, these People will never be ruled, or united? It is you that tempt them to use Fire and Faggot, that will not be ruled or kept in concord, by the wisest, and holiest, and most self-denying Ministers upon Earth. *(Are not these kind words for themselves, considering what he gives to others?)* And must you, even you, that should be our comfort, become our shame, and break our hearts, and make Men Papists by your Temptation? Wo to the World because of offences, and wo to some by whom they come.

Sacrilegious desertion, p.103,104.

Let now any impartial Reader judge, who did most effectually serve the Papists Designs, *those who kept to the* Communion *of the* Church *of* England, *or those who fell into the* Course *of* Separation? *I will allow, what Mr.* Baxter *saith,* That they might use their endeavours to exasperate

Defence of the Cure, p. 53.

the ſeveral Parties againſt each other; *and might ſometimes preſs the more rigorous execution of* Laws *againſt them*; *but then it was to ſet them at the greater diſtance from us, and to make them more pliable to a* General Toleration. *And they ſometimes complained, that thoſe who were moſt adverſe to this found themſelves under the ſeverity of the Law, when more tractable men eſcaped*; *which they have weakly imputed to the* implacable temper *of the* Biſhops, *when they might eaſily underſtand the true cauſe of ſuch a diſcrimination: But from the whole it appears, that the* grand Deſign *of the* Papiſts *for many years, was to break in pieces the* Conſtitution *of the* Church *of* England; *which being done, they flatter'd themſelves with the hopes of great Acceſſions to their ſtrength and party*; *and in order to this, they inflamed the differences among us to the utmoſt height, on purpoſe to make all the* Diſſenting Parties *to join with them for a* General Toleration; *which they did not queſtion would deſtroy this* Church, *and advance their Intereſt. Whether they did judge truly in this, I am not to determine*; *it is ſufficient that they went upon the greateſt Probabilities. But, is it poſſible to imagine ſuch skilful* Engineers *ſhould uſe ſo much art and induſtry to undermine and blow up a* Bulwark, *unleſs they hoped to gain the place, or at leaſt ſome very conſiderable advantage to themſelves by it? And it is a moſt unfortunate condition our* Church *is in, if thoſe who deſign to bring in* Popery, *and thoſe who deſign to keep it out, ſhould both conſpire towards its deſtruction.*

This, which I have repreſented, was the poſture of our Church-Affairs, *when the late horrible* Plot *of the* Papiſts, *for* Deſtruction *of the* King's Perſon, *and* Subverſion *of our* Religion *came to be diſcover'd. It ſeems, they found the other methods tedious and uncertain*; *and they met with many croſs accidents, many rubs and diſappointments in their way*; *and therefore they reſolved upon a* Summary way *of* Proceeding, *and to do their buſineſs by one blow. Which, in regard of the circumſtances of our Affairs, is ſo far from being incredible, that if they* had *no ſuch deſign, it is rather a Wonder, they had not*; *eſpecially conſidering the allowed Principles and Practices in the* Church *of* Rome. *Upon the diſcovery of the* Plot, *and the means the* Papiſts *uſed to confirm the* Truth *of it (knowing our great proneneſs to* Infidelity) *by the Murder of a worthy Gentleman who received the* Depoſitions, *the Nation was extremely alarm'd with the apprehenſions of* Popery, *and provoked to the utmoſt deteſtation of it. Thoſe who had been long apprehenſive of their reſtleſs deſigns, were glad to ſee others awaken'd*; *but they ſeemed like Men rouſed out of a deep ſleep, being amazed and confounded, fearful of every thing, and apt to miſtruſt all perſons who were not in ſuch a* Conſternation *as themſelves. During this heat, ſome of us, both in private, and publick, endeavour'd to bring the* Diſſenters *to the ſenſe of the neceſſity of* Union *among* Proteſtants, *hoping the apprehenſion of preſent danger, common to us all, would have diſpoſed them to a better inclination to* the things which belong to our Peace. *But finding the Nation thus vehemently bent againſt* Popery, *thoſe who had formerly carried it ſo ſmoothly and fairly towards the* common *and* innocent Papiſts *(as they then ſtiled them) and thought them* equally capable of Toleration with themſelves, *now they fly out into the utmoſt rage againſt them*; *and others were apt, by* ſly inſinuations, *to repreſent thoſe of the* Church *of* England *(ſome of whom had appeared with vigour and reſolution againſt* Popery, *when they were trucking underhand for* Toleration *with them) as* Papiſts *in* Maſquerade. *But now*

they tack about, and ſtrike in with the violent Rage *of the* People, *and none ſo fierce againſt* Popery *as they. What influence it hath had upon others I know not, but I confeſs it did not leſſen my eſteem of the Integrity of thoſe of the* Church *of* England, *that they were not ſo much tranſported by ſudden heats, beyond the juſt bounds of* Prudence, *and* Decency, *and* Humanity, *towards their greateſt* Enemies, *having learnt from the Apoſtle, That,* the wrath of Man worketh not the righteouſneſs of God. *They expected as little favour from them as any, if they had prevailed, and I doubt not but ſome of them had been made the firſt Examples of their* Cruelty. *However, this was interpreted to be want of Zeal, by thoſe who think there is no Fire in the Houſe, unleſs it flame out at the Windows; and this advantage was taken by the inveterate Enemies of our* Church, *to repreſent us all as ſecret friends to the* Papiſts *(ſo improbable a Lie, that the Devil himſelf would bluſh at the telling of it, not for the Malice, but the Folly and ill Contrivance of it) and thoſe who were more* moderate, *were content to allow* 3 *or* 4 *among the* Biſhops *to be* Proteſtants, *and about* 4 *or* 5 *among the* Clergy *of* London. *To feed this humour (which wonderfully ſpread among more of the* People *than we could have believed to have been ſo weak) moſt of the Malicious Libels againſt the* Church *of* England *were reprinted and diſperſed, and new ones added to them. Among the reſt, one tranſlated out of* French, *to prove the* Advances of the Church of England towards Popery; *but ſo unhappily managed, that thoſe Perſons are chiefly mention'd, who had appeared with moſt zeal againſt* Popery. *Yet, ſo much had the Arts of ſome men prevailed over the Judgment of others, that even this Diſcourſe was greedily ſwallowed by them. But I muſt do the* Author *of it that Right, to declare, that before his Death, he was very ſenſible of the injury he had done to ſome worthy* Divines *of our* Church *therein; and begged God and them pardon for it. Wherein, as he followed the Example of ſome others, who were great Enemies to our* Church *while they lived, but repented of it when they came to die; ſo, I hope, others, upon better conſideration, will ſee reaſon to follow his. But this was but an inconſiderable trifle in compariſon of what follows. We were ſtill in hopes, that Men* ſo Wiſe, ſo Self-denying, *as the* Non-conformiſt Miniſters *repreſent themſelves to the World, would, in ſo* Critical *a time, have made ſome ſteps or advances towards an* Union *with us; at leaſt to have let us known their Senſe of the preſent ſtate of things, and their readineſs to join with us as far as they could, againſt the* Aſſaults *of a* Common Enemy. *Inſtead of this, thoſe we diſcourſed with, ſeemed farther off than before; and when we leaſt expected ſuch a Blow, under the Name of a* Plea *for* Peace, *out comes a* Book, *which far better deſerved the Title of a* Plea for Diſorder and Separation, *not without frequent, ſharp, and bitter Reflections on the* Conſtitution *of our* Church, *and the* Conformity *required by* Law; *as though it had been deſigned on purpoſe, to repreſent the* Clergy *of our* Church *as a Company of notorious,* lying *and* perjured Villains; *for conforming to the* Laws *of the* Land, *and* Orders *eſtabliſhed among us; for there are no fewer than* 30 tremendous Aggravations of the Sin of Conformity *ſet down in it. And all this done, without the leaſt Provocation given on our ſide; when all our Diſcourſes that touched them, tended only to* Union, *and the* Deſirableneſs *of* Accommodation. *If this had been the ſingle work of one Man, his Paſſion and Infirmities might have been ſome tolerable excuſe for the* indiſcretion *of it; but he writes in the Name of a whole* Party *of Men, and delivers*

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the Sense of all his Acquaintance; *and if those* Principles *be owned, and allowed by them, there can hardly be expected any such thing as a* National Settlement, *but all* Churches *must be heaps of Sand, which may lie together till a puff of wind disperses them; having no firmer Bond of Union, than the* present humour *and* good will *of the* People. *But of the Principles of that Book, I have discoursed at large, as far as concerns the business of.* Separation *in the Second and Third* Parts *of the following* Treatise.

But, as though this had not been enough, to shew what Enemies to Peace *Men may be under a pretence of it; not long after, the same* Author *sets forth another* Book, *with this* Title, The true and only way of Concord of all the Christian Churches. *As though he had been* Christ's Plenipotentiary *upon Earth, and were to set the* Terms *of* Peace *and* War *among all* Christians; *but I wish he had shewed himself such a Pattern of Meekness, Humility, Patience, and a peaceable Disposition, that we might not have so much reason to dispute his* Credentials. *But this is likewise fraught with such impracticable Notions, and dividing Principles, as though his whole design had been, to prove that there is* No true way of Concord among Christians; *for if there be no other than what he allows, all the* Christian Churches *this day in the World are in a mighty mistake. When I looked into these* Books, *and saw the design of them, I was mightily concerned, and infinitely surprized, that a Person of his Reputation for Piety, of his Age and Experience in the World, and such a* Lover of Peace, *as he had always professed himself, and one who tells the* World *so often of* his dying, and of the Day of Judgment, *should think of leaving two such* Firebrands *behind him, as both these* Books *will appear to any one who duely considers them, which have been since followed by four or five more to the same purpose, so that he seems resolved to leave his* Life *and* Sting *together in the Wounds of this Church. And it made me extremely pity the case of this poor Church, when even those who pretend to* plead *for* Peace, *and to bring* Water *to quench her* Flames, *do but add more Fuel to them. This gave the first occasion to those Thoughts, which I afterwards delivered in my Sermon; for since by the means of such* Books, *the zeal of so many* People *was turned off from the* Papists *against those of our* Church, *I saw a plain necessity, that either we must be run down by the impetuous violence of an enraged, but unprovoked company of Men, or we must venture our selves to try, whether we could stem that Tide which we saw coming upon us. And it falling to my Lot to preach in the most publick* Auditory *of the* City, *at a more than usual Appearance, being the first* Sunday *in the Term, I considered the relation I stood in under our Honoured* Diocesan, *to the* Clergy *of the* City, *and therefore thought my self more obliged to take notice of what concerned* the Peace and Welfare *of the* Churches *therein. Upon these Considerations, I thought fit to take that opportunity, to lay open the due sense I had of the* Unreasonableness *and* Mischief *of the present* Separation. *Wherein I was so far from intending to reflect on Mr.* B. as preaching in the neighbourhood of my Parish, *that to my best remembrance, I never once thought of it, either in the making or preaching of that Sermon. And yet throughout his* Answer *he would insinuate,* That I had scarce any one in my eye but himself. *His* Books *indeed had made too great an Impression on my Mind for me easily to forget them: But it was the great, the dangerous, the unaccountable* Separation, *which I knew to be in and about the* City, *without regard to the Greatness or Smallness of Parishes, to the Abilities or Piety of their Mini-*

ſters, or to the Peace and Order of the Church we live in, which made me fix upon that Subject, although I knew it to be ſo ſore a place, that the Parties moſt concerned, could hardly endure to have it touched, tho' with a ſoft and gentle hand. However, I conſidered the duty which I owe to God, *and this* Church, *above the eſteem and good words of peeviſh and partial Men; as I had before done in my dealing with the* Papiſts; *and I reſolved to give them no juſt provocation by reproachful Language, or perſonal Reflections; but if* Truth *and* Reaſon *would anger them, I did not hold my ſelf obliged to ſtudy to pleaſe them.*

But, againſt this whole Undertaking, there have been two common Objections.

Firſt, That it was Unſeaſonable.

Secondly, That it was too Sharp and Severe.

To both theſe I ſhall anſwer:

Firſt, *As to the* Unſeaſonableneſs *of it. What! Was it* Unſeaſonable *to perſuade* Proteſtants *to* Peace and Unity? *That ſurely is very ſeaſonable at any time, and much more then. And I appeal to any one that reads it, whether this were not the chief, and only deſign of my* Sermon. *And, to ſay,* This was Unſeaſonable, *is juſt as if a Garriſon were beſieg'd by an Enemy, and in great danger of being ſurprized, and although they had frequent notice of it given them, yet many of the Soldiers were reſolved not to join in a common Body, under command of their Officers, but would run into corners, a few in a company, and do what they liſt, and one ſhould undertake to perſuade them to return to their due obedience, and to mind the common Intereſt, and ſome grave By-ſtanders ſhould ſay,* It is true, this is good Counſel at another time, but at this preſent it is very Unſeaſonable. *When could it be more* ſeaſonable, *than when the ſenſe of their danger is greateſt upon them? At another time it might have been leſs neceſſary; but when the common danger is apparent to all, Men of Senſe, or common Ingenuity, could not but take ſuch Advice moſt kindly at ſuch a* ſeaſon. But this Advice was not given to themſelves, but to the Magiſtrates and Judges, and that made it look like a deſign to ſtir them up to a perſecution of them. *There had been ſome colour for this, if there had been the leaſt word tending that way through the whole* Sermon. *But this Objection is generally made by thoſe who never read the* Sermon, *and never intend to read it; and ſuch I have found have ſpoken with the greateſt bitterneſs againſt it. They reſolved to condemn it, and therefore would ſee nothing that might have alter'd their Sentence. It is enough,* it was preach'd before the Magiſtrates and Judges, and therefore it muſt be for perſecution of Diſſenters. *None are ſo incapable of conviction, as thoſe who preſently determine what a thing muſt be, without conſidering what it is. Is it not poſſible for a Man to ſpeak of* Peace *before* Hannibal, *or of* Obedience *to* Government *before* Julius Cæſar? *Muſt one ſpeak of nothing but* Drums *and* Trumpets *before great* Generals? *Which is juſt as reaſonable as to ſuppoſe, that a Man cannot preach about* Diſſenters *before* Judges *and* Magiſtrates, *but he muſt deſign to ſtir them up to the ſevere* Execution *of* Laws? *But it is to no purpoſe for me to think to convince thoſe by any* Vindication, *who will not be at the pains to read the* Sermon *it ſelf, for their own ſatisfaction.* But the Diſſenters themſelves were not there to hear it. *And muſt we never preach againſt the* Papiſts *but when they are* preſent? *It ſeems they ſoon heard enough of it, by the noiſe and clamour they made about it.* Yet ſtill this gives advantage to the Papiſts for us to quarrel among our ſelves. *Would to God this advantage had*

never

never been given them! And Woe be to them by whom theſe offences come. *And what muſt we do? Muſt we ſtand ſtill with open Arms, and naked Breaſts to receive all the Wounds they are willing to give us? Muſt we ſuffer our ſelves to be run down with a popular Fury, raiſed by reviling Books, and* Pamphlets, *and not open our Mouths for our own Vindication, leſt the* Papiſts *ſhould overhear us? Which is, as if the unruly Soldiers in an Army muſt be let alone in a Mutiny, for fear the Enemy ſhould take notice, and make ſome advantage to him, but which will be the greater advantage to him, to ſee it ſpread and increaſe, or care taken in time to ſuppreſs it? If our* Diſſenters *had not appeared more active and buſie than formerly; if they had not both by publick Writings, and ſecret Inſinuations, gone about to blaſt the Reputation of this* Church, *and the* Members *of it, ſo diſingenuouſly, as they have done, there might have been ſome pretence for the* Unſeaſonableneſs *of my* Sermon. *But when thoſe things were notorious, to ſay it was* Unſeaſonable *to preach ſuch a* Sermon *then, or now to defend it; is in effect to tell us, they may ſay and do what they will againſt us, at all ſeaſons; but whatever we ſay or do for our own Vindication is* Unſeaſonable; *which, under favour, ſeems to be little leſs than a* State *of* Perſecution *on our ſide, for it is like ſetting us in the* Pillory, *for them to throw* Dirt *at us, without allowing us any means to defend our ſelves.*

But ſome complain of the two great Sharpneſs and Severity *of it. But, Wherein doth it lie? Not in raking into old Sores, or looking back to the proceedings of former Times? Not in expoſing the particular Faults of ſome Men, and laying them to the charge of the whole Party? Not in ſharp and provoking Reflections on Mens Perſons? All theſe I purpoſely, and with care declined. My deſign being not to exaſperate any; but to perſuade and argue them into a better diſpoſition to* Union, *by laying open the common danger we are in, and the great* Miſchief *of the preſent* Separation. *But I am told by one,* There are ſevere Reflections upon the Sincerity and Honeſty of the Deſigns of the Non-conformiſts; *by another,* that indeed I do not beſpeak for them, Gibbets, Whipping-poſts, and Dungeons, nor (directly) any thing grievous to their Fleſh; but I do not paſs any gentle Doom upon them, in reſpect of their everlaſting State. *God forbid, that I ſhould judge any one among them, as to their preſent Sincerity, or final Condition;* to their own Maſter they muſt ſtand or fall; *but, my buſineſs was to conſider, the nature and tendency of their Actions. My Judgment being, that a cauſeleſs breaking the* Peace *of the* Church *we live in, is really as great and as dangerous a* Sin *as* Murder, *and in ſome reſpects aggravated beyond it; and herein having the concurrence of the* Divines *of greateſt reputation both ancient and modern: Would they have had me repreſented that as no Sin, which I think to be ſo great a one; or thoſe as not guilty, whom in my Conſcience I thought to be guilty of it? Would they have had me ſuffered this* Sin *to have* lain upon them *without* reproving it; *or would they have had me found out all the ſoft and palliating conſiderations to have leſſen'd their ſenſe of it? No, I had ſeen too much of this already; and a mighty prejudice done thereby to Men otherwiſe ſcrupulous and conſcientious, that ſeem to have loſt all* Senſe *of this* Sin; *as if there neither were, nor could be any ſuch thing; unleſs perhaps they ſhould happen to quarrel among themſelves in a particular Congregation. Which is ſo mean, ſo jejune, ſo narrow a Notion of* Schiſm, *ſo much ſhort of that* Care *of the* Church's Peace, *which* Chriſt *hath made ſo great a* Duty *of his Followers, that I cannot but wonder that Men of underſtanding ſhould be ſatisfy'd with it, unleſs they thought there was no other way*

Dr. O. Vindication, p. 4. Letter out of the Country, p. 7.

to excuſe their own actings. And that I confeſs, is a ſhrewd temptation. But, ſo far as I can judge, as far as the Obligation to preſerve the Church's Peace extends, *ſo far doth the* Sin *of* Schiſm *reach*; *and the* Obligation *to* preſerve the Peace of the Church *extends to all lawful* Conſtitutions *in order to it*; *or elſe it would fall ſhort of the* Obligation *to* Civil Peace, *which is* as far as is poſſible, *and* as much as lies in us. *Therefore to break the* Peace *of the* Church *we live in, for the ſake of any* lawful Orders *and* Conſtitutions *made to preſerve it, is directly the* Sin *of* Schiſm, *or an unlawful breach of the* Peace *of the* Church. *And this is not to be determined by Mens Fancies, and preſent Apprehenſions*; *which they call the* Dictates *of* Conſcience; *but upon plain and evident grounds, manifeſting the repugnancy of the things required to the* Laws *and* Inſtitutions *of* Chriſt, *and that they are of that importance that he allows Men rather to divide from ſuch a* Communion, *than join in the practice of ſuch things. We were in a lamentable caſe, as to the* Defence *of the* Reformation, *if we had nothing more to plead againſt the Impoſitions of the* Church *of* Rome, *than they have againſt ours*; *and I think it impoſſible to defend the* lawfulneſs *of our* Separation *from them, if we had no better grounds to proceed upon, than they have againſt our* Church. *For the proof of this, I refer the* Reader *to the* BOOK *it ſelf. This then being my opinion concerning their Practices: Was this a fault in me, to ſhew ſome reaſon for it? And how could I do that without proving thoſe Practices to be ſinful? and if they were ſinful, how could they who knowingly and deliberately continue in the Practice of them be innocent? What influence the prejudices of Education, the authority of Teachers, the almoſt invincible Ignorance of ſome weaker People, and the uncurable Byaſs of ſome Mens Minds may have to leſſen their Guilt, I meddle not with*; *but the* Nature *of the* Actions, *and the* Tendency *of them which I then declared to be* ſinful; *and I am ſo far from being alter'd in my Judgment by any of the* Anſwers *I have ſeen, (and I have read all that have been publiſhed) that I am much more con-*

Page 4. *firmed in it. But Dr.* O. *ſaith,* He had ſeen a Collection of ſevere Reflections by the hand of a Perſon of Honour, with his Judgment upon them. *I wiſh the Doctor had favour'd me with a ſight of them*; *but at preſent it is ſomewhat hard for me to make the* Objections *and* Anſwers *too. And it was not ſo fairly done to mention them unleſs he had produced them. Therefore to the* unknown Objections, *I hope no* Anſwer *is expected.*

But there is one expreſſion wherein I am charged with a ſcurrilous Sarcaſm, or a very unchriſtian judging Mens Hearts, or a ridiculous Piece of Nonſenſe, *viz. when I ſay,* That the moſt godly People among them can the leaſt endure to be told of their Faults: *Now, ſaith Mr.* A. How can they be moſt godly, who cannot bear reproof of their Faults, which is a main part of Godlineſs. *I am really ſorry, ſome of my* Anſwerers *have ſo much made good the truth of that Saying in its plaineſt ſenſe. But there needs no more to clear my Intention in it, but to conſider of whom it is ſpoken,* viz. *of thoſe, who will not bear being told of the* Sin *of* Separation by their own Teachers. *For my Words are,* " *Is it that they fear* " *the Reproaches of the People? which ſome few of the moſt eminent Per-* " *ſons among them, have found they muſt undergo, if they touch upon this* " *Subject (for I know not how it comes to paſs, that the moſt godly People* " *among them can the leaſt endure to be told of their Faults.) In all which words I had a particular reſpect to the* Caſe *of Mr.* Baxter, *who after he had, with great honeſty, publiſhed his* Cure *of* Diviſions, *and therein ſharply rebuked the* ſeparating, dividing Humour of the People,

Miſchief of Impoſ. end of the Preface.

who pretended most to religious Strictness, *he met with bitter Reproaches from them for the sake of this Freedom, that he was forced to publish a* Defence *of his* Cure, *in Vindication of himself from them, wherein he saith*, He was judged by them to be too censorious of them, and too sharp in telling them of that which he did not doubt to be their Sin: *Pref. p. 11, 13.* And *again*, If I be mistaken, should you be so impatient, as not to bear with one, that in such an opinion differeth from you? And why should you not bear with my dissent, as well as I do with yours? *Again*, Why should not you bear with lesser contradiction, when others must bear with far greater from you? Will you proclaim your selves to be the more impatient? You will then make Men think, you are the most guilty——— *And a little after*, And yet you that should be most patient, take it for a heinous crime and injury, to be told, that you wrong them, and that you judge too hardly of them; and that their Communion is not unlawful. *And when we join to this, what he saith elsewhere, that they are the* most self-conceited Professors who will not be ruled by their Ministers, but are most given to division and separation: *In a Passage before-mention'd, there needs no more to vindicate the truth of this saying, than to shew, that the* most self-conceited *do often pass for* the most godly *among them; which is a* figure *so common, so easie to be understood, that it needs no more Apology, than our* Saviour's *calling the* Pharisees righteous Men, *and saying, they were* so whole, *as* to need no Physician. *And I cannot think such* figures *which were used by our* Saviour, *unfit for a Pulpit.* *Page 15.*

But notwithstanding all the care I took to prevent giving any just occasion of offence, my Sermon *had not been long abroad, but I heard of great Clamours against it. At first it went down quietly enough, and many of the People began to read and consider it, being pleased to find so weighty and so necessary a Point debated, with so much Calmness, and freedom from Passion. Which being discerned by the Leaders and Managers of the Parties, it was soon resolved, that the* Sermon *must be cried down, and the People dissuaded, by all means, from reading it. If any of them were talked with about it, they shrunk up their Shoulders, and looked sternly, and shook their Heads, and hardly forbore some bitter Words, both of the* Author *and the* Sermon. *Upon this followed a great Cry and Noise, both in* City *and* Country, *against it; and some honest Persons really pitied me, thinking I had done some very ill thing; so* many People were of a sudden so set against me, *and* spoke so bitterly of my Sermon. *I asked what the matter was? What false Doctrine I had preached? Did they suspect I was turn'd* Papist, *at such a Time when all the* Nation *was set against* Popery? *who had written so much against it, when others, who are now so fierce, were afraid to appear?* It was something they said, had angred them sorely, but they could not tell what; *which made me read my* Sermon *over again, to see what offensive Passages there might be in it; after all, I could see no just cause for any offence, unless it were, that I perswaded the Dissenters to* submit *to the* Church *of* England, *and not the* Church *of* England *to* submit *to them. And this, I believe, lay at the bottom of many Mens Stomachs. They would have had me humour'd the growing Faction, which, under a Pretence of* Zeal *against* Popery, *design'd to overthrow the* Church *of* England; *or, at least, have preach'd for* Alterations *and* Abatements, *and taking away* Ceremonies *and* Subscriptions, *and leaving them full liberty to do what they pleased; and then I might have gained their good opinion, and been thought to have*

preached

preached a very Seaſonable Sermon. *But ſuppoſing my own private opinion were never ſo much for ſome* Abatements *to be made, that might tend to ſtrengthen and unite* Proteſtants, *and were conſiſtent with our* National Settlement: *Had it been ſeaſonable to have ſpoken of the* Alteration *of* Laws *before* Magiſtrates *and* Judges, *who are tied up to the* Laws *in being? Is it fit for private Perſons, when* Laws *are in force, to take upon them to judge what* Laws *are fit to continue, and what not? I think the alteration of eſtabliſhed* Laws, *which concern the* preſervation *of our* Church *and* Religion, *one of the weightieſt things that can be taken into conſideration. And although the Arguments are very plauſible one way, yet the Objections are very ſtrong another. The* union *of* Proteſtants, *the* eaſe *of* ſcrupulous Conſciences, *the* providing for ſo many poor Families of ejected Miniſters, *are great* Motives *on one ſide: But,*

1. *The Impoſſibility of ſatisfying all Diſſenters.*
2. *The Uncertainty of gaining any conſiderable number by Relaxations.*
3. *The Difficulty of keeping Factions out of the Church, conſidering the ungovernableneſs of ſome Mens Tempers and Principles.*
4. *The Danger of breaking all in pieces by* Toleration.
5. *The Expoſing our ſelves to the* Papiſts, *and others, by receding too far from the firſt* Principles *and* Frame *of our* Reformation.

And 6. *The Difficulty of keeping out* Prieſts, *pretending to be allowed Diſſenters, are very weighty* Conſiderations *on the other ſide.*

So that, whatever Men talk of the eaſineſs of taking away the preſent Impoſitions, *it is a ſign they look no farther than their own caſe, and do not conſider the* Strength *and* Union *of a* National Settlement, *and the* neceſſity *thereof to keep out* Popery, *and how much eaſier it is to break things in pieces, than to ſet them in order again; for new Objections will ſtill be raiſed againſt any* Settlement, *and ſo the reſult may be nothing but* Diſorder *and* Confuſion. *Of what moment theſe things may be thought to other Perſons, I know not, but they were great enough to me, to make me think it very* unſeaſonable *to meddle with* eſtabliſh'd Laws; *but on the other hand, I could not but think it* ſeaſonable *to endeavour to remove ſuch* Scruples *and* Prejudices, *as hindred the People moſt from* Communion *with our* Churches; *for, as I ſaid in the* Epiſtle *before the* Sermon, "*If the People be brought to underſtand and practiſe their duty, as to* "*Communion with our Churches, other difficulties, which obſtruct our* "*Union, will more eaſily be removed.* This Paſſage *Mr.* A. *tells me,* was the Sport and Entertainment of the **Coffee-Houſes.** *I confeſs, I am a great Stranger to the* Wiſdom *of thoſe places; but I ſee Mr.* A. *is able to give me an account of the ſage Diſcourſes upon Points of* Divinity *there. But if thoſe pleaſant Gentlemen would have underſtood the difference between* Lay-Communion, and Miniſterial Conformity, *they might have apprehended the meaning of that Paſſage. For, I am of opinion, if the* People *once thought themſelves bound to do, what they may lawfully do, towards* Communion *with us; many of the* Miniſters *who ſeem now moſt forward to defend the* Separation, *would think of putting a fairer Conſtruction upon many things than now they do. And therefore I thought it fitteſt to handle the* Caſe *of the* People, *who are either over-violent in theſe matters, without ever conſidering them, or have met with ill Inſtructors, who have not faithfully let them know what the* Terms *of* Communion, *as to themſelves were. For the* Scruple *of the* Surplice *ſeems to be worn out;* Kneeling at the Sacrament *is generally allowed by the more judicious* Non-conformiſts; *and the only Scruple, as to them, about* the Sign of the Croſs,

Miſchief of Impoſition, Preface, towards the end.

Croſs, *is not, whether it be lawful for the Miniſter to uſe it, but* whether it be lawful for them to offer their Children to be baptized where it is uſed; *and as Mr.* Baxter *reſolves the caſe*; Baptiſm is God's Ordinance, and his privilege, and the Sin (if it be one) is the Miniſters, and not his. Another Man's ſinful Mode will not juſtifie the neglect of our Duty; elſe we might not joyn in any Prayer or Sacrament in which the Miniſter modally ſinneth: that is with none. *As to the* Uſe of the Liturgy, *Mr.* Baxter *ſaith*, he that ſeparateth from all Churches among us, on the account of the unlawfulneſs of our Liturgy, doth ſeparate from them on a Reaſon common to all, or almoſt all Chriſtian Churches upon Earth; the thoughts of which he is not able to bear. And although the new Impoſitions, *he ſaith*, makes their Miniſterial Conformity harder than formerly; yet the Peoples Conformity is the ſame (if not eaſier, by ſome Amendments of the Liturgy) as when Separation was fully confuted by the old Non-conformiſts. And the moſt learned and worthy of them, *he ſaith*, wrote more againſt Separation, than the Conformiſts: and the preſent Non-conformiſts have not more Wiſdom, Learning, or Holineſs than they. But, *he ſaith*, they did not only urge the People againſt Separation, but to come to the very beginning of the publick Worſhip, preferring it before their private Duties. *What ground was there now, to make ſuch a hideous Out-cry about a* Sermon, *which perſuaded Men to no more, than the old pious, and peaceable* Nonconformiſts *would have done; who talked more ſharply againſt the* Sin, *and* Miſchief *of* Separation, *than I have done; as may be ſeen in the* firſt Part *of the following Treatiſe?*

Chriſtian Direct. Caſes Ec. p. 49.

Defence of Cure of Diviſ. Introd. p. 55.

Ib. & p. 88.

But as if they had been the Papiſts *Inſtruments, to execute the fury of their Wrath and Diſpleaſure againſt me, they Summon in the Power of their Party, and reſolve, with their full might, to fall upon me. And, as if it had not been enough to deal with me by open Force, which is more Manly, and Generous; they made uſe of mean and baſe Arts, by ſcurrilous* Rimes, *by virulent and malicious* Libels *ſent to me without Names; by idle Stories, and falſe Suggeſtions, to rob me at once, of my reputation, and the Tranquillity of my Mind. But I thank* God, *I deſpiſed ſuch pitiful Artifices, and ſuch unmanly and barbarous Uſage; which made no other Impreſſion on my mind, but to make me underſtand, that other Men could uſe me, as bad, or worſe, than the* Papiſts. *But this brought to my Mind a Paſſage of* Arch-Biſhop Whitgift, *concerning their Predeceſſor's uſage of* Biſhop Jewel; *after he had ſo ſtoutly defended this* Church *againſt the* Papiſts. But, *ſaith he*, it is their manner, except you pleaſe their humor in all things, though you otherwiſe deſerve never ſo well, all is nothing with them, but they will deprave you, rail on you, backbite you, invent Lies of you, and ſpread falſe Rumors, as though you were the vileſt Perſons upon Earth. *I could hardly have believed ſo ill a Character of Men pretending to any kind of* Religion, *had I not found ſo juſt a parallel; abating only the due allowances that muſt be made as to my Caſe, with reſpect to the far greater deſerts of that incomparable* Biſhop, *But notwithſtanding all their hard Cenſures of me, I do aſſure them, I am as firm a* Proteſtant *as ever I was, and ſhould be ſtill as ready to promote the* Intereſt *of the* Proteſtant Religion, *yea, and to do any real Kindneſs to the* Diſſenters *themſelves, that may be conſiſtent with the* National Settlement *of our* Church, *and the* Honor *of our* Reformation.

Arch-Biſhop Whitgift's Defence, &c. p. 423.

After a while, they thought fit to draw their Strength into open Field and the Firſt *who appeared againſt me, was Dr.* Owen, *who treated me*

with that Civility, and decent Language, that I cannot but return him Thanks for it; however, I was far from being ſatisfied with his Reaſoning, *as will appear in the* Book *it ſelf. The next was Mr.* Baxter, *who appeared with ſo much Anger, and unbecoming Paſſion; that I truly pitied him; and was ſo far from being tranſported by it, that it was enough to cure an inclination to an indecent paſſion, to ſee how ill it became a Man of his Age, Profeſſion, and Reputation. At firſt he ſent me ſome captious Queſtions for a Trial of Skill; I returned him Anſwer,* They were not to the buſineſs; but if he intended to anſwer my Sermon *(as I perceiceived by his* Letter *he was put upon it, and I knew how hardly he could abſtain from Writing however)* I deſired him not to make too haſty a Reply. *But he, who ſeldom takes the Advice of his Friends, was, I ſuppoſe, the more provoked by this good Counſel, and ſeems to have written his whole* Book *in one continued fit of Anger; and by ſome* Rules *of* Civility *peculiar to himſelf, he publiſhed my private* Letter, *without ſo much as letting me know that he intended it. Whatever injurious and ſpiteful Reflections he hath made upon me through his* Book, *I can more eaſily forgive him, than he can forgive himſelf, when he looks them over again with a better mind. And therefore I paſs over the* Scurrility *of his* Preface, *wherein, after he hath in* 20 Particulars *deſcribed, the* moſt unſkilful, proud, partial, obſtinate, cruel, impertinent Adverſaries *he could think of* places of Scripture, *or* Similitudes *for, he then concludes*; But although all this be not the caſe of the Reverend Doctor. *What a malicious way of reproaching is this? To name ſo many very ill things, and to leave it to the* Reader *to apply as much as he pleaſes; and when he is charged with any one to ſay, he meant not that, for he added,* although all this be not the caſe of R. Dr. *If this be the* Juſtice, *the* Charity, *and* Ingenuity *of Mr.* B. *and his* Bretliren, *who put him upon* Writing, *they muſt give me leave to think, there are ſome* Non-conformiſt Miniſters, *that are not* the Wiſeſt, the Meekeſt, *nor* the moſt Self-denying Men upon Earth. *He ſeems much concerned about* my being likely to have the laſt Word: *Which I am very willing to let him have, hoping he will come to himſelf before he dies; and may live to* repent *of the* Injuries *he hath done his* Brethren *and the* Miſchiefs *he hath done to the* Church *of* God, *by ſo induſtrionſly expoſing the* Governors *of it, and laying the* Foundation *for* endleſs Separation, *as will appear in the following* Diſcourſe.

The Third who entred the Liſts, was one, who ſeemed to write more like a well-diſpoſed Gentleman, *than like a* Divine; *he* wiſhes *very well to the* Cauſe *he undertakes; he diſcourſes gravely and piouſly, without Bitterneſs and Rancor, or any ſharp Reflections, and ſometimes with a great mixture of Kindneſs towards me; for which, and his* Prayers for me, *I do heartily thank him. What I find material to the buſineſs in his* Book, *I have conſider'd in its due place.*

The Fourth comes forth with a more than ordinary briſkneſs; *and ſeems to ſet up rather for a ſort of* Wit, *than a* grave Divine. *His* Book *reſembled the* Bird *of* Athens, *for it ſeems to be made up of* Face *and* Feathers: *For, ſetting aſide his bold Sayings, his impertinent Triflings, his hunting up and down for any occaſion of venting his little Stories and Similitudes, there is very little of* Subſtance *left in him; but what he hath borrowed from Dr. O. or Mr.* B. *Methinks, ſuch a light, vain, ſcurrilous Way of Writing, doth not become ſuch a* Tenderneſs of Conſcience *as our* Diſſenting Brethren *pretend to. There is a ſort of pleaſantneſs of Wit which ſerves to entertain the Reader in the rough and deep Way of Controverſies;*

verſies; *but certainly there is a difference between the Railery and good Humor of Gentlemen, and the Jeſts of Porters and Watermen. But this* Author *ſeems to be ambitious of the honor of a* ſecond Martin, *whoſe way he imitates, and whoſe Wit he equals. Yet this is not his greateſt Fault, for he deals with me as a Man that was by any means to be run down, without regard to common Ingenuity. For, ſuppoſe* I had miſtaken the Senſe of my Text, *which I am certain I did not*; *yet I am not the only Perſon in the World that talks impertinently. Suppoſe* there had been a a Fault in my Reaſoning, *methinks the ſenſe of humane Frailty ſhould make Men not grow inſolent upon ſuch a Diſcovery: and yet I do not know one thing which he hath made it in*; *as will appear hereafter. But, will nothing ſerve but to repreſent me to the World as a kind of* Atheiſtical Hypocrite, *i. e. as a ſecret underminer of the* proof of a Deity, *under the pretence of proving it? Yet, this he doth more than once: which was ſo remote from his Buſineſs, that nothing but a wretched, malicious Deſign of expoſing me, could make him draw it in: He gives a gentle Touch at it in his* Preface, *to prepare the Reader's Appetite*; *but* p. 70. *he charges me* with proceeding upon ſuch Principles, as plainly render it impoſſible by any certain Argument to prove the exiſtence of a Deity. *Mr.* B. *had unhappily ſaid, and without the leaſt ground*, that my Principles overthrow all Religion; *and Mr.* A. *vouches it, and undertakes to prove it for him. Mr.* B. *begins his Plea for Peace with a ſaying of St.* Auſtin, *(he meant St.* Hierom) that no Man ought to be patient under the accuſation of Hereſy: *What ſhould a Man then be under the accuſation of* being guilty of overthrowing all Religion, and rendring it impoſſible, by any certain Argument, to prove that there is a God? *According to all Rules of Juſtice, a Charge of ſo high a nature ought not to be brought againſt any Man, without ſuch evidence, as appears clear and convincing to him that brings it. But I very much miſtruſt in this caſe, that Mr.* A. *in his Conſcience knew, his Proofs to be weak and inſufficient*; *What then can we think of him that charges another with ſo high a Crime, when he knows that he cannot prove it? His firſt Proof, he takes from my* Popiſh Adverſaries, about the inconſiſtency of proving a Deity, by ſuch infallible Arguments, as muſt ſuppoſe the exiſtence of what we prove; *as all* infallibility *from* divine Aſſiſtance *muſt do. But did I ever ſay, there was no Certainty without infallible Aſſiſtance? And yet this whole matter about* Certainty, *as to the* Proof of a God, and the Chriſtian Religion, *I had ſo lately clear-* *Several Conferences p. 258. &c.*
ed in my laſt Anſwer to the Papiſts, *which he refers to in this very place, that he could not but be convinced of the Impertinency of it. His main Argument he pretends to bring from a Principle of my own*; *for his words are*, He lays down this for a Principle, that the Foundation of all Certainty lies in the neceſſary Exiſtence of a being abſolutely perfect; how then, *ſaith he*, ſhall we come to prove his Exiſtence by ſuch demonſtration, Cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum? *And then he adds*, That I have excluded all Demonſtration from the Works of God, becauſe we muſt firſt know, that there is an inviſible God, before we can certainly know, that there is a viſible World. *But if I make it evident, that I lay down no ſuch* Principles *of my own*; *and that I do particularly inſiſt upon the* certainty of proving a God from his Works, *What doth this Man deſerve for his Calumnies?*

Firſt, *That which he ſaith I lay down for a* Principle, *I only propoſe as an inference from the* Hypotheſis *of other Men. For my words are*, And if that Principle be ſuppoſed, as the foundation of all Phyſical Certainty, *Orig. Sacr. l. 2. ch. 8. p. 220.*

as to the Being of things, that there is a God: I say, if that Principle be supposed. *From hence appears a double Falsification.*

1. *That I make it* the Principle of all certainty, *whereas I expresly set down in their Hypothesis* Physical Certainty as to the being of things; *but, Is there no* certainty *but what is* Physical? *What thinks he of* Mathematical, *or* Metaphysical Certainty? *so that there might be a* Mathematical *or* Metaphysical Certainty *of the* Being of a God, *though this* Principle *were allowed. How then doth this prove, that* I render it impossible, by any certain Argument, to prove the Existence of a Deity?

2. *That I make it* a Principle of my own, *whereas I only suppose it as following from a* Principle *of others. To clear this, it will be necessary to lay down the* scope *of that* Discourse, *which was to prove, that there is* a certainty of Faith, as well as of Sense; *and to that end I shewed from the nature of the* certainty of sense, *that it doth fall short of* Mathematical Demonstrations; *which having done from other Arguments, I then consider their* Hypothesis, *who derive* all Physical Certainty from the knowledge of God, who will not suffer Mens Minds to be deceived in clear perceptions; *then from this Principle being supposed, I infer several things for the advantage of the* certainty of Faith. 1. That the Foundation of all Certainty, *i. e. such as was before spoken of,* lies in the necessary Existence of a being absolutely perfect *which I deduce as a* just inference *from the former* Hypothesis; *and therefore on this* Supposition, *something above our* Comprehension, *viz.* Absolute perfection, *must be made the* foundation *of our* certain knowledge of things, *and so the* difficulty *of our* conception *of* matters of Faith, *ought to be no hindrance to the* certainty *of* Faith. 2. *That we have as great, or greater reason to believe, that* God *will not suffer us to be deceived in* matters *of* Faith, *as in the* objects *of our* Senses; *because as I there argue, there is no such great danger of being deceived, or in being deceived in the* objects *of* Sense, *as in the* matters *of* Faith. *Let any Man now judge, whether this be the discourse of one* that rendred it impossible, by any certain Argument, to prove the Existence of a Deity? *or that I laid down that as a* Principle of my own, *from which being supposed, I deduce such* inferences *as prove the* certainty *of* Faith *hath no greater difficulties, than the* certainty *of* Sense.

Secondly, *I am so far from excluding the* certainty *of the* Argument *from* the Works of God to prove his Being, *that I particularly and largely insist upon it from* p. 401. *to* p. 411. *but he pretends* that I bring no Argument but from the Idea of God in our minds, *which is so false, that*

Orig. Sacr. p. 367, 368.

(1.) *I make use of that* Argument *only to shew,* that the notion of a God hath no inconsistency in it, nothing repugnant to the faculties of our Minds: *as appears by that very place he quotes:*

(2.) *The main Arguments I insist upon, are,* That the things in the World are the manifest effects of divine Wisdom, Goodness and Power: and that there be such things in the World which are unacceptable without a Deity.

Let any Man now judge, with what Conscience *or* Ingenuity, *this Man hath managed such an* Accusation *against me,* as that I go upon such Principles, as plainly render it impossible, by any certain Argument, to prove the Existence of a Deity.

But it may be he will pretend, that he did not design to prove me Atheistical *but only to shew*, that I acted very unreasonably, in requiring a greater certainty in them, as to the Principles of Separation, than I do allow in far greater things. *As to his design, I leave the* Reader *to judge by his way of proceeding in it. As to the colour he hath to bring it in, on the account of the* Grounds *of* Separation *it is only this*; The Sub-Committee of the Assembly arguing against the dissenting Brethren, *saith he*, I say, That such tenderness of Conscience, as ariseth out of an opinion, (cui potest subesse falsum) which may be false, is not a sufficient ground, *&c.* to justifie Separation. *But here is a dangerous* &c. *in the middle of a Sentence, which made me look again into the* Papers, *and there I find such words left out, as fully explain and determine the sense*; *for the whole Sentence runs thus.* We much doubt, whether such tenderness of Conscience, as ariseth out of an opinion, *Cui potest subesse falsum,* when the Conscience is so tender, as that it may be withal an erring Conscience, can be a sufficient ground to justifie such a material Separation as our Brethren plead for. *Where we see, the force is not laid upon the* bare possibility of deception, *(for then no* Separation *could be allowed in any case, since all Men are* fallible*) but upon the* supposition *of an* actual deception, *which an* erroneous Conscience *supposes. For it is such a* deception *as doth suppose* Tenderness of Conscience, *which doth not arise from a* possibility *of* being deceived, *but from an* error of Conscience. *The Plea is*, Tenderness of Conscience; *the Question is*, Whether this Plea be sufficient to justifie Separation? We much doubt it, *say they, Why so? the other reply:* Our Reason is, Because this Tenderness may arise from an erroneous Conscience. *But why should you suspect an erroneous Conscience in the Case?* Because Persons are liable to be deceived in the Dictates of Conscience: especially when they go merely upon their own Apprehensions, without producing Arguments ex Naturâ rei. *For all the debate between them about* Tenderness of Conscience *proceeded upon this. So that their meaning is not here to be taken as to the bare* possibility of deception, *but of such an Opinion, as carried a great* probability *along with it, that they were* actually deceived. *And what coherence is there now between this, and the Proof that I bring for the* Existence of a Deity? *so that, it is apparent, that this was an occasion sought after, to lay as much load upon me as he could. And by this taste let the* Reader *judge, what* Ingenuity *I am to expect from this Man.*

Papers of Accommodation, p. 51.

The Last who appeared against my Sermon, *is called*, The Author of the Christian Temper. *I was glad to find an* Adversary *pretending to that*; *having found so little of it in the* Answers *of Mr.* B. *and Mr.* A. *His business is*, To commit the Rector of Sutton, with the Dean of St. Paul's; *which was enough to make the common People imagine, this was some busie* Justice *of* Peace, *who had taken them both at a* Conventicle. *The whole design of that* Book *doth not seem very agreeable to* the Christian Temper *which the* Author *pretends to. For it is to pick up all the Passages he could meet with, (in a Book written twenty years since) with great tenderness towards the* Dissenters, *before the* Laws *were* established. As though, *as Mr.* Cotton *once answered in a like case*, there were no weighty Argument to be found, but what might be gather'd from the weakness or unwariness of my Expressions. *And, have you not very well requited the* Author *of that* Book, *for the tenderness and pity he had for you, and the concernment he then expressed, to have brought*

Answer to R. Williams, p. 129.

you in, upon eaſier Terms *than were ſince required? And hath he now deſerved this at your hands, to have them all* thrown in his face, *and to be thus upbraided with his former kindneſs? Is this your* Ingenuity, *your* Gratitude, *your* Chriſtian Temper? *Are you afraid of having too many* Friends, *that you thus uſe thoſe, whom you once took to be ſuch?*

Methinks herein you appear very Self-denying, *but I cannot take you to be any of* the Wiſeſt Men upon Earth. *When you think it reaſonable, that upon longer time, and farther conſideration, thoſe* Divines *of the* Aſſembly, *who then oppoſed* Separation, *ſhould change their Opinions: Will you not allow one* ſingle Perſon, *who happen'd to write about theſe matters when he was* very young, *in* twenty years *time, of the moſt buſie and thoughtful part of his Life, to ſee reaſon to alter his Judgment? But after all this, wherein is it that he hath thus contradicted himſelf? Is it in the Point of* Separation, *which is the preſent buſineſs? No, ſo far from it, that in that very* Book, *he ſpeaks as fully concerning the* Unlawfulneſs *of* Separation, *as in this* Sermon. *Which will appear by theſe Particulars in it.*

In p. 123. (1.) That it is unlawful to ſet up new Churches, becauſe they cannot conform to ſuch practices which they ſuſpect to be unlawful.

(2.) Thoſe are new Churches, when Men erect diſtinct Societies for worſhip, under diſtinct and peculiar Officers, governing by Laws, and Church Rules, different from that Form they ſeparate from.

Page 124. (3.) As to things in the Judgment of the Primitive and Reformed Churches left undetermin'd by the Law of God, and in matters of meer order and decency, and wholly as to the Form of Government, every one, notwithſtanding what his private Judgment may be of them, is bound for the peace of the Church of God, to ſubmit to the determination of the lawful Governours of the Church. *Allow but theſe three* Concluſions, *and defend the preſent* Separation *if you can. Why then do you make ſuch a ſtir about other Paſſages in that* Book, *and take ſo little notice of theſe, which are moſt pertinent and material? Was it not poſſible for you to eſpy them, when you ranſacked every corner of that* Book, *to find out ſome thing which might ſeem to make to your purpoſe?*

Page 5. *And yet the very firſt* Paſſage *you quote, is within two Leaves of theſe;*

Page 6, 7. *and two Paſſages more you ſoon after quote, are within a* Page *of them,*

Page 8. *and another in the very* ſame Page; *and ſo many up and down ſo very near them, that it is impoſſible you ſhould not ſee and conſider them?* Yes, he hath at laſt found ſomething very near them, *for he quotes the very Pages where they are.* And, *he ſaith,* he will do me no wrong, for I do diſtinguiſh, *he confeſſes,* between Non-communion in unlawful or ſuſpected Rites or Practices in a Church, and entering into diſtinct Societies for worſhip. *This is doing me ſome right however, although he doth not fully ſet down my meaning. But he urges another Paſſage in the ſame place, viz.* That if others caſt them wholly out of Communion, their Separation is neceſſary——— *That is no more, than hath been always ſaid by our* Divines *in reſpect to the* Church *of* Rome. But, will not this equally hold againſt our Church, if it excommunicates thoſe who cannot conform? *I anſwer,* (1.) *Our* Church *doth not caſt any* wholly out of Communion *for meer* ſcrupulous Non-conformity *in ſome particular Rites. For, it allows them to* Communicate *in other* Parts of worſhip, *as appeared by all the* Non-conformiſts *of former times, who conſtantly joined in* Prayers *and other* Acts of worſhip, *although they ſcrupled ſome particular Ceremonies.* (2.) *The caſe is vaſtly different, as to*

the neceſſity *of our* Separation, *upon being* wholly caſt out *of* Communion *by the* Church of Rome; *and the neceſſity of others* ſeparating from us, ſuppoſing a general Excommunication ipſo facto *againſt thoſe* who publickly defame the Orders of this Church. *For that is all which can be inferred from the* Canons. *For, in the former caſe, it is not a* leſſer Excommunication *denounced, as it is only in our caſe againſt* publick and ſcandalous Offenders, *(which is no more than is allowed in all* Churches; *and is generally ſuppoſed to lay no obligation, till it be duly executed, tho' it be* latæ ſententiæ & ipſo facto*) but in the* Church *of* Rome *we are caſt out with an* Anathema, *ſo as to pronounce us* uncapable of Salvation, *if we do not return to, and continue in their Communion; and this was it which that* Author *meant, by being* wholly caſt out of Communion, *i. e. with the greateſt and higheſt* Church Cenſure. (3.) *That* Author *could not poſſibly mean, that there was an equal reaſon in theſe caſes, when he expreſly determines, that in the caſe of our* Church, Men are bound in Conſcience to ſubmit to the Orders of it; *being only about matters of* Decency *and* Order, *and ſuch things which in the* Judgment *of the* Primitive *and* Reformed Churches *are left undetermined by the* Law of God. *Although therefore he might allow a ſcrupulous forbearance of ſome* Acts *of* Communion, *as to ſome* ſuſpected Rites, *yet upon the Principles there aſſerted, he could never allow Mens proceedings to a* poſitive Separation *from the* Communion *of our* Church. *And ſo much ſhall ſerve to clear the agreement between the* Rector *of* Sutton, *and the* Dean *of St.* Paul's. *But if any thing in the following* Treatiſe *be found different from the ſenſe of that* Book, *I do entreat them to allow me that which I heartily wiſh to them,* viz. *that in* Twenty years *time we may arrive to ſuch maturity of Thoughts, as to ſee reaſon to change our opinion of* ſome things; *and I wiſh I had not cauſe to add, of* ſome Perſons *too.*

There is one thing more which this Author *takes notice of, and the reſt do not, (for elſe he offers little or nothing but what is in the others) which is, that when I ſay our differences are condemned by the wiſer Proteſtants abroad, he ſaith,* if it be ſo, they may thank their Friends at home, that have miſrepreſented them to the World. *Therefore to give ſatisfaction, as to the Judgment of ſome of the moſt eminent and learned* Proteſtant Divines *abroad now living, I have ſubjoined to the* following Treatiſe, *ſome late* Letters *of theirs, to a* Perſon *of great* Honour and Dignity *in our* Church, *to ſhew the* Unlawfulneſs *of* Separation *from the* Communion *of the* Church of England. *Which were not written by ſuch who had only a partial repreſentation from others at a diſtance, but two of them by thoſe who have been among us, and have been curious obſervers both of the* ſeparate Meetings, *and of the* Cuſtoms *of our* Churches; *and the Third by the Famous and Excellent* Monſieur Claude. *And if a* Council *could be called of all the* Proteſtant Churches *in* Chriſtendom, *we ſhould not doubt of their determination of the* Unlawfulneſs *of the* preſent Separation.

But before I conclude this Preface, *there is a great* Objection *yet to be removed, which concerns* the Time of publiſhing this Treatiſe, which ſome do ſeem to think, to be very unſeaſonable; when there is ſo much talk of Union among Proteſtants, and there appears a more general Inclination to it than formerly. And what, *ſay they,* can the laying open the Weakneſs of Diſſenters tend to, but to provoke and exaſperate them, and conſequently, to obſtruct the Union ſo much deſired? In ſo doing, I ſhall appear to reſent more the Injuries done to

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my Self, than the miſchief which may come to the Proteſtant Religion, if this opportunity be not embraced for making an Union among Proteſtants. *This is the force of the* Objection. *To which I anſwer.*

God forbid that I ſhould either deſign, or do any thing which tended to obſtruct ſo bleſſed a Work, as a firm and laſting Union among Proteſtants would be. But my buſineſs is, to ſhew the Unreaſonableneſs of thoſe Principles and Practices, which hinder Men from ſuch an Union, and lay a Foundation for perpetual and endleſs Separations. For upon the Principles laid down by ſome of our Diſſenting Brethren, *let the Conſtitutions be made never ſo eaſie to themſelves, yet others may make uſe of their grounds, and carry on the Differences as high as ever. Which will render all Attempts of Union vain, and leave the ſame Weapons ready to be taken up by others. If the Union ſo much talked of, be ſuch as tends to the leſſening, and not to the increaſing of our Differences; if it be for ſtrengthening and ſupporting the Proteſtant Religion, and not rather for weakning and betraying it, by laying it more open to the aſſaults of our Enemies; no Man ſhall be more ready to promote it than I; no Man will rejoice more in the accompliſhment of it.*

But univerſal liberty is quite another thing from Union; as much as looſing is from binding up; and it is ſtrange if that which the Papiſts, *not long ſince, thought the beſt means to bring in* Popery, *ſhould now be looked on as the moſt effectual way to keep it out. But ſuppoſe the* Indulgence *be at preſent ſtrictly limited to* Diſſenting Proteſtants, *are we ſure it ſhall always ſo continue? Will not the ſame Reaſons, as to ſcruple of Conſcience, ſuffering for Religion,* &c. *extend farther when occaſion ſerves, and the* Popiſh Religion *get footing on the* Diſſenters grounds? *Where hath the* Church *of* Rome *more Labourers, and a greater Harveſt, than under the greateſt liberty of Conſcience? Let the ſtate of the* Northern Kingdoms, *as to this matter, be compared with the number of* Papiſts *in the* United Provinces. *And it will be found impoſſible to root out* Popery *where Toleration is allowed.* (1.) *Becauſe of the various ways of creeping in under ſeveral diſguiſes, which the* Prieſts *and* Jeſuits *have; and can never be prevented, where there is a general Indulgence for* Diſſenters, *and an unaccountable* Church Power *is allowed to ſeparate* Congregations. (2.) *Becauſe it will be thought great hardſhip, when Mens heats are over, for them only to be deprived of the liberty of their Conſciences, when the wildeſt Fanaticks are allowed it.* (3.) *Becauſe the diverſity of Sects which will be kept up by this means, will be always thought a plauſible argument to draw Men to the* popiſh Pretences *of* Unity. (4.) *Becauſe the allowed Sects will in probability grow more inſolent upon a* legal Indulgence, *and bid defiance to the ſettled Conſtitution; as we have ſeen already by the yet viſible effects of the former* Indulgence. *If Laws would alter the temper of Mens minds, and make proud, ſelf-willed, froward and paſſionate Men, become meek and humble, gentle and peaceable, then it were great pity, ſome Men had not had the Law on their ſide long ago. But is this to be looked for? are we to expect the Laws of Men ſhould work more upon them than the Grace of God? If ſuch then continue peeviſh and quarrelſome, full of wrath and bitterneſs againſt all that are not of their minds; and they meet with Men as froward and contentious as themſelves; will this look like the* Union *of* Proteſtants? *And By-ſtanders will be apt to ſay, if this be all that you mean by* Union *of* Proteſtants, viz. *a liberty to* pray *and* preach, *and to* write *and* diſpute *one againſt another, there ſeems to be much more of ſenſe and reaſon in the* papal *Pretence to* Unity *and* Infallibility.

But

But what then? Is there nothing to be done for diſſenting Proteſtants, who agree with us in all Doctrinal Articles of our Church, and only ſcruple the uſe of a few Ceremonies, and ſome late Impoſitions? ſhall theſe differences ſtill be continued, when they may be ſo eaſily removed? And ſo many uſeful Men be encouraged, and taken into the Conſtitution? Do we value a few indifferent Ceremonies, and ſome late Declarations, and doubtful Expreſſions, beyond the ſatisfaction of Mens Conſciences, and the Peace and Stability of this Church?

As to this material Queſtion, I ſhall crave leave to deliver my opinion freely and impartially; and that,

I. *With reſpect to the Caſe of the People, the Terms of whoſe* Union *with us, is acknowledged by our Brethren to be ſo much eaſier than their own. But theſe are of two ſorts:*

1. Some allow the uſe of the Liturgy, but ſay they cannot join in Communion with us, becauſe the participiation of the Sacraments hath ſuch Rites and Ceremonies annexed to it, which they think unlawful; and therefore till theſe be removed, or left indifferent, they dare not join with us in Baptiſm, or the Lord's-Supper, becauſe in the one the Croſs is uſed, and in the other Kneeling is required. *As to theſe I anſwer,*

(1.) *Upon the moſt diligent ſearch I could make into theſe things, I find no good ground for any ſcruple of Conſcience, as to the uſe of theſe Ceremonies, and as little as any as to the Sign of the Croſs, as it is uſed in our* Church; *notwithſtanding all the noiſe that hath been made about its being a* new Sacrament, *and I know not what, but of this at large in the following Treatiſe.*

(2.) *I ſee no ground for the Peoples ſeparation from other Acts of Communion, on the account of ſome Rites they ſuſpect to be unlawful. And eſpecially when the uſe of ſuch Rites is none of their own Act, as the* Croſs *in* Baptiſm *is not; and when ſuch an Explication is annexed concerning the intention of* Kneeling at the Lord's-Supper, *as is in the* Rubrick *after the* Communion.

(3.) *Notwithſtanding, becauſe the uſe of* Sacraments *in a* Chriſtian Church *ought to be the moſt free from all exceptions, and they ought to be ſo adminiſtred, as rather to invite than diſcourage ſcrupulous Perſons from joining in them; I do think it would be a part of* Chriſtian Wiſdom *and Condeſcenſion in the Governours of our* Church, *to remove thoſe Bars from a freedom in joining in full Communion with us, which may be done, either by wholly taking away* the Sign of the Croſs; *or if that may give offence to others, by confining the uſe of it to the publick adminiſtration of* Baptiſm; *or by leaving it indifferent, as the Parents deſire it. As to* Kneeling at the Lord's-Supper, *ſince ſome Poſture is neceſſary, and many devout People ſcruple any other, and the* Primitive Church *did in ancient Times, receive it in the poſture of adoration; there is no reaſon to take this away, even in Parochial Churches; provided, that thoſe who ſcruple Kneeling do receive it, with the leaſt offence to others, and rather ſtanding than ſitting, becauſe the former is moſt agreeable to the practice of Antiquity, and of our Neighbour Reformed Churches. As to the* Surplice *in* Parochial Churches, *it is not of that conſequence, as to bear a diſpute one way or other. And as to Cathedral Churches, there is no neceſſity of alteration. But there is another thing which ſeems to be of late much ſcrupled in Baptiſm,* viz. the uſe of God-fathers and God-mothers excluding the Parents. *Although I do not queſtion but the Practice of our Church may be juſtified, (as I have*

have done it towards the end of the following Treatise) yet I see no necessity of adhering so strictly to the Canon *herein, but that a little alteration may prevent these Scruples, either by permitting the Parents to join with the Sponsors, or by the Parents publickly desiring the Sponsors to represent them in offering the Child to Baptism; or, which seems most agreeable to Reason, that the Parents offer the Child to Baptism, and then the Sponsors perform the Covenanting part, representing the Child; and the Charge after Baptism be given in common, to the Parents and Sponsors.*

These things being allowed, I see no Obstruction remaining, as to a full Union *of the Body of such Dissenters with us, in all Acts of Divine Worship, and Christian* Communion, *as do not reject all* Communion *with us as unlawful.*

2. *But because there are many of those, who are become zealous Protestants,* and plead much their Communion with us in Faith and Doctrine, although they cannot join with us in worship, because they deny the lawfulness of Liturgies, and the right Constitution of our Churches; *their Case deserves some consideration, whether and how far they are capable of being made serviceable to the common Interest, and to the support of the Protestant Religion among us?*

To their Case *I answer,*

First, That a general unlimited Toleration *to* dissenting Protestants, *will soon bring* Confusion *among us, and in the end* Popery, *as I have shewed already; and a suspension of all the penal Laws that relate to Dissenters is the same thing with a* boundless Toleration.

Secondly, If any present Favours be granted to such, in consideration of our circumstances, and to prevent their conjunction with the Papists, *for a* general Toleration, *(for if ever the* Papists *obtain it, it must be under their Name) if, I say, such favour be thought fit to be shewed them, it ought to be with such restrictions and limitations, as may prevent the mischief which may easily follow upon it. For all such Meetings are a perpetual reproach to our Churches, by their declaring, that* our Churches are no true Churches, *that* our manner of worship is unlawful, *and that* our Church-Government is Anti-christian; *and that* on these accounts they separate from us, and worship God by themselves. *But if such an* Indulgence *be thought fit to be granted, I humbly offer these things to consideration.*

1. *That none be permitted to enjoy the privilege of it, who do not declare* that they do hold Communion with our Churches to be unlawful. *For it seems unreasonable to allow it to others, and will give countenance to endless and causeless Separations.*

2. *That all who enjoy it, besides taking the* Test *against* Popery, *do subscribe the* Thirty six Articles *of our Faith, because the pretence of this Liberty is joining with us in* Points *of* Faith; *and this may more probably prevent* Papists *getting in amongst them.*

3. *That all such as enjoy it, must declare the particular Congregations they are of, and enter their Names before such* Commissioners *as shall be authorised for that purpose; that so this may be no pretence for idle, loose, and profane Persons, never going to any Church at all.*

4. *That both Preachers and Congregations be liable to severe Penalties, if they use any bitter or reproachful words, either in Sermons or Writings, against the established Constitution of our Churches; because they desire only the freedom of their own Consciences; and the using this liberty will discover it is not Conscience, but a turbulent factious Humour, which makes them separate from our Communion.*

5. *That*

5. *That all indulged Persons be particularly obliged to pay all legal Duties to the parochial Churches, (lest mere covetousness tempt Men to run among them) and no Persons so indulged be capable of any publick Office. It not being reasonable, that such should be trusted with Government, who look upon the Worship established by Law as unlawful.*

6. *That no other Penalty be laid on such indulged Persons, but that of* Twelve-pence *a Sunday for their absence from the* Parochial Churches, *which ought to be duly collected for the use of the Poor, and cannot be complained of as an heavy burden, considering the* liberty *they do enjoy by it.*

7. *That the* Bishops, *as* Visitors *appointed by Law, have an exact Account given to them, of the Rule of their* Worship *and* Discipline, *and of all the Persons belonging to the indulged Congregations, with their Qualities, and Places of abode; and that none be admitted a Member of any such Congregation, without acquainting their* Visitor *with it, that so means may be used to prevent their leaving our* Communion, *by giving satisfaction to their Scruples. This* Power *of the* Bishops *cannot be scrupled by them, since herein they are considered as* Commissioners *appointed by* Law.

8. *That no indulged Persons presume under severe Penalties, to breed up* Scholars, *or to teach Gentlemens Sons* University Learning; *because this may be justly looked on as a design to propagate* Schism *to* Posterity, *and to lay a* Foundation *for the disturbance of* future Generations.

II. *As to the* Case *of the* ejected Ministers, *I have these things to offer,*

1. *That bare* subscription *of the* Thirty six Articles, *concerning* Doctrinal Points, *be not allowed as sufficient to qualifie any Man for a* Living, *or any* Church-preferment, *for these Reasons,*

First, *Any* Lay-man, *upon these Terms, may not only be capable of a* Living, *but may take upon him to* administer the Sacraments; *which was never allowed in any well-constituted* Church *in the* Christian World. *And such an allowance among us, instead of setling and uniting us, will immediately bring things into great* confusion, *and give mighty advantage to the* Papists *against our* Church. *And we have reason to fear, a design of this Nature, under a pretence of* Union of Protestants, *tends to the subversion of this* Church, *and throwing all things into* confusion, *which at last will end in* Popery.

Secondly, *This will bring a* Faction *into the* Church, *which will more endanger it than external opposition. For such Men will come in triumphantly, having beaten down* Three *of the* Thirty nine Articles, *and being in legal possession of their Places, will be ready to defie and contemn those who submitted to the rest, and to glory in their Conquests, and draw Followers after them, as the victorious Confessors against* Prelacy *and* Ceremonies. *And can they imagine those of the* Church *of* England *will see the reputation of the* Church, *or their* own, *to suffer so much, and not appear in their own* Vindication? *Things are not come to that pass, nor will they suddenly be, that the* Friends *of the* Church *of* England *will be either afraid,* or *ashamed to own her Cause. We do heartily and sincerely desire* Union *with our Brethren, if it may be had on just and reasonable Terms; but they must not think, that we will give up the* Cause of the Church *for it, so as to condemn its* Constitution, *or make the* Ceremonies unlawful, *which have been hitherto observed and practised in it. If any Expedient can be found out for the ease of other Mens Consciences, without reflecting on our own; if they can be taken in, without reproach or dishonour*

to the Reformation *of the* Church; *I hope no true Son of the* Church *of* England *will oppoſe it. But if the deſign be to bring them in as a* Faction *to bridle and control the* Epiſcopal Power, *by ſetting up* forty Biſhops *in a Dioceſe againſt* one; *if it be for them to trample upon the* Church *of* England, *and not to ſubmit to its* Order *and* Government *upon fair and moderate terms, let them not call this a deſign of* Union, *but the giving* Law *to a* Party, *to oppoſe the* Church *of* England. *And what the ſucceſs of this will be, let wiſe Men judge.*

Thirdly, *If a* ſubſcription *to* Thirty ſix Articles *were ſufficient by the Statute* 13 El. c. 12. *I do not underſtand how by virtue of that Statute a Man is bound publickly to read the* Thirty nine Articles in the Church, and the Teſtimonial of his Subſcription, on pain of being deprived *ipſo facto*, if he do not. *For the Lord Chief Juſtice* Coke *ſaith*, That ſubſcription to the Thirty nine Articles is required by force of the Act of Parliament, 13 Eliz. c. 12. *And he adds*, That the Delinquent is diſabled and deprived *ipſo facto*; and that a conditional ſubſcription to them was not ſufficient, was reſolved by all the Judges in *England*. *But how a Man ſhould be deprived* ipſo facto, *for not ſubſcribing, and reading the Thirty nine Articles, as appears by the Caſes mentioned in* Coke; *and yet be required only to ſubſcribe to Thirty ſix, by the ſame* Statute, *is a thing too hard for me to conceive.*

Co. *Inſt.* 4. *Part* 323, 324.

2. *But notwithſtanding this, if any temper can be found out, as to the* manner *of* Subſcription, *that may give eaſe to the* Scruples *of our Brethren, and ſecure the* Peace *of the* Church, *the deſired* Union *may be attained without that apparent danger of increaſing the Factions among us.*

And this I ſuppoſe may be done, by an abſolute ſubſcription to all thoſe Articles *which concern* the Doctrine of the true Chriſtian Faith, and the uſe of the Sacraments; *and a* ſolemn Promiſe under their hand, or Subſcription of peaceable ſubmiſſion, *as to the reſt, ſo as not to oppoſe or contradict them, either in* Preaching *or* Writing; *upon the ſame penalty as if they had not ſubſcribed to the Thirty ſix. Which may be a more probable means to keep the* Church *in quiet, than forcing a more rigorous* Subſcription *upon them, or leaving them at their full liberty.*

3. *As to the other* Subſcription *required,* 1 Jac. *to the Three* Articles. *The firſt is provided for, by* the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy. *The third is the ſame with the* Subſcription *to the* Thirty nine Articles. *And as to the ſecond,* about the Book of Common-Prayer, *&c. it ought to be conſidered,*

(1.) *Whether, for the ſatisfaction of the ſcrupulous, ſome more doubtful and obſcure Paſſages may not yet be explained or amended? Whether the* New Tranſlation *of the* Pſalms *were not fitter to be uſed, at leaſt in* Parochial Churches? *Whether* Portions *of* Canonical Scripture *were not better put inſtead of* Apocrypha Leſſons? *Whether the* Rubrick *about* Salvation of Infants, *might not be reſtored to its former place, in the* Office of Confirmation, *and ſo the preſent exceptions againſt it be removed? Whether thoſe expreſſions which ſuppoſe the ſtrict exerciſe of* Diſcipline, *in* burying the Dead, *were not better left at liberty in our preſent Caſe? Such a* Review *made by* wiſe *and* peaceable Men, *not given to* wrath *and* diſputing, *may be ſo far from being a diſhonour to this Church, that it may add to the glory of it.*

(2.) *Upon ſuch a* Review, *whether it be not great* Reaſon *that all Perſons who officiate in the Church, be not only tied to a conſtant* uſe *of it in* all publick Offices, *(as often as they adminiſter them) which they ought*

in Perſon frequently to do, but to declare at their firſt entrance upon a Parochial Charge, *their* approbation *of the* uſe *of it, after their own* reading *of it, that ſo the* People *may not ſuſpect them to carry on a factious Deſign, under an outward pretence of* Conformity *to the* Rules *of the* Church *they live in.*

(3.) *Whether ſuch a ſolemn* uſing *the* Liturgy, *and* Approbation *and* Promiſe *of the* uſe *of it, may not be ſufficient, inſtead of the late* Form *of declaring* their Aſſent and Conſent, *which hath been ſo much* ſcrupled *by our Brethren?*

Theſe are all the things which appear to me reaſonable to be allowed in order to an Union, *and which I ſuppoſe may be granted without detriment or diſhonour to our* Church. *There are other things very deſirable towards the* happineſs *and* flouriſhing *of this* Church, *as the exerciſe of* Diſcipline *in* Parochial Churches, *in a due ſubordination to the* Biſhop; *the* reforming *the* Eccleſiaſtical Courts *as to* Excommunication, *without prejudice to the excellent* Profeſſion *of the* Civil Law; *the building of more* Churches *in great* Pariſhes, *eſpecially about the* City *of* London; *the retrenching* Pluralities; *the ſtrictneſs and ſolemnity of* Ordinations; *the making a* Book *of* Canons *ſuitable to this Age, for the better regulating the* Converſations *of the* Clergy. *Such things as theſe, might facilitate our* Union, *and make our* Church, *in ſpite of all its Enemies, become* a praiſe in the whole earth.

The Zeal I have for the true Proteſtant Religion, *for the* Honour *of this* Church, *and for a firm* Union *among* Brethren, *hath tranſported me beyond the bounds of a* Preface; *which I do now conclude with my hearty Prayers to* Almighty God, *that he, who is* the God of Peace, *and the* Fountain of Wiſdom, *would ſo direct the Counſels of thoſe in authority, and incline the hearts of the People, that we may neither run into a* Wilderneſs *of* Confuſion, *nor be driven into the* Abyſs *of* Popery; *but that the* true Religion *being preſerved among us, we may with one heart and mind ſerve the* only true God, *through his only Son* Jeſus Chriſt the Prince of Peace, *and our* alone Advocate and Mediator. Amen.

THE UNREASONABLENESS OF *SEPARATION.*

PART I.

An Hiſtorical Account of the Riſe and Progreſs of Separation.

§ 1. *No Separation in the beginning of the Reformation, although there were then the ſame Reaſons which are now pleaded.* § 2. *Our Terms of Communion being the ſame which were required by the Martyrs in Queen* Mary's *days.* §. 3. *A true account of the Troubles of* Francford. *Mr.* B's *miſtake about them.* §. 4. *The firſt cauſes of the diſlike of our Ceremonies.* § 5. *The Reaſons of retaining them at the time of Reformation.* § 6. *The Tendencies to Separation checked by* Beza *and other Reformed Divines abroad.* § 7. *The Heats of the Nonconformiſts gave occaſion to Separation.* § 8. *Their zeal againſt it notwithſtanding; their repreſenting the ſinfulneſs and miſchief of it.* § 9, 10. *The true ſtate of the Controverſie between the Separatiſts and Nonconformiſts.* § 11. *Their Anſwers to the Separatiſts Reaſons.* § 12. *The progreſs of Separation. The Schiſms and Diviſions among the Separatiſts the occaſion of Independency. That makes Separation more inexcuſable, by owning ſome of our Churches to be true Churches.* § 13. *The miſchiefs which followed Independency both abroad, and* § 14. *hither into* England. § 15. *The Controverſie ſtated between the Divines of the Aſſembly and the Diſſenting Brethren.* § 16. *The Cauſe of the Aſſembly given up by the preſent Diſſenters.* § 17. *The old Nonconformiſts Judgment of the unlawfulneſs of mens preaching here, when forbidden by Laws, fully cleared from ſome late Objections.*

Sect. I. FOR our better underſtanding the *State* of this *Controverſie*, it will be neceſſary to premiſe theſe two Things.

1. *That although the preſent Reaſons for Separation would have held from the beginning of our Reformation, yet no ſuch thing was then practiſed, or allowed, by thoſe who were then moſt zealous for Reformation.*

2. *That when Separation began, it was most vehemently opposed by those Non-conformists who disliked many things in our Church, and wished for a farther Reformation.* And from a *true Account of the State* of the *Controversie* then, it will appear, that the *Principles* owned by them, do overthrow the present practice of *Separation* among us.

In the making out of these, I shall give a full account of the *Rise* and *Progress* of this *Controversie* about *Separation* from the *Communion* of our *Church.*

I. *That although the present Reasons for Separation would have held from the beginning of the Reformation, yet no such thing was then practised, or allowed by those who were then most zealous for Reformation.* By *Separation* we mean nothing else, but *Withdrawing from the constant Communion of our Church, and joyning with separate Congregations for greater Purity of Worship, and better means of Edification.* By *the present Reasons for Separation* we understand such as are at this day insisted on, by those who pretend to justifie these Practices; and those are such, as make the *Terms* of *Communion* with our *Church* to *be unlawful.* And not one of all those, which my Adversaries at this time hope to justifie the *present Separation* by, but would have had as much force in the beginning of the *Reformation.* For our *Church* stands on the same Grounds; useth the same Ceremonies (only fewer;) prescribes the same Liturgy (only more corrected;) hath the same constitution and frame of Government; the same defect of Discipline; the same manner of appointing parochial Ministers; and at least as effectual means of Edification, as there were when the *Reformation* was first established. And what advantage there is, in our present circumstances, as to the Number, Diligence and Learning of our allowed Preachers; as to the retrenching of some Ceremonies, and the Explication of the meaning of others; as to the Mischiefs we have seen follow the practice of *Separation*, do all make it much more unreasonable now, than it had been then.

Sect. II. It cannot be denied, that there were different apprehensions concerning some few things required by our *Church* in the beginning of the *Reformation*; but they were such things, as are the least scrupled now. *Rogers* refused the wearing of *a square Cap, and Tippet*, &c. *unless a Difference were made between the Popish Priests and ours.* *Hooper* at first scrupled the *Episcopal Habits*, but he submitted afterwards to the use of them. *Bucer*, and some others, disliked some things in the first *Common-Prayer-Book* of *Edward* the Sixth, which were corrected in the Second: So that upon the *Review* of the *Liturgy* there seemed to be little or no dissatisfaction left in the Members of our Church; at least, as to those things which are now made the *grounds* of *Separation.* For we read of none, who refused *the constant use of the Liturgy*, or to comply with those very few Ceremonies which were retained, as *the Cross in Baptism, and Kneeling at the Communion*, which are now thought such *Bugbears* to scare People from our *Communion*, and make them cry out in such a dreadful manner of the *Mischief of Impositions*; as though the Church must unavoidably be broken in pieces by the weight and burden of two or three such insupportable Ceremonies. Now we are told, *That it is unreasonable that any should create a necessity of Separation, and then complain of an Impossibility of Union.* By whom? At what time? In what manner was *this necessity of Separation created?* Hath our *Church* made any new *Terms* of *Communion*, or alter'd the old ones? No: the same

Acts and *Monuments* Vol. 3. p. 131.

Mischief of Impositions Preface.

same Author saith, *It is perpetuating the old Conditions, and venturing our Peace in an old Worm-eaten Bottom, wherein it must certainly miscarry.*

Not to insist on his way of Expression, in calling the Reformation, *an old Worm-eaten Bottom*; which ill becomes them that would now be held the most zealous *Protestants*. I would only know, if those *Terms* of *Communion* which were imposed by the Martyrs, and other Reformers, and which are only continued by us, do, as this *Author* saith, *Create a Necessity of Separation*; how then it came to pass, that in all King *Edward*'s Days, there was no such thing as Division in our Church about them?

Flesh suit against Ceremonies, p. 467.

And even Dr. *Ames*, who searched as carefully as any into this matter, can bring no other Instances of any differences then, but those of *Rogers* and *Hooper:* he adds indeed, *That* Ridley *and others agreed with* Hooper. Wherein? What, in opposing our Ceremonies, when *Hooper* himself yielded in that which he at first scrupled? *No, but there was a perfect reconciliation between them, before they suffered.* And what then? Is there any the least colour of Evidence, that before that Reconciliation, either *Hooper* or *Rogers* held separate Assembles from the Conformists, or that *Ridley* ever receded from his stedfast adhering to the *Orders* of this *Church?* This is then a very mean Artifice, and disingenuous Insinuation. For although *Ridley*, in his Letter to *Hooper*, out of his great Modesty and Humility, seems to take the blame upon himself, by attributing the greater *Wisdom* to *Hooper* in that difference; yet he doth not retract his Opinion, but only declares the hearty love that he bore to him, for his constancy in the Truth. Neither do we find that ever *Hooper*, repented of his Submission, to which he was so earnestly persuaded, both by *Peter Martyr*, and *Martin Bucer*; and *Peter Martyr* in his *Letter* to *Bucer* condemns his *frowardness*, and saith, *That this cause was by no means approved by the wiser and better sort of Men.* But *Ames* saith, *Mr.* Bradford *might have been added, who calleth forked Caps and Tippets, Antichristian Pelf and Baggage.* Suppose this were true, it proves no more than that a good Man had an unreasonable Scruple, and such as is thought so by our Brethren themselves at this day. But did he ever divide the Church on such an account as this? Did he set up *separate Congregations*, because *a square Cap and a Tippet* would not go down with him? No, he was a far better Man than to do so. But if the whole words had been set down, the seeming force of these words had been taken away, for they are these; *The cognizance of the Lord standeth not in forked Caps, Tippets, shaven Crowns, or such other Baggage and Antichristian pelf, but in suffering for the Lord's sake*; *i. e.* it is more a Mark of God's Service to suffer Martyrdom as a *Protestant*, than to be at ease as a *Romish Priest*, for he puts them althogether, *Caps, Tippets, and shaven Crowns.* And what is this to the *Impositions* of our *Church*, or *Separation* on the account of them? Dr. *Ames* knew too much, to pretend to any think like that in those Times; for there was no such thing as *Separation* from our *Church* then heard of, on the account of these *dividing Impositions.* Some furious *Anabaptists* it may be, or *secret Papists* then had *separate Meetings*, of which *Ridley* bids *enquiry* to be made in his *Articles of Visitation*; but no *Protestants*, none that joined in the *Articles of our Faith, and Substantials of Religion with our Church*, as Dr. *O.* speaks, did then apprehend *any necessity of Separation* from it; *not for the*

Pet. Martyr, Epist. Theolog. Hoopero, Bucer. Script. Anglic. p. 708.

Acts and Mon. Vol. 3. p. 319.

Ridley's Articles of Visitation, 1550.

Vindicat of Nonconf. p. 13.

the sake of the aerial Sign of the Cross; *nor kneeling at the Communion*; *nor the religious observation of Holy-days*; *nor the constant use of the Liturgy*; nor any one of all the particulars mentioned by Dr. O. *which*, he saith, *makes our Communion unlawful, and separation from it to be necessary.* How come these Terms to be so unlawful now, which were then approved by such holy, learned, and excellent Men as our first *Reformers?* Were they not arrived *to that measure of Attainments*, or *Comprehension of the Truths of the Gospel*, that Men in our Age are come to? Is it credible, that Men of so great integrity, such indefatigable industry, such profound judgment, as *Cranmer* and *Ridley*, who were the *Heads* of the *Reformation*, should discern no such *sinfulness* in these things, which now every dissenting Artificer can cry out upon as *unlawful?* Is it possible, that Men that sifted every thing with so much care themselves, and made use of the best help from others, and begg'd the Divine Assistance, should so fatally miscarry in a matter of such mighty importance to the Souls of Men? Could not *Latimer*, or *Bradford*, or such holy and mortified Men as they, discern so much as a *Mote* of *unlawfulness* in those Times, which others espy such *Beams* in now? What makes this wonderful difference of eye-sight? Were they under a cloudy, and dark, and *Jewish* Dispensation; and all the clear Gospel Light of *Division* and *Separation* reserved for our Times? Did they want warmth and zeal for Religion, who burnt at the Stake for it? Doth God reveal his Will to the meek, the humble, the inquisitive, the resolute Minds? And would he conceal such weighty things from those who were so desirous to find the Truth, and so resolved to adhere to it? If *Diocesan Episcopacy*, and the *Constitution of our Church* were such an *unlawful thing*, as some now make it, it is strange such Men should have no suspicion of it, no not when they went to suffer? For as *H. Jacob*, the old *Nonconformist*, saith, in answer to *Johnson* the *Separatist*, *Did not* M. Cranmer, *hold himself for Arch-Bishop still, and that he was by the Pope unjustly and unsufficiently deposed, and by Queen* Mary *forcibly restrained from it? Did he ever repent of holding that Office to his death? Also did not* Ridley *stand upon his Right to the Bishoprick of* London, *though ready to die?* Latimer, *though he renounced his Bishoprick, yet he kept his Ministry, and never repented him of it.* Philpot *never disliked his Archdeaconry*; *yea, when he refused bloody* Bonner, *yet he appealed to his Ordinary, the Bishop of* Winchester. *The like mind is to be seen in Bishop* Farrar. *And generally, whosoever were Ministers then of the Prelats Ordination, they never renounced it, though they died Martyrs. Johnson* indeed quotes some Passages of *Bradford*, *Hooper* and *Bale* against the *Hierarchy*; but he notoriously misapplies the words of *Bradford*, which are, *The time was, when the Pope was out of* England, *but not all Popery*; which he would have understood of the Times of *Reformation*, under *Edward* VI. whereas he speaks them *expressly* of *King Henry*'s *days.* And it is not credible, *Hooper* should think the *Hierarchy* unlawful, who (as it is generally believed) had the administration of two Bishopricks at once. *Bale*'s words were spoken in *Henry* VIII. his time, and could not be meant of a Protestant Hierarchy, for he was after a *Bishop* himself. But *H. Jacob* answers to them all, *That supposing these Men disliked the Hierarchy, it made the stronger against the Principles of Separation: Seeing for all that, they did not refuse to communicate and partake with them then as true Christians.* And that not only *occasionally*,

P. 35, 37.

Jacob's Answer to *Johnson*, p. 20, 21.

Johnson's Defence of his ninth Reason.

Bradford's Confer. with the BB. *Acts* and *Mon.* Vol. 3. p. 298.

Jacob's Answer, p. 82.

And

and at *certain seasons*, but they maintained *constant* and *fixed Communion* with our *Church*, as the Members of it.

Sect. 3. Thus matters stood as to *communion* with our *Church* in the days of *Edward* VI. but as soon as the Persecution began in Queen *Mary*'s time, great numbers were forced to betake themselves to foreign parts, whereof some went to *Zurick*, others to *Basil*, others to *Strasburg*, and others to *Frankford*. *Grindal*, in a Letter to *B. Ridley*, saith, *they were nigh an hundred Students and Ministers then in exile:* These, with the People in all other Places, *Geneva* excepted, kept to the *Orders* established in our *Church*; but at *Frankford* some began to be very busie in *reforming* our *Liturgy*, leaving out many things, and adding others, which occasioned the following *Troubles of Frankford*. The true ground whereof is commonly much mis-represented. Mr. *Baxter* saith, *The difference was between those which strove for the* English *Liturgy, and others that were for a free way of praying*, i. e. as he explains it, *from the present sense and habit of the Speaker*; but that this is a great mistake, will appear from the account published of them, *A. D.* 1575. by one that was a Friend to the Dissenting Party. From which it appears, that no sooner were the *English* arriv'd at *Frankford*, but the Minister of the *French Congregation* there, came to them, and told them, he had obtained from the Magistrates the freedom of a Church for those who came out of *England*, but especially for the *French*; they thanked him and the *Magistrates* for so much kindness, but withal let them understand this would be little benefit to the *English*, unless they might have the liberty of performing all the Offices of Religion in their own Tongue. Upon an Address made to the Senate, this request was granted them; and they were to make use of the *French Church* at different times, as the *French* and they could agree, but with this express *Proviso, that they should not dissent from the French in Doctrine, or Ceremonies, lest they should thereby minister occasion of offence.* But afterwards, it seems, the Magistrates did not require them to be strictly tied up *to the French Ceremonies, so they did mutually agree.* Upon this, they perused the *English Order*, and endeavour'd to bring it as near as they could to the *French Model*, by leaving out the *Responses*, the *Litany*, *Surplice*, and many other things, and adding a larger *Confession*, *more suitable to the State and Time*; after which a *Psalm* was sung; then the *Minister*, after a short Prayer for Divine Assistance, (according to *Calvin*'s *Custom*) was to proceed to the *Sermon*, which being ended, then followed a *general Prayer for all Estates*, particularly for *England*, ending with the *Lord's Prayer*; and so repeating the *Articles of the Creed*, and another *Psalm* sung, the People were dismissed with the Blessing. By which we see, here was not the least controversie, *whether a Liturgy or not*; but whether the *Order of Service* was not to be accommodated, as much as might be, to the *French Model.* However, when they sent to the *English* in other Places to resort thither, by reason of the great Conveniencies they enjoy'd, and acquainted them with what they had done; it gave great offence to them, which they expressed in their Letters. Those of *Zurick* sent them word, *They determined to use no other Order, than that which was last established in* England; and in another Letter, *They desire to be assured from them, that if they removed thither, they should all join in the same Order of Service concerning Religion, which was in* England, *last set forth by King* Edward. To this the *Congregation* of *Frankford*

Letters of the Martyrs, *p.* 50.

Plea for Peace, *p.* 120.

Frankford returned answer, *That they could not, in all points, warrant the full use of the Book of Service, which they impute to their present Circumstances, in which they suppose such Alterations would be allowed; but they intended not hereby to deface the worthy Laws and Ordinances of King* Edward. These learned Men of *Strasburg*, understanding their resolutions, send *Grindal* to them, with a *Letter* subscribed by Sixteen, wherein they intreat them, *To reduce the English Church there, as much as possible, to the Order lately set forth in* England, *lest*, say they, *by much altering of the same, they should seem to condemn the chief Authors thereof, who, as they now suffer, so are they most ready to confirm that fact with the price of their Bloods; and should also both give occasion to our Adversaries to accuse our Doctrine of imperfection, and us of mutability; and the godly to doubt of that truth wherein before they were persuaded, and to hinder their coming thither, which before they had purposed.* And to obtain their desire, they tell them, *They had sent Persons for that end, to negotiate this Affair with the Magistrates, and, in case they obtained their Request, they promised to come and join with them; and they did not question the English in other Places would do the same.* Notwithstanding the weight of these Reasons, and the desireableness of their Brethrens company in that time of exile, they persist in their former Resolutions, not to have the *entire English Liturgy*; for by this time *Knox* was come from *Geneva*, being chosen *Minister of the Congregation:* However, they returned this answer to *Strasburg*, *That they made as little alteration as was possible; for, certain Ceremonies the Country would not bear; and they did not dissent from those which lie at the ransom of their Bloods for the Doctrine, whereof they have made a most worthy Confession.* Page 19. About this time, some suggested, that they should take the *Order* of *Geneva*, *as farthest from superstition*; but *Knox* declined this, till they had advised with the learned Men at *Strasburg*, *Zurick*, *Emden*, &c. knowing, that the *Odium* of it would be thrown upon him. But finding their Zeal and Concernment for the *English Liturgy*, he, with *Whittingham*, and some others, drew up an *Abstract* of it, and sent it to *Calvin*, desiring his Judgment of it. Who, upon perusal of it, being throughly heated in a Cause that so nearly concerned him, writes a very sharp Letter, directed to the *Brethren at Frankford*; gently rebuking them for their *unseasonable Contentions about these matters*, but severely reproving the *English Divines*, who stood up for the *English Liturgy*, when the *Model* of *Geneva* stood in competition with it. And yet, after all his Censures of it, he confesses, the things he thought *most unfit*, were *tolerable*; but he blames them, *if they did not chuse a better, when they might chuse*; but he gives not the least encouragement to *Separation* if it were continued; and he declares for his own part, *how easie he was to yield in all indifferent things, such as external Rites are.* And he was so far, in his Judgment, from being for *free Prayer*, or making *the constant use of a Liturgy a ground of Separation*, as Dr. *O.* doth, that when he delivered his Opinion, with the greatest freedom, to the then *Protector*, about the best method of *Reformation*, he declares, *That he did mightily approve a certain Form, from which Men ought not to vary, both to prevent the inconveniencies which some Mens folly would betray them to*, in the free way of praying; *and to manifest the general consent of the Churches in their Prayers; and to stop the vain affectation of some, who love to be shewing some new things.* Let Mr. *Br.* now judge, whether it were likely that the *Controversie* then at *Frankford*, was, as he

Page 21.

Calvin, *Ep.* 164.

Ep. 55.

 saith,

faith, between them that were for the *English Liturgy*, and others that were for a *free way of praying*; when *Calvin*, to whom the *Dissenters* appealed, was so much, in his Judgment, against the latter. And it ap-
Ep. 165. pears, by *Calvin*'s Letter to *Cox*, *and his Brethren*, that the State of the Case at *Frankford* had not been truly represented to him; which made him write with greater sharpness than otherwise he would have done; and he expresses his satisfaction, that the matter was so composed among them, when by Dr. *Cox* his means, the *English-Liturgy* was brought into use at *Frankford*. And to excuse himself for his liberal Censures before, he mentions *Lights*, as required by the Book, which were not in the second *Liturgy* of *Edward* the Sixth. So that either they deceived him, who sent him the *Abstract*; or he was put to this miserable shift to defend himself; the matter being ended contrary to his expectation. For, although upon the receipt of *Calvin*'s Letter, the *Order* of *Geneva* had like to have been presently voted in, yet there being
Tr. of Fr. p. 30. still some fast Friends to the *English-Service*, they were fain to compromise the matter, and to make use of a mixt Form for the present. But, Dr. *Cox*, and others, coming thither from *England*, and misliking these Alterations, declared, That they were for having *the face of an*
Page 31. *English Church* there; and so they began the *Litany* next *Sunday*; which put *Knox* into so great a rage, that instead of pursuing his *Text*, (which was directly contrary) he made it his business, *to lay open the nakedness of our Church*, as far as his Wit and Ill-Will would carry him. He charged the *Service-Book* with *Superstition*, *Impurity*, and *Imperfection*; and the *Governors of our Church with slackness in Reformation*, *want of Discipline*, with the business of *Hooper*, allowing *Pluralities*; all the ill things he could think on. When *Cox* and his *Party*, (with whom, at this time, was our excellent *Jewel*) were admitted among them, they presently forbad *Knox* having any thing farther to do in that Congregation; who being complained of soon after for *Treason* against the *Emperor*, in a Book by him published, he was forced to leave the City, and to retire to *Geneva*, whither most of his Party followed him. And thus saith *Grindal*, in his Letter to Bishop *Ridley*, *The Church at* Frankford *was well quieted by the Prudence of Mr.* Cox, *and others*, *which met there for that purpose.*

Letters of the Martyrs, *p.* 60. *Sect.* 4. It is observed by the *Author* of the *Life of Bishop* Jewel, (before his Works) *that this Controversie was not carried with them out of* England, *but they received new impressions from the places whither they went.* For as those who were Exiles in *Henry* the Eighth's time, (as particularly *Hooper*, who lived many years in *Switzerland*) brought home with them a greater liking of the Church's Model, where they had lived, (which being such as their Country would bear, they supposed to be nearer *Apostolical Simplicity*, being far enough from any thing of *Pomp*, or *Ceremony*) which created in them an aversion to the *Ornaments* and *Vestments* here used: So now, upon this new Persecution, those who had friendship at *Geneva*, as *Knox* and *Whittingham*, or were otherwise much obliged by those of that way, as the other *English* were, who came first to *Frankford*, were soon possessed with a greater liking of their Model of *Divine Service*, than of our own. And when Men are once engaged in Parties, and several Interests, it is a very hard matter to remove the Prejudices which they have taken in, especially when they have great Abettors, and such, whose Authority goes beyond any Reason with them. This is the true Foundation of those unhappy Dif-

ferences which have so long continued among us, about the *Orders* and *Ceremonies* of our Church. For when *Calvin* and some others found, that their Counsel was not like to be followed in our *Reformation*, our *Bishops* proceeding more out of reverence to the *ancient Church*, than *mere opposition to Popery*, (which some other Reformers made their Rules) they did not cease, by Letters, and other ways, to insinuate, that our *Reformation* was imperfect, as long as any of the *Dregs of Popery* remained. So they called the *use* of those *Ceremonies*, which they could not deny to have been far more *ancient* than the great *Apostasie* of the *Roman Church*. *Calvin*, in his Letter to the *Protector*, avows this to be the best Rule of *Reformation*, *To go as far from Popery as they could*; and therefore *what Habits and Ceremonies had been abused in the time of Popery were to be removed, lest others were hardned in their Superstition thereby*: but at last he yields to this *moderation* in the case, *That such Ceremonies might be retained as were easie, and fitted to the Capacities of the People, provided they were not such, as had their beginning from the Devil, or Antichrist*, i. e. were not first begun in the time of *Popery*. Now by this *Rule* of *Moderation* our *Church* did proceed; for it took away all those *Ceremonies* which were of late invention. As in *Baptism*, of all the multitude of *Rites* in the *Roman Church*, it reserved, in the *Second Liturgy*, only *the Cross after Baptism*, which was not so used in the *Roman Church*, for there the *Sign of the Cross* is used in the *Scrutinies* before *Baptism*; and the *anointing* with the *Chrysm in vertice* after it; instead of these, our *Church* made choice of *the Sign of the Cross after Baptism* being of uncontrolable Antiquity, and not used till the *Child* is *baptized*. In the *Eucharist*, instead of fifteen Ceremonies required in the *Church* of *Rome*, our Church hath only appointed *Kneeling*. I say *appointed*, for although Kneeling at the *elevation* of the *Host*, be strictly required by the *Roman Church*, yet in the *Act* of *receiving* it is not; (as manifestly appears by the *Pope*'s manner of receiving, which is not *Kneeling*, but either *Sitting*, as it was in *Bonaventure*'s time; or *after the fashion of Sitting*, or a *little leaning upon his Throne*, as he doth at this day) therefore our *Church* taking away the *adoration* at the *elevation*, lest it should seem to recede from the practice of *Antiquity*, which received the *Eucharist* in the *posture* of *adoration* then used, hath appointed *Kneeling* to be observed of all *Communicants*. Instead of the great number of *consecrated Vestments* in the *Roman Church*, it only retained a *plain linen Garment*, which was unquestionably used in the Times of St. *Hierome*, and St. *Augustin*. And lastly, As to the *Episcopal Habits*, they are retained only as a Mark of distinction of a certain *Order* of Men; the colour of the *Chimere* being changed from *scarlet* to *black*. These are now the *Ceremonies*, about which all the noise and stir hath been made in our Church; and any sober, considering Man, free from passion and prejudice, would stand amazed at the clamour and disturbance which hath been made in this *Church*, and is at this Day, about the intolerable *Mischief* of these *Impositions*.

Bonavent. *in Ps.* 21.

Angel. Roccha de Solemni Communione Summi Pontificis, p. 33, 38.

Sect. 5. But the most material Question they ever ask, is, *Why were these few retained by our Reformers, which were then distastful to some Protestants, and were like to prove the occasion of future Contentions?*

I will here give a just and true account of the Reasons which induced our *Reformers* either to retain or to appoint these *Ceremonies*, and then proceed.

I. *Out of a due reverence to antiquity.* They would hereby convince the *Papists* they did put a difference between the gross and intolerable *Superstitions* of *Popery*, and the innocent *Rites* and *Practices* which were observed in the *Church* before. And what could more harden the *Papists*, than to see Men put no difference between these? It is an unspeakable advantage which those do give to the *Papists*, who are for reforming 1600 years backward, and when they are pinch'd with a *Testimony* of *Antiquity*, presently cry out of the *Mystery of Iniquity working in the Apostles times*; as though every thing which they disliked, were a part of it. Next to *the taking up Arms for Religion*, which made Men look on it as a *Faction* and *Design*, there was scarce any thing gave so great a check to the *Progress* of the *Reformation* in *France*, especially among learned and moderate Men, as the putting no difference between the *Corruptions* of *Popery*, and the innocent *Customs* of the *ancient Church*. For the time was when many great Men there, were very inclinable to a *Reformation*; but when they saw the *Reformers* oppose the undoubted Practices of *Antiquity*, equally with the *modern Corruptions*, they cast them off, as Men guilty of an unreasonable humour of *Innovation*; as may be seen in *Thuanus*, and *Fran. Baldwin*'s *Ecclesiastical Commentaries*, and his Answers to *Calvin* and *Beza*. But our Reformers, altho' they made the *Scripture* the only *Rule of Faith*, and rejected all things *repugnant* thereto, yet they designed not to make a *Transformation* of a *Church*, but a *Reformation* of it; by reducing it as near as they could, to that state it was in, under the first *Christian Emperors*, that were found in Religion; and therefore they retained these few *Ceremonies*, as *Badges* of the respect they bore to the *ancient Church*.

II. *To manifest the Justice and Equity of the Reformation*, by letting their Enemies see, they did not break *Communion* with them for *mere indifferent things*. For some of the *popish Bishops* of that time were subtle and learned Men, as *Gardiner*, *Heath*, *Tonstall*, &c. and nothing would have rejoiced them more, than to have seen our *Reformers* boggle at such *Ceremonies* as these; and they would have made mighty advantage of it among the People. Of which we have a clear instance in the case of *Bishop Hooper*'s scrupling the *Episcopal Vestments*. *Peter Martyr*, tells him plainly, *That such needless scrupulosity would be a great hindrance to the Reformation.* For, saith he, *since the People are with difficulty enough brought to things necessary, if we once declare things indifferent to be unlawful, they will have no patience to hear us any longer. And withal, hereby we condemn other reformed Churches, and those ancient Churches, which have hitherto been in great esteem.*

III. *To shew their consent with other Protestant Churches*, which did allow and practice the same, or more Ceremonies, as the *Lutheran Churches* generally did. And even *Calvin* himself, in his *Epistle* to *Sadolet*, declared, *That he was for restoring the face of the ancient Church*; and in his *Book of the true way of Reformation*, he saith, *He would not contend about Ceremonies, not only those which are for decency, but those that are symbolical.* *Œcolampadius* looked *on the gesture at the Sacrament as indifferent.* *Bucer* thought *the use of the Sign of the Cross after Baptism neither indecent nor unprofitable.* Since therefore, so great a number of *Protestant Churches* used the same Ceremonies; and the chief *Leaders* of other *reformed Churches* thought them *not unlawful*, our first *Reformers* for this, and the foregoing *Reasons*, thought it fit to *retain* them, as long as they were so few, so easie both to be practised and understood.

Calvin. *Ep. ad Sadolet.* *De verâ Eccles. Reformat.* c. 16. Oecolamp. *Ep.* f. 177. Bucer. *Script. Ang.* p. 479.

Sect. 6. But the impressions which had been made on some of our *Divines* abroad, did not wear off at their return home, in the beginning of Queen *Elizabeth*'s Reign. For they retained a secret dislike of many things in our *Church*; but the *Act* of *Uniformity* being passed, and the *use* of the *Liturgy* strictly enjoined; I do not find any *Separation* made then on the account of it; no, not by *the dissenting Brethren*, that withdrew from *Frankford* to *Geneva*. *Knox* was forbidden to preach here, because of some personal Reflections on the *Queen*; but *Whittingham*, *Sampson*, *Gilby*, and others accepted of Preferment and Employment in the Church. The Bishops, at first, shewed kindness to them, on the account of their forward and zealous *preaching*, which, at that time was very needful, and therefore many of them were placed in *London*. Where, having gained the People by their zeal and diligence in preaching, they took occasion to let fall at first their *dislike* of the *Ceremonies*, and a desire of a farther *Reformation* of our *Liturgy*; but finding that they had gained ground, they never ceased, till by inveighing against *the Livery of Antichrist*, as they called *the Vestments and Ceremonies*, they had inflamed the People to that degree, that *Gilby* himself insinuates, *That if they had been let alone a little longer, they would have shaken the Constitution of this Church.* This was the first *occasion* of pressing *Uniformity* with any rigor, and therefore some examples were thought fit to be made for the warning of others. But as kindness made them presumptuous, so this severity made them clamorous, and they sent bitter complaints to *Geneva*. *Beza*, after much importunity, undertook to give an answer to them; which being of great consequence to our present business, I shall here give a fuller account of it. We are then to understand, that about this time, the *dissenting Party* being exasperated, by the *silencing* some of their most busie *Preachers*, began to have *separate Meetings*: This *Beza* takes notice of in his *Epistle* to *Grindal*, Bishop of *London*; and it appears, by an *Examination* taken before him, 20th of *June*, 1567, of certain Persons, *who were accused not only for absenting themselves from their Parish-Churches, but for gathering together, and making Assemblies, using Prayers and Preachings, and ministring Sacraments among themselves, and hiring a Hall in* London, *under pretence of a Wedding, for that purpose.*

Dialogue between a Soldier of Barwick, *and an English Chaplain.* p. 5,6.

Beza Epist. 13.

Part of a Register, p. 23.

The *Bishop* of *London* first rebuked them for their *lying Pretences*, and then told them, *That in this severing themselves from the Society of other Christians, they not only condemned them, but also the whole state of the Church reformed in King* Edward's *days, which was well reformed according to the word of God; yea, and many good Men have shed their blood for the same, which your doings condemn. Have ye not,* saith he, *the Gospel truly preached, and the Sacraments ministred accordingly, and good order kept, although we differ from other Churches in Ceremonies, and in indifferent things, which lie in the Prince's power to command for order sake?* To which one of them answered, *That as long as they might have the Word freely preached, and the Sacraments administred, without the preferring of idolatrous Gear about it, they never assembled together in Houses: but their Preachers being displaced by Law for their Nonconformity, they be-thought themselves what was best for them to do; and calling to mind, there was a Congregation there in the days of Queen* Mary, *which followed the Order of* Geneva, *they took up that, and this Book and Order,* saith he, *we hold.* Another answered, *That they did not refuse Communion for preaching the Word, but because they had tied the*

the Ceremonies of Antichrist to it, and set them up before it, so that no Man may preach, or minister the Sacraments without them. Things being come to this height, and *Separation* beginning to break out, the wiser Brethren thought not fit to proceed any farther, till they had consulted their *Oracle* at *Geneva*. *Beza* being often solicited by them, *with doleful Complaints of their hard usage, and the different Opinions among themselves, what they were to do*, at last resolves to answer, but first he declares, *How unwilling he was to interpose in the Differences of another Church, especially when but one Party was heard; and he was afraid, this was only the way to exasperate and provoke more, rather than cure this evil, which he thought was not otherwise to be cured*, but *Precibus & Patientiâ, by Prayers and Patience.* After this general Advice, *Beza* freely declares his own Judgment, as to the *Reformation* of several things he thought amiss in our *Church*; but as to the case of the *silenced Preachers*, and the *Peoples Separation*, he expresses his mind in that manner, that the *Dissenters* at this day, would have published their Invectives against him, one upon the back of another. For, (1.) *As to the silenced Ministers*, he saith, *That if the pressing Subscription continued, he persuades them rather to live privately, than to yield to it. For, they must either act against their Consciences, or they must quit their Employments*; *for*, saith he, *the third thing that may be supposed*, viz. *That they should exercise their Function against the Will of the Queen and the Bishops, we tremble at the thoughts of it, for such reasons, as may be easily understood, though we say never a word of them.* What! is *Beza* for *silencing*, and stopping the Mouths of such a number of faithful and able Ministers, and at such a time, when the *Church* was in so great *necessity* of preaching, and so many *Souls* like to be *famished* for the want of it? when St. *Antholins*, St. *Peters*, St. *Bartholomews*, at which *Gilby* saith their great *preaching* then was, were like to be left destitute of such Men? Would *Beza*, even *Beza*, at such a time as that, be for *silencing* so many *Preachers*, i. e. for their *sitting quiet*, when the Law had done it: And would not he suffer them to preach, when they ought to have done it, though against the Will of the *Queen* and the *Bishops?* It appears, that *Beza* was not of the mind of our *Adversaries*; but that he was of the contrary, it appears plainly by this, That before he persuades the *Dissenting Ministers rather to live privately, than to subscribe*; and that he expresses no such terrible apprehensions at their *quitting their Places*, as he doth at *their preaching in opposition to the Laws.* (2.) As to the case of the *People*, his Advice was, *As long as the Doctrine was sound, that they should diligently attend upon it, and receive the Sacraments devoutly, and to join amendment of Life with their Prayers, that by those means they might obtain a through Reformation.* So that nothing can be more express against *Separation*, than what is here said by *Beza*, for, even as to the *Ministers*, he saith, *Though he did not approve the Ceremonies, yet since they are not of the nature of things evil in themselves, he doth not think them of that moment, that they should leave their Functions for the sake of them, or that the People should forsake the Ordinances, rather than hear those who did conform.* Than which words, nothing can be plainer against *Separation.* And it farther appears, by *Beza*'s resolution of a case concerning a *Schism* in the *French Church*, then in *London*, *That he looked on it as a Sin, for any one to separate from a Church wherein sound Doctrine, and a holy Life, and the right use of the Sacraments is kept up. And, by Separation*, he saith, he means, *not merely*

Beza *Epist.* 24. p. 148.

going

going from one Church to another, but the discontinuing Communion with the publick Assemblies, as though one were no Member of them.

Beza's Authority being so great with the *Dissenting Brethren* at that time, seems to have put an effectual *Stop* to the *Course* of *Separation*, which they were many of them, then inclined to. But, he was not alone among the Foreign *Divines*, who, about that time, expressed themselves against *Separation* from the *Communion* of our *Church*, notwithstanding the *Rites* and *Ceremonies* herein used. For *Gualter*, a Divine of good Reputation in the *Helvetian Churches*, takes an occasion in an *Epistle* to several of our *Bishops*, to talk of the Difference then about these things; and he extremely blames *the morose humor of those, who disturbed the Church for the sake of such things, and gave an occasion thereby to endless Separations.* And in an *Epistle to* Cox *Bishop of* Ely, 1572, he tells him, *How much they had dissuaded them from making such a stir in the Church, about Matters of no moment: and he complains grievously of the Lies and Prejudices against our Church, which they had sent Men on purpose to possess them with, both at* Geneva *and other places.*

Gualter. *Ep. ded. ad Hom. in 1 Ep. ad Corinth.*

Zanchy, upon great Sollicitation, wrote an earnest Letter to the *Queen to remove the Ceremonies*; but withal he sent another to *Bishop Jewel*, to persuade the *Nonconformists*, *if the Queen could not be moved, not to leave their Churches on such accounts, which, for his part, he did not understand how any could lawfully do*; *as long as they had otherwise liberty to preach the Gospel, and administer the Sacraments, although they were forced to do something therein, which did not please them*; *as long as the things were of that kind, which in themselves were neither good nor evil.* And the same Reason will much more hold against the *Peoples Separation.*

Zanchii, *Epist.* l. 2. p. 391.

Sect. 7. But about this time, *the dissenting Party* much increasing, and most of the old and peaceable *Non-conformists* being dead or unfit for business; the management of their affairs fell into the hands of younger and fiercer Men. Who thought their Predecessors too cold in these matters; insomuch, that honest *John Fox* complained of the *factious and turbulent Spirit which had then possessed that Party*, although himself a moderate Non-conformist; and he saith, *They despised him, because he could not rail against Bishops, and Archbishops as they did*; *but if he could be as mad as they, they would be kinder to him. And therefore he soberly adviseth the Governors of the Church to look well after this sort of Men*; for, saith he, *if they prevail, it is not to be imagin'd, what Mischief and Disturbance they will bring*; *whose Hypocrisie is more subtle and pernicious than that of the old Monks*; *for under a Pretence of greater Purity, they will never give over, till they have brought Men under a Jewish Slavery.* These new Men, full of bitter zeal, despised the old trifling Controversie about *Garments* and *Ceremonies*; they complained, *That all was out of order in the Church*, and nothing but a *new* and *thorough Reformation* would please them. For, in the *Admonition* presented to the *Parliament*, 14 *Eliz.* they complain for want of *a right Ministry, a right Government in the Church according to the Scriptures, without which* (they say) *there could be no right Religion.* *The Liturgy* they deride, *as culled and picked out of the Popish Dunghil, the Portuse and Mass-Book*; *the Government of the Church by Arch-Bishops and Bishops they call Devilish and Antichristian*; *and condemn the Vocation of the Clergy, as Popish and Unlawful*; and add, *That the Sacraments are mangled, and profaned, that Baptism is full of childish and superstitious Toys.* All which, and many

See his Letter in Fuller's *Church-History*, l. 9. p. 106.

ny more expressions of a like Nature, are extant in the *First and Second Admonitions*. Which bold and groundless assertions, being so openly avowed to the World, by the *Leaders* of the *Dissenting Party*, gave the true *Occasion* to the following practice of *Separation*. For when these things were not only published in the name of the *Party*, being the *Pleas for Peace* at that time, but stifly maintained with greater Heat than Learning. It is easie to imagine, what *Impressions* such things would make on the common sort of *People*; who have still a good Inclination to find fault with their *Governors*, especially in the *Church*, and to admire those that oppose them. And these they courted most, having their *Opinions* so suited to *vulgar Capacities*, that they apprehended their *Interest* carried on together with that of Purity of *Reformation*. Hence they pleaded then, as others do at this day, for the *Peoples right to choose their Bishops and Pastors against the Usurpations*, as they accounted them, of *Princes* and *Patrons*; hence they railed against the *Pomp and Greatness of the Clergy*, which is always a popular Theme; and so would the exposing the inequality of Mens *Estates* be, if Men durst undertake it, with as great hopes of Impunity. Besides, it was not a little pleasant to the *People*, to think, what a share they should come to in the new *Seigniory*, as they called it, or *Presbytery*, to be erected in every *Parish*; and what Authority they should exercise over their *Neighbours*, and over their *Minister* too by their double Votes. By such Arts as these, they complied with the natural Humors of the *People*, and so gained a mighty Interest amongst them; as the *Anabaptists* in *Germany* and *Switzerland* at first did, upon the like Grounds. Which made *Bullinger*, in an *Epistle* to *Robert Bishop of Winchester*, parallel the Proceedings of this *Party* here, with that of the *Anabaptists* with them in those Countries; *For*, saith he, *we had a sort of People here, to whom nothing seemed pure enough in our Reformation, from whence they brake out into Separation, and had their Conventicles among us, upon which followed Sects and Schisms, which made great entertainment to our Common Enemies, the Papists*. Just thus it happened here, these hot *Reformers* designed no *Separation* at present; which they knew would unavoidably bring confusion along with it; for that was laying the Reins on the Peoples necks, and they would run whither they pleased, without any possibility of being well managed by them; but since these Men would *Refine* upon the present *Constitution* of our *Church*, there soon arose another sort of Men, who thought it as fit to *Refine* upon *them*. They acknowledged they had good *Principles* among them, but they did not *practise* according to them: If our *Church* were so bad as they said, that there was neither *right Ministery*, nor *right Government*, nor *right Sacraments*, nor *right Discipline*; What follows, say they, from hence, *but that we ought to separate from the Communion of so corrupt a Church, and joyn together to make up new Churches for the pure administration of all Gospel Ordinances?* The *Leaders* of the *Non-conformists* finding this Party growing up under them, were quickly apprehensive of the danger of them; because the *Consequence* seemed so *natural* from their *own Principles*; and the People were so ready to believe, that nothing but worldly Considerations of *Interest* and *Safety* kept them from practising according to them. Which was a mighty prejudice against them in the Minds of the *Separatists*, as appears by *Robinson's Preface* to his *Book* of *Communion*.

Bullinger, *Ep. ad* Robert Winton. *in the Appendix to Bishop* Whitgift's *first Book.*

Sect.

Sect. 8, II. The *Separation* being now begun, the *Non-conformists* set themselves against it, with the greatest Vehemency. Which is the second thing I am to make out. *As for those of the Separation*, saith *Parker* a noted *Non-conformist*, *who have confuted them more than we? or, Who have written more against them?* And in a Letter of his, he expresseth the greatest Detestation of them. *Now it grieved me not a little, at this time*, saith he, *that Satan should be so impudent, as to fling the dung of that Sect into my Face, which, with all my Power, I had so vehemently resisted, during the whole course of my Ministery in* England: *I think no other, but that many of them love the Lord, and fear his Name; howbeit their Error being Enemy to that Breast of Charity, wherewith* Cyprian *covered his*, Qui ab Ecclesiâ nunquam recessit, *as* Augustin *speaketh; they cannot stand before his Tribunal, but by the Intercession of our blessed Saviour. Father forgive them for they know not what they do. Think not these words are applied to their Sect amiss; for, in effect, what doth it less than even persecute the Lord* Jesus *in his Host, which it revileth; in his Ordinances, which it dishonoureth; and in his Servants last of all, whose Graces it blasphemeth, whose Footsteps it slandereth, and whose Persons it despiseth.* And two Characters he gives of the Men of that way, viz, *That their Spirits were bitter above measure, and their hearts puffed up with the Leaven of Pride.* How far these Characters still agree to the *Defenders* of the present *Separation*, I leave others to judge. When *Brown* and *Harrison* openly declared for *Separation*, *T. C.* himself undertook to answer them, in a *Letter* to *Harrison*. His example was soon followed by others of his *Brethren*, who wrote the *Admonition to the Followers of* Brown, and the *Defence of that Admonition*. When *Barrow* and *Greenwood* published their *four Reasons* for *Separation*, three of which they took out of the *Admonition to the Parliament*, viz. *Unlawful Ministry*, *Antichristian Government*, and *false Worship*; *Gifford*, a *Non-conformist* at *Maldon* in *Essex*, undertook to answer them in several Treatises. And it is observable, that these *Non-conformists* charge the *Brownists* with making a *vile*, *notorious*, and *damnable Schism*, because they withdrew from the *Communion* of our *Churches*, and set up *new Ones* of their own. *Gifford* not only calls them *Schismaticks*, but saith, *They make a vile Schism, rending themselves from the Church of* England; *and condemning by their Assertions, the whole visible Church in the World, even as the* Donatists *did of old time:* and he adds, *That the end of* Brownism, *as it was then called, is infinite Schisms, Heresies, Atheism* and *Barbarism.* And the same Author, in his second *Book*, reckoning up the ill effects of this *Separation* among the *People*, hath these remarkable words. *Now look also on the People, where we may see very many, who not regarding the chief Christian Virtues, and Godly Duties, as namely, to be Meek, to be Patient, to be Lowly, to be full of Love and Mercy, to deal uprightly and justly, to guide their Families in the Fear of God, with wholesome Instructions, and to stand fast in the Calling in which God hath set them, give themselves wholly to this, even as if it were the Sum and Pith of Religion, namely, to argue and talk continually against Matters in the Church, against Bishops and Ministers, and one against another on both sides. Some are proceeded to this, that they will come to the Assemblies to hear the Sermons and Prayers of the Preacher, but not to the Prayers of the Book, which I take to be a more grievous sin than many do suppose. But yet this is not the worst, for sundry are gone farther, and fallen into a damnable Schism; and the same so much the more fearful and dangerous, in that many do not*

Parker *on the Cross, Part.* 2. *cap.* 9. *Sect.* 2.

Vide *Profane Schism of the* Brownists, *Ch.* 12.

Gifford's *first Treatise against the* Donatists *of* England, *Preface.*

Gifford's *Second Treatise. Preface.*

see the foulness of it, but rather hold them as Godly Christians, and but a little over-shot in these matters. But that this Man went upon the Principles of the *Non-conformists*, appears, by his stating the Question, in the same Preface, *For, I shewed*, saith he, *in express words, that I do not meddle at all in these Questions, whether there be corruptions and faults in our Church, condemned by God's Word; whether they be many or few; whether they be small or great; but only thus far, whether they be such, or so great, as make our Churches Antichristian.* *Barrow* saith, *That this* Gifford *was one that joyned with the rest of the Faction in the Petition to the Parliament against the English Hierarchy:* and it appears by several passages of his *Books* that he was a *Non-conformist*; and he is joyned with *Cartwright*, *Hildersham*, *Brightman*, and other *Nonconformists*, by the *Prefacer* to the *Defence* of *Bradshaw* against *Johnson:* and I find his Name in one of the *Classes* in *Essex* at that time. The *Author* of the *second Answer for Communicating*, who defends *T. C's* Letter to *Harrison*, *Brown's* Colleague against *Separation*, proves *joyning with the Church a Duty necessarily enjoyned him of God by his Providence, through his being and placing in a particular Church, and justly required of him by the Church, or spiritual Body, through that same inforcing Law of the coherence, and being together of the parts and members, which is the express Ordinance of God. So that*, saith he, *unless I hold the Congregation, whereof I am now, disanulled, and become no Church of Christ, for the not separating an unworthy Member, I cannot voluntarily either absent my self from their Assemblies to holy Exercises, or yet depart away being come together, without Breach of the Bond of Peace, sundring the Cement of Love, empairing the growth of the Body of* Christ, *and incurring the guilt of Schism and Division.* To the same purpose he speaks elsewhere. *Richard Bernard* calls it, *An uncharitable and lewd Schism which they were guilty of.* But I need not mention more particular *Authors*, *since in the grave Confutation of the Errors of the Separatists, in the Name of the Nonconformists*, it is said, *That because we have a true Church, consisting of a lawful Ministry, and a faithful People, therefore they cannot separate themselves from us, but they must needs incur the most shameful and odious Reproach of manifest Schism.* And concerning the *State* of the Persons who lived in *Separation*, they say, *We hold them all to be in a dangerous Estate, (we are loth to say in a damnable Estate) as long as they continue in this Schism.*

Answer to Gifford's Preface.

Dangerous Positions, &c. l. 3. c. 5.

The second Answer for Communicating, p. 20. Printed by John Winder, A. D. 1588.

Page 46.

Answer to Ainsworth, p. 13.

Page 57.

Preface to the Reader, p. 17.

Sect. 9. But, for our farther understanding the full *State* of this *Controversie*, we must consider, what things were agreed on both sides, and where the main Points of Difference lay.

1. The *Separatists* did yield *the Doctrine, or Faith of the Church of* England *true and sound, and a Possibility of Salvation in the Communion of it.* In their *Apology* presented to *King James*, thus they speak; *We testifie by these presents unto all Men, and desire them to take knowledge hereof, that we have not forsaken any one Point of the true ancient Catholick and Apostolick Faith professed in our Land; but hold the same Grounds of Christian Religion with them still.* And the Publisher of the Dispute about *Separation*, between *Johnson* and *Jacob*, saith, *That the first Separatists never denied, that the Doctrine and Profession of the Churches of* England, *was sufficient to make those that believed and obeyed them, to be true Christians, and in the state of Salvation, but always held, professed, and acknowledged the contrary.* *Barrow* saith, *That they commended the Faith of the English Martyrs, and deemed them saved, notwithstanding the false*

Browniſt's Apology, p. 7. A. D. 1604.

A Defence of the Churches and Ministry of England. Middleburgh, p. 3. A. D. 1599.

Barrow's Observations on Gifford's last Reply, n. 4. p. 240.

false Offices, and great corruptions in the Worship exercised: And in the *Letter* to a *Lady* a little before his Death, he saith, *he had reverend Estimation of sundry, and good hope of many hundred thousands in* England; *though he utterly disliked the present Constitution of this Church, in the present Communion, Ministry, Worship, Government, and Ordinances Ecclesiastical of these Cathedral and Parishional Assemblies.* Brownist's *Apol.* p. 92.

2. The *Separatists* granted, That *Separation* was not justifiable from a *Church, for all Blemishes and Corruptions in it.* Thus they express themselves in their *Apology, Neither count we it lawful for any Member to forsake the Fellowship of the Church, for blemishes and imperfections, which every one, according to his Calling, should studiously seek to cure, and to expect and farther it, until either there follow redress, or the Disease be grown incurable,* And in the 36 *Article* of the *Confession* of their *Faith,* written by *Johnson* and *Ainsworth,* they have these words. *None is to separate from a Church rightly gathered and established, for faults and Corruptions, which may, and so long as the Church consisteth of mortal Men, will fall out and arise among them, even in true constituted Churches, but by due order to seek the redress thereof.* But in the case of our Church they pleaded, that the Corruptions were so many and great, as to overthrow the very Constitution of a Church. So *Barrow* saith, *They do not cut off the members of our Church from God's Election, or from Christ, but from being Members of a true constituted Church.* Brownist's *Apol.* p. 7. Barrow, *ib.*

On the other side, the *Non-conformists* granted there were many and great Corruptions in our *Church,* but not such as did overthrow the *Constitution* of it, or make *Separation* from our *Parochial Assemblies* to be necessary, or lawful. So that the force of all their Reasonings against *Separation* lay in these two *Suppositions.*

1. That nothing could justifie *Separation* from our Church, but such *Corruptions* which overthrew the *being,* or *constitution* of it.
2. That the *Corruptions* in our *Church* were not such, as did overthrow the *Constitution* of it.

The making out of these two will tend very much to the clear *stating* of this present Controversie.

1. *That nothing could justifie Separation from our Church, but such Corruptions which overthrow the being or constitution of it.* *Barrow* and his Brethren, did not think they could satisfie their Consciences in *Separation,* unless they proved our *Churches* to be *no true Churches.* For, here they assign the four Causes of their *Separation* to be; *Want of a right gathering our Churches* at *first*; *False Worship*; *Antichristian Ministery* and *Government: These Reasons,* say they, *all Men may see prove directly these Parish Assemblies not to be the true established Churches of Christ, to which any faithful Christian may joyn himself in this estate; especially, when all Reformation unto the rules of* Christ's *Testament is not only denied, but resisted, blasphemed, persecuted.* These are the words of the *first,* and *chiefest Separatists,* who suffered death rather than they would foregoe these Principles. *We condemn not,* say they, *their Assemblies, barely for a mixture of good and bad, which will always be, but for want of an orderly gathering, or constitution at first: we condemn them not for some faults in the Calling of the Ministry, but for having and retaining a false Antichristian Ministry imposed upon them: we forsake not their Assemblies for some faults in their Government, or Discipline, but for standing subject to a Popish and Antichristian Government. Neither refrain we their Worship for some light imperfections, but because their Worship is superstitious,* Barrow's *Refutation of* Giffard. *Preface to the Reader.* *Sum of the Causes of Separation.*

stitious, devised by Men idolatrous, according to that patched Popish Portuise their Service Book; according unto which their Sacraments, and whole Administration is performed, and not by the Rules of Christ's *Testament.* So that these poor deluded Creatures saw very well, that nothing but such a Charge, which overthrew the very being and constitution of our Churches (the Doctrine of Faith being allowed to be sound) could justifie their *Separation:* not mere promiscuous *Congregations*, nor mixt *Communions*; not defect in the *Exercise* of *Discipline*; not some *Corruptions* in the *Ministry* or *Worship*; but such gross Corruptions as took away the *Life* and *Being* of a *Church*; as they supposed *idolatrous Worship*, and an *Antichristian Ministry* to do. *If Mr.* Gifford, *saith* Barrow, *can prove the Parish Assemblies in this estate true and established Churches, then we would shew him how free we are from Schism.* The same four Reasons are insisted on as the *Grounds* of their *Separation* in the *Brownist's Apology to King James*, by *Ainsworth*, *Johnson*, and the rest of them. *Ainsworth* frames his *Argument* for *Separation* thus. *That Church which is not the true Church of* Christ *and of God, ought not, by any true Christian, to be continued, or communicated with; but must be forsaken, and separated from; and a true Church sought, and joyned unto,* &c. *But the Church of* England *is before proved, not to be the true Church of* Christ, *and of God, therefore it ought to be separated from,* &c. By which we see, the greatest *Separatists* that were then, never thought it *lawful* to *separate* from our *Churches*, if they were true. On the other side, those who opposed the *Separation*, with greatest zeal, thought nothing more was necessary for them, to disprove the *Separation*, then to prove *our Churches to be true Churches. R. Brown* (from whom the Party received their denomination) thought he had a great advantage against *Cartwright* (the *Ringleader* of the *Non-conformists*) to prove the *Necessity* of *Separation*, because he seemed to *make Discipline Essential to a Church*; and therefore since he complained of the *want* of *Discipline* here, he made *our Church* not to be a *true Church*, and consequently *that Separation was necessary.* T. C. Answers, *That Church Assemblies are builded by Faith only on* Christ *the Foundation, the which Faith so being, whatsoever is wanting of that which is commanded, or remaining of that which is forbidden, is not able to put that Assembly from the right and title of so being the Church of* Christ. *For that Faith can admit no such thing, as giveth an utter overthrow, and turning upside down of the truth.* His meaning is, wherever the *true Doctrine of Faith* is received and professed, there no *defects* or *corruptions* can overthrow the *being* of a *true Church*, or *justifie Separation* from it. *For*, he addeth, *although besides Faith in the Son of God, there be many things necessary for every Assembly; yet be they necessary to the comely and stable being, and not simply to the being of the Church. And in this respect*, saith he, *the Lutheran Churches*, (which he there calls *the Dutch Assemblies*) *which beside the maym of Discipline, which is common to our Churches, are grosly deceived in the matter of the Supper, are notwithstanding holden in the Roll of the Churches of God. Was not* Jerusalem, saith he, *after the return from* Babylon, *the City of the great King, until such time as* Nehemias *came and builded on the Walls of the City? To say therefore it is none of the Church, because it hath not received this Discipline, methinks is all one with this, as if a Man would say, It is no City, because it hath no Wall: or that it is no Vineyard, because it hath neither Hedge, nor Ditch. It is not, I grant, so sightly a City, or Vineyard, nor yet so safe against the Invasion*

Ibid.

Brownist's *Apology*, p. 7, 8, 9.

Ainsworth's Counter-poyson, p. 3.

Ib. p. 87.

T. C's *Letter to* Harrison *against Separation, in Defence of the Admonition to the followers of* Brown p. 98, 99.

Page 106.

Page 107.

sion of their several Enemies which lie in wait for them; but yet they are truly both Cities and Vineyards. And whereas *T. C.* seemed to make *Discipline essential to the Church*, his Defender saith. *He did not take Discipline there strictly for the political guiding of the Church, with respect to Censures, but as comprehending all the behaviour concerning a Church in outward Duties*, i. e. *the Duties of Pastor and People.* Page 91.

Afterwards, as often as the *Non-conformists* set themselves to disprove the *Separation*, their main business was, *to prove our Churches to be true Churches.* As in a Book entituled, *Certain Positions held and maintained by some godly Ministers of the Gospel, against those of the Separation*; which was part of that Book, afterwards published by *W. R.* and called, *A grave and modest Confutation of the Separatists.* The *Ground-work whereof*, as Mr. *Ainsworth* calls it, is thus laid.

That the Church of England *is a true Church of* Christ, *and such a one, as from which whosoever wittingly and continually separateth himself, cutteth himself off from* Christ. Counterpoyson, p. 117.

If this was *the Ground-work* of the *Non-conformists* in those days, those who live in ours, ought well to consider it, if they regard their *Salvation.*

And, for this Assertion of theirs, they bring Three *Reasons.*

1. *For that they enjoy, and join together in the use of these outward Means, which God in his Word hath ordained for the gathering of an invisible Church*; i. e. *preaching of the Gospel, and administration of the Sacraments.*

2. *For that their whole Church maketh profession of the true Faith, and hold and teach*, &c. *all Truths fundamental.* So we put their Two *Reasons* into One, because they both relate *to the profession of the true Faith*; which, say they, *is that which giveth life and being to a visible Church*; *and upon this profession we find many that have been incorporated into the visible Church, and admitted to the privileges thereof, even by the Apostles themselves. So the Church of* Pergamus, *though it did tolerate gross Corruptions in it, yet because it kept the Faith of* Christ, *was still called the Church of God.*

3. *For that all the known Churches in the world acknowledge that Church for their Sister, and give unto her the Right-hand of Fellowship.*

When *H. Jacob* undertook *Fr. Johnson* upon this Point of *Separation*, the Position he laid down was this,

That the Churches of England *are the true Churches of God.* Which he proved by this *Argument.*

Whatsoever is sufficient to make a particular Man a true Christian, and in state of Salvation; *that is sufficient to make a company of Men, so gathered together, to be a true Church.*

But the whole Doctrine, as it is publickly professed, and practised, by Law in England, *is sufficient to make a particular Man a true Christian, and in state of Salvation, and our publick Assemblies are therein gathered together.*

Therefore it is sufficient to make the publick Assemblies true Churches.

And in the defence of this Argument, against the *Reasons* and *Exceptions* of *Johnson*, that whole *Disputation is spent.* And, in latter times, the Dispute between *Ball* and *Can*, about *the necessity of Separation*, runs into this, *Whether our Church be a true Church or not*; concerning which, *Ball* thus delivers his Judgment. *True Doctrine, in the main Grounds and Articles of Faith, though mixt with Defects and Errors in other matters, not concerning the Life and Soul of Religion, and the right Administration* Ball against Can, p. 77.

stration of Sacraments for substance, though in the manner of Dispensation, some things be not so well ordered, as they might and ought, are Notes and Marks of a true and sound Church, though somewhat crased in health and soundness, by Errors in Doctrine, Corruptions in the Worship of God, and Evils in Life and Manners.

The Second Supposition which the *Non-conformists* proceeded on, was,

Sect. 11. (2.) *That the Corruptions in our Church were not such as did overthrow the being and constitution of it.*

This will best appear, by the Answers they gave to the main *Grounds* of *Separation.*

I. *That our Church was not rightly gathered at the time of our Reformation from Popery.* To which *Gifford* thus answers, *The Church of* England, *in the time of Popery, was a Member of the Universal Church, and had not the being of a Church of* Christ *from* Rome, *nor took not her beginning of being a Church, by separating her self from that* Romish *Synagogue; but having her Spirits revived, and her Eyes opened, by the light of the heavenly Word, did cast forth that tyranny of Antichrist, with his abominable Idolatry, Heresies, and false Worship, and sought to bring all her Children unto the right Faith, and true Service of God, and so is a purer, and more faithful Church than before.* Others add, *That the Laws of Christian Princes have been a means to bring Men to the outward Society of the Church, and so to make a visible Church: Neither were sufficient means wanting, in our case, for the due conviction of Mens Minds*; but then they add, *That the Question must not be, Whether the means used were the right means, for the calling and converting a People to the Faith*; *but, whether Queen* Elizabeth *took a lawful course for re-calling, and re-uniting of Her Subjects unto those true Professors, whose fellowship they had forsaken*; *which they justifie by the Examples of* Jehoshaphat, *and* Josiah, Asa, *and* Hezekiah.

Gifford's Answer to the Brownists, *p.* 55.

Grave Confutation, &c. p. 9, 10, 11.

II. *That we communicate together in a false and idolatrous Worship of God, which is polluted with reading stinted Prayers, using popish Ceremonies,* &c.

To this they answer,

1. *That it is evident by the Word, That the Church hath used, and might lawfully use, in God's Worship, and Prayer, a stinted Form of Words*; *and that not only upon ordinary, but extraordinary occasions, which requires an extraordinary and special fervency of Spirit. Nay,* they say, *They are so far from thinking them unlawful, that in the ordinary and general occasions of the Church, they are many times more fit, than those which are called conceived Prayers.*

Grave Confutation, &c. p. 12, 13, 15.

Ibid. 2. *If Forms, thus devised by Men be lawful and profitable, what sin can it be for the Governours of the Church, to command that such Forms be used*; *or, for us, that are persuaded of the lawfulness of them to use them? unless they will say, That therefore it is unlawful for us to hear the Word, receive the Sacraments, believe the Trinity, and all other Articles of Faith, because we are commanded by the Magistrates so to do*; *whereas indeed, we ought the rather to do good things, that are agreeable unto the Word, when we know them also to be commanded by the Magistrate.*

Ball *against* Can, *Part* 2. *p.* 8. 3. *It is true,* the Non-conformists say, *The Liturgy is in great part picked and culled out of the Mass-Book*; *but it followeth not thence, that either it is, or was esteemed by them a devised or false Worship*; *for many things contained in the Mass-Book it self are good and holy. A Pearl may be found upon a Dunghil*; *we cannot more credit the Man of Sin, than*

to

to say, That every thing in the Mass-Book is Deviliſh and Antichriſtian, for then it would be Antichriſtian to pray unto God in the mediation of Jeſus Chriſt, *to read the Scriptures, to profeſs many fundamental Truths neceſſary to Salvation. Our Service might be picked and culled out of the Mass-Book, and yet be free from all fault and tincture, from all ſhew and appearance of evil; though the Mass-Book it ſelf was fraught with all manner of abominations——— But if it be wholly taken out of the Mass-Book, how comes it to have thoſe things which are ſo directly contrary to the Mass, that both cannot poſſibly ſtand together? Yea, ſo many Points,* ſaith Ball, *are there taught directly contrary to the foundation of Popery, that it is not poſſible Popery ſhould ſtand, if they take place. And,* ſaith he, *it is more proper to ſay, the Mass was added to our Common-Prayer, than that our Common-Prayer was taken out of the Mass-Book; for moſt things in our Common-Prayer, were to be found in the Liturgies of the Church, long before the Mass was heard of in the world.*

4. As to the *Faſts*, and *Feaſts*, and *Ceremonies* retained, they anſwer, *That what was Antichriſtian in them, was the Doctrine upon which thoſe practices were built in the Church of* Rome, *which being taken away by the Reformation, the things themſelves are not Antichriſtian. As namely,* ſaith *Gifford, the remiſſion of Sins, and merit of eternal Life by faſting, which is the Doctrine of the Romiſh Church; the worſhip and invocation of Saints and Angels; the power of expelling Devils by the ſign of the Croſs, and ſuch like things, which the Papacy is full of, but rejected by us.* Gifford's *Plain Declaration, &c. Preface. Anſwer to the* Brownists, *p.* 10, 11.

III. *That our Miniſtry was Antichriſtian.* To this they anſwer:

1. *That Antichriſt is deſcribed in Scripture, not by his unlawful outward Calling, or Office, that he ſhould exerciſe in the Church; but,* Firſt, *by the falſe Doctrine he ſhould teach; and,* Secondly, *by the Authority he ſhould uſurp, to give Laws to Mens Conſciences, and to rule in the Hearts of Men as God. Which two Marks of* Antichriſt, *as they may evidently be diſcerned in the Papacy, ſo admit all the outward Callings and Offices in the Church of* England *exerciſed, were faulty, and unwarrantable by the Word, yet you in your own Conſcience know, that theſe Marks of* Antichriſt *cannot be found among the worſt of our Miniſters. For neither do the Laws of our Church allow any to teach falſe Doctrine; and we all profeſs* Chriſt *to be the only Law-giver to Conſcience; neither is any thing among us urged to be done, upon pain of damnation, but only the Word and Law of God.* *Mr.* Arthur Hilderſham's *Letter againſt Separation, §. 2. highly commended by Mr.* J. Cotton, *in his Preface before his Commentaries on* 4 John.

2. *That the Office, which our Laws call the Office of Prieſthood, is the very ſame in ſubſtance with the Paſtor's Office deſcribed in the Word; and the manner of outward Calling unto that Office, which the Law alloweth, is the very ſame in ſubſtance which is ſet down in the Word. Doth the Word enjoin the Miniſter to teach diligently? ſo, by our Laws, he is expreſly charged at his Ordination to do, and forbidden to teach any thing, as required of neceſſity to ſalvation, but that which he is perſuaded may be concluded and proved by the Scripture; yea, it commandeth him, with all faithful diligence, to baniſh and drive away all erroneous and ſtrange Doctrines, that are contrary to God's Word. Doth the Word authoriſe him to adminiſter the Sacraments? So doth our Law. Doth the Word require that the Miniſter ſhould not only publickly teach, but alſo overſee, and look to the Peoples Converſation, exhorting, admoniſhing, reproving, comforting them as well privately as publickly? So doth our Law. Laſtly, Doth the Word authoriſe the Miniſter to execute the Cenſures and Diſcipline of* Chriſt? *our Law doth alſo command the ſame. So that, although many,* *Id.* §. 6, 7, 8. *V.* Bradſhaw's *Anſwer to* Johnſon.

to whom the execution of these things appertain, do grievously fail in the practice thereof, yet you see the Office which the Law enjoineth to the Minister, is the same in substance, with that which the Word layeth upon him. Tell us not then, That the same name is given to our Office, as to the Popish Sacrificers. Do you think the worse of your self, because you are called Brownists? *And, shall the holy Office and Calling, which is so agreeable to the Word, be misliked, because it is called a Priesthood? considering, that though it agree in name, yet it differeth in nature and substance, as much from the Romish Priesthood, as Light doth from Darkness.*

IV. *That Discipline is wanting in our Church.* To which they answer.

Hildersham's *Letter*, §. 3. 1. *That the want or neglect of some of those Ordinances of* Christ, *which concern the Discipline of his Church, and the outward calling of his Ministers, is no such sin, as can make either the Ministers, or Governours of our Church* Antichrist, *or our Church an* Antichristian *and false Church.* And Mr. *H.* adds, *That no one place of Scripture can be found, wherein he is called an* Antichrist, *or* Antichristian, *who holding the truth of Doctrine, and professing those Articles of Religion that are fundamental, as we do, doth swerve either in Judgment or Practice, from that Rule, which* Christ hath given for the *Discipline of his Church. Neither can you find any* Antichrist *mentioned in Scripture, whose Doctrine is sound. If then the Doctrine of our Church be sound, what warrant have you to call us* Antichrists? *If our Pastors offer to lead you unto salvation, through no other door than* Christ, *how dare you, that say you are* Christ's, *refuse to be guided by them? If our Assemblies be built upon that Rock, how can you deny them to be true Churches?*

Grave Confutation, &c. p. 17. 2. *That the Substance of Discipline is preserved among us, in which they reckon preaching of the Word, and administration of Sacraments, as well as the Censures of Admonition, Suspension, Excommunication, and Provision for the necessity of the Poor; which,* say they, *by Law, ought to be in all our Assemblies, and therefore we cannot justly be said to be without the Discipline of* Christ; *but rather, that we having the Discipline of* Christ, *which is most substantial, do want the other, and so exercise it not rightly, that is to say, not by those Officers which* Christ *hath appointed.* And farther they add, *That the Laws of our Land do authorise the Minister to stay from the Lord's-Table, all such as are uncatechised, and out of Charity, or any otherwise publick offenders, as appeareth in the Rubrick before the Communion, and in that which is after Confirmation.*

Gifford's *Answer to the* Brownists, *p.* 47.

Grave Confutation, &c. p. 18. 3. *That although it were granted, That we wanted both the exercise of the Church's Censures, and some of those Officers which* Christ *hath appointed to exercise them by, yet might we be a true Church notwithstanding; as there was a true Church in* Judah *all the days of* Asa *and* Jehosaphat, *yet was not the Discipline reformed there till the latter end of* Jehoshaphat's *Reign. The Church of* Corinth *was a true Church, even when the Apostle blamed them for want of Discipline. The Congregation at* Samaria *is called a Church, before the Discipline was established there. And even in* Jerusalem *there was a famous visible Church of* Christ *long before sundry parts of the Discipline, (for want whereof they condemn us) were established there; yea, it is evident, that by the Apostles themselves, divers Churches were gathered, some good space of time, before the Discipline was settled, or exercised; by all which it is manifest, that how necessary soever those parts of the Discipline (which we want) be, to the beauty, and well-being, or preservation of the Church, yet are they not necessary to the being thereof, but a true Church may be without them.*

Acts 8. 12, 19, 31.

4. *That*

4. *That it doth not belong to private Persons to set up the Discipline of the Church, against the will and consent of the Christian Magistrate, and Governours of the Church: Nay, they declare, that in so doing, they should highly offend God. Giffard* saith, *That the Fetters and Chains can no faster bind the hands and feet of* Brownists, *than the hands of private Men are bound with the bands of Conscience, and the fear of God, from presuming to take upon them publick Authority. And if all the* Brownists *in the Land should come together, and chuse a Minister, and ordain him, it would make him no more a Minister before God, than if all the Apprentices in* London, *taking upon them to chuse a Lord Mayor, and minister an Oath unto him, should make him a Lord Mayor.* But of this, more afterwards. *Grave Confutation, &c. p. 51, 52. Giffard's Answer, p. 59, 95, 100, 101, 102.*

V. *That the Ministers of our Church stand under* (as they speak) *an Antichristian Hierarchy.* To which they answer,

First, *They deny that our Bishops can be called Antichristian, since they do, and by the Laws of the Land ought to hold and teach all Doctrines that are fundamental; yea, some of them have learnedly and soundly maintained the Truth against* Heretick*s, that have gainsay'd it; some have not only by their Doctrine and Ministry converted many to the Truth, but have suffered persecution for the Gospel.* *Grave Confutation, &c. p. 19.*

Secondly, *Supposing it were an Antichristian Yoke, which they deny; yet this doth not destroy the being of a true Church, or Ministry under it. Since both the* Jewish *and* Christian *Churches, have frequently born such a Yoke, and yet have been the true Churches of God still.*

Thirdly, *That there is nothing unlawful, or Antichristian in the Office of Bishops, if they consider them as the King's Visitors and Commissioners, to see that the Pastors do their duties. And that this cannot destroy the nature of a visible Church, to cast many particular Churches, under one Provincial, or Dioces an Government.* Yea, Mr. *Bradshaw* undertakes to prove this, not only *lawful*, but *expedient, to that degree, that he thinks the Magistrate cannot well discharge his duty, as to the Oversight and Government of the Churches within his dominions, without it*, as is implied in the seven *Quæries* he propounds to *Fr. Johnson* about it. *But supposing them to be Pastors of the Churches under them, this*, saith he, *doth not overthrow the Office of Pastors to particular Congregations, so long as under them they perform the main and substantial duties of true Pastors, which all the Ministers of our Church-Assemblies do, and by the Laws ought to do.* *Bradshaw's Answer to Johnson, p. 65. Ed. 1642. Page 49.*

These Particulars I have laid together with all possible brevity and clearness, from the *Authors* of best reputation on both sides, that we might have a distinct view of the *State* of the *Controversie* about *Separation*, between the old *Non-conformists*, and the *Separatists* of that time.

Sect. 12. But before we come to our present Times, we must consider the *alteration* that was made in the *State* of this *Controversie*, by those who were called *Independents*, and pretended to come off from the Principles of *Brownism*, or *rigid Separation.*

And here I shall give an account of the Progress of the *Course* of *Separation*, or the Steps by which it was carried on, and how it came at last to settle in the *Congregational Way*, and what the *true State* of the difference was, between the *Assembly* of *Divines*, and the *Dissenting Brethren*, and how far the *Reasons*, then used, will hold against the present *Separation.*

Stephen Offwood's *Advertisement to* John Delecluse *and* H. May, *p.* 10, 39.

When those who were called *Brownists*, for the freer exercise of their *new Church way*, withdrew into the *Low-Countries*, they immediately fell into strange Factions and Divisions among themselves, *A. D.* 1582. *Robert Brown*, accompanied with *Harrison*, a *School-Master*, and about fifty or sixty Persons, went over to *Middleburgh*, and there they chose *Harrison Pastor*, and *Brown Teacher*. They had not been there *three Months*, but upon the falling out between *Brown* and *Harrison*, *Brown* forsakes them, and returns for *England*, and subscribes, promising to the *Archbishop*, *to live obediently to his Commands*. Concerning whom, *Harrison* writes to a *Friend* in *London*, in these words, *Indeed the Lord hath made a breach among us for our sins, which hath made us unworthy to bear his great and worthy Cause. Mr.* Brown *hath cast us off, and that with open, manifest, and notable Treacheries; and if I should declare them, you could not believe me. Only this I testifie unto you, that I am well able to prove, that* Cain *dealt not so ill with his Brother* Abel, *as he hath dealt with me.* Some of the words *of* Brown's *Subscription* were these, *I do humbly submit my self to be at my Lord of* Canterbury's *Commandment, whose Authority, under Her Majesty, I will never resist, or deprave, by the Grace of God*, &c. But, being a Man of a restless and factious Temper, no Promises, or *Subscriptions* could keep him within due bounds, as one who lived at that time hath fully discovered. For, although he promised *to frequent our Churches, and to come to Prayers and Sacraments*, yet, living *School-Master* at St. *Olave*'s in *Southwark* for two years, in all that time he never did it; and when he was like to have been question'd for it, he withdrew into another Parish. Sometimes he would go *to hear Sermons*, but that he accounted *no act of Communion*; and declared to his Friends, That he thought it *not unlawful to hear our Sermons*, and therefore persuaded his Followers in *London* so to do. Notwithstanding this he *preached in private Meetings*, and that in *the time of pubick Assemblies*, when he thought fit; which this *Author*, though a *Non-conformist*, and Friend of *T. C*'s, calls a *cursed Conventicle*; who sets forth at large his *strange Jugglings*, and *Jesuitical Equivocations* in his *Subscription*. By the *Bishop*'s *Authority*, he said he meant only his *Civil Authority*; by *declaring the Church of* England *to be the Church of God*, he understood the *Church of his own setting up*; by *frequenting our Assemblies according to Law*, he meant, *the Law of God*, and not of the *Land*; he declared, *his Child was baptized according to Law*, but then told his Followers, *it was done without his consent.* Mr. *Cotton*, of *New England*, hath this Passage concerning *Brown*. *The first Inventor of that way which is called* Brownism, *from whom the Sect took its Name, fell back from his own way, to take a Parsonage called* Church, *God so, in a strange (yet wise) Providence, ordering it, that he, who had utterly renounced all the Churches in* England, *as no Church, should afterwards accept of one Parish-Church among them, and it called* A Church. But upon the Dissention at *Middleburgh*, between *Brown* and *Harrison*, that Congregation soon broke to pieces. *Ainsworth* cannot deny the early Dissentions between *Brown* and *Harrison*, *Brown* and *Barrow*, *Barrow* and *Fr. Johnson*; but he reckons up all the *differences* in *Scripture*, from *Cain* and *Abel* downwards to justifie theirs; notwithstanding, as Dr. *O.* well observes, *We are to distinguish between what falls out through the Passions of Men, and what follows from the nature of the thing.* But one of their own Party at *Amsterdam* takes notice of a *third Cause* of these *Dissentions*, viz. *the Judgment of God upon them. I do see*, saith he, *the*

Defence of the Admon. to the Followers of Brown, *p.* 127.

Page 133.

Page 135.

Page 134.

Page 140.

Page 141.

Page 138, &c.

Counterpoyson, p. 25. Cotton's *Answer to* R. Williams, *p.* 122.

Offwood's *Advertisement, p.* 15.

hand

hand of God is heavy upon them, blinding their Minds, and hardening their Hearts, that they do not see his Truth, so that they are at wars among themselves, and they are far from that true peace of God which followeth Holiness.

There were two great Signs of *this hand of God upon them.*

First, Their *invincible Obstinacy.*

Secondly, The *scandalous Breaches* which followed still one upon the other, as long as the course of *Separation* continued, and were only sometimes hindred from shewing themselves, by their not being let loose upon each other, for then the *Firebrands* soon *appear*, which at other times they endeavour to cover.

Their great *Obstinacy* appears, by the execution of *Barrow* and *Greenwood*, who being condemned for *seditious Books*, could no ways be reclaimed; rather chusing to die, than to renounce the Principles of *Separation.* But *Penry*, who suffered on the same account about that time, had more relenting in him, as to the business of *Separation.* For Mr. *J. Cotton*, of *New-England*, relates this Story of him, from the Mouth of Mr. *Hildersham*, an eminent Non-conformist, that he confessed, *He deserved death at the Queen's hand, for that he had seduced many of Her loyal Subjects to a separation, from hearing the word of Life in the Parish Churches; which though himself had learned to discover the evil of, yet he could never prevail to recover divers of Her Subjects, whom he had seduced, and therefore the Blood of their Souls was now justly required at his hands.* These are Mr. *Cotton*'s own words. Concerning *Barrow*, he reports, from Mr. *Dod*'s Mouth, that when he stood under the Gibbet, he lift up his eyes, and said, *Lord, if I be deceived, thou hast deceived me. And so being stopt by the hand of God, he was not able to proceed to speak any thing to purpose more, either to the glory of God, or edification of the People.* These Executions extremely startled the Party, and away goes *Francis Johnson* with his Company to *Amsterdam*; *Johnson* chargeth *Ainsworth* and his Party with *Anabaptism, and want of Humility and due Obedience to Government.* In short, they fell to pieces, separating from each others *Communion*; some say, *they formally excommunicated each other*; but Mr. *Cotton* will not allow that, *but*, he saith, *they only withdrew:* Yet those who were Members of the Church do say, *that Mr.* Johnson, and *his company were accursed and avoided by Mr.* Ainsworth *and his company, and Mr. A. and his company, were rejected and avoided by Mr.* Johnson *and his:* And one Church received the Persons excommunicated by the other, and so became ridiculous to Spectators, as some of themselves confessed. *Johnson*, and his Party, charged the other with *Schism in separating from them:* But, as others said, who returned to our Church, *Is it a greater Sin in them to leave the Communion of Mr.* Johnson, *than for him to refuse and avoid the communion of all true Churches beside?* But the difference went so high, that *Johnson* would admit none of *Ainsworth*'s company without *Re-baptizing* them; *Ainsworth*, on the other side, charged them with *woful Apostasie:* And one of his own company said, *That he lived and died in contentions.* When *Robinson* went from *Leyden*, on purpose to end these Differences, he complained very much of the *disorderly and tumultuous carriage of the People*; which, with Mr. *Ainsworth*'s maintenance, was an early discovery of the great excellency of *popular Church-Government.* *Smith*, who set up another *separate Congregation*, was *Johnson*'s Pupil, and went over, *in hopes*, saith Mr. *Cotton*, *to have gained his Tutor from the Errors of his rigid separation*;

Cotton's *Answer to* R. Williams, *p.* 17.

Ibid.

Clifton's *Advertisement*, p. 22, 26.

Way of Congregational Churches cleared, p. 6.

Profane Schism of the Brownists, *p.* 63.

Ib. ch. 2. *p.* 9.

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Offwood's *Advertisement*, p. 43.

Schism of the Brownists, *p.* 87.

Way of Congregational Churches, p. 7. *See* Smith's *Reasons in* Bernard *against* Brownists, *called Plain Evidences*, p. 5, 6, 7.

tion; but he was so far from that, that he soon outwent him; and he charges the other *separate Congregations* with some of the very same Faults which they had found in the *Church* of *England*, viz. (1.) *Idolatrous Worship*, for if they charged the *Church* of *England* with *Idolatry, in reading of Prayers*, he thought them equally guilty *in looking on their Bibles, in preaching and singing.* (2.) *Antichristian Government*, in adding the human Inventions of *Doctors, and ruling Elders*; *which was pulling down one Antichrist, to set up another*; *and if one was the Beast, the other was the Image of the Beast.* Being therefore unsatisfied with all Churches, he began one wholly new, and therefore baptiz'd himself.

Smith's *Ep. to the Character.*

For, he declared, *There was no one true Ordinance with the other Separatists.* But this new Church was of short continuance, for, upon his death, it dwindled away, or was swallowed up in the common Gulf of *Anabaptism.* And now one would have thought here had been an end of *Separation*; and so in all probability there had, had not Mr. *Robinson* of *Leyden* abated much of the *Rigor* of it, for he asserted, *The lawfulness of communicating with the Church of* England *in the Word and Prayer, but not in Sacraments and Discipline.* The former he defended in a *Discourse* between *Ainsworth* and him. So that the present *Separatists*, who deny that, are gone beyond him, and are fallen back to the *Principles* of the *Rigid Separation. Robinson* succeeded (though not immediately) *Jacob*, in his *Congregation* at *Leyden*, whom some make the *Father of Independency.* But from part of Mr. *Robinson*'s *Church*, it spread into *New-England*; for Mr. *Cotton* saith, *They went over thither, in their Church-State to* Plymouth; and that *Model was followed by other Churches there*; *at* Salem, Boston, Watertown, *&c.* Yet Mr. *Cotton* professeth, *That* Robinson's *denial of the Parishional Churches in* England *to be true Churches, (either by reason of their mixt corrupt matter, or for defect in their Covenant, or for excess in their Episcopal Government) was never received into any heart, from thence to infer a nullity of their Church-State.* And in his Answer to Mr. *Roger Williams*, he hath these words, *That upon due consideration he cannot find, that the Principles and Grounds of Reformation do necessarily conclude a Separation from the English Churches, as false Churches*; *from their Ministry as a false Ministry*; *from their Worship as a false Worship*; *from all their Professors as no visible Saints: Nor can I find, that they do either necessarily, or probably conclude a Separation from hearing the Word preached by godly Ministers in the Parish Churches in* England. Mr. *R. Williams* urged Mr. *Cotton* with an apparent inconsistency between these Principles and his own Practice; for although he pretended to *own the Parish Churches as true Churches*, yet by his *actual Separation from them*, he shewed that really he did not; and he adds, that *Separation* did naturally follow from the old *Puritan Principles*, saying, *That Mr.* Can *hath unanswerably proved, That the Grounds and Principles of the Puritans against Bishops and Ceremonies, and profaneness of People professing* Christ, *and the necessity of* Christ's *Flock and Disciples, must necessarily, if truly followed, lead on to, and inforce a separation.* Notwithstanding all this, Mr. *Cotton* doth assert the *lawfulness of hearing English Preachers in our Parish Churches*; but then, he saith, *there is no Church communion in hearing, but only in giving the Seals.* Mr. *Williams* urgeth, *That there is communion in Doctrine, and fellowship of the Gospel.* Upon which, Mr. *Cotton* grants, *That though a Man may join in hearing, and prayer, before and after Sermon, yet not as in a Church-state.* Yet, after all, he will not deny our *Churches* to be *true Churches.*

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R. Williams's *Answer to* Cotton's *Letter*, p. 36.

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Page 43.

Cotton's *Answer to* William's, p. 129, 132.

But, if they remain *true Churches*, it appears from the former Discourse, they can never justifie *Separation* from them, upon the *Principles* of either Party. So that though those of the *Congregational Way* seem to be more moderate, as to some of their *Principles*, than the old *rigid Separatists*; yet they do not consider, that by this means they make their *Separation* more *inexcusable*. The *Dissenting Brethren*, in their *Apologetical Narration*, to avoid the imputation of *Brownism*, deliver this as their Judgment, concerning our *Parochial Churches*. *And for our own Congregations*, viz. *of* England, *we have this sincere Profession to make before God, and all the World, that all that Conscience of the Defilements, we conceived to cleave to the true Worship of God in them, or of the unwarranted Power in Church Governours exercised therein, did never work in us any other thought, much less opinion, but that multitudes of the Assemblies, and Parochial Congregations thereof, were the true Churches and Body of* Christ, *and the Ministery thereof a true Ministery; much less did it ever enter into our hearts, to judge them Antichristian; we saw, and cannot but see, that by the same reason, the Churches abroad in* Scotland, Holland, *&c. (though more reformed) yet for their mixture, must be in like manner judged no Churches also; which, to imagine, or conceive, is, and hath ever been an horror to our thoughts. Yea, we have always professed, and that in those times when the Churches of* England *were the most, either actually overspread with defilements, or in the greatest danger thereof; and when our selves had least, yea no hopes of ever so much as visiting our own Land again in peace and safety to our Persons, that we both did and would hold communion with them as the Church of* Christ. *Apologet. Narrative, p. 5, 6.* This is a very fair Confessing from the *Dissenting Brethren*; but then the difficulty returns with greater force, *How comes Separation from these Churches to be lawful?* If they had gone upon the *Brownists Principles*, all the Dispute had been about the truth or falshood of them; but their truth being supposed, the necessity of *Separation* followed; whereas now, upon altering the *State* of the *Controversie* by the *Independents*, though their *Principles* seem more moderate, yet their *Practice* is more unreasonable. It is therefore a vain pretence used at this day, to justifie the *Separation*, that *they do not deny our Churches to be true Churches, and that therein they differ from the old Separatists:* It is true, in that opinion they do, but in *Separation* they agree, which is the more unjustifiable in them, since they yield so much to our *Churches*. And yet herein, whatever they pretend, they do not exceed their *Independent Brethren*, whose *Separation* themselves condemned. But the *Presbyterians* were then unsatisfied with this *Declaration* of the *Dissenting Brethren*, and thought it did not sufficiently clear them from the charge of *Brownism*, because, (1.) They agreed with the old *Separatists* in the main Principle of *popular Church Government, which*, they say, *is inconsistent with the civil Peace, as may be seen*, say they, *in the Quarrels both at* Amsterdam, *and* Rotterdam, *and the Law-Suits depending before the Magistrates there.* *Anatomy of Independency, p. 18, 19, 20, &c.* (2.) They overthrow the Bounds of *Parochial Churches*, as the *Separatists* did, and think such a Confinement unlawful. (3.) They make *true Saintship* the necessary Qualification of *Church Members*, as the *Separatists* did: *Whereby*, say they, *they confound the visible and invisible Church, and make the same essential form of both.* (4.) They renounce the *Ordination* received in our *Church*, but all the allowance they make of a *true Ministery*, is, by vertue of an *explicit or implicit Call*, grounded on the Peoples *explicit or implicit Covenant* with such a Man as their Pastor.

For

For when they first began to set up a *Congregational Church*, after the new Model, at *Rotterdam*, *Ward* was chosen *Pastor*, and *Bridge Teacher*; but they both renounced their *Ordination* in *England*; and some say, *They ordained one another*; others, *That they had no other Ordination, than what the Congregation gave them.*

Sect. 13. And now, new *Congregations* began to set up in *Holland*, upon these *Principles*; but they again fell into *Divisions* as great as the former. *Simpson* renouncing his *Ordination*, was admitted a *private Member* of the *Church* at *Rotterdam*; but he grew soon unsatisfied with the *Orders* of that *Church*, and thought too great a Restraint was laid upon the private Members, as to the *exercise* of *Propheſying*; and so he, and those who joyned with him, complaining of the *Mischief* of *Impositions*, were ready for a *Separation*, if that restraint were not speedily removed. Mr. *Bridge* yields to the thing, but not as to the time, viz. *On the Lord's Day after Sermon*; this gives no satisfaction, for they must have their will in every thing, or else they will never cease complaining of the *Mischief of Impositions*. And so Mr. *Simpson*, and his Party, set up a *new Church* of their own: Which *J. Goodwin* doth not deny; for *Mr.* Simpson, saith he, *upon dislike of some persons and things in that Church, whereof Mr.* Bridge *was Pastor, might seek and make a departure from it. But were these Churches quiet, after this Separation made?* So far from it, *that the contentions and slanders were no less grievous*, saith Baylie, *than those of* Amsterdam, *betwixt* Ainsworth *and* Johnson's *followers. But did not Mr.* Bridge's *Church continue in great quietness?* No, but instead of that, *they were so full of Bitterness, Reproaches, and hard Censures, that Mr.* Bridge *often declared, if he had known at first, what he met with afterwards, he would never have come amongst them, nor being amongst them, have given them such scope and liberty, as he had.* It seems at last, he came to apprehend the *necessity* of *Impositions*, and the *mischief* of a *separating dividing humor.* But the People having the *Power* in their hands, were resolved to shew, that they *held it not in vain:* for Mr. *Ward*, had it seems given Offence to some of the *Congregation, by preaching the same Sermons there, which he had preached before at* Norwich; this, and some other frivolous things, were thought intolerable *Impositions*; and therefore against the *Will* of Mr. *Bridge*, they depose Mr. *Ward* from his Ministery. This being a fresh discovery of the great inconveniency of *popular Church Government*, gave a mighty alarm to the Brethren: which occasion'd a Meeting of *the Messengers from other Churches* (as they called them) for closing up of this wound; but they durst not search deep into it, but only skinn'd it over, to prevent the great reproach and scandal of it. From these things, the *Presbyterians* inferred the necessity of *civil Authorities* interposing, and of not leaving all to *Conscience. For*, say they, *Conscience hath been long urging the taking away that Scandal occasion'd at* Rotterdam *by that Schism, where divers Members left the one Church, and joyned to the other so disorderly, wherein even the Rulers of one Church had a deep Charge; yet as that could not then be prevented, so there had been many Meetings, Sermons, and all means used to press the Conscience of taking it off, by a Re-union of the Churches, and yet the way to do it could never be found, till the Magistrates Authority and Command found it.* These things I have more fully deduced; not as though bare Dissentions in a Church were an Argument of it self against it; but, to shew (1.) That popular Church Government naturally leads to Divisions, and leaves them without Remedy;

Answer to the Antapologia, *p.* 245.

Dissuasive from the Errors of the Times, p. 76.

Anatomy of Independ. *p.* 6.

Anatomy of Independ. *p.* 49.

dy; and (2.) That humerous and factious people will always complain of the *Mischief of Impositions*, though the things be never so just and reasonable; and (3.) That this Principle of *Liberty of Conscience*, will unavoidably lead Men into *confusion:* For when Men once break the *Rules* of *Order* and *Government in a Church*, they run down the Hill, and tumble down all before them. If Men complain of the *Mischief* of our *Impositions*, the Members of their own *Churches*, may on the same grounds, complain of theirs; and as the *Presbyterians* cannot answer the *Independents*, as to the *Pretence of Conscience*; so it is impossible for either, or both of them, to answer the *Anabaptists*, who have as just a *Plea* for *Separation* from them, as they can have from the *Church* of *England.*

Sect. 14. From hence we find, that, although the Pretence of the *Dissenting Brethren* seemed very modest, as to themselves; yet they going upon a common Principle of *Liberty of Conscience*, the *Presbyterians* charged them with being the *Occasion* of that horrible Inundation of *Errors* and *Schisms*, which immediately overspread this *City* and *Nation:* which I shall briefly represent in the words of the most eminent *Presbyterians* of that time. Thence Dr. *A. Stuart*, a zealous Scotch *Presbyterian*, said, *That he verily believed*, Independency *cannot but prove the Root of all Schisms and Heresies: Yea, I add*, saith he, *That by consequence, it is much worse than Popery.* Duply *to* M.S. p. 53.

Thence the *Scotch Commissioners*, in the first place, pressed, *Uniformity in Religion, as the only means to preserve Peace, and to prevent many Divisions and Troubles; a thing very becoming the King to promote, according to the practice of the good Kings of* Judah; *and a thing which*, they say, *all sound Divines and Politicians are for.* *Arguments of the Scotch Commiss.* p. 3, 4.

Dr. Corn. Burgess *told the* House *of* Commons, *That our Church was laid waste, and exposed to confusion, under the plausible Pretence of not forcing Mens Consciences: and that, to put all Men into a course of Order and Uniformity, in God's way, is not to force the Conscience; but to set up God in his due place, and to bring all his People into the paths of righteousness and life.* *Serm.* Nov. 8. 1641.

The Errors and Innovations, under which we groaned so much of later years, saith Mr. *Case*, *were but* Tolerabiles ineptiæ, *Tolerable Trifles, Childrens Play, compared with these damnable Doctrines, Doctrines of Devils, as the Apostle calls them: Polygamy, Arbitrary Divorce, Mortality of the Soul; no Ministry, no Churches, no Ordinances, no Scripture*, &c. *And the very foundation of all these laid in such a Schism of boundless Liberty of Conscience, and such Lawless Separation of Churches*, &c. *Serm. before the Com.* Feb. 19. 1645.

The famous City of London *is become an* Amsterdam, saith Mr. *Calamy, Separation from our Churches is countenanced, Toleration is cried up, Authority asleep. It would seem a wonder, if I should reckon how many separate Congregations, or rather Segregations there are in the City; what Churches against Churches*, &c. *Hereby the hearts of the People are mightily distracted, many are hindred from Conversion, and even the Godly themselves have lost much of the Power of Godliness in their Lives. The Lord keep us*, saith he, *from being poysoned with such an Error as that of an unlimited Toleration. A Doctrine that overthroweth all Church-Government, bringeth in Confusion, and openeth a wide door unto all Irreligion and Atheism.* *Serm. before the Lord Mayor*, Jan. 14. 1645.

Serm. before the Parliament, Sept. 12. 1644.

Diversity of Religion, saith Mr. *Matthew Newcomen*, *disjoynts and distracts the Minds of Men, and is the Seminary of perpetual Hatreds, Jealousies, Seditions, Wars, if any thing in the World be*; *and in a little time, either a Schism in the State begets a Schism in the Church, or a Schism in the Church begets a Schism in the State:* i. e. *either Religion in the Church is prejudiced by civil Contentions, or Church-Controversies and Disputes about Opinions break out into civil Wars. Men will at last take up Swords and Spears in stead of Pens*; *and defend that by Arms which they cannot do by Arguments.*

These may serve for a Taste of the Sense of some of the most eminent *Presbyterian Divines* at that time, concerning the dangerous effects of that *Toleration* which their *independent Brethren* desired.

The *dissenting Brethren* finding themselves thus loaden with so many reproaches, and particularly with being the *Occasion* of so many *Errors* and *Schisms*, published their *Apologetical Narration* in *Vindication* of themselves, wherein (as is said before) they endeavour to purge themselves from the Imputation of *Brownism*; declaring, *That they looked on some of our Churches as true Churches, and our Ministery, as a true Ministery*; but yet they earnestly desire liberty, as to the *peaceable practice of their own way.*

Observations and Annotations on the Apologetical Narration, p. 17.

To this the *Presbyterians* answered,

First, That they did not understand by them, in what Sense they allowed *our Churches to be true Churches.*

Secondly, If they did, what Necessity there was for any *Separation*, or what need of *Toleration.*

As to the Sense in which they owned *our Churches to be true Churches*; *either they understood it of a bare Metaphysical Verity, as many of our Divines*, say they, *grant it to the Romish Church*; *that she is a true Church, as a rotten infectious Strumpet is a true Woman*; *and then they thank them for their Favour, that they hold our Churches in the same Category with* Rome: *or else they understand it in a moral sense for sound and pure Churches, and then*, say they, *Why do ye not joyn with us, and Communicate as Brethren? Why desire ye a Toleration? Yes*, say the *Dissenting Brethren, we own you to be true Churches, and Communicate with you in Doctrine.* To which the others reply'd, *If you own it by external Act of Communion, ye must Communicate with us in Sacraments:* but this ye refuse; therefore ye must return to the old *Principles* of *Separation.* For where there was such a refusal of *Communion*, as there was in them towards all Churches besides their own, there must lie at the bottom the same Principle of Separation which was in the *Brownists.* And, as Mr. *Newcomen urged them, their agreeing with us in Doctrines that are fundamental, their holding one Head, and one Faith, doth not excuse them from being guilty of breach of Unity, and downright Schism, as long as they hold not one Body, one Baptism. For when Men make different Assemblies, and Congregations, and draw Men into Parties, it is not their owning the same Doctrine doth excuse them from Schism, as he proves from St.* Augustin *and* Beza. Of which afterwards.

Sermon at St. Paul's, Feb. 8. 1645. p. 41.

But still they denied themselves to be *Brownists, or rigid Separatists, because they separated from our Congregations as no Churches, and from the Ordinances dispensed as Antichristians and from our People as no visible Christians.*

To

To which the other replyed; *That there was always a Difference among the Separatists themselves, some being more rigid than others*; and as to the *last Clause*, none since *Barrow had owned it*. But, for the rest, only putting *Unlawful* for *Antichristian*; and by *Ordinances*, understanding *Church-Ordinances*, they own the very same Principles as the others did. And although in words they seem to own *our Parochial Congregations to be true Churches*; yet having the same Opinions with the more moderate *Brownists*, touching *Church-Constitution*, *Matter*, *Form*, *Power*, *Government*, *Communion*, *Corruptions*, &c. *The consequence must be*, say they, *that we have no true Churches, and that our Ordinances are all unlawful*. And the less cause they have to plead for their *Separation*, *by acknowledging our Churches to be true Churches, their Separation is so much the more culpable, and the grosser and more inexcusable the Schism. For, it is a greater sin*, saith *Bayly*, *to depart from a Church, which I profess to be true, and whose Ministry I acknowledge to be saving, than from a Church which I conceive to be false, and whose Ministers I take to have no calling from God; nor any Blessing from his hand.*

Narrative of New-England, &c. Post-script, p. 52.

Bayly's Dissuasive, p. 104.

So that the *Independents* were then charged with *Schism* for these two things.

First, For *refusing Communion with those Churches*, which they confessed to *be true Churches*. For, say the *Members* of the *Assembly*, *Thus to depart from true Churches, is not to hold Communion with them as such, but rather by departing, to declare them not to be such.*

Papers for Accommod. p. 47.

Secondly, For setting up *different Congregations*, where they confessed there was *an Agreement in Doctrine.*

Sect. 15. But because some Men are so unwilling to understand the *true State* of this *Controversie* about *Separation*, between the *Divines* of the *Assembly*, and the *Independents*, I shall here give a fuller account of it from the *Debates* between them.

The desire of the *Independents*, as it was proposed by themselves at the *Committee* for *Accommodation*, Dec. 4. 1645. was this,

That they may not be forced to Communicate as Members in those Parishes where they dwell; but may have liberty to have Congregations of such Persons who give good Testimonies of their Godliness, and yet out of tenderness of Conscience, cannot Communicate in their Parishes, but do voluntarily offer themselves to joyn in such Congregations.

To which the *Divines* of the *Assembly* answered, *Decemb.* 15.

This Desire is not to be granted them, for these Reasons.

1. Because it holds out a *plain and total Separation from the Rule*; as if in nothing it were to be complied with; nor *our Churches* to be communicated with in any thing, which should argue Church-Communion. More could not be said, or done, against *false Churches.*

2. It plainly holds out, *The lawfulness of gathering Churches out of true Churches*, yea out of such *true Churches*, which are endeavouring farther to reform according to the word of God; whereof we are assured, there is not the least hint of any Example in all the Book of God.

3. This would give Countenance to *A perpetual Schism and Division in the Church*, still drawing away some from the *Churches* under the *Rule*, which also would breed many irritations among the Parties going away, and those whom they leave; and again, between the *Church* that should be forsaken, and that to which they should go.

December 23. The *Dissenting Brethren* put in their *Reply* to these *Reasons.*

To the *First Reason*, they say, (1.) *That gathering into other Congregations such, who cannot, out of tenderness of Conscience, partake as Members in their Churches, for the purer enjoyment (as to their Consciences) of all Ordinances yet still maintaining Communion with them as Churches, is far from Separation, much less a plain and total Separation. And this is not setting up Churches against Churches, but Neighbour Sister Churches of a different Judgment. For*, say they, *if the purest Churches in the World (unto our Judgment, in all other respects) should impose as a Condition of receiving the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, any one thing, that such tender Consciences cannot joyn in (as suppose kneeling in the* Act *of Receiving, which was the case of* Scotland *and* England) *if they remove from these Churches, and have Liberty from a* State *to gather into other Churches, to enjoy this and other Ordinances, this is no Separation.*

(2.) *That it is not a plain and total Separation from the Rule, unless they wholly in all things differ, by setting up altogether different Rules of Constitution, Worship and Government; but they shall practice the most of the same things; and these the most substantial, which are found in the* Rule *it self.*

(3.) *That they would maintain Occasional Communion with their Churches, not only in hearing and preachiug, but Occasionally, in Baptizing their Children in their Churches, and receiving the Lord's Supper there*, &c.

And, would not all this clear them from the *Imputation* of *Schism?* Not *agreeing in the main things?* Not *owning their Churches to be true?* Not maintaining *Occasional Communion* with them? Let us hear, what the *Divines* of the *Assembly* think of all this.

Thus they *Answer*,

First, That although *Tenderness of Conscience* may bind Men to *forbear*, or *suspend the Act of Communion* in that Particular, wherein Men conceive they cannot *hold Communion* without sin, yet it doth not bind to follow such a positive Prescript, as possibly may be divers from the Will and Counsel of God, of which kind we conceive this of *gathering separate Churches out of the true Churches*, to be one.

Secondly, It is one thing to remove to a *Congregation* which is under *the same Rule*, another to a *Congregation* of a *different Constitution* from the *Rule*; in the former case a Man retains his Membership; in the latter he renounceth his Membership upon difference of Judgment, touching the very *Constitution* of the *Churches*, from and unto which he removes.

Thirdly, If a *Church* do require that which is evil of any Member, he must forbear to do it, yet *without Separation.* They who thought *kneeling* in the *Act* of *Communion*, to be unlawful, either in *England*, or *Scotland*, did not *separate*, or renounce *Membership*, but did, some of them, with Zeal and Learning, defend *our Church* against those of the *Separation.*

Fourthly, The Notion of *Separation* is not to be measured by civil *Acts* of *State*, but by the *Word of God.*

Fifthly, To leave all *Ordinary Communion* in any Church with dislike, when Opposition or Offence offers it self, is to *separate* from such a *Church* in the Scripture Sense.

Sixthly,

Sixthly, A *total difference* from *Churches* is not necessary to make a *total Separation*; for the most *rigid Separatists* hold the same rule of *Worship*, and *Government* with our *Brethren*; and under this pretence, *Novatians*, *Donatists*, all that ever were thought to separate, might shelter themselves.

Seventhly, If they may *occasionally* exercise these *Acts* of *Communion* with us once, a second, or third time, without sin, we know no reason why it may not be ordinarily without sin; and then *Separation*, and *Church-Gathering* would have been needless. To *Separate* from those Churches ordinarily and visibly, with whom occasionally you may joyn without sin, seemeth to be a most unjust Separation.

To the Second Reason, *The Dissenting Brethren* gave the Answers.

1. *That it was founded upon this supposition, That nothing is to be tolerated which is unlawful in the Judgment of those who are to tolerate:* Which the *Divines* of the *Assembly* denied; and said, It was upon the supposition of the *unlawfulness, to tolerate gathering of Churches out of true Churches:* which they do not once endeavour to prove lawful.

2. *That if after all endeavours,* Mens Consciences *are* unsatisfied, *as to Communion with a Church, they have no Obligation lying upon them to continue in that* Communion; *or on the Churches to withold them from removing to purer Churches; or if there be none such to gather into* Churches.

To which the *Divines* of the *Assembly* replied.

I. That this opened a *Gap* for all *Sects* to challenge such a Liberty as their due.

II. This *Liberty* was denied by the *Churches* of *New-England*; and they have as just ground to deny it as they.

To the third *Reason* they answered.

First, *That the abuse of the word Schism hath done much hurt in the Churches; that the signification of it was not yet agreed upon by the State, nor debated by the Assembly.*

To which the others reply;

That if the word *Schism* had been left out, the Reason would have remained strong, *viz.* That this would give countenance to *perpetual Division* in the *Church*, still drawing away *Churches* from under the *Rule.* And to give countenance to an unjust, and causeless *Separation* from lawful *Church-Communion*, is not far from giving countenance to a *Schism*; especially when the grounds, upon which this *Separation* is desired, are such, upon which all other possible scruples, which erring Consciences may, in any other case, be subject unto, may claim the privilege of a like *Indulgence*, and so this Toleration being the first, shall indeed but lay the foundation, and open the Gap, whereat as many *Divisions* in the *Church*, as there may be Scruples in the Minds of Men, shall, upon the self-same Equity be let in.

Secondly, *This will give* Countenance *only to* Godly Peoples *joyning in other* Congregations *for their greater Edification, who cannot otherwise, without sin, enjoy all the Ordinances of* Christ; *yet so, as not condemning those Churches, they joyn not with, as false; but still preserving all Christian Communion with the Saints, as Members of the Body of* Christ, *of the Church Catholick; and joyn also with them in all duties of* Worship, *which belong to* particular Churches, so far as they are able; *and if this be called* Schism, *or* Countenance *of* Schism, *it is more than we have yet learned from Scriptures, or any approved Authors.*

To this, the *Divines* of the *Assembly* replied.

1. This desired forbearance is a perpetual *Division* in the *Church*, and a perpetual drawing away from the Churches under the *Rule*. For, upon the same pretence, those who scruple *Infant-Baptism*, may withdraw from *their Churches*, and so separate into another *Congregation*; and so in that some practice may be scrupled, and they separate again: Are these Divisions, and Sub-divisions, say they, as lawful as they may be infinite? or, must we give that respect to the Errors of Mens Consciences, as to satisfie their *Scruples*, by allowance of this liberty to them? And, doth it not plainly signifie, that Errors of Conscience is a protection against Schism?

2. The not condemning of *our Churches as false*, doth little extenuate the *Separation*; for divers of the *Brownists*, who have *totally separated* in former times, have not condemned *these Churches as false*; though they do not pronounce an affirmative Judgment against us, yet the very *separating* is a tacit and practical condemning of our *Churches*, if not *as false*, yet *as impure*, *eousq*; as that in such Administrations, they cannot be by them, as Members communicated with, without sin. And when they speak of Communion with us, as *Members* of the *Church Catholick*, it is as full a declining of *Communion* with us as *Churches*, as if we were *false Churches*.

3. We do not think differences in Judgment, in this or that Point, to be *Schism*, or that every inconformity unto every thing used or enjoined is *Schism*, so that *Communion* be preserved; or that *Separation* from *idolatrous Communion*, or *Worship*, *ex se*, unlawful, is *Schism*; but to join in *separate Congregations* of another Communion, which secession of our Members is a manifest rupture of our *Societies* into others, and is therefore a *Schism* in the *Body*; and if the Apostle do call those *Divisions* of the *Church*, wherein *Christians* did not separate into divers *formed Congregations*, of several Communion in the *Sacrament* of the *Lord*'s-*Supper Schisms*, much more may such *Separation* as this desired, be so called.

4. *Scruple* of *Conscience* is no cause of *separating*, nor doth it take off *causeless separation* from being *Schism*, which may arise from *Errors* of *Conscience*, as well as carnal and corrupt reasons; therefore we conceive the Causes of Separation must be shewn to be such *ex naturâ rei*, as will bear it out, and therefore we say, that the granting the liberty desired will give countenance to *Schism*.

5. We cannot but take it for granted, upon evidence of Reason and Experience of all Ages, that this *Separation* will be the *Mother* and *Nurse* of *Contentions*, *Strifes*, *Envyings*, *Confusions*, and so draw with it that breach of Love, which may endanger the heightning of it into formal *Schism*, even in the sense of our *Brethren*.

6. What is it that approved Authors do call *Schism*, but the breaking off *Members* from their *Churches*, which are lawfully constituted *Churches*, and from *Communion* in *Ordinances*, &c. without just and sufficient cause, *ex naturâ rei*, to justifie such secession, and to join in other Congregations of separate Communion, either because of personal Failings in the Officers, or Members of the *Congregation* from which they separate, or because of causeless scruple of their own Conscience, which hath been called setting up *altare contra altare*; for which they quote St. *Augustin* and *Cameron*.

Thus

Thus I have faithfully laid down the *State* of this *Controversie* about *Separation*, as it hath been managed in former times among us. From whence there are these things to be considered by us, which may be of some use in our following Discourse.

(1.) That all the old *Non-conformists* did think themselves bound in Conscience to communicate with the *Church* of *England*, and did look upon *Separation* from it to be sin, notwithstanding the Corruptions they supposed to be in it. This I have proved with so great evidence in the foregoing Discourse, that those who deny it, may, with the help of the same *Metaphysicks*, deny that the *Sun* shines.

(2.) That all Men were bound in Conscience towards preserving the *Union* of the *Church*, *to go as far as they were able.* This was not only asserted by the *Non-conformists*, but by the most *rigid Separatists* of former times, and by the *Dissenting Brethren* themselves. So that the *lawfulness* of *Separation*, where *Communion is lawful*, and thought so to be by the Persons who *separate*, is one of the newest Inventions of this Age; but what new Reasons they have for it, besides noise and clamour, I am yet to seek.

(3.) That bare *scruple* of *Conscience* doth not justifie *Separation*, although it may excuse *Non-communion* in the particulars which are scrupled, provided that they have used the best means for a right information.

(4.) That where *occasional Communion is lawful*, *constant Communion is a Duty.* Which follows from the *Divines* of the *Assembly* blaming *the Dissenting Brethren* for allowing the lawfulness of *occasional Communion* with our *Churches*, and yet forbearing ordinary Communion with them. For, say they, *to separate from those Churches ordinarily and visibly, with whom occasionally you may join, seemeth to be a most unjust Separation.*

(5.) That withdrawing from the *Communion* of a *true Church*, and setting up *Congregations for purer Worship*, or under *another Rule*, is *plain and down-right Separation*, as is most evident from the *Answer* of the *Divines* of the *Assembly* to the *Dissenting Brethren.*

Sect. 16. From all this it appears, that the present *practice* of *Separation* can never be justified, by the old *Non-conformists Principles*; nor by the Doctrine of the *Assembly* of *Divines.* The former is clear from undeniable Evidence, and the latter is in effect confessed by all my Adversaries. For, although they endeavour all they can, to blind the Reader's Judgment, with finding out *the disparity of some circumstances*, which was never denied; yet not one of them can deny, that it was their Judgment, *That the holding of separate Congregations for Worship, where there was an agreement in Doctrine, and the Substantials of Religion was unlawful and schismatical.* And this was the point for which I produced their Testimony in my Sermon; and it still stands good against them. For their resolution of the case, doth not depend upon the particular circumstances of that time, but upon general Reasons drawn from the Obligations to preserve *Unity* in Churches; which must have equal force at all times, although there happen a great variety, as to some circumstances. For whether the greater purity of Worship be pleaded, as to one circumstance, or another, the general case, as to Separation, is the same; whether the Scruples do relate to some Ceremonies required, or to other Impositions, as to Order and Discipline, if they be such as they pretend to, a necessity of Separation on their account, it comes at last to the same point. Was it unlawful to desire a liberty of *separate*

Baxter's *Answer*, p. 89. Dr. O. p. 50.

Congregations, as *the Dissenting Brethren* did, because of *some Scruples of Conscience in them?* and is it not equally unlawful in others, who have no more but *Scruples* of *Conscience* to plead, although they relate to different things? I will put this case as plain as possible, to prevent all subterfuges and slight evasions. Suppose five Dissenting Brethren now, should plead the necessity of having *separate Congregations*, on the account of very different *Scruples* of *Conscience*; one of them pleads, that his company scruple the *use of an imposed Liturgy*; another saith, His People do not scruple that, but they cannot bear *the Sign of the Cross, or Kneeling at the Communion*; a third saith, If all these were away, yet if their *Church* be not *rightly gather'd* and *constituted*, as to *matter* and *form*, they must have a *Congregation* of their own; a fourth goes yet farther, and saith, Let their *Congregation* be *constituted* how it will, if they allow *Infant-Baptism*, they can never join with them; nor, saith a fifth, can we, as long as you allow Preaching by *set forms*, and your Ministers stint themselves by *Hour-glasses*, and such like human Inventions: Here are now very different *Scruples of Conscience*; but doth the nature of the case vary, according to the bare difference of the *Scruples?* One Congregation scruples any kind of *Order*, as an unreasonable imposition and restraint of the *Spirit*, is *Separation* on that account *lawful?* No, say all other Parties against the *Quakers*; because their *Scruples* are *unreasonable*. But is it lawful for a *Congregation* to separate on the account of *Infant-Baptism?* No, say the *Presbyterians* and *Independents*, that is an *unreasonable Scruple*. Is it lawful for Men to separate to have greater *purity* in the frame and order of *Churches*, although they may *occasionally join* in the duties of *Worship?* No, saith the *Presbyterians*, this makes way for all manner of *Schisms* and *Divisions*, if mere *scruple* of *Conscience* be a sufficient ground for *Separation*; and if they can join *occasionally* with us, they are bound to do it *constantly*; or else the obligation to Peace and Unity in the Church signifies little: *No Man's erroneous Conscience can excuse him from Schism.* If they alledge grounds to justifie themselves, they must be such as can do it *ex naturâ rei*, and not from the mere error or mistake of *Conscience*. But, at last, the *Presbyterians* themselves come to be required to join with their Companies in Communion with the *Church* of *England*, and if they do not, either they must desire a *separate Congregation*, on the account of their Scruples, as to the *Ceremonies*, and then the former Arguments unavoidably return upon them. (For the *Church* of *England* hath as much occasion to account those *Scruples unreasonable*, as they do those of the *Independents*, *Anabaptists*, and *Quakers*) or else they declare, they can join *occasionally* in *Communion* with our Church, but yet hold it lawful to have *separate Congregations* for *greater Purity* of *Worship*; and then the obligation to *Peace and Unity* ought to have as much force on them, with respect to our *Church*, as ever they thought it ought to have on the *dissenting Brethren*, with respect to themselves. For no *disparity*, as to other *Circumstances*, can alter the nature of this Case, *viz.* That as far as Men judge *Communion lawful*, it becomes a *Duty*, and Separation a Sin, under what denomination soever the Persons pass. For the fault doth not lie in the *Circumstances*, but in the nature of the Act; because then *Separation* appears most unreasonable, when *occasional Communion* is confessed to be *lawful*. As will fully appear by the following Discourse. Those Men therefore speak most agreeably to their present practice, although least for the *honour* of the *Assembly*, who confess,

That

That they were transported with undue heats and animosities against their Brethren; which deserve to be lamented, and not to be imitated; that they are not obliged to vindicate all they said, nor to be concluded by their Determinations: that it is to be hoped, the Party is become wiser since. This is plain dealing, and giving up the *Cause* to the *dissenting Brethren*, and that in a matter wherein they happened to have the strongest reason of their side. But hereby we see, that those who justifie the *present Separation*, have forsaken the *Principles* and *Practices* of the old *Non-conformists*, as to this Point of *Separation*.

Mischief of Impositions, p. 58, 68, 69.

Letter out of the Country, p. 28.

Sect. 17. It remains now, that I shew how far they are likewise gone off from the peaceable Principles of their Predecessors, *as to private Persons undertaking to reform the Discipline of the Church, and setting up new Churches, against the consent of the Magistrate, in a reformed Church; and particularly, as to the preaching of their Ministers, when silenced by our Laws.* This I am the more obliged to do, because when I said, That I was certain, that preaching in opposition to our established Laws, is contrary to the Doctrine of all the Non-conformists of former Times, Mr. *B.* is pleased to say, *That my Assertion is so rash and false, in matters of notorious Fact, that it weakeneth his Reverence of my Judgment, in matters of Right*, I should desire no better Terms from Mr. *B.* as to the *matter of Right*, in this present Controversie, than that he would be determin'd by the plain evidence of the Fact; and if what I say be *true*, and *notoriously true*, I leave him to consider on whose side the *Rashness* lies.

Answer to my Sermon, p. 21.

Gifford makes this one principal part of *Brownism, That Churches are to be set up, and Discipline reformed, without the consent of the Christian Magistrate:* Brown *maketh many Arguments*, saith he, *to prove, that Princes are not to be stayed for, nor yet to have to do, by publick Power, to establish Religion. Which Opinion of his, is such abridging the sacred Power of Princes, and such horrible injury to the Church, contrary to the manifest Word of God, that if there were nothing else, it is enough to make him an odious and detestable Heretick, until he shew Repentance.* But to clear this matter, he distinguishes, (1.) *Of Princes that are enemies to Christianity*, as they were in the time of the *Apostles*; *to what end*, saith he, *should they, having authority from* Christ, *to establish Discipline, sue unto the Courts of such Princes, or attend their pleasure.* (2.) Of such who profess *Christianity*, but are *Idolaters*. *In this case*, he saith, *they are neither bound to forbear preaching, nor setting up Discipline if they do oppose it.* (3.) Of such *Princes*, who own the *true Doctrine of Christianity*, but the *Churches* in their Dominions are corrupt in *Discipline*. In this case he determines, *That though every Man is to take care to keep a good Conscience, yet no private Persons are to break the Unity and Peace of the Faithful, or to take upon them publick Authority to reform*; which he there proves, and concludes it to be a *wicked and dangerous Principle in the* Brownists *to hold the contrary.*

Gifford's *Answer to the* Brownists, p. 104.

In answer to this, *Barrow* saith, *That the Servants of God ought not to be stayed from doing the Commandments of God, upon any restraint, or persecution of any mortal Man whatsoever*; *and for this he quotes the example of the Apostles, who then had been guilty of the same disobedience and rebellion, if Princes had been to be stayed for, or their restraint been a sufficient let:* And adds, *That they only, according to God's Commandment, refrained from their Idolatry, and other publick Evils, and assembled together in all holy and peaceable manner, to worship the Lord our God,*

Barrow against Gifford, p. 105.

and

and to join our selves together in the Faith, unto mutual Duties, and to seek that Government which Christ *left to his Church, and for the Church to erect the same.*

To the Instance of the Apostles, Gifford had answered, *That they were furnished with an extraordinary Authority and Commission by* Christ, *to set up his Kingdom; but ye have no Commission from God, it is the Devil that hath set you forward: And will ye, in such vile and wretched manner, pretend the examples of the primitive Churches?* *Barrow* replies, *If the Commandment of God were sufficient warrant to the Apostles to do their work, though all the Princes of the world resisted, then must the Commandment of the same God, be of the same effect to all other Instruments, whom it pleaseth the Lord to use in their callings to his Service also, though all the Princes in the world should withstand and forbid the same,* By this, we see, this was a great Point in controversie between the *Brownists* and *Non-conformists.* Which will more appear by the dispute between *Fr. Johnson* and *Jacob.* For among the Points of false Doctrine, which he charges the *Non-conformists* with, whom they called the forward Preachers, these are two.

Page 70, 72.

1. *That the planting, or reforming of* Christ's *Church must tarry for the* Civil Magistrate, *and may not otherwise be brought in by the Word and Spirit of God in the Mouths of his weakest Servants, except they have Authority from earthly Princes; which Doctrine,* saith he, *is against the Kingly Power of* Christ, *and* three whole Lines of *Scripture, which he there puts together.*

2. *That it is lawful for a Minister of* Christ *to cease preaching, and to forsake his Flock, at the commandment of a Lord Bishop: Which Doctrine,* he saith, *is contrary* to two Lines of Scripture *more,* with the bare numbers of Chapter and Verse. But, lest it should be supposed, that these *two* were among those which *Jacob* saith, *he falsly laid to their charge,* we find both these Doctrines owned by the several *Non conformists,* who joined together in a *Confutation* of the *Brownists. For,* say they, *as to the Peoples power of reforming,*

Confut. of the Brown. *p. 51.*

First, *We cannot find any Warrant in Holy Scripture, for them that are private Members of any Church, to erect the Discipline, no not though the Magistrate and Ministers, who should deal in this work, were altogether profane and ungodly.*

Secondly, *We esteem our Prince to be a most Lawful and Christian Magistrate, and our Ministers to be true Ministers of* Christ, *and therefore we are justly afraid, that by enterprising a publick Reformation, not only without, but contrary to the direction and liking of them, who by God's word ought to have, if not the only, yet the principal hand in that work, we should highly offend God.*

Thirdly, *That for the want of publick Reformation, the Magistrate is every where blamed, and no where the Church, for ought we can find:* *Page 22.* *Oft are the Priests and People blamed for erecting and practising Idolatry, but never for that they plucked it not down, when their Princes had set it up; neither can we find, whether ever the Church, under a Christian Magistrate, was by any Prophet, either commanded to deal (otherwise than by persuasion) in publick Reformation, when the Magistrate neglected it, or reproved for the contrary.*

Fourthly, To the *Instance of the Apostles* they answer two things.

I. *That though they set up Church-Government without the Magistrate's leave, yet not contrary to his liking; or when he opposed his Authority directly,*

rectly, and inhibited it, they never erected the Discipline, when there was so direct an opposition made against it by the Civil Magistrates.

II. *If it could be proved, that the Apostles did so then, yet would it not follow, that we may do so now; for neither was the Heathen Magistrate altogether so much to be respected by the Church, as the Christian Magistrate is; neither have our Ministers and People now so full and absolute a power, to pull down, and set up Orders in the Church, as the Apostles (those wise Master-builders) had.*

Fifthly, As to *their Ministers preaching being silenced*, they declare,

1. *So long as the Bishops suspend, and deprive, according to the Law of the Land, we account of the Action herein, as of the Act of the Church, which we may and ought to reverence, and yield unto; if they do otherwise, we have liberty given us by the Law, to appeal from them. If it be said*, the Church is not to be obey'd when it suspends and deprives us, for such causes as we in our Consciences know to be insufficient. *We answer, That it lieth on them to depose, who may ordain; and they may shut that may open. And as he may, with a good Conscience execute a Ministery, by the Ordination and Calling of the Church, who is privy to himself of some unfitness, (if the Church will press him to it) so may he who is privy to himself, of no fault that deserveth deprivation, cease from the execution of his Ministery, when he is pressed thereunto by the Church. And if a guiltless Person, put out of his charge by the Church's Authority, may yet continue in it, what proceedings can there be against guilty Persons, who, in their own conceit, are always guiltless, or will at least pretend so to be; seeing they will be ready always to object against the Church's Judgment, That they are called of God, and may not therefore give over the execution of their Ministery at the will of Bishops?* Page 41. The Second Quære.

2. *That the case of the Apostles was very different from theirs in three respects.*

First, *They that inhibited the Apostles were known and professed enemies to the Gospel.*

Secondly, *The Apostles were charged not to teach in the Name of* Christ, *nor to publish any part of the Gospel, which Commandment might more hardly be yielded unto, than this of our Bishops, who, though they cannot endure them which teach that part of the Truth that concerneth the good Government, and Reformation of the Church, yet are they not only content that the Gospel should be preached, but are also Preachers of it themselves.*

Thirdly, *The Apostles received not their Calling and Authority from Men, nor by the hands of Men; but immediately from God himself, and therefore also might not be restrain'd or deposed by Men; whereas we, though we exercise a Function, whereof God is the Author, and we are also called of God to it, yet are we called and ordained by the hands and ministery of Men, and may therefore by the ministery of Men be also deposed, and restrained from the exercise of our Ministery.*

To this which I had referred Mr. *B.* to, he gives this Answer, *If Mr.* Rathband *hath denied this, it had been no proof.* Did I ever mention Mr. *Rathband*'s Testimony as a sufficient proof? My words are, That I was certain their Practice was contrary to the Doctrine of all the Nonconformists, as you may see in the Book published in their Name, by Mr. *Rathband.* Can any thing be plainer, than that the Book was written by the *Non-conformists*, and that Mr. *Rathband* was only the Publisher of it? This way of answering is just as if one should quote a Passage out of *Curcellæus* his *Greek Testament*, and another should reply, if *Curcellæus* Answer to Letter, p. 22.

cellæus said so, it had been no proof. Can Mr. *B.* satisfie his Mind with such Answers?

Unreasonableness of Separation, p. 89.

When *Fr. Johnson* said, *That our Ministers ought not to suffer themselves to be silenced and deposed from their publick Ministery, no not by lawful Magistrates.* Mr. *Bradshaw* answered, *This Assertion is false and seditious.* And when *Johnson saith, That the Apostles did not make their immediate Calling from God the ground of their refusal; but this, that they ought to obey God rather than Man; which is a Duty required of all Ministers and Christians.* *Bradshaw* (a Person formerly in great esteem with Mr. *Baxter*, and highly commended by the *Author* of the *Vindication* of his Dispute with *Johnson*) gives this Answer.

1. *Though the Apostles did not assign their immediate Calling from God, as the Ground of their refusal, in so many Letters and Syllables, yet that which they do assign, is by implication, and in effect the same with it. For it is as much as if they had said, God himself hath imposed this Calling upon us, and not Man; and therefore except we should rather obey Man than God, we may not forbear this Office which he hath imposed upon us. For, opposing the Obedience of God to the obedience of Man, they therein plead a Calling from God, and not from Man; otherwise, if they had received a Calling from Man, there had been incongruity in the Answer; considering, that in common sense and reason, they ought so far forth to obey Men, forbidding them to exercise a Calling, as they exercise the same by vertue of that Calling. Else, by this reason, a Minister should not cease to preach, upon the Commandment of the Church, that hath chosen him; but should be bound, to give them also the same Answer, which the Apostles gave, which were absurd. So that by this gross conceit of Mr.* Johnson, *there should be no Power in any sort of Men whosoever, to depose a Minister from his Ministery; but that notwithstanding any Commandment of Church or State, the Minister is to continue in his Ministery.*

2. *For the farther Answer of this his ignorant conceit, plainly tending to Sedition, we are to know, that though the Apostles, Prophets, and Evangelists, preached publickly, where they were not hindred by open violence; and did not, nor might not leave their Ministery upon any human Authority, or Commandment whatsoever, because they did not enter into, or exercise the same upon the will and pleasure of any Man whatsoever; yet they never erected and planted publick Churches and Ministeries in the Face of the Magistrate, whether they would or no; or in despite of them; but such, in respect of the Eye of the Magistrate, were as private and invisible as might be.*

3. *Neither were some of the Apostles only forbidden, so as others should be suffered to preach the same Gospel in their places; but the utter abolishing of Christian Religion was manifestly intended in silencing of them. But our Churches whereof we are Ministers, are no private and secret Assemblies, such as hide themselves from the Face of a persecuting Magistrate and State; but are publick, professing the Worship, and doing their Religion in the face of the Magistrate and State; yea, and by his Countenance, Authority and Protection; and we are set over those Churches, not only by a Calling of our People, but also by the Authority of the Magistrate, who hath an armed Power to hinder any publick action; who is willing also to permit and maintain other true Ministers of the Gospel, in those places where he forbiddeth some. If therefore after our publick calling, to Minister to such a known and publick Church, not by the Church only, but by the Magistrate also, the Magistrate shall have matter against us (whether just or unjust it skilleth not) and shall in that regard forbid us to Minister to our Church; I see not by what*

Warrant in God's Word, we should think our selves bound notwithstanding to exercise our Ministery still; except we should think such a Law of Ministery to lie upon us, that we should judge our selves bound to run upon the Swords point of the Magistrate; or to oppose Sword to Sword. And suppose the Magistrate should do it unjustly, and against the will of the Church, and should therein sin; yet doth not the Church in that regard cease to be a Church, nor ought she therein to resist the Will of the Magistrate; neither doth she stand bound, in regard of her affection to her Minister (how great and deserving soever) to deprive her self of the Protection of the Magistrate, by leaving her publick standing, to follow his Ministery in private, and in the dark; refusing the benefit of all other publick Ministery, which with the leave and liking of the Magistrate she may enjoy.

4. *Neither do I know what warrant any ordinary Minister hath, by God's Word, in such a case, so to draw any such Church or People to his private Ministery, that thereby they should hazard their outward state and quiet in the Common-wealth where they live; when in some competent measure they may publickly, with the grace and favour of the Magistrate, enjoy the ordinary means of Salvation by another: and (except he have a calling to Minister in some Church) he is to be content to live as a private Member, till it shall please God to reconcile the Magistrate to him, and to call him again to his own Church; labouring mean while privately, upon particular occasions offered, to strengthen and confirm in the ways of God, those People that are deprived of his publick Labour. And I take it to be the duty of the People; in such a Case, if they will approve themselves faithful Christians, and good Subjects, so to submit to the Ministery of another, as that by Prayer, and all other good, dutiful, and loyal means, they may do their best endeavour to obtain him, of whom, against their will, they have been deprived, and still to affect and love him as their Pastor: now, if the People do thus, then is that Minister called to be silent, not only by the Magistrate, but by them also, though with much grief.*

To this Testimony of Mr. *Bradshaw*, all that Mr. *B.* saith, is, *That* Bradshaw *thought, we should submit to a silencing Law, where our Ministery was unnecessary, and so doth he.* If Mr. *B.* did allow himself any time to consider what he writes, he would never have given such an Answer as this. For, Mr. *Bradshaw* never puts the case upon the *necessity*, or *no necessity* of their *preaching*, but upon the *allowance*, or *disallowance* of the *Christian Magistrate.* And if it had been resolved upon the point of *necessity*, Is it possible for Mr. *B.* to think there was *less necessity* of preaching at that time, than there is now, when himself confesseth several years since, *That thirty years ago, there were many bare reading, not preaching Ministers, for one that there is now?* And what was there, which the old Non-conformists more complained of, than *the want of a more preaching Ministery?* This then, could not be Mr. *Bradshaw*'s Reason; and Mr. *Baxter*, upon second thoughts, cannot be of that opinion.

Answer to Serm. p. 99.

Defence of the Cure of Divisions, p. 55.

I have yet one Argument more, to prove this to have been the general sense of the *Non-conformists*; which is Mr. *Sprint*'s Argument for *Conformity in the case of Deprivation*; Which is, that where two Duties do meet, a greater, and a less, whereof both cannot be done at the same time, the lesser duty must yield unto the greater; but this Doctrine of suffering Deprivation for not conforming, teacheth, and the practice thereof causeth, to neglect a greater duty for performing of a less; therefore it seemeth to be an Error in Doctrine, and a Sin in Practice. The

Cassand. Anglic. p. 2.

force of which Argument doth necessarily suppose, That Ministers, deprived by Law, are not to exercise their Ministerial Function in opposition to the Laws. And to confirm this, several *Non-conformists* undertook to answer this Argument, and to give an account of the disparity of the case as to the *Apostles* times, and ours. For Mr. *Sprint* had urged the instance of the *Apostles* to this purpose, since they submitted to *Jewish Ceremonies* rather than lose the liberty of their Ministery, they ought to yield to our *Ceremonies* on the same ground; to which they answer; Page 232. *that the Apostles had far greater reason so to do; because their Ministery was of far greater excellency, and usefulness, and therefore the Argument was of much greater weight with the Apostles, than it could be with them. For*, say they, *What one Minister of the Gospel is there, that dare be so presumptuous, as to say, That his Preaching and Ministery can be of that necessity, and use for the Glory of God, and good of his Church; as was the Ministery of his Apostles? The work whereunto the Lord called and separated the Apostles* (viz. *the planting of the Church, and the preaching the Gospel to all Nations*) *was such, as could not have been performed by any other, but the Apostles alone; but in deprivation of our Ministers that refuse conformity, there is no such danger, and of their preaching there can be no such necessity imagined; though they preach not, the Gospel is preached still, and that soundly, and fruitfully.* Did these Men think, the *Apostles Woe be unto me if I preach not the Gospel*, did reach to their case? Can Mr. *B.* imagine, that such Men thought themselves still bound to preach, although they were silenced by our Laws?

And now, I hope, I have proved that to be *evidently* true, which Mr. *B.* saith was *notoriously false*. But if after all this, Mr. *B.* will persist, in saying, *That he knew those who did otherwise*; all that I have to say to it, is, That I hope Mr. *B*'s Acquaintance, both of the one, and the other Party (if they were such, as he represents) are not to be the Standard for all the rest; for, it seems, he was not very happy in either.

The

The Unreaſonableneſs of Separation.

PART II.

Of the Nature *of the preſent* Separation.

§. 1. *The different Principles of Separation laid down. The things agreed on with reſpect to our Church.* § 2. *The largeneſs of Pariſhes a mere Colour and Pretence; ſhewed from Mr.* B's *own words.* § 3. *The Myſtery of the* Preſbyterian Separation *opened.* § 4. *The Principles of it as to the People. Of occaſional Communion, how far owned, and of what force in this matter, ſhewed from parallel Caſes.* § 5. *The reaſons for this occaſional Communion examined.* § 6. *Of the pretence of greater Edification in ſeparate Meetings, never allowed by the Separatiſts or Independents as a reaſon for Separation. No reaſon for this pretence ſhewed from Mr.* B's *words.* § 7. *The Principles of Separation as to the Miniſtry of our Churches. Of joyning with our Churches as Oratories.* § 8. *Of the Peoples judging of the worthineſs and competency of their Miniſters. Mr.* B's *Character of the People. The impertinency of this Plea as to the* London Separation. § 9. *The abſurdity of allowing this liberty to ſeparate from Mr.* B's *own words.* § 10. *The allowance he gives for Separation on the account of Conformity. What publick Worſhip may be forbidden.* § 11. *The Miniſtry of our Church charged with Uſurpation in many caſes, and Separation allowed on that account.* § 12. *Of Separation from Ithacian Prelatiſts.* § 13. *That the Schiſm doth not always lie on the Impoſers ſide, where the terms of Communion are thought ſinful.* § 14. *The Principles of the* Independent Separation, *or of thoſe who hold all Communion with our Church unlawful.* § 15. *The nature of Separation ſtated and explained.* § 16. *The charge of Separation made good againſt thoſe who hold Occaſional Communion lawful.* § 17. *The obligation to conſtant Communion, where Occaſional Communion is allowed to be lawful, at large proved.* § 18. *The Objection from our Saviour's practice anſwered.* § 19. *The text* Phil. 3. 16. *cleared from all Objections.* § 20. *A new Expoſition of that text ſhewed to be impertinent.* § 21. *The charge of Separation proved againſt thoſe who hold all Communion with us unlawful.* § 22, 23. *The miſchief brought upon the Cauſe of the Reformation by it. The teſtimonies of foreign Proteſtant Divines to that purpoſe.* § 24. *No poſſibility of Union among the Proteſtant Churches upon their grounds, which hath been much wiſhed for and deſired by the beſt Proteſtants.* § 25. *All the ancient Schiſms juſtifiable on the ſame pretences.* § 26. *There can be no end of Separation on the like grounds. Mr.* A's *Plea for Schiſm at large conſidered.* § 27. *The Obligation on Chriſtians to preſerve the Peace and Unity of the Church. The Caſes mentioned wherein Separation is allowed by the Scripture. In all others it is proved to be a great ſin.*

Sect. 1. HAVING made it my business, in the foregoing *Discourse*, to shew, how far the *present Dissenters* are gone off from the Principles of the *old Non-conformists*; I come to consider, what those *Principles* are, which they now proceed upon;

And those are of two sorts.

First, Of such as hold *partial, and occasional Communion with our Churches to be lawful, but not total and constant*, i. e. they judge it lawful at *some times* to be present in *some part* of our *Worship*, and upon particular occasions to partake of *some Acts of Communion* with us; but yet, they apprehend *greater purity and edification in separate Congregations, and when they are to chuse, they think themselves bound to chuse these*, altho' at *certain seasons* they may think it *lawful* to submit to *occasional Communion* with our *Church*, as it is now established.

Secondly, Of such as hold *any Communion with our Church to be unlawful*, because they believe *the Terms of its Communion unlawful*, for which they instance, *in the constant use of the Liturgy*; *the Aereal sign of the Cross*; *kneeling at the Communion*; *the observation of Holy-days*; *renouncing other Assemblies*; *want of Discipline in our Churches*; *and depriving the People of their Right in chusing their own Pastors.*

To proceed with all possible clearness in this matter, we must consider these three things, 1. What things are to be taken for granted by the several Parties, with respect to our *Church*. 2. Wherein they *differ* among themselves, about the nature and degrees of *Separation* from it. 3. What the true state of the present *Controversie* about *Separation* is.

I. In general, they cannot deny these *three* things.

1. That there is *no Reason* of *Separation*, because of the *Doctrine* of our *Church*.
2. That there is *no other Reason* of *Separation* because of the Terms of our Communion, than what was from the beginning of the *Reformation*.
3. That *Communion* with our Church hath been still allowed by the *Reformed Churches* abroad.

1. That there is no *Reason* of *Separation*, because of the *Doctrine* of our *Church*. This was confessed by the *Brownists*, and most *rigid Separatists*, as is proved already; and our present *Adversaries* agree herein. Dr. *Owen* saith, *We agree with our Brethren in the Faith of the Gospel*; *and we are firmly united with the main Body of Protestants in this Nation, in confession of the same Faith:* And again, *The Parties at difference do agree in all substantial Parts of Religion, and in a common Interest, as unto the preservation and defence of the Protestant Religion.* Mr. *Baxter* saith, *That they agree with us in the Doctrine of the Thirty nine Articles, as distinct from the Form of Government, and imposed Abuses.* And more fully elsewhere, *Is not the Non-conformists Doctrine the same with that of the Church of* England, *when they subscribe to it, and offer so to do? The Independents, as well as Presbyterians offer to subscribe to the Doctrine of the Thirty nine Articles, as distinct from Prelacy and Ceremony. We agree with them in the Doctrine of Faith, and the Substance of God's Worship*, saith the *Author* of the last *Answer*. And again, *we are one with the Church of* England *in all the necessary Points of Faith, and Christian Practice. We are one with the Church of* England, *as to the Substance, and all necessary Parts of God's Worship.* And even Mr. *A.* after many trifling Cavils, acknowledges,

Vindication of Non-conformists, p. 8, 9.

Page 22.

Answer to my Sermon, p. 27.

Defence of the Cure of Divisions, p. 64.

Rector of Sutton, p. 15.

Page 30.

That

That the Dissenters generally agree with that Book which is commonly called the Thirty nine Articles, which was compiled above a hundred years ago; and this Book some Men call the Church of England. I know not who those Men are, nor by what Figure they speak, who call a *Book* a *Church*; but this we all say, That the *Doctrine of the Church of England* is contained therein; and whatever the Opinions of private Persons may be, this is the *Standard* by which the *Sense* of our *Church* is to be taken: And that no objection ought to be made, against *Communion* with our *Church*, upon account of the *Doctrine* of it; but what reaches to such *Articles* as are owned and received by this *Church*. *Mischief of Imposition, Preface.*

2. That there are, in effect, no *new Terms* of *Communion* with this *Church*, but the same, which our first *Reformers* owned, and suffered *Martyrdom* for, in Q. *Mary*'s days. Not, but that some *Alterations* have been made since, but not such as do, in the Judgment of our Brethren, make the Terms of *Communion* harder than before. Mr. *Baxter* grants, that the Terms of *Lay-Communion* are rather made easier by such *Alterations*, even since the *additional Conformity*, with respect to the late Troubles. The same *Reasons* then, which would now make the *Terms* of our *Communion unlawful*, must have held against *Cranmer*, *Ridley*, &c. who laid down their Lives for the *Reformation* of this *Church*. And this the *old Non-conformists* thought a considerable Argument against *separating* from the *Communion* of our *Church*, because *it reflected much on the honour of our Martyrs*; who not only lived and died in the *Communion* of this *Church*, and in the practice of those things, which some are now most offended at, but were themselves the great Instruments in setling the *Terms* of our *Communion*. Jacob *against* Johnson, *p.* 21, 23, 29, 32, 33, 37, 40, 42, 47, 54, 63, 79, 82. Bradshaw's *Answer to* Johnson's *Third Reason.*

3. That *Communion* with our *Church* hath still been owned by the *Protestant* and *Reformed Churches* abroad. Which they have not only manifested, by receiving the *Apology* and *Articles* of our *Church* into the *Harmony* of *Confessions*, but by the *Testimony* and *Approbation* which hath been given to it by the most esteemed and learned *Writers* of those *Churches*, and by the discountenance which they have still given to *Separation* from the *Communion* of it. This Argument was often objected against the *Separatists*, by the *Non-conformists*; and *Ainsworth* attempts to answer it no less than four times in one *Book*; but the best Answer he gives, is, *That if it prove any thing, it proves more than they would have. For*, saith he, *the Reformed Churches have discerned the National Church of* England *to be a true Church*; *they have discerned the Diocesan Bishops of* England, *as well as the Parish-Priests to be true Ministers, and rejoice as well for their Sees, as for your Parishes, having joined these all alike in their Harmony.* As to the good opinion of the *Reformed Church*, and *Protestant Divines* abroad, concerning the *Constitution* and *Orders* of our Church, so much hath been proved already by Dr. *Durel*, and so little or nothing hath been said to disprove his evidence, that this ought to be taken as a thing granted; but, if occasion be given, both he and others are able to produce much more from the *Testimony* of *foreign Divines*, in justification of the *Communion* of our *Church* against all pretences of *Separation* from it. *Sect.* 2. Gifford *against* Brown. *p.* 97, 98, 100. *Counterpryson, p.* 9, 10, 27, 51, 92.

Sect. 2. We now come to the several *Hypotheses* and *Principles* of *Separation*, which are at this day among the *Dissenters* from our *Church*.

Some do seem to allow *separate Congregations* only *in such places where the Churches are not capable to receive the Inhabitants.* For this I find insisted on, by almost all my Answerers: *Some Parishes*, saith one, *cannot* *Letter out of the Country, p.* 34.

cannot receive a tenth part, some not half the People belonging to them, few can receive all. The Parochial Teacher, saith another, *is overlaid with a numerous throng of People. The Parish-Ministers are not near sufficient for so populous a City*, saith a third. And yet not one of these, but assigns such reasons, for *the necessity of separate Congregations*, as would equally hold, if there were never a *Church* in *London*, but what would hold all the *Inhabitants* together. This is therefore but a *colour*, and *pretence*, and no *real Cause*. Any one would think, by Mr. *Baxter*'s insisting so very much, *on the greatness and largeness of our Parishes, as the reason of his preaching in separate Congregations*, this were his opinion, *that such Congregations are only allowable in such vast Parishes, where they are helps to the parochial Churches:* And no Man denies, that more Places for Worship are desireable, and would be very useful, where they may be had, and the same way of Worship and Order observed in them, as in our *Parochial Churches*, where they may be under the same Inspection, and Ecclesiastical Government; where, upon pretence of greater *purity of Worship*, and *better means of Edification*, the People are not drawn into *Separation*. But, is it possible that Mr. *Baxter* should think the case alike, where the *Orders* of our *Church* are constantly neglected, the *Authority* of the *Bishops* is slighted and contemned; and such *Meetings* are kept up in affront to them, and the Laws? Would Mr. *B.* have thought this a sufficient reason for Mr. *Tombs* to have set up a *Meeting* of *Anabaptists* in *Kidderminster*, because it is *a very large Parish?* Or for *R. Williams* in *New-England* to have set up a *separate Congregation* at *Boston*, because there were but *three Churches* there, to receive all the numerous Inhabitants? If such a number of *Churches* could be built, as were suitable to the *greatness* and *extent* of *Parishes*, we should be so far from opposing it, that we should be very *thankful* to those who would accomplish so excellent a Work; but, in the mean time, is this just and reasonable, to draw away the *People*, who come to our *Churches*, under the pretence of *preaching* to those who cannot come? For, upon consideration, we shall find,

Mischief of Imposition. Preface. *Rector of Sutton, &c. p. 35.*

Answer to Let. p. 24. (1.) That this is Mr. *Baxter*'s own case. For, if we observe him, although he sometimes pretends *only to preach to some of many thousands, that cannot come into the Temples, many of which never heard a Sermon of many years*; and to this purpose he put so many Quæres to me, concerning *the largeness of Parishes, and the necessity of more Assistants*, thereby to insinuate, *That what he did, was only to preach to such, as could not come to our Churches*; yet, when he is pinch'd with the point of *Separation*, then he declares, *That his hearers are the same with ours; at least ten or twenty for one; and that he knows not many, (if any) who use to hear him, that separate from us.* If this be true, as no doubt Mr. *B.* believes it, then what such mighty *help*, or *assistance* is this to our *great Parishes?* What colour, or pretence is there from the *largeness* of them, that he should preach to the *very same Persons*, who come to our *Churches?* And if such *Meetings* as theirs be only lawful *in great Parishes, where they preach to some of many thousands who cannot come into the Churches*, then how come they to be lawful, where few or none of those *many thousands* ever come at all, but they are filled with the very same Persons, who come to our *Parish-Churches?* These two pretences then are inconsistent with each other; and one of them cannot hold. For if he doth preach *to those who come to our Churches, and scarce to any else (if any*, as Mr. *B.* supposes) then all the pretence from the *largeness of our Parishes,*

Anf. to Letter, p. 17. *Answer to Serm. p. 57.*

Parishes, and the many thousands who cannot come to our Churches, is vain and impertinent; and, to speak softly, not becoming Mr. *Baxter*'s sincerity.

(2.) That if this were Mr. *Baxter*'s own case, *viz. That he preached only to such, as could not come to our Churches*, it would be no defence of the *general practice* of *Dissenters*, who express no regard at all to the *greatness* or *smallness of Parishes*. As, if it were necessary, might be proved by an *Induction* of the particular *Congregations* within the *City*; and in the *adjacent Parishes*. Either those *separate Meetings* are *lawful* or not; if not, why doth not Mr. *Baxter* disown them? if they be, why doth he pretend the *greatness* of *Parishes* to justifie *separate Meetings*; when, if they were never so small, they would be lawful however? This therefore must be set aside, as a mere *colour* and *pretence*, which he thought plausible for himself, and invidious to us, though the bounds of our Parishes were neither of our own making, nor is it in our power to alter them. And we shall find, that Mr. *B.* doth justifie them upon other grounds, which have no relation at all to the *extent* of *Parishes*, or *capacity* of *Churches*. I come therefore to the real grounds which they proceed upon.

Sect. 3. Some do allow *Communion* with *some Parochial Churches, in some Duties, at some Seasons*; but not *with all Churches, in all Duties, or at all times*. These things must be more particularly explained, for a right understanding the *Mystery* of the *present Separation*. Which proceeds not so openly and plainly, as the *old Separation* did, but hath such artificial windings and turnings in it, that a Man thinks they are very near our *Church*, when they are at a great distance from it. If we charge them with following the *Steps* of the *old Separatists*, we utterly deny it, say they, *For they separated from your Churches as no true Churches; they disowned your Ministery and Hierarchy as Antichristian, and looked on your Worship as idolatrous*, but we do none of these things, and therefore you charge us unjustly with *Separation*. To which I answer,

(1.) There are many still, especially of the People, who pursue the Principles of the *old Separatists*; of whom Mr. *B.* hath spoken very well in his *Cure of Divisions*, and the *Defence* of it, and elsewhere. Where he complains, *of their Violence and Censoriousness; their Contempt of the gravest and wisest Pastors; and forcing others to forsake their own Judgments to comply with their humours*. And, he saith, *A sinful humouring of rash Professors, is as great a temptation to them, as a sinful compliance with the great ones of the World*. In another place he saith, *The People will not endure any Forms of Prayers among them, but they declare they would be gone from them, if they do use them*. And he doth not dissemble, that they do comply with them, in these remarkable words, *Should the Ministers in* London, *that have suffer'd so long, but use any part of the Liturgy and Scripture-Forms, though without any motive but the pleasing God, and the Church's good; what muttering and censuring would then be among them? And woe to those few Teachers that make up their Designs by cherishing these Distempers. One would think, that their warning had been fair; but*, Si nati sint ad bis perdendam Angliam; *The Lord have mercy upon us*.

Cure of Divis. p. 393.

Sacrileg. desertion, p. 102, &c.

(2.) When the matter is throughly examined, the difference between their *Teachers*, and the *old Separatists*, will be found not near so great as is pretended. For what matter is it, as to the *nature* of *Separation*, whether the *Terms* of our *Communion* be called *idolatrous*, or *unlawful*; whether the *Ministery* of our *Church* be called a *false Ministery*, or *insuf-*

ficient, scandalous, Usurpers, and *Persecutors*; whether our *Hierarchy* be called *Antichristian,* or *repugnant to the Institution of Christ.* Now these are the very same Arguments which the *old Separatists* used, only they are disguised under another appearance, and put into a more fashionable dress, as will be manifest by Particulars.

(1.) As to the *People.*

(2.) As to the *Ministry* of our *Church.*

Sect. 4. (1.) Our present Dissenters, who disown the *old Separation,* yet make the Terms of *Lay-Communion* for Persons, as *Members of our Church,* to be *unlawful.* For, Mr. *B.* in his late *Plea for Peace,* hath a whole *Chapter* of *Reasons* against *the Communion of Lay-men with our Church.* And in the same Book, he saith, *It is schismatical in a Church to deny Baptism, without the transient Sign of the Cross, or for want of Godfathers,* &c. *or to deny the Communion to such who scruple kneeling.* Now if the *Church* be *schismatical,* then those who separate in these things are not. For, saith Mr. *B. When the Laity cannot have their Children baptized without such use of the transient dedicating Image of the Cross; and such use of entitling and covenanting Godfathers, which they take to be no small sin: Is it Separation to join with Pastors that will otherwise baptize them?* We see the *Church* is *schismatical* in requiring these things, and Mr. *B.* thinks *the People bound to join with other Pastors that will not use them:* And what is this but *formal Separation? But for all this, Mr.* B. *may hold, that total renouncing of Communion with our Church may be schismatical; for,* he saith, *it may be Schism to separate from a Church that hath some schismatical Principles, Practices, and Persons, if those be not such, and so great, as to necessitate our departure from them.* But here Mr. *B.* saith, *There is a necessity of departure, and to join with other Pastors*; and therefore he must hold a *formal Separation:* And as to *the renouncing total Communion with our Church,* that was never done by the greatest *Separatist.* For they all held *Communion* in *Faith* with it: And even *Brown,* the *Head* of the *old Separatists,* thought it *lawful* to join with our *Church* in *some Acts of Worship*; and others thought they might join in *Acts* of *private* and *Christian Communion,* but not *in Acts of Church Communion*; others thought it *lawful* to join *in hearing Sermons,* and *Pulpit-Prayers,* though not in others; and yet were charged with *Separation* by the *old Non-conformists.* And if our *present Dissenters* do hold the *Terms of Communion* with our *Church* to be *unlawful,* they must hold a *necessity* of *Separation,* or that Persons may be good *Christians,* and yet be no *Members* of any *Church.* For, if it be unlawful to *communicate* as *Members of our Church,* they must either not *communicate* at all, as *Members* of any *Church,* or as *Members* of a *distinct* and *separate Church* from ours. If they declare themselves *Members* of *another Church,* they own as plain a *Separation,* as the *old Separatists* ever did; if they do not, and yet hold it *unlawful* to *communicate* with our *Churches* as *Members,* then they are *Members* of no *Church* at all. So that, if they hold the *Terms* of our *Communion unlawful*; they must either be *Separatists,* or *no good Christians* upon their own Principles. For, saith the *Author* of *the Letter out of the Country*; *this were to exchange visible Christianity, for visible (at least negative) Paganism.* Now that our *present Dissenters* do hold the *Terms of our Communion unlawful,* they are more forward to declare, than I could have imagined. In my *Sermon* I mentioned some Passages, wherein it seemed clear to me, that some considerable Persons among them *did allow Lay-communion with*

First Plea, §. 9. p. 141.

Page 45.

Answer to Serm. p. 49.

Plea for Peace, p. 47.

Letter out of the Country, &c. p. 9.

our Church to be lawful: But they have taken a great deal of pains to undeceive me; some declaring in express terms, *That they look on the terms of our Communion as unlawful, and that there is a necessity of Separation from our Parochial Churches, and of joyning to other Congregations.* And others saying, *That such a Concession,* viz. *That they hold Communion with our Churches to be lawful, taken in their own sense, will neither do them any harm, nor us any service.* For, as Mr. *A.* hath summed up the sense of these Men. 1. *Many of them declare so, and many declare otherwise,* —— *And it's as good an Argument to prove Communion unlawful, because many declare against it, as 'tis to prove it lawful, because many declare for it.* 2. *They declare Communion lawful, but, do they declare total Communion lawful? The same Persons will tell us, that both these Propositions are true, Communion is lawful, and Communion is unlawful; Communion in some parts of Worship is so, in others not: And,* 3. *They will farther tell us, That Communion with some Parish Churches is lawful, with others unlawful; that there are not the same Doctrines preached, the same Ceremonies urged, the same rigid terms of Communion in all Churches exacted. And lastly, that occasional Communion is, or may be lawful, where a stated and fixed Communion is not so; and they give this Reason for their Judgment and Practice; because to hold Communion with one Church, or sort of Christians, exclusively to all others, is contrary to their true Catholick Principles, which teach them to hold Communion, though not equally, with all tolerable Churches; and that there are some things tolerable, which are not eligible, wherein they can bear with much for Peace sake, but chuse rather to sit down ordinarily with purer Administrations.* Here we have the *Principles* of the *new Separation* laid together.

Dr. O. *Vindication, &c. p.* 35.

Mischief of Imposition, &c. p. 36.

1. Many of them *hold Communion with our Church unlawful*; and that must be understood of any *kind* of *Communion*; for the second sort, from whom they are distinguished, hold *total Communion unlawful*; and therefore this first sort must hold *Communion in any parts of Worship unlawful.* And so they exceed the more moderate *Separatists* of *Robinson*'s, and the *New-England* way; and must fall into the way of the most *rigid Separatists.*

2. Those that *do hold Communion lawful,* do it with so many *restrictions* and *limitations*, that in practice it amounts to little more than the other. For *first*; It is only with *some Churches*; and those it seems must be such, as do not hold to our *Constitution*; for he saith, *The same Ceremonies are not urged in all Churches, nor the same rigid terms of Communion exacted,* i. e. If any *Churches* among us comply with them, they can *Communicate* with them, *i. e.* if *they break their own Rules*, they can joyn with them. Is not this an admirable way of *Communicating* with our *Churches?* But, if our *Churches* hold to their *Rule*, and observe the *Orders* prescribed, then it seems they renounce all *Communion* with them as *unlawful.* And what is this but to deny *Communion* with the *Church* of *England?* For unless *Parochial Churches* depart from the *terms* of *Communion* required by it, they will have no *Communion* with them.

And Mr. *A.* delivers this, not only as his own Opinion, but as the Sense of the Party, *That if most of the Preachers in the separate Meetings were asked their Judgments, about the lawfulness of joyning with the parochial Churches in all the parts of Worship, or in any exclusive to their joyning with other Assemblies, where the Gospel Rule is more strictly observed, they would flatly deny it.* And he goes yet farther, when he saith, *That the People cannot lawfully separate from those Churches whereof they are regu-*

Mischief of Impositions, p. 65.

larly Members, and from those Pastors, under whose Ministerial Conduct their own free Election hath placed them, to joyn ordinarily and constantly with any other particular Churches. This is owning a plain and downright *Separation*, in as clear and distinct words as ever *Johnson* or *Ainsworth* did. For, 1. He makes it to be their general sense, *That it is unlawful to communicate with our Churches ordinarily and constantly*, or to be *Members* of our *Churches:* Which is the same thing which they said, 2. He owns the setting up new and distinct Churches in plain opposition to ours. For he owns *other Pastors, other People*, and a new *Relation between* these, by the *choice* of the one, and the *conduct* of the other. This is no mincing the matter, as Mr. *B.* often doth; but he speaks it boldly, and with great assurance; and ushers it in with, *I have confidence contrary to his.* I think no Man doubts of his *Confidence*, that ever looked into his Book; but in this matter he is so brisk, that he saith, *He doth not question that he should carry it by the Poll.* And is withal so indiscreet as on this occasion to triumph *in the Poll of Non-conformists at Guidhall:* as though all who gave their Votes there, had owned these Principles of *Separation*, for which, many of those Gentlemen will give him little thanks, and is a very unseasonable boasting of their Numbers.

(II.) All the difference then that seems to be left, is about the lawfulness of that which they call *occasional Communion.* As to which, these things are to be observed. (1.) That it is practised by *very few*; especially if Mr. *A*'s *Poll* be allowed. (2.) That it signifies little, as to this matter, if Men be fixed *Members* of other Churches. For the denomination of their *Communion* is to be taken from thence, and not from an *occasional* and *accidental Presence.* For *Communion* with a *Church*, is joyning with a *Church* as a *Member* of that *Church:* And it is not *occasional Presence* at *some parts of Worship*, which makes a Man a *Member* of a *Church.* I suppose there are many *occasionally Present* at Mr. *A*'s, or Mr. *B*'s *Meetings*, who renounce all *Communion* with them. A *Protestant* may be *occasionally present* at *some parts of Worship* in the *Roman Church*, and that frequently too, *to hear Sermons*, &c. but, doth this make a Man to have *Communion* with the *Church* of *Rome?* Most of our *Gentlemen* who have travelled abroad, have been thus *occasionally present* in *some parts of the Romish Worship*, at *Rome* and *Paris*; but they would think themselves hardly dealt with, to be charged to have had *Communion* with the *Church* of *Rome.* And if they be urged with it, they will plead still, *They were of the Protestant Communion*; and the Reason they will give, is, because they did not joyn with them *in all parts* of their *Worship*; not in *adoration of the Host*, or *Worship* of *Images*; and therefore they remained still of the *Protestant Communion*, although they were *occasionally present* at *some parts* of the *Popish Service.* And is it not the same case here, if Men only afford an *occasional Presence*, at *some parts of our Worship?* How comes this to make them more to have *Communion* with our *Church*, than the like presence would make them to have *Communion* with the *Roman Church?* In the beginning of Queen *Elizabeth*'s Reign, most of the *Papists* in *England* did offer an *Occasional Presence* at our *Churches*, in *some parts of our Worship*; and yet all that time were Members of the *Roman Church*, because they kept their *Priests*, and had *Mass* in private, and declared, That though they looked on our *Service* as *tolerable*, yet they thought the Roman *more eligible*; and so having *full Communion* with that, and being only *occasionally present* at our *Service*, they thought themselves good *Catholicks.* So, if Men do look on the *separate Meet-*

ings as *more eligible*, and *a better way of Worship*; with which they *constantly joyn*, and *always choose* to do it, their *occasional Presence* at our Assemblies, doth not make them *Members* of our *Churches*, but they still remain *Members* of the *separate Congregations*, if they maintain full and constant Communion with them. And none of the formed *separate Churches* will look on any one as having *Communion* with them, for being *occasionally present at some parts of their Worship*; for they say, That *Heathens* and *Indians* may have such *occasional Communion* with them; but they require from *Persons* that are admitted to *Communion* with their *Churches*, a *Submission* to *all the Rules* and *Orders* among them. The *New-England Churches* will suffer no Man to continue a *Member* of their *Communion*, that scruples *Infant Baptism*, or *refuses to be present at the Administration of it*; although he be never so willing to be *occasionally present* at all other parts of *Worship* with them. For not only *openly condemning and opposing Infant-Baptism, but going about secretly to seduce others from the approbation or use thereof, or purposely departing the Congregation at the Administration of that Ordinance*, is liable, by their *Laws*, to the *Sentence* of *Banishment*. And they have found it so necessary to twist the *Civil* and *Ecclesiastical Interests* together, that as none but *Church Members* are *Freemen* among them; so none that are *banished* can retain their *Church-Membership*. From all this, it appears, that this *new Notion* of *Occasional Communion, in some parts of Worship*, exclusively to others, is disowned by all sorts of *Churches*; and is a late fancy taken up on purpose to avoid the charge of *Separation*.

Sect. 5. But we here meet with an excellent Reason for the *lawfulness* of this *Occasional Communion* with our *Churches*; viz. *because to hold Communion with one Church exclusively to all others, is contrary to their true Catholick Principles, which teach them to hold Communion, though not equally, with all tolerable Churches*. Or as Mr. *B.* expresses it, *The benefit of Christian Love and Concord may make it best, for certain seasons, to joyn even in defective Modes of Worship, as* Christ *did in the Synagogues and Temple in his time: though the least defective must be chosen, when no such accidental Reasons sway the other way*. From whence we may take notice, (1.) That no obligation to the *Peace* and *Unity* of this Church, as they are *Members* of it, doth bring them to this *occasional Communion* with it, but a certain Romantick Fancy of *Catholick Unity*; by which these *Catholick Gentlemen* think themselves no more obliged to the *Communion* of this *Church*, than of the *Armenian* or *Abissine Churches*. Only it happens, that our *Church* is so much nearer to them, than the others are, and therefore they can afford it more *occasional Communion*. But I would suppose one of these Men of *Catholick Principles* to be at *Jerusalem*, where he might have *occasional Communion* with all sorts of the *Eastern Churches*; and some of the *Members* of those *Churches* should ask him, what *Church he is Member of?* If he should answer, he could have *occasional Communion* with all *tolerable Churches*, but was a *fixed Member* of none: Would they take such a Man for a *Christian?* What, a Christian and a *Member* of no *Church!* That, they would all agree, was no *part* of *Catholick Christianity*. And I much doubt, whether any of them would admit such a *one* to *occasional Communion*, that could not tell what *Church* he was Member of. For, as to the *Church* of *England*, he declares, *That he holds only occasional Communion with that*, as he would do with any other *tolerable Churches*. But, were they not *baptized* in this *Church*, and received into *Communion* with it as *Members* of it? if so, then if they

Sacrileg. dejertion, p. 16

Commu-

Communicate no otherwise with it, than as a *tolerable defective Church*, they must renounce their former *Membership*; for that did oblige them to *fixed* and *constant Communion* with it. And if they do renounce their *Membership* in this *Church*, their *occasional Presence at some duties of Worship* can never excuse them from Separation. We thank them, that they are pleased to account *our Churches tolerable*, but we cannot see, how in any *tolerable sense* they can be accounted *Members* of our *Church*; so that this great favour of *occasional Communion*, which they do not chuse but submit to *for some accidental reasons*, and some very good *occasions*, is not worth the speaking of among Friends; and so far from looking like *Communion*, that it hath hardly the face of a *Civility*.

(2.) That, *if the least defective way of Worship is to be chosen*, as they say, then this *occasional Communion* cannot be *lawful* above *once* or *twice* in a Man's Life: For that is sufficient to shew their *true Catholick Principles*; and Mr. *B.* saith, *When no such accidental Reasons do sway, they are to choose the least defective way of Worship*; or as Mr. *A.* speaks, *To sit down ordinarily with purer Administrations.* If then a Man be bound, *out of love to his Soul, to prefer the best way of Worship*, and he judges the *way of the separate Congregations* to be *such*, there will arise a difficult case of Conscience, concerning the *lawfulness* of this *occasional Communion.* For the same *Reasons*, which moved him to prefer one *Communion* above the other, will likewise induce him to think himself bound to adhere *constantly* to the one, and to forsake the other. And why should a Man, that is acquainted with *purer Administrations*, give so much countenance to a *defective way of Worship*, and have any Communion with a Church which *walks so disorderly*, and contrary to the Rules of the Gospel; and *not reprove her rather*, by a total forbearance of her *Communion?* And why should not those general Rules of *approving the things that are more excellent*, and *holding fast that which is good, and not forsaking the Assembling themselves together*, persuade such a Man, that it is not *lawful* to leave the *best Communion*, merely to shew, what *defective, and tolerable Church he can communicate with?* Which is, as if a Man should forsake his *Muskmelons*, to let others see what *Pumpions* he can swallow; or to leave wholesome Diet to feed on *Mushroms*, and *Trash.*

(3.) That here are no bounds set to the *Peoples Fancies* of *purer Administrations*, and *less defective ways of Worship.* So that there can be no *stop* to *Separation* in this way. Suppose some think our *Churches tolerable*, and Mr. *B*'s or Mr. *A*'s *Meetings more eligible*; but after a while, when the first relish is over, they afford *occasional Communion* to the *Anabaptists* or *Quakers*, and then think their way *more eligible*, and the other *only tolerable*; are not these Men bound to forsake them, for the same Reasons, by which they were first moved to leave our *Communion*, and joyn with them, unless they be secure, that the absolute perfection of their way of Worship is so glaringly visible to all Mankind, that it is impossible for them, either to find or fancy any defect in it? Mr. *Baxter* once very well said, *Separation will ruin the separated Churches themselves at last; it will admit of no consistency. Parties will arise in the separated Churches, and separate again from them, till they are dissolved.* Why might not *R. Williams* of *New-England* (mention'd by Mr. *B.*) proceed in his course of *Separation* from the *Church* of *Salem*, because he thought he had found out a *purer and less defective way of Worship than theirs*; as well as they might withdraw from our *Churches* on the like pretence?

Defence of the Cure of Divis. Introd. p. 50.

Ibid. p. 170.

pretence? Why might he not go on still refining of *Churches*, till at last he dissolved his Society, and declared, *That every one should have liberty to worship God according to the light of his own Conscience?* By which remarkable Instance, we see, that this Principle, when pursued, will carry Men at last to the dissolution of all Churches.

Sect. 6. This I had objected to Mr. *B.* in my *Letter*, that upon his Principles the *People* might leave him to morrow, and go to Dr. *O.* and leave *him* next week, and go to the Anabaptists, and from *them* to the Quakers. To which Mr. *B.* answers; *What harm will it do me or them, if any hearers go from me, as you say, to Dr.* O. None, that I know. For, as Dr. *O.* saith, *Since your practice is one and the same, your Principles must be so also, although you chuse several ways of expressing them.* But, did the whole force of my Argument lie there? Did I not mention *their going from him to the Anabaptists and Quakers*, upon the very same ground? And, is this a good way of answering, to dissemble the main force of an Argument, that something may seem to be said to it? I suppose Mr. *B*'s great haste made him leave the best part of the Argument behind him. But I desire him calmly to weigh and consider it better; whether he doth think it reasonable to suppose, that since the *Peace* and *Unity* of the *Church* is a thing of such great importance, and *Separation so mischievous* (as he hath represented it) that the *Peoples* apprehension of a *less defective way of Worship*, shall be sufficient ground for them to break a Church in pieces, and to run into ways of *Separation?* Hath not Mr. *Baxter* represented (and no Man better) *the Ignorance, Injudiciousness, Pride, Conceitedness, and Unpeaceableness of the ordinary sort of zealous Professors of Religion?* And after all this, must they, upon a conceit of *purer Administrations, and less defective ways of worship*, be at liberty to rend and tear a Church into pieces; and run from one *separate Congregation* to another, till they have run themselves out of breath, and left the best parts of their Religion behind them? How fully hath Mr. *B.* set forth the *ungovernable and factious Humour of this sort of People*, and the pernicious *consequences of complying with them?* and must the Reins be laid in their Necks, that they may run whither they please? *Because, forsooth, they know better, what is good for their Souls, than the King doth; and they love their Souls better than the King doth; and the King cannot bind them to hurt, or famish, or endanger their Souls.* But why must the *King* bear all the blame, if Mens Souls be not provided for according to their own wishes? Doth the *King* pretend to do any thing in this matter, but according to the *established Laws* and *Orders* of this *Church?* Why did he not keep to the good old Phrase of *King and Parliament?* And why did he not put it as it ought to have been, that they know what makes better for their own *Edification*, than the *Wisdom* of the whole *Nation* in *Parliament*, and the *Governours* of this *Church* do? and let them make what *Laws* and *Orders* they will, if the *People*, even *the rash and injudicious Professors*, as Mr. *B.* calls them, do think other means of *Edification* better, and other *ways* of *Worship less defective*, they are bound to break through all Laws, and to *run* into *Separation.* And, how is it possible, upon these Terms, to have any *Peace*, or *Order*, or any *established Church?* I do not remember that any of the *old Separatists*, no not *Barrow*, or *Johnson*, did ever lay down such loose Principles of *Separation*, as these are. The *Brownists* declare, in their Apology, *That none are to separate for Faults and Corruptions, which may, and will fall out among Men, even in true constituted Churches, but*

Answ. p. 23.

Dr. O. Vindicat. p. 20.

Christian Directory, Part 3. p. 739, 741.

Sacrileg. desert. p. 102, &c.

Cure of Divis. p. 393.

Answer to my Letter, p. 23.

Apology of the Brownists, n. 36.

by

by due order to seek the redress thereof. Where a *Church* is *rightly constituted*, here is no allowance of *Separation* for *Defects and Corruptions of Men*, although they might apprehend *Smith* or *Jacob* to be more *edifying Preachers*, than either *Johnson* or *Ainsworth*. The ground of *Separation* with them, was the want of a *right constituted Church*; if that were once supposed, other *Defects* were never till now thought to be
Chap. 13. good grounds of *Separation*. In the *Platform* of the *Discipline* of *New-England*, it is said, *That Church-Members may not depart from the Church as they please, nor without just and weighty cause, because such departure tends to the dissolution of the Body.*

Those just Reasons are,

1. *If a Man cannot continue without sin.*

2. *In case of persecution.*

Not one word of *better means of Edification.* For the *Independents* have wisely taken care to secure their *Members* to their own *Congregations*, and not suffer them to wander abroad upon such pretences, lest such liberty should break them into disorder and confusion. So in their *De-*
Order of Congregational Churches, n. 28. *claration* at the *Savoy*, they say, *That Persons joined in Church-fellowship, ought not lightly, or without just cause, to withdraw themselves from the Communion of the Church, whereunto they are joined.*

And they reckon up those which they allow for *just causes.*

1. *Where any Person cannot continue in any Church without his sin*, and that in three cases.

First, *Want of Ordinances.*

Secondly, *Being deprived of due Privileges.*

Thirdly, *Being compelled to any thing in practice, not warranted by the word.*

2. *In case of persecution.*

3. *Upon the account of conveniency of habitation.*

And in these cases, the Church or Officers are to be consulted, and then they may peaceably depart from the Communion of the Church. No allowance here made of *forsaking a Church*, merely for *greater means of edification.* And how just soever the reason were, they are civilly to take leave of the Church, and her Officers, and to tell them why they de-
Irenic. c. 22. part. And Mr. *Burroughs* condemns it, *as the direct way to bring in all kind of disorder and confusion into the Church.* Yet this is now the main support of the *present Separation*; and mere necessity hath driven them to it, for either they must own the Principles of the *old Separatists*, which they are unwilling to do, or find out others to serve their turn; but they are such, as no Man, who hath any regard to the *Peace* and *Unity* of the *Church*, can ever think fit to maintain, since they apparently tend to nothing but *disorder* and *confusion*, as Mr. *Burroughs* truly observed. But what ground is there to suppose so much *greater*
Answer to Letter, p. 18. *means of edification* in the *separate Congregations?* since Mr. *B.* is pleased to give this *Testimony* to the *preaching* in our *Parish-Churches*; *That, for his part, he hath seldom heard any, but very good, well studied Sermons, in the Parish-Churches in London, where he hath been; but most of them are more fitted to well bred Scholars, or judicious Hearers, than to such as need more practical Subjects, and a more plain, familiar, easie method.* Is this the truth of the case indeed? then, for all that I can see, the *King* is excused from all blame in this matter, unless it be a fault to provide too well for them. And, is this a *good ground* for *Separation*, that the *preaching* is *too good* for the *People?* Some Men may want

Causes

Causes to defend, but at this rate they can never want Arguments. Yet, methinks, the same Men should not complain of *starving, and famishing Souls*, when the only fault is, that the Meat is *too good*, and *too well dressed* for them. And on the other side, hath not Mr. *B.* complained publickly of *the weakness and injudiciousness* of *too many of the Non-conformist Preachers? and that he really fears, lest mere Non-conformists have brought some into reputation as conscientious, who, by weak preaching, will lose the reputation of being judicious, more than their silence lost it.* And again, *But verily the injudiciousness of too many is for a lamentation.* To which he adds, *But the grand calamity is, that the most injudicious are usually the most confident and self-conceited, and none so commonly give way to their ignorant Zeal, to censure, backbite and reproach others, as those that know not what they talk of.* Let now any Reader judge, whether upon the stating of the case by Mr. *B.* himself, their having *better means of edification*, can be the ground of leaving *our Churches*, to go to *separate Congregations*, unless *injudiciousness, and self-conceited confidence and an ignorant Zeal* may perhaps be more edifying to some capacities, and to some purposes, than *judicious and well-studied Sermons.* *Sacrileg. desert. p. 86*

This Argument must therefore be quitted, and they who will defend the *present Separation*, must return to the *old Principles* of the *Separatists*, if they will justifie their own *practices*. And so I find Mr. *B.* is forced to do; for discerning that the pretence of *greater edification* would not hold of it self, he adds more weight to it, and that comes home to the business, *viz. That the People doubt of the Calling of the obtruded Men.* This is indeed an Argument for *Separation*, and the very same, which *Barrow*, and *Greenwood*, and *Johnson*, and *Smith*, and *Can* used. Now we are come to the old Point of defending the *Calling of our Ministry*, but we are mistaken, if we think they now manage it after the same manner. We do not hear so much the old Terms of a *False and Antichristian Ministry*; but if they do substitute others in their room, as effectual to make a *Separation*, but less fit to justifie it, the difference will not appear to be at all to their advantage. *Answ. p. 18.*

Sect. 7. 2. I come therefore to consider the *Principles* of our *new Separatists, as to the Ministry of our Church*, and to discover, how little they differ from the *old Separatists*, when this matter is throughly enquired into, as to the Argument for *Separation.*

1. In general, they declare, *That they only look on those as true Churches, which have such Pastors whom they approve. How oft have I told you,* saith Mr. *B. that I distinguish, and take those for true Churches, that have true Pastors. But I take those for no true Churches, that have,* *Answer to my Sermon, p. 63.*

1. *Men uncapable of the Pastoral Office.*
2. *Or not truly called to it.*
3. *Or that deny themselves to have the power essential to a Pastor.*

And one or other of these he thinks most, if not all the *Parochial Churches* in *England* fall under.

You will say then, Mr. *B. is a Rigid Separatist*; *and thinks it not lawful to join with any of our Parochial Congregations, but this is contradicted by his own practice.*

There lies therefore a farther subtilty in this matter, for he declares in the same place, *he can join with them* notwithstanding. But how? *as true Churches, though he saith they are not:* No, but as *Chappels and Oratories, although they be not Churches, as wanting an essential part.* This will bring the matter to a very good pass, the *Parish-Churches* of

England shall only be *Chappels of Ease* to those of the *Non-conformists*. This, I confess, is a Subtilty beyond the reach of the old *Brownists*, and *Non-conformists*, for they both took it for granted, that there was sufficient ground for *Separation, if our Churches were not true Churches*, and the proof of that depended on the *Truth* of our *Ministry*. Now, saith Mr. *B. Although our Parochial Congregations be not true Churches, because they want an essential part*, viz. *a true Ministry, yet he can join with them occasionally, as Chappels or Oratories.* From whence it appears, that he accounts not our *Parochial-Churches as true Churches*, nor doth communicate with them *as such*, but only looks on them as *publick Places of Prayer*, to which a Man may resort upon occasion, without owning any relation to the *Minister*, or looking on the *Congregation* as a *Church*. For, where he speaks more fully, he declares, That he looks *on none as true Churches, but such as have the power of the Keys within themselves, and hath a Bishop or Pastor over them with that Power, and any parochial Church* that hath such a one, and owns it self to be *independent*, he allows to be *a true Church*, and none else. So that unless our *Parochial-Churches, and Ministers* assume to themselves *Episcopal Power*, in opposition to the present *Constitution* of our *Church*, as he apprehends, he at once discards them all from being *true Churches:* But I shall afterwards discover his mistake as to the *nature* of our *Parochial Churches*; that which I only insist on now is, That he looks on none of them as *truly constituted Churches*, or, as he calls it, *of the political organized Form*, as wanting *an essential part*, viz. a *true Pastor*. From hence it necessarily follows, either that Mr. *B.* communicates with *no true Church at all*; or it must be *a separate Church*; or, if he thinks himself bound to be *a Member of a true Church*, he must proceed to as great a *Separation* as the old *Brownists* did, by setting up *new Churches*, in opposition to ours. It is no sufficient Answer in this case, to say, *That Mr.* B. *doth it not*, for we are only to shew, what he is obliged to do by vertue of his *own Principles*, which tend to as much *Separation*, as was practised in former Times, and hath been so often condemned by Mr. *B.*

Sacrileg. desert. p. 34. *True way of Concord, Ch.* 10.

Sect. 8. II. Suppose they should allow *our Parochial Churches* in their *Constitution* to be *true Churches*, yet the *Exceptions* they make against the *Ministers* of our *Churches* are so many, that they scarce allow any, from whom they may not *lawfully separate.*

1. If the People judge their *Ministers unworthy*, or *incompetent*, they allow them liberty to *withdraw*, and to *separate* from them. This I shall prove from many Passages in several *Books* of Mr. *B.* and others.

First, They leave it in the *Peoples power*, notwithstanding all legal Establishments, *to own or disown whom they judg fit.* Mr. *B.* speaks his Mind very freely against the *Rights* and *Patronage*, and the *Power* of *Magistrates* in these cases, and pleads for the unalterable *Rights* of *the People*, as the old *Separatists* did. *God*, saith Mr. *B. in Nature and Scripture, hath given the People that consenting power, antecedent to the Prince's determination, which none can take from them.* Mr. *A.* saith, *Every particular Church has an inherent right to chuse its own Pastors.* D. O. makes *the depriving the People of this Right, one of his grounds of Separation.* So that although our Ministers have been long in possession of their Places, yet *if the People have not owned them*, they are at liberty *to chuse whom they please. How many hundred Congregations*, saith Mr. *B. have Incumbents, whom the People never consented to, but take them for their hinderers and burden!* So many hundred *Congregations* it seems are in readiness for *Separation.*

Answ. p. 15, 50. *Plea for Peace*, p. 55. Brownists *Apology*, Sect. 23. *Mischief of Imposition. Preface. Dr. O's Vindic.* p. 36. *Answ.* p. 50.

Secondly,

Secondly, The *People* are made *Judges* of the *worthiness* and *competency* of their *Ministers*. This follows from the former. *In case incompetent Pastors be set over the People*, saith Mr. *B. though it be half the Parishes in a Kingdom, or only the tenth part, it is no Schism*, saith he, *but a Duty, for those that are destitute, to get the best supply they can*, i. e. to *chuse* those whom they judge more *competent*; *and it is no Schism, but a Duty, for faithful Ministers, though forbidden by Superiors, to perform their Office to such People that desire it.* This is plain-dealing. But suppose the *Magistrate* should *cast* out some, and *put in others*; *in that case* he saith, *If they be Men of untried and suspected parts of fidelity*, (of which the People are to be Judges) the *Princes imposition doth not make such true Pastors of the Church before, or without the Peoples consent, nor doth it always bind the People to consent, and to forsake their former Pastors, nor prove them Schismaticks, because they do it not.* *Plea for Peace, p. 83.*

Thirdly, They give particular *Directions* to the *People*, what sort of *Ministers* they should *own*, and what not. Mr. *B.* bids *the People not think that he is persuading them to make no difference*; but after he had set aside the *utterly insufficient*, and the *heretical*, (of which the People are admirable Judges) he lays down this general Rule, *Any one whose Ministry is such, as tendeth to destruction more than to edification, and to do more harm than good, is not to be owned.* And if not to be *owned* so, then he is to be *separated* from; and although he *adviseth* the *People to lay aside partiality and passion*; yet whether they will or not, they are left *sole Judges* in this matter. And that we may not think all this to be only a *Romantick* Scheme, or Fiction, he tells us elsewhere, *That they are not able to confute the People, in too many places, who tell them, that their publick Priests are so defective in their necessary Qualifications for their Office, as that they hold it unlawful to own such for true Ministers, and to encourage them by their presence, or commit the care of their Souls to such*, i. e. in plain Terms, they are encouraged to *Separation* on this account, which is directly contrary to the Principles of the *old Non-conformists*, as appears at large by Mr. *Ball*, *If*, saith he, *Can's meaning be, that it is not lawful to communicate in the Worship of God with Ministers not fitly qualified, disorderly called, or carelesly executing their Office and Function, then it is directly contrary to the word of Truth, sound Reason, and consent of all the Learned.* With much more to that purpose. And even Mr. *B.* himself, when he takes upon him, as a *Casuist*, to determine these things, doth then declare his Mind. *Cure of Divisions, Direct. 36.* *Sacrileg. desert. p. 10.* Ball *against* Can, *p. 1, 4, 5, &c.* *Pag. 15, 42, 56.* *Tryal of New Church way, p. 11.* *Christian Directory, Part 3. p. 747.*

1. *That a Minister's personal Faults do not allow People to separate from the Worship of God.*
2. *Nor all ministerial Faults, but only those that prove him or his Ministration utterly intolerable.*

But now, if Mr. *B.* may be believed, *the People need not be told, how great a number of Cases there are among us, where the Ministers are uncapable of the ministerial Office, and therefore it is no sin in them to judge him no Minister*, and, consequently, to *separate* from him. Hath not Mr. *B.* fully set forth the *Pride, Ignorance, Censoriousness, Headiness, Rashness*, of *raw and injudicious Zealots?* and after all this, is it fit or reasonable, that the Opinion of such Persons be taken, concerning the Qualifications of their *Ministers?* Hath not Mr. *B.* complained with more than ordinary resentment, *that they are ready to scorn, and vilifie the gravest wisest Pastors?* And, must such Mens Judgments be taken, concerning the *Abilities* and *Competency* of their *Ministers?* Either Mr. *B.* *Answ. p. 50.* *Cure of Divis. p. 393.*

hath extremely *wronged* them in the *Characters* he hath given of such *People*; or he hath taken away all the reputation of their Judgment in such Cases: When *they scorn and contemn the gravest wisest Pastors*, are they fit to judge of *Ministerial Abilities? But there are graver and wiser among the People.* Suppose that; but doth not Mr. *B.* say, *That the rawest and rashest Professors are commonly the most violent and censorious?* These are the bold and forward Men, that will judge in spite of the rest; these are the Men *that need not be told, what numbers of uncapable Ministers there are among us.* And it doth not become Mr. *B.*'s *Gravity* or *Wisdom* to hearken to all the *Censures* and *malicious Reports* of such *ignorant and heady Zealots*, (as he calls them) about the *unworthiness* or *incapacity* of their Ministers. Are they only *the grave and wise Pastors* among themselves, which are scorned by such Men? It is possible, that those may be *grave* and *wise* among us too, whom they censure for *incompetent* Men; or must the same *People* which are *raw* and *injudicious, ignorant and censorious, proud and self-conceited*, when they make their Judgment of them, be of a sudden turned into *grave and wise Men*, when they pass their Judgment upon the *Abilities* and *Fitness* of our *Preachers?* This doth not look like fair and equal dealing. I pray let our Ministers have a fair hearing, and let the matter be well examined, before the *People* be thus encouraged to *separate* from their *Ministers* for their *Disabilities*, or *Unworthiness*. But suppose there be too great a number of *young, raw, injudicious Preachers*, as Mr. *B.* saith, *no* Answ. p. 54. *Man can deny, that knoweth* England, *and hath any modesty.* Is there no way, but *to your Tents, O Israel?* Will nothing but *Separation* serve your turn? Is this the way to mend the matter, and to make them *grave and wise?* Doth not Mr. *B.* confess, *That they have too many such among themselves?* Must they *separate* from them too? What endless confusions do such Principles tend to? But the bottom of all is, this *Separation* must be justified one way or other; and such Principles found out, which may seem to do it. Yet, after all, what is this to the present case of *Separation* in this *City?* for here the charge was laid, and to this the *Answer* must be given, or it is to no purpose. Is it any reason, that near half of some *Parishes* in *London*, should separate from their *grave and wise Pastors*, such as I know some to be, where this case is; because in *Cornwal*, or *Yorkshire*, or *Northumberland*, there are *many raw and injudicious, besides scandalous Priests*, as Mr. *B.* speaks? We urge you particularly with the *London Separation*, you tell us what the People say of the *Insufficiency* and *Unworthiness* of the *Clergy* in other Parts of *England*; suppose it true, what is all this to the business? If you persist in this way, we can name the Parishes to you in *London*, where the *Ministers* are Men of unexceptionable Learning and Piety; where the *Churches* are large enough to receive the *People* that *separate*; as well as those that come, and yet they forsake the *Church's Communion*, and adhere to the *separate Congregations:* Tell us plainly in this case, is this *Separation lawful* or not? If it be *lawful*, to what purpose do you make use of so many shifts and evasions, as to *great Parishes, and insufficient and scandalous Priests, in other parts of the Nation?* Answer to the case proposed, and to the place where the *charge* was laid, and think not to escape by such apparent evasions, and impertinencies as these. If you think such a *Separation unlawful*, then why do you pretend to confute my *Sermon*, which was designed purposely against it?

Sect. 9. But while you plead for this liberty of the *Peoples separating* upon their *Judgment* of their *Ministers Abilities and Fitness*, you can never secure them from *Separation* from any *Church* or *Ministers* whatsoever. And no setled Church in the World could ever subsist long, without infinite disorder and confusion, if this were allow'd. For Mr. *B.* thinks them uncapable of the *Ministerial Office* in the *Peoples* Judgment.

1. *Who have not tolerable Ministerial Knowledge, or Utterance.* *Answ. p. 50.*
2. *Who are Heretical.*
3. *Who malignantly oppose serious Religion as Hypocrisie, or a needless thing.*
4. *Who by their wicked Lives do more hurt than they do good. From such,* saith he, *St.* Paul *bids them turn away.*

And of all these things the *People* are to be *Judges*, and so may *separate*, (1.) When they are unsatisfied about *the Ministerial Knowledge, or Utterance of their Ministers.* As for their *Utterance*, we may allow them to be Judges of that; but I never heard before, that St. *Paul* did bid People *turn away* from their *Ministers*, if their *Utterance* were not thought to be *tolerable.* For he intimates, that some complained of *his* Utterance, and had him in contempt for it. But as to *Abilities* and *Knowledge fit for Ministers*, are not the *People* admirable Judges? How few, how very few, even of those of the People who pretend most to *Knowledge* in *Religion*, have any tolerable understanding of the *true Principles*, and *right notion* of it? I do not speak only of *Artificers* and *Tradesmen*, but of those of better education, who either by Prejudices, or want of due application of their Minds to such things, are subject to great Mistakes about *Religion*, and yet may be very good Men: If such as these are so unfit to judge of *Ministerial Knowledge*, and the *Doctrines* of *Religion*, what shall we say to the common sort of *raw and injudicious Professors of Religion?* Mr. *B.*'s experience in the World is not so little, as not to know and be sensible of the truth of this, among the *People* most apt to divide and separate. Is it not then a strange thing he should thus subject the Judgment of *Ministerial Knowledge* to such a *company* of *Triers* as these? But suppose they do allow their *Ministers* to pass for Men of tolerable *Abilities*, and reasonable *good Utterance*, there is a harder Task yet behind, and that is, to approve themselves to the *People*, to be *Sound and Orthodox:* For, saith Mr. *B.* (2.) *If they be Heretical*, they may, without sin, separate from them. But how shall a Man escape being thought *Heretical* by the *People*, if they have a mind to make him so, *i. e.* if he crosseth their humour, and delivers such Doctrine as doth not please them, for that is generally their *Standard* for *Heresie?* And they cannot well have any other, unless you will suppose all the People to be learned Divines, and every Man obliged to read and understand *Epiphanius* and *Binius*, and then perhaps they may be competent *Judges* of *Heresie*, and come at last to be even with the *Divines* for having been their Judges so long in that matter. Let us now suppose a Person of great value and esteem among them for his other *Ministerial Abilities*, should happen to be thought *unsound* in the Point of *Justification*, and to draw too near to the *Papists* in it! and this not only be said by the *common People*, but they are abetted and encouraged in it, by the greatest part of their *Teachers*, who tell them, this is a *fundamental Point*, *Articulus stantis & cadentis Ecclesiæ*; *that they had as good give up the Cause of Reformation, as yield in that matter*, as some have

have said; I would fain know in this Case, whether upon Mr. *B.*'s Principles, the *People* are not bound to *separate* from such a Man, notwithstanding his other *Abilities?*

The like may happen as to many other *Doctrines*, which the *People* are as incompetent *Judges* of, as they are in this matter. Let us yet suppose that such a Man may pass for *sound in the main* among the *People*; what shall we say to him, if under pretence of *curing Divisions* he exposes good People, and lays open with great freedom and plainness their *factious*, *turbulent*, *censorious*, *ungovernable* humor; not omitting their *Injudiciousness*, but forgetting all the while that these same *injudicious People* (with all their other faults) were once his *Electors*, and are still his *Judges*; suppose, that he tells the World, *That for their Ignorance, Injudiciousness, Pride and Self-conceitedness, they are their grief and their shame; that they are endanger'd by Divisions, principally because the self-conceited part of the religious People will not be ruled by their Pastors; that it is they that tempt the Papists to use Fire and Faggot that will not be ruled, nor kept in concord by the wisest, and holiest, and most self-denying Ministers upon earth.* Notwithstanding all these very kind words of themselves, do not we think such *People* would call all this *reviling*, and *reproaching the People of God*, and say, That such Men *do malignantly oppose serious Godliness as Hypocrisie*; and let their Lives be what they will, *they do more hurt than good*; and therefore by Mr. *B.*'s own Rules, they are bound to separate from the *wisest*, *the holiest*, *the most self-denying Ministers upon earth.* Which I think is sufficient for the present to shew the mischievous consequence of putting so great a power of Judgment, and *Separation* upon it, into the hands of the People.

Sect. 10. But this is not all the encouragement to *Separation*, which is given to the *People*, by their power of *judging*, and *withdrawing* from their *Ministers*, for,

2. They insinuate, That the *whole Body of the conforming Clergy* is *guilty* of such *Faults*, as the *People may lawfully separate* from them, as will appear by these Particulars.

First, They make *Conformity* it self to be a *very scandalous thing*, and then tell the People over and over, *It is no sin to separate from scandalous Priests*; especially when the *Scandal is notorious*, as it is in this case, Mr. *B.* goes about to prove this by many Arguments, when he writes in the Name of the *Party*; now let us see what Judgment they pass upon *Conformity*. In one place he saith, *That the love of Peace, and the fear of frightning any farther from Parish-Communion than I desire*, (as though such Suggestions did not do it enough) *do oblige me to forbear so much as to describe or name the additional Conformity*; *and that sin which Non-conformists fear, and fly from, which maketh it harder to us that desire it to draw many good People to Communion with the Conformists than it was of old.* No doubt of it, if you give such broad intimations as these are, what a horrible scandalous sin *Conformity* is. Nay, he maketh it an *inexcusable sin*, when he saith, in the Preface to his *Plea*, *That more like truth hath been said for the lawfulness of Anabaptistry, Poligamy, Drunkenness, Stealing, and Lying, in case of necessity, than any thing he ever yet read of all that he hath there described*, i. e. full *Conformity*. He chargeth us down-right with *Lying*, and by consequence, with *Perjury*, and tells me of *thirty tremendous Aggravations of the sin of Conformity*, among which are *Lying and Perjury*, and not only that, *but drawing on our selves the guilt of many thousand Perjuries*, (by declaring,

Plea for Peace, p. 108.

Sacrileg. desert. p. 43.

Answer to Serm. p. 46. *Plea for Peace*, p. 220, 223, 226, 339.

claring, That the *Covenant* doth not oblige.) But I do not question, if Mr. *B.* pleased, he could find out *forty* or *fifty* as *tremendous Aggravations* of the *sin of Separation.* For never did any Man lay more load than he, upon whatever he opposes, without considering how it may fall upon himself at last; and how easie it is to return such heaps of *Aggravations.* And it was well said by one of Mr. *B.*'s *Adversaries* concerning him, *That be the Controversie what it will, he can make his Adversary differ with him about the existence of God and Christ, a Heaven and Hell.* Which I have found too true, by my experience in this case, for without any colour or pretence in the World that I know of, but only by declaring against *Separation*, he tells me, *That he is so far past doubt, on the other side, as that he thinks I overthrow all Religion, and set up Man in rebellion against God.* But the worst is, that he would make me say, which I never said or thought, *That all publick Worship is sinful, when forbidden*; and then on he runs with a mighty torrent, *Daniel may go to the Lions*; *the Martyrs, Fathers, Counsels, the universal Church are all foolisher than the meanest of his Auditors.* I wonder he did not give me *thirty tremendous Aggravations* of *Atheism* and *Hobbism.* For he doth in effect charge me with them; for it follows, *It's strange that he can be sure, God's Word is true, and yet be so sure, that Mens Laws are above it, and may suspend it.* Did I ever in my Life say the least thing tending that way? I abhor and detest such *Principles*, as set *Man's Laws above God's.* And when I gave him the *State* of the *Controversie* about *Separation*, I supposed *an Agreement in all the Substantials of Religion, between the dissenting Parties and our Church.* How then could he possibly infer from hence, that I set *Man's Laws above God's?* The Question is not, whether *all publick Worship be sinful, when forbidden?* but whether in a Nation professing *true Religion*, some *publick Worship* may not be *forbidden?* If not, then an universal, unlimited Toleration of *Turks, Jews, Papists, Socinians, Ranters*, &c. must follow. If *some* may be *forbidden*, then another Question follows, *viz.* Whether such *publick Worship*, as may have an evil in it, antecedent to that *Prohibition*, may not be forbidden? *viz.* such as tends to *Idolatry, Sedition, Schism*, &c. and if this be allowed, then it comes to this at last, whether such *Meetings* are guilty of any of these *faults*, and if they be, whether the *Magistrate*, so judging, may not justly forbid them? And this is the utmost that matter can be driven to; which I here mention, to let the Reader understand, what little cause there is to dread Mr. *B.*'s *thirty Aggravations of the sin of Conformity*; which are built on as slight grounds as this heavy charge against me; for the sake of which I shall hardly ever dread his *Aggravations* more. But the sting of these *Aggravations* follows. *If the People think, (though they should mistake) that all the Conformists are guilty of the like, can you wonder, if they prefer less guilty Pastors to trust the conduct of their Souls with?* Now the true *Reason* of *Separation* is come out at last. Our *Conformity* is a *horrible scandalous sin* with them, and therefore they must chuse *better Pastors.* Is not this just the old *Brownists* Argument? *The Ministery of the Church of* England *is a corrupt and sinful Ministery, and therefore we must not communicate with them, but chuse more honest and faithful Guides:* But let me ask Mr. *B.* supposing all this to be true, Is it *lawful* to communicate with *Conformists* or not? If it be not *lawful*, then he condemns his own practice, and takes away *occasional Communion*; if it be lawful, how comes *Separation* to be *lawful*, since that is never *lawful*, but when it is *necessary?* as it will be proved afterwards.

Answer to Sacrileg. desertion, p. 13.

Answ. p. 19.

Answ. p. 50.

Sect. 11. 2. They make most of the *present Ministers of the Church of England* to be *Usurpers*; and from such they say, they may *lawfully separate. Is it Separation*, saith Mr. *B. to refuse Pastors that are Usurpers, and have no true Power over them?* But who are these *Usurpers* among us, since we have a *legal Establishment*, and we thought *Law* and *Usurpation* contrary to each other? But notwithstanding *Law*, it is determin'd,

Answ. p. 49.

First, All that come into the *places of ejected Ministers* are *Usurpers*, at least to as many of the *People*, as do not *consent* to their coming in: *How prove you*, saith Mr. *B. that the relation of the ejected* London-*Ministers and their Flocks, was dissolved, and that the succeeders, were true Pastors to the Non-consenting Flock? When faithful Pastors*, saith he in *his Plea*, (written in the name of the Party, *and by consent*, *as* he saith, *of many of his Acquaintance*) *are in possession, if a lawful Magistrate cast them out, and put others in their places, of untried or suspected Parts or Fidelity.*

Answ. p. 54.

Plea for Peace, p. 55. Answ. p. 44.

I. *The Prince's Imposition maketh not such true Pastors of that Church, before, or without the Peoples consent.*

II. *Nor will it always bind the People to consent, and to forsake their former Pastors, nor prove them Schismaticks, because they do it not.*

The bottom of all this, is, they are *Usurpers*, to whom the People do not *consent* in any particular Parish, although the whole Nation in *Parliament* consented to the passing of a *Law* for removal of some *Pastors*, and putting in of others. And what dangerous consequences there may be of such Principles as these, I leave others to judge. For upon these grounds, when *Salomon* deprived *Abiathar*, and put *Zadock* in his room, any part of the People might have pleaded, *They never consented to* Zadok's *coming in, and therefore he was their High-Priest still*; *let* Salomon *do what he would*; *he could not dissolve the relation between them*, without *their own consent.* For the Question is not, whether *Abiathar* did not deserve to be put out, but to whom it belonged to do it, whether to the *King*, or the *People?* And whether any part of the *People* might still own that *relation* which he had before to them, without palpable *disobedience* and *contempt* of *Autority?* Especially if the *People* had given their *own consent*, and the thing had been done not only by *Salomon*, but by the *States* of *Israel*, as it was in our case. They who discern not the ill consequences of such Assertions as to our *Government*, have very little insight into Affairs. For it follows, that a small part of the People may disown the *publick Acts of Parliament*, and *chuse* other *Governours* to themselves, in opposition to those established by *Law*; and why they should not do it, upon an equal pretence in other cases, I do not understand. For there is no more colour for the *Peoples* resuming their *right*, especially a *small part* against the whole, in one case then in the other. Which makes we wonder at those who dare call them *Usurpers*, who enjoy their places by the same *Laws*, that any Men do enjoy their Estates. And they who assert, That the *People* are bound, notwithstanding the *Laws*, to *adhere* to their former *Pastors*, *as* Mr. *A.* doth, who saith, *They judge it their unquestionable duty to abide in that relation to their ejected Pastors*, do not only assert a *power* in a handful of *People* to act against *established Laws*, passed by general consent in *Parliament*, but overthrow the settlement of our *Church* upon the *Reformation.* For, the *Papists* then had the very same *Plea*, that these Men have now, *viz.*

1 *Kings*, 2. 35.

Mischief of Impositions, Preface.

That

That the Magistrate could not dissolve the relation between their former Church Guides and them; and therefore notwithstanding Acts of Parliament, they were still bound to adhere to them. For the Magistrate had no power in such matters, and the real Schism was to withdraw from those Guides; just as Mr. *A.* speaks concerning *the ejected Ministers.* So much do these Men, in pursuing the Interests of their Parties, overthrow the *Principles* of the *Reformation.* For either the *Magistrate* hath a *Power* to *silence* some *Ministers*, and to put others in their places, or he hath none: if he hath none, then, what becomes of the *Justice* of the *Reformation*, when the *Popish Bishops* and *Priests* were ejected, and others put into their places? If they say, *He hath a just power in some cases, but not in theirs.* Is not this a *Plea* common to all? For whoever thought themselves *justly ejected?* Or that they did any thing which deserved so severe a punishment? What then is to be done in this case, if Men think themselves unjustly cast out? The old *Non-conformists* said, *They ought to sit down quietly, with this satisfaction, that there were others to preach the word of God soundly, although they did not.* They might by joining in their private Capacities in *Communion* with our *Churches*, and drawing the People to it by their example and encouragement, have done more good both to the *People*, and to this *Church*, than I fear their *publick preaching* in opposition to the *Laws* hath done to either. But if they go upon such *principles* as these, *That the Magistrate had no rightful power to eject them, that others are Usurpers who come in their places, that the People are still bound to own them in their former relation notwithstanding the Laws; and that 'tis Schism to separate from them*, notwithstanding that they confess *the true Religion is maintained and preached in our publick Assemblies*, I leave it to others to determine how consistent such Principles are with the *submission* Men owe to *Government*, or that *peaceable behaviour* which becometh Christians. This I the rather insist upon, because I find not only Mr. *B.* and Mr. *A.* asserting it, but that it is made the *standing Plea* for the *necessity* of the *present Separation*, among those who do not hold all *Communion* with our *Churches unlawful.* So the latest of my *Answerers makes a Question, Whether they can be said to erect new Churches, or proceed to the forming of separate Congregations, who were true Ministers, and had their Congregations before others came into their places? If they had done nothing worthy of ejection, or exclusion from their Ministry, whether they have not still a right to exercise their Function. And consequently, whether others may not as justly be said to draw away their People from them, as they are charged with the same practice?* There is not one word in all this *Plea* but might have equally served the *Papists* in the *beginning* of the *Reformation.* For the Law signifies nothing with them in any case where themselves are concerned, if Ministers be ejected without or against Law, they who come into their places are no Usurpers; and if they are cast out by Law, they that succeed them are Usurpers; so that the Law is always the least thing in their consideration.

Rector of Sutton, &c. p. 26.

Secondly, All those who come into any *Pastoral Charge*, whether *Bishops* by virtue of the *King*'s *Nomination*, or others by the *Presentation* of *Patrons*, are *Usurpers*, unless the *People* be pleased to give their *free consent*; and if they do it not, they may *lawfully withdraw* from them. *For*, saith Mr. *B. the People have an antecedent Right to consent, which none can take from them.* And he saith, *he hath proved it by many Canons, that he was no Bishop, that was not chosen by the Clergy and*

Plea, p. 55. Answ. p. 9.

the People; *or came in without the Peoples consent.* Nay, if they have the consent of *some*, and not of the greater part, those who did not consent, may proceed to choose *another Bishop*, if Mr. *B.* say true. For these are his words. *If a Diocess have a Thousand or* 600, *or* 300 *Parish Pastors, and a Hundred thousand or a Million of People (or* 50000 *or* 20000, *as ye will suppose) and if only a dozen or* 20 *Presbyters, and a thousand People (or none) chuse the Bishop, this is not the Election or Consent of the Diocesan Church*; *nor is it Schism for twenty thousand to go against the Votes of two thousand.* Therefore if they have so much the advantage in *polling*, as Mr. *A.* suggests, there is nothing hinders them, but that in spite of Laws, they may proceed to the choice of *new Bishops*, and *new Pastors* of *Churches*, wherever they think they can make the *Majority.* For this is *an inherent and unalterable right in the People*, say they, *to choose their own Pastors.* Again, saith Mr. *B.* in the name of the Party in his Plea, *If Bishops that have no better a Foundation*, i. e. that come in by the King's Nomination, and not by the Majority of the People, *shall impose inferior Pastors or Presbyters on the Parish Churches, and command the Peoples acceptance and obedience*, i. e. if they give them Institution upon a Patron's presentation, *the People are not bound to accept and obey them by any Authority that is in that command as such*; *nor is it Schism to disobey it, no more than it is Treason to reject the Usurper of a Kingdom.* It is plain then, all *Bishops* of the *King*'s *Nomination*, all *Ministers* presented by *Patrons* are mere *Usurpers:* the *People* may give them a good *Title* if they please; but they are not to blame if they do it not. *For in them*, Mr. *B.* saith, *the chief Power is*, and sometimes he tells them, *they are bound to separate*; however, *while they do not consent, they are no Churches, which they are set over*; *and it is no Schism so to pronounce them*; *nor to deny them Communion proper to a Church.* Is not this an excellent *Plea for Peace*; and the *true and only way of Concord*, which lays the foundation for all imaginable Disorders and Confusions, only that they might have some pretence for their present *Separation?*

Plea, p. 81, 82. *Ibid.* *Answ.* p. 49. *Plea*, p. 82.

Sect. 12. 3. Suppose the Bishops and Clergy have gained the consent (*implicit* at least) of the People, and so are no *Usurpers*, yet if they be *Persecutors*, or *Ithacian Prelatists*, i. e. if they either act towards, or approve of the *silencing Non-conformists*, the *People* may *Separate* from them. When Mr. *B.* wrote the *Defence* of his *Book*, called, *The Cure of Divisions*, to satisfie the *People* who were much displeased with him for it; one of the material Questions, he asks about his Book, is, *Is there a word to persuade you to Communion with Persecutors?* As though that had been an unpardonable Crime. In the *Plea* he saith, *If any Excommunicate persons for not complying with them in sin*, i. e. Conformity, *but also prosecute them with Mulcts, Imprisonments, Banishments, or other Prosecution, to force them to transgress, this were yet more heinously aggravated Schism: and therefore it is no sin to separate from such.* And how easily Men are drawn in to the guilt of this *persecution*, appears by the example he makes of me, for although I expressly set aside *the case of Ministers*, and declared, *I intended only to speak of Lay-communion*; yet he charges me *with engaging my self in the silencing design.* And by such consequences, all that speak against *Separation* may be separated from, as *Prosecutors*, and *Ithacian Prelatists.*

Preface to Defence of his Cure, p. 9. *Plea*, p. 42. *Answ.* p. 61.

Sect.

Sect. 13. 4. As long as they suppose *the terms of our Communion to be sinful*, they say, *the Schism doth not lye on those that separate, but on those that do impose such terms*; and therefore they may *lawfully separate* from such *imposers*. This is the most *colourable Plea* hath been yet used by them. But in this case, we must distinguish between *terms of Communion* plainly and *in themselves sinful*; and such which are only *fancied* to be so through *prejudice*, or *wilful Ignorance*, or *Error of Conscience*. That there is a real distinction between these two, is evident; and that it ought to be considered in this case, appears from hence, that else there can be no *sinful Separation* under an *erroneous Conscience*. As suppose some Men should think that *Preaching by an Hour-glass, and much more praying by one, was a stinting of the Spirit in point of Time, as praying by a Form was in point of words; and all Men should be required to begin the publick Worship at such an Hour, and so end at such an Hour*; *time* being a *necessary circumstance*, our Brethren grant, that the *Magistrate* or *Church* may *lawfully* determine it. Here is then *a lawful Imposition*; and yet the *Quakers* may *really judge it to be sinful*; and declare they cannot communicate unless this *sinful Imposition* be removed; for it is against their *Consciences* to have *the Spirit limited to any certain time?* on whose side doth the *Schism* lie in this case? Not *on the Imposers*, because they grant such an *imposition lawful*; therefore it must lie on those that *separate*, although they judge *such terms of Communion sinful*. If therefore the determination of other things not forbidden be really as much in the *Magistrates* and *Churches Power*, as the necessary *circumstances of time and place*, &c. then Mens apprehending such *terms of Communion to be sinful* will not hinder the *guilt* of *Separation* from *lying* on their side, and not on the *imposers*. Because it is to be supposed, that where there is no *plain prohibition*, Men may with ordinary care and judgment, satisfie themselves of the *lawfulness* of things required. As for instance, when the *Church* of *Rome* imposeth the *Worship* of *Images*, we have the *plain prohibition* of the *Second Commandment* to prove that it is really a *sinful Condition of Communion*; but when our *Church* requireth the *constant use of a Liturgy*, and *Ceremonies*, which are now pleaded as *sinful Conditions of Communion*, where is the *prohibition? In the same Second Commandment* say some. I desire them to read it over to me. They do so. Where, say I, are the words that forbid a *Liturgy*, or *Ceremonies? I am mistaken*, they tell me, *it is not in the words, but in the sense*. I ask, how we should come by the sense, but from the words? *Yes*, they say, *there are certain Rules for interpreting the Commandments*. Are they *divine* or *human?* Where are they to be found? What are those *Rules? One*, they say, is, *that where any thing is forbidden, something is commanded*. So say I, there is here a Command to worship God without an Image. What is there more? *Yes*, say they, (1.) *That we must not worship God with our own Inventions*; *now Liturgies and Ceremonies are Mens Inventions*. But, I say, no *Inventions are condemned* in the *Worship* of *God*, but such as *God* himself hath *somewhere forbidden*; but he hath no where forbidden these. And *human Inventions* are forbidden in this *Commandment* in the *Worship* of *God*; but then (1.) They are such *inventions* which go about to *represent God*, and so to disparage him; and no other *inventions* are to be understood, than the *Reason* of the *Law* doth extend to, *i. e.* not such which are consistent with the spiritual and invisible Nature of God. (2.) They are not such as do relate to the *manner* or *form* of *Worship*, supposing the *Worship* it self be performed in a way *agreeable* to the *divine Nature* and

Plea, p. 42.

Law. For otherwise all use of Mens Inventions, as to *preaching*, or *reading*, or *interpreting Scripture*, would be forbidden. And then this *Interpretation* of the *Second Commandment* would be *unlawful*, because it is a *mere Invention of Men*; as much as *Liturgies*, or *Ceremonies*.

By this we see, what *stretching* and *forcing* of *Scripture* there must be, to make *Liturgies* or *Ceremonies unlawful terms* of *Communion*; and that Men must first blind and fetter their Minds by certain *prejudices* of *Education*, or *Reading* only one sort of *Books*, and taking some things for granted which they ought not, before they can esteem the *terms of Communion* required by our *Church* to be *sinful:* and therefore the *Schism* doth not lye on the *Imposers* side, but upon those who suffer themselves first to be so easily deluded, and then separate from our *Church* upon it. But there is another plain instance in this case, wherein our *Brethren* themselves will not allow the *Schism* to lie on the *imposers side*; and that is of those who deny the *lawfulness* of *Infant-baptism*. Many of whom pretend to do it with as much *sincerity* and *impartiality*, as any of our *Brethren* can deny the *lawfulness* of *Liturgy* or *Ceremonies:* if they break *Communion* rather than allow what they judge to be *sinful*, on whose side doth the *Schism* lie, on theirs that require the allowance of it, as a *condition* of *Communion*, or not? If on the *Imposer*'s *side*, they must condemn themselves, who blame the *Anabaptists* for their *Separation*. And so did *Fr. Johnson*, and so did the *New-England Churches*. From whence it appears, that they do all agree, that where Men through *mistake* do judge those to be *sinful terms of Communion* which are not, the guilt of *Schism* doth not lie *on the Imposer's side*, but on those that *separate*. Therefore, this matter of *Schism* cannot be ended by the *Plea* of *Conscience* judging the *conditions to be sinful*, but by evident and convincing Proofs that they are so; but till these are brought forth, which never yet were, or ever will be, they must bear the *blame* of the *Schism*, if they *separate* on these accounts.

Thus I have faithfully represented the *Principles* of those who allow *occasional Presence* in our *Churches*, rather than *Communion* with them; which I have discover'd to be of that Nature, as leads Men to the greatest *Separation*.

Sect. 14. There are others who deal more openly and ingenuously, and so need the less pains to discover their minds, and those are,

II. Such who do in terms assert all *Acts of Communion* with our *Churches* to be *unlawful*. But there is a difference among these; For,

First, Some allow *hearing Sermons* in our *publick Assemblies*, and joyning in the *Pulpit Prayers*; but not in the *Liturgy*, or any proper *Act* of *Church-Communion*. This I have shewed, was the Opinion of *Robinson*, and the *New-England Churches*; and was lately owned by Mr. *Ph. Nye*, who wrote a Discourse about it, and answered all Objections. Yea, he goes so far, as to own *the publick preaching, as a great blessing to the Nation*; and he thinks, *the Dissenters and their Families are bound to frequent, (as they have liberty and opportunity) the more publick and National Ministry*. But towards the end of his Treatise he confesses the *generality of their People, to be of another opinion*; which he imputes to the *activity* of the *Jesuits* among them; and he was a very sagacious Man.

Secondly, Others hold it unlawful to joyn with our *Churches* in any *Acts* of *publick Worship*. And some are arrived to that height, that one of my *Answerers* confesseth, *That they refuse to hear him, because he owns*

Rector of Sutton, &c. p. 25.

many

many Parochial Churches to be true Churches, It seems then, they not only think it *unlawful* to hear us, but to *hear* those who think it *lawful*; and the next step will be to separate from those who do not separate from them, that *own many Parochial Churches to be true Churches.*

Several *Books* have been published to prove it *unlawful* to hear our Ministers preach: and these proceed upon the old Arguments of the former *Separatists*; as may be seen at large in a *Book* called *Jerubbaal*: whose Author goes about to prove *our Worship Idolatry, and our Ministers Antichristian*; which Mr. *Nye* was so far from owning, that he grants *our Ministry to be true and lawful*, and utterly denies it *to be Anti-christian*; *because the Articles of our Religion, to which our Ministers are to conform their Instructions, are Orthodox, and framed for the casting and keeping out of Popery.*

Sect. 15. The several Principles of our *Dissenters* being thus laid down, the *State* of the *present Controversie*, as to *Separation* from our *Communion*, will soon appear. And any one may now discern,

1. That I do not mean bare *local Separation.* For Mr. *B.* puts this in the front of his *Quære's*; *do you think, that he is a Separatist that meeteth not in the same Parish Church with you?* No; I do assure him, provided that he elsewhere joyns with our *Churches* as a *Member* of them; and doth not think himself bound to prefer the *separate Meetings*, as having a *purer way of Worship*, and ordinarily to frequent them for more *Gospel-administrations.* And so much may satisfie Mr. *A.* too, who, after his trifling manner, talks of a *bellum Parochiale*, as though Men were so weak to charge one another with *Separation* because they meet in *different Parishes*; but as to the Gird he gives about a *Bellum Episcopale*, I desire him only to look into the *Evangelium armatum* for an Answer to it.

Answ, p. 46.

Mischief of Impositions, p. 42.

2. I do not mean by Separation any *difference in Doctrine*, not determin'd by our Church, upon which Men do not proceed to divide from the *Communion* of it: And I wonder, who ever did. But Mr. *B.* is pleased to make another *Quære* about it. To this I shall answer him in Mr. *Hales* his words: *While the Controversies in* Holland *about Prædestination, went no farther than the Pen-combats, the Schism was all that while unhatcht; but assoon as one party swept an old Cloyster, and by a pretty art made it a Church, by putting a new Pulpit in it for the separating Party there to meet, that which was before a Controversie became a formal Schism.*

Tract of Schism, p. 3.

3. By *Separation* I do not mean any *difference in Modes of Worship* allowed by the *Church* in whose *Communion* we live. This is to answer Mr. *B*'s Quære concerning *the difference between Cathedral and Parochial Churches*; *and publick and private administrations of Sacraments.* But this sticks much with Mr. *A.* who takes his hints from Mr. *B.* which he cooks and dresses after his facetious manner, that they may go off the better with the common people. And a very pleasant representation he endeavours to make of the difference of the *Cathedral Service* from that in *Country Parishes.* But what is all this to the purpose? If the same Man puts on finer Clothes at *London*, than he wears in the *Country*, is he not the same Man for all that? Are not *David's Psalms the same*, whether they be *Sung*, or *Said?* Or whether *Sung* in a *Cathedral Tune*, or as set by a *Parish Clerk*? That which only looks like Argument (and my business is to mind nothing else; possibly others may call him to an account for his unbecoming way of Writing) That I say which looks like

Mischief of Impositions, p. 48, 49.

Mischief of Impos. p. 53. like Argument is, *That some things are done without Rules in our Parish Churches, as the universal practice of singing Psalms in* Hopkin's *and* Sternhold's *Metre*; and therefore they may do things without *Rules* and yet not be *guilty* of *Separation.* This proceeds upon a mistake, for in the first establishment of the *Liturgy* upon the *Reformation* under *Edward* VI. allowance was made for the *use* of the *Psalms*, as they were to be sung in *Churches* distinct from the *use* of them as *part* of the *Liturgy*; and from thence that custom hath been so universally practised. But suppose there are some Customs receiv'd without *Rules*; suppose there are some different *Customs* among us; what is this, *to the denying the lawfulness of constant Communion with our Churches? To the choosing of new Pastors?* and sitting *down*, as he speaks, *with purer Administrations?* All which this Man owns in his Book, as their avowed Principles and Practices; and yet hath the confidence to parallel their *Separation* from our *Church*, with the *different Modes* of *Worship* among our selves. He must have a very mean opinion of Mens understandings, that thinks to deceive them in so gross a manner.

4. By *Separation* I do not understand a *mere difference as to the way of Worship, which the Members of foreign Churches are here permitted to enjoy.* For they do not break off from the *Communion* of our *Churches*; but have certain privileges allowed them, as acting under the *Rules* of those *Churches* from whence they came. But what have we to do to judge the Members of other Reformed Churches? Our business is with those who being baptized in this *Church*, and living under the *Rules and Government* of it; either renounce *the Membership* they once had in it, or *avoid Communion* with it as *Members*, and joyn with other *So-*
Answ. p. 46, 60, 87. *cieties* set up in opposition to this *Communion.* Yet this matter about *the Foreign Churches* Mr. *B.* mentions again and again; as though their case could be thought alike, who never departed from ours, but only continue in the Communion of their own Churches.

5. I do not charge *every disobedience to the King and Laws and Canons in matters of Religion, Government and Worship with the Guilt of Sepa-*
Answ. p. 47. *ration.* For although a Man may be guilty of culpable disobedience in breaking the *Commands* of *Authority*, and the *Orders* of the *Church* he lives in; yet if he continues in all *Acts* of *Communion* with our *Church*, and draws not others from it upon mere pretence of *greater Purity of Worship*, *and better means of Edification*, I do not charge such a one with *Schism.*

6. I do not charge those with *Separation*, who under *Idolatrous*, or *Arian Princes* did keep up the Exercise of true Religion though against the *Will* of the *Magistrate.* But what is this to our case, where the *true Religion* is acknowledged, and the *true Doctrine of Faith* owned by the *Dissenters themselves*, who break off *Communion* with our *Churches.*
Answ. 15, 52, 53, 84. Wherefore then doth Mr. *B.* make so many Quæres, *about the case of those who lived under Heathen Persecutors? or the Arian Emperors, or Idolatrous Princes?* I hope, he did not mean to Parallel their own Case with theirs; for, what horrible reflection would this be upon our *Go-*
Answ. p. 21. *vernment*, and the *Protestant Religion* established among us? To what end doth he mention *Valens* and *Humericus that cut out the Preacher's Tongues*, and several other unbecoming Insinuations? when God be thanked, we live under a most merciful Prince, and have the *true Doctrine of the Gospel* among us, and may have it still continued, if Mens great *Ingratitude*, as well as other crying Sins, do not provoke

God

God justly to deprive us of it. What need was there, of letting fall any passages tending this way? when I told him in the very State of the *Question*, that all our *Dispute* was, *Whether the upholding separate Meetings for divine Worship, where the Doctrine established, and the substantial parts of Worship are acknowledged to be agreeable to the Word of God, be a sinful Separation or not?* Why is this dissembled and passed over? And the worst cases imaginable supposed, instead of that which is really theirs? If I could defend a Cause by no other means, I think common Ingenuity, the Honour of our Prince and Nation, and of the *Protestant Religion* professed among us, would make me give it over.

Sect. 16. And for the same *Reasons*, in the management of this debate, I resolve to keep to the *true State* of the *Question*, as it is laid down; and to make good the charge of *Separation*,

I. Against those who hold *occasional Communion* with our Church to be *lawful in some parts of Worship*; but deny *constant Communion* to be a Duty.

II. Against those who deny *any Communion with our Church to be lawful*; although *they agree with us in the Substantials of Religion.*

I. Against those who hold *occasional Communion* to be *lawful* with our *Church* in some *parts* of *Worship*, but deny *constant Communion* to be a *Duty.*

To overthrow this Principle, I shall prove these two things,

1. That bare *occasional Communion* doth not *excuse* from the *guilt* of *Separation.*

2. That as far as *occasional Communion* with our *Church* is *allowed* to be *lawful*, *constant Communion* is a *Duty.*

1. That bare *occasional Communion* doth not excuse from *guilt* of *Separation.* Which will appear by these things,

First, Bare *occasional Communion* makes no Man the *Member* of a *Church.* This term of *occasional Communion*, as far as I can find, was invented by the *Dissenting Brethren* to give satisfaction to the *Presbyterians*, who charged them with *Brownism:* to avoid this charge, they declared, *That the Brownists held all Communion with our Parochial Churches unlawful, which they did not*; *for*, said they, *we can occasionally Communicate with you*; but this gave no manner of satisfaction to the other Party, as long as they upheld *separate Congregations*, with whom they would *constantly Communicate*; and accounted those their *Churches*, with whom they did joyn as *Members* of the same Body. But notwithstanding this *lawfulness* of *occasional Communion* with our *Churches*, they joyned with other *societies* in *strict* and *constant Communion*; it was a plain Argument they apprehended something so bad or defective in our *Churches*, that they could not joyn as *Members* with them; and because they saw a necessity of joyning with some *Churches* as *Members*, they pleaded for *separate Congregations.* And so must all those do; who think it their *duty* to be members of any *Churches* at all; and not follow *Grotius* his Example, in suspending *Communion* from all *Churches.* Which is a principle I do not find any of our *dissenting Brethren* willing to own. Although Mr. *B.* declares, *That he and some others own themselves to be Pastors to no Churches*; *That he never gather'd a Church*; *that he baptized none in* 20 *years*; *and gave the Lord's Supper to none in* 18 *years.* I desire to know, what *Church* Mr. *B.* hath been of all this time. For as to *our Churches*, he declares, That he thinks it *lawful* to Communicate with us *occasionally*; but

Answ. p. 64. *Page* 24. *Page* 62. *Page* 86.

but not as *Churches* (for he thinks we want an *essential part*, viz. *a Pastor with Episcopal Power*, as appears before) *but as Oratories*; and so he renounces Communion with our *Churches* as *Churches*; and for other *Churches*, he saith *he hath gathered none, he hath administred Sacraments to none in* 18 *years*; and if he hath not joyned as a *Member* in constant *Communion* with any *separate Church*, he hath been so long a *Member* of no *Church* at all. It is true, he hath *pray'd occasionally*, and *receiv'd the Sacrament occasionally* in our *Oratories*, but not as a *Member* of our *Churches*; he hath *preached occasionally to separate Congregations*, but *he hath gather'd no Church, he hath administred no Sacraments for* 18 *years together.* So that he hath *prayed occasionally in one place*, and *preached occasionally* in another, but hath had no *Communion* as a *Member* of a *Church* any where. But I wonder, how any Man could think such a *necessity lay upon him to preach*, that *Woe was unto him if he did not*; and yet apprehend none *to administer the Sacraments* for so long together; none, to joyn himself as *a Member to any Church.* Is it possible for him *to think it Sacrilege not to preach*; and to think it no fault, not to give the *Sacraments* to others, nor to receive *one* of them himself as a *Communicant* with a *Church?* Was there not the *same devotedness*, in Ordination to the *faithful Administration of Sacraments*, as *to preaching the Gospel?* Was not the *same Authority*, the *same charge* as to both of them? Was there not the *same promise* and *engagement to give faithful diligence to Minister the Doctrine and Sacraments?* Is there an indispensable obligation to do one part of your duty, and none at all to the other? Is this possible, to persuade impartial Men, that for 18 years together you thought your self bound *to preach against the Laws*; and yet never thought your self bound to do that, which you were as solemnly obliged to do as the other? Mr. *B.* knows very well in *Church-History*, that *Presbyters* were rarely allowed to preach, and not without leave from the *Bishop*, and that in some of the *Churches* he most esteems too, *viz.* the *African*; but they were constantly bound to administer the *Sacraments*; so that, if one obligation were stricter than the other, that was so which Mr. *B.* dispensed with himself in, *for* 18 *years together*; and why he might not as well in the other, is not easie to understand. However, why all this while, no *constant Communicant* with any *Church?* What, no *Church* among us fit for him to be a *Member* of? No Obligation upon a *Christian* to that, equal to the *necessity* of *Preaching?*

These things must seem very strange, to those who judge of Christian Obligations, by the *Scripture*, and the *universal Sense* and *practice* of the *Christian Church* in the *best* and *purest Ages.* To what purpose is it to dispute about the *true notion* of *an Instituted Church for personal presential Communion*; if Men can live *for* 18 *years together* without joyning in *Communion* with any such *Church?* What was this *Communion* intended for? The antient *Churches* at this rate, might easily be capacious enough for their Members, if some never joyned with them in so long a time. *But he hath communicated occasionally with us:* Yes, to shew, what *defective and tolerable Churches he can communicate with*, but not *as a Member*, as himself declares; and this *occasional Communion* makes him none.

Mischief of Impositions, p. 85. For Mr. *A.* saith, *Their occasional Communion with us, is but like any of our occasional Communion with them: or occasional hearing of a weak Preacher*; *or occasional going to a Popish Chappel*; which no one imagines makes the Persons Members of such Congregations. If therefore Men use this *occasional Communion* more than once or twice, or ten or twenty

twenty times, as long as they declare it is only *occasional Communion*, it makes them no *Members* of our *Churches*; for that obliges them to fixed and constant Communion.

Secondly, They that have *fixed* and constant *Communion* in a *Church gathered out of another*, are in a *State of Separation* from the *Church* out of which it is gathered; although they may be *occasionally present* in it. Now, if Men who think our *constant Communion unlawful*, do judge themselves bound to joyn together in another Society for *purer Administrations*, as Mr. *A.* speaks, and to *choose new Pastors*; this is gathering *new Churches*; and consequently is a plain *Separation* from those *Churches* out of which they are gather'd. The *Author* of the *Letter out of the Country* speaks plainly in this matter. *Such*, saith he, *of the dissenting Ministers, as have most openly declared for communicating at some times with some of the Parochial Churches; have also declared their judgment of the lawfulness and necessity of Preaching and Hearing, and doing other religious Duties in other Congregations also.* If this be true, as no doubt that *Gentleman* well understands their Principles, then we see plainly a *Separation* owned, notwithstanding the *occasional Communion* with our *Churches*. For, here is not only a *lawfulness*, but a *necessity* asserted of joyning in separate Congregations, for *Preaching*, *Hearing*, and *other religious Duties*. And here are all the parts necessary for making *new Churches*, *Pastors*, *People*, and *joyning together for religious Worship*, in a way separate from our Assemblies. For although they allow the *lawfulness* of *occasional Communicating* with some of them; yet they are so far from allowing *constant Communion*, that they assert a *necessity* of *separate Congregations* for *divine Worship*; and what was there more than this which the old *Separatists* held? For when they first published the *Reasons* of their *Separation*, which *Giffard* answered, they laid down the grounds of their dissatisfaction with our *Assemblies*; from whence they inferred *the necessity of Separation*; and then declare, *that they only sought the Fellowship and Communion of God's faithful servants; and by the direction of his holy Spirit to proceed to a choice of new Pastors; with whom they might joyn, in all the Ordinances of Christ.* And what is there in this different, from what must follow from the *Principles* of those, who assert *the necessity of joyning in other Congregations distinct and separate from our Assemblies for the performance of religious Duties?* And if there be a *necessity of Separation*, as this *Gentleman* tells us they generally hold, that seem most moderate, the holding the *lawfulness* of *occasional Communion*, will not excuse them from the *guilt* of the other. For, as long as the necessity of *Separation* was maintained, the other was always accounted a less material dispute, and some held one way and some another. And for this *occasional Communion* the same *Author* tells us, *that he looks upon it, but as drinking a single glass of Wine, or of Water, against his own inclination, to a person out of Civility; when he is not for any Man's pleasure to destroy his health by tying himself to drink nothing else.* It seems then, this *occasional Communion* is a mere *Complement* to our *Churches*, wherein they force themselves to a dangerous piece of civility much *against their own Inclinations*; but they account *constant Communion* a thing pernicious to their Souls, as the other is destructive to their Health. So that this *Salvo* cannot excuse them from the *Guilt* of *Separation*.

Page 33.

Page 51.

Sect. 17. 2. That as far as *occasional Communion* is *lawful*, constant *Communion* is a *Duty*. This the former *Gentleman wonders at me if I think a good consequence*. Mr. *A.* brings several instances to prove, *that we allow occasional Communion to be lawful, where constant is no duty*; *as with other Parish Churches, upon a Journey, at a Lecture*, &c. but who ever question'd the lawfulness of *occasional Communion* with *Churches* of the same constitution; or thought a Man was bound to be always of that *Church*, where he goes to hear a Lecture, *&c.* but the question is, about the *lawfulness* of *Separation*, where *occasional Communion* is allowed to be *lawful*. For a Man is not said to separate from every Church, where he forbears or ceases to have Communion; but only from that Church, with which he is obliged to hold Communion, and yet withdraws from it. And it is a wonder to me, none of my *Friends* (my *Adversaries* I am loth to call them) could discern this. *It is lawful*, saith Mr. *B. to have Communion with the French, Dutch, or Greek Church, must constant Communion therefore with them be a duty?* Yes, if he were obliged to be a *Member* of those *Churches*, and thought it lawful to communicate some times, constant Communion would be a Duty. But because this seems so hard to be understood, I will therefore undertake to prove it, by these two Arguments.

Page 50. *Mischief of Impositions*, p. 84.

Answer, p. 105.

First, From the general Obligation upon *Christians* to use all *lawful Means* for preserving the *Peace* and *Unity* of the *Church*.

Secondly, From the particular force of that Text, Philipp. 3. 16. *As far as you have already attained walk by the same Rule*, &c.

First, From the general Obligation upon *Christians* to use all *lawful means* for preserving the Peace and Unity of the Church. *If it be possible*, saith St. *Paul*, *as much as lies in you live peaceably with all Men*. Now I ask, if there be not as great an Obligation at least, upon *Christians* to preserve *Peace* in the *Church*, as with *all Men?* and they are bound to that, *as far as possible, and as much as lies in them*. And is not that *possible and lies in them* to do, which they acknowledge *lawful to be done*, and *can do at some times?* What admirable Arguments are there to *Peace* and *Unity* among *Christians?* What divine Enforcements of them on the Consciences of Men in the Writings of *Christ* and his *Apostles?* And cannot these prevail with Men to do that, which they think in their Consciences they may lawfully do, towards joyning in *Communion* with us? This I am persuaded, is one of the provoking Sins of the *Non-conformists*, that they have been so backward in doing, what they were convinced they might have done, with a *good Conscience*. When they were earnestly prest to it by those in *Authority*, they refused it; and they have been more and more backward ever since, till now they seem generally resolved, either to break all in pieces, or to persist in *Separation*. Mr. *B.* indeed very honestly moved them 1663. to consider *how far it was lawful, or their duty to communicate with the Parish Churches in the Liturgy and Sacraments*; and brought many Arguments to prove it *lawful*; *and no one of the Brethren seemed to dissent:* but observe the Answer Mr. *A.* makes to this; *i.e.* saith he, *They did not enter their several Protestations, nor formally declare against the Reasons of their Brother*; *like wise and wary persons they would advise upon them*. And so they have been *advising* and *considering* ever since, till with great Wisdom and Wariness they are dropt into *Separation* before they were aware of it; and the mere *necessity* of defending their own *practices*, makes them espouse these *Principles*. *Such another Meeting* Mr. *B.* saith, *they had after the Plague and Fire, at*

Rom. 12. 18.

Mischief of Impositions, p. 39.

which they agreed, That Communion with our Church was in it self lawful and good. Here Mr. *A.* charges me *for being tardy, and wronging the Relator, by leaving out the most considerable words of the sentence,* viz. *When it would not do more harm than good.* And upon this he expatiates about the ways when it *may do more harm than good*; whereas if the Reader please to examine the place, he will find, I did consider the force of those words; when I put it, *that they resolved it to be lawful in it self*; although some *Circumstances* might hinder their present doing it. For they declared, *That it was in it self lawful and meet*; but the *Circumstances* of that time, did make them think *it might do more harm than good*; and therefore it is said, *They delaid for a fitter opportunity*, which makes it clear, they were then resolved upon the *lawfulness* of the thing. But that *opportunity* hath never hapned since; and so they are now come to plead against the *Practice* of it; as Mr. *A.* plainly doth; by such reasons as these. *Communion with our Churches will then do more harm than good,* *Ibid.* *Plea, p. 240.*

1. *When such Communion shall perswade the Parish Churches, that their frame is eligible and not only tolerable.* As though *Separation* were more *eligible*, than a *Communion* that is *lawful* and *tolerable*; and Schism were not more intolerable, than Communion with a tolerable Church. What will not Men say in defence of their own practice? Was ever *Schism* made so light a matter of, and the *Peace* and *Unity* of *Christians* valued at so low a rate; that for the prevention of the one, and the preservation of the other, a thing that is *lawful* may not be done, if there be any danger that what is only *tolerable* should be mistaken for more *eligible?* As if all the *Mischiefs* of *Schism* and *Division* in the Church, were not fit to be put in the ballance, against such a horrible and monstrous inconvenience. Methinks, it were better sometimes to be wise and considerate, than always thus subtle and witty against the common sense, and reason of Mankind. *Mischief of Impositions, p. 40.*

2. *When others shall thereby be thought obliged to separate from purer Churches*, i. e. be drawn off from their Separation.

3. *When it will harden the Papists.* As though their *Divisions* did not do it ten thousand times more.

4. *When it shall notably prejudice the Christian Religion in general.* Yes, no doubt the *Cure* of *Divisions* would do so.

By these particulars, it appears, that he thinks them not obliged to do *what lawfully they can do.* Yet at last, he saith, *he tells us, as much is done, as their Consciences will permit them.* Say you so? Is it indeed come to this? Will none of your Consciences now permit you either to *come to the Liturgy*, or to make use of *any parts* of it, in your own *Meetings?* How often hath Mr. *B.* told the World, That you stuck not at *Set-Forms*, nor at the *Use of the Liturgy*, provided some exceptionable passages were alter'd in it? Did not Mr. *B.* declare at his *Meeting*, publickly, in a *Writing* on purpose, *That they did not meet under any colour, or pretence of any religious Exercise in other manner, than according to the Liturgy and Practice of the Church of* England, *and were he able he would accordingly read himself?* Is this observed in any one *Meeting* in *London*, or through *England?* Then certainly, there are some who do not, what they think they lawfully may do towards *Communion* with us. And Mr. *B.* saith in the beginning of his late *Plea, That they never made one Motion for Presbytery, or against Liturgies*; and these words are spoken in the Name of the whole *Party* called *Presbyterians.* And since

Answ. p. 64. that, Mr. *B.* saith, *They did come to an Agreement, wherein the constant Use of the Liturgy*, with some *Alterations*, was required. And are we now told, *That all that can lawfully be done is done?* Mr. *B.* indeed acts agreeably to his Principles, in coming to our *Liturgy*; but where are all the rest? And, which of them *reads* what they think *lawful* at their own *Assemblies?* Do they not hereby discover, that they are more afraid of losing their People, who force them to comply with their *humours*, than careful to do, what they judge *lawful*, towards *Communion* with our *Church?*

Sect. 18. But whence comes it to pass, that any who think *occasional Communion* with us to be *lawful*, should not think themselves obliged to *constant Communion?* From what grounds come they to practise *occasional Communion?* Is it *from the Love of Peace and Concord*, as Mr. *B.* saith? That is a good ground so far, as it goes, but will it not carry a Man farther, if he pursue it, as he ought to do? What *love of Concord* is this to be *occasionally present at our Churches*, and at the same time to declare, That there is *greater purity of Worship, and better means of Edification in separate Congregations?* The one can never draw Men so much to the *love of Concord*, as the other doth encourage them in the *Principles* of *Separation.* But, if there be an Obligation upon Men to Communicate with the *Church* they live in, notwithstanding the *Defects* and *Corruptions* of it, that *Obligation* can never be discharged by meer *occasional Presence* at *some times*, and *in some Acts of Worship*; for, saith Mr. *Ball*, *To use one Ordinance, and not another, is to make a Schism in the Church.*

Trial of Grounds of Separation. Chap. 10. p. 791.

The only Example produced to justify such *occasional Communion with defective Churches*, is that, *our blessed Saviour did communicate after that manner in the Jewish Synagogues and Temple.* But this is so far from being true, that the *old Separatists* granted, That *our Lord Communicated with the Jewish Church in God's Ordinances, living and dying a Member thereof*; and from thence they prove, *That the Jewish Church had a right Constitution in our Saviour's time.*

Robinson's Treatise, p. 11.

Ainsworth's Consider. examin'd. p. 5.

And did not he declare, That *he came not to dissolve the Law, but to fulfil it?* And that he complied with *John's Baptism, because he was to fulfil all righteousness?* Did he not go up to *the Feasts at Jerusalem*, as a *Member* of the *Jewish Church*, and frequent the *Synagogues?* Even at the *Feast* of *Dedication*, though not instituted by the Law, he was present, as other *Jews* were. Yea, did he not express more than ordinary zeal, for *purifying* the *outward parts of the Temple*, because it was *to be a House of Prayer for all Nations?* Was not this to shew Mens *Obligation* to *come* and *Worship* there, as well, as that the *place* was to be kept *sacred* for that use? And, doth not the *Apostle* expressly say, *That he was made under the Law?* Where is there the least ground in *Scripture*, to intimate, that *Christ* only kept *occasional, and not constant communion* with the *Jewish Church?* What *part* of Worship did he ever withdraw from? Did he not command his *Disciples to go hear the Scribes and Pharisees*, because *they sate in* Moses's *Chair?* Where did he ever bid them go thither, when they could have *no better*; but when they could to be sure to prefer the *purer way of Worship, and better Means of Edification?* Was not his own *Doctrine* incomparably beyond theirs? Is there any pretence for *greater Edification* now, to be mention'd with what the *Disciples* had, to forsake the *Jewish Assemblies*, for the love of *Christ's own Teaching?* Yet he would

John 10, 22, 23.

Mat. 23. 2.

not have them to do that, out of the regard he had to the *publick Worship and Teaching*. Our *Saviour* himself did only teach his Disciples *occasionally*, and at *certain Seasons*; but their *constant Communion* was with the *Jewish Assemblies*. And so it was after his *Passion*, till the *Holy Ghost* fell upon them, and they were then imploy'd to gather and form a new Church; which was not done before; and thence the *Author* of the *Ordinary Gloss* observes; *That we never read of* Christ's *Praying together, with his Disciples* (unless perhaps at his Transfiguration with three of his Disciples) although we often read of his praying alone. So that no Example can be mention'd, which is more directly contrary to the *Practice* of *Separation* upon the present grounds, than that of our blessed *Saviour*'s; which ought to be instead of all others to us. Luk. 24,53.

Sect. 19. 2. I argue, *from the particular force of that Text*, Phil. 3. 16. *As far, as we have already attained, let us walk by the same Rule, let us mind the same things.* From whence it appears evident, that Men ought to go as far as they can, towards *Uniformity*; and not to forbear doing any thing, which they *lawfully* may do towards *Peace* and *Unity*.

To take off the force of the Argument from this place, several *Answers* have been given, which I shall now remove; so that the strength of it may appear to remain, notwithstanding all the attempts which have been made to weaken it.

Some say, *That the Apostles words are to be understood of the different attainments Christians had in knowledge, and the different Conceptions and Opinions which they had concerning the Truths of the Gospel.* Thus Dr. O. understands the *Text*; whose sense is somewhat obscurely and intricately expressed; but as far as I can apprehend his meaning, he makes this to be the *Apostles:* viz. *Vindication of Non-conformists, p.* 25, 30.

I. *That although the best Christians in this life cannot attain to a full measure and perfection in the comprehension of the Truths of the Gospel, or the enjoyment of the things contained in them; yet they ought to be pressing continually after it.*

II. *That in the common pursuit of this design, it is not to be supposed, but that Men will come to different attainments, have different measures of light and knowledge, yea and different conceptions, or opinions about these things.*

III. *That in this difference of opinions, those who differ'd from others should wait on the Teachings of God, in that use of the means of Instruction which they enjoy'd.*

IV. *That as to their Duty in common to each other, as far as they had attained, they should walk by the same Rule, namely, which he had now laid down, and mind the same things as he had enjoyned them.*

From whence he infers, *That these words are so far from being a Foundation to charge them with Schism, who agreeing in the substance of the Doctrine of the Gospel, do yet dissent from others, in some things; that it enjoyns a mutual forbearance towards those who are differently minded.* And again, he saith, *The advice St.* Paul *gives to both Parties, is, that whereunto they have attained, wherein they do agree, which were all those Principles of Faith and Obedience which were necessary to their acceptance with God, they should walk by the same Rule, and mind the same things, that is, forbearing one another in the things wherein they differ; which,* saith he, *is the substance of what is pleaded for by the Nonconformists.*

For

For the clearing of this matter, there are Three things to be debated.

1. Whether the *Apostle* speaks of *different Opinions*, or *different Practices?*
2. Whether the *Rule* he gives be *mutual forbearance?*
3. How far the *Apostle's Rule*, hath an *influence* on our present *case?*

First, Whether the *Apostle* speaks of *different Opinions*, or of *different Practices?* For the right understanding of this, we must strictly attend to the *Apostle's* scope and design. It is most evident that the *Apostle* began this *Discourse* with a *Caution* against the *Teachers* of the *Circumcision*, Vers. 2. *Beware of Dogs, beware of evil Workers, beware of the Concision.* But speaking so reproachfully of them, he shews in the next words, that every thing that was excellent in the design of the Law, was accomplished in the Gospel; and so he proceeds to declare, how justly he was brought to a *disesteem* of the *greatest privileges* of the *Law*, in comparison with the things revealed by the Gospel, which shews, that the Apostle had still an Eye to these *false Teachers*, who were very busie in disturbing the *Peace* of the *Churches*, and drawing Disciples after them, pleading the *necessity* of observing the *Law*; and dividing the *Christians* into *different Communions* on that account, as appears by their proceedings at *Antioch*, where they did separate themselves from the *Gentile Christians*, and St. *Peter* for a time complied with them.
Act. 16. 13. If such as these had not been busie at *Philippi* (where it appears that *Jews* inhabited) What need St. *Paul* give so much *caution* against them? What need all this dispute concerning the *Privileges* of the *Law?* If it be allowed, that they were there carrying on the same designs, which they did in other *Churches*, then it follows, he had great reason to persuade them to *Unity* so earnestly, as he doth, *Philip.* 2. 1, 2. and to give so much *caution* against them; and to represent the great *excellencies* of the *Gospel* above the *Law*; which being done, the *Apostle* after his usual method, makes a *digression*, concerning himself, viz. *How far short he thought himself of what he aimed at*, and yet with *what earnestness he pressed forward, toward Christian perfection*; making no longer any account of *legal privileges.* Which I take to be his meaning, when he saith, *Forgetting the things which are behind I press forward*, &c. So St. *Hierome* understands it, *Legis obliviscens ad perfecta Evangelii præcepta me teneo. Forgetting the Law, I keep to the Precepts of the Gospel.* This being understood, the *Apostles* sence naturally follows, according to his former design; *Let us therefore, as many as are arrived to this height of Christianity* (so the word τέλειοι is used, 1 *Cor.* 14. 20. *Ephes.* 4. 13. *Colos.* 4. 12. *Heb.* 5. 14.) *agree in pursuing our main end.* But then comes the case of *those*, who were not so fully satisfied in this *matter* of the *Law*; there being many and plausible Arguments on their side; well, saith the Apostle, if they are doubtful, I advise them however, not to hearken to *these false Teachers*, for they make nothing but *Faction* and *Divisions* among you, wait patiently upon God, which is the best means, for your Satisfaction. *If any be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you*, i. e. saith *Beza* in his *Paraphrase*, *If any yet doubt of the laying aside of the Law, let them make no disturbance in the Church about it.* And so *Erasmus* saith, *It ought to be understood of the judaizing Christians, who did not yet discern, that the Ceremonial Law was to be abolished, however*, saith he, *they ought not to break the Peace of the Church for it.* But, What sence can Dr. *O.* here put upon the

being

being otherwise minded: Otherwise than what? *As many as be perfect be thus minded,* to pursue your main end; but, *if any be otherwise minded*; did any think they ought not to mind chiefly their great end? that is incredible; therefore the *Apostle* must be understood of somewhat, about which there were then very *different apprehensions*; and that is certain there were about the *Law* among the *Christians* then. The *Apostle* therefore doth not speak of any kind of *different apprehensions* Christians might fall into; but of such as were at that time among them; and so one Copy reads it, εἰ ἔτι ἑτέρως φρονεῖτε. *If hitherto ye have been otherwise minded*; they had no difference concerning the τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, *the things before them*, viz. the *happiness* of the *Gospel*, but they had concerning the τὰ ὀπίσω, *the things behind*, viz. the *force* and *obligation* of the *Law*. And since this *difference* did not rest barely in opinion, but was carried on so far, as to break the *Peace* of the *Church* about it; it appears to have been no bare *difference* of *Opinions*, but such as related to the *Peace* and *Communion* of *Christians*.

Secondly, Whether the Rule which the Apostle lays down, be only a *Rule* of *mutual forbearance? Nevertheless, whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same Rule, let us mind the same things.* The sence according to Dr. O. is this, *That those who are agreed in the Substantials of Religion, should go on and do their duty without regarding lesser differences.* Which is a *sence* very uncertain, and doth not reach to the *differences* then among them. It is very uncertain, because it sets no bounds to *differences*; and supposes the continuance of such *differences* among them, which he designed to prevent, by perswading them so often in this *Epistle* to be *of one mind, of one soul*; as well as *to mind the same things.* Besides, the difference then on foot, was none of the *smaller differences of opinions*, but that about which they differ'd was urged on one side, *as necessary to Salvation*, by the *false Apostles*; and opposed on the other, *as pernicious and destructive to it.* One of my *Answerers* saith, *That the judaizing Christians were leaven'd with such a corrupt Opinion, as was by no means to be born with; which would have made* Christ *and his Death in vain, And that the Apostle sets himself against it might and main, shewing the dreadful consequences of it.* And is it probable the *Apostle* should prescribe a *Rule* of *mutual forbearance*, in such a case as this? especially, when in the same *Chapter*, he gives so great a *caution* against them, with so much unusual sharpness of expression; *Beware of Dogs, beware of Evil Workers, beware of the Concision.* Doth this look like a *Precept* of *mutual forbearance, as to the differences then among them?* these we know there were, let Dr. O. name any other smaller *differences* of *Opinion*, which might be an occasion of the *Apostles* giving such a *Rule* of *mutual forbearance.* But now, if we suppose the *Apostle* to speak to the *difference* about the *Law*, about which the *Churches* were then divided, the sence is plain, easie, and pertinent. For so, either (1.) It takes in those who hitherto differ'd about the *Law*; and then the sence is, although you are not come up to so great satisfaction as others have, yet go as far as you can with the Body of Christians, you live with; *keep within one Rule*; break not the *bounds* of *Peace* and *Unity* which *Christ* hath set you; run not with the *false Teachers* into *separating dividing Courses.* (2.) It is directed to those who have *got the start of others*, and then it contains the *Obligation* that lies upon them, especially to have a mighty regard to the *Peace* and *Unity* of *Christians*; not to break the common Ties and Bonds on the account of their *greater attainments*, nor to *separate* from others, as

Phil. 1. 27. 2. 2.

Act. 15. 1.

Rector of Sutton, P. 15, 16.

Gal. 5. 2.

meaner

meaner and lower Christians, because they are not come up to that *perfection*, which you have attained to. And so either way, it contains an excellent *Rule*, and of admirable use to the *Christian Church*, not only at that time, but in all Ages of the World, *viz.* That those who cannot be fully satisfied in all things, should *go as far as they can* towards preserving *Peace* and *Communion* among *Christians*; and not peevishly separate and divide the Church, because they cannot in all things think as others do; nor others on the account of *greater sanctity and perfection*, despise the inferior sort of *Christians*, and *forsake* their *Communion*, but they ought all to do what lies possibly in them to preserve the *bonds* of *Peace*, and the *Unity* of the *Church*.

Thirdly, How far this *Rule* hath an *influence* on our case? (1.) It follows from hence, that *as far as Communion is lawful, it is a duty*, since, as far as they have attained they are to walk by the same Rule. And so much Dr. O. doth not deny; when he saith, *Those who are agreed in the Substantials of Religion, or in the Principles of Faith and Obedience, should walk by the same Rule, and mind the same things, forbearing one another in the things wherein they differ.* Then as far as they agree, they are bound to joyn together, whether it be as to Opinion, or Communion. Because the obligation to *Peace* and *Unity* must especially reach to *Acts* of *Christian Communion*, as far as that is judged to be *lawful*. (2.) That the *best Christians* are bound to *Unite* with others, though of *lower attainments*, and to keep within the *same Rule*; which is a general expression relating to the *bounds* of a *Race*, and so takes in all such *Orders* which are *lawful* and judged necessary to hold the *Members* of a *Christian Society* together. But, saith Dr. O. *Let the Apostles Rule be produced with any probability of proof to be his, and they are all ready to subscribe and conform unto it.* This is the *Apostle's Rule*, to *go as far as they can*; and if they can go no farther, *to sit down quietly, and wait for farther instruction*, and not to *break the Peace of the Church*, upon present dissatisfaction, nor to gather *new Churches* out of others upon supposition of *higher attainments*.

Vindication of Non-conformists, p. 26.

Page 27. *If the Rule reach our Case*, saith he again, *it must be such as requires things to be observed, as were never divinely appointed, as National Churches, Ceremonies and Modes of Worship.* And so this *Rule* doth in order to *Peace*, require the observation of such things, which although they be not particularly appointed by God, yet are enjoyned by lawful Authority, provided, they be not unlawful in themselves, nor repugnant to the Word of God.

Page 28. *But the Apostles never gave any such Rules themselves, about outward Modes of Worship with Ceremonies, Feasts, Fasts, Liturgies*, &c. What then? It is sufficient that they gave this general Rule, *That all lawful things are to be done for the Churches Peace:* And without this no *Unity*, or *Order* can be preserved in *Churches*. *The Apostles*, saith he, *gave Rules inconsistent with any determining Rule*, viz. *of mutual forbearance*, Rom. 14. *And herein the Apostle acted not upon mere Rules of Prudence, but as a Teacher divinely inspired.* That he was divinely inspired, I do not question, but even such a one may determine a case upon *present Circumstances*, which resolution may not always bind, when the *Circumstances* are changed. For then, the meaning of the *Apostle* must be, that whatever *differences* happen among *Christians*, there must be no determination either way. But the direct contrary to this, we find in the *Decree* of the *Apostles* at *Jerusalem*, upon the difference that

P. 28, 31.

happened

happened in the *Christian Churches*. And although there was a very plausible pretence of the *obligation* of *Conscience* one way; yet the *Apostles* made a determination in the case, contrary to their Judgment. Which shews, that the *Rule* of *Forbearance*, where *Conscience* is alledged both ways, is no *standing Rule* to the *Christian Church*; but that the *Governors* of it from *Parity* of *Reason* may determine those things which they judge to conduce most to the *Peace* and *Welfare* of that *Church*, which they are bound to preserve. And from hence it appears how little *Reason* there is for Dr. O's Insinuation, *as though the false Apostles were the only Imposers:* whereas, it is most evident, that the true *Apostles* made this peremptory *Decree*, in a matter of great *consequence*, and against the pretence of *Conscience* on the other side. Act. 15. 28.

But saith Dr. O. farther, *The Jewish Christians were left to their own liberty, provided they did not impose on others; and the Dissenters at this day, desire no more, than the Gentile Churches did*, viz. *not to be imposed upon to observe those things which they are not satisfied, it is the mind of* Christ *should be imposed upon them. I Answer*, 1. It was agreed by all the *Governors* of the *Christian Church*, that the *Jewish Christians* should be left to their own liberty, out of respect to the *Law* of *Moses*; and out of regard to the *Peace* of the *Christian Church*, which might have been extremely hazarded, if the *Apostles* had presently set themselves against the observing the *Jewish Customs* among the *Jews* themselves. 2. The *false Apostles imposing* on the *Gentile Christians* had two *Circumstances* in it, which extremely alter their case from that of our *present Dissenters*. For, (1.) They were none of their *lawful Governors*, but went about as *Seducers* drawing away the *Disciples* of the *Apostles* from them. (2.) They imposed the *Jewish Rites as necessary to Salvation*, and not as *merely indifferent things*. And therefore the case of our *Dissenters* is very different from that of the *Gentile Christians*, as to the *Impositions* of the *false Apostles*. Thus I have considered every thing material in Dr. O. which seems to take off the force of the Argument drawn from this Text. Page 7, 8.

The *Author* of the *Letter* saith, (1.) *That I ought to have proved, that the Apostles meant some Rule superadded to the Scriptures*; *and*, (2.) *That other Church-Guides had the same Power, as the Apostles had.* But what need all this? If it appear (1.) That the *Apostles* did give *binding Rules* to particular *Churches*, which are not extant in Scriptures, as appears by 1 *Cor.* 7. 17. So that either the *Scripture* is an *imperfect Rule*, for omitting some *Divine Rules*; or else these were only *Prudential Rules* of *Order* and *Government*. (2.) That it is a standing *Rule* of *Scripture*, that *Men are bound to do all lawful things* for the *Peace of the Church*. And this I have shewed, was the *Apostles* design in the *words* of this *Text*. *Letter out of the Country*, p. 24.

Sect. 20. Others pretend, that the *Apostle* means no more by these words, *but that Christians must live up to their knowledge, and mind that one thing*. This is a very *new Exposition*; and the *Author* of it intends to set up for a *Critick* upon the credit of it. It is pity therefore it should pass, without some consideration. But, I pass by the Childish triflings about Κανόνι, a *Canon*, viz. *that is not taken in a Military notion, because great Guns were not then invented*; *that it is an Ecclesiastical Canon mounted upon a platform of Moderation*; which are things fit only for *Boys* in the *Schools*; unless, perhaps, they might have been designed for an *Artillery-Sermon* on this *Text*; but however, methinks they come not in very futably in a weighty and serious debate. *Mischief of Imposit.* p. 6, 7.

I come therefore to examine the New-Light that is given to this Controverted Text. Κανόνι he observes *from* Grotius, *is left out in one MS.* (it may be the *Alexandrian*) but, What is one *MS.* to the general consent of *Greek Copies?* not only the Modern, but those which St. *Chrysostom*, *Theodoret*, *Photius*, *Œcumenius*, and *Theophylact* had, who all keep it in. But suppose it be left out, the sence is the very same to my purpose. No, saith he, Τῷ αὐτῷ στοιχειν, *To walk by the same must be referred to the antecedent* Εἰς ὅ. And what then? *Then*, saith he, *the sense is, What we have attained let us walk up to the same; Which comes to no more than this, unto whatsoever measure or degree of knowledge we have reached, let us walk suitably to it.*

But the *Apostle* doth not here speak of the *improvement* of *knowledge*; but of the *union* and *conjunction* of *Christians*, as appears by the next words τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, *to mind the same thing*. No such matter, saith Mr. *A. that phrase implies no more than to mind that thing*, viz. *or that very thing*, V. 14. *pressing towards the mark*. But if he had pleased to have read on, but to *Phil.* 4.2. he would have found τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, to signifie *Unanimity*. And St. *Paul*, 1 *Cor.* 12. 25. opposes the τὸ αὐτὸ to σχισμα. *That there be no Schism in the Body, but that all the Members should take care of* τὸ αὐτὸ, *one for another:* and therefore the τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, *minding the same things*, is very aptly used against *Schisms* and *Divisions*. I should think St. *Chrysostom*, *Theodoret*, and *Theophylact*, all understood the importance of a *Greek Phrase*, as well as our *Author*, and they all make no scruple of interpreting it of the *Peace* and *Concord* of *Christians*. Although St. *Augustin* did not understand much *Greek*, yet he knew the general sense of the *Christian Church* about this place; and he particularly applies it to the *Peace* of the *Church*, in St. *Cyprian*'s case. By this taste, let any Man judge of the depth of that Man's Learning, or rather the height of his Confidence, who dares to tell the World, *That the Universal Current and Stream of all Expositors is against my sense of this Text.* And for this *universal Stream and Current*, besides *Grotius*, who speaks exactly to the same sense with mine, viz. *That those who differ'd about the legal Ceremonies, should join with other Christians in what they agreed to be Divine*; he mentions only *Tirinus* and *Zanchy*, and then cries, *In a word, they all conspire against my Interpretation.* If he be no better at *Polling Non-conformists* than *Expositors*, he will have no such reason to boast of his *Numbers*. Had it not been fairer dealing, in one word, to have referred us to Mr. *Pool*'s *Synopsis?* For, if he had looked into *Zanchy* himself, he would have found, how he applyed it sharply against *Dissentions* in the *Church*. Mr. *B.* saith, *That the Text speaketh for Unity and Concord is past Question; and that to all Christians, though of different attainments; and therefore requireth all to live in Concord that are Christians, notwithstanding other differences.* And if he will but allow, that by vertue of this *Rule*, Men are bound *to do all things lawful for preserving the Peace of the Church*, we have no farther difference about this matter: For then, I am sure, it will follow, that if *occasional Communion* be *lawful constant Communion* will be *a Duty*.

De Baptismo, c. Donat. l. 2. c. 4, 5.

Answ. p. 28.

And so much for the first sort of *Dissenters*, who allow some kind of *Communion* with our *Church* to be *lawful*.

Sect. 21. II. I come now to consider the charge of *Schism*, or *Sinful Separation*, against Those, who, *though they agree with us in the Substantials of Religion, yet deny any Communion with our Church to be lawful.* I do not speak of any improper Acts of Communion, which Dr. O. calls

Communion in Faith and Love, this they do allow to the *Church* of *England*, but no otherwise, than as they believe us to be *Orthodox Christians*; yet he seems to go farther, as *to some at least of our Parochial Churches, that they are true Churches:* But in what sense? Are they *Churches rightly constituted*, with whom they may join in *Communion* as *Members*? No; that he doth not say. But his meaning is, *that they are not guilty of any such heinous Errors in Doctrine, or Idolatrous Practice in Worship, as should utterly deprive them of the Being and Nature of Churches.* And doth this Kindness only belong to *some of our Parochial Churches*? I had thought, every *Parochial Church* was *true*, or *false*, according to its *frame and constitution*; which among us supposeth the owning the *Doctrine* and *Worship* received and practised in the *Church* of *England*, as it is established by Law; and if no such *Errors in Doctrine, nor Idolatrous Practices* be allowed by the *Church* of *England*, then every *Parochial Church* which is constituted according to it, is *a true Church*. But all this amounts to no more, than what they call a *Metaphysical Truth*; for he doth not mean, that they are *Churches* with which they may lawfully have *Communion*. And he pleads, *for the necessity of having Separate Congregations*, from *the necessity of Separating from our Communion*: (altho' the time was, when the bare want of a *right Constitution* of *Churches*, was thought a sufficient ground for setting up *new Churches*, or for withdrawing from the Communion of a *Parochial Church*; and I do not think the *Dr.* is of another mind now.) But however, I shall take things as I find them; and he insists on, *as the grounds of this necessity of Separation, the things enjoined by the Laws of the Land, or by the Canons and Orders of the Church*; *as Signing Children Baptized with the Sign of the Cross*; *Kneeling at the Communion*; *Observation of Holy-days*; *Constant Use of the Liturgy*; *Renouncing other Assemblies, and the Peoples Right in choice of their own Pastors*; *Neglect of the Duties of Church-members*; *submitting to an Ecclesiastical Rule and Discipline, which not one of a Thousand can apprehend to have any thing in it, of the Authority of* Christ, *or Rule of the Gospel.* This is the short account of the *Reasons* of *Separation* from our *Churches Communion.* Vindicat. p. 14.

That which I am now to inquire into is, Whether such *Reasons* as these be sufficient ground for *Separation* from a *Church*, wherein it is confessed *there are no heinous Errors in Doctrine, or Idolatrous Practice in Worship*; for if they be not, such *Separation* must be a *formal Schism*; because such persons not only withdraw from *Communion* with our *Church*, but set up other *Churches* of their own.

Now the way I shall take to shew the insufficiency of these *Causes* of *Separation*, shall be, by shewing the great Absurdities, that follow upon the allowance of them.

These *Five* especially, I shall insist upon.

(1.) That it weakens the *Cause* of *Reformation.*

(2.) That it hinders all *Union* between the *Protestant Churches.*

(3.) That it justifies the *ancient Schisms*, which have been always condemned by the Christian Church.

(4.) That it makes *Separation* endless.

(5.) That it is contrary to the Obligation which lies on all *Christians*, to preserve the *Peace* and *Unity* of the *Church.*

Sect. 22. (1.) *The prejudice it brings upon the Cause of the Reformation.* Which I shall make appear, not from the *Testimonies* of our own *Writers*, who may be suspected by the *Dissenters* of too much kindness

to our *Church*; but, from the eminent and learned *Defenders* of the *Reformation* in *France*, who can be the least suspected of partiality to our *Church*.

Instit. l. 4. c. 1. n. 9. I begin with *Calvin*; against whom I hope no exceptions will be taken.

(1.) In the General, *He assigns two marks of the Visible Church, the Word of God truly preached, and Sacraments administred according to* Christ's *Institution.*

(2.) He saith, *Wherever these Marks are to be found in particular Societies, those are true Churches, howsoever they are distributed according to humane conveniencies.*

(3.) *That although those stand as Members of particular Churches, (who may not be thought worthy of that Society) till they are duly cast out; yet the Churches themselves having these Marks, do still retain the true Nature and Constitution of Churches, and ought to be so esteemed.*

(4.) *Men ought not to Separate from, or break the Unity of such Churches.* *Numb. 10.* And he hath this notable saying upon it: *God sets such a value upon the Communion of his Church, that he looks upon him as an Apostate from his Religion, who doth wilfully separate himself from any Christian Society, which hath the true Ministery of the Word and Sacraments.* And a little after, he calls *Separation a Denial of God and* Christ, *a destruction of his Truth, a mighty provocation of his Anger, a crime so great that we can hardly imagine a worse, it being a Sacrilegious and perfidious breach of the Marriage betwixt* Christ *and his People.* *Numb. 11.* In the next *Section* he makes it a very *dangerous and mischievous temptation so much as to think of Separation from a Church that hath these Marks.*

(5.) *That although there be many Faults and Corruptions in such a Church, yet as long as it retains those Marks, Separation from it, is not justifiable: nay, although some of those faults be about Preaching the Word, and Administration of Sacraments: for,* saith he, *all truths are not of equal moment: but as long as the Doctrine according to Godliness, and the true Use of Sacraments is kept up, Men ought not to separate upon lesser differences; but they ought to seek the amending what is amiss, continuing in the Communion of the Church; and without disturbing the Peace and Order of it.* And he at large proves, what great allowance is to be made, *Numb. 13, 14, 15, 16.* *as to the corruption of Members* from the *Examples* of the *Apostolical Churches:* and he saith, *Mens moroseness in this Matter, although it seems to flow from zeal, yet it much rather comes from Spiritual Pride, and a false opinion of their own holiness above others. Although,* saith he, *there were such universal corruptions in the Jewish Church, that the Prophets compare it to* Sodom *and* Gomorrah; *Numb. 18.* *yet they never set up new Churches, nor erected other Altars, whereat they might offer separate Sacrifices: but whatever the People were, as long as God's Word and Ordinances were among them, they lifted up pure hands to God, although in such an impure Society.* The same he proves, *as to* Christ *and his Apostles.* From whence he concludes, *That Separation from such Churches, Numb. 19.* *where the true Word of God and Sacraments are, is an inexcusable fault.*

But how then comes he to justifie the *Separation* from the *Church* of *Cap. 2. n. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.* *Rome? Because in that Church the true Doctrine of* Christ *is so much suppressed, and so many Errors obtruded on Mens Minds instead of it; and the Worship of God so corrupted, that the Publick Assemblies are Schools of Idolatry and Wickedness. And the truth of the Gospel, being the Foundation of the Churches Unity, it can be no culpable Separation to withdraw from the Communion of a Church which hath so notoriously corrupted his Doctrine and Institutions; especially, when they anathematize those who will*

not

not comply with them? But doth he mean any *indifferent Rites*, or *Ceremonies*, where the *Doctrine* is *sound?* No; but *False Doctrine, and Idolatrous Worship*; as he frequently declares. And therefore he that would go about to defend Separation from a Church, on the account of some *Ceremonies* prescribed, and some *Corruptions* remaining in it, must overthrow the fundamental grounds of the Reformation, as they are explained by *Calvin* himself. *Numb.* 9, 10, 11, 12.

Sect. 23. Among their later Writers, no Man hath vindicated the *Cause* of the *Reformation* with greater *success* and *reputation* than Mr. *Daille* in his *Apology*. And the *Grounds* he goes upon are these.

(1.) *That we are bound to avoid the Communion of those, who go about to destroy and ruin Christianity.* *Apology, c.* 3.

(2.) *If the Church of* Rome *hath not required any thing from us which destroys our Faith, offends our Consciences, and overthrows the service which we believe due to God; if the differences have been small, and such as we might safely have yielded unto; then he will grant, that their Separation was rash and unjust, and they guilty of the Schism.* *Cap.* 4.

(3.) He proves, *that they had weighty reasons for their Separation*; which are these, (1.) *Imposing new Doctrines as necessary Articles of Faith: and yet, not all errors in Doctrine do afford sufficient ground for Separation; but such as are pernicious and destructive to Salvation:* for which he instanceth in the *Lutherans opinion of* Christ's *Bodily Presence in the Sacrament, which overthrows not the use of the Sacraments, nor requires the adoring it, it neither divides nor mutilates it, nor makes it an expiatory Sacrifice for Sin; all which follows from the Popish Doctrine.* From whence he concludes, *That to separate from a Church for tolerable Errors, is an unjust Separation.* *Cap.* 5. *Cap.* 7. (2.) *Requiring such Worship, as overthrows the Foundations of Christianity; which,* saith he, *proves the necessity of our Separation*; and for this he instances in *Adoration of the Host*; *which the Church of* Rome *strictly requiring, and the Protestants believing it to be a mere Creature, they cannot give it without Idolatry: from whence* he concludes *our Separation to be just, because it was necessary.* Besides this he gives instances *in the Worship of Images, Invocation of Saints,* &c. By which we see the *Justice* of the *Cause* of *Reformation* doth not depend on any such *Ceremonies*, as ours are, nor on the *want* of *Discipline*, nor on the bare *Dissatisfaction* of *Conscience*, but on such great and important Reasons, as obtruding *new Articles of Faith*, and *Idolatrous Worship* on the *partakers* of the *Communion* of the *Roman Church.* *Cap.* 8. *Cap.* 18.

Amyraldus goes so far, as to say, *That if there had been no other faults in the Roman Church besides their unprofitable Ceremonies in Baptism, and other things, beyond the measure and genius of Christian Religion, they had still continued in its communion*; *For,* saith he, *a Physician is to be born with that loads his Patient with some unuseful Prescriptions, if he be otherwise faithful and skilful. But if he mixes Poison with his Medicines, and besides adds abundance of Prescriptions, both needless and chargeable, then the Patient hath great reason to look out for better help; and to take care of his own safety and freedom.* By which he plainly declares, that bare *Ceremonies*, although many more than ours, are no sufficient *Ground* for *Separation.* *De seceſſ. ab Eccleſ. Rom.* &c. *p.* 233.

Of late years, a *Person* of Reputation in *France* set forth a *Book* against the *Reformation*, charging it with *Schism*, because of the *Separation* from the *Roman Church*; which hath been Answered three several ways by three learned Divines, M. *Claude*, M. *Pajon*, and Mr. *Turretin.* *Prejuges legitimes contre les Calviniſtes.*

But,

But, Do any of these insist upon matters of *mere Ceremony* where the *Doctrine is sound*, the *constant use of Liturgy*, *bare neglect of Discipline*, &c. No, they were Men of better understanding, than to insist on such things as these, which they knew could never bear that weight, as to justifie *Separation* from a *Church*; and that they should have exposed themselves and their *Cause*, to the contempt of all considering Men, if they could have alledged no more Substantial Reasons than these.

Claude sa Defence de la Reformation. 2. part. Pajon Examen du livre, &c. 3. partie. Turretini disput. 1. de necessariâ secessione ab Ecclesiâ Rom. Sect. 11.

But they all agree in such common reasons, which they thought sufficient to make a *Separation* justifiable, *viz.* *Great corruption in Doctrine, idolatrous Worship, and insupportable Tyranny over the Consciences of Men.* *Turretin* expresly saith, *No slight Errors, no tolerable Superstitious Rites that do not infect the Conscience* (as they cannot where they are not forced upon it by unsound Doctrine) *not any corruption of Manners, nor defect in Government or Discipline, are sufficient grounds for Separation.* *In one word*, saith he, *the Patient is not to be forsaken, unless his Disease be deadly and infectious, nor then neither but with great difficulty.*

Le Blanc. Theses de Reunione.

Le Blanc shewing the *impossibility* of *Re-union* with the *Papists*, goes upon these Three Grounds.

1. *That it cannot be obtained without subscribing to the Decrees and Canons of the Council of* Trent, *and without anathematizing all those who have opposed them. For the condition of Communion with that Church is no less, than receiving all its Errors for necessary Articles of Faith.*

2. *That the Publick Worship practised and allowed in that Church is idolatrous, he instanceth in Adoration of the Host, the Worship of Saints and Images.*

3. *That they cannot return to that Church without subjecting their Consciences to the tyrannical Usurpations of the Pope.*

Let our *Brethren* now consider, what Triumphs the *Church* of *Rome* would make over us, if we had nothing to justifie our *Separation* from them, but only that we could not have *our Children Baptized without an aerial Sign of the Cross, nor receive the Communion without Kneeling; that we do not observe Holy-days, and use a Liturgy; and that they are not so good as they should be, nor Doctrines so exact as were to be wished*; How should we be hissed and laughed at all over the *Christian World*; if we had nothing to alledge for our *Separation* from the *Roman Church*, but such things as these? And when the *Papists* see the weakness of these Allegations, they are harden'd in their own ways; and cry out presently there is no End of *Schisms* and *Separations* on such Pretences as these, by which unspeakable Mischief hath been done to the *Cause* of the *Reformation*.

Sect. 24. (2.) *This Pretence of Separation would make Union among the Protestant Churches impossible, supposing them to remain as they are.* For the *Lutheran Churches* have the same, and more *Ceremonies*, and *Unscriptural Impositions*, (as they are called) than *our Church* hath. They use the *Cross in Baptism*, *Kneeling at the Communion*; and the *Observation of Holy-days and Times of Fasting*, *and Set-Forms of Prayer*, &c. yet these *Churches* have been thought fit to be *united* with the *most Reformed Churches*, by the best and wisest *Protestants*, both abroad and at home. I do not mean only to have *Communion with them in Faith and Love*, as Dr. *O.* speaks, but to join together so as to make the same

Bodies

Bodies of *Churches*. A *Synod* of the *Reformed Churches* in *France*, at *Charenton*. *A.D.* 1631. declared, *that there was no Idolatry or Superstition in the Lutheran Churches, and therefore the Members of their Churches might be received into Communion with them, without renouncing their own Opinions or Practices*; which shews that they did not look on them as sufficient grounds of *Separation*; for then they would not have admitted them as *Members* of the *Lutheran Churches*, but have told told them, they ought to forsake their Communion, and embrace that of the *Reformed Churches*. Look over all those *learned* and *peaceable Divines*, who have projected or perswaded an *Union* with the *Lutheran Churches* and others; and see if any of them make the Particulars mention'd, any cause of *Separation* from them. The *Helvetian Churches* declare, *That no Separation ought to be made for different Rites and Ceremonies, where there is an Agreement in Doctrine: And the true concord of Churches lies in the Doctrine of* Christ, *and the Sacraments deliver'd by him.* And this *Confession* was first drawn up by *Bullinger*, *Myconius* and *Grynæus*, and subscribed afterwards by *all* their *Ministers*; and by those of *Geneva* and other Places. And they take notice of the different *Customs* in other *Churches* about the *Lord's Supper* and other things, yet, say they, *because of our consent in Doctrine, these things cause no Breach in our Churches.* And they make no scruple about the *indifferency* of any of the *Ceremonies* used in the *Lutheran Churches*, except those of the *Mass* and *Images in Churches*. At *Sendomir in Poland*, *A. D.* 1570. Those who followed the *Helvetian*, *Auspurg*, *Bohemian Confessions*, came to a full Agreement, so as to make up one Body, notwithstanding the different *Rites* and *Ceremonies* among them; *which*, they say, *ought not to break the Communion of Churches, as long as they agree in the same purity of Doctrine, and the same foundation of Faith and Salvation*; and for this they appeal to the *Auspurg* and *Saxon Confessions*. The *Auspurg Confession* declares, *That agreement in Doctrine and Sacraments is sufficient for the Churches Unity*; then Separation cannot be lawful merely on the account of *Ceremonies* and *Human Traditions*. And the *Confession of Strasbug* saith, *That they look on no Human Traditions as condemned in Scripture, but such as are repugnant to the Law of God*; *and bind the Consciences of Men*; *otherwise if they agree with Scripture, and be appointed for good Ends, although they be not expresly mention'd in Scripture, they are rather to be looked on as Divine than Human*; *and the contempt of them is the contempt of God himself. Nay*, they say, *tho' the Laws seem very hard and unjust, a true Christian will not stick at obeying them, if they command nothing that is wicked.*

Praefat. ad Confess. Helvet. & art. 17, 27.

Consens. Polon. p. 220.

Confess. August. art. 7.

Confess. Argent. c. 14.

Joh. Crocius distinguisheth of Three sorts of *Ceremonies*.

The First *commanded*,
The Second *forbidden*,
The Third *neither commanded nor forbidden.*

Croc. de Eccles. Unit. & Schism. c. 6. n. 4.

The Unity of the Church supposeth the Observation of the First, and yet for every Omission the Communion of the Church is not to be broken. The Second breaks the Churches Unity; *yet its communion not to be forsaken for One or Two of these, if there be no Tyranny over the Consciences of Men*; *but for the Third, Men ought not to break the Unity of the Church.* And in another place he gives particular Instances in the *Ceremonies* observed in the *Lutheran Churches*, *the Exorcism in Baptism*, *the Linen Garments and Wax-Candles*, *the Holy-days and Confession*, &c. and declares, *That we ought not to break off communion with Churches, or make a Schism for these things.* Zanchy *accounts it a great Sin to disturb*

Comment. de Aug. confess. 9. c. 4. p. 33. c. 29. Pag. 435. Zanch. 1. de Red. p. 765.

disturb the Peace of Churches for the sake of indifferent Ceremonies; *and contrary to that Charity we ought to have to our Brethren and to Churches.*

Amyrald. de Seces. ab Eccl. Rom. Deque pace cum Evangel. constit. p. 231.

Amyraldus speaking of the *Ceremonies* in the *Lutheran Churches*, saith, *that those which came in use after the Apostolick times, have no other Obligation on us, than that for the sake of indifferent things, tho' at first appointed out of no Necessity, nay tho' there be Inconveniency in them, yet the Churches Peace ought not to be disturbed.*

And he very well observes, *that the Nature of Ceremonies is to be taken from the Doctrine which goes along with them*; *if the Doctrine be good the Rites are so, or at least are tolerable*; *if it be false, then they are troublesome, and not to be born*; *if it be impure, and lead to Idolatry, then the Ceremonies are tainted with the Poyson of it.* But, saith he, *the Lutheran Churces have no false or wicked Doctrine concerning their Rites*; *and therefore he adviseth Persons to communicate with the Lutheran Churches, as their Occasions serve*; and so do others. And *Ludovicus Prince Elector Palatine*, not only congratulated the *mutual Communion* of the several *Churches in Poland*, but pray'd for the same in *Germany* too, as *Bishop Davenant* tells us; who proves at large, that there is no sufficient *Reason* to hinder it; which he makes to lie only in Three things.

Hornbeek de Consociat. Evang. Sect. 1. n. 3.

Sentent. D. Daven. p. 5.

I. *Tyranny over Mens Faith and Consciences.*

II. *The Practice of Idolatry.*

III. *The Denial of some Fundamental Article of Faith.*

And none of these things being chargeable on the *Lutheran Churches*, the *lawfulness* of the *Terms* of *Communion* with them doth fully appear.

And now I desire our Brethren, who justifie their *Separation* upon pretence *that our Terms of Communion are unlawful*, to reflect upon these things. Will they condemn so many *Protestant Churches* abroad, which have harder *Terms* of *Communion* than we? What would they think of the *Exorcism* of *Infants*, of *Auricular Confession*, of *Images in Churches*, and some other things, besides what are observed among us? Do we *want Discipline?* Do they not in other *Churches* abroad?

The *Transylvanian Divines* in their *Discourse* of the *Union* of *Protestant Churches* declared, *That little or none was observ'd among them.* Will they then *separate from all Protestant Churches?* Will they confine the *Communion* of *Christians* to their Narrow Scantlings? Will they shut out all the *Lutheran Churches* from any possibility of *Union* with them? For what *Union* can be justifiable with those whose *Terms of Communion are unlawful?* They may pity them, and pray for them, and wish for their *Reformation*, but an *Union* doth suppose such a *Communion of Churches*, that the *Members* of one may *communicate* in another. Do they allow this to the *Lutheran Churches?* If not, then they render *Union* among the *Protestant Churches* impossible, because *unlawful.* If they do, will they be so unjust, as not to allow the same Favour and Kindness to our own *Church?* Can they think *Separation* necessary from our *Church* on those Grounds, which are common to us with other *Protestant Churches*; and yet think *Union desirable* and *possible* with them notwithstanding? Do they think that the *Members* of the *Reformed Churches* could *lawfully communicate* with the *Lutheran Churches*, altho' they have the *Cross in Baptism*, *Kneeling at the Communion*; the *Surplice*, and other *Ceremonies* which we have not? and yet, Is it necessary to *separate* from our *Churches Communion* on the account of such things as these; where there is acknowledged to be a full *Agreement* in the *Substantials* of *Religion?*

Irenic tract. Pror. p. 55.

ligion? Either therefore they must differ from the Judgment of the *Reformed Churches*, and the most eminent *Protestant Divines* abroad, or they must renounce this *Principle* of *Separation.*

Sect. 25. (3.) *This will justifie the ancient Schisms which have been always condemn'd in the Christian Church.* For setting aside the *Ceremonies* (of which already) and *the use of the Liturgy and Holy-days* (which is common to our *Church* with all other *Christian Churches*, for many Hundred years before the great Degeneracy of the *Roman Church*; and are continued by an *universal consent* in all parts of the *Christian World*) the other Reasons for *Separation* are such, which will justifie the greatest *Schismaticks* that ever were in the *Christian Church*, viz. *Want of Evangelical Church-Discipline, and due Means of Edification, and depriving the People of their Liberty of chusing their own Pastors, whereby they are deprived also of all use of their light and knowledge of the Gospel, in providing for their own Edification.* For, What gave occasion to the *Novatian Schism*, which began so soon, and spread so far, and continued so long, but the Pretence of *the want of Evangelical Church-Discipline, and better Means of Edification, and humouring the People in the choice of their own Pastors?* *Vindication of Non-conformists, p. 13. 36.*

There were Two things the *Novatians* chiefly insisted on, as to *Evangelical-discipline.*

1. The *Power of the Keys.*
2. The *Purity of the Church.*

1. As to *the Power of the Keys*, they said, *That* Christ *had never given it absolutely to his Church, but under certain Restrictions, which if Men exceeded, the Church had no Power to release them*; and that was especially *in the case of denial of* Christ *before Men, when Men fell in time of Persecution.*

2. *The Church's Purity ought to be preserved, by keeping such who had thus fallen from ever being receiv'd into communion again.* They did not deny *that God might pardon such upon Repentance, but*, they said, *the Church could not.* And this they pleaded would tend very much to *the Edification of Christians*, and would make them *more watchful* over themselves, when they saw no hopes of recovering the *Church's communion*, if they once fell from it. Add to this, that *Novatus*, or *Novatianus* (for the *Greeks* confounded their Names) in his *Epistle* to *Dionysius* of *Alexandria*, saith, *That he was forced to do what he did, by the importunity of the Brethren, who out of their zeal for the Purity of the Ecclesiastical-Discipline*, would not comply with the looser part, which joined with *Cornelius*, and therefore chose him to be their *Bishop.* And so much appears by *Pacianus*, that *Novatus* coming from *Carthage* to *Rome*, makes a Party there for *Novatianus* in opposition to *Cornelius*, which consisted chiefly of *those who had stood firmest in the Persecution*; in their Name he Writes to *Novatianus*, declaring, That he was *chosen* by the *zealous Party* at *Rome, whereas Cornelius had admitted the lapsed to communion*, and consequently *corrupted* the *Discipline* of the *Christian Church.* *Cyprian. ad Anton. Ep. 52. n. 13.* *Euseb. l. 6. c. 45.* *Pacian. Epist. 3. ad Sempron.*

Here we have a concurrence of Dr. O's Pleas, *Zeal for Reformation of Discipline, the greater Edification of the People, and the asserting their right in chusing such a Pastor as was not likely to promote their Edification.* But notwithstanding these fair Pretences, the making a *Separation* in the *Church*, was every where condemned as a *great Sin*; as appears by St. *Cyprian*, *Dionysius* of *Alexandria*, *Theodoret*, *Epiphanius*, and others. *Cyprian. Epist. 51, 52. De unit. Eccl. de lapsis. Euseb. l. 6. c. 45. Theod. hæret. fab. l. 3. 5. Epiph. hær. 59.*

others. *Dionysius* tells the Author of the *Schism, that he had better have suffer'd any thing, than thus to have made a Rent in the Church: and it was as glorious a Martyrdom to die to prevent a Schism, as to avoid Idolatry, and he thinks it a much greater thing; the one being a Martyrdom for the Church, the other only for ones own Soul.* St. *Cyprian* charges those who were guilty of this *Schism* with *Pride and Arrogance, and doing unspeakable mischief to the Church, by breaking the Peace of it: and will hardly allow those to be Christians who lived in such a Schism:* when as *Epiphanius* observes, *they still pleaded they had the same Faith with the Catholick Church*; and yet St. *Cyprian* will not allow that to be *true Faith which hath not charity*; and saith, *That there can be no true charity, where Men do thus break in pieces the Unity of the Church.*

Cyprian. de Unit. Eccl. n. 11. 12, &c.

Epiph. hær. 68. The *Meletians* in *Ægypt* agreed with the *Catholick Christians* in the *Substantials of Religion, holding the same Faith with them*, as *Epiphanius* relates the Story; and their *Schism* began too *about preserving the Discipline of the Church, and the best means for the Edification of the People.* They allowed a *Restitution* for the *lapsed* to the *Communion* of the *Church*, but after a *very severe Discipline*, and an utter *incapacity* of those in *Orders* as to any parts of their *Functions*. But *Peter Bishop* of *Alexandria* thought the milder way the better; whereupon a *Separation* followed: and the *Meletians* had *distinct Churches*; which they called, *The Churches of the Martyrs*. This *Schism* grew to that height, *that they would not pray together in Prison, nor in the Quarries whither they were sent. Meletius being a Bishop* was *deposed* by *Peter* of *Alexandria*, but he went on still to promote the *course of Separation* in *Thebais*, and other parts of *Egypt*, upon which the *Council* of *Nice*, in their *Synodical Epistle*, deprived him of all *Episcopal Power*, and the *People* that adhered to him, of the *Power of choosing their own Pastors* (or rather of *proposing the names of those who were to be ordained.*) And so, according to Dr. *O. they had just cause to continue their Separation still*, although it were condemned by the *Council* of *Nice*.

Theod. l. 1. *c.* 9.

Audæus began his *Schism* out of a *mighty zeal* for the *Discipline* of the *Church*, and a great freedom which he used in reproving the *faults* of the *Bishops* and *Clergy*; but meeting with ill usage, he withdrew from the *Churches Communion*, with his *Disciples*, although he still retained *the same Faith, and agreed in the Substantials of Religion with the best Christians*; but forbore *all Communion* with them; which *Epiphanius* accounts δεινότερον πάντων καὶ φοβερώτερον, *the most dreadful thing in the World:* and yet upon Dr. O's *Principles* of *Separation*, they did a very commendable thing as long as their design was to restore *the Churches Discipline, and to consult their own greater Edification.*

Epiph. hær. 70. *Sect.* 15.

The followers of *Eustathius Sebastenus* are on this account likewise excused, who withdrew from the *publick Congregations* on a pretence of greater *sanctity and purity in Paphlagonia*, and stand condemned in several *Canons* of the *Council* at *Gangræ*; so are those mention'd and condemn'd in the *Councils* of *Constantinople* and *Carthage*; and the *Separation* of *Felicissimus* and his *Brethren* from St. *Cyprian*; all which are set down together in my *Sermon*, but are gently passed over by Dr. *O.* and Mr. *B.* and the rest of their Adversaries.

Only one saith, *That the Errors of the followers of* Eustathius Sebastenus, *both in Opinion and Practice, were very gross, which the Council takes notice of and condemns.* Yet, *as gross as they were*, there was a *pretence* of *greater Sanctity and Purity* in them. For *their abstaining from*

Rector of Sutton, &c. p. 42.

Marriage, and peculiarity of Habits, and *Separate Meetings*, were all carried on with the same *Pretence*.

To proceed then. On the same accounts the *Donatists* will be vindicated in the *main grounds* of their *Schism*, although they were mistaken in the *matter* of *fact* concerning *Cæcilian*; for their *great pretence* was to preserve *the purity* of the *Church's Discipline*, as may at large be seen in *Optatus*, and St. *Augustin*; and yet they frequently, and deliberately call it, *a most Damnable and Sacrilegious Schism*.

The *Luciferians* pretended such a *zeal* for the *true Faith*, and the *Discipline of the Church*, that the only *pretence* for their *Schism* was, that they could not *communicate* with those who had subscribed to *Arianism*, or received *Ordination* from *Arian Bishops*; as may be seen at large in the *Book* of *Marcellinus* and *Faustinus*. And they joyned with the party of *Ursinus* at *Rome* against that of *Damasus*, and complained, *they were deprived of the liberty of choosing their own Pastors*.

So that upon these grounds, there hath scarce been any considerable *Schism* in the *Christian Church*, but may be justified upon Dr. *Owen*'s Reasons *for Separation from our Church*.

Sect. 26. (4.) Another Argument against this *course* of *Separation*, is, *That these grounds will make Separation endless*. Which is, to suppose all the Exhortations of *Scripture* to *Peace* and *Unity* among *Christians*, to signifie nothing. For nothing being more contrary to *Unity* than *Division* and *Separation*; if there be no bounds set, but what the fancies of Men dictate to them be sufficient Grounds to justifie *Division* and *Separation*, any People may break *Communion* with a *Church*, and set up a *new* one, when they think fit; which will leave the *Christian Church* in a remediless condition against those who break its *Peace* and *Communion*. It being a true saying of Mr. *Cotton*'s of *New-England*, *That they that separate from their Brethren farther than they have just Cause, shall at length find cause (or at least think they have found cause) just enough to separate one from another. I never heard*, saith he, *of any instance to the contrary, either in* England, *or* Holland. The substance of this I had objected before in the *Preface* to my *Sermon*; To which Mr. *A.* Replies after this manner; *That though some petty and inconsiderable inconveniencies, some little trouble may arise to a Church from the levity and volubility of Mens Minds; yet this is no Reason why they should enslave their Judgments or Consciences to others*. And is this all the *Antidote* against the *Mischief* of *Separation?* Is it a Sin, to *break* the *Church's Communion*, or, Is it not? If it be a *Sin* in some cases, but not in others; Why do you not shew us what those *cases* are; and that it is a *sinful Separation* in other *cases*, but not in them? But to talk of *small inconveniencies by the levity of Peoples minds*, is Childish trifling, and not answering. Is *Schism* indeed become such an *inconsiderable and petty inconvenience?* Is this an Answer becoming a *Christian*, to swell every *small Imposition* into a huge insupportable Mountain, and to make themselves lie groaning under the weight of a *Ceremony or two*, as though their very heart-strings were cracking, and as if *Nero* had begun a fresh Persecution; and at the same time to lessen the guilt of *Division* and *Separation*, as though it were nothing but a little *wantonness* in the *Lambs* of their *Flocks*, frisking up and down from one *Pasture* to another; *some small and inconsiderable inconveniencies* may happen by it, but not worth speaking of; and it is pity they should be deprived of their pleasure for it. What a rare Advocate had this Man been for the *Novatians*, *Donatists*, *Luciferians*, or what

Cotton's *Answer to* R. Williams *p.* 121.

Mischief of Imposit. in the Preface.

Schismaticks soever rent the *Church* in pieces in former times? And supposing St. *Cyprian*, and St. *Augustine*, and other great opposers of the ancient *Schisms*, to be met together, we may gather from these words, and the *Principles* of *Separation*, which he lays down, after what manner he would accost them. " Alas (saith he) What do you mean, *Cyprian*, " and *Austin*, and other *Reverend Fathers*, to talk with so much severity " and sharpness against *separation* from the *communion* of the *Church*, as " though it were such a *damnable sin*, such a *sacrilegious impiety*, such a " *horrid Wickedness?* Will you make no allowance to the *levity and* " *volubility of Mens Minds?* What! you would have Men *enslave* " *their Judgments and consciences to others*, would you? You would " have us be *mere Brutes to be managed by your Bit and Bridle?* If " the *Novatians* do think your *Discipline* too loose, Why should not " they join together for stricter? If *Felicissimus* and his Brethren " dislike some things in the *Church* of *Carthage*, Why may not they " go to the *Mountains* for *separate Meetings?* If the good People were " imposed upon against their *Wills* in the Choice of *Cornelius*, Why " may not they choose *Novatian* for their *Pastor?* What a stir do you " *Cyprian* make in your *Epistles* about keeping the *Peace* of the *Church*, " and submitting to your *Rules* of *Discipline?* As though there were " not more *mischief* in your *imposing*, than in the *Peoples separating*. And " as for you *Augustin*, Who can with patience read your long and fierce " Declarations, against the sober *Donatists?* For, there were mad hare-" brained *Fanaticks*, called *Circumcellians*, who were troubled with more " than ordinary *levity* and *volubility*, running *from place to place*, and ta-" ing away other Mens lives, and their own too, out of *pure zeal*; " These I grant have an extraordinary *Worm*, which ought to be picked " out in time; but for the rest of the *Brethren*, that only *separate* on " the account of *impurity* which they apprehend in your *Church*, Why " should you be so severe against them? Why do you so often cry out " of the *sacrilegiousness* of this *Schism?* We know no other *sacrilege*, " but the *sacrilegious desertion* of our *Ministry*, in obedience to the Laws; " this is a *Sacrilege* we often talk of, and tell the People, *it is far worse* " *than robbing Church-Plate*, considering what precious Gifts we have. " But for the *Sacrilege* of *Schism*, that we can never understand; al-" though I perceive you have it over and over; besides many other hard " words, wherein you would seem to make it *the greatest of all Wicked-*" *ness*; and you say, *That God punished it more severely than Idolatry*; " *since those who were guilty of the latter, were to be destroyed by the* " *Sword, but Schismaticks were swallowed up of the Earth*; *as* Corah, " *and his* Company. Whereas we that have greater light, look upon " *Separation* but as an effect of the *levity and volubility of Mens Minds*, " and though some *little trouble may come to the Church by it*, yet it is " far better than submission to others impositions. And is not this an " intolerable imposition, for you to force these honest *Donatists* to com-" municate in a *corrupt* and *impure Church*, as they do believe yours to " be? When the *Cause* was strictly examined at *Carthage*, What was " it their *Party* pleaded for, but *Purity* of *Discipline*, and that the *Church* " was defiled for *want* of it? And therefore they were forced to *Sepa-*" *rate*, for *greater Purity* of *Ordinances*. And, Is this the *Damnable*, " *Devilish*, *Sacrilegious Schism* you talk of? Methinks you should con-" sider better the *Mischief* of your *Impositions*, when you require *Com-*" *munion* so strictly with you, or else they must presently be *Separatists*

" and

Aug. c. Ep. Parmen. l. 1. c. 7. l. 2. c. 1, 3, 11. l. 3. c. 1. De bapt. c. Donat. l. 2. c. Cresc. l. 2. c. 14. Aug. Ep. 43. & 51.

Collat. 3. Carthag. n. 258.

" and *Schismaticks.* I pray Sirs have a little patience with me; if I do " not fetch off my good friends the *Donatists* in this matter, we will all " be content to be called *Schismaticks*, as well as they. For if our *Prin-* " *ciples* do clear our selves, I am sure they will do as good a turn " for them. Now, the main *Principles* of our present *Separation* are " these.

" (1.) *That every particular Church, upon a due balance of all circum-* " *stances, has an inherent right to choose its own Pastor, and every parti-* " *cular Christian the same Power to choose his own Church. I say not to mis-* " *choose*, do you mark me, *but, a power to choose; not to choose any, but one* " *that may best advance their own Edification; at least that no Pastor be for-* " *ced upon a Church, no Church obtruded on a single Christian without their* " *own consent.* Now I pray consider, Why might not *Lucilla*, and *Do-* " *natus*, and *Botrus*, and *Celeusius*, with their Party among the *People at* " *Carthage*, choose *Majorinus* for their *Pastor*; although the rest had " chosen *Cæcilian?* For they were not well satisfied with *Mensurius* his " Predecessor, whom they suspected for a *Traditor*; but when they had " *their liberty to choose*, Why should they be debarred of their *inherent* " *right of choosing their own Pastor?* Why should *Cæcilian* be obtruded " upon them? Why should not they choose one, who would best *ad-* " *vance their Edification?* For *Cæcilian* was at least under suspicion of " *compliance* in time of *Persecution*, and therefore for my part, upon " our Principles, I think the *Donatists* very free from the *charge* of " *Schism.* *Mischief of Impositions in the Preface.*

" (2.) *That it is the duty of every Christian to worship, not only in pu-* " *rity of heart, but according to the purity of Gospel-Administrations.* Now " observe, that there was nothing the *Donatists* pleaded so much, and " so vehemently for, as the *purity of Gospel-Administrations.* This was " that which *Parmenian*, *Petilian*, and the rest still contended for, as " appears by the *Plea* they put in for themselves in the last *Conference* " at *Carthage. We are they* (say they) *that have suffer'd persecution* " *for maintaining the Purity of the Church, this hundred years, because* " *we would not comply with their corruptions, we have been turned out of* " *our Churches, and been sent to Prison, and had our Goods taken from* " *us, and some of our Brethren have been killed, and others hardly used* " *for so good a Cause*; And, Can such Men as you condemn them for a " horrible *Schism?* I tell you, they are as Innocent as our selves, for " they went upon the same grounds. *Collat. 3. Carthag. n. 258.*

" (3.) *That every Christian is obliged to live in the use of all God's Or-* " *dinances and Commandments.* Now, Is not *Discipline* one of *God's Ordi-* " *nances?* And, Do we not make *want of Discipline*, one of the *Reasons* " of our *Separation?* And therefore the *Donatists* were very honest Men, " for they were just of our mind. And these being the chief grounds " we go upon, we cannot but in *Brotherly kindness* speak this in *vindica-* " *tion* of them, against your unreasonable severity. I know you tell " them often, *There will be no end of Separation upon these terms; for* " *why might not* Maximianus *do the same by* Primianus, *that* Majorinus " *did by* Cæcilian? And so make *frustum de frusto*, by which they did " *minutatim concidere, cut the Church into so many little pieces*, that " could never be joyned together again; But, let me tell you, that the " force of your Argument comes to this, *That Men may choose one Pastor* " *to day, and another to morrow, and a third the next; and so turn round* " *till they are giddy, and run themselves out of breath in a Wild-goose* " *chase,* *Aug. enarr. 2. in Ps. 36. C. Parmen. l. 1. c. 5. l. 2. c. 18.*

" *chase, till they sit down and rest in Irreligion and Atheism. And is*
" *this all?* (these are his own words.) *The Apostle commands us to*
" *prove all things* (What! by running from one Communion to another?
" *Must we needs therefore never hold fast that which is good? unsetled*
" *heads, and unsetled hearts will be wandring; let them go, 'tis a good*
" *riddance of them if they be obstinate; but where this humour has de-*
" *stroyed one Church, this rigorous forcing of Pastors on the People* (as
" *Cæcilian* on the People of *Carthage*) *has divided and destroyed*
" *hundreds.*

Thus far the *Advocate-General* for *Schismaticks.*

Judge now, *Reader*, whether the *causes* of the present *Separation*, as they are laid down by my Adversary, do not equally defend the *Donatists* in their *Schism*; and his making so light a matter of *Schisms* doth not give Encouragement to Men to make more.

Sect. 27. But I shall not send him so far back as St. *Cyprian*, and St. *Augustin*, for better Instruction in this matter; but I shall refer him to one whose Writings I perceive he is better acquainted with, even Mr. *Baxter*. Who hath very well, in several *Books*, set forth *the great Mischief of Divisions and Separations.* He doth not look upon them *as petty and inconsiderable Inconveniencies, little Troubles to the Church, the effects of levity, and volubility of Mens Minds*; but he quotes above Forty Places of *Scriptures* against them, and saith, *That the World, the Flesh, and the Devil are the causes from whence they come*; *that they are as much the Works of the Flesh, as Adulteries, Fornications*, &c. *that contentious Dividers are carnal Men, and have not the Spirit*; *that Dividers are the Wounding, nay the Killing of the Church, as much as lieth in the Dividers*; *and that to reform the Church, by dividing it, is no wiser than to cut out the Liver, or Spleen, or Gall, to cleanse them from the filth that both obstruct them, and hinder them in their Office*; *that Divisions are the deformities of the Church, the lamentation of Friends, and the scorn of Enemies*; *the dishonour of* Christ *and the Gospel*; *the great hinderance of the Conversion and Salvation of the World, and of the Edification of the Members of the Church*; *That they fill the Church with Sins of a most odious Nature*; *they cherish Pride and Malice, and Belying others (the Three great Sins of the Devil) as naturally as dead flesh breedeth Worms. In a word, the Scripture telleth us, that where envying and strife is, there is confusion and every evil work,* (*And, is not this a lamentable way of Reformation of some imaginary, or lesser evils*) *Yet farther*, he saith, *They are uneasie to the persons themselves, and rob them of the sweetest part of Religion*; *they lead directly to Apostacy from the Faith, and shake States and Kingdoms, having a lamentable Influence on the Civil Peace.* Is all this nothing but the natural effect of *the levity or volubility of Peoples Minds?* This learned *Author* begins his *Book* with a very starched Relation of his admirable Reading, *That in his time he hath read an Elegant Oration in praise of a Quartan Ague*; *another upon the Gout, a third upon Folly*; *but there wants one yet in the praise of Schism*; and I never met with one that doth offer fairer toward it, than he doth. For he not only excuses it, from the *natural cause* of it, and *the small trouble that attends it*; but he implies it to be the *consequence of Men's using their Reason, and not being made Brutes to be managed with a strong Bit and Bridle.* But Mr. *Baxter* will teach him another Lesson; for, he saith, *that Schism is a Sin against so many, and clear, and vehement words of*

Cure of Divisions, Direct. 7. *Defence of the Cure, p.* 3.

Christian Directory, p. 739, &c.

Mischief of Impos. Sect. 1.

Christian Directory, p. 741.

the

the Holy Ghost, that it is utterly without excuse; Whoredoms, and Treason, and Perjury are not oftner forbidden in the Gospel, than this: That it is contrary to the very design of Christ *in our Redemption, which was, to reconcile us all to God, and to unite and centre us all in him: That it is contrary to the design of the Spirit of Grace, and to the very nature of Christianity it self: That it is a Sin against the nearest Bonds of our highest Relations to each other; that it is either a dividing* Christ, *or robbing him of a great part of his Inheritance: And neither of these is a little sin: That it is accompanied with Self-ignorance, and Pride, and great Unthankfulness to God: That Church-dividers are the most successful servants of the Devil, being enemies to* Christ *in his Family and Livery: And that they serve the Devil more effectually than open enemies: That Schism is a sin which contradicteth all God's Ordinances and Means of Grace, which are purposely to procure and maintain the Unity of his Church. That it is a sin against as great and lamentable Experiences, as almost any sin can be: And this is a heinous aggravation of it, that it is commonly justified, and not repented of by those that commit it; and it is yet the more heinous, that it is commonly father'd upon God: Lastly, that it is most unlike the Heavenly State, and in some regard worse than the Kingdom of the Devil, for he would not destroy it by dividing it against it self. Remember now,* saith he, *that Schism, and making Parties and Divisions in the Church, is not so small a Sin as many take it for.* I conclude this, with his *Admonition* to *Bagshaw*, upon his lessening the *Sin* of *Separation*. *Alas, dear Brother, that after so many years Silencing and Affliction, after Flames and Plagues, and Dreadful Judgments, after Twenty years Practice of the Sin it self, and when we are buried in the Ruins which it caused, we should not yet know, that our own Uncharitable Divisions, Alienations, and Separations are a Crying Sin! Yea, the Crying Sin; as well as the Uncharitableness and Hurtfulness of others. Alas! Will God leave us also, even us, to the Obdurateness of* Pharaoh? *Doth not Judgment begin with us? Is there not Crying Sin with us? What have we done to* Christ's *Kingdom, to this Kingdom, to our Friends (dead and alive) to our selves, and (alas) to our Enemies, by our Divisions. And, Do we not feel it? Do we not know it? Is it to us, even to us, a Crime intolerable to call us to Repentance? Woe to us! Into what Hard-heartedness have we sinned our selves? Yea, that we should continue, and Passionately defend it? When will God give us Repentance unto Life?*

Defence of his Cure, 2 Except. p. 6.

Let Mr. *A.* read these Passages over Seriously, and then consider, Whether he can go on to Excuse, and Palliate the *SIN* of *SCHISM.*

But it may be said, *That Mr.* A. *speaks all this Comparatively, with enslaving our Judgments and Consciences to others, which he calls an Enormous and Monstrous Principle*; and he saith, *This is a Medicine worse than the Poyson, even as 'tis much better to have a Rational Soul, tho' subject to Mistakes, than the Soul of a Brute, which may be managed as you will, with a strong Bit and Bridle.* To make it plain, that he makes little or nothing of the *Sin* of *Separation*, we must attend to the *Argument* he was to answer; which was, *That if it be lawful* to *separate* on a *pretence* of *greater purity*, where there is an *Agreement in Doctrine*, and the *substantial parts of Worship*, as is agreed in our *Case*, then a bare difference of *Opinion*, as to some *circumstances of Worship*, and the best *Constitution* of *Churches*, will be sufficient *Ground* to break

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Communion, and to set up *new Churches*; which considering the great variety of Men's fancies about these matters, is to make an *infinite Divisibility* in *Churches*, without any possible stop to farther *Separation*. Where we see plainly the Inconvenience urged is *endless Separation*: Doth he set any kind of bounds to it? No; but only talks of *inconsiderable and petty Inconveniences, and some little trouble that may arise to a Church from the levity and volubility of Men's Minds*, i. e. let Men *separate* as long as they will, this is the worst of it; and he must grant, that though *Separation* be *endless*, there is no harm in it. But he that could find out a *medium* between *Circumstances of Worship, and Substantials*; can find out none between *endless Separation*, and the *enslaving Men's Judgments and Consciences*; for he supposes, one of the two must of necessity be: Which is plain giving up the *Cause* to the *Papists*. For this is their Argument, *Either we must give up our Judgments and Consciences to the Conduct of our Guides, or there will be endless Separation*. He grants the *consequence*, and cries, What then? It is nothing but *the levity and volubility of Men's Minds*, and *this is much rather to be chosen than the other*. But any sound *Protestant* that understands the *State* of the *Controversie* between us and them (as this *Author* apparently doth not) will presently deny the *Consequence*: Because a *prudent and due submission* in *lawful things* lies between *Tyranny over Men's Consciences, and endless Separation*. But he knows no *Medium* between being tied Neck and Heels together, and leaping over Hedge and Ditch, being kept within no Bounds. And what ignorance or malice is it to suppose, *that our Church brings in that enormous and monstrous Principle, of enslaving Men's Judgments and Consciences, forcing them to surrender their Reasons to naked Will and Pleasure?* and if he doth not suppose it, his Discourse is frivolous and impertinent. For, a *due submission* to the *Rules* of our *established Church*, without any force on the *Consciences* of Men, as to the *Infallibility* of *Guides*, or *necessity* of the *things* themselves; will put a sufficient stop to *Separation*; which must be *endless* on my Adversaries suppositions.

Sect. 28. (5.) Lastly, I Argue against this *Separation*, *from the Obligation which lies upon all Christians, to preserve the Peace and Unity of the Church*. And now I have brought the matter home to the *Consciences* of Men, who it may be will little regard other *Inconveniences*, if the practice of *Separation* do not appear to be *unlawful* from the *Word* of *God*. Which I now undertake to prove, upon these Suppositions.

(1.) That all *Christians* are under the *strictest Obligations* to preserve the *Peace and Unity* of the *Church*. For it is not possible to suppose, that any *Duty* should be bound upon the *Consciences* of Men, with plainer Precepts, and stronger Arguments than this is. The places are so many, that it were *endless* to repeat them; and therefore needless, because this is agreed on all hands. So that *violation* of the *Unity* of the *Church*, where there is no sufficient reason to justifie it, is a *Sin*, as much as *Murder* is, and as plainly forbidden. But it happens here, as it doth in the other case, that as *Murder* is always a *sin*; but there may be some *circumstances*, which may make the taking away a Man's Life, not to be *Murder*; so it may happen, that though *Schism* be always a *sin*, yet there may be such *circumstances* which may make a *Separation* not to be a *Schism*; but then they must be such Reasons,

as

as are not fetched from our Fancies, no more than in the case of *Murder*; but such as are allowed by *God* himself in his Law. For, he only that made the Law can except from it.

(2.) The *Unity* of the *Church* doth not lie in a *bare communion of Faith and Love*, but in a *Joynt-participation of the Ordinances appointed by* Christ *to be observed in his Church.* For although the former be a *Duty*, yet it doth not take in the whole *Duty* of a *Christian*, which is to join together, as *Members of the same Body.* And therefore they are commanded *to Assemble together*; and upon the first *Institution* of a *Christian Church*, it is said, *The Disciples continued in the Apostles Doctrine and Fellowship, and in breaking of Bread, and in Prayers.* And the *Apostle* sets forth *Christians* as making *one Body*, by Communion in the Ordinances of *Christ. We being many are one Bread, and one Body*; *for we are all Partakers of that one Bread. And by one Spirit, we are all Baptized into one Body*; *whether we be Jews or Gentiles, bond or free, and have been all made to drink into one Spirit.* The *Unity* of the Christian Church, St. *Paul* saith, is *to be preserved by the Bond of Peace*; and that *Unity* supposeth *One Body* and *One Spirit*; and the *Members* of that *Body* as they are united to one *Head*, whom he calls *One Lord*, so they are joined together by *One Faith*, and *One Baptism.* Therefore as the *Unity* of the *Church* is founded upon some *External Bonds*, as well as *Internal*, that is, *One Faith*, and *One Baptism*, as well as *One Lord*, and *One Spirit*; so the manifestation of this *Unity* ought to be by *External Acts*; for, How can this *Unity* be discovered by *Acts* merely Internal and Spiritual; as inward *love* to the *Members* of the *Body*, being *present in Spirit*, &c? Therefore, the Obligation to preserve the *Unity* of the *Church*, doth imply a *joining* together with the other *Members* of the *Church*, in common and Publick *Acts* of *Religion.*

Heb. 10. 25. Act. 2. 42. 1 Cor. 10. 17. 1 Cor. 12. 13. Ephes. 4. 3, 4, 5.

(3.) Nothing can discharge a *Christian* from this *Obligation* to *Communion* with his *Fellow-Members*, but what is allowed by *Christ* or his *Apostles*, as a *sufficient Reason* for it. Because this being a *new Society* of *Christ*'s own *Institution*; and the *obligation* to *Communion* being so strictly enjoined, we are to suppose it still to hold, where some plain declaration of his Will to the contrary doth not appear. Although *God* hath, with great severity, forbidden *Killing:* Yet when himself appointed particular *cases*, wherein Men's Lives were to be taken away; we are thereby assur'd, that in these cases it is not that *killing* which is *forbidden*; so in the present case, if it appear that although *Separation* from the *Communion* of *Christians* be a thing condemned; yet if the same *Authority* do allow particular exemptions, we are certain in those cases such *Separation* is no sin. But then, as in the former case, no Man is exempted from the guilt of *shedding blood*, who upon his own fancy takes upon him to execute *Justice*; so here, no Man's *imagination* that he doth *separate* for a good end, will justifie his *Separation*; for the guilt of the sin remains as great in it self. And there is scarce any other sin more aggravated in the *New Testament* than this; it being so directly contrary to that *Unity* of his *Church*, which our *Saviour* prayed for, and his *Apostles* with so much earnestness recommend to all Christians; and use so many Arguments to perswade Men to persevere. From hence *Irenæus* saith, *That* Christ *will come to Judge those who make Schisms in the Church, and rather regard their own advantage, than the Churches Unity*; *who, for* slight

John 17. 21.

Iren. l. 4. c. 62.

slight causes, or for any, make nothing of cutting asunder the great and glorious Body of Christ, *and do what in them lies to destroy it. They speak for Peace,* saith he, *but they mean War; they strain at a Gnat, and swallow Camels. The benefit they hope to bring to the Church, cannot make amends for the mischief of their Schism. Nothing provokes God more,* Chrysost. in Eph. 4. p. 822. saith St. *Chrysostom, than to divide his Church: Nay,* saith he, *the Blood of Martyrdom will not wash off the guilt of it. The mischief the Church receives by it, is greater than it receives from open Enemies; for the one makes it more glorious, the other exposes it to shame among its Enemies, when it is set upon by its own Children. This,* saith he, *I speak to those who make no great matter of Schism, and indifferently go to the Meetings of those who divide the Church. If their Doctrine be contrary to ours, for that reason they ought to abstain; if not,* πολλῷ μᾶλλον, *they ought to do it so much the rather. Do not you know what* Corah, Dathan, *and* Abiram *suffer'd? and not they only, but those that were with them. But you say, they have the same Faith, and they are very Orthodox: Why then,* saith he, *do they separate? One Lord, one Faith, one Baptism. If they do well, we do ill; if we do well they do ill. If they have the same Doctrines, the same Sacraments, for what cause do they set up another Church in opposition to ours? It is nothing but vain-glory, ambition, and deceit. Take away the People from them, and you cut off the disease.* And after much more to that purpose, *I speak these things,* saith he, *that no Man might say, he did not know it to be such a sin: I tell you, and testifie this to you, that Separation from the Church, or dividing of it, is no less a sin, than falling into Heresie.* If the sin then be so great and dangerous, Men ought to examine with great care, what cases those are wherein Separation may be made without sin.

And I do earnestly desire our *Brethren,* as they love their own Souls, and would avoid the guilt of so great a Sin, impartially, and without prejudice to consider this passage of *Irenæus,* and how parallel it is with their own Case who *separate* from us, and set up other Churches in opposition to ours, which yet they acknowledge *to be very Orthodox,* and to agree with them *in the same Doctrine, and the same Sacraments.*

4. There are Three *Cases* wherein the *Scripture* allows of *Separation.*

First, In the *case* of *idolatrous Worship.* For the Precepts are as plain that *Christians* should *abstain* from *Idolatry,* as that they should preserve 1 Cor. 10. 6. 14. 1 St. Joh. 5. Mat. 4. 19. the *unity* of the *Church. Neither be ye Idolaters. Flee from Idolatry. Keep your selves from Idols. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve.* And to the case of *Idolaters,* St. *Paul* applies the 2 Cor. 6. 17. words spoken of old to the *Babylonians, Come out from among them, and be separate, and touch not the unclean thing.* Now in this case, where there is so plain a Command, there is no doubt of the *lawfulness* of *Separation*; if Men cannot join with a Church in their religious Worship, without doing that which *God* hath so strictly forbidden.

Secondly, In case of *false Doctrine* being imposed in stead of *true.* For Heb. 13. 7. 17. 1 Thess. 5. 12, 13. Gal. 1. 6, 7, 8. although in other things great *submission* is required to the *Guides* and *Governours* of the *Church*; yet if any *Teachers* offer to bring *another Gospel,* or to corrupt the *true* one, St. *Paul* denounces an *Anathema* against them; and that implies that they should have *no communion* with them, but look upon them as *Persons cut off* from the *Body,* (like putrid Members) lest they should corrupt the rest. St. *Paul* commands *Titus,* when Tit. 3. 10. there is no hopes of reclaiming such, to exclude them from the *So-*

ciety of *Christians*. St. *John* forbids all familiar conversation with such. The *Church* of *Ephesus* is commended for *hating the Nicolaitans*, and the *Church* of *Pergamus* reproved for *tolerating* their *Doctrine*. 2 John 10. Rev. 2. 6. 15.

Thirdly, In case Men make *things indifferent necessary to Salvation*, and *divide* the *Church* upon that account. And this was the case of the *false Apostles*, who urged the *Ceremonies* of the *Law*, *as necessary to Salvation*; and to propagate this opinion of theirs, they went up and down, and endeavour'd to draw away the *Apostles Disciples*, and to set up *separate Churches* among the *Christians*; and to allow none to partake with them, that did not own the *Necessity* of the *Jewish Ceremonies* to *Salvation*. Now although St. *Paul* himself complied sometimes with the practice of them; and the *Jewish Christians* especially in *Judæa*, generally observed them; yet when these false *Apostles* came to enforce the *observation* of them, *as necessary to Salvation*, then he bid the *Christians* at *Philippi* to beware of them, *i. e.* to fly their *communion*, and have nothing to do with them. These are all the *Cases* I can find in the *New Testament*, wherein *Separation* from *publick Communion* is allowed; but there are two others, wherein St. *Paul* gives particular Directions, but such as do not amount to *Separation*. Acts 15. 1. Phil. 3. 3.

1. The *different Opinions* they had about *Meats* and *Drinks*; some were for a *Pythagorean Abstinence*, from *all Flesh*; some for a *Jewish Abstinence*, from some certain sorts; others for a full *Christian Liberty*. Now this being a matter of *Diet*, and relating to their own *Families*, the *Apostle* advises them not to censure or judge one another; but notwithstanding this difference, to join together as *Christians* in the *Duties common* to them all. For the *Kingdom of God doth not lie in Meats and Drinks*; *i. e.* Let every one order his Family as he thinks fit; but that requires *innocency*, and a care not to give disturbance to the *Peace* of the *Church* for these matters; which he calls *peace and joy in the Holy Ghost*, which is provoked and grieved by the dissentions of *Christians*. *And he*, saith he, *that in these things serveth Christ, is acceptable to God, and approved of men. Let us therefore follow after the things that make for peace, and things wherewith we may edifie one another.* In such *Cases* then, the Apostle allows no *Separation* from the *publick communion of Christians*. It was the same case as to the *observation* of *Days* then; for some *Christians* went then on *Jewish Holidays* to the *Synagogues*; others did not; but for such things they ought not to divide from each others *communion* in the common *Acts of Christian Worship*. And the design of the *Apostle* is not to lay down a *standing Rule* of *mutual forbearance* as to *different Communions*; but to shew that such *differences* ought not to be an occasion of *breaking Communion* among *Christians*, and so the *Apostle*'s discourse, *Rom.* 14. holds strongly against *Separation*, on these and the like accounts. Rom. 14. 2. —17. —18. —19.

2. The *corrupt Lives* of many who were not under the *Church*'s Censure. When St. *Paul* taxes so many *Corruptions* in the *Church* of *Corinth*, no wonder if some of them, put the case to them, what they should do, in case they knew some *Members* of the *Church* to be Men of bad Lives; although the offences were not *scandalous*, by being *publickly known*; must they *abstain* from the *communion* of the *Church* for these? To this St. *Paul* answers, That every private Christian ought to forbear all *familiar Conversation* with such: *If any one that is a brother, be a fornicator*, &c. *with such a one, no not to eat.* Which is all the *Apostle* requires of *private Christians*; but if the *Scandal* be publick, as that of the *incestuous* 1 Cor. 5. 11.

stuous person, the *Church* had power to vindicate its own honour, by
Ver. 12, 13. *casting such out*; not as though the *Church-Communion* were *defiled*, if they continued in; but the reputation and honour of the *Church* suffered by it; the preservation whereof, is the *true cause* of the *Church*'s *Discipline*. But the *Apostle* gives not the least *countenance* to private Mens withdrawing from the *Church*'s *Communion*, though such persons still continued in it. For there may be many *reasons* to break off *private familiarity*, which will not hold as to *publick Communion*. For our *Communion* in publick is a thing which chiefly respects *God*, and a necessary duty of his own appointing, the benefit whereof depends upon his *Promises*, and all the *communion* they have with other Men, is only joining together for the performance of a *common religious Duty*: but *private familiarity* is a thing which wholly respects the *Person*'s converse with, and a thing of *mere choice*, and hardly to be imagined without *approbation* at least, if not *imitation* of their *wickedness*. And therefore to argue from one to the other is very *unreasonable*.

The matter of *Separation* being thus stated, according to the *Scripture*, there can be no way left to justifie the *Separation* from our Church, but to prove, either that our *Worship is idolatrous*, or that *our Doctrine is false*, or that *our Ceremonies are made necessary to Salvation*; which are all so remote from any colour of *Truth*, that none of my *Adversaries* have yet had the hardiness to undertake it. But however, what *Pleas* they do bring to justifie this *Separation*, must in the next place be examined.

The Unreaſonableneſs of Separation.

PART. III.

The Pleas *for* Separation *examined.*

§. 1. *The Plea for Separation from the Conſtitution of the* Parochial Churches *conſidered.* §. 2. *Juſtice* Hobart's *Teſtimony for Congregational Churches anſwered.* §. 3. *No Evidence in Antiquity for Independent Congregations.* §. 4. *The Church of* Carthage *governed by Epiſcopal Power, and not Democratical in St.* Cyprian's *time.* §. 5, 6. *No evidence in Scripture of more Churches than one in a City, though there be of more Congregations.* §. 7. *No rule in Scripture to limit Church-power to a ſingle Congregation; but the general Rules extend it farther.* §. 8. *Of* Dioceſan Epiſcopacy; *the Queſtion about it ſtated. But one Biſhop in a City in the beſt Churches, though many Aſſemblies.* §. 9. *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy clearly proved in the* African *Churches. The extent of St.* Auſtin's *Dioceſe.* §. 10. *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy of* Alexandria. *The largeneſs of* Theodoret's *Dioceſe; the Teſtimony of his Epiſtle cleared from all Mr.* B.'s *late Objections.* §. 11. *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy not repugnant to any inſtitution of Chriſt, proved from Mr.* B. *himſelf.* §. 12. *The Power of* Preſbyters *in our Church.* §. 13. *The Epiſcopal Power ſucceeds the Apoſtolical, proved from many Teſtimonies.* §. 14. *What Power of Diſcipline is left to Parochial Churches, as to Admiſſion.* §. 15. *Whether the Power of Suſpenſion be no part of Church Diſcipline.* §. 16, 17. *Of the defect of Diſcipline; and whether it overthrows the being of our Parochial Churches.* §. 18. *Of* National Churches, *and the grounds on which they are built.* §. 19. *The advantages of National Churches above Independent Congregations.* §. 20. *Mr.* B.'s Quæries *about National Churches anſwered. The* Notion *of the* Church of England *explained.* §. 21. *What neceſſity of one Conſtitutive Regent part of a National Church.* §. 22. *What Conſent is neceſſary to the Union of a National Church.* §. 23. *Other Objections anſwered.* §. 24. *Of the* Peoples Power of chuſing their own Paſtors. *Not founded in Scripture.* §. 25. *The Teſtimony of Antiquity concerning it fully enquired into. The great diſturbance of popular Elections; the Canons againſt them. The* Chriſtian Princes *interpoſing. The ancient Rights of Nomination and Preſentation. The practice of foreign Proteſtant Churches. No reaſon to take away the Rights of Patronage to put the choice into the peoples hands. Objections anſwered.* §. 26. *No unlawfulneſs in the* Terms of our Communion. *Of ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip. The things agreed on both ſides.* §. 27. *The way of finding the difference between mere Ceremonies and parts of Divine Worſhip cleared.* §. 28. *The difference of the Popiſh Doctrine from ours as to Ceremonies.* §. 29. *The Sign of the Croſs a Rite of Admiſſion into our Church, and no part of Divine Worſhip.* §. 30. *No new Sacrament. Mr.* B.'s *Objections anſwered.* §. 31. *His great miſtakes about the Papiſts Doctrine*

Etrine concerning the Moral Causalty of Sacraments. §. 32. *Of the Customs observed in our Church, though not strictly required.* §. 33. *Of the Censures of the Church against Opposers of Ceremonies, and the force of Excommunication* ipso facto. §. 34. *Of the Plea of an erroneous Conscience, in the case of Separation.* §. 35. *Of Scruples of Conscience still remaining.* §. 36. *Of the use of Godfathers and Godmothers in Baptism.* §. 37. *No ground of Separation because more Ceremonies may be introduced.* §. 38. *No parity of Reason as to the Dissenters Pleas for separating from our Church, and our separation from the Church of* Rome.

An Appendix containing several Letters of eminent Protestant Divines abroad, shewing the unreasonableness of the present Separation from the Church *of* England.

Letter of Monsieur Le Moyn.

—— *Of Monsieur* Le Angle.

—— *Of Monsieur* Claude.

Sect. 1. ALL the considerable *Pleas* at this time made use of for *Separation*, may be reduced to these *Heads*. 1. Such as relate to the *Constitution of our Church*. 2. To the *Terms* of *Communion* with it. 3. To the *Consciences* of *Dissenters*. 4. To the *Parity* of *Reason* as to our *Separation* from *Rome*.

I. Such as relate to the *Constitution* of *our Church:* Which are these,

1. That our *Parochial Churches* are not of *Christ's Institution*.
2. That our *Diocesan Churches* are *unlawful*.
3. That our *National Church* hath no foundation.
4. That the *People* are deprived of their *Right* in the *choice* of their *Pastors*.

1. I begin with our *Parochial Churches*; because it is Separation from these, with which we principally charge our Adversaries; for herein they most discover their *Principles* of *Separation*, since in former times, the *Nonconformists* thought it their duty to keep up *Communion* with them. But since the *Congregational-way* hath prevailed in *England*, the present *Dissenters* are generally fallen into the *practice* of it, whatever their *Principles* are, at least so far as concerns forsaking *Communion* with *our Parochial Churches*, and joining together in *separate Congregations* for *Divine Worship*. This Principle is therefore the first thing to be examined. And the main foundation of that way, I said, was, that *Communion* in *Ordinances* must be only in such *Churches* as *Christ* himself instituted by *unalterable Rules*, which were only *particular* and *Congregational Churches*. Concerning which I laid down two things. (1.) That supposing *Congregational Churches* to be of *Christ's Institution*, this was no reason for *separation* from our *Parochial Churches*, which have all the *essentials* of such *true Churches* in them. (2.) That there is no reason to believe that the *Institution* of *Churches* was limited to *particular Congregations*.

In answer to this, Dr. O. saith these things, (1.) *That they do not deny, at least some of our Parochial Churches to be true Churches:* But why then do they deny Communion with them? But, he saith, *he hopes it will not be made a Rule, that Communion may* not *be with-held,* (so the sense must be although *not* be left out) *or withdrawn from any Church in any thing, so long as it continues as unto the essence of it to be so.*

This is somewhat odly and faintly expressed. But as long as he grants, that our *Parochial Churches are not guilty of such heinous Errors in Doctrine, or idolatrous Practice in Worship as to deprive them of the Being and Nature of Churches*, I do assert it to be a *Sin* to *separate* from them. Not but that I think, there may be a *separation* without sin, from a *Society* retaining the *essentials* of a *Church*; but then I say, the reason of such *separation* is, *some heinous Error in Doctrine, or some idolatrous Practice in Worship, or some tyranny over the Consciences of men*; which may not be such, as to destroy *true Baptism*, and therefore consistent with the *essentials* of a *Church*. And this is all that I know the *Protestant Writers* do assert in this matter. *Ibid.*

(2.) He answers, *That they do not say, that because Communion in Ordinances must be only in such Churches as Christ hath instituted, that therefore it is lawful and necessary to separate from Parochial Churches, but if it be on other grounds necessary so to separate or withold Communion from them, it is the duty of them who do so, to join themselves in or unto some other particular Congregation.*

To which I reply, that this is either not to the business, or it is a plain giving up the *Cause* of *Independency*. For, wherefore did the *dissenting Brethren* so much insist upon their *separate Congregations*, when not one of the things, now particularly alleged against our *Church*, was required of them? But if he insists on those things common to our *Church* with other *reformed Churches*, then they are such things, as he supposes contrary to the *first Institution of Churches*; And then I intreat him to tell me, what difference there is, between *separating from our* Churches *because Communion in Ordinances is only to be enjoy'd in such Churches as Christ hath instituted*; *and separating from them because they have things repugnant to the first Institution of Churches?* Is not this the *primary reason* of *Separation*, because *Christ hath appointed unalterable Rules for the Government of his Church*; which we are bound to observe, and which are not observed in *Parochial Churches?* Indeed, the most *immediate reason* of *separation* from *such a Church* is not observing *Christ's Institution*; but the *primary ground* is, *that Christ hath settled such Rules for Churches which must be unalterably observed.* Let us then (1.) suppose, that *Christ* hath by *unalterable Rules* appointed *that a Church shall consist only of such a number of men as may meet in one Congregation, so qualified*; *and that these by entring into Covenant with each other become a Church, and choose their Officers, who are to Teach, and Admonish and Administer Sacraments, and to exercise Discipline by the consent of the Congregation*; And let us (2.) suppose such a *Church not yet gathered*, but there lies *fit matter* for it dispersed up and down in several *Parishes*. (3.) Let us suppose Dr. O. about to *gather such a Church*. (4.) Let us suppose not one thing *peculiar* to our *Church* required of these *members*; *neither the aereal sign of the Cross, nor kneeling at the Communion, &c.* I desire then to know, whether Dr. O. be not bound by these *unalterable Rules* to draw these *members* from *Communion* with their *Parochial Churches*, on purpose that they might form a *Congregational Church*, according to *Christ's Institution?* Either then he must quit these *unalterable Rules*, and the *Institution* of *Christ*; or he must acknowledge that *setting* up a *Congregational Church* is the *primary ground* of their *Separation* from our *Parochial Churches*. If they do suppose but *one* of those *Ordinances* wanting which they believe *Christ* hath *instituted* in *particular Churches*, do they not believe this a sufficient ground for *separation?* It is not therefore

fore any *Reason* peculiar to our *Church*, which is the true *Cause* of their *separation*; but such *Reasons* as are common to all *Churches*, that are not formed just after their own model. If there be then *unalterable Rules for Congregational Churches*, those must be observed, and *separation* made in order to it; and therefore *separation* is necessary upon Dr. O's grounds, not from the particular *Conditions* of *Communion* with us, but because our *Parochial Churches*, are not formed after the *Congregational way*. But this was a necessary piece of art at this time, to keep fair with the *Presbyterian Party*, and to make them believe (if they can be so forgetful) that they do not own *separation* from their Churches, but only from *ours*, the contrary whereof is so apparent from the debates with the *dissenting Brethren*, and the setting up *Congregational Churches* in those days, that they must be forgetful indeed, who do not remember it. Have those of the *Congregational way* since alter'd their judgments? Hath Dr. O. yielded, that in case some *terms* of *Communion* in our *Church* were not insisted upon, they would give over *separation?* Were not their *Churches* first gathered out of *Presbyterian Congregations?* And if *Presbytery* had been setled upon the *Kings Restauration*, would they not have continued their *Separation?* Why then must our *Church* now be accused for giving the *Occasion* to the *Independant separation*, when it is notoriously otherwise; and they did *separate* and *form their Churches*, upon reasons common to our *Church* with all other *Reformed Churches?* This is more artificial than ingenuous.

Vindic. 3. p. 37. *Sect.* 2. As to the Second, Dr. O. answers, *that it is so clear and evident in matter of fact, and so necessary from the nature of the thing, that the Churches planted by the Apostles were limited to Congregations, that many wise Men, wholly unconcerned in our Controversies, do take it for a thing to be granted by all without dispute.* And for this two Testimonies are alleged, of *Justice Hobart*, and *Father Paul*; but neither of them speaks to the point. All that *Chief Justice Hobart* saith is, *That the Primitive Church in its greatest Purity, was but voluntary Congregations of Believers submitting themselves to the Apostles, and after to the Pastors.* Methinks Dr. O. should have left this *Testimony* to his Friend *L. du Moulin*, it signifies so very little to the purpose; or rather, quite overthrows his *Hypothesis*; as appears by these two Arguments. (1.) Those *voluntary Congregations over which the Apostles were set*, were no *limited Congregations* of any one *particular Church*; but those *Congregations over whom the Apostles were set*, are those of which *Justice Hobart* speaks. And therefore it is plain he spake of *all the Churches* which were under the *care* of the *Apostles*, which he calls *voluntatary Congregations.* (2.) Those *voluntary Congregations over whom the Apostles appointed Pastors after their decease*, were no *particular Congregations* in one City; but those of whom *Justice Hobart* speaks, were such; for he saith, *they first submitted to the Apostles, and after to other Pastors.* But *Justice Hobart* could not be such a stranger to Antiquity to believe that the *Christians* in the *Age* after the *Apostles* amounted but to *one Congregation in a City.* And therefore, if he consults *Justice Hobart*'s honour or his own, I advise him to let it alone for the future. As to the Testimony of Father *Paul*, it only concerns the *Democratical Government of the Church*, and I wonder how it came into this place; I shall therefore consider it in its due season.

Sect. 3. I come therefore to consider now, the evidence *for the Institution of Congregational Churches*; concerning which, these are my words.

"It

" It is possible at first, there might be no more Christians in one City " than could meet in one Assembly for Worship; but where doth it ap- " pear, that when they multiplied into more Congregations, they did " make new and distinct Churches under new Officers with a separate " Power of Government? Of this I am well assured, there is no mark " or footstep in the New Testament, or the whole History of the Primi- " tive Church. I do not think it will appear credible to any considerate " man, that the 5000 Christians in the Church of *Jerusalem* made one " stated and fixed Congregation for Divine Worship; not, if we make all " the allowances for strangers which can be desired: but if this were " granted, where are the unalterable Rules, that as soon as the compa- " ny became too great for one particular Assembly, they must become a " new Church under peculiar Officers and an independent Authority? To this Dr. O. answers in four particulars.

1. *That an account may e'er long be given of the insensible deviation of the First Churches after the decease of the Apostles from the Rule of the first Institution: which although at first it began in matters of small moment; yet still they increased until they issued in a fatal Apostasie*; or as he after expresses it, *leaving their Infant state, by degrees, they at last brought forth the Man of Sin.* But I do not understand how this at all answers the former *Paragraph* of my *Sermon* concerning the *first Institution* of *Churches*; but being I suppose intended for a *Reason* why he doth not afterwards answer to the *evidence* out of *Antiquity*, I shall not only so far take notice of it, as to let him know, that when that is done, I do not question, but the *Primitive Church* will find sufficient *Advocates* in the *Church* of *England:* but I desire that undertaker to consider, what a blot and dishonour it will be to *Christian Religion*, if the *Primitive Churches* could not hold to their *first Institution*, not for one *Age* after the *Apostles*. I know what abominable *Heresies* there were soon after, if not in the *Apostles* days; but the question is not concerning these, but the *purest and best Churches*; and about them, not whether some trifling Controversies might not arise, and humane infirmities be discovered; but *whether they did deviate from the plain Institutions of Christ, and the unalterable Rules of Government which he had fixed in his Church?* This seems utterly incredible to me upon this consideration among many others: That Government is so nice and tender a thing, that every one is so much concerned for his share in it, that men are not easily induced to part with it. Let us suppose the Government of the Church to have been *Democratical* at first, as Dr. O. seems to do; is it probable, that the *People* would have been wheadled out of the sweetness of Government so soon and made no noise about it? Yea, Dr. O. tells us that in *Cyprian's* *Vindi. p. 41.* *time it continued at Carthage*; and others say, a great deal longer: there was then no such change as to this *part* of the *Government* so soon after. And why should we imagin it otherwise, as to extent of *Power* and *Jurisdiction?* Suppose *Christ* had limited the *Power* of a *Church* to *one Congregation*; the *Pastor* of that *Church* could have no more pretence over any other Congregation, than Dr. O. by being *Pastor* over one *Congregation* in *London*, could challenge a right to Govern all the *Independent Congregations* in *London* or *about it*; and appoint their several *Teachers*, and call them to an account for their proceedings. I appeal now to any man of consideration, whether there be the least probability that such an alteration could be made without great noise and disturbance? Would not Mr. *G.* Mr. *B.* Mr. *C.* and many more, think themselves concerned to stand up for their own *Rights?* And if they

could be drawn into the design, would the *People* submit? Let us put the case, as to *New-England.* Suppose the *Apostles* an Age or two since, had planted such *Congregational Churches* there, as have been formed within these last 50 years at *Plimouth*, *Boston*, *Hereford*, *New-haven*, &c. and had invested every *Congregation* with the *full Power* of the *Keys*, the execution whereof they had intrusted with the several *Elderships*, within their own Congregation; but so, as not to have any *Power* or *Authority*, over the *Elders* or *Members* of any other *Congregation:* Let us then suppose, that after the decease of the *Apostles*, these *Churches* gradually declined so far, that in this Age Mr. *Cotton* at *Boston* should take upon him the whole *Power* of the *Keys*, and not only so, but appoint *Pastors* over other *Congregations*, and keep a great *number* of *Elders* under him, and challenge the *Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction* over the whole *Colony* of *Massachusets*, of which *Boston* is the *chief Town*, and so three others do the same at the chief *Places* of the other *Colonies*; Would not this be a wonderful alteration of the Church Government? And is it possible to conceive, such a change should be brought about insensibly, without any complaint of the *subordinate Elders*, or the *members* of the *Congregations*, who were robbed of their *inherent Right* by an *Institution* of *Christ*, and so late an establishment by the *Apostles?* Doctrines may be insensibly changed by continuing the names and altering opinions, through the carelesness and unskilfulness of *People:* But in *matters* of *Government*, the meanest *People* are sensible, and look big with an opinion of it. If therefore it be not conceivable in this case, the *Government* should be thus changed from the *Institution* of *Christ* in so short a time; let the same consideration be applied to the *Ages* which really succeeded the *Apostles.*

Sect. 4. I shall, to prevent all cavils, chuse that very *Church* which Dr. O. mentions, and I find Mr. *Cotton* and others make their *Appeals* to, and that is the *Church* of *Carthage* in Saint *Cyprian*'s time. Here Dr. O. finds the *Community of Members determining Church affairs*; but Mr. *Cotton* hath farther discovered the *judgment of the Elders*, the *Votes* of the *Congregation*, and the *Consent of neighbour Ministers*; in short, he hath found there, *the express and lively Lineaments of the very Body of Congregational Discipline*; *and the same for substance wherein they walk* (as he calls it) *at this day.* Hitherto then, there was *no deviation* from the *unalterable Rules of Christ.* Let us therefore impartially consider, what the *Government* of the *Church* of *Carthage* then was: Concerning which these things may be observed.

Cotton's *way of Congregational Churches cleared, p.* 98, 99.

1. That there was a *great number* of *Presbyters* belonging to the *Church* of *Carthage*, and therefore not probable to be one *single Congregation.* This appears from Saint *Cyprian*'s *Epistles* to them in his Retirement. In one he gives them advice how to visit the *Confessors* in *Prison*, which he would have them *to do by turns, every one taking a Deacon with him because the change of Persons would be less invidious:* And considering the *number* of *Confessours*, and the frequent attendance upon them, the number of *Presbyters* and *Deacons* must be considerable. When he sent *Numidicus* to be placed among the *Presbyters* at *Carthage*, he gives this reason of it, *that he might adorn the plenty of his Presbyters with such worthy Men, it being now impaired by the fall of some*, during the persecution. In the case of *Philumanus*, *Fortunatus* and *Favorinus*, he declares he would give no judgment, *cùm multis adhuc*

Cyprian *l.* 5. *Ep.* 2. *in the late Edit. Ep.* 5.

L. 4. 10. *Ep.* 35.

L. 5. *Ep.* 3.

adhuc de Clero absentes sint, when many of his Clergy were absent. And in another *Epistle* he complains, *that a great number of his Clergy were absent, and the few that were remaining were hardly sufficient for their work.* At one time *Felicissimus* and *five Presbyters* more did break Communion with the *Church* at *Carthage*; and then he mentions *Britius*, *Rogatianus* and *Numidicus*, as the chief *Presbyters* remaining with them; besides *Deacons* and *inferiour Ministers.* About the same time *Cornelius Bishop* of *Rome* mentions 46 *Presbyters* he had with him in that *City.* And in *Constantinople* of old, saith *Justinian* in his *Novels*, were 60 *Presbyters* (for in one he saith, *The custom was to determin the number*, and in another, *that 60 was to be the number at* Constantinople.) Let any one now consider, whether these *Churches* that had so many *Presbyters* were *single Congregations*; and at *Carthage*, we have this evidence of the great *numbers* of *Christians*; that in the time of *Persecution*, although very many stood firm, yet *the numbers of the lapsed was so great*, that Saint *Cyprian* saith, *Every day thousands of Tickets were granted by the Martyrs and Confessors in their behalf for reconciliation to the Church: And in one of those Tickets sometimes might be comprehended twenty or thirty persons, the form being Communicet ille cum suis.* Is it then probable this *Church* at *Carthage* should consist of one *single Congregation?*

Ep. 28. *L.* 3. *Ep.* 22. *Ep.* 24. *Ep.* 40. Euseb. *l.* 6. *c.* 35. Phot. *Nomo-Can. tit.* 1. *c.* 30. *L.* 3. *Ep.* 5. *Ep.* 15. *L.* 3. 15. *Ep.* 11.

2. These *Presbyters* and the *whole Church* were under the particular care and *Government* of Saint *Cyprian* as their *Bishop.* Some of the *Presbyters* at *Carthage* took upon them to meddle in the affairs of *Discipline*, without consulting their *Bishop* then in his retirement. Saint *Cyprian* tells them *they neither considered Christ's Command, nor their own Place, nor the future Judgment of God, nor the Bishop who was set over them, and had done that which was never done in foregoing times, to challenge those things to themselves, with the contempt and reproach of their Bishop*, which was to receive *Penitents* to *Communion* without imposition of hands by the *Bishop* and his *Clergy.* Wherein, he vindicates the *Martyrs and Confessors* in his following *Epistle*, saying, *that such an affront to their Bishop was against their will: For they sent their Petitions to the Bishop, that their Causes might be heard when the Persecution was over.* In another *Epistle* to the *People* of *Carthage* on the same occasion, he complains of these *Presbyters*, that they did not *Episcopo honorem Sacerdotii sui & Cathedræ reservare, reserve to the Bishop the honour which belonged to his Place:* And therefore charges, *that nothing farther be done in this matter till his return, when he might consult with his fellow-Bishops.* *Celerinus* sends to *Lucian* a *Confessor*, to beg him for a *Letter of Grace* for their Sisters *Numeria* and *Candida* who had fallen. *Lucian* returns him answer, *that* Paulus *before his Martyrdom had given him Authority to grant such in his Name, and that all the Martyrs had agreed to such kindness to be shewed to the lapsed; but with this condition that the Cause was to be heard before the Bishop, and upon such Discipline as he should impose, they were to be received to Communion.* So that though *Lucian* was extreamly blamed for *relaxing* the *Discipline* of the *Church*; yet neither he nor the other *Martyrs* would pretend to do any thing without the *Bishop.* *Cyprian* gives an account of all that had passed in this matter to *Moses* and *Maximus* two Roman *Presbyters* and *Confessors*; they return him answer, *that they were very glad he had not been wanting to his Office, especially in his severe reproving those who had obtained from*

L. 3. *Ep.* 14. *Ep.* 10. *L.* 3. *Ep.* 15 *Ep.* 11. *L.* 3. *Ep.* 10. *Ep.* 12. *Ep.* 21. *Ep.* 22. *Ep.* 25. *Ep.* 26.

Presbyters the Communion of the Church in his absence. In his *Epistle*
Ep. 28. to the *Clergy* of *Carthage* he mightily blames those *who communicated with those persons who were reconciled to the Church merely by Presbyters without him*; *and threatens excommunication to any Presbyters or Deacons who should presume to do it.* The *Roman Clergy* in the vacancy of
Ep. 30. the *See*, take notice of the *discretion of the Martyrs in remitting the lapsed to the Bishop, as an argument of their great modesty, and that they did not think the Discipline of the Church belonged to them:* And
Ep. 31. they declared their resolution, *to do nothing in this matter, till they had a new Bishop.* By which we see the *Power* of *Discipline* was not then supposed to be in the *Congregation*, or that they were the *first subject of the Power of the Keys*; but that it was in the *Bishop* as *superiour* to the *Presbyters.* And that they were then far from thinking it in the *Power*
Ep. 33. of the *People*, *to appoint and ordain their own Officers.* Saint *Cyprian* sends word to the *Church* of *Carthage*, *that he had taken one* Aurelius *into the Clergy*; *although his general custom was in Ordinations to consult them before, and to weigh together the manners and deserts of every*
Ep. 34. *one:* Which is quite another thing from an *inherent Right* to *appoint* and *constitute* their own *Church-Officers:* The same he doth soon af-
Ep. 35. ter, concerning *Celerinus* and *Numidicus.* When he could not go among them himself, by reason of the Persecution, he appoints *Caldo-*
Ep. 38. *nius* and *Fortunatus* two *Bishops*, and *Rogatianus* and *Numidicus* two *Presbyters*, *to visit in his name*; *and to take care of the poor, and of the persons fit to be promoted to the Clergy.* Who give an account in the
Ep. 39. next *Epistle*, *that they had excommunicated* Felicissimus *and his Brethren for their separation.*

3. That Saint *Cyprian* did believe that this *Authority* which he had for *governing* the *Church* was not from the *Power* of the *People*, but from the *Institution* of *Christ.* So upon the *occasion* of the *Martyrs* in-
Ep. 27. vading the *Discipline* of the *Church*, he produceth that saying of *Christ* to Saint *Peter*, *Thou art Peter*, &c. And *whatsoever you shall bind*, &c. *From whence*, saith he, *by a constant succession of times, such a course hath been always observed in the Church, that the Church hath been still governed by Bishops, and every Act of the Church hath been under their care and conduct. Since this*, saith he, *is a Divine Institution, I wonder at the boldness of those who have written at that rate to me* (concerning the lapsed) *since the Church consists in the Bishop, the Clergy and the*
Ep. 52. *standing People.* In his *Epistle* to *Antonianus*, he speaks of the *Agree-*
Ep. 55. *ment of the Bishops throughout the whole World:* And in *that* to *Cornelius*, *that every Bishop hath a part of the flock committed to him, which he is to govern and to give an account thereof to God:* And
Ep. 65. *that a Bishop in the Church is in the place of Christ; and that disobedience to him is the cause of Schisms and Disorders.* To the same
Ep. 69. purpose he speaks in his *Epistle* to *Rogatianus*, and to *Papianus*; where he declares *a Church to be a People united to a Bishop*; and to *Stephanus*,
Ep. 75. *that they have succeeded the Apostles in a constant course.*

Let the Reader now judge, whether these be the *strokes and lineaments* of the *Congregational way*; and whether Dr. O. had any reason to appeal to Saint *Cyprian* for the *Democratical Government of the Church.* But we have this advantage from this appeal, that they do not suppose *any deviation* then *from the Primitive Institution*, and what that was in Saint *Cyprian*'s judgment any one may see, when he speaks of nothing peculiar to his own *Church*, but what was generally ob-

served over the *Christian world*. And now let Dr. O. give an account, how a change so great, so sudden, so universal, should happen in the *Christian world*, in the *Government* of the *Church*; that when *Christ* had placed *the Power in the People*, the *Bishops* in so short a time should be every where settled, and allowed to have the chief management in *Church-affairs*, without any *control* from the *People*: which to me is as strong an argument as a matter of this nature will bear, that the *Power* was at first lodged in *them*, and not in the *People*. For, as Mr. *Noys* of *New-England* well argues, *It is not imaginable that Bishops should come by such Power, as is recorded in Ecclesiastical History, and that over all the world; and in a way of ambition, in such humbling times, without all manner of opposition for three hundred years together, and immediately after the Apostles, had it been usurpation or innovation. When and where is innovation without opposition? Would not Elders, so many seeing and knowing men, at least some of them, have contended for Truth, wherein their own Liberties and Rights were so much interessed?* Aërius *his opposing of Bishops, so long after their rise and standing, is inconsiderable.* The force of which reasoning, will sway more with an impartial and ingenuous mind, than all the difficulties I ever yet saw on the other side. So much for the account Dr. O. promises of the *deviations* of the *Churches* after the *Apostles decease*. Moses *and* Aaron, p. 62.

Sect. 5. (2.) Dr. O. answers as to the *matter of fact* concerning *the Institution of Congregational Churches*, that *it seems to him evidently exemplified in the Scripture.* The *matter* of *fact* is, that when *Churches* grew too big for one *single Congregation* in a *City*, then a *new Congregational Church* was set up under *new Officers*, with a *separate Power of Government*. Let us now see Dr. O.'s proof of it. *For although it may be there is not express mention made that these or those particular Churches did divide themselves into more Congregations with new Officers*, i. e. although the *matter of fact* be not *evident* in *Scripture*, *yet*, saith he, *there are Instances of the erection of new particular Congregations in the same Province.* But what is this to the proof of the *Congregational way?* The thing I desired was, that when the *Christians* in *one City* multiplied into *more Congregations*, they would prove, that they did make *new and distinct Churches*; and to exemplifie this, he mentions *new Congregations in the same Province.* Who ever denied or disputed that? On the contrary, the proof of this, is a great advantage to our *Cause*; for since where the *Scripture* speaks of *the Churches of a Province*, it speaks of them as of *different Churches*; but when it mentions *the Christians of one City*, it calls them *the Church of that City*, (as the *Church of Jerusalem*, the *Church of Ephesus*; but *the Churches of Judea, Galilee* and *Samaria*) what can be more evident, than that the *Christians* of *one City*, though never so numerous, made but *one Church?* If one observe the language of the *New Testament*, one may find this observation not once to fail; that where *Churches* are spoken of in the *plural number*, they are the *Churches of a Province*, as the *Churches* of *Judæa*, *the Churches of Asia*; *the Churches of Syria and Cilicia*; *the Churches of Galatia*; *the Churches of Macedonia*; but where all the *Christians* of *one City* are spoken of, it is still called the *Church of that City*; as *the Church at Antioch*; *the Church at Corinth*; and when the seven *Churches* are spoken of together, they are the seven *Churches*; but when spoken to single, it is *the Church of Ephesus*, *the Church of Smyrna*, &c. Which being spoken without any discrimination, as to the difference of these places, Vindic. p. 39. Acts 9. 31. 1 Thess. 2. 14. 1 Cor. 16. 19. Acts 15. 41. 1 Cor. 16. 1. Gal. 1. 2. 2 Cor. 8. 1.

places, in greatness and capacity, or the number of Believers in them, doth evidently discover that what *number* soever they were, they were all but the *Church* of that *City*. For it is not to be supposed that the *number* of *Christians* was no greater in *Ephesus*, *Sardis*, *Pergamus* and *Laodicea*, which were great and populous Cities, than in *Thyatira* and *Philadelphia*, which were much less; especially, considering the time Saint *Paul* staid at *Ephesus*, and the *mighty success* which he had in preaching there, which will amount to no great matter, if in three years time, he converted no more, than made up one *single Congregation*. And thus men to serve an *Hypothesis*, take off from the mighty *power* and prevalency of the *Gospel*. I cannot but wonder, what Dr. O. means when after he hath produced the evidence of distinct *Churches* in the *same Province*, as *Galatia*, and *Macedonia*, he calls this *plain Scripture evidence and practice for the erecting particular distinct Congregations*; who denies that? but I see nothing like a proof of *distinct Churches in the same City*, which was the thing to be proved, but because it could not be proved, was prudently let alone: whereas we have *plain Scripture evidence*, that all the *Christians* of *a City*, though never so great, made but *one Church*; and uncontrolable evidence from *Antiquity*, that the neighbouring *Christians* were laid to the *Church* of the *City*. All that he saith farther to this matter, is, *that such Churches had power to rule and govern themselves, because in every one of them Elders were ordained*, Acts 14. 22. which is again an argument on our side; for if we compare *Acts* 14. 22. with *Titus* 1. 5. we shall find *that ordaining Elders*, κατ' Ἐκκλησίαν hath the same importance with *ordaining them* κατὰ πόλιν; so that by the *Church* is understood the *Body of Christians inhabiting in one City*, as the Ἐκκλησία at *Athens* was the whole *Corporation* there; and particular *Congregations* are but like the several *Companies*, all which together make up but *one City*.

Acts 20. 19. —31. 1 Cor. 16. 9.

Vindic. p. 40.

p. 41.

Sect. 6. (3.) Dr. O. saith, *that the Christians of one City might not exceed the bounds of a particular Church or Congregation, although they had a multiplication of Bishops or Elders in them, and occasional distinct Assemblies for some Acts of Divine Worship.* Then, say I, the notion of a *Church* is not limited in *Scripture* to a single *Congregation*: For if *occasional Assemblies* be allowed for some *Acts of Worship*, why not for others? if the *number* of *Elders* be unlimited, then every one of these may attend the *occasional distinct Assemblies* for *Worship*, and yet altogether make up the *Body* of *one Church*; to which, if he had but allowed a *single Bishop* over these, he had made up that *representation* of a *Church*, which we have from the best and purest *Antiquity*. And so *Origen* compares the *Churches* of *Athens*, *Corinth*, and *Alexandria* with the *Corporations* in those *Cities*; the *number* of *Presbyters* with the *Senates* of the *Cities*; and at last the *Bishop* with the *Magistrate*. But Dr. O. adds, *that when they did begin to exceed in number, beyond a just proportion for edification, they did immediately erect other Churches among them, or near them.* Name any one *new Church* erected in the *same City*, and I yield. And what need a new Church, when himself allows *occasional distinct Assemblies* for *greater edification*? But he names *the Church at Cenchrea, which was a Port to the City of Corinth*; *because of the mighty increase of Believers at Corinth*, Acts 18. 10. *with* Rom. 16. 1. I answer, (1.) It seems then there was such an increase at *Corinth*, as made them plant a *distinct Church*; and yet at *Ephesus*, where Saint *Paul* used extraordinary diligence, and had great success, there was no

Orig. c. Cels. l. 3.

need

need of any *new* and *distinct Church*. And at *Corinth* he staid but a *year and six months*, but at *Ephesus three years*, as the time is set down in the *Acts*. Doth not this look very improbably? (2.) *Stephanus Byzant.* reckons *Cenchrea* as a *City* distinct from *Corinth*, and so doth *Strabo*, who placeth it in the way from *Tegea* to *Argos*, through the *Parthenian Mountain*; and it is several times mentioned by *Thucydides* as distinct from *Corinth*; and so it is most likely was a *Church* originally planted there, and not *formed* from the too great fulness of the *Church* of *Corinth*. Acts 18.11. Acts 20.31. Str. l. 8. Thucyd. l. 4. & l. 8.

As to the *Church* of *Jerusalem*, he saith, *that the five thousand Converts were so disposed of or so dispersed, that some years after, there was such a Church there, as did meet together in one place, as occasion did require, even the whole multitude of the Brethren; nor was their number greater when they went unto Pella.* To which I answer, (1.) The force of the Argument lies in the five thousand being said *to be added to the Church*, before any *dispersion* or *persecution*. In which time we must suppose a *true Church* to be *formed*, and the *Christians* at that time performing the *Acts of Church-communion*: the *Question* then is, whether it be in the least probable, that five thousand persons should at that time, make one *stated and fixed Congregation* for *Divine Worship*, and all the *Acts* of *Church-communion*? What place was there large enough to receive them, when they met for *Prayer* and *Sacraments*? Dr. O. was sensible of this inconvenience, and therefore only speaks of the *Church* of *Jerusalem* when these were *dispersed*; but my question was about them while they *were together*. Were they not a *Church* then? *Did they not continue in the Apostles Doctrine and Fellowship, and breaking of Bread and Prayers?* But how could five thousand then do all this together? Therefore a *Church* according to its first *Institution*, is not limited to a *single Congregation*. (2.) A *Church* consisting of many *Congregations*, may, upon extraordinary *occasions*, assemble together, as the several *Companies* in a *common Hall*, for matters of general concernment, which yet manage their particular Interests apart: so for *Acts* of *Worship* and *Christian Communion*, *particular Congregations* may meet by themselves; but when any thing happens of great concernment, they may *occasionally assemble together*; as in the two debates mentioned *Acts* 15. 4. and 21. 22. so the several *Tribes* in *Athens* did, at their general *Assemblies*, which *Strabo* and *Eustathius* say were 174. (3.) There is no number mentioned of the *Christians* that went to *Pella*, neither by *Eusebius* nor *Epiphanius*, who relate the story, so that nothing can thence be concluded; but if the force lies in his calling *Pella* a *Village*, I am sure *Eusebius* calls it a *City of Perœa, beyond Jordan*; and *Epiphanius* adds, *that they spread themselves from thence to Cœlesyria, and Decapolis, and Basanitis*. So that all this put together makes no proof at all, that the *Christian Churches*, by their *first Institution*, were limited to *single Congregations*. p. 41. Acts 4. 4. Str. l. 9. Eustat. ad Il. β. Euseb. l. 3. c. 5. Epiph. hær. 29.

Sect. 7. (4.) He answers, *that he cannot discern the least necessity of any positive Rule or Direction in this matter, since the nature of the thing, and the duty of men doth indispensably require it.* But is it not Dr. O. that saith, *that the Institution of Churches, and the Rules for their disposal and government throughout the world, are the same, stable and unalterable?* Are all these *Rules* now come to nothing but what follows from the *nature of the thing?* Is it not Dr. O. that saith, *that no religious Union or Order among Christians is of spiritual use and advantage to them,* p. 42. Evangel. Love, p. 59. p. 65.

but what is appointed and designed for them by Jesus Christ? Doth not this overthrow any other *Order* or *Union* among *Christians* but what *Christ hath instituted and appointed for them?* The Question is not about such a *Constitution* of *Churches* as is necessary for performing the *duties* of *religious Worship*; for all Parties are agreed therein; but whether *Church-power* be limited to these exclusively to all other *Unions* of *Christians?* whether every *single Congregation* hath *all Church-power* wholly in it self, and unaccountably, as to subordination to any other? How doth this appear from the *nature of the thing*, and the *necessary duties of Christians?* I grant the *Institution* of *Churches* was *for Edification:* And I think a great deal of that *Edification* lies in the *orderly disposal* of things. Whatever tends to *Peace* and *Unity* among *Christians*, in my judgment tends to *Edification.* Now I cannot apprehend how a *sole Power* of *Government* in every *Congregation* tends to the preserving this *Peace* and *Unity* among *Christians:* much less how it follows so clearly from *the nature of the thing* as to take away the need of any *positive Rule or Direction* in this matter. And here the main Controversie lies, between us and the *Congregational Churches.* Is there no *positive Rule* or *Direction* in this matter? then it follows as much from the *nature of the thing*, that since *Peace* and *Order* is to be kept up among *Churches* as well as *Persons*, every *single Congregation* ought not to engross *Church-power* to it self, but to stand accountable for the management of it to those who are intrusted with the immediate care of the *Churches Peace.* And I cannot yet see, by all that hath been said, how those that break the established *Order* in a *Church wherein all the substantials of Religion are acknowledged to be sound*, and set up particular *Independent Churches* in opposition to it, can acquit themselves from the Guilt of Schism, how *great and intolerable* soever it be thought.

p. 43.

As to what concerns *the Churches in the Houses of Priscilla and Aquila, and Nymphas and Philemon*, I say, that this is to be understood, not of a *Church meeting in their Houses*, but of their own *Families* was pleaded by the *dissenting Brethren*, who say, *most of our Divines are of that Opinion:* and therefore the Argument holds against them. And from Dr. O's Discourse I less understand than I did before, what *obligation* of *Conscience* can be upon any, when they may serve *God* in their *Families*, in opposition to *Laws*, to keep up such *publick Congregations* as are forbidden by them. For (1.) he grants that a *Church* may be in a *Family*; altho' a *Family* as such be not a *Church.* Then the *members* of a *Family* submitting to the *Government* of the *Master* as their *Pastor* are a *true Church:* for a *Church*, he saith, *may consist only of the Persons that belong to a Family.* Then there is no necessity of going out of a *Family* for the *Acts* of *Church-communion*; especially, when the addition of four more, may provide sufficiently for all the *Officers* they believe necessary to the making up of a *Church.* (2.) All that he saith, is, *that there is no such example given of Churches in private Families in Scriptures, as should restrain the extent of Churches from Congregations of many Families.* And what then? the *Question* is not now whether they be *lawful*, but whether they be *necessary*; for nothing less than a *Divine Command* can justifie the *breach* of a plain *Law*; but where is that *Command?* Doth not Dr. O. appeal to the *nature* of the *thing*, and the *indispensible duties* of men with respect to the end of *Churches*, as his great *Rule* in these cases? But which of all these necessary *duties* may not be performed within the *terms* of the *Law?* so that no *obligation* can arise from thence to have *Congregations* of many *Families.* All that he saith farther, as to this

p. 44.

Reasons against the Instances, &c. p. 83.

this matter is, *that if through non-compliance any disturbance happen, the blame will be found lying upon those who would force others to forego their Primitive Constitution.* Then it seems at last the *Primitive Constitution* is come to be the ground of *non-compliance*; which in this case amounts to *separation.* But this *primitive Constitution* had need be far better proved, before it can be thought a *good ground* for breaking the *Peace* of the *Church* and the *Laws* of the *Land:* and much more before it can carry off the blame from the persons who break *Orders* and *Laws* to the *Makers* of them. All men no doubt that ever broke Laws, if this Plea would be admitted, would transfer the blame upon those that made them. And so much for the *Plea* of the *Congregational* Party. p. 45.

Sect. 8. 2. I now come to consider the *Plea* of those, who hold *our Diocesan Episcopacy* to be unlawful. In my *Sermon*, as it is printed, I set down this saying of Mr. *Baxter, That to devise new species of Churches (beyond Parochial or Congregational) without God's Authority, and to impose them on the world (yea in his name) and to call all Dissenters Schismaticks, is a far worse usurpation, than to make or impose new Ceremonies or Liturgies.* Which I said doth suppose *Congregational Churches* to be so much the *Institution of Christ*; that any other *Constitution* above these is both *unlawful* and *insupportable:* which is more than the *Independent Brethren* themselves do assert. Now for our better understanding Mr. *B*'s meaning, we must consider his design in that place from whence those words are quoted. 1. He saith, *Christ hath instituted only Congregational or Parochial Churches.* 2. That *Diocesan Episcopacy is a new species of Churches devised by men without God's Authority, and imposed in such a manner, that those are called Schismaticks who dissent from it.* 3. *That such an imposition is worse than that of Ceremonies and Liturgies; and consequently affords a better plea for Separation.* But to prevent any misunderstanding of his meaning, I will set down his own Cautions. 1. *That the Question is not whether every particular Church should have a Bishop with his Presbyters and Deacons:* i. e. *whether every Rector of a Parish be not a Bishop, if he hath Curates under him.* This he calls *Parochial Episcopacy.* 2. *Nor, whether these should have Archbishops over them, as Successors to the Apostolical and general Overseers of the first Age, in the ordinary continued parts of their Office.* 3. *Nor, whether Patriarchs, Diocesans and Lay-chancellours be lawful, as Officers of the King, exercising under him such Government of the Church as belongeth to Kings, to which in such exercise all Subjects must for conscience sake submit.* 4. *Nor, if Diocesans become the sole Bishops over many hundred Parishes, all the Parochial Bishops and Parish Churches being put down and turned into Curates and Chapels, whether a Minister ought yet to live quietly and peaceably under them.* You will ask then, where lies this horrible *imposition*, and intolerable *usurpation?* It is in requiring the owning the *lawfulness* of this *Diocesan Episcopacy*; and joyning with *Parochial Churches* as *parts* of it. But wherein lies the unsufferable malignity of that? 1. *It is making a new species of Churches without God's Authority.* 2. *It is overthrowing the species of God's making:* which, according to Mr. *B.* requires two things. 1. *Local and presential Communion*, as he calls it, *i. e.* That it consists only of so many, as can well meet together for *Church Society.* 2. *The full exercise of Discipline within it self by the Pastors*; which being taken away, they are only *Curates*, and their *Meetings Oratories* and no *Churches.* This I think is a true and fair representation of Mr. *B*'s opinion in this matter. Which tending so apparently to overthrow our present *Constitution* as *insupportable*, and to justifie *separation* from our p. 24. True and only way of Concord. p. 111. Premoniti-on to the true way of Concord.

Parochial Churches as *members* of a *Diocesan Church*; therefore to vindicate the *Constitution* of *our Church*, I shall undertake these three things.

1. To shew that our *Diocesan Episcopacy* is the same for *substance* which was in the *Primitive Church*.
2. That it is not *repugnant to any Institution of Christ*, nor *devising a new species of Churches* without *God's Authority*.
3. That the accidental *alterations* in *Discipline* do not overthrow the *being* of our *Parochial Churches*.

1. *That our Diocesan Episcopacy is the same for substance which was in the Primitive Church.* This I begin with, because Mr. *B.* so very often makes his *Appeal* to *Antiquity* in this matter. And my first inquiry shall be into the *Episcopacy* practised in the *African Churches*; because Mr. *B.* expresseth an esteem of them above others; for in St. *Cyprian*'s time he saith *they were the best ordered Churches in the world*; *and that the Bishops there were the most godly, faithful, peaceable company of Bishops since the Apostles times.* And of the following times he thus speaks, *Most of the African Councils*, saith he, *were the best in all the world. Many good Canons for Church order were made by this and most of the African Councils, no Bishops being faithfuller than they.* Therefore concerning the *Episcopacy* there practised, I shall lay down these two Observations.

Plea for peace, p. 66. *Church-History, p. 37.* *p. 73.* *Church-History, p. 57.*

Obs. 1. That it was an *inviolable Rule* among them, *That there was to be but one Bishop in a City*, though the *City* were never so *large*, or the *Christians* never so *many*. This one Observation made good, quite overthrows Mr. *B*'s *Hypothesis*. For upon his *principles*, where ever the *Congregation* of *Christians* became so great, *that they could not conveniently assemble at one place so as to have personal Communion in presence*, as he speaks; there either they must alter the *instituted species* of *Government*, or they must have more *Bishops* than *one* in a *City*. For, he saith, *the Church must be no bigger, than that the same Bishop may perform the Pastoral Office to them in present Communion*, and for this he quotes 1 *Thess.* 5. 12, 13. *Heb.* 13. 7, 17. *i. e.* their *Bishops* must be such as they must *hear preach, and have Conversation with.* But that this was not so understood in the *African Churches*, appears by their strict observance of this Rule; of having but *one Bishop* in a *City*, how large soever it was. And how punctually they thought themselves bound to observe it, will appear by this one Instance, That one of the greatest and most pernicious *Schisms* that ever happened, might have been prevented if they had yielded to more *Bishops* than *one* in a *City*; and that was the *Schism* of the *Donatists*, upon the competition between *Majorinus* and *Cœcilian*; as the *Novatian Schism* began at *Rome* upon a like occasion between *Cornelius* and *Novatian*. Now was there not all the *Reason* imaginable upon so important an occasion to have made more *Bishops* in the *same City*, unless they had thought some *Divine Rule* prohibited them? When there were 46 *Presbyters* at *Rome*, had it not been fair to have divided them? or upon Mr. *B*'s principles *made so many Bishops* that every one might have had three or four for his share? But instead of this, how doth St. *Cyprian*, even the holy and meek St. *Cyprian*, as St. *Augustin* calls him, aggravate the *Schism* of *Novatian* for being chosen a *Bishop* in the *same City*, where there was one chosen before? His words are so considerable to our purpose, that I shall set them down. *Et cum post primum secundus esse non possit, quisquis post unum qui solus esse debeat, factus est, non jam secundus ille sed nullus est. Since there cannot be a second after the first, whosoever is made Bishop when one is made already, who ought to be alone, he is not another*

Answ. to Sermon, p. 74.

Aug. de Bapt. l. 2. c. 4.

Cyp. Ep. 52. n. 4.

another Bishop, but none at all. Let Mr. *B.* reconcile these words to his *Hypothesis* if he can. What! in such a *City* of *Christians*, as *Rome* then was, where were 46 *Presbyters*, to pronounce it a mere *nullity* to have a *second Bishop* chosen? Mr. *B.* would rather have thought there had been need of 46 *Bishops*; but St. *Cyprian* who lived somewhat nearer the *Apostles* times, and I am apt to think, knew as well the *Constitution* of *Churches* then, thought it overthrew that *Constitution* to have *more Bishops than one in a City.* At *Carthage* it seems some turbulent *Presbyters* that were not satisfied with St. *Cyprian*'s Government, or it may be looking on the charge as too big for one, chose one *Fortunatus* to be *Bishop* there: with this St. *Cyprian* acquaints *Cornelius*; and there tells him, how far they had proceeded, and what mischief this would be to the *Church, since the having one Bishop was the best means to prevent Schisms.* After the election of *Cornelius*, some of the *Confessors* who had sided with *Novatian* deserted his Party, and were received back again at a *solemn Assembly*, where they confessed their fault, and declared, *That they were not ignorant, that as there was but one God, and one Christ, and one Holy Ghost, so there ought to be but one Bishop in the Catholick Church.* Not according to the senseless interpretation of *Pamelius*, who would have it understood of *one Pope*; but that according to the ancient and regular *Discipline* and *Order* of the *Church*, there ought to be but *one Bishop* in a *City.* After the *Martyrdom* of *Cornelius* at *Rome*, St. *Cyprian* sends to *Rome* to know *who that one Bishop was, that was chosen in his place.* And the necessity of this *Unity*, he insists on elsewhere; and saith, *Our Saviour so appointed it, unam Cathedram constituit, & unitatis ejusdem originem, ab uno incipientem sua auctoritate disposuit.* Which the *Papists* foolishly interpret of St. *Peter*'s *Chair*; for in his following words he utterly overthrows the *supremacy*, saying, *all the Apostles were equal*; and a little after, *Episcopatus unus est, cujus à singulis in solidum pars tenetur.* But this is sufficient to my purpose, to shew that these *holy men*, these *Martyrs* and *Confessors*, men that were indeed *dying daily*, and that for *Christ* too, were all agreed that a *Bishop* there must be, and that but *one in a City*, though never so large and full of *Christians.* St. *Augustin* in his *excellent Epistle* to the *Donatists*, gives an account of the proceedings about *Cæcilian* after the *election* of *Majorinus*, and that *Melchiades* managing that matter with admirable temper, offer'd for the *healing* of the *Schism* to receive those who had been ordained by *Majorinus*, with this Proviso, *that where by reason of the Schism there had been two Bishops in a City, he that was first consecrated was to remain Bishop, and the other to have another People provided for him.* For which St. *Augustin* commends him, *as an excellent man, a true Son of Peace, and Father of Christian People.* By which we see the best, the wisest, the most moderate Persons of that time, never once thought that there could be *more Bishops than one in a City.* In the famous *Conference* at *Carthage* between the *Catholick* and *Donatist Bishops*, the *Rule* on both sides was, *but one Bishop to be allowed of either side of a City and Diocese*; and if there had been any new made, to increase their number, as it was objected on both sides; if it were proved, they were not to be allowed: for generally then, every *Diocese* had *two Bishops* of the *different Parties*; but in some places they had but *one*, where the *People* were of *one mind*; and nothing but this notorious *Schism* gave occasion to such a multiplication of *Bishops* in *Africa*; both Parties striving to increase their *Numbers.*

Cyp. Ep. 55. n. 6, 9.

Ep. 46. n. 3.

Ep. 58. n. 2. De Unit. Eccl. n. 3, 4.

S. August. Ep. 162. N.E. Ep. 43.

Collat. Carthage 1.

Sect. 9. *Obs.* 2. In *Cities* and *Dioceses* which were under the *care* of one *Bishop*, there were *several Congregations* and *Altars*, and *distant places*. *Carthage* was a very *large City*, and had great *numbers* of *Christians* even in S. *Cyprian*'s time, as I have already shewed. And there besides the *Cathedral* called *Basilica Major & Restituta* [a] in which the *Bishops always sate*, as *Victor Vitensis* saith; there were several other considerable *Churches*, in which S. *Augustine* often preached when he went to *Carthage*, as the [b] *Basilica Fausti*; the [c] *Basilica Leontiana*; the [d] *Basilica Celerinæ* mentioned by * *Victor* likewise, who said it was otherwise called *Scillitanorum*. The [f] *Basilica Novarum*. The [g] *Basilica Petri*. The [h] *Basilica Pauli*. And I do not question there were many others, which I have not observed; for *Victor* saith, *that when Geisericus enter'd* Carthage *he found there* Quodvultdeus *the Bishop, & maximam turbam Clericorum, a very great multitude of Clergy, all which he immediatly banished.* And without the *City* there were *two great Churches*, saith *Victor*; one where S. *Cyprian suffered Martyrdom*, and the other *where his body was buried*, at a place called *Mappalia*. In all he reckons about 500 of the *Clergy* belonging to the *Church* of *Carthage*, taking in those who were trained up to it; And doth Mr. *B.* imagine all these were intended to serve *one Congregation?* or that all the *Christians* then in *Carthage* could have *local and presential Communion*, as he calls it, in *one Church*; and at *one Altar?* Sometimes an *Altar* is taken with a particular *respect* to a *Bishop*; and so setting up *one Altar* against *another*, was setting up *one Bishop* against *another*, as that *Phrase* is commonly used in Saint *Cyprian* and Saint *Augustin*; sometimes for the *place* at which the *Christians* did communicate, and so there were as many *Altars* as *Churches*. So *Fortunatus* a *Catholick Bishop* objected to *Petilian* the *Donatist*, *that in the City where he was Bishop, the Hereticks had broken down all the Altars:* which is the thing *Optatus* objects so much against them. And that there were *Altars* in all their *Churches* appears from hence, that not only the *Oblations* were *made* there, and the *Communion* received, but all the *Prayers* of the *Church* were made at them; as not only appears from the *African Code* and Saint *Augustin* (which I have mentioned elsewhere) but from *Optatus*, who upbraiding the *Donatists* for breaking down the *Altars* of *Churches*, he tells them *that hereby they did what they could to hinder the Churches Prayers*, for saith he, *illàc ad aures Dei ascendere solebat populi oratio. The Peoples Prayers went up to Heaven that way.* And that *distant places from the City* were in the *Bishop's Diocese* and under his care I thus prove. In the *African Code*, there is a *Canon* that *no Bishop should leave his Cathedral Church, and go to any other Church in his Diocese there to reside*; which evidently proves, that there were not only *more places*, but *more Churches* in a *Bishop's Diocese*. And where the *Donatists* had erected *new Bishopricks*, as they often did, the *African Council* decrees, *that after the decease of such a Bishop, if the People had no mind to have another in his room, they might be in the Diocese of another Bishop.* Which shews, that they thought the *Dioceses* might be so *large*, at to hold the *People* that were under *two Bishops*. And there were many *Canons* made about the *People* of the *Donatist Bishops*. In one it was determined, *that they should belong to the Bishop that converted them, without limitation of distance*; after that, *that they should belong to the same Diocese they were in before: But if the Donatist Bishop were converted, then the Diocese was to be divided between them.*

Aug. *Ep.* 43.

Victor Vitensis *l.* 1.

*Aug. *Serm.* 4. 14. 102. *de diversis.*

[b] *Serm.* 12. 122. *de diversis.*

[c] *De diversis.* 11.

[d] 96. *de Temp.*

* Vict. *l.* 1.

[f] 110. *de Temp.*

[g] 251. *de Temp.*

[h] 24. *de diversis.*

Victor Vit. *l.* 5.

Collat. 1. Carthage *n.* 139.

Optat. *l.* 6.

Cod. *Eccl.* Afric. *c.* 71.

c. 98, 99.

c. 117.

c. 118.

If any Bishop neglected the converting the People of the places belonging to his Diocese, he that did take the pains in it, was to have those places laid to his Diocese; unless sufficient cause were shewed by the Bishop, that he was not to blame. Let Mr. *Baxter* now judge, whether their *Bishopricks* were like *our Parishes*; as he confidently affirms. Saint *Austin* mentions the *Municipium Tullense* not far from *Hippo*, where there was *Presbyter* and *Clerks* under his *care* and *government*: And he tells this particular Story of it; *that a certain poor Man who lived there fell into a Trance, in which he fancied he saw the Clergy thereabout, and among the rest the Presbyter of that place who bad him go to* Hippo *to be baptized of* Augustin *who was Bishop there; the Man did accordingly, and the next Easter put in his name among the Competentes and was baptized, and after told Saint* Augustin *the foregoing passages.* It seems the *Donatists* were very troublesome in some of the remoter parts of the *Diocese* of *Hippo*, whereupon Saint *Augustin* sent one of his *Presbyters* to *Cæcilian* the *Roman President*, to complain of their insolence, and to crave his assistance, which, he saith he did, *lest he should be blamed for his negligence, who was the Bishop of that Diocese.* And can we think all these persons had *præsential and local Communion* with Saint *Austin* in his *Church* at *Hippo?* While he was yet but a *Presbyter* at *Hippo*, in the absence of the *Bishop* he writes to *Maximinus* a *Donatist Bishop* a sharp Letter, for offering to *rebaptize* a *Deacon* of their *Church* who was placed at *Mutagena*, and he saith, *he went from* Hippo *to the place himself to be satisfied of the truth of it.* At the same place lived one *Donatus* a *Presbyter* of the *Donatists* whom Saint *Augustin* would have had brought to him against his Will, to be better instructed, *as being under his care*, but the obstinate Man rather endeavour'd to make away himself, upon which he writes a *long Epistle* to him. In another *Epistle* he gives an account, that there was a place called *Fussala, which with the Country about it, belonged to the Diocese of* Hippo; *where there was abundance of People, but almost all* Donatists; *but by his great care in sending Presbyters among them, those places were all reduced; but because* Fussala *was* 40 *miles distant from* Hippo, *he took care to have a Bishop placed among them*; but as appears by the event he had better have kept it under his own Care. For upon the complaints made against their *new Bishop*, he was fain to *resume it*; as appears by a *Presbyter* of *Fussala*, which he mentions afterwards. However it appears, that a place 40 *miles distance* was then under the *care* of so *great* a *Saint*, and so *excellent* a *Bishop* as Saint *Augustin* was. And could Mr. *B.* have found it in his heart to have told him *that he did not understand the right constitution of Churches?* How many *Quæres* would Mr. *B.* have made about the *numbers* of *Souls* at *Fussala*, and how he could take upon him the *care* of a *place* so far *distant* from him? And it is no hard matter to guess what answer Saint *Augustin* would have given him.

c. 121. *Church History, p.* 75. *De curâ pro Mortuis c.* 12. Aug. *Ep.* 60. Aug. *Ep.* 203. *Ep.* 204. *Ep.* 262. *Ep. ad* Quodvultdeum *ante lib. de hæres.*

But besides this plain evidence of the extent of *Dioceses*, we have as clear proof of *Metropolitan Provinces* in the *African Churches*. *Quidam de Episcopis in Provinciâ nostrâ*, saith Saint *Cyprian*; and yet he speaks of his *Predecessors* times, which shews the very *ancient extent* of that *Province*, *In provinciâ nostrâ per aliquot Civitates*, saith he again; which shews that *more Cities than Carthage* were under his care. *Quoniam latius fusa est provincia nostra*, in his *Epistle* to *Cornelius*. In the *African Code* it appears the *Bishop* of *Carthage* had the *Primacy* by his

S. Cyprian. *Ep.* 52. *n.* 13. *Ep.* 23. *n.* 2. *Ep.* 45. *n.* 2.

his *place*; in the other *Provinces* by *Seniority of Consecration. Victor* mentions one *Crescens*, who had 120 *Bishops* under him as *Metropolitan.* And I hope at least for the sake of the *African Bishops*, Mr. *B.* will entertain the better opinion of the *English Episcopacy.*

Victor Vit. l. 1.

Sect. 10. But that he may not think this sort of *Episcopacy* was only in these *parts* of *Africa*, let us enquire into the *Episcopacy* of the *Church* of *Alexandria.* And we may suppose *Athanasius* did not spend all his zeal upon *doctrinal points*, but had some for the *right Constitution* of *Churches*; and yet it is most certain the *Churches* under his care could not have *personal Communion* with him. It is observed by *Epiphanius, that* Athanasius *did frequently visit the neighbour Churches, especially those in* Maræotis; of which *Athanasius* himself gives the best account. *Maræotis*, saith he, *is a Region belonging to* Alexandria, *which never had either Bishop or Suffragan in it; but all the Churches there are immediately subject to the Bishop of* Alexandria; *but every Presbyter is fixed in his particular Village; and here they had Churches erected in which these Presbyters did officiate.* All this we have expressly from *Athanasius* himself, whence we observe, (1.) That here were *true Parochial Churches*; for so *Athanasius* calls them *Churches*, and not *bare Oratories.* (2.) That these had *Presbyters fixed among them*, who performed *divine Offices* there. (3.) That these were under the *immediate inspection* of the *Bishop* of *Alexandria*, so that the *whole Government* belonged to him. (4.) That these were at *that distance*, that they could not have *local Communion* with their *Bishop* in his *Church* at *Alexandria.* Which is directly contrary to Mr. *Baxter*'s *Episcopacy.* So in *Alexandria* it self, there were many *distant Churches* with fixed *Presbyters* in them, as *Epiphanius* several times observes: And it would be a very strange thing indeed, if so many *Presbyters* should have *fixed Churches* in *Alexandria*, and yet the *whole Church* of *Alexandria* be no *bigger* than to make *one Congregation for personal Communion with the Bishop.* But Mr. *Baxter*'s great argument is, *from the meeting of the whole multitude with* Athanasius *in the great Church at* Alexandria *to keep the Easter Solemnity*; whence he concludes, *that the Christians in* Alexandria *were no more than that the main body of them could meet and hear in one Assembly.* Whereas all that *Athanasius* saith, amounts to no more than this, *that the multitude was too great to meet in one of the lesser Churches, and therefore a great clamour was raised among them that they might go into the New Church*; Athanasius *pressed them to bear with the inconveniency and disperse themselves into the lesser Churches*; *the People grew impatient, and so at last he yielded to them.* But what is there in all this to prove that *all the Christians* in the *whole City* were then *present*, and that this *Church* would hold them all? If a great Assembly should meet at one of the lesser *Churches* in *London* upon some *Solemn Occasion*, and finding themselves too big for that place should press the *Bishop* to open St. *Paul*'s for that day before it were quite *finished*, because of the greater *capacity* of the *Church* for receiving such a number, would this prove that Saint *Paul*'s held all the *Christians* in *London*? *Athanasius* saith not a word more, *than that it was Easter, and there appeared a great number of People, such a one as Christian Princes would wish in a Christian City.* Doth he say, or intimate, that all the Christians of the *City* were *present*? that none of them went to the *lesser Churches*? or were absent, though the Crouw as so great?

Epiph. *hær.* 68. *n.* 6. Athanas. *Ap. p.* 781. 802.

Hæres. 68. *n* 469 *n.* 1.

Abridgment of Church. hist. p. 9.

Athanas. *Ap. p.* 682.

Doth

Doth he not say, *the multitudes were so great in the smaller Churches in the Lent Assemblies, that not a few were stifled and carried home for dead? And therefore it was necessary to consider the multitude at such a time.* In my mind Mr. *Baxter* might as well prove that the whole *Nation* of the *Jews* made but one *Congregation*; because at the dedication of *Solomon*'s *Temple* there was so great *a multitude present*, that one of the lesser *Synagogues* could not hold them. But the argument is of greater force in this respect, that *God* himself appointed but *one Temple* for the *whole Nation* of the *Jews:* And therefore he intended no more than a *single Congregational Church.* But to serve this *Hypothesis*, *Alexandria* it self must be shrunk into a less compass; although *Dionysius Alexandrinus*, who was *Bishop* there, saith it was ἡ μεγάλη πόλις *a very great City*, and the *Geographer* published by *Gothofred* saith it was σφόδρα μεγάλη, *an exceeding great City*; *so great that it was* ἀσύλληπτος *pass'd Men's comprehension:* And *Ammianus Marcellinus* saith it *was the top of all Cities.* And for the *number* of *Christians* there long before the time of *Athanasius*, *Dionysius Alexandrinus* saith *in a time of great persecution, when he was banished, he kept up the Assemblies in the City*; *and at* Cephro *he had a large Church, partly of the Christians of* Alexandria *which followed him, and partly from other places, and when he was removed thence to* Colluthion, *which was nearer the City, such numbers of Christians flocked out of the City to him, that they were forced to have distinct Congregations:* So the words κατὰ μέρος signifie, and so *Athanasius* useth them, κατὰ μέρος καὶ διηρημένως, for the *Christians meeting in several Congregations.* If there were such a number of *Christians* at *Alexandria* so long before, under the *sharpest persecution*, is it possible to imagin, in so *great* a *City*, after *Christianity* had so long been the *Religion* of the *Empire*, that the number of *Christians* there should be no greater than to make *one large Congregation?* There is no hopes of convincing Men, that can build *Theories* upon such strange Improbabilities. I shall only add one Instance more from *Antiquity*, which is plain enough of it self to shew the great extent of *Diocesan Power* then; and that is of *Theodoret*, a great and learned Bishop; and although his *Bishoprick* was none of the largest, yet in his *Epistle* to *Leo* he saith, *he had the Pastoral charge of* 800 *Churches*; *for so many Parishes*, saith he, *are in my Dioceſs, which he had then enjoyed twenty six years.* Doth Mr. *B.* believe that all the *Christians* in *these* 800 *Churches had personal Communion with* Theodoret? And yet these *Parishes* did not change their *species*, for he saith, *they were Churches still.*

Euseb. *l.* 7. *c.* 21.

Vetus Orbis descript. p. 18.

Amm. Marc. *l.* 22.

Euseb. *l.* 7. *c.* 11.

Ath. *Apol. p.* 683.

Theodor. *Ep.* 113.

This Testimony of *Theodoret* is so full and peremptory, that Mr. *Baxter* hath no other way to avoid the force of it, but to call in question the *Authority* of the *Epistle.* But without any considerable ground, unless it be that it contradicts his Hypothesis. For, *what if* Theodoret's *Epistles came out of the* Vatican *Copy?* Is that a sufficient argument to reject them, unless some inconsistency be proved in those Epistles, with the History of those times, or with his other Writings? Which are the *Rules*, *Rivet* gives for judging the sincerity of them. *That Epistle which* Bellarmin *and others reject as spurious*, is contradicted by other Epistles of his still extant; which shew a full reconciliation between *Cyril* of *Alexandria* and him before his death. And it is supposed, that *John* of *Antioch* was dead some considerable time before *Cyril*; which manifestly overthrows the Authority of it. But what

Treatise of Episcopacy, p. 67.

Critic. Sacr. l. 4. *c.* 21.

what is there like that in this *Epistle* to *Leo*, when the matter of fact is proved by other *Epistles*? As to the unreasonable proceedings of *Dioscorus* against him, (which was the occasion of writing it) his other Epistles are so full of it, that Mr. *B.* never read the rest, if he calls this into question upon that account. That *Hypatius*, *Abramius* and *Alypius* were sent into the *West* upon *Theodoret*'s account, appears by the Epistles to *Renatus* and *Florentius*, which follow that to *Leo*. What *if several Epistles of his are lost, which* Nicephorus *saw*, doth that prove all that are remaining to be counterfeit? But he is much mistaken, if he thinks *there was no other Copy but the* Vatican *translated by* Metius; for *Sirmondus* tells us he met with another Copy at *Naples*, which he compared with the *Vatican*, and published the various Readings of the *Epistles* from it. *What if* Leontius *saith that Hereticks feigned Epistles in* Theodoret's *name?* Doth that prove an *Epistle* wherein he vindicates himself from the *imputation* of *Heresie*, to be spurious? What Mr. *B.* means *by the printing this Epistle alone after* Theodoret's *Works*, I do not well understand, unless he never saw any other than the *Latin Edition* of *Theodoret*. But it is a very bold thing to pronounce concerning the *Authority* of a Man's Writings, without so much as looking into the latest and best Editions of them. But there are two things he objects which seem more material. (1.) *That it seems incredible that a Town within two days journey of* Antioch *should have* 800 *Churches in it at that time.* (2.) *That he proves from other places in* Theodoret, *that it is very improbable that Dioceses then had so many Churches.*

Theod. *Ep.* 116. *Ep.* 117.

Sirmond. *Præf. ad* Theod. *Opera.*

1. As to the first, certainly no man in his wits ever undertook to prove, *that one such City* as *Cyrus* then was, *had* 800 *Churches in it.* But by *Cyrus*, *Theodoret* means the *Diocese* of *Cyrus*; as will afterwards appear. If *Cyrus* were taken for the *Regio Cyrrhestica*, with the bounds given it by *Ptolemy*, *Strabo*, and *Pliny*, then there would not appear the least improbability in it, since many considerable *Cities* were within it, as *Beræa*, (now *Aleppo*) and *Hierapolis*, and extended as far as *Euphrates*; *Zeugma* being comprehended under it. The Ecclesiastical Province was likewise very large, and by the ancient *Notitiæ* it is sometimes called *Euphratensis*, which in *Ammianus* his time took in *Comagena*, and extended to *Samosata*, (but the *Regio Cyrrhestica* before was distinct from *Comagena*, as appears by *Strabo*, and others) in that Province there was a Metropolitan, who was called the Metropolitan of *Hagiopolis*, which by the same *Notitiæ* appears to have been then one of the names of *Cyrus*, or *Cyrrhus*. But notwithstanding, I do not think the words of *Theodoret* are to be understood of the *Province*, but of his own peculiar *Diocese*; for *Theodoret* mentions the *Metropolitan* he was under. By *Cyrus* therefore we understand the *Region* about the *City*, which was under *Theodoret*'s care; within which he was confined by the Emperour's Order, as he complains in several Epistles, and there it is called by him, ἡ Κυρρεστῶν χώρα, *Regio Cyrrhestica*; and *Theodoret* himself sets down the extent of it in his *Epistle* to *Constantius*, where he saith, *it was forty miles in length, and forty in breadth.* And he saith in another *Epistle*, *that Christianity was so much spread among them, that not only the Cities, but the Villages, the Fields, and utmost bounds were filled with Divine Grace.* And that these Villages had *Churches* and *Priests* settled in them, under the care of the *Bishop*, appears expressly from a passage in the *Life* of *Symeon*, where he speaks of *Bassus visiting* the *Parochial Churches*; Ὃς τηνικαῦτα πύλας περιώδευσε κώμας τοῖς κατὰ κώμην ἱερεῦσιν ὑποτελῶν.

Ptolem. *l.* 5. *c.* 15. Strab. *l.* 16. Plin. *l.* 5. *c.* 24.

Amm. Marcel. *l.* 14.

Notitiæ *Antiq. Append. ad* Car. à S. Paulo, *p.* 59.

Theodor. *Ep.* 16.

Theodor. *Ep.* 79, 81.

Ep. 42.

Ep. 72.

Religios. Hist. Vit. Symeon. *p.* 879.

If

If there were then *Parochial Churches* setled with *Presbyters* in them, and these under the care of the *Diocesan Bishop*, then Mr. *B.*'s *Hypothesis* is utterly overthrown. In his Epistle to *Nomus*, he mentions *eight Villages in his Diocese that were over-run with the Heresie of* Marcion, *another with the* Eunomian, *another with the* Arian *Heresie, which were all converted by his care:* and in another place he saith, *he had brought ten thousand* Marcionists *to Baptism.* In another he mentions the *spreading of* Marcion's *Doctrine in his Diocese, and the great pains he took to root it out; and the success he had therein.* And we find the names of many of the *Villages* in his *Lives*, as *Tillima, Targala, Nimuza, Telada, Telanissus*, which are sufficient to shew that *Theodoret* had properly a *Diocesan Church*, and that his Episcopal Care and Authority did extend to many *Parochial Churches*; his *Diocese being forty miles in length, and as many in breadth.* So that Mr. *B.* must reject, not only that *Epistle* to *Leo*, but the rest too, and his other Works, if he hopes to make good his *Parochial Episcopacy*; which is too hard a Task to be undertaken, without better evidence than he hath hitherto brought.

Ep. 81: Ep. 145. Vita Jacobi jun. p. 860, 861, &c. 868, 869, 876, 877, 878, 879.

2. But he offers to produce *other Testimonies out of* Theodoret, *to shew the improbability that Dioceses had so many Churches.* The question is not about the bare *number* of *Churches* in *Dioceses*, which all men know to have been very different; but about the *extent* of *Episcopal Power*, whether it were limited to *one Parochial Church*, or was extended over many. And what is there in *Theodoret* which contradicts this? I extremely failed of my expectation, as to the other places of *Theodoret*, which he promised to produce; for I find five or six places cited out of his *History*, but not one that comes near any proof of this matter. The (1.) proves, *that in a time of Persecution at* Alexandria, *nineteen Presbyters and Deacons were banished to* Heliopolis *in* Phœnicia, *where there were no Christians.* Therefore in *Theodoret*'s time there was no *Diocesan Episcopacy.* The (2.) shews, *that in a small City of* Thebais, *whither* Eulogius *and* Protogenes *were banished, and there were but a few Christians, yet there was a Bishop.* Who ever denied this, where there was a prospect of converting more, as appears by the endeavours of *Eulogius* and *Protogenes* there? But he ought to have proved that as the *Christians increased, new Bishops* were made, which this is very far from. The (3.) proves *that* Lucius *of* Alexandria *was made Bishop by force, without any Synod of Bishops, or choice of the Clergy, or request of the People.* I suppose by this time, Mr. *B.* had forgotten what he promised to prove from *Theodoret.* But I wonder how it came into his mind to say *the Church of* Alexandria *at that time was like a Presbyterian Church:* which I am sure he had not from *Theodoret*, nor from the *Epistle* of *Peter* of *Alexandria.* The (4.) is intended to prove, *that in the time of* Valens, *the Patriarchal Orthodox Church of* Alexandria *was but one Assembly, which met only in one place at once.* But it is very unhappy, that *Theodoret* shews just the contrary in that place, for he saith, *that* Valens *expelled the orthodox Christians out of their Churches,* Τῶν ἱερῶν ἐξήλασεν οἴκων, are his very words: *to whom,* he saith, *Jovianus had likewise given the new built Church.* Which Mr. *B.* thus translates, *Valens found the Orthodox, even in the great Patriarchal City of* Antioch *in possession but of one Church, which good* Jovinian *the Emperour had given them, of which he dispossessed them.* I desire any one who relies on Mr. *B.*'s skill and fidelity in these matters, but to compare this *Translation* with the *Text* in *Theodoret*, and I dare say he will see

Treatise of Episcopacy, part 2. p. 49, 50. Theod. *Hist. l. 4. c. 19. l. 4. c. 15.* *l. 4. c. 19.* *l. 4. c. 21.*

cause to admire it. But if any one can imagine that the *Patriarchal Church* of *Antioch* in the time of *Valens* could consist but of *one Congregation*, for my part, I must give him over, as one uncapable of being convinced of any thing by me. I do not speak what the *Church* in a time of great persecution might be driven to, but of what it was in its *setled state*. The (5.) is, *from* Terentius *his begging one Church for the Orthodox, of* Valens; which saith Mr. *B. intimates their numbers.* I am ashamed to read, much more to confute such arguments as these. For if the *Papists* should desire the *liberty* but of *one Church* in *London*, doth that prove they are no more than can make *one Congregation?* The (6.) proves *that* Maris *was made Bishop of* Dolicha, *a small Town infected with* Arianism. It is true, *Theodoret* saith, *Doliche was a little City*, and so he tells us, *Cyrus was no great one*; but he doth not set down the *bounds* of the *Diocese*; which for any thing we see in *Theodoret*, might be as large, as we have evidently proved from him, the *Diocese of Cyrrhus* was. Let the Reader now judge, whether *Theodoret* doth not plainly overthrow Mr. *B.*'s notion of *Parochial Episcopacy.*

l. 4. c. 29.

l. 5. c. 4.

But Mr. *B.* insists *upon the Institution of Christ*; *and if Christ hath appointed one sort of Churches*, viz. *for personal communion*, *and men make another*, *is not this a violation of Christ's command, and setting up Man against God?* I see no evidence produced for any such *Institution of Christ*, which limits *Episcopal Power* to a *single Congregation*; and therefore the extending it to more, can be no *violation* of *Christ*'s *command*, or *setting up a new species of Churches*, as will appear from Mr. *B.* himself under the next particular. Yet Mr. *B.* according to his wonted meekness towards his *Adversaries*, charges me, for speaking against this principle of his, with pleading for *presumption*, *profanation*, *usurpation*, *uncharitableness*, *schism*, and what not? What is the reason of all this *rage* and *bitterness?* Why, I set down a saying of his, as going beyond the *Independents* in making *the devising new species of Churches beyond Parochial or Congregational without God's Authority, and to impose them on the world, yea in his name, and call all Dissenters Schismaticks, a far worse usurpation than to make or impose new Ceremonies or Liturgies. But is not all this true supposing that such new species of Churches be so devised and so imposed?* That is not to the business; for that which I quoted it for, was to shew that Mr. *B.* looked upon all *Churches beyond Parochial, as Churches merely of mens devising*; and that *to charge men with Schism for opposing any such Constitution is unreasonable*; and that *the imposing it as Divine, is an intolerable usurpation*; and all this at the same time, when he pretends to write for *Peace* and *Concord.* My business is now to shew

Answer to Serm. p. 73.

Sect. 11. 2. *That such an Episcopacy as is practised here, and was so in the Primitive Church is no devising a new species of Churches, nor hath any thing repugnant to any Institution of Christ.* And to prove this, I need no more than one of Mr. *B.*'s own *Cautions* in his *Premonition*, viz. that *he doth not dispute the lawfulness of Archbishops*, as he calls them, *over Parochial Bishops, as Successors to the Apostolical and other general Overseers of the first Age, in the ordinary continued parts of their Office.* And what he saith in his own name and others in his *Plea* for *Peace*: *There are some of us, that much incline to think that Archbishops, that is, Bishops that have oversight of many Churches with their Pastors, are lawful Successors of the Apostles in the ordinary part of their Work.* But I cannot here omit Mr. *Baxter*'s Arguments to prove, that the *ordinary governing part of the Apostolical Office, was setled for all following Ages.*

p. 263.

Christian Directory. Eccles. Cases Q. 66. p. 831

1. *Because we read of the setling of that form, but we never read of any abolition, discharge, or cessation of the Institution.* 2. *Because if we affirm a cessation without proof, we seem to accuse God of mutability, as setling one form of Government for one Age only, and no longer.* 3. *We leave room for audacious Wits accordingly to question other Gospel Institutions, as Pastors, Sacraments,* &c. *and to say, they were but for an Age.* 4. *It was general Officers Christ promised to be with to the end of the world,* Mat. 28. 20. Which being joined with the *Consent* of the *Christian Church of the Ages succeeding the Apostles,* that the *Apostles* did leave *Successours* in the *care* and *government* of *Churches*, have a great deal of weight in them, and over-ballance the *difficulties* on the other side. As upon this occasion I think fit to declare. From whence I argue thus, That which is only a *continuance* of the *same kind of Churches* which were in being in the *Apostolical time*, is *no devising a new species of Churches*, nor hath any thing *repugnant to any Institution of Christ.* But that is the case as to our *Episcopacy.* We intend no quarrel about names: If it be Mr. *B.*'s pleasure to call our *Bishops Archbishops*, let him enjoy his own fancy. It already appears from Saint *Cyprian*, and might much more be made plain from many others if it were needful, that the *Bishops* of the *several Churches* were looked on as *Successors* to the *Apostles* in the *care* and *government* of *Churches.* Now the *Office* of Mr. *B.*'s *Parochial Bishops* was only to attend to *one particular Congregation*; but the *Apostolical Office* was above this, while the *Apostles* held it in their own hands; and did not make a *new species* of *Churches*, nor overthrow the *Constitution* of *Parochial Churches.* It seems then a strange thing to me, that the continuance of the same kind of *Office* in the *Church*, should be called the *devising a new species of Churches.*

But Mr. *B.* runs upon this perpetual mistake, that our *English Episcopacy* is not a *succession* to the *Ordinary part* of the *Apostolical Power* in *governing Churches*; but a *new sort of Episcopacy*, not heard of in the *ancient Church*, which swallows up the *whole Power* of *Presbyters*, and leaves them only a bare name of *Curates*, and destroys the *being* of *Parochial Churches.* But if I can make the contrary to appear from the *Frame* and *Constitution* of this *Church*, I hope Mr. *B.* will be reconciled to our *Episcopal Government*, and endeavour to remove the *prejudices* he hath caused in *Peoples* minds against it.

Sect. 12. Now to examine this, let us consider two things. (1.) What *Power* is left to *Presbyters* in our *Church.* (2.) What *Authority* the *Bishops* of our *Church* have over them.

I. What *Power* is left to *Presbyters* in our *Church:* and that may be considered two ways. 1. With respect to the *whole Body* of this *Church.* 2. With respect to their particular *Congregations* or *Cures.*

1. With respect to the *whole Body* of this *Church:* and so, (1.) There are no *Rules of Discipline*, no *Articles of Doctrine*, no *Form of Divine Service*, are to be allowed or received in this *Nation*; but, by the *Constitution* of this *Church*, the *Presbyters* of it have their *Votes* in passing them, either in *Person*, or by *Proxy.* For, all things of that *Nature*, are to pass both *Houses* of *Convocation*; and the *lower House* consists wholly of *Presbyters*, who represent the whole *Presbytery* of the *Nation*, either appearing by their *own Right*, as many do, or as *being chosen by the rest*, from whom *by Indentures* they either do, or ought to receive *Power* to transact things in their *names.* And the *custom* of this *Church* hath sometimes been, for the *Clergy* of the *Dioceses* to give *limited*

Proxies in particular *Caſes* to their *Procurators*. Now I appeal to any man of underſtanding, whether the *Clergy* of this *Church* have their *whole Power* ſwallowed up by the *Biſhops*, when yet the *Biſhops* have no power to oblige them to any *Rules* or *Canons* but by their *own conſent*, and they do freely vote in all things of *common concernment* to the *Church*, and therefore the *Preſbyters* are not by the *Conſtitution* deprived of their *ſhare* in one of the greateſt *Rights* of *Government*, viz. in making *Rules* for the *whole Body*. And in this main part of *Government* the *Biſhops* do nothing without the *counſel* of their *Preſbyters*, and in this reſpect our *Church* falls behind none of the *ancient Churches*, which had their *Councils* of *Preſbyters* together with their *Biſhops*; only, there they were taken *ſingly* in *every City*, and here they are combined together in *Provincial Synods*; model'd according to the *Laws* of the *Nation*. And when the *whole Body* of *Doctrine*, *Diſcipline*, and *Worſhip* are thus agreed upon by a general conſent, there ſeems to be far leſs need of the particular *Councils* of *Preſbyters* to every *Biſhop*, ſince both *Biſhops* and *Preſbyters* are now under *fixed Rules*, and are accountable for the breach of them. (2.) *In giving Orders*; by the *Rules* of this *Church four Preſbyters* are *to aſſiſt the Biſhop*, and to *examine the Perſons to be ordained*, (or the *Biſhop* in their preſence) and afterwards *to join in the laying on of hands upon the Perſons ordained*. And is all this nothing but to be the *Biſhop's Curates*, and to officiate in ſome of his *Chapels?*

Can. 31, & 35.

2. As to their *particular charges*, one would think thoſe who make this objection, had never read over the *Office* of *Ordination*, for therein, (1.) For the *Epiſtle* is read the Charge given by Saint *Paul* to the *Elders* at *Miletus*, Acts 20. or the *third Chapter* of the *firſt Epiſtle* to *Timothy*; concerning the *Office* of a *Biſhop*. What a great impertinency had both theſe been, if the *Preſbyter's Power* had been quite ſwallowed up by the *Biſhop's?* But it hence appears, that our *Church* looked on the *Elders* at *Epheſus*, and the *Biſhop* in *Timothy* to be *Preſbyters*, as yet under the care and government of the *Apoſtles*, or ſuch as they deputed for that Office, ſuch as *Timothy* and *Titus* were. Which I ſuppoſe is the true meaning of Saint *Jerome*, and many other doubtful Paſſages of Antiquity, which relate to the *community* of the *names* of *Biſhop* and *Preſbyter*, while the *Apoſtles* governed the Church themſelves. And at this time *Timothy* being appointed to this part of the *Apoſtolical Office* of *Government*, the *Biſhops* mentioned in the *Epiſtle* to him, may well enough be the ſame with the *Preſbyters* in the *Epiſtle* to *Titus*, who was *appointed to ordain Elders in every City*, Titus 1. 5. (2.) In the *Biſhop's Exhortation* to them that are to be ordained, he ſaith, *Now we exhort you in the name of the Lord Jeſus Chriſt, to have in remembrance into how high a dignity, and to how chargeable an Office ye be called, that is to ſay, the Meſſengers and Watchmen, the Paſtors and Stewards of the Lord, to teach, to premoniſh, to feed and provide for the Lord's Family*, &c. *have always therefore printed in your remembrance, how great a treaſure is committed to your charge; for they be the Sheep of Chriſt, which he bought with his death, and for whom he ſhed his Blood. The Church and Congregation whom you muſt ſerve is his Spouſe and Body. And if it ſhall chance the ſame Church, or any Member thereof, to take any hurt or hindrance, by reaſon of your negligence, you know the greatneſs of the fault, and of the horrible puniſhment which will enſue*, &c. Is this the language of a *Church* which deprives *Preſbyters* of the *due care of their flocks*, and makes *Parochial Congregations* to be *no Churches?* (3.) The perſon to be ordained doth

ſolemnly

solemnly promise *to give faithful diligence to minister the Doctrine and Sacraments, and the Discipline of Christ, as the Lord hath commanded, and as this Realm hath received the same, according to the Commandments of God, so that he may teach the People committed to his Cure and Charge, with all diligence to keep and observe the same.* Here we see a *Cure* and *Charge* committed to the *Presbyters*; *Preaching* and *Administration* of *Sacraments* required of them, and the *exercise of Discipline*, as far as belongs to them, (of which afterwards) but now in the *Consecration* of a *Bishop*, this part is left out, and instead of that it is said, *That he is called to the Government of the Church; and he is required to correct and punish such as be unquiet, disobedient and criminous in his Diocese.* So that the more particular *charge* of *Souls* is committed to every *Pastor* over his own Flock, and the general care of *Government* and *Discipline* is committed to the *Bishop*, as that which especially belongs to his *Office*, as distinct from the other.

Sect. 13. II. Which is the next thing to be considered, *viz. What Authority the Bishop hath, by virtue of his Consecration, in this Church?* And that, I say, is what Mr. *B.* calls the *ordinary parts of the Apostolical Authority*; which lies in three things, *Government*, *Ordination* and *Censures.* And that our *Church* did believe our *Bishops* to succeed the *Apostles* in those parts of their *Office*, I shall make appear by these things. (1.) In the *Preface* before the *Book* of *Ordination*, it is said, *That it is evident unto all men, diligently reading Holy Scripture, and ancient Authors, that from the Apostles time, there have been these Orders of Ministers in Christ's Church, Bishops, Priests and Deacons.* What is the reason that they express it thus, *from the Apostles time*, rather than *in the Apostles times*, but that they believed, while the *Apostles* lived, they managed the affairs of Government themselves; but as they withdrew, they did in some Churches sooner, and in some later, as their own *continuance*, the *condition* of the *Churches*, and the *qualification* of *Persons* were, commit the Care and Government of *Churches* to such *Persons* whom they appointed thereto? Of which, we have an uncontrolable evidence in the Instances of *Timothy* and *Titus*; for the care of *Government* was a distinct thing from the *Office* of an *Evangelist*; and all their removes do not invalidate this, because while the *Apostles* lived, it is probable there were no fixed *Bishops*, or but few. But as they went off, so they came to be settled in their several *Churches.* And as this is most agreeable to the sense of our *Church*, so it is the fairest *Hypothesis* for reconciling the different *Testimonies* of *Antiquity.* For hereby the succession of *Bishops* is secured from the *Apostles* times, for which the Testimonies of *Irenæus*, *Tertullian*, Saint *Cyprian*, and others, are so plain; hereby room is left to make good all that Saint *Jerome* hath said; and what *Epiphanius* delivers concerning the differing *settlements* of *Churches* at first. So that we may allow for the *community* of names, between *Bishop* and *Presbyter*, for a while in the *Church*, i. e. while the *Apostles* governed the *Churches* themselves; but afterwards, that which was then part of the *Apostolical Office*, became the *Episcopal*, which hath continued from that time to this, by a constant succession in the *Church.* (2.) *Archbishop Whitgift* several times declares, *that these parts of the Apostolical Office still remained in the Bishops of our Church. As for this part of the Apostles function*, saith he, *to visit such Churches as were before planted, and to provide that such were placed in them, as were vertuous and godly Pastors, I know it remaineth still, and is one of the chief parts of the Bishops function.* And again, *There is now no planting of Churches,*

Defence of the Answer to the Admon. p.218.

p. 424.

Churches, nor going through the whole world, there is no writing of new Gospels, no propheſying of things to come, but there is governing of Churches, viſiting of them, reforming of Paſtors, and directing of them, which is a p. 427. *portion of the Apoſtolical function.* Again, *Although that this part of the Apoſtolical Office which did conſiſt in planting and founding of Churches through the whole world is ceaſed, yet the manner of Government by placing Biſhops in every City, by moderating and governing them, by viſiting the Churches, by cutting off ſchiſms and contentions, by ordering Miniſters, remaineth ſtill, and ſhall continue, and is in this Church in the Archbiſhops and Biſhops, as moſt meet men to execute the ſame.* *Biſhop Bilſon* fully agrees, as to theſe particulars. (1.) *That the Apoſtles did not at firſt commit the Churches to the government of Biſhops, but reſerved the chief power of Government in their own hands.* (2.) *That upon experience of the confuſion and diſorder which did ariſe through equality of Paſtors, did appoint at their departure certain approved men to be Biſhops.* (3.) *That theſe Biſhops did ſucceed the Apoſtles in the Care and Government of Churches,* as he proves at large, and therefore he calls *their function Apoſtolick.* Inſtead of many others, which it were eaſie to produce, I ſhall only add the *Teſtimony* of King *Charles* I. in his *Debates* about *Epiſcopacy*, who underſtood the *Conſtitution* of our *Church* as well as any *Biſhop* in it, and defended it with as clear and as ſtrong a Reaſon. In his *third Paper* to *Henderſon*, he hath theſe words, *Where you find a Biſhop and Preſbyter in Scripture to be one and the ſame, (which I deny to be always ſo) it is in the Apoſtles times; now I think to prove the Order of Biſhops ſucceeded that of the Apoſtles, and that the name was chiefly altered in reverence to thoſe who were immediately choſen by our Savionr.* In his *firſt Paper* at the *Treaty* at *Newport*, he thus ſtates the caſe about *Epiſcopal Government.* *I conceive that Epiſcopal Government is moſt conſonant to the word of God, and of an Apoſtolical Inſtitution, as it appears by the Scriptures to have been practiſed by the Apoſtles themſelves, and by them committed and derived to particular Perſons as their ſubſtitutes or ſucceſſors therein, (as for ordaining Preſbyters and Deacons, giving Rules concerning Chriſtian Diſcipline, and exerciſing Cenſures over Preſbyters and others) and hath ever ſince to theſe laſt times been exerciſed by Biſhops in all the Churches of Chriſt, and therefore I cannot in conſcience conſent to aboliſh the ſaid Government.* In his *Reply* to the *firſt Anſwer* of the *Divines*, he ſaith, *that mere Preſbyters are* Epiſcopi Gregis *only, they have the overſight of the Flock in the duties of Preaching, Adminiſtration of Sacraments, publick Prayer, Exhorting, Rebuking,* &c, *but Biſhops are* Epiſcopi Gregis & Paſtorum *too, having the overſight of Flock and Paſtors within their ſeveral Precincts in the Acts of external Government. And that, although the Apoſtles had no Succeſſors* in eundem gradum *as to thoſe things that were extraordinary in them, as namely the meaſure of their Gifts, the extent of their charge, the infallibility of their Doctrine, and the having ſeen Chriſt in the fleſh; but in thoſe things that were not extraordinary, (and ſuch thoſe things are to be judged which are neceſſary for the ſervice of the Church in all times, as the Office of Teaching and the Power of governing are) they were to have and had Succeſſors; and therefore the learned and godly Fathers and Councils of old times, did uſually ſtile Biſhops the Succeſſors of the Apoſtles without ever ſcrupling thereat.* Many other Paſſages might be produced out of thoſe *excellent Papers* to the ſame purpoſe, but theſe are ſufficient to diſcover that our *Biſhops* are looked on as *Succeſſors* to the *Apoſtles*, and therefore Mr. *Baxter*

Perpetual Government of Chriſt's Church, ch. 12. p. 224

ch. 13. p. 244.

hath no reason to call our *Episcopacy a new devised species of Churches*, and such as destroys the *being of Parochial Churches.*

Sect. 14. 3. It now remains, that we consider whether the *restraint* of *Discipline* in our *Parochial Churches* doth overthrow their *Constitution?* To make this clear, we must understand that the *Discipline* of the *Church* either respects the *admission* of *Church-members* to the *Holy Communion*; or the *casting of them out* for *Scandal* afterwards.

1. As to that part of *Discipline* which respects the *admission* of *Church-members.* The *Rubrick* after *Confirmation* saith, *That none shall be admitted to the holy Communion, until such time as he be confirmed, or be ready and desirous to be confirmed.* Now to capacitate a person for *Confirmation*, it is necessary that he be able to give an account of the necessary points of the *Christian Faith* and *Practice*, as they are contained in the *Creed*, the *Lord's-Prayer*, the *Ten Commandments* and the *Church Catechism*; and of his sufficiency herein the *Parochial Minister* is the *Judge.* For he is *either to bring or send in writing, with his hand subscribed thereunto, the names of all such persons within his Parish, as he shall think fit to be presented to the Bishop to be confirmed.* Now, if this were strictly observed (and the *Church* is not responsible for mens neglect) were it not sufficient for the satisfaction of men as to the *admission* of *Church-members* to the *Lord's Supper?* And I do not see, but the *Objections* made against the *Discipline* of this *Church* might be removed, if the things allowed and required by the *Rules* of it, were duly practised; and might attain to as great *purity*, as is ever pretended to by the *Separate Congregations*, who now find so much fault for our *want* of *Discipline.* For, even the *Churches* of *New-England* do grant, *that the Infant seed of Confederate visible Believers are members of the same Church with their Parents, and when grown up are personally under the Watch, Discipline and Government of that Church. And, that Infants baptized have a right to farther priviledges, if they appear qualified for them.* And the main of these *qualifications* are, *understanding the Doctrine of Faith, and publickly professing their assent thereto, not scandalous in life, and solemnly owning the Covenant before the Church.* Taking this for the *Baptismal Covenant*, and not *their Church Covenant*, our *Church* owns the same thing, only it is to be done *before the Bishop* instead of their *Congregation.* But the *Minister* is to be *judge* of the *qualifications*, which Mr. *Baxter* himself allows in this case. Who grants *the Profession of Faith to be a Condition of Right before the Church*; and then adds, *that such profession is to be tried, judged and approved by the Pastors of the Church to whose Office it belongs*; *because to Ministers as such the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven are committed*; *and they are Stewards of God's House*, &c. which he there proves at large by many Arguments. But *he complains of the old careless practice of this excellent duty of Confirmation.* This is a thing indeed to be lamented, that it is too hastily and cursorily performed: but let the fault then be laid, where it ought to be laid; not upon the *Church*, whose *Rules* are very good, but upon those *persons* in it who slubber over so important a *Duty.* But is it not more becoming *Christians* in a peaceable and orderly manner to endeavour to retrieve so excellent a means for the *Reformation* of our *Parochial Churches*; than peevishly to complain of the *want* of *Discipline*, and to reject *Communion* with our *Church* on that account? And I shall desire Mr. *Baxter* to consider his own words, *That the practice of so much Discipline, as we are agreed in, is a likelier way to bring us to agreement in the rest, than all our disputings will do without it.*

Synod of New-England concerning the subject of Baptism, &c 1662.

Baxter *of Confirmation*, p. 20. p. 49, 52.

p. 155.

p. 172.

Yea,

Yea, Mr. *Baxter* grants, *That the Presbyters of our Church have by the Rubrick the Trial and Approbation of those, that are sent to the Bishop for Confirmation*; *and that the Doctrine and Practice of the Church of* England, *is for the Power of Presbyters herein as far as they could desire.* This is a very fair confession, and sufficient to make it appear that our *Diocesan Episcopacy* doth not overthrow the *Power* of *Presbyters*, as to this part of *Discipline* which concerns *admission* of *Church-members* to the *Communion.*

p. 262.

Sect. 15. 2. As to that part of *Church Discipline* which respects the rejecting those for *Scandal*, who have been Church-members. In case of *open* and *publick Scandal*, our Church doth allow if not require *the Parochial Minister to call and advertise such a one that is guilty of it in any wise not to come to the Lord's Table, until he hath openly declared himself to have truly repented and amended his former naughty life, that the Congregation may thereby be satisfied, which before was offended. And in case the offender continue obstinate, he may repel him from the Communion*; *but so, that after such repelling, he give an account to the Ordinary within* 14 *days*; *and the Ordinary is then to proceed according to the Canon.* Here is plainly a *Power* granted to put back any *Scandalous Offender* from the *Sacrament*, whose faults are so notorious as to give *offence* to the *Congregation*; but it is not an *absolute* and *unaccountable Power*, but the *Minister* is obliged to give account thereof within a limited time to the *Ordinary.* Now wherein is it that our *Diocesan Episcopacy* destroys the *being* of *Parochial Churches* for want of the *Power* of *Discipline?* Is it that they have not *Power* to exclude men, whether their faults be *Scandalous* to the *Congregation* or not? Or is it, that they are bound to justifie what they do, and to prosecute the Person for those faults for which they put him back from the *Communion?* Or is it, that they have not *Power* to proceed to the *greater Excommunication*, that being reserved to the *Bishop*, upon full hearing of all parties concerned? But as long as by the *Constitution* of our *Church* every Minister in his Parish hath power to keep back *notorious Offenders*, it will be impossible to prove from other circumstances that the being of our *Churches* is destroyed by our *Diocesan Episcopacy.* Mr. *B.* saith, *that if it could be proved, that the lesser excommunication out of our particular Congregations were allowed to the Parish Ministers, it would half reconcile him to the English sort of Prelacy*; *but if it be so, he hath been in a sleep these* 50 *years, that could never hear or read of any such thing.* It is strange, in all this time, he should never read or consider the 26 Canon, which saith, *that no Minister shall in any wise admit any one of his Flock, or under his care to the Communion of the Lord's Supper, who is notoriously known to live impenitently in any scandalous Sin.* This is not in the *Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum*, which he mentions *as an abortive thing, published by John Fox*, (which last any one that hath seen them, knows to be a mistake) not *in* Dr. *Mocket's Book which was burnt*; yet not so destroyed, but with some diligence he might have seen it (but it was *for nothing of this kind*, that *Book* underwent so severe a censure; as Mr. *B.* insinuates; but for seeming to incroach too much on the *King's Prerogative.*) But I appeal to what Mr. *B.* calls *the Authorized Church Canons*; which I think are plain in this case. But Mr. *B.* saith, *this is not the lesser excommunication, but a temporary suspension of the Ministers own Act in delivering the Sacrament to such persons.* Let Mr. *B.* call it by what name he pleaseth; this is certain, the *Minister* is impowered, is required to do this; the question

Rubrick before Communion.

Defence of the Plea. p. 58.

question then is, whether this be not such a *Censure* of the *Church*, as to suspend *notorious Offenders* from the *Sacrament*; and that within the *Power* of the *Parochial Minister?* I grant, this is not *the lesser excommunication*, according to the *Use* of this *Church*, for that supposeth the *sentence* passed; and is so called by way of distinction from the *greater* pronounced by the *Bishop* in Person, upon extraordinary occasions. But yet it is a *Church-censure* upon *Offenders*, and was accounted a sort of *excommunication* by the *Ancient Church*; for those who were in the *state* of *Penitents* were then said to be under a kind of *excommunication*; as appears by several passages in St. *Augustin*, produced by *Spalatensis* to this purpose, *viz.* to prove that there was a *penitential excommunication*. But Mr. *B.* quotes *Albaspinæus* to shew *that the old Excommunication did shut persons out from all other Church-communion as well as the Sacrament*. Which is very true of the *greater Excommunication*; but besides this there were other *Censures* of the *Church* upon *Offenders*, whereby they were *suspended* from *full Communion*; but not debarred the *hopes* of it upon *satisfaction* given. These were said to be in the *state* of *Penitents*. It was a favour to the *excommunicated* to be brought into this *state*; and others were never allowed to *hope* to be *restored* to *Communion*; others only on their *death-beds*; others according to the *nature* and *degrees* of their *Repentance*; of which those were left to be *Judges*, who were particularly intrusted with the *care* of the *Penitents*. *Albaspinæus* grants that as long as men remained *Penitents they were actually deprived of the Privileges of Church-communion*; but he saith, *the Penitents were in a middle state between the excommunicated and the faithful, being still Candidates*, as he calls them; so that all that were *Penitents* were *suspended* from *Communion*; but not *wholly cast out of the Church*; because the *Christians* might as freely converse with these, as with any, but they were not allowed to participate in the *Sacred Mysteries*. But there was no question, whereever there was a *Power* to *suspend* any *Persons* from *Communion*, there was a *Power* of *Discipline*; because the *Church's Discipline* did not consist merely in the *power of Excommunication*; no more than a *Judge's* power lies only in condemning men to be hanged; but in so governing the *Members* of the *Church*, that *Scandalous persons* may be kept from the greatest *Acts* of *Communion*, and by *Admonition* and *Counsel* be brought to a due *preparation* for it. Since then our *Church* doth give *power* to *Parochial Ministers* to *suspend notorious Offenders* from the *Communion*, it is thereby evident, that it doth not deprive them of all the necessary and essential parts of *Church-discipline*. But saith Mr. *B. If a Minister doth publickly admonish another by name, not censured by the Ordinary, the Lawyers tell him he may have his action against him.* I answer, 1. What need this *publick Admonition by name?* Doth the *nature of Church-discipline* lie in that? Suppose a man be privately and effectually dealt with to withdraw himself, is not this sufficient? I am sure St. *Augustine* took this course with his *People* at *Hippo*, *he persuaded them to examine their own Consciences, and if they found themselves guilty of such Crimes as rendred them unfit for the holy Communion, he advised them to withdraw themselves from it, till by Prayers and Fasting and Alms they had cleansed their Consciences, and then they might come to it.* Here is no *publick Admonition* by *name*; and in many cases St. *Augustin* declares the *Church* may justly forbear the *exercise* of *Discipline* towards *Offenders*, and yet the *Church* be *a true Church*, and *Christians* obliged to *communicate* with it; as appears by all his *disputes* with the *Donatists*. 2. If a restraint be laid on *Ministers by Law:*

Epist. 108. *Post collat. c.* Donat. *c.* 20. Spalat. *l.* 5. *c.* 9.

Albaspin. *l.* 2. *c.* 4.

Defence of the Plea. p. 65, 72.

De Tempore Serm. 252.

Law: The question then comes to this, whether the obligation to admonish publickly an Offender, or to deny him the Sacrament, if he will come to it, be so great as to bear him out in the violation of a Law; made by publick Authority, with a design to preserve our *Religion?* But my design is only to speak to this case, so far as the *Church* is concerned in it.

Sect. 16. If it be said, *that notwithstanding this, the neglect and abuse of Discipline among us are too great to be justified, and too notorious to be concealed*; I answer.

1. That is not our question, but whether our *Parochial Churches* have lost their being for want of the *Power* of *Discipline?* and whether the *Species* of our *Churches* be changed by *Diocesan Episcopacy?* which we have shewed sufficient Reason to deny. And what other *abuses* have crept in, ought in an orderly way to be reformed, and no good Man will deny his assistance in it.

2. It is far easier to *separate*, or complain for *want of Discipline*, than to find out a *due way* to restore it. No Man hath more set out the almost insuperable difficulties which attend it, than Mr. *Baxter* hath done; especially in that, it will provoke and exasperate those most who stand in need of it; and be most likely to do good on those who need it least.

Of Confirmation, p. 174, &c.

3. The case of our *Churches* now, is very different from that of the *Churches* in the *Primitive times.* For, the great *Reason* of *Discipline* is not, that for want of it the *Consciences* of *Fellow-communicants* would be *defiled* (for to assert that, were *Donatism*) but that the *honour* of a *Christian Society* may be maintained. If then the *Christian Magistrates* do take care to vindicate the *Church's honour* by *due punishment* of *Scandalous Offenders*, there will appear so much less necessity of restoring the *security* of the *ancient Discipline.* To which purpose these words of the *Royal Martyr* King *Charles* I. are very considerable. "But "his *Majesty* seeth no necessity that the *Bishops* challenge to the *Power* "of *Jurisdiction* should be at all times as large as the *exercise* there- "of at some times appeareth to have been; the *exercise* thereof being "variable according to the various conditions of the *Church* in diffe- "rent times. And therefore his *Majesty* doth not believe that the "*Bishops* under *Christian Princes* do challenge such an *amplitude* of "*Jurisdiction* to belong unto them in respect of their *Episcopal Office* "precisely, as was exercised in the *Primitive times*, by *Bishops* before "the days of *Constantine.* The reason of the difference being evident, "that in those former times under *Pagan Princes*, the *Church* was a "*distinct body* of it self, divided from the *Commonwealth*, and so was to "be governed by its own *Rules* and *Rulers*; the *Bishops* therefore of "those times, though they had no outward coercive power over Mens "Persons or Estates, yet in as much as every Christian Man when he "became a Member of the Church, did *ipso facto*, and by that his own "voluntry Act put himself under their Government, they exercised a "very large Power of Jurisdiction *in spiritualibus*, in making *Eccleси-* "*astical Canons*, receiving accusations, converting the accused, exami- "ning Witnesses, judging of Crimes, excluding such as they found "guilty of *Scandalous offences* from the *Lord's Supper*, enjoyning Pe- "nances upon them, casting them out of the Church, receiving them "again upon their Repentance, *&c.* And all this they exercised as "well over *Presbyters* as others. But after that the *Church* under

His Majesty's final Answer to the Divines at Newport, n. 4.

" *Christian Princes* began to be incorporated into the *Commonwealth*, " whereupon there must of necessity follow a *complication* of the *Civil* " and *Ecclesiastical Power*, the *Jurisdiction* of *Bishops* (in the outward " exercise of it) was subordinate unto, and limitable by the Supreme " Civil Power, and hath been, and is at this day, so acknowledged by " the Bishops of this Realm.

4. The due exercise of *Discipline* is a work of so much *prudence* and *difficulty*, that the greatest *Zealots* for it, have not thought it fit to be trusted in the hands of every *Parochial Minister* and his *particular Congregation*. *Calvin* declares, *that he never thought it convenient that every Minister should have the power of Excommunication: Not only because of the invidiousness of the thing, and the danger of the example; but because of the great Abuses and Tyranny it may soon fall into, and because it was contrary to the Apostolical Practice.* And to the same purpose, *Beza* delivers his judgment, who likewise gives this account of the *Discipline* of *Geneva*, *that the Parochial Ministers and Elders proceed no farther than Admonition; but in case of Contumacy they certify the Presbytery of the City which sits at certain times and hears all Causes relating to Discipline, and as they judge fit either give admonition, or proceed to suspension from the Lord's Supper; or, which is a rare case, and when no other remedy can prevail, they go on to publick Excommunication.* Where we see, every *Parochial Church* is no more trusted with the *Power* of *Discipline* than among us; nay, the *Minister* here hath no power *to repel*, but all that he can do there is *to admonish*; and how come then their *Parochial Churches* to be *true*, and not ours? Besides, why may not our *Ministers* be obliged to *certify* the *Bishop*, as well as theirs to *certify* the *Presbytery?* since in the *African Churches* the matter of *Discipline* was so much reserved to the *Bishop*, that a *Presbyter had no power to receive a Penitent into the Communion of the Church without the advice and direction of the Bishop*; and Saint *Augustin* proposed it, *that whosoever received one that declined the judgment of his own Bishop, should undergo the same censure which that person deserved*; *and it was allowed by the Council.* *Alipius*, Saint *Augustin*'s great Friend and Legat of the *Province* of *Numidia*, *proposed the case of a Presbyter under the censure of his Bishop, who out of pride and vain-glory sets up a separate Congregation in opposition to the Order of the Church*; *and he desired to know the judgment of the Council about it*; *and they unanimously determined that he was guilty of Schism, and ought to be anathematized, and to lose his place.* And this was the *Judgment* even of the *African Bishops*, for whom Mr. *Baxter* professeth greater reverence than for any others; and saith, *their Councils were the best in the world*; and commends *their Canons for very good about Discipline.* But he pretends *that a Bishop's Diocese there, was but like one of our Parishes*, which I have already refuted at large, by shewing that there were places at a considerable distance under the care of the *Bishops*. So that the bringing the *full power* of *Discipline* into *every Parochial Church*, is contrary to the practice of *Antiquity*, as well as of the *Reformed Churches* abroad, which plead most for *Discipline*; and would unavoidably be the occasion of great and scandalous disorders, by the ill management of the *Power* of *Excommunication*; as was most evident by the *Separatists* when they took this *Sword* into their hands, and by their foolish and passionate, and indiscreet use of it, brought more *dishonour* upon their *Churches*, than if they had never

Calvin. *Ep.* 136.

Bez. *Ep.* 20.

Codex *Eccles.* Afric. c. 6, 7, 9, 43.

c. 10.

c. 11.

meddled with it at all. And in such a matter, where the *honour* of the *Christian Society* is the chief thing concerned, it becomes wise Men to consider what tends most to the promoting of that; and whether the good, Men promise themselves by *Discipline*, will countervail the *Schisms* and *Contentions*, the heart-burnings, and animosities which would follow the *Parochial exercise* of it. The dissenting Brethen in their Apologetical Narration do say, *That they had the fatal Miscarriages and Shipwrecks of the Separation, as Land-marks to forewarn them of the Rocks and Shelves they ran upon*; and therefore they say *they never exercised the Power of Excommunication.* For they saw plainly, they could never hold their *People* together if they did; since the *excommunicated Party* would be sure to make Friends enough, at least to make *breaches* among them; and they holding together by *mutual consent*, such *Ruptures* would soon break their *Churches* to pieces. Besides, this would be thought no less than setting up an *Arbitrary Court of Judicature* in *every Parish*; because there are no *certain Rules* to proceed by; no standing determination what those sins and faults are, which should deserve *excommunication*; no method of trials agreed upon; no security against false Witnesses; no limitation of Causes; no liberty of Appeals, (if *Parochial Churches* be the only *instituted Churches*, as Mr. *Baxter* affirms:) besides multitudes of other inconveniencies, which may be easily foreseen; so that I do not question, but if Mr. *Baxter* had the management of this *Parochial Discipline* in any one *Parish* in *London*, and proceeded by his own *Rules*, his Court of *Discipline* would be cried out upon in a short time, as more *arbitrary* and *tyrannical*, than any *Bishop's Court* this day in *England*: Let any one therefore judge, how reasonable it is for him to overthrow the *being* of our *Parochial Churches*, for *want* of that, which being set up according to his own *Principles*, would destroy the *Peace* and *Unity*, if not the very being, of any *Parochial Church* whatsoever.

p. 5. p. 9.

5. That *want* of *Discipline*, which is in *Parochial Churches*, was never thought by the most zealous *Non-conformists* of old, destructive to the *Being* of them. Of which I have already produced the *Testimonies* of *Cartwright*, *Hildersham*, *Giffard* and many others.

Sect. 17. And supposing all persons left to the *judgment* of their *own Consciences*, as to their own *fitness* for the *Holy Communion*, we may observe these things; which may serve towards the *vindication* of our *Parochial Churches.*

(1.) That the *greatest Offenders* do generally *excommunicate* themselves; not daring to venture upon so hazardous a thing, as they account the *Holy Communion* to be, for fear of the *damnation* following *unworthy receiving.* So that, the most constant *Communicants*, are the most *pious* and *sober* and *devout Christians.*

(2.) That if any such do voluntarily come, it is upon some great *awakenings of Conscience*; some *fresh Resolutions* they made of amendment of life; after some dangerous sickness, or under some great affliction; when they are best inclined, and have strong convictions, and hope for greater *strength* of *Grace* against the *power* of *Temptations.* So that whether this *Sacrament* be a *converting Ordinance* or not, by *God's Institution*, yet the *preparation* and disposition of Men's Minds before it, puts them into the fittest capacity for *Divine Grace*; if they be not looked on as the *effects* of it.

(3.) That it is no prejudice to the benefit of this *Holy Sacrament* to those who are well prepared, if those who are not, do come to it; any more than in joining in *Prayer* or *Thanksgiving* with them. And if the presence of such persons who deserve *excommunication* and are *not excommunicated*, do overthrow the *being* of a *Church*; then *Christ* and his *Disciples* did not make a *Church*, when *Judas* was present with them; as in probability he was, at his last *Supper*. At least, if this kind of *Discipline* had been so necessary, it would never have been left so doubtful, as it is by the *Evangelists*; since it had been necessary for the *information* of the *Christian Church*, to have set it down expressly; not only that he was not present, but that he *ought not to be*; and therefore was *cast out* before.

(4.) That several *Presbyterian Churches* for many years had no *Discipline* at all among them; nor so much as the *Lord's Supper* administred. And were these *true Churches* all that while, and are not ours so now? Nay Mr. *Baxter* saith, *That some Non-conformists have these seventeen or eighteen years forborn to baptize, or administer the Lord's Supper, or to be Pastors of any Churches.* Now I would fain know, what *Churches* these Men are of? Some or other they must own, if they be *Christians*; *New Churches they have not*, they say; either then they must own *our Churches* to be *true*, notwithstanding the *defect* of *Discipline*, or they must be of *no Church* at all. *Plea for Peace, p. 243. Answ. to Serm.*

(5.) That our Church is but in the same condition, the *Church* of *Constantinople* and other *Churches* were in, when *Nectarius* changed the *Discipline* of it, or rather took it quite away. For, the *Pœnitentiary*, whom he removed for the scandal given, was the Person whose business it was to look after the *Discipline* of the *Church*, and to see that all known *Offenders* performed the *Penance* enjoined them, for satisfaction of the *Church*. And, the consequence of it *Socrates* saith was, *That every one was left to the judgment of his own Conscience, as to the participation of the Holy Mysteries.* And this *Socrates* saith, he had from *Eudæmon* himself, who gave the Counsel to *Nectarius to take that Office away*; which was accordingly done; and *no more restored*, saith *Sozomen:* The consequence whereof was, saith he, *that every one went to the Lord's Table, ὡς ἂν ἑαυτῷ συνειδείη καὶ θαῤῥεῖν δύναιτο, as his Conscience gave him leave, and as he was assured in his own mind.* And this example of *Nectarius* was soon followed *in other Churches*, saith *Sozomen*; and so the *Discipline* of the *Church* decayed. But I hope all those *Churches* did not lose their *being*, by the loss of *Discipline*. And so much in vindication of our *Diocesan Church Government*. Socr. *l.* 5. *c.* 19. Soz. *l.* 7. *c.* 16.

Sect. 18. I now come to the *National Constitution* of *our Church*. By the *Church of England*, I said, " We meant that *Society* of *Christian* " *People* which in this Nation are united under the same *Profession* of " *Faith*, the same *Laws* of *Government*, and *Rules* of *Divine Worship*. " And that this was a very consistent and true notion of our *National* " *Church*, I proved from the first notion of a *Church*, which is a *So-* " *ciety* of Men united together for their *Order* and *Government* accord- " ing to the *Rules* of *Christian Religion*. And since, the lowest kind of " that Society, *viz. Congregations* for *Worship*, are called *Churches*; " since the largest *Society* of all *Christians* is accounted a *true Catholick* " *Church*; and both from their *union* and *consent* in some common " thing; I said I did not understand why a *National Society* agreeing " together in the *same Faith*, and under the *same Government* and *Dis-* " *cipline*, *Serm. p.* 19.

" *cipline*, might not be as truly and properly *a Church*, as any *particu-*
" *lar Congregations?* Because the narrowness or largeness of extent doth
" not alter the *nature* of the thing: The *Kingdom* of *France* being as
" truly a *Kingdom*, as the small *Kingdom* of *Ivetot:* And as several
" *Families* make one *Kingdom*, so several *lesser Churches* make *one Na-*
" *tional.* And that this notion was not disagreeing with the impor-
" tance of the word Ἐκκλησία, I shewed, that at *Athens*, from whence
" the word was taken, it did comprehend in it all the *several Tribes*
" when met together, although every one of those *Tribes* in its *parti-*
" *cular Assembly* might be an Ἐκκλησία too; and from thence in the
" *first Ages* of the *Christian Church*, the name of a *Church* compre-
" hended in it the *Ecclesiastical Governours* and *People* of *whole Cities*,
" and therefore might by parity of Reason be extended to many Cities
" united together under one civil Government and the same Rules of
" Religion. This is the substance of what I delivered upon this sub-
ject; against which all my Adversaries have something to say, though not with equal strength, clearness, or temper. Dr. *Owen* saith,

Vindicat. of Non-con form. p. 16. (1.) *That since I make National Churches to begin with the dissolution of the Roman Empire, it fell out a great while after the first Institution of Churches, and therefore they are not concerned in it: because he supposeth Congregational Churches to be entire Churches of Christ's Institution, and therefore to have a just right to govern and reform themselves, independently as to any National Constitution.* To which I answer, that if the *Churches* of *Christ's Institution* be not limited to *particular Congregations*, as I have already proved, then the gradual increase of *Churches*, till they came to be *National*, doth not alter any *Institution of Christ*; and consequently the *Power* of those *Churches* must limit and determin that of *particular Congregations*; or else nothing but disorder and confusion will follow, if every *Congregation* may have a *several Rule* of *Worship* and *Doctrine* of *Faith*, without being liable to an account to any superior *Church Authority.* Which is all one, as to suppose that every Family may govern it self, because a *Kingdom* is made up of *Families*, without any respect to the *Laws* and *Constitution* of a *Kingdom.*

p. 17. No, saith Dr. O. *the case is not the same. For God never appointed that there should be no other Government but that of Families.* And where hath he appointed that there should be no other *Churches* but particular *Congregations? But God by the Light and Law of Nature, by the ends and use of the Creation of Man, by express Revelation in his Word, hath by his own Authority, appointed and approved other sorts of Civil Government.* So say I, that *God* by the *Light* and *Law* of *Reason*, by the *ends* and *use* of a *Christian Society*, by *express Institution* of the *Apostolical Function* in the *care* and *Government* of *many Churches* did declare, that he did appoint and approve other *sorts* of *Church Government* besides that of *particular Congregations.* For, if *God* upon the *dispersion* of the *Nations* after the *Flood*, had appointed *twelve Princes* to have ruled the People in their several dispersions, it had been a plain demonstration he did not intend the *several Families* to have a *distinct* and *independent Power* within themselves; but that they ought to be governed according to their appointment; so in the case of *Churches*; since *Christ* did appoint *twelve Apostles* to plant, settle and govern *Churches*, and set up *Rulers* in them, but still under their *Authority*, Can any thing be plainer, than that these particular *Churches* were not settled with an *entire power of governing themselves?* But as in the former

former case, if we suppose those *twelve Princes* to have led out their several *Divisions*, and to have placed them in convenient *Seats*, and given them general *Rules* for governing themselves in *Peace* and *Order* under such as they should appoint, and as they found themselves decaying, should nominate so many *Successors* as they thought fit for the ruling the *several Colonies*, were they not then obliged to submit to such *Governors?* Without breaking in pieces into so many *Families*, every Master governing his family by himself; which would certainly ruin and destroy them all; because they could not have strength and union to defend themselves. So it is again in the *case* of *Churches*, the *Apostles* planted them, and settled such *Officers* in them as were then fit to teach and govern them, still reserving the main care of *Government* to themselves; but giving excellent *Rules* of *Charity*, *Peace*, *Obedience* and *Submission* to *Governours*; and as they withdrew from particular *Churches* (within such a *precinct*, as *Crete* was) they appointed some, whom they thought fit to take care of all those *Churches*, and to constitute inferior Officers to teach and rule them; and therefore in this case, here is no more *independency* in *particular Congregations*, than in the other, as to *private Families*; which is as contrary to the general design of the *Peace* and *Unity* of *Christians*, and their mutual preservation and defence, as in the former case. In which, we believe the *civil Government* to be from *God*, although no *Monarch* can now derive his *Title* from such *Princes* at the first dispersion; and would it not then seem unreasonable to question the *succession* of *Bishops* from the *Apostles*, when the matter of fact is attested by the most early, knowing, honest and impartial *Witnesses?* Lastly, as in the former case, several of those *lesser Princes* might unite themselves together by joint-consent for their common interest and security, and become one *Kingdom:* so in the latter case; *several Bishops* with the *Churches* under them, might for promoting the common ends of *Christianity*, and the *Peace* and *establishment* of their *Churches*, join together under the same common bonds and become one *National Church:* which being intended for the good of the whole so united, and no ways repugnant to the design of the Institution, and not usurping upon the *Rights* of others, nor assuming more than can be managed, as an *universal Pastor* must do; will appear to be no ways repugnant to any particular command or general *Rules* of the *Gospel*, as the *Pope*'s challenge of *universal Dominion* over the *Church* is. Which I therefore mention that any one may see, that the force of this Reasoning will never justifie the *Papal Usurpations.*

But saith Dr. O. *National Provincial Churches must first be proved of Christ's Institution, before they can be allowed to have their power given them by Jesus Christ.* And yet in the case of Congregational Churches, he saith *there is no need of any positive Rule or direction; for the Nature of the thing it self, and the duty of men with respect to the end of such Churches, is sufficient for it.* And this is as much as we plead in behalf of *National Churches*, viz. What the nature of a *Christian Society*, and the *duty of men with respect to the end of it* doth require. For, whatever tends to the *support* of *Religion*, to the *preserving Peace* and *Unity* among *Christians*, to the preventing *dangerous Errors* and *endless confusions*, from the *very nature* of the *thing*, and the end of a *Christian Society* becomes a *Duty.* For the general *Rules* of *Government* lay an obligation upon men to use the best means for advancing the ends of it. It being then taken for granted among all *Christians*, 1. That *Christ* is the *Author* or founder of this *Society* which we call the *Church*; 2. That he designs the

p. 17.

p. 42.

continu-

continuance and *preservation* of it; 3. That the best way of its *preservation* is by an *Union* of the *members* of it; provided the *Union* be such as doth not overthrow the ends of it: We may reasonably infer, that whatever tends to promote this *Union*, and to prevent any notable inconveniences or mischiefs which may happen to it, is within the design of the *first Institution*; although it be not contained in express words.

Sect. 19. We are now therefore to consider, whether *single Congregations* dispersed and disunited over a *Nation*; or a *combination* of them together under some *common bonds* as to *Faith*, *Government* and *Worship*, be the more likely way to promote *Religion*, to secure the *Peace* and *Tranquillity* of a *Church*.

Let us then compare these two *Hypotheses* together in point of *Reason*, as to these ends.

In the *Congregational way*, there may be as many *Religions* as *Churches*: I do not say there *are*, but we are arguing now upon what may be, from the nature of the *thing*. Supposing then every *Congregation* to have an entire and unaccountable Power within it self; what hinders but of *ten Congregations* one may be of *Socinians*, another of *Papists*, another of *Arians*, another of *Quakers*, another of *Anabaptists*, &c. and it may be no two of them of the same mind. But if they be, it is mere *chance* and *good hap*; there being no *obligation* upon them to have any more than *mutual forbearance* towards each other. Let now any rational man judge, whether it appear probable, that so loose and shatter'd a *Government* as this is, should answer the *obligation* among *Christians*, to use the best and most effectual means to preserve *the Faith once delivered to the Saints*, and to uphold *Peace* and *Unity* among *Christians?* But supposing all these several *Congregations* united together under such common bonds, that the *Preacher* is accountable to *superiors*; that none be admitted but such as own the *true Faith*, and promise *obedience*; that publick *legal Censures* take hold upon the *disturbers* of the *Church's Peace:* here we have a far more effectual means according to *Reason* for upholding *true Religion* among us. And that this is no mere *Theory*, appears by the sad experience of this *Nation*, when upon the breaking of the bonds of our *National Church-Government*, there came such an overpowring inundation of *Errors* and *Schisms* among us, that this Age is like to smart under the sad effects of it. And in *New-England*, two or three men, as *Williams*, *Gorton* and *Clark* discovered the apparent weakness of the *Independant Government:* which being very material to this business, I shall give a brief account of it as to one of them. Mr. *Roger Williams* was the *Teacher* of a *Congregational Church* at *Salem*, and a man in very good esteem as appears by Mr. *Cotton*'s Letter to him: he was a great admirer of the *purity* of the *New-England Churches*; but being a thinking man, he pursued the *principles* of that way farther than they thought fit, for he thought it *unlawful* to join with *unregenerate men in prayer, or taking an Oath*; *and that there ought to be an unlimited toleration of Opinions*, &c. These Doctrines, and some others of his not taking, he proceeded to *Separation* from them, and gathered a *New Church* in opposition to theirs; this gave such a disturbance to them, that the *Magistrates* sent for him, and the *Ministers* reasoned the case with him. He told them, *he went upon their own grounds, and therefore they had no reason to blame him.* Mr. *Cotton* told him *they deserved to be punished who made Separation among them*; Mr. *Williams* replied, *this would return upon themselves*; *for had not they done the same as to the Churches of* Old-England? In short,

Williams *his Answer to* Cotton's *Letter, p.* 1.

short, after their debates, and Mr. *Williams* continuing in his *principles* of *Separation* from their *Churches* a *sentence* of *banishment* is decreed against him by the *Magistrates*, and this *sentence* approved and justified by their *Churches*. For these are Mr. *Cotton*'s words, *That the increase of concourse of People to him on the Lord's days in private, to a neglect or deserting of publick Ordinances, and to the spreading of the leaven of his corrupt imaginations, provoked the Magistrates, rather than to breed a Winter's spiritual plague in the Country, to put upon him a Winter's journey out of the Country.* This Mr. *Williams* told them, was falling into *the National Church way*, which they disowned; or else, saith he, *why must he that is banished from the one, be banished from the other also?* And he charges them *that they have suppressed Churches set up after the Parochial way; and although the Persons were otherwise allowed to be godly, to live in the same air with them, if they set up any other Church or Worship than what themselves practised.* Which appears by the *Laws* of *New-England* mentioned before: and Mr. *Cobbet* one of the *Teachers* of their *Churches*, confesseth *that by the Laws of the Country, none are to be free men, but such as are members of Churches.* I now appeal to any man, whether these *proceedings* and these *Laws* do not manifestly discover the apparent weakness and insufficiency of the *Congregational way* for preventing those *disorders*, which they apprehend to be *destructive* to their *Churches?* why had not Mr. *Williams* his liberty of *Separation* as well as they? why are no *Anabaptists* or *Quakers* permitted among them? *Because these ways would disturb their Peace, and distract their People, and in time overthrow their Churches.* Very well: but where is the *entireness* of the *power* of *every single Congregation*, the mean while? Why might not the *People* at *Salem* have the same liberty as those at *Boston* or *Plymouth?* The plain truth is, they found by experience, this *Congregational way* would not do alone, without civil Sanctions, and the interposing of the *Pastors* of other *Churches*. For when *Williams*, and *Gorton*, and *Clark* had begun to make some impressions on their *People*, they bestirred themselves as much as possible to have their mouths stopt, and their persons banished. This I do only mention, to shew, that where this way hath prevailed most, they have found it very insufficient to carry on those ends which themselves judged necessary for the preservation of their *Religion*, and of *Peace* and *Unity* among themselves. And in their *Synod* at *Boston*, 1662. the *New-England Churches* are come to apprehend the necessity of *Consociation* of *Churches*, *in* case of *divisions* and *contentions*; and *for the rectifying of male-administrations, and healing of errors and scandals, that are unhealed among themselves: For, Christ's care*, say they, *is for whole Churches as well as for particular persons.* Of which *Consociation* they tell us, that Mr. *Cotton drew a platform before his death.* Is such a *Consociation* of *Churches* a *Duty* or not, in such cases? If not, why do they do any thing relating to *Church Government*, for which they have no Command in *Scripture*? If there be a *Command* in *Scripture*, then there is an *Institution* of a *Power* above *Congregational Churches.* It is but a slender evasion, which they use, when they call these only *voluntary Combinations*, for what are all *Churches* else? Only, the antecedent obligation on men to join for the Worship of God makes entring into other *Churches* a *Duty*; and so the obligation lying upon *Church Officers* to use the best means to prevent or heal divisions, will make such *Consociations* a Duty too. And therefore in such cases *the Nature* of the *thing* requires an *union* and

Cotton's *Answer to* R. Williams, *p.* 57.

Answer to Cotton, *p.* 46.

Cobbet's *Answer to* Clark's *Narrative*, *p.* 40. 47.

Synod of New-England, *p.* 30. *Defence of the Synod p.* 102.

conjunction superiour to that of *Congregational Churches*; which is then most agreeable to *Scripture* and *Antiquity*, when the *Bishops* and *Presbyters* join together. Who agreeing together upon *Articles* of *Doctrine*, and *Rules* of *Worship* and *Discipline*, are the *National Church representative*; and these being owned and established by the civil Power, and received by the *Body* of the *Nation*, and all persons obliged to observe the same in the several *Congregations* for *Worship*; these *Congregations* so united in these common bonds of Religion, make up the *complete National Church.*

Sect 20. And now I hope I may have leave to consider Mr. *Baxter's* subtilties about this matter; which being spread abroad in abundance of words to the same purpose, I shall reduce to these following heads, wherein the main difficulties lie.

1. Concerning the *difference* between a *National Church*, and a *Christian Kingdom.* 2. Concerning the *Governing Power* of this *National Church*, which he calls the *Constitutive Regent part.* 3. Concerning the *common Ties*, or *Rules* which make this *National Church.*

1. Concerning the difference between a *Christian Kingdom*, and a *National Church.* A *Christian Kingdom*, he saith, *they all own, but this is only equivocally called a Church, but*, he saith, *the Christian Bishops for* 1300 *years, were far from believing that a Prince, or Civil Power, was essential to a Christian Church, or that the Church in the comon sense was not constituted of another sort of regent part that had the Power of the Keys.* If there be any such *Christians* in the world, that hold a *Prince* an *essential part* of a *Christian Church*, let Mr. *Baxter* confute them; but I am none of them, for I do believe there were *Christian Churches* before *Christian Princes*, that there are *Christian Churches* under *Christian Princes*, and will be such, if there were none left. I do believe the *Power* of the *Keys* to be a distinct thing, from the *Office* of the *Civil Magistrate*; and if he had a mind to write against such an opinion, he should rather have sent it to his *learned, sincere*, and *worthy Friend Lewis du Moulin*, if he had been still living. *But if I only mean a Christian Kingdom, who denies it?* saith he, *If all this confused stir be about a Christian Kingdom, be it known to you, that we take such to be of divine Command.* Nay farther, *if we mean all the Churches of a Kingdom associated for concord as equals, we deny it not.* What is it then, that is so denied and disputed against, and such a flood of words is poured out about? It seems at last it is this, *that the Nation must be one Church as united in one Sacerdotal head, personal or collective, Monarchical or Aristocratical.* Before I answer this Question, I hope I may ask another; whence comes this zeal now against a *National Church?* For, when the *Presbyterians* were in power, they were then for *National Churches*, and thought they proved them out of *Scriptures*; and none of these *Subtilties* about the *Constitutive Regent part* did ever perplex or trouble them. Thus the *Presbyterian London Ministers*, 1654, made no difficulty of owning *National Churches*; and particularly the *Church of England*, in these words. *And if all the Churches in the world are called one Church; let no man be offended if all the Congregations in England, be called the Church of England.* But this you will say is by *association* of *equal Churches.* No, they say, *it is when the particular Congregations of one Nation living under one Civil Government, agreeing in Doctrine and Worship, are governed by their greater and lesser Assemblies, and in this sense*, say they, *we assert a National Church.* Two things, saith Mr. *Hudson*,

Answ. p. 31, 32.

Difference between the Power of the Magistrates and Church Pastors, 1671. p. 37, 40.

p. 37.

Jus divinum Minist. Evangelici 2d *part*, p. 12, 13, 14.

Hudson of the Church, p. 15.

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are required to make a *National Church*, 1. *National agreement in the same Faith and Worship*: 2. *National union in one Ecclesiastical body, in the same Community of Ecclesiastical Government.* The old *Non-conformists* had no scruple about owning the *Church of England*, and thought they understood what was meant by it. Whence come all these difficulties now to be raised about this matter? Is the thing grown so much darker than formerly? But some mens Understandings are confounded with nice distinctions, and their Consciences ensnared by needless Scruples.

To give therefore a plain answer to the Question, *What we mean by the National Church of England.* By that is understood either, (1.) The *Church of England diffusive.* Or, (2.) The *Church of England representative.*

1. The *National Church of England diffusive*, is, the whole *Body* of *Christians* in this Nation, consisting of *Pastors* and *People*, agreeing in that *Faith*, *Government* and *Worship*, which are established by the *Laws* of this *Realm.* And by this description any one may see, how easily the *Church* of *England* is distinguished from the *Papists* on one side, and the *Dissenters* on the other. Which makes me continue my wonder at those who so confidently say, *they cannot tell what we mean by the Church of England.* For was there not a *Church* here setled upon the *Reformation* in the time of *Edward 6.* and *Queen Elizabeth?* Hath not the *same Doctrine*, the *same Government*, the *same manner of Worship*, continued in this *Church?* (bating only the interruption given by its Enemies.) How comes it then so hard for men to understand so easie, so plain, so intelligible a thing? If all the Question be, how all the *Congregations* in *England* make up this *one Church?* I say, by *unity of consent*, as all *particular Churches* make *one Catholick Church.* If they ask, *how it comes to be one National Church?* I say, because it was received by the *common consent* of the *whole Nation* in *Parliament*, as other *Laws* of the *Nation* are; and is universally received by all that obey those *Laws*: And this I think is sufficient to scatter those Mists which some pretend to have before their eyes, that they cannot clearly see *what we mean by the Church of England.*

2. The *representative Church of England*, is the *Bishops and Presbyters of this Church*, meeting together according to the *Laws* of this *Realm*, to consult and advise about *matters of Religion.* And this is determin'd by the allowed *Canons* of this *Church.* We do not say, that the *Convocation* at *Westminster* is *the representative Church of England*, as the *Church of England* is a *National Church*; for that is only *representative* of this *Province*, there being another *Convocation* in the other *Province*; but the *Consent* of both *Convocations*, is the *representative National Church of England.* Can. 139.

Sect. 21. And now to answer Mr. *Baxter*'s grand difficulty, concerning *the Constitutive Regent part of this National Church.* I say, 1. It proceeds upon a *false supposition.* 2. It is capable of a *plain resolution.*

1. That it proceeds upon a *false supposition*; which is, that where-ever there is the *true Notion* of a *Church*, there must be a *Constitutive Regent part*, i. e. there must be a *standing governing Power*, which is an *essential part* of it. Which I shall prove to be *false* from Mr. *Baxter* himself. He asserts, that there is *one Catholick visible Church*; and *that all particular Churches, which are headed by their particular Bishops, or Pastors, are parts of this universal Church, as a Troop is of an Army, or a City of a Kingdom.* *Christian Directory, Eccl. Cases, Q. 56. p. 830.* *Answer to my Sermon, p. 77.*

Kingdom. If this Doctrine be true, and withal it be necessary *that every Church must have a Constitutive Regent part as essential to it*, then it unavoidably follows that there must be a *Catholick visible Head*, to *a Catholick visible Church.* And so Mr. *Baxter*'s *Constitutive Regent part* of a *Church*, hath done the *Pope* a wonderful kindness, and made a very plausible *Plea* for his *Universal Pastorship.* But there are some Men in the World, who do not attend to the advantages they give to *Popery*; so they may vent their spleen against the *Church* of *England.* But doth not Mr. *Baxter* say, *that the universal Church is headed by* Christ *himself?* I grant he doth; but this doth not remove the difficulty; for the *Question* is about *that visible Church* whereof *particular Churches are parts*; and they being *visible parts* do require a *visible Constitutive Regent part as essential* to them; therefore *the whole visible Church* must have likewise *a visible Constitutive Regent part*, i. e. *a visible Head* of the *Church*; as if a *Troop* hath an inferiour *Officer*, an *Army* must have a *General*; if a *City* hath a *Mayor*, a *Kingdom* must have a *King*, that is *equally present* and *visible* as the other is. This is indeed to make a *Key* for *Catholicks*, by the help of which they may enter and take possession.

2. The *plain resolution* is, that we deny any necessity of any such *Constitutive Regent part*, or *one formal Ecclesiastical Head* as *essential to a National Church.* For a *National Consent* is as sufficient to make *a National Church*; as an *Universal Consent* to make a *Catholick Church.* But if the Question be, by what way this *National Consent* is to be declared? then we answer farther; that by the *Constitution* of this *Church*, the *Arch-bishops*, *Bishops*, and *Presbyters* being summoned by the *King's Writ* are to *advise* and *declare* their *Judgments* in *matters* of *Religion*; which being received, allowed and enacted by the *King* and *three Estates* of the *Kingdom*; there is as great a *National Consent* as is required to any *Law.* And all *Bishops*, *Ministers*, and *People*, taken together, who profess the *Faith* so *established*, and *worship God* according to the *Rules* so appointed, make up this *National Church* of *England:* which notion of a *National Church* being thus explained, I see no manner of difficulty remaining in all Mr. *Baxter*'s *Queries* and *Objections* about this matter.

Sect. 22. 3. That which looks most like a difficulty is (3.) concerning *the common ties or Rules which make this National Church.* For
Answ. p. 34. Mr. *B.* would know, *whether by the common Rules I mean a Divine Rule or a mere human Rule. If it be a Divine Rule, they are of the National Church as well as we; if it be a humane Rule, how comes consent in this to make a National Church? how come they not to be of it for not consenting? how can such a consent appear, when there are differences among our selves?* This is the substance of what he objects. To which I answer, (1.) Our *Church* is founded upon a *Divine Rule*, viz. the *Holy Scriptures*, which we own as the *Basis* and *Foundation* of our *Faith*; and according to which, all other *Rules* of *Order* and *Worship* are to be agreeable. (2.) Our *Church* requires a *Conformity* to those *Rules* which are appointed by it, as *agreeable* to the *word* of *God.* And so the *Churches* of *New-England* do, to the *orders* of *Church Government* among themselves by all that are members of their *Churches*; and annex *civil Privileges* to them; and their *Magistrates* impose *civil Punishments* on the breakers and disturbers of them. And although they profess agreement in other things, yet because they do not submit to

the *Orders* of their *Churches*, they do not own them as *members* of their *Churches*. Why should it then be thought unreasonable with us, not to account those *members* of the *Church* of *England*, who contemn and disobey the *Orders* of it? (3.) There is no difference among our selves concerning the *lawfulness* of the *Orders* of our *Church*, or the *duty* of *submission* to them. If there be any other differences, they are not *material*, as to this business: And I believe are no other than in the *manner of explaining* some things, which may happen in the best *Society* in the world, without breaking the *Peace* of it. As about the *difference* of *Orders*; the sense of some *passages* in the *Athanasian Creed*; the *true explication* of *one* or *two Articles*; which are the things he mentions. A multitude of such differences will never overthrow such a *Consent* among us, as to make us not to be *members* of the same *National Churches*. p. 39.

Sect. 23. Having thus cleared the *main difficulties* which are objected by my more weighty Adversaries, the weaker assaults of the rest in what they differ from these, will admit of a quicker dispatch. Mr. *A.* objects, *Mischief of Impos.* p. 27. (1.) *That if National Churches have Power to reform themselves, then so have Congregational*; *and therefore I do amiss to charge them with Separation.* I grant it, if he proves that no *Congregational Church* hath any more *Power* over it, than a *National Church* hath: *i. e.* that there is as much evidence against both *Episcopal* and *Presbyterial Government* as there is against the *Pope's Usurpations*. When he doth prove that, he may have a farther answer. *ibid.* (2.) *That National Churches destroy the being of other Churches under them*; this I utterly deny, and there wants nothing but Proof; as *Erasmus* said one *Andrelinus* was a good *Poet*, only his *Verses* wanted one *Syllable* and that was N*us*. p. 29. (3.) *By my description the Parliament may be a National Church, for they are a Society of Men united together for their Order and Government, according to the Rules of the Christian Religion.* But did I not immediately before say, that *National Churches are National Societies of Christians, under the same Laws of Government and Rules of Worship?* from whence it is plain that in the next words, when I went about to prove *National Churches* to be *true Churches*, I used such a general description as was common to any kind of *Church* and not proper to a *National Church*. p. 30. (4.) *He gives this reason why consent should not make National Churches as well as Congregational*; *because it must be such an agreement as the Gospel warrants*; *and that is only for Worship, and not to destroy their own being.* This is the reasoning of a Horse in a Mill; still round about the same thing. And therefore the same answer may serve. p. 31. (5.) Out come Mr. *B*'s Objections, *against a visible Head of this National Church*; *and the manner of union, and the differences among our selves*; as though Mr. *B.* could not manage his own Arguments, and therefore he takes them and strips them of their heavy and rusty Armour; and makes them appear again in the field, in another dress, and if they could not stand the field in the former habit, they can much less do it in this.

The Author of the Letter saith, *I only prove a National Church a possible thing.* He clearly mistakes my design; which was to shew that if there be such a thing as a *National Church*, then no *single Congregations* have such a power in themselves to separate from others in matters of *order* and *decency* where there is a *consent* in the *same Faith*. To prove that there was such a thing, I shewed that if the *true Notion* of a *Church* doth agree to it, then upon the same reason that we own *Letter out of the Country*, p. 24.

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particular Churches, and the *Catholick Church*, we are to own a *National Church*; so that the design of that discourse was not barely to prove the *possibility* of the thing; but the *truth and reality* of it. But,

p. 25. saith he, *Can it be proved that Christ hath invested the Guides of this Church, not chosen by the People, with a Power to make Laws and Decrees, prescribing not only things necessary for common order and decency; but new fœderal rites, and teaching signs and symbols, superadded to the whole Christian Institution?* &c. I answer, that such a *Church* hath *Power* to appoint *Rules* of *Order* and *Decency* not repugnant to the *word* of *God*, which on that account others are bound to submit to; and to take such care of its *preservation*, as to admit none to its *privileges* but such as do submit to them; and if any disturb the *Peace* of this *Church*, the *Civil Magistrate* may justly inflict *civil Penalties* upon them for it. All which is no more than any settled *Church* in the world asserts, as well as ours. And I wonder this should be so continually objected against our *Church*, which all *Societies* in the world think just and necessary for their own *preservation*. *As to the Guides of the Church not being chosen by the People*, I shall speak to that afterwards. One objection more he makes, which the others did not, *viz.* I had said *that by whole or National Churches, I understood the Churches of such Nations which upon decay of the Roman Empire resumed their just right of Governing themselves, and upon their owning Christianity incorporated into one Christian Society, under the same common ties and rules of Order and Government. Such Churches, I say, have a just right of Reforming themselves, and therefore are not liable to the imputation of Schism from the Roman Church.* Would one think what unlucky In-

p. 26. ferences he draws from hence? (1.) *Then all that remain within the Empire, were bound to continue in the Communion of the Roman Church.* What, if I should deny the continuance of the *Roman Empire?* then all would be safe. But do I any where say, *that being in the Empire*, they were bound to *submit* to the *Roman Church?* No; but as the *Nation* resumed its *just civil Rights*, the *Church* might as rightfully recover it self from *Papal Usurpations*; not laying the force of one upon the other, but paralleling them together: And the advantage of the argument is on the *Churches* side. (2.) *Then where Princes have not resumed their just rights as to Reformation, they are Schismaticks that se-*

Part 2. *parate from Rome.* That doth not follow: for in the cases before mentioned *separation* is *lawful*; but no *Reformation* is so unexceptionable, as when there is a *Concurrence* of the *Civil Power*.

Rector of Sutton, &c. p. 27. My last Adversary doth not deny a *National Church* from *consent* in the *same Articles of Religion, and Rules of Government and Order of Worship*; but then he saith, *such ought to be agreeable to the established Rule of Holy Scriptures*. And therein we are all agreed. So that after much tugging, this point is thought fit to be given up.

Sect. 24. The next thing to be considered, is, *the interest and Power of the People as to the choice of their Pastors*; for want of which great complaints are made by my *Adversaries*, as a thing *injurious* to *them*, and *prejudicial* to the *Church*, and that we therein go *contrary* to all

Vindication, &c. p. 36. *Antiquity*. Dr. *O.* puts *the depriving the People of their liberty of chusing their Pastors among the Causes of Separation*. Mr. *Baxter* is very *Tragical* upon this argument; and keeps not within tolerable bounds of *discretion*, in pleading the *Peoples Cause*, *against Magistrates and*

Answ. p. 15, 16. *Patrons and Laws*: And he tells me, *I go against all the ancient Fa-*

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thers and Churches for many hundred years, and am so far a Separatist from more than one Parish Priest; and therefore my charge of them is schismatical and unjust, and recoileth on my self; who instead of God's Rule, accuse them that walk not by our novel crooked Rules, which may make as many modish Religions as there are Princes. When I first read such passages as these, I wonder'd what I had said, that might give occasion to so much *indecent Passion*, as every where almost discovers it self in his Answer: And the more I consider'd the more I wonder'd; but at last I resolved as Mr. *A.* doth about the Assembly, that Mr. *B.* is *but a Man*, as other Men are; and for all that I see, of *equal passions*, and that upon little or no provocation. For I had not said one word upon this Argument. What then? Would Mr. *B.* seek a *Cause* to express his *anger* against me? as *if I had allowed Princes to set up what Religions they please.* Surely, he thought himself writing against *Hobbs* and *Spinosa* then. No: but thus he artificially draws me into this snare. I spake much against *Separation.* How then? *They would never have separated, if they had not been silenced; and therefore my being against their separation, shews I am for their silencing.* As though these necessarily followed each other. What is this *to Princes imposing what Religion they please?* Thus. Then *Magistrates* by their *Laws* may put out *Nonconformists* and put in *Conformists.* But have we not the same *Religion* still? But, saith Mr. *Baxter, these must be my supposed grounds; that Magistrates may appoint what Religion they please, and those are Separatists who do not obey them.* Is not this admirable ingenuity, to rail upon a Man, for *suppositions* of his own making? However Mr. *Baxter* will have it so, let me say what I will. The *People's* part he will take, and let me take that of the *Magistrates* and *Laws*, if I think good; and since they are fallen to my lot, I will defend them as well as I can, as to this matter. Mr. *B.* appearing very warm in this business, what doth Mr. *A.* coming after him, but make it the very *first* and *fundamental Ground* of their *Separation?* viz. *That every particular Church upon a due balance of all circumstances, has an inherent right to chuse its own Pastor, and every particular Christian the same Power to chuse his own Church.* Nay then, I thought, we were in a very fair way of settlement; when the *Anabaptists* in *Germany* never broached a *looser principle* than this; nor more contrary to the very possibility of having an *established Church:* for it leads to all manner of *Schisms* and *Factions* in spight of all *Laws* and *Authority* in *Church* or *State.* The *Author* of the *Letter* goes upon the same principle too, and saith, *The Guides of the Church are to be chosen by the People, according to Scripture and Primitive practice.* This I perceive is a *popular argument*, and a fine device to draw in the *common People* to the *dissenting Party*; whatever becomes of *Laws*, and Mens *just* and *legal Rights of Patronage*, all must yield to the *antecedent Right of the People.* But to bring this matter to a strict debate, we must consider these three things. 1. What *Original*, or *inherent Right* and *Power* the *People* had. 2. How they came to be *devested* of it. 3. Whether there be sufficient *ground* to *resume* it. And from thence we shall understand, whether some of the *People's* consenting to hear the *Nonconformists preach*, notwithstanding the *Laws*, can excuse them from *Separation?* for this lies at the bottom of all.

Mischief of Imposition, Preface.

Letter out of the Country, p. 25.

1. As to the *Original, inherent Right* and *Power* of the *People.* Dr. *O.* supposeth all *Church-Power to be originally in the People*; for to manifest

fest how favourable *wise Men have been to the Congregational way*, he
Vindicat. quotes a saying of *F. Paul*; out of a *Book* of his, lately translated into
p. 37. *English, That in the beginning, the Government of the Church had altogether a Democratical Form*; which is an opinion so absurd and unreasonable, that I could not easily believe such a saying to have come from so *learned* and *judicious* a *Person*. For was there not a *Church* to be formed *in the beginning?* Did not *Christ* appoint *Apostles* and give them *Commission* and *Authority* for that end? Where was the *Church-power* then lodged? Was it not in the *Apostles?* Did not they in all places, as they planted *Churches*, appoint *Officers* to teach and govern them? And did they not give them *Authority* to do what they had appointed? Were not then the several *Pastors* and *Teachers* invested with a *Power superior* to that of the *People* and *independent* upon them? And if they had such *Power* and *Authority* over the *People*, how came their *Power* to be derived from them, as it must be, if the *Church Government* then were *Democratical?* Besides, Is it reasonable to suppose the *People* should *assemble* to chuse their *Officers*, and convey the *Power* of the *Keys* to them; which never *were* in their hands? And how could they make choice of Men for their *fitness* and *abilities*, when their *abilities* depended so much on the *Apostles laying on of their hands?* For *then the Holy Ghost was given unto them.* But in all the *Churches* planted by the *Apostles*, in all the directions given about the choice of *Bishops* and *Deacons*, no more is required, as to the *People*, than barely their *Testimony*; therefore it is said *they must be blameless and Men of good report.*
1 *Tim.* 3. 2, 7, 10. But, where is it said or intimated that the *Congregation* being the *first subject of the Power of the Keys*, must meet together, and chuse their *Pastor*, and then convey the *Ministerial Power* over themselves, to them? If it were true *that the Church Government at first was Democratical*, the *Apostles* have done the People a mighty injury; for they have said no more of their *Power* in the *Church*, than they have done of the *Pope*'s. It is true the *Brethren* were present at the *nomination* of
Act. 1. 14. a *new Apostle:* But were not the *Women* so too? And is the *Power* of the *Keys* in their hands too? Suppose not, Doth this prove that the *Church's Power* was then *Democratical?* then the *People* made an *Apostle* and gave him his *Power*; which I do not think any Man would say, much less *F. Paul.* As *to the election of Deacons*; it was no properly *Church Power* which they had; but they were *Stewards* of the *common Stock*; and was there not then, all the reason in the world, the *Com-*
Act. 6. 3, 5. *munity* should be satisfied in the choice of the Men? *When Saint* Peter *received* Cornelius *to the Faith, he gave an account of it to all the Church.* And what then? Must he therefore derive his *power* from it? Do not *Princes* and Governours give an account of their proceedings for the satisfaction of their *Subjects* Minds? But here is not *all the*
11. 3. *Church* mentioned; only *those of the Circumcision at Jerusalem* had a mind to understand the *reason* of his receiving a *Gentile Convert.* And what is this to the *power* of the *Church? But in the Council of* Jerusalem *the People did intervene, and the Letters were written in the names of all the three Orders, Apostles, Priests and faithful Brethren.* I grant it; but is it not expressly said, that the *Question* was sent up from
15. 2. the *Churches, to the Apostles and Presbyters?* Is it not said, *that the Apostles and Presbyters met to debate it*; and that *the multitude was*
6. 12. *silent?* Is it not said, *that the Decrees were passed by the Apostles and*
16. 4. *Presbyters*, without any mention of the *People?* And here was the proper

proper occasion to have declared their *Power*; but in the other place, it signifies no more than their *general consent* to the *Decrees* that were then made. *In success of time*, it is added, *when the Church increased in number, the faithful retiring themselves to the affairs of their Families*, and having *left those of the Congregation, the Government was retained only in the Ministers, and so became Aristocratical, saving the election which was Popular.* Which account is neither agreeable to *Reason*, nor to *Antiquity*. For, was not the Government of the Church *Aristocratical* in the *Apostles* times? How came it to be changed, from that to a *Democratical Form?* Did not the Apostles appoint *Rulers* in the several Churches, and charged the *People* to *obey them?* And was this an argument the *Power* was then in the *People?* It was not then *the Peoples withdrawing* (of which there can be no evidence, if there be so much evidence still left for the *Peoples Power*, in *Antiquity*) but the *Constitution* of the *Church* was *Aristocratical* by the appointment of the *Apostles.*

Sect. 25. We therefore come now to consider the *Popular Elections*, as to which there is so fair a pretence from *Antiquity*; but yet not such, as to fix any *inherent*, or *inalterable Right* in the *People.* As I shall make appear, by these following Observations.

1. That the main ground of the *Peoples Interest* was founded upon the *Apostles* Canon, *That a Bishop must be blameless* and of *good report.* 1 *Tim.* 3. 2, 7.

2. That the *People* upon this *assuming* the *Power* of *Elections*, caused great *disturbances* and *disorders* in the *Church.*

3. That to prevent these, many *Bishops* were appointed without their *choice*, and *Canons* made for the better regulating of them.

4. That when there were Christian *Magistrates*, they did interpose as they thought fit, notwithstanding the popular claim; in a matter of so great consequence to the *Peace* of *Church* and *State.*

5. That upon the alteration of the *Government* of *Christendom* the *Interest* of the People was secured by their consent in *Parliaments*, and that by such consent the *Nomination* of *Bishops* was reserved to *Princes*, and the *Patronage* of *Livings* to *particular Persons.*

6. That things being thus settled by established *Laws*, there is no reasonable *Ground* for the *Peoples* resuming the *Power* of *electing* their own *Bishops* and *Ministers* in opposition to these *Laws.*

If I can make good these *Observations*, I shall give a full answer to all the *Questions* propounded, concerning the *Right* and *Power* of the *People*, which my Adversaries build so much upon.

(1.) *That the main ground of the Peoples interest was founded upon the Apostles Canon, that a Bishop must be blameless, and of good report.* For so the *Greek Scholiast* argues from that place in *Timothy*, *If a Bishop ought to have a good report of them that are without,* πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδελφῶν, *How much rather of the Brethren,* πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων, saith *Theophylact.* And both have it from Saint *Chrysostom.* So it is said concerning *Timothy* himself, Ὃς ἐμαρτυρεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Λύστροις καὶ Ἰκονίῳ ἀδελφῶν, *Who had a good Testimony from the Brethren in Lystra and Iconium.* And this is mentioned before Saint *Paul's* taking him into the Office of an *Evangelist.* So in the choice of the *Deacons*, the *Apostles* bid them find out, ἄνδρας ἐξ ὑμῶν μαρτυ- Act. 16. 2. Act. 6. 3.

μαρτυρημένης, *Men of good reputation among them.* And there is a very considerable *Testimony* in the *Epistle* of *Clemens* to this purpose; where he gives an account, how *the Apostles preaching through Cities and Countries, did appoint their First-fruits, having made a spiritual trial of them, to be Bishops and Deacons of those who were to believe.* Here it is plain, that they were of the *Apostles appointment*, and not of the *Peoples choice*; and that their *Authority* could not be from them, whom they were appointed *first to convert* and then to *govern*; and although their number was but small at first, yet as they increased, though into many *Congregations*, they were still to be under the *Government* of those, whom the *Apostles* appointed over them. And then he shews *how those who had received this Power from God came to appoint others:* And he brings the *Instance* of *Moses, when there was an emulation among the Tribes, what method he took for putting an end to it, by the blossoming of Aaron's Rod*; which, saith he, *Moses did on purpose to prevent confusion in Israel, and thereby to bring Glory to God*; now, saith he, *the Apostles foresaw the Contentions that would be about the name of Episcopacy* (ὅτι τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς Ἐπισκοπῆς) *i. e.* about the choice of Men into that *Office* of *Ruling* the *Church*; which the sense shews to be his meaning: *Therefore foreseeing these things perfectly, they appointed the persons before mentioned, and left the distribution of their Offices, with this instruction, that as some died, other approved Men should be chosen into their Office. Those therefore who were appointed by them, or other eminent Men, the whole Church being therewith well-pleased, discharging their Office with humility, quietness, readiness, and unblameableness, being Men of a long time of good report, we think such Men cannot justly be cast out of their Office.* It seems, some of the *Church* of *Corinth* were at that time *factious* against some *Officers* in their *Church*, and endeavoured to throw them out for the sake of one or two more, and made such a disturbance thereby as had brought a *great scandal*, not only on themselves, but the *Christian Church*; which made *Clemens* write this *Epistle* to them; wherein he adviseth those busie Men *rather to leave the Church themselves, than to continue making such a disturbance in it*; *and if they were good Christians they would do so*; *and bring more glory to God by it, than by all their heat and contentions.* Now by this discourse of *Clemens* it is plain, (1.) That these *Officers* of the *Church* were not *chosen* by the *People*, but appointed by the *Apostles*, or other *great Men*, according to their Order? (2.) That they took this course on purpose to prevent the *contentions* that might happen in the *Church*, about those who should bear *Office* in it. (3.) That all that the *People* had to do, was to *give Testimony*, or to express their *approbation* of those, who were so appointed. For he could not allow their *power of chusing*, since he saith, *the Apostles appointed Officers on purpose to prevent the contentions that might happen about it.* And it seems very probable to me, that this was one great reason of the *faction* among them, *viz.* that those few *Popular* Men in that *Church*, who caused all the disturbance, represented this, as a great grievance to them; that their *Pastors* and *Officers* were *appointed* by others, and not *chosen* by themselves. For they had no *objection* against the *Presbyters themselves*, being allowed to be Men of *unblameable lives*; yet a *contention* there was, and that about *casting them out*; and such a contention, as the *Apostles designed to prevent by appointing a succession from such whom themselves ordained*; and therefore it is very likely, they challenged this

Clement. *Epist. p.* 54, 55, 56, 57.

this *power* to themselves to *cast out* those whom they had *not chosen*. But it seems, the *Apostles* knowing what *contentions* would follow in the *Church*, took care to prevent them, leaving to the *People* their *Testimony* concerning those whom they ordained. And this is plain, even from Saint *Cyprian* where he discourseth of this matter, *Answ. p. 27.* in that very *Epistle* concerning *Basilides* and *Martialis*, to which Mr. *Baxter* refers me. For, the force of what Saint *Cyprian* saith comes at last only to this *giving Testimony*; *therefore*, saith he, *God appointed the Priest to be appointed before all the People, thereby shewing that Ordinations in the Christian Church ought to be sub Populi Assistentis Conscientiâ, in the Presence of the People:* For what reason? That they might give them *Power?* No; that was never done under the *Law*; nor then imagined, when S. *Cyprian* wrote; but he gives the account of it himself; *that by their presence, either their faults might be published, or their good acts commended; that so it may appear to be a just and lawful Ordination, which hath been examined by the suffrages and judgment of all.* The *People* here had a share in the *Election*, but it was in matter of *Testimony* concerning the good or ill behaviour of the Person. And, *therefore*, he saith, *it was almost a general Custom among them, and he thinks came down from Divine Tradition and Apostolical Practice, that when any People wanted a Bishop, the neighbour Bishops met together in that place, and the new Bishop was chosen, plebe præsente, the People being present,* (not by the *Votes* of the *People*) *quæ singulorum vitam plenissimè novit, which best understands every Man's Conversation:* And *this*, he saith, *was observed in the Consecration of their Fellow-bishop* Sabinus, *who was put into the place of* Basilides. Where he doth express the *Consent* of the *People*, but he requires the *Judgment* of the *Bishops*; which being thus performed, he incourages the People to withdraw from *Basilides* and to adhere to *Sabinus*. For, *Basilides* having fallen foully into *Idolatry*, and joined *blasphemy* with it, had of his *own accord* laid down his *Bishoprick*, and desired only to be received to *Lay-Communion*, upon this *Sabinus* was *consecrated Bishop* in his room; after which *Basilides* goes to *Rome* and there engages the *Bishop* to interpose in his behalf, that he might be restored; *Sabinus* finding this, makes his *application* to Saint *Cyprian* and the *African Bishops*, who write this *Epistle* to the *People* to withdraw from *Basilides*, saying *that it belonged chiefly to them to chuse the good and to refuse the bad.* Which is the strongest Testimony in *Antiquity* for the *People's Power*; and yet here we are to consider, (1.) It was in a case where a *Bishop* had *voluntarily resigned.* (2.) Another *Bishop* was put into his room, not by the *Power* of the *People*, but by the *Judgment* and *Ordination* of the *neighbour Bishops.* (3.) They had the judgment of a whole *Council* of *African Bishops* for their deserting him. (4.) For a notorious matter of fact, *viz. Idolatry* and *Blasphemy* by his *own confession.* (5.) All the proof which Saint *Cyprian* brings for this, doth amount to no more, than that the *People* were most concerned to give *Testimony*, as to the *good* or *bad lives* of their *Bishops.* This farther appears by the words in *Lampridius* concerning *Alexander Severus*, who proposed the *names* of his *civil Officers* to the *People*, *to hear what they had to object against them, and said it was a hard case, when the Christians and Jews did so about their Priests, the same should not be done about Governours of Provinces, who had Mens lives and fortunes in their hands.* But no Man could ever from hence imagin, that the *People*

had the *Power* to *make* or *unmake the Governors* of *Roman Provinces.* Orig. *hom.* 6. *in Levit.* *Origen* saith, *The Peoples presence was necessary at the Consecration of a Bishop, that they might all know the worth of him who was made their Bishop*; it must be *astante Populo, the People standing by*; and this is that Saint *Paul* meant, when he said, *A Bishop ought to have a good Testimony from those that are without.*

(2.) That the *People* upon this *assuming* the *Power* of *Elections* caused great *disturbances* and *disorders* in the *Church.* *Eusebius* represents the *disorders* of *Antioch* to have been so *great* in the City upon the *choice* of a *new Bishop*, by the *Divisions* of the *People*, *that they were like to have shaken the Emperor's Kindness to the Christians. For, such a flame was kindled by it*, that he saith, *it was near destroying both the Church and the City: and they had certainly drawn Swords, if the Providence of God, and fear of the Emperour had not restrained them. Who was forced to send Officers and Messages to keep them quiet: and after much trouble to the Emperour and many meetings of Bishops, at last* Eustathius *was chosen.* *Greg. Nazianzen* sets forth the mighty *unruliness* of the *People* of *Cæsarea* in the *choice* of their *Bishop*, saying *it came to a dangerous sedition, and not easy to be suppressed:* and he saith, *the City was very prone to it, on such occasions.* And although there was one *Person* of *incomparable worth* above the rest, yet through the *Parties* and *Factions* that were made, *it was a hard matter to carry it for him.* He complains so much of the *inconveniencies* of *popular Elections, that he wishes them alter'd*; and the *Elections brought to the Clergy*; and he thinks *no Commonwealth so disorderly as this method of Election was.* *Evagrius* saith, *the sedition at* Alexandria *was intolerable, upon the division of the People between* Dioscorus *and* Proterius; the *People rising against the Magistrates and Soldiers who endeavoured to keep them in order: and at last they murthered* Proterius. Such *dangerous Seditions* are described at *Constantinople*, upon the *Election* of *Paulus* and *Macedonius*, by *Sozomen*; and in the same place after the death of *Eudoxius*, and after the death of *Atticus* by *Socrates*; and after the deprivation of *Nestorius.* And again at *Antioch* upon the *removal* of *Eudoxius*; and about the Election of *Flavianus*; at *Ephesus* by Saint *Chrysostom*, at *Verselles* by Saint *Ambrose*; at *Milan* by *Socrates*, and many other places. I shall only add a remarkable one at *Rome* on the choice of *Damasus:* which came *to bloodshed* for *several days*; and is particularly related by *Ammianus Marcellinus*; and the *Preface* to *Faustinus* his *Libellus Precum.* Mr. *Baxter* grants *there are inconveniencies in the Peoples consenting Power, and so there are in all humane affairs.* But are these *tolerable inconveniencies?* Is this Power still to be pleaded for, in *opposition* to *Laws*, as though *Religion* lay at stake; and only *Magistrates* were *bad men*, and the *People* always *good* and *wise* and *vertuous?* A man must have great spite against *Men* in *Power*, and unreasonable fondness of the *Common People* that can represent *great Men as wicked, debauched, and enemies to Piety*, and at the same time dissemble, and take no notice of the *Vices* of the *Common People*; besides their *Ignorance* and *incapacity* of *judging* in such matters, and their great proneness to fall into *sidings* and *parties* and *unreasonable contentions* on such occasions. But Saint *Chrysostom* complains much of the *unfitness of the People to judge in such cases.* Saint *Hierom* saith, *they are apt to choose men like themselves:* and saith elsewhere, *they are much to be feared whom the People choose.* *Origen* saith, *the People are often moved either for favour or reward.*

Euseb. *de Vit.* Const. *l.* 3. *c.* 59.

Greg. Naz. *Orat.* 19.

Evagr. *l.* 2. *c.* 5.

Socr. *l.* 4. *c.* 14. Soz. *l.* 3. *c.* 5. Socr. *l.* 7. *c.* 26, 35. Ambros. *Ep.* 82. Socr. *l.* 4. *c.* 30. Soz. *l.* 4. *c.* 28. Socr. *l.* 5. *c.* 9. *l.* 6. *c.* 11. Amm. Marc *l.* 27.

Answ. p. 15.

De Sacerd. l. 3. Hieron. *adversus Jovin. in Ezek. c.* 33. Orig. *in Num. hom.* 22.

(3.) That to prevent these *Inconveniencies* many *Bishops* were appointed without the *choice* of the *People*, and *Canons* were made for the *regulation* of *Elections*. In the *Church* of *Alexandria* the *Election* of the *Bishop* belonged to the 12 *Presbyters*, as Saint *Jerome* and others shew. For by the *Constitution* of that *Church*, before the *alteration* made by *Alexander*, the *Bishop* of *Alexandria* was not only to be *chosen* out of the *twelve Presbyters*, but *by them*. So *Severus*, in the Life of the *Alexandrian Patriarchs*, saith, *that after the death of their Patriarch. the Presbyters met together and prayed, and proceeded to election; and the first Presbyter declared it belonged to them to chuse their Bishop, and to the other Bishops to consecrate him. To which the Bishops assented, only saying, if he were worthy they would consecrate whom they chose, but not otherwise.* *Elmacinus* makes this a *Constitution* of Saint *Mark* in the first *foundation* of that *Church*; and saith, *it continued to the time of the* Nicene *Council*; and then, as *Hilarius* the *Deacon* saith, *the custom was alter'd, by a Council among themselves, which determin'd that they might chuse the most deserving person, whether of that Body or not.* And there could be no room for *popular Elections*, where-ever that *Custom* obtained, which the counterfeit *Ambrose* speaks of, *ut recedente uno sequens ei succederet*; speaking of the *Bishop dying, and the next in course succeeding.* But if this be only a particular *conceit* of that *Author*, yet we find the *Bishops* consecrating others in several *Churches*, without any mention of *choice* made by the *People*. So, when *Narcissus* retired from *Jerusalem*, *Eusebius* saith, *the neighbour Bishops assembled, and consecrated one* Dius *in his room, and after him followed* Germanio, *and then* Gordius, *in whose time* Narcissus *returned*; *but being grown very old*, Alexander *was brought in to assist him, by Revelation, and a Voice from Heaven to some of the Brethren.* *Severus*, Bishop of *Melevis*, *in his life-time appointed his Successor, and acquainted the Clergy with it, but not the People*; great disturbance was feared hereupon; the *Clergy* sent to Saint *Augustin* to come among them, and to *settle* their *new Bishop*, who went, *and the People received the Bishop so appointed very quietly.* St. *Augustin* himself declares, *the sad effects he had often seen of the Church's election of Bishops*, through the *ambition* of some, and the *contention* of *others*, and *therefore he desired to prevent any such disturbance in his City, when he was dead.* And for that reason, he acquainted the *People* that he designed *Eradius*, or as some Copies have it, *Eraclius* for his *Successor*. So *Paulus* the *Novatian Bishop* at *Constantinople*, appointed his *Successor Marcianus* to *prevent the contentions that might happen after his death*; *and got his Presbyters to consent to it.*

Hieron. *Ep. ad* Evagr.

Ecchellens. *de* Orig. *Eccl.* Alex. *c.* 6.

Ambrose *Comment. in* 4 *Eph.*

Euseb. *l.* 6. *c.* 10.

c. 11.

Aug. *Ep.* 110.

Socr. *l.* 8. *c.* 46.

The *Greek Canonists* are of opinion, that the *Council of* Nice *took away all power of election of Bishops from the People, and gave it to the Bishop of the Province.* And it is apparent from the *Council* of *Antioch*, that *Bishops were sometimes consecrated in the East, without the consent of the People*; for it doth suppose a *Bishop* after *consecration may not be received by his People*, which were a vain *supposition*, if their *election* necessarily went before it. And withal, it puts the *case* of a *Bishop* that *refused to go to his People after Consecration*; which shews, that the *consecration* was not then performed in his own *Church*. *Gregory* subscribed at *Antioch*, as *Bishop* of *Alexandria*, before ever he went thither. So Saint *Basil* mentions his *consecration* of *Euphronius* to be *Bishop* of *Nicopolis*, without any *consent* of the *People* before; it being then performed by the *Metropolitan* in his own See; but *he persuades the Senate and People*

Concil. Nicen. *c.* 4.

Concil. Antioch. *c.* 18.

c. 17.

Socr. *l.* 2. *c.* 10.

Basil. *Ep.* 194.

to

to accept of him. If the *People did* agree upon a *Person* to be *Bishop*, their way then was, to petition the *Metropolitan and his Synod*, who had the *full Power* either to allow or to refuse him. And it is evident from the twelfth *Canon* of the *Council* of *Laodicea*, that although all the *People* chose a *Bishop*, if he intruded himself into the *possession* of his *See*, without the *consent* of a *Provincial Synod, he was to be turned out or rejected by them.* Which shews how much the *business* of *Elections* was brought into the *Bishop's Power* in the *Eastern parts*. And by virtue of this *Canon, Basilianus* and *Stephanus* were *rejected* in the *Council* of *Chalcedon*. By the Law of *Justinian*, the *common People* were excluded from *Elections* of *Bishops*; and the *Clergy*, and *better sort of Citizens*, were to *nominate* three to the *Metropolitan*, out of which he was to chuse one. By the *Canon* of *Laodicea*, *the common People were excluded the power of chusing any into the Clergy:* For they were wont to raise tumults upon such occasions; such as St. *Augustine* describes in the case of *Pinianus*; but some of the *Greek* and *Latin Canonists* enlarge the sense of the *Laodicean Canon* to the *election* of *Bishops* too. The *second Council* of *Nice* restrained the *election only to Bishops*, which was confirmed by following *Councils* in the *Greek Church*, as Can. 28. *Concil. Constantinopol.* against *Photius*; and the *People* are there excluded with an *Anathema*. So far were *popular Elections* grown out of request in the *Eastern Church*.

Conc. Chalced. *Act.* 11. Novel. Justin. 123, 137. *C. de Episc. lex.* 42. *Can.* Laod. *c.* 13. Aug. *Ep.* 225. Conc. Nic. 2. *c.* 3. *Concil.* 8. *c.* 28.

(4.) That when there were *Christian Magistrates*, they did interpose in this *matter* as they judged expedient. So *Constantine* did in the *Church* of *Antioch*, when there was great dissention there, upon the deposition of *Eustathius*, he recommended to the Synod *Euphronius* of *Cappadocia*, and *Georgius* of *Arethusa*, or whom they should judge fit, without taking any notice of the *interest* of the *People:* and they accordingly consecrated *Euphronius*. After the death of *Alexander*, *Bishop* of *Constantinople*, the *People* fell into *Parties*, some were for *Paulus*, and others for *Macedonius*; the *Emperour Constantius* coming thither puts them both by, and appoints *Eusebius* of *Nicomedia* to be *Bishop* there. *Eusebius* being dead, the *Orthodox Party* again chuse *Paulus*; *Constantius* sends *Hermogenes* to drive him out by force, and was very angry with *Macedonius* for being made *Bishop* without his leave, although afterwards he placed him in his throne. When *Athanasius* was restored, *Constantius* declared, *it was by the decree of the Synod, and by his consent.* And he by his *Authority* restored likewise *Paulus* and *Marcellus*, *Asclepas* and *Lucius* to their several *Sees*. When *Gregory Nazianzen* resigned the *Bishoprick* of *Constantinople*, *Theodosius* commended to the *Bishops* the care of *finding out a Person*, who recommending *many* to him, the *Emperor* himself pitched upon *Nectarius*, and would have him made *Bishop*, tho' many of the *Bishops* opposed it. When *Chrysostom* was chosen at *Constantinople*, the *Royal Assent* was given by *Arcadius*, *the election being made*, saith *Sozomen, by the People and Clergy*; but *Palladius* gives a more particular account of it, *viz. That upon the death of* Nectarius *many Competitors appeared, some making their application to the Court, and others to the People, in so much that the People began to be tumultuous,* (κλονέται, saith *Palladius*) *upon which they importuned the Emperor to provide a fit man for them.* Eutropius *being then chief Minister of State, recommended* Chrysostom *to the Emperor, and immediately an Express was sent to the* Comes Orientis, *that he should with all privacy*, for fear of a tumult at *Antioch, send him away to* Constantinople: *whither being brought, he was soon after consecrated Bishop.* So that here was no antecedent

Soz. *l.* 2. *c.* 19. Socr. *l.* 2. *c.* 6, 7. *c.* 13. *c.* 16. *c.* 23. Soz. *l.* 7. *c.* 7. *l.* 8. *c.* 2. Socr. *l.* 7. *c.* 29. Pallad. *Vit.* Chryst. *p.* 42.

election

election of the *People*, as *Sozomen* saith, but whatever there was, was subsequent to the *Emperor*'s determination. After the death of *Sisinnius*, the Emperor declared, *That to prevent disturbance, they would have none of the Clergy of* Constantinople *chosen Bishop there*; and so *Nestorius* was brought from *Antioch*. *Maximianus* being dead, he gave order that *Proclus* should be made *Bishop*, before the other's body was buried. These Instances are sufficient to shew, that *Christian Princes* did from the first think fit, when *just occasion* was given, to make use of their *Authority* in this matter. Socr. *l.* 7. *c.* 40.

(5.) Upon the alteration of the *Government* of *Christendom* there was greater reason for the *Magistrate*'s interposing than before. For upon the *endowment* of *Churches* by the great *liberality* of the *Northern Princes*, it was thought at first very reasonable, that the *Royal Assent* should be obtained, though a *Bishop* was *chosen* by the *Clergy* and *People*: which at first depended only on *tacit consent*; but after the solemn Assemblies of the *People* came to be much used, these *Privileges* of *Princes* came not only to be *confirmed* by the *Consent* of the *People*, but to be enlarged. For, the *Princes* obtained by degrees not only the *Confirmation* of the *elected*, but the *liberty* of *nomination*; with a *shadow* of *election* by the *Clergy*, and others of the *Court*, as appears by the *Formulæ* of *Marculphus*. This way was not always observed in *France*, where frequently, according to the *Edict* of *Clotharius*, the *Clergy* and *People chose*, the *Metropolitan consecrated*, and the *Prince* gave his *Royal Assent*: but in doubtful or difficult cases, he made use of his *Prerogative*, and *nominated* the Person, and appointed the *Consecration*. Afterwards, there arose great contests between the *Papal* and *Royal Power*, which continued for several Ages, and at last among us, the *Royal Power* overthrowing the other, reserved the *Power* of *Nomination* of *Bishops*, as part of the *Prerogative*; which being allowed in *frequent Parliaments*, the *Consent* of the *People* is swallowed up therein; since their *Acts* do oblige the whole Nation. For not only the *Statute* of 1 *Ed.* 6. declares, *The Right of appointing Bishops to be in the King*; but 25 *Ed.* 3. it is likewise declared, *That the Right of disposing Bishopricks was in the King by Right of Patronage, derived from his Ancestors before the freedom of elections was granted.* Which shews not only the *great Antiquity* of this *Right*, but the *Consent* of the *whole Nation* to it. And the same is fully related in the *Epistle* of *Ed.* 3. to *Clement* 5. where it is said, *That the King did dispose of them*, jure suo Regio, *by his Royal Prerogative, as his Ancestors had done from the first founding of a Christian Church here.* This is likewise owned in the famous *Statute* of *Carlisle*, 25 *Ed.* 1. so that there is no *Kingdom* where this *Right* hath been more fully acknowledged by the *general consent of the People*, than here in *England*; and that from the *original planting* of a *Christian Church* here. As to the inferior *Right of Patronage*, it is justly thought to bear equal date with the *first settlements* of *Christianity* in peace and quietness. For when it began to spread into *remoter Villages* and places distant from the *Cathedral Churches*, where the *Bishop* resided with his *Presbyters*, as in a *College* together; a necessity was soon apprehended of having *Presbyters fixed* among them. For the *Council* of *Neocæsarea* mentions the ἐπίσκοποι πρεσβύτεροι, *the Country Presbyters*, *c.* 13. whom the *Greek Canonists* interpret to be such as then were *fixed* in *Country-Cures*, and this *Council* was held ten years before the *Council* of *Nice*. In the time of the *first Council* of *Orange*, *A.D.* 441. express mention is made of

Concil. Aurelian. *A.D.* 549. *V. Concil.* Tarracon. *A. D.* 599. *Can.* 3. *Concil.* Tolet. 12. *c.* 6. *& ibi* Loaisam. Grati. *Dist.* 63. *Concil.* Vernense, *Can.* 2. Sirmond. *Append. ad* To. 2. *Con.* Gall. Lup. Ferrariens. *Ep.* 81, 98, 99. *V.* Grotii *Piet. p.* 91. Walsingh. *in* Edw. 3. *p.* 161.

the *Right of Patronage* reserved to the *first Founders* of *Churches*, *c.* 10. *viz. If a Bishop built a Church on his own Land, in another Bishop's Diocese, yet the Right of presenting the Clerk was reserved to him.* And this was confirmed by the *second Council* of *Arles*, *c.* 36. *A. D.* 452. By the *Constitution* of the *Emperour Zeno*, *A. D.* 479. the *Rights of Patronage* are *established*, upon the *agreements* at first made in the *endowments* of *Churches.* This *Constitution* was confirmed by *Justinian*, *A. D.* 541. and he allows the *nomination* and *presentation* of a fit *Clerk:* And the same were setled in the *Western Church*, as appears by the *ninth Council* of *Toledo*, about *A. D.* 650. and many *Canons* were made in several *Councils* about *regulating* the *Rights* of *Patronage*, and the *Endowments* of *Churches*, till at last it obtained by *general Consent*, that the *Patron* might transmit the *Right* of *Presentation* to his *Heirs*, and the *Bishops* were to approve of the *Persons* presented, and to give *Institution* to the *Benefice.* The *Barons* of *England*, in the *Epistle* to *Gregory* IX. plead, *That their Ancestors had the Right of Patronage, from the first planting of Christianity here.* For those upon whose Lands the *Churches* were built, and at whose cost and charges they were erected, and by whom the *Parochial Churches* were endowed, thought they had great *Reason* to reserve the *Nomination* of the *Clerks* to themselves. And this *Joh. Sarisburiensis* saith, *was received by a general custom of this whole Kingdom.* So that the *Right* of *Patronage* was at first built upon a *very reasonable consideration*; and hath been ever since received by as *universal a Consent* as any *Law* or *Custom* among us. And the only *Questions* now remaining are, whether such a *Consent* can be made void by the *Dissent* of some *few Persons*, who plead it to be their *inherent Right to chuse their own Pastors?* and supposing, that it might be done, whether it be *reasonable* so to do? And I conclude, that,

C. si quis 15. Cod. de Sacros. Eccl. *Nov. 57.* *Nov. 123. c. 18.* Mat. Paris, *ad A.* 1239. Joh. Sarisb. *Ep. 6. & 119.*

6. Things being thus setled by *general Consent, and established Laws*, there is no ground for the *People* to *resume* the *liberty* of *Elections:* (1.) Because it was *no unalterable Right*, but might be passed away; and hath been by *Consent* of the *People*, upon good considerations: And, (2.) Because no such inconveniencies can be alleged against the setled way of disposal of *Livings*, but may be remedied by *Laws*; far easier, than those which will follow upon the *Peoples taking this Power to themselves*, which cannot be done in a *divided Nation*, without throwing all into *remediless confusion.* (3.) Because *other reformed Churches* have thought this an *unreasonable pretence. Beza* declaims against it, *as a thing without any ground in Scripture, or any right in Antiquity, and subject to infinite disorders.* In *Sweden* the *Archbishop* and *Bishops* are appointed by the *King*; and so are the *Bishops* in *Denmark:* In other *Lutheran* Churches, the *Superintendents* are appointed by the several *Princes* and *Magistrates*; and in these the *Patrons* present before *Ordination.* The *Synod* of *Dort* hath a *Salvo* for the *Right* of *Patronage*, *Can. Eccles.* 5. In *France* the *Ministers* are chosen by *Ministers*; at *Geneva* by the *Council* of *State*, which hath *Power* to *depose them.* And it would be very strange, if this *inherent* and *unalterable Right* of the *People* should only be discovered here, where it is as unfit to be practised, as in any part of the Christian world.

Epist. 83. Rittershus. *ad* Novell. *p. 1. c. 7. n. 36, 37.*

But Mr. *B.* is unsatisfied with any *Laws* that are made in this matter; for when the objection is put by him, *That the People chuse the Parliament who make the Laws which give the Patrons Power, and therefore they now consent*; he saith, *this seemeth a Jest*; *for*, he saith,

Treatise of Episcop p. 2. p. 123.

1. *It*

1. *It cannot be proved that all the Churches or People gave the Patrons that Power.* 2. *They never consented that Parliaments should do what they list, and dispose of their Souls, or what is necessary to the saving of their Souls.* 3. *They may as well say, that they consent to be baptized, and to receive the Sacraments, because the Parliament consented to it.* 4. *Their Forefathers had no power to represent them by such consenting.* 5. *The obligation on the People was Personal, and they have not God's consent for the transmutation.*

So that one would think by Mr. *B.*'s Doctrine, all *Laws* about *Patronage* are void in themselves; and all *Rights* of *Advowson* in the *King*, or *Noblemen* and *Gentlemen*, or *Universities*, are mere *Usurpations*, and things utterly unlawful among *Christians*, since he makes such a *personal obligation to chuse their own Pastors* to lie on the *People*, that they cannot transfer it by their own *Act*. But upon second Thoughts, I suppose, he will not deny, that the *freedom* of *publick Churches*, and the *Endowments* of them, do lie within the *Magistrate*'s *Power*, and so binding Laws may be made about them; unless he can prove that the *Magistrate*'s *Power* doth not extend to those things which the *Magistrate gives*. And if these may be justly setled by *Laws*, then the *Rights* of *Patronage* are as *just* and *legal Rights* as Men have to their Estates, and consequently every Minister duly presented, hath a *legal* Title to *the Temple and Tythes*, as Mr. *B.* calls them. *But this doth not*, saith he, *make a Minister for their Souls, and the Parliament cannot dispose of their Souls.* The meaning of all which is, if the People be humoursome and factious, they may run after whom they please, and set up what *Minister* they please, in opposition to Laws. And so for instance, suppose a Parish be divided in their Opinions about Religion, (as we know too many are at this day) all these several parties, *viz. Anabaptists*, *Quakers*, yea and *Papists* too, as well as others, will put in for an equal share in what concerns *the care of their Souls*, and consequently, may chuse a several Pastor to themselves, and leave the *Incumbent* the bare possession of *the Temple and Tythes*. But if there be no other objection, this may be thought sufficient, *that he was none of their chusing*, being imposed upon them by others, who could not *dispose of their Souls*. By which means, this pretence of *taking care for their Souls*, will be soon made use of to justifie the greatest disorder and confusion, which can happen in a Church. For, let the Person be never so worthy in himself, the *People* are still to have their *liberty* of *chusing* for themselves. And who are these *People?* Must all have equal Votes? then according to Mr. *B.*'s opinion of our *Churches*, the worst will be soonest chosen; for why should we not think the *worst People will chuse their like*, as well as the *worst Patrons*, and the *worst Bishops?* But if the *profane* must be excluded, *by what Law?* Is it because they have *no right to the Ordinances?* But have they *no right to their own Souls, and to the care of them?* therefore they are equally concerned with others. Yea let us suppose all these excluded, as *no competent Judges*; shall all the rest be excluded too, who are *incompetent Judges?* then I am afraid there will not be many left. And, whatever they pretend, the *People* where they do chuse, do trust other mens Judgments, as well as where the *Patrons present*; and to prevent popular tumults, such Elections are generally brought by a kind of *devolution* to a few Persons who are entrusted to chuse for the rest. But if all the People were left *to chuse their own Pastors*, it is not to be imagined, what Parties and Factions; what mu-

tual Hatreds, and perpetual Animosities, they would naturally fall into on such occasions. Do we not daily see such things to be the fruits of popular Elections, where men are concerned for the strength and reputation of their Party? What envying and strife, what evil-speaking and backbiting; what tumults and disorders; what unchristian behaviour in general, of men to each other, do commonly accomany such *Elections?* Which being the natural effects of mens passions, stirred up by such occasions, and there being so much experience of it in all Ages of the Christian Church, where such things have been; I am as certain, that *Christ* never gave *the People such an unalterable Right of chusing their own Ministers*, as I am that he designed to have the *peace* and *unity* of the *Church* preserved. And of all Persons, I do the most wonder at him, who pretends to discover *the Only way of unity and concord among Christians*, that he should so much, so frequently, so earnestly insist upon this; which if it be not *the only*, is one of the most *effectual ways* to perpetuate *disorder* and *confusion* in a broken and divided Church. And so much for the *Plea* for *Separation*, taken from the *Peoples Right to chuse their own Ministers.*

Sect. 26. Having thus dispatched all the *Pleas* for *Separation*, which *relate* to the *Constitution* of our *Church*, I come to those which concern the *Terms* of *Communion* with us, *which are said to be unlawful.*

Mischief of Impositions, p. 41. One of the chief *Pleas* alleged for *Separation*, by Dr. *O.* and Mr. *A.* is, *that many things in the constant total Communion of Parochial Churches are imposed on the Consciences and Practices of men, which are not according to the mind of* Christ. These are very general words; but Dr. *O.* reckons up the particulars, which (setting aside those already considered) are, *the use of the Aëreal sign of the Cross, kneeling at the Communion, the religious observation of Holy-days, and the constant use of the Liturgy in all the publick Offices of the Church.* As to this last I shall say nothing, it being lately so very well defended by a *learned Divine* of our *Church.* To the other, Mr. *B.* adds, *the use of Godfathers* and *Godmothers*; and now I am to examine what weight there is in these things, to make men seriously think *Communion* with our *Church unlawful.*

Vindic. of Non conf. p. 13.

Dr. Falkner's *Vindication of Liturgies*, 1680.

When I found our *Church* thus charged with *prescribing unlawful Terms of Communion*, I expected a particular and distinct proof of such a charge, because the main weight of the *Cause* depended upon it. And this is the method we use in dealing with the *Church* of *Rome.* We do not run upon general charges of *unscriptural Impositions*, and *things imposed on mens Consciences, against the mind of* Christ; but we close with them upon the particulars of the charge, as *Worship of Images*, *Invocation of Saints*, *Adoration of the Host*, and we offer to prove by plain *Scripture*, that these are *forbidden*, and therefore *unlawful.* But I find no such method taken or pursued by our *Brethren*, only we are told, over and over, that *they judge, they think, they esteem them unlawful*; *and they cannot be satisfied about them*; but for particular arguments to prove them *unlawful*, I find none; which makes the whole charge look very suspiciously. For men do not use to remain in *generals*, when they have any assurance of the *goodness* of their *Cause.* Yet, to let the Reader see that I decline nothing that looks like argument in this matter, I shall pick up every thing I can find, which seems to prove these *Terms* of our *Communion* to be *unlawful*, or to justifie their *Separation.*

In the *Epistle* before my *Sermon*, I had used this Argument against the *present Separation*, " that if it be lawful to separate on a pretence of " *greater purity*, where there is an *agreement* in *Doctrine* and the *sub-* " *stantial parts of Worship*, as is acknowledged in our Case, then a bare " difference of opinion, as to some *circumstantials of Worship*, and the " *best Constitution* of *Churches*, will be sufficient ground to break *Com-* " *munion*, and to set up *new Churches*; which, considering the great " variety of mens fancies about these matters, is to make an infinite " Divisibility in Churches, without any possible stop to farther Separa- " tion.

This Argument others were willing to pass over, but Mr. *A.* in his *Preface*, undertakes to answer it in all the parts of it; which being so material to our business, I shall now distinctly consider; and like an able Disputant, he allows nothing at all in this Argument; for he denies the *Supposition*, viz. *that there is any such agreement in Doctrine, and the substantial parts of Worship*; he denies *the first consequence*; and, as though that were not sufficient, he denies the *remoter consequence* too. And what Argument can stand before a Man of such prowess in disputing?

1. He denies *an agreement in Doctrine*, which I have already shewed, was allowed by *all Dissenters* before him, from the days of *R. Brown*, to Mr. *A.* But we must not mistake him, for as fierce as he seems to be at first, yet let him but have scope to shew some tricks of Wit, and trials of his skill in fencing, and he is as tame and yielding as you would wish him; for at last he confesses *they generally agree with the Doctrine contained in the Thirty nine Articles*; and but for mere shame he would have said *all*; for I never heard of one before him made any scruple of it. And this is the *Doctrine* established in this *Church*, and if there be an *agreement in this*, then this *Supposition* is granted.

2. As to *substantial parts of Worship*, he denies an *agreement in this too*, although Dr. *O.* saith, *we are agreed in the substantial parts of Religion*, and I hope the *parts* of *Worship* are allowed to be some of them. *Vindication, p. 22.* But he pretends *not to know what we mean by the difference between the parts of Worship, making some substantial, and others circumstantial*; and then he offers to prove, *that our Church appoints new substantial parts of Worship*, and therefore he must know one from the other; and after he hath spent some leaves in the proof of that, at last he fairly concludes, *that there is a difference at least in a circumstantial part of Worship.*

But because this is a weighty charge against our *Church*, I shall take the more pains to consider it, because the main objection against our *Ceremonies* lies under it, and that which most sticks with the more sober *Non-conformists.*

Mr. *A.*'s charge about *a substantial part of Worship* being appointed by our *Church*, is thus drawn up. *An outward visible sign of an inward invisible grace, whereby a person is dedicated to the profession of, and subjection to the Redeemer, is a substantial part of Worship.* Now this he chargeth our *Church* with, but gives no instance; but the *sign* of the *Cross* after *Baptism*, is that which he means, which Mr. *B.* calls *the transient dedicating Image of the Cross.* For the clearing of this, it will be necessary to shew, 1. What we mean by *a substantial part of Worship.* 2. How it appears that the *sign of the Cross* is made no *substantial part of Worship* by our *Church.* *Answ. p. 49*

1. What we mean by a *substantial part of divine Worship.* For I have observed, that the want of a clear and distinct notion of this, hath been one of the greatest occasions of the *Scruples* of the most conscientious *Non-conformists.* For being afraid of displeasing God, by using any other *parts of Worship*, than himself hath appointed; and looking on our Ceremonies, as *real parts of divine Worship*, upon this reason they have thought themselves obliged in conscience, at least, to forbear the use of them. The great principle they went upon was this, *that whatever was any ways intended or designed for the Worship of God, was a real and substantial part of his Worship*; and when their Adversaries told them that *Divine Institution* was necessary to make *a part of Worship*, their answer was, that *Divine Institution* did not make that a *part of Worship* which was *none*, but that to be *a part of true Worship*, which otherwise would be *a part of false Worship.* In the mean time, they did not deny the *lawfulness* of the *application* of *common Circumstances* to *Acts* of *Religious Worship*, as *Time* and *Place*, &c. but the annexing any other *Rites*, or *Ceremonies* to proper *Acts* of *Religious Worship*, (as the *sign of the Cross* to *Baptism*) they supposed to be the making *new substantial parts of Divine Worship*; and therefore forbidden by all those places of *Scripture*, which imply the *Scripture it self* to be a perfect *Rule of Worship.* This, as far as I can gather, is the strongest *Plea* of the *Non-conformists side*, which I have represented with its full advantage, because my design is, if possible, not so much to confute, as to convince our *Dissenting Brethren.*

Let us then seriously consider this matter, and if we can find out a plain discernable difference between *substantial parts of Divine Worship*, and mere *accidental Appendices*, this discovery may tend more to disentangle scrupulous minds, than the multiplying of Arguments to *prove* the *lawfulness* of our *Ceremonies.* And that we may better understand where the difficulty lies, these following things are agreed on both sides.

1. That besides *proper Acts* of *Worship*, there are some *Circumstances* which may be differently used, without setting up *new parts* of *Worship.* As for instance, *Adoration* is a *substantial* and *proper Act* of *Divine Worship*; but whether that *Adoration* be performed by *prostration*, or by *bowing*, or by *kneeling*, is in it self *indifferent*; and no man will say, that he that makes his *adoration kneeling*, makes another *new part* of *Worship*, from what he doth who performs it *standing*, or *falling on his face.* And so, if the ancient *Eastern Church* did at certain times forbid *kneeling* in *Acts* of *adoration*, this doth not prove that they differ'd in point of *Adoration* from the *Western Church*, which requires *kneeling* in the same *Offices* of *Divine Worship*, because they agreed in the *Act* of *Adoration*, but only differ'd in the manner of expressing it.

2. That *Divine Institution* makes those to be *necessary parts* of *Worship*, which of themselves are not so. As is plain in the *Sacraments* of the *New Testament*, which of themselves are no *necessary substantial parts of the Worship of God*, but only become so, by being appointed by *Christ.* So under the Law, many things merely *ritual* and *ceremonial* in themselves, yet by vertue of *Divine appointment*, became *substantial parts* of *Divine Worship.*

3. That for men to make *new Parts* of *Divine Worship* is *unlawful.* For that is to suppose the *Scripture* an *imperfect Rule* of *Worship*, and that

that *Superstition* is no fault, and consequently, that our Saviour, without cause, found fault with the *Scribes* and *Pharisees* for their *Traditions.*

4. That there are many things which may be done in the *Worship* of *God*, which are not forbidden to be done, unless they be *Parts* of *Divine Worship.* For, if the supposed reason of their *prohibition*, be their being made *Parts* of *Divine Worship*, if it be made appear, that they are not so, then it follows they are not forbidden.

5. That what is neither *forbidden directly*, nor by *consequence*, is *lawful*, and may be practised in the *Worship* of *God.* For although Mr. *A.* quarrels with me, for saying, they require *express Commands* to make things *lawful* in the *Worship of God*; yet he allows, that what is not required either *directly*, or by *consequence* is unlawful, and by parity of Reason, what is not forbidden in the same manner must be lawful. *Mischief of Impos.* p. 29.

Sect. 27. It remains now to find out those certain *Notes* and *Marks* of *distinction* in this matter, as may give satisfaction to the consciences of men, in the difference between *innocent Ceremonies*, and *superstitious Parts* of *Divine Worship.* For the difference here doth not lie in supposing some things of *Divine Institution* which are not, but in making those to be *parts* of *Divine Worship* which are not. And that may be done these ways.

1. By supposing them to be so *necessary*, that the *doing* them would be a thing *pleasing* to God, and the *omitting* of them would be a thing *displeasing* to God, although there were no *humane Law* which required the doing of them. For, where there is no obligation by vertue of any humane Law, and yet men suppose they should *please God* by doing, or *displease God* by not observing some particular *Ceremonies*, it is a sign they esteem those to be *Parts* of *Divine Worship.* And this was the case of the *Scribes* and *Pharisees*, whom our *Saviour* reproved, not so much for their *frequent washings*, as for supposing that a man's *Conscience* was *defil'd*, if he did not observe them. For they had taken up an opinion among them, (as *H. Grotius* observes) that any thing that was touched by a Person unclean by the Law, did communicate an uncleanness first to their Bodies, and then to their Souls; but that this ceremonial washing did purifie both Body and Soul: upon which supposition, they concluded this *washing* so necessary a *part* of *God's Worship*, that the doing of it was a thing very pleasing to God, and the omission of it must be displeasing to him, because it left an inward defilement upon their Consciences, which might have been removed by the use of it. But it is lately pleaded by Mr. *A. that this washing of hands among the Jews condemned by our Saviour, was just of the nature of our Ceremonies, being only observed as a command of their Superiors, not repugnant to the Law of God, but rather more agreeable to it than our Ceremonies are:* from whence he infers, *That all Traditions, Canons, Injunctions, concerning unnecessary things are contrary to the Law of God, and consequently invalid, and not obligatory.* But I say, the reason of our Saviour's opposing the *Pharisees* about this matter, was not because a thing in it self unnecessary, was determined by their *Superiors*, but because of the *superstitious opinion* which the *Pharisees* had concerning this *washing*, with respect to the *Consciences* of men. And that I shall prove, 1. From the force of our *Saviour*'s reasoning. 2. From the general sense of the *Jews* concerning it. *Mat.* 15. 11; 19, 20. *Exercit. on Mat.* 15. 1, 9. p. 23, 25. p. 28.

1. From the force of our *Saviour*'s reasoning, which will appear, by observing what he proves, *viz.* that they set up their *Tradition above the Law.* Ver. 3. *Why do you also transgress the Commandment of God by your Tradition?* and v. 6. *Thus ye have made the Commandment of God of none effect by your Tradition:* v. 9. *Full well ye reject the Commandment of God, that ye may keep your own Tradition.* Our *Saviour* here proves by a plain and undeniable Instance about the *Vow Corban*, that they did believe their *Traditions* to have a force *superior* to the *Law*; else it were impossible they should suppose such an *arbitrary Vow* should supersede the obligation of the *Law*, as to the duty which *Children* owe to their Parents; but from hence it appeared that they believed the keeping of this *Vow* to be a thing more pleasing to *God*, than relieving their Parents, and so they esteemed it a *more necessary* and *substantial part* of *Divine Worship.* The force of his Argument then extends to all things which they looked on as things pleasing to God, on the account of the *Tradition* of their *Elders*; for he argued against the main supposition, the truth of which he proves by a clear instance, where the *Tradition* did contradict the *Law.* And since by this, it appeared, that they thought their *Tradition* to over-rule the *Law*, it was no wonder they set up others equal to it, and thought mens Consciences strictly obliged to observe them. *But how doth the argument reach to the present case*, viz. *Because that when their Traditions contradicted the Law, they were not to be observed; therefore, not, when agreeable, unless he rejected all kind of Traditions?* I answer, the *Pharisees* did think a man's *Conscience* defiled if he did not observe that *Tradition*, as appears by what follows, when he taught the People upon this occasion, *v.* 11. *That which entreth into the mouth defileth not a man, but that which cometh out of the mouth defileth a man.* This was the *Doctrine Christ* taught the *People* with respect to this dispute with the *Pharisees*; which signified nothing, unless the opinion among them was, that eating of bread with unwashen hands, did really defile a man's *Conscience* towards *God.* At which the *Pharisees* were much offended, as the *Disciples* told him, *v.* 12. and they were not so very well satisfied, but they desire a farther explication of this matter from himself; which he gives them, *v.* 17, 18, 19. where he shews that no *defilement* could come to mens *Consciences* merely *by what they did eat*; but that mens *inward lusts* were the things which *defiled them*, for these were the source of those *wicked actions*, which were most displeasing to God. And so he concludes his Discourse, *v.* 20. *These are the things which defile a man, but to eat with unwashen hands defileth not a man.* From whence it follows, that the main thing in dispute was, whether this *Ceremony* of *washing hands* could be omitted, without *defiling the Conscience?* or else our *Saviour*'s conclusion doth not reach the Question. But if the *conclusion* was contrary to the *Pharisees Doctrine*, then they must look upon this *Ceremony* of *washing of hands*, as *a part* of *Worship* equal to the *Law of God*, and which men pleased *God* by doing, and displeased him by omitting it; not merely with respect to the *command* of *Superiors*, but as they supposed some lesser guilt upon the *Conscience* might be *expiated* by it, which would remain, if they did not use it.

2. From the *general sense* of the *Jews.* Even Mr. *A.* himself, in the very same discourse, where he would make *this washing of hands* p. 17. *like our Ceremonies*, quotes several passages of the *Talmudists*, to prove *that they equalled their Traditions with the Laws of God, and sometimes*

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set them above them; and particularly of this *Tradition* he saith, *It is a saying of the Talmud, that he that eats bread with unwashen hands, sins as grievously as if he lay with a Whore.* Which is a saying of *R. Ase* in *Sota*; and abundantly proves, that this was not looked on as an *indifferent Ceremony*, but as a thing whose omission brought a guilt on the Conscience. And I wonder Mr. *A.* did not discern, that by this one saying, he overthrew all the rest of his discourse: But this opinion is not built on the saying of any *Rabbi*, but on a constant *Tradition* among them, which they derive from the *days* of *Solomon*, *who*, they say, *appointed it first*, *when they did eat of Sacrifices*; afterwards, *the wise men applied it to the Terumah*, and at last *Hillel* and *Schammai decreed it ought to be observed for their greater purification*, *before the eating their common Meals.* And the *Pharisees* placing the greatest part of their *Religion* in the nice observance of such *Traditions*, thought themselves so much more holy than others, as they did more carefully avoid the defilements of common Conversation; and for that reason they observed *this washing*, especially when they had been in promiscuous company. For they thought themselves *defiled* by any *touch from the ordinary sort of People*; and this, *Maimonides* saith, *they looked on as a peculiar part of Sanctity*; and the more strict and punctual they were in this, the more holy they were accounted. Therefore in the *Talmud*, one *John*, the Son of *Gudged*, is particularly admired for his *Sanctity*, *because he exceeded others in the niceness of washing his hands.* And they have a saying in the *Misna* to this purpose, *The Garments of the common People, are a pollution to the Pharisees, and the Garments of the Pharisees to those that eat the Terumah, and theirs to those that eat of the Sacrifices, and theirs to those that touched the water of cleansing.* So that they had different *degrees* of *Sanctity* about this *matter* of *washing*, none of which was imposed for the sake of *cleanliness*, but from the *supposition* of some *inward purification* they obtained by it, from the *common filthiness* of the world. And upon this principle, even the *vessels* of the *Temple* were to be *washed* all over, *if they were but touched by the common People.* In the *washing their hands*, they put a difference between that before, and that after meat; the latter they accounted a matter of liberty, or at least only *for health* to wash off the dangerous *saline particles* which they supposed to remain; but the former was required for *inward purification*; which they require so strictly, *that if water may be had within four miles, a Jew is bound not to eat till he hath washed, no not with a fork*; *and in case none can be had, then he is to cover his hands, and so eat*; *nor can he take meat from another in his mouth, until his mouth be first washed. If there be no more water than will serve for his drink, he must part with enough of it to wash his hands*; and therefore *R. Akiba* in prison said, *He would rather perish with thirst, than want water to wash his hands.* And they say, *Whosoever disesteems this Custom, deserves not only excommunication, but death too.* Since all this is evident from the most *authentick Writers* among the *Jews*, I cannot but admire at Mr. *A.*'s design, who would make the world believe, that this was no more than an *indifferent Ceremony* among the *Jews*, that was only required for *Order* and *Decency*, as *our Ceremonies* are, when those very *Citations* he brings from *Buxtorf*, and Dr. *Lightfoot*, do manifestly prove the contrary. This I thought necessary to be cleared, because this is the chief place in the *New Testament*, which they bring to prove the *unlawfulness* of our *Ceremonies.*

Excerpta Gemar. c. 13. §. 6.

Mark 7. 4.

Chagiga, c. 2. §. ult.

Erub. in f. 21.

From

From hence it now appears that the reason of *Christ*'s condemning that *Ceremony* of *washing of hands*, was not upon the account of *Decency*, but a *superstitious Opinion* they had concerning it, that it did *expiate* a lesser kind of *guilt* and *spiritual filthiness* which they contracted by the *impure touches* of Men less holy than themselves. And this the *Pharisees* more wondred at in *Christ's Disciples*, because it was a *Rule* among them, *that the Disciples of the Wise ought to be more strict in these cases than others*, because these things tended to advance the *Reputation* of their *Holiness*, among the *People*. And where such an Opinion prevails, there such *Ceremonies* are made *parts* of *Divine Worship*.

Bellarm. *de effectu Sacra. l. 2. c. 31. Sect. tertia.*

Sect. 28. And thus it is in many of the *Ceremonies* of the *Roman Church*, which their *Divines* assert to have *a purifying and cleansing faculty as to the Souls of Men*; *not for justification of Men from mortal sins*, *but for other spiritual effects*, *and taking away the guilt of venial sins*. For say they, *no doubt they are effectual for the ends to which the Church appointed them*, *and of this*, *there is no dispute among Catholicks*. And withal, they add, *That it is probable that the Church hath power to appoint Ceremonies in such a manner*, *that they may produce these effects*, ex opere operato, *as the Sacraments do justification*, *because Christ hath left it in the power of the Church to apply his merits for lesser effects*, *having appointed the Sacraments himself for the greater*. But *Bellarmin* thinks this latter part disputable concerning the *opus operatum of Ceremonies*; but as to the former, *viz. by way of impetration*, he saith, *it is past all doubt among Catholicks*. So, as to *the sprinkling of Holy Water*, *Bellarmin* saith, *it is no mere significant Ceremony*; *but it is effectual for the blotting out of venial sins*; and he quotes Saint *Thomas*, and *Dom. à Soto*, and *Gratian* for it; who produceth the *Canon of Alex.* 1. whereby it appears it was first instituted *ut eâ cuncti aspersi sanctificentur & purificentur*; that all that were sprinkled might be sanctified and purified by it. In the prayer of *Consecration* for the *Salt* to *make holy Water*, one expression is, *that it might be wholsome both to Body and Soul*; and the *Water* is consecrated *to drive away the power of the Devil*. *Azorius* saith, *that holy Water cleanseth venial sins*, ex opere operato, *and drives away Devils*. *Greg. de Valentia* agrees in the thing, but is not so peremptory in the manner. But *Marsilius Columna* hath written a whole *Book* of the *admirable effects of this Ceremony*. And so for *the sign of the Cross*, *Bellarmin* attributes *wonderful effects* to it, *for driving away Devils and Diseases*, *and sanctifying the things it is applied to*: And he saith, it hath power against the Devil *ex opere operato*. *Pet. Thyræus* the *Jesuit*, attributes a *proper efficiency to the sign of the Cross against the power of the Devil*. *Coccius* saith, *It is a terror to the Devils*, *and very beneficial to Mankind*. Which makes me wonder at Dr. *Ames* his disingenuity, when he would go about to make the Doctrine of our *Church* about *Ceremonies* not to differ from that of the *Church* of *Rome*. It is true, *Cassander* and some few others, talk at another rate; and *Cassander* himself saith, *the best Men on both sides were agreed about these matters*: But we are not to take their general sense from such as *Cassander*; especially when their *publick Offices* speak the sense of their *Church* better than *Cassander*. *Greg. de Valentiâ* indeed, saith, *It is a lie that they attribute as much to Ceremonies as to Sacraments*: And in truth they do it not; for they attribute *Justification* to the *Sacraments*, and the *expiation* of the remainder

Bell. *de cultu Sanct. l. 3. c. 7. § Nota.* Benedict. *Salis ad aquam lustral. Pastoral. de Sacr. Bap.* Azor. *Instit. Moral. l. 4. c. 11.* Greg. *de Valent. To. 4. disp. 7. q. 4. puncto* 1. Marsil. Columnæ *Hydragiologia.* Bell. *de Imag. l. 2. c. 30.* Thyræ. *de locis infest. p. 3. c. 68.* Thesaur. *Cathol. To. 1. l. 2. art. 9.* *Fresh Suit against Cerem. p. 70. p. 427.* Cassand. *Consult. art. 7. & 9.* *To. 4. disp. 3. q. 1. p. 4.*

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of *venial sins* to the use of *Ceremonies*. However, since they attribute so *spiritual effects* to them; it is an argument they look upon them as *real parts* of *Divine Worship*, as much as they do on *Prayer*, with which they compare them in point of *efficacy*. But with what face can this be objected against our *Church*; which utterly rejects any such *spiritual efficacy*, as to the *Ceremonies* that are retained among us; and declares that they are no otherwise received in our *Church*, than as they are purged from *Popish Superstition* and *Error?* And therefore all opinion of *merit* and *spiritual efficacy* is taken from them; which do make them to be *parts* of *Divine Worship*; which being removed, they remain only naked *Ceremonies*, *i. e.* as *Cassander* well expresses it, *Words made visible*, or *teaching Actions*; whose design and intention being towards us, and not towards *God*, they cannot be thought to be made *parts* of *Divine Worship*, although they be used in the performance of them. As if the *Christians* in the East did wear the badge of a *Cross* upon their *Arms*, at some solemn days, as on *good Friday* at their *devotions*, to distinguish them from *Turks* and *Jews*; would any one say, that they made this *badge* a *part* of *Divine Worship?* But when they see the *Papists* on that day using the most solemn *postures* of *adoration* to the *Crucifix*, they might well charge them with making this a *part* of *Divine Worship*. So that the *distinction* between these two, is not so hard to find, if Men apply their Minds to the consideration of it.

Preface to the Common-Prayer, Can. 30.

2. Men may make *Ceremonies* to become *parts* of *Divine Worship* if they suppose them *unalterable*, and *obligatory* to the *Consciences* of all *Christians*: for this supposes an *equal necessity* with that of *Divine Institution*. If Men do assert so great a *Power* in the *Church*, as to appoint things for *spiritual effects*, and to *oblige* the *Consciences* of all *Christians* to observe them; it is all one as to say, the *Church* may make *new parts* of *Worship*. But this can with no colour be objected against a *Church* which declares as expressly as it is possible, *that it looks on the Rites and Ceremonies used therein, as things in their own nature indifferent and alterable; and that changes and alterations may be made, as seems necessary or expedient to those in Authority: And that every Country is at liberty to use their own Ceremonies; and that they neither condemn others nor prescribe to them.* What can more express the not making *Ceremonies* any *parts* of *Divine Worship* than these things do? And thus I have at once shewed, what we mean by *substantial parts* of *Divine Worship*, and that our *Church* doth not make any human *Ceremonies* to be so.

Preface to Common Prayer.

Second Preface.

Sect. 29. I now come particularly to examin the charge against our *Church*. For Mr. *A.* saith, *An outward visible sign of an inward invisible grace, whereby a person is dedicated to the profession of and subjection to the Redeemer, is a substantial part of Worship.* I answer,

1. An *outward visible sign* between Men representing the *duty* or *engagement* of another, is *no part* of *Divine Worship* at all, much less a *substantial part* of it. There are some *visible signs* from *God to Men*, representing the *effects* of his *Grace* to us, and those we call *Sacraments*; there are other *signs from Men to God*, to testifie their *subjection* and *dependence*, and these are *acts* of *Worship*; and there are *signs from Men to Men* to represent some other thing besides the bare action; and these are *significant Ceremonies*, such as the *Cross* in *Baptism* is. For, after the *Child is baptized* and received into the *Church*, the sign of the

Cross is used *in token that hereafter he shall not be ashamed to confess the faith of Christ crucified.* &c. To whom is this token made? Is it to *God?* No certainly. If it were a permanent sign of the *Cross*, would it be for a *Testimony* to *God*, or to *Men?* When the *Primitive Christians* used the *sign of the Cross* in token they were not ashamed of *Christ crucified*, was this a *dedicating sign to God*, or a *declarative sign to Men?* And what if it represents *subjection to Christ* as the *Redeemer?* Must it therefore be such an *outward visible Sign* of *inward invisible Grace*, as the *Sacraments* are? It represents the *Duty* and not the *Grace*; the *Duty* is *ours*, and may be represented by us; but the *Grace* is *God's*, and therefore he must appoint the *signs* to *represent* and convey that, because he alone is the *Giver* of it.

2. The *Cross* in *Baptism* is not intended by our *Church* for a *sign* of *immediate dedication* to *God*, but of *obligation* on the person. It is true, that in the 30 *Canon* it is said, *that this Church retains the sign of the Cross, following the example of the Primitive and Apostolical Churches; and accounteth it a lawful outward Ceremony and honourable badge, whereby the Infant is dedicated to the service of him who died upon the Cross.* But for the right understanding thereof, we must consider, That *Baptism* is declared to be *compleat* before; so that the *sign* of the *Cross* adds nothing to the *perfection* or *vertue* of it, nor being omitted, takes nothing from it; as it is there expressed as the *sense* of this *Church.* This therefore, is no part of the *Baptismal Dedication.* And the *Minister* acts in a *double capacity*, when he doth *baptize*, and when he *signs* with the *sign* of the *Cross:* When *he baptizeth*, he acts by vertue of *Authority* derived *from Christ*, *I baptize thee in the Name of the Father*, &c. Which being done, and the *Child* thereby solemnly *dedicated to God in Baptism*; he then speaks in the *name* of the *Church*, varying the number; *We receive this Child into the Congregation of* Christ's *Flock, and do sign him with the sign of the Cross*, &c. *i. e. We Christians*, that are already *members* of *Christ's Flock, do receive him into our number*; and in token of his being *obliged* to perform the *duty* belonging to such a one, do make use of this *sign of the Cross*, as the *Rite of Admission* into the *Church*, and of his *obligation* to behave himself, as becomes a *Christian.* And if we consider the *sign of the Cross* in this sense, as no doubt it was so intended, all the difficulties about a *Dedicating*, *Covenanting*, *Symbolical*, *Sacramental Sign*, concerning which some have made so great a stir, will soon appear to be of no force. For why may not the *Church* appoint such a *Rite* of *Admission* of one of her *Members* declaring it to be *no part* of *Baptism?* Let us suppose an adult person to be *baptized*, and immediately after *Baptism* to be admitted a *Member* of an *Independent Church*; and the *Ceremony* of this *admission* to be *holding up of his hand*, in token of his owning the *Church-Government*, i. e. of promising to live as a *Church-member* ought to do among them; the *Pastor* of the *Church* then baptizes him, and immediately after, upon *the holding up of his hand, in token of his owning the Church-Covenant*, he saith in the name of the Church, *we receive thee into this Congregation, and accept of thy holding up of thy hand as a token that thou wilt hereafter behave thy self as a Church-member ought to do among us.* What harm is there in all this? And yet is not this a *Professing*, *Dedicating*, *Covenanting*, *Symbolical*, *Sacramental Sign*, as much as the *Sign of the Cross* is among us? Doth not *holding up the hand* signify and represent? Is it not

Plea for Peace, p. 178, 179. Defence of the Plea, p. 42.

not therefore a *significant* and *symbolical Ceremony?* Doth it not import an *obligation* lying on the person? Is it not therefore *dedicating, covenanting, and sacramental,* as much as the *sign of the Cross?* Why then should this be scrupled more than the other?

And by this Mr. *B*'s great mistake appears about this matter; who supposeth that the *Minister* speaketh *in the name of* Christ when he *signs* with the *sign of the Cross*; and *as God's Officer from him,* and *so dedicates him by this sign to the service of him that died upon the Cross*; whereas the *Minister* in that *Act* speaks in the *name* of the *Church,* as evidently appears by those words, *We receive him into the Congregation of Christ's Flock*; and then follows, as the solemn rite of Admission, *And do sign him with the sign of the Cross,* &c. All publick and solemn *Admissions* into *Societies,* having some peculiar *Ceremony* belonging to them. And so as *Baptism* besides its *sacramental Efficacy* is a *Rite* of *Admission* into *Christ's Catholick Church*; so the *sign of the Cross* is into our *Church* of *England:* in which this *Ceremony* is used, without any *prescription* to other *Churches.*

Plea for Peace, p. 180.

Sect. 30. But saith Mr. *B. though the sign of the Cross may be lawful, as a transient, arbitrary, professing sign; yet not as a dedicating sign, and as the common professing symbol of baptized Persons.* If it be *lawful* in the former sense, I cannot understand how it should be *unlawful* in the latter. *Yes,* saith he, *the instituting of the latter belongs to God only.* How doth that appear? *Because he hath made two Sacraments already for that end.* True, but not only for that end; but to be the *means* and *instruments* of *conveying his Grace* to men; which none but *God* himself can do, and therefore none but he ought to appoint the *means* for that end. And we account it an unsufferable insolency in the *Roman Churches,* for them to take upon them to make *application of the Merits of* Christ *to Rites of their own Institution*; which is the only possible way for a *Church* to make *new Sacraments*; but if every *significant custom* in a *Church* must pass for a *new Sacrament,* then *sitting* at the *Sacrament* is a *new Sacrament,* because we are told *it betokens rest and Communion with* Christ; then putting off the *Hat* in *Prayer* is a *new Sacrament,* because it is a *professing sign of Reverence*; then laying *on the hand, and kissing the Book in swearing* are *new Sacraments,* because they are *publick symbolical Rites.* But saith Mr. *B. it belongeth only to the King to make the common badge or symbol of his own Subjects.* Yet I hope, every Nobleman or Gentleman may give a *distinct Livery* without *Treason.* And therefore why may not every *Church* appoint its own *Rite* of *admission* of *Members* into its *Body? But the obligation here is to the common duties of Christians.* And is not every *Church-member* bound to perform these? That which is peculiar, is the *manner* of *admission* by the *sign* of the *Cross*; and his *Rite* our *Church* imposes on no others but its own *Members, i. e.* makes it necessary to none else; and to shew it to be only a solemn *Rite* of *Admission,* it allows it to be forborn in *private Baptism.* But saith Mr. *B. Christ's Sacraments or Symbols are sufficient, we need not devise more, and accuse his Institution of insufficiency.* If it be lawful, the *Church* is to judge of the *expediency*; and not every private person. And to appoint other *Rites* that do not encroach upon the *Institutions* of *Christ,* by challenging any *effect* peculiar to them, is no charging them with insufficiency. Well, saith Mr. *B. but it is unlawful on another account,* viz. *as it is an Image used as a medium in God's Worship, and so forbidden in the Second Commandment.* He may as well make it unlawful to use *Words*

Christian Directory. Ecclesiastical Cases, Q. 113.

in *God's Worship*, for are not they *Images* and represent things to our *minds*, as well as a *transient sign of the Cross*? Nay, doth not Mr. *B.* in the same place make it *lawful to make an Image an Object or Medium of our consideration exciting our minds to Worship God? as he instanceth in a Crucifix or historical Image of Christ, or some holy man.* If any *Divine* of the *Church* of *England* had said any thing to this purpose, what out-cries of *Popery* had been made against us? How many *Advances* had we presently made for letting in the *grossest Idolatry*? How many *Divines* of the *Church* of *Rome* had been quoted, to shew, that they went no farther and desired no more than this? Yet the *transient sign of the Cross*, without any respect to *Worship*, is condemned among us, *as forbidden by the Second Commandment*; and that by the *same person* and in the *same page. But it is used as a medium in God's Worship.* Is our *Worship* directed to it? or, do we *kneel* before it, as Mr. *B.* allows men may do before a *Crucifix*? Do we declare that we are *excited* by it to worship God? No; all these are rejected by our Church. How then *is it a medium in God's Worship*? Why forsooth, *it is not a mere circumstance but an outward act of Worship.* What, as much as *kneeling before a Crucifix*? and yet that is lawful according to him, *supposing the mind be only excited by it.* Suppose then we only use *the sign of the Cross* to *excite* mens consideration in the *act* of *Worship*; what harm were in it upon Mr. *B*'s grounds? But our *Church* allows not so much, only taking it for a *lawful outward Ceremony*, which hath nothing of *Worship* belonging to it; how comes it then to be a *medium in God's Worship.* For Mr. *B.* saith, in the same place, *there is a twofold medium in God's Worship.* 1. Medium excitans, *that raises our minds to Worship God, as a Crucifix, &c.* 2. Medium terminans; or as he calls it *terminus, in genere causæ finalis*, a worshipped *medium or the terminus, or the thing which we worship mediately, on pretence of representing God, and that we worship him in it ultimately. And this he takes to be the thing forbidden directly in the second Commandment*, viz. *to worship a Creature (with mind or body) in the Act of Divine Worship, as representing God, or as the mediate term of our Worship, by which we send it unto God, as if it were more acceptable to him. So that it is lawful*, saith he, *by the sight of a Crucifix to be provoked to worship God, but it's unlawful to offer him that Worship, by offering it to the Crucifix first, as the sign, way, or means of sending it to God.* Observe here a strange piece of partiality. 1. It is allowed to be *lawful to pray before a Crucifix*, as a *medium excitans*, as *an object that stirs up in us a worshipping affection*; and so all those *Papists* are excused from *Idolatry* who profess they use a *Crucifix* for *no other end*, although they perform all *Acts* of *adoration* before it; and it will become a very hard question whether the mind in its consideration, uniting the *Image* with the *Object*, may not give the same *Acts of Worship* to one as to the other, but in different respects. For the *Image* being allowed to *excite the mind to consideration of the object to be worshipped*, the *object* is *considered* in the *mind* as *represented by the Image*, and consequently is so worshipped; and why then may not *the worship* be as well directed to the *Image as representing*, as to the *Object represented by the Image*; provided, that the *Act* of the mind be still fixed upon the *Object* as *represented* by the *Image*? And thus even *Latria* may be performed to a *Crucifix.* Is not this a very fair concession to the *Papists*? But on the other side, 2. The *sign of the Cross*, even the *aëreal sign*, as Dr. *O.* calls it, must be made a *medium* in *God's Worship*, though it be utterly denied by our *Church*; and there be no colour for it,

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from his own grounds. For it is neither *medium excitans*, being not intended by our *Church* for that purpose, a *Crucifix* being much fitter for that purpose; and our *Church* calls it only *a lawful ceremony and honourable badge*; much less can it be thought to be any *mediate object* of *our Worship*, there being nothing like *Worship* performed towards it. But if all his meaning be, that whatever is used in the time of *Worship*, that is not a *mere circumstance*, must be a *medium* of *Worship*, that is so weak a pretence, that I shall consider it no farther.

Sect. 31. But suppose it be no *medium* of *Worship*, yet it cannot out of Mr. *B*'s Head, but that it must be a *new Sacrament*; *For*, saith he, *If Christ had instituted the Cross as our Church doth; would you not have called this a Sacrament? And if it want but Divine Institution and Benediction, it wanteth indeed a due efficient, but it is still a Human Sacrament though not a Divine, and therefore an unlawful Sacrament.* If *Christ* had instituted it with such *promises*, as he hath his other *Sacraments*, no doubt it had been one; but then the use of it had been quite changed, from what it is now. For then its *signification* had been from *God to us*; and the *Minister* had *signed in Christ's Name* and not in the *Church's*; and then it had been *in token that Christ will not fail of his Promise, if we perform our Conditions.* But here it is quite contrary, as hath already appeared. *Defence of the Plea, p. 41.*

There is one thing yet remaining in Mr. *B.* about this matter to be considered, *viz. That according to the Rule of our Church, the Cross in Baptism hath a Sacramental efficacy attributed to it*; for, saith he, *As the Water of Baptism worketh morally, by signifying the washing of Christ's Body; so the Cross is to operate morally, by signifying Christ's Crucifixion, the benefits of his Cross and our Duty.* And then he adds, *That it is the common Doctrine of Protestants that the Sacraments are not instituted to give Grace physically, but only morally; and that even the wisest Papists themselves do maintain only such moral Causality in Sacraments.* And so by this means he would make *the sign of the Cross* to have the *nature* of a *Sacrament* with us. But that he hath misprerepresented or misapplied both the *Popish* and *Protestant Doctrine* about the *efficacy* of *Sacraments* to serve his purpose, I shall now make appear, *Defence of the Plea, p. 49.*

1. Concerning the *Popish Doctrine*; that which overthrows the strength of all that Mr. *B.* saith is, that it is unanimously agreed among them as a *matter of faith*, *that the Sacraments do confer grace*, ex opere operato, *where there is no actual impediment*; *and that it is no less than heresie to assert, that they are bare outward professing signs, i. e.* That they are *mere Ceremonies.* This not one of them, whom I ever saw, either denies, or disputes; and it is expressly determined in the *Councils* of *Florence* and of *Trent.* But then they have a very nice and subtle question among them about the *manner* how the *Sacraments* do confer Grace, whether *physically* or *morally.* By *physically*, they mean, *when a thing by its own immediate action hath influence on producing the effect*; by *morally*, they mean *that which doth effectually concur to the producing the effect, but after another manner, as by persuasions, by intreaty*, &c. As he that *runs* the *sword* into *another's bowels*, kills him *physically*; he that *persuades and incourages him* effectually to do it, is as *really* the *cause* of his *death* as the other; but then they say, he is but a *moral* and not a *physical cause* of the *murther.* They all agree, that the *Sacraments* do *effectually* convey *Grace*, where there is *no obstacle put*; but the only question is, about the *manner* of producing it. And as to this they agree, that the *Sacraments* do work as *moral Causes*, *Concil. Florent. Decret. Union. Concil. Trident. Sess. 7. Can. 6.*

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not *principal* but *instrumental*; the *principal* they say is *the Merit of Christ*, the *Instrumental* the *Sacraments* as deriving their *efficacy* from the former; as the *Writing* from the *Seal*, and the *Seal* from the *Authority* of the *Person*; or as *Money* from the *Stamp*, and the *Stamp* from the *King*; but besides this, they question whether there be not a *proper efficiency by Divine Power in the Sacraments*, to produce at least the *character* from whence *Divine Grace* immediately follows. And about this indeed they are divided. Some say, there is *no necessity* of asserting more than a bare *moral Causality*; because this is sufficient *for the infallible efficacy of the Sacraments*, sublato obice, as *Gamachæus* a late *Professor in the Sorbon* delivers their Doctrine: and of this opinion, he reckons *Bonaventure*, *Altissidore*, *Scotus*, *Durandus*, *Canus*, *Ledesma*, *and many others*: and with this he closes, *because this is sufficient*, *and the other is to make Miracles without cause*; *as long as the effect follows*, *certò infallibilitèr & ex opere operato*, as he there speaks. And for the same reason *Card. de Lugo* yields to it, although he there saith, that a Sacrament is *signum practicum infallibile Gratiæ*. So that those who do assert only this *moral Causality* of *Sacraments*, do not suppose *any uncertainty in the effect*, any more than the others do, but only differ about the *way* of producing it. Yet *Ysambertus*, another late Professor of the *Sorbon*, proves the Doctrine of a *Physical efficiency* to be much more agreeable to the *sense* of their *Church*; and that the argument is of no force against it, *because it is so hard to be understood*, for then they must quit many other Doctrines besides this. *Joh. Baptista Gonet*, a late learned *Thomist* not only contends earnestly for this opinion, but saith, *The greater part of their Divines assert it*, *and those of the greatest reputation*, as *Ruardus Tapper*, *Vega*, *Sayrus*, *Ysambertus*, *Suarez*, *Valentia*, *Bellarmin*, *Reginaldus*, *Mæratius*, *Ripalda* and many more. And *Coquetius*, he saith, *reckons up Fifty three eminent Divines who hold the physical Causality of the Sacrament*. So that Mr. *B.* is both very much mistaken in the *common Doctrine* of the *Roman Schools*, and in *applying* the *moral Causality* of the *Sacraments*, as it is asserted by their *Divines*, to the *significancy* of our *Ceremonies*.

Gamachæ. *Sum. Theol. To. 2. qu. 2. c. 5.*

Lugo *de Sacram. disp. 4. Sect. 4. n. 32.*

Ysambert. *de Sacram. ad. Qu. 62. disp. 4. art. 3.*

Clypeus *Theolog. Thomist. To. 5. disp. 3. art. 2. §. 1.*

2. As to the *Protestant Doctrines*, he represents that in very ambiguous terms; for, he saith, *That Protestants commonly maintain that the Sacraments are not instituted to give Grace physically*, *but only morally*. If it be their *Doctrine*, that the *Sacraments* are instituted for the *conveying of Grace* at all, which he seems to yield; (and if he did not, might be fully proved from the *Testimonies* of the most eminent *Reformers* abroad, as well as at home) This is sufficient to shew that the *sign* of the *Cross* can never be advanced to the *dignity* of a *Sacrament* among us; since in no sense it is held to be an *Instrument* appointed for the *conveying* of *Grace*.

And so this *Phrase* of a *New Sacrament* is a thing only invented to amuse and perplex tender and injudicious Persons. There being not the least ground for it, that I can discern; and yet such pretences as these have served to darken People's minds, and have filled them with strange fears and scruples; yea, some who have conquer'd their prejudices as to other things, have not been able to get over this mighty *stumbling-block*; which I have therefore taken the more pains to remove out of their way.

Christian Directory Eccles. Cases Q. 49. p. 826. And yet after all, Mr. *B.* declares, *That if it be a sin*, *it is the Minister's*, *and not the Person's who offers the Child to be baptized*; *and another man's sinful mode will not justifie the neglect of our duty*. And therefore

fore supposing *the sign of the Cross* to be as bad as some make it, yet it can be no pretence for *Separation.*

Sect. 32. But Mr. *A.* hath a farther blow at our *Church*, for allowing *worshiping towards the Altar, the East, and at the sound of the word Jesus*; *which*, he saith, *are made the Motive of Worship, if not something else.* The lawfulness of these things, so far as they are required by our *Church*, I had formerly defended against the *Papists*, and now Mr. *A.* borrows their *Weapons* from them; although he doth not manage them with that skill and dexterity which *T. G.* used. I had said, that bowing at the *name of Jesus* was no more than *going to Church at the Toll of a Bell*, the *Worship* being not given to the *Name*, but to *Christ* at the sound of his Name. *Why may not*, saith he, *an Image give warning to the Eye, when to worship God, as well as a Bell to the Ear?* I will tell him, since he needs it, because an *Image* is a *mighty disparagement* to an *infinite* and *invisible Being*; it is directly contrary to his *Law* to *worship* him by an *Image*; it is against the *sense* of the *Christian Church* in its *best and purest Ages*; this one would have thought I had proved so much against the *Papists*, that I had little reason to expect such a question from a *Protestant.* But such men do too much discover, whose part they are willing to take against the *Church* of *England.* *He grants the Papists go too far in preferring an Image higher than to be* Motivum Cultûs; *but the Question is, whether they do not sin in applying it to this lower use, to make it an ordinary stated Motive to Worship.* When I read this, I began to pity the man, being in some fear lest something had a little disordered his fancy. For where do we ever allow such an *use of Images* in our *Church?* If he had written against Mr. *B.* who allows a *Crucifix* to be *Medium excitans*, he had some reason to have answered him, but I have none. But he brings it home to us; *for*, saith he, *If men do sin who make an Image an ordinary stated motive of Worship, then how shall we excuse our own adorations?* What doth the man mean? I am yet afraid, all things are not right somewhere. We acknowledge *no adorations*, but what are due to the *Divine Majesty*; and do these need to be excused? And what consequence is there from the unlawfulness of the *Worship* of *Images*, against our *worshipping* of *God?* Let him first prove, that we give *adoration* to any besides the *Divine Majesty*, before we shall go about to *excuse* our *adorations.* *But if men do not sin in making an Image a stated Motive of Worship* (who ever said they did not? I am sure, not our Church. But let this pass, what follows?) *then*, saith he, *why do we not introduce Images into our Churches?* Ask Mr. *B.* that *Question*, and not us of the *Church* of *England.* If we allowed the *Worship* of *Images* to be *lawful*, this were a pertinent Question; but since we deny it, what makes all this against us? *which if our Churchmen shall venture upon*; I pray stay till they do, before you charge us with it. Are not these men hugely to seek for Arguments against our *Church* that talk at this rate? But, he saith, *they may do it with equal reason.* Here is something now fit to be proved. We utterly deny that we may *worship Images* on the same *Reason*, that we perform *external adoration* to *God* by *bowing the body*; or to *Jesus* at the mention of his *name.* Hold now to this, and prove it. Instead of that, he shews the difference between going to Church at the *sound* of a *Bell*, and *bowing* at the *name* of *Jesus*; viz. *That the Bell tolls out of Worship to bring them to it*; *but the sound of the word Jesus is in the middle of Worship, when mens minds should be intent on devotion, and not sit listening and watching,*

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watching, as Whittington's *Cat watcht the Mouse, (there 'tis for you, viz.* what he hath laboured for all this while) *for the casual starting of a word, and the dropping of two syllables.* But the Question is not about the *seasonableness* of doing this when we are in other *Acts of Devotion* and *immediate application to God*, which no body contends for, that I know of, but about the *lawfulness* of doing it in the *time* of *Divine Service*, when we hear the name of *Jesus* repeated in the *Lessons*, or the *Creed*; and the *Canon* which requires it refers to the former *Custom*, and in the *Injunctions* of Queen *Elizabeth*, the *Lessons* and *Sermons* are mentioned particularly; and although it be said, *or otherwise in the Church pronounced*, yet by the manner of shewing this Reverence, *viz. with lowness of courtesie and uncovering of heads of mankind*; it supposeth them at that time not to be imployed in any other *Act of Devotion.* And so it gives no interruption to the *intention* of it; nor *obliges* men to lie at the *catch for the coming of the word*, as though all our *Worship* consisted in it; but since our *Church* approves it as a *laudable Ceremony*, we ought not to refuse it at *seasonable times*; unless it can be proved *unlawful* in it self. Which I say, can never be done, as long as the *Worship* is directed to a *true object, viz.* the *Person of Christ*; and the mention of his name, only expresses *the time*, as the tolling the *Bell* doth of going to *Church.* Neither doth it signifie any thing to this purpose, *whether Persons be in the Church or out of it, when the Bell rings*; for in the same page he mentions the *Mass-bell*; which sounds to the *People* in the Church as well as out of it; and if the *Object* of their *Worship* were true, as it is false, that would make him better understand the parallel.

But, saith he, *if it be a duty to give external Reverence to God, when ever the word Jesus is mentioned, there is more need of it in our ordinary converses, and the secular affairs of the world; and so,* he adds, *this word might do the service of the Mass-bell going about the streets, at which all are bound to fall down and worship.* Now, what a strange piece of *crosness* is this, to dispute the *lawfulness* of doing it at *Church*, because we do it not at the Market-place? My business is to defend what our *Church* requires; if he will allow that, and thinks it convenient to do it likewise in *common conversation*, let him defend his own new invented *ways of Reverence*; as for us, we think there are proper *seasons* for *Divine Worship*, and that it is not enough to do what is *lawful*, unless it be done at its *convenient time*; but there are some men, who know no mean between *doing nothing*, and *over-doing.* But is this becoming a *Protestant Divine* to parallel the *Worship* we give to *the Eternal Son of God*, as our *Church* declares, *Can.* 18. and that which the *Papists* give to the *Host*, when it is carried up and down the streets? At last, *he commends the moderation of the Canon*, 1640. *about bowing towards the East or Altar, that they which use this Rite, despise not them who use it not; and they who use it not, condemn not those that use it: but he would fain know why the same moderation should not be us'd in other Rites, as the sign of the Cross, and kneeling at the Lord's Supper?* It had been much more to his purpose to have proved any thing *unlawful* which had been required by our *Church.* But the case was not the same as to those things which were required by our *Church*, ever since the *Reformation*, and as to some customs, which although in themselves *lawful*, yet were never strictly enjoyned, but left indifferent. And therefore the *moderation* used in the *Canon*, 1640, was very suitable to the *principles* of

our *Church*; but how doth it follow, *that because some things are left at liberty, therefore nothing shall be determin'd; or being determin'd ought not to be obeyed?* It was the great *Wisdom* of our *Church* not to make more things necessary (as to practice) than were made so at the settlement of our *Reformation*; but whether there be *sufficient Reason* to alter those *terms* of *Communion* which were then settled, for the sake of such whose scruples are groundless and endless, I do not take upon me here to determine. But as far as I can perceive by Mr. *A.* he thinks *the Apostle's Rule of forbearance*, Rom. 14. *to be of equal force in all ages, and as to all things, about which Christians have different apprehensions*; and then the *Papists* come in for an equal share in such a *toleration*. And so *those who do not worship the Host, or Images, or use Auricular Confession, must not censure those that do*, unless he will say, that the *Papists* have no *scruple of Conscience*, as to such things; but if notwithstanding these scruples, our *Laws* put a just restraint upon them, then *the Rule of Forbearance*, Rom. 14. is no *obligatory Law* to *Christians* in all *Ages*; and consequently, notwithstanding that, our *Church* may justly require the *observation* of some things, tho' it leaves others undetermin'd.

But he saith, *these Customs though left indifferent, are still observed among us, and practised by all the leading Church-men.* And what then? are they *lawful*, or are they not? If not, why are they not proved to be *unlawful?* And if that were proved, what is all this to the point of *Separation*, unless they were enjoined to *all People*, and made *terms* of *Communion*, *i. e.* that persons were not allowed to joyn in all *Acts* of *Communion* with us, unless they did them. However, *he thinks this will prove* (What, that they differ from us in any *substantial part of Worship?* No, he dares not say that: But what then?) *that we differ in more than a circumstance, even at least in a circumstantial part of Worship, yet we must be supposed to be agreed.* To convince the Reader; what an admirable faculty of proving this Man hath, let him but look on the thing he undertook to prove. I had said, that *we were agreed in the substantial parts of Worship*; this he undertakes to disprove, for two or three leaves together, and the conclusion is, *that at least we differ in a circumstantial part of Worship*, and his consequence must be, therefore we differ in a *substantial*, or else it is idle and impertinent talk. *T. G.* would have been ashamed to have argued after this fashion: but they are to be pitied, they both do as well as their Cause will bear.

Yet Mr. *A.* cannot give over, for he hath a very good will at proving something against our Church, although he hath very ill luck in the doing of it. My argument was, "If it be lawful to *separate* upon "pretence of *greater purity*, where there is an *agreement in Doctrine*, "and *the substantial parts in Worship*; then a bare difference in opini-"on, as to some *circumstantials of Worship*; and the *best constitution of* "*Churches* will be a sufficient ground to *break Communion* and to set "up *new Churches*. Hitherto we have considered his denial of the *Antecedent*; and the charge he hath brought against our *Church*, about *new substantial parts of Worship*; we now come to his *denying the Consequence*, viz. *that although it be granted that there is an agreement in Doctrine and the substantial parts of Worship, yet he will not allow it to follow, that a bare difference in opinion as to some circum-*

stantials will be sufficient ground to break Communion and to set up new Churches. To understand the consequence we must suppose, 1. An *agreement* in the *substantial parts of Worship.* 2. *A Separation,* for *greater purity of Worship.* And what then can justifie this *Separation,* but a difference of *Opinion* as to some *circumstantials* in Worship? *Hold,* saith he, *the consequence is not good, for there are certain middle things, between substantial parts of Worship and bare circumstances, about which it will be lawful to divide, though otherwise we agree in doctrine, and the substantial parts of Worship.* So that here a *Separation* is justified (1.) on the account of such things, which are confessed to be neither *substantial* nor *circumstantial parts of Worship,* (2.) *Although there be an agreement in the substantial parts of Worship*; and consequently, although these *middle kind of things* be not made *substantial parts of worship.* For that he charged us with in the *Antecedent*; and now allowing the *Antecedent* and denying the *Consequence,* he must grant, that it is lawful to *separate* on the account of *Ceremonies,* although they be made no *parts* of *worship* at all. For if they be neither *substantial* nor *circumstantial parts of Worship,* they can be none at all; and yet he saith, it is lawful to divide about them. And which is more pleasant, when he goes about to prove the *lawfulness* of *separating* for the sake of these things, he doth it by undertaking to shew, *that they are made substantial parts of Worship.* For thus he argues, *The Church of* England *hath exalted these things,* i. e. *Ceremonies, to a high preferment in worship, to signifie the same things with the Sacramental Elements, to make them necessary to salvation as far as Man can make them; and therefore they conclude them sinful.* If their preferment in Worship makes them sinful, then they must be either *substantial,* or *circumstantial parts of Worship,* and their *separation* is not upon the account of their being *Ceremonies,* but those *Ceremonies* are supposed to be made *Parts* of *Worship,* which I have answer'd already.

§. 33. But after all our arguings about these matters, Mr. *A.* saith, *the Controversie stands still, where it did these hundred years and more:* I utterly deny that, for the *Nonconformists* have advanced more towards *Separation* these last ten years, than they did in a hundred years before; as appears by the foregoing discourse. However, *they are still unsatisfied in Conscience about these matters, and so long they cannot join with us, and our Church excommunicates those who condemn our ceremonies; so that there appears from hence a necessity of separation; and if it be necessary it cannot be denied to be lawful.* This is the fairest remaining *Plea* for *Separation,* which I shall consider both ways. (1.) As it respects *the Church's censures.* (2.) As it respects *the judgment of Conscience.*

I. Answer to Serm. p. 47, 48. Plea for Peace, p. 232 233.

1. As it respects the *Church's censures.* *This* Mr. *B.* often insists upon. *The Canons,* saith he, *excommunicate* ipso facto, *all that say the imposed Conformity is unlawful. If this be unjust, is it separation to be so excommunicated? And who is the Schismatick here? Would you have excommunicate Men communicate with you? And if Men be wrongfully excommunicate, are they thereby absolved from all publick Worshipping of God? or do they lose their Right to all Church-communion?* To this I answer, That the *Excommunication* denounced, is not against such as modestly scruple the *lawfulness* of *things imposed,* but against those who *obstinately affirm it?* The words of the *Canon* are not, as Mr. *B.* quotes them,

them, *If any one do but affirm any thing in the Liturgy, Ceremonies,* &c. *to be unlawful are excommunicate,* ipso facto; but *whosoever shall Affirm the Ceremonies of the Church of* England, *established by Law, to be impious, Anti-Christian, or Superstitious, let him be Excommunicate* ipso facto. Mr. *B.*'s words bear quite another sense from those of the *Canon*; for to say, *if any Man do but affirm,* &c. it implies that a *bare single affirmation* incurrs *excommunication* ipso facto; but when the *Canon* saith, *if any shall affirm,* &c. it implies, these circumstances which according to the common sense of Mankind do deserve *excommunication,* viz. that it be done *publickly* and *obstinately*: (Both which the word *Affirm* will bear.) For, as S. *Augustin* very well saith, *every Man's error is born with, until he either finds an accuser, or he obstinately defends his opinion. Tam diu sustinetur peccatum aut error cujuslibet, donec aut accusatorem inveniat, aut pravam opinionem pertinaci animositate defendat.* All *excommunication* doth suppose *precedent admonition,* according to the *Rule, If he will not hear the Church, let him be as an Heathen, or a Publican.* Therefore *general excommunications* although they be *latæ sententiæ,* as the *Canonists* speak, do not affect particular persons, until the *evidence* be *notorious,* not only of the *bare fact* but of the *contumacy joined* with it. Besides, such *excommunications* which are *de jure & latæ sententiæ,* are rather to be looked on as *Comminations,* than as *formal excommunications.* For *Gerson* putting the question, *what the effect of such excommunications is?* he answers, *that it is no more than this, that there needs no new judicial process, but upon proof or confession the Judge may pronounce the sentence. Which,* he saith, *he learnt from his Master,* who was *Pet. de Alliaco* the famous *Cardinal of Cambray.* And if it requires a *new sentence,* then it doth not *actually excommunicate.* But of this the learned *Arch-bishop of Spalato* hath discoursed at large; to whom I refer the Reader. As to the practice of *Canon* Law in *England, Lyndwood* saith, that a declaratory sentence of the Judge is necessary, notwithstanding the Excommunication *ipso facto.* And it is a *Rule* in our *Church, that Persons excommunicate are to be publickly denounced excommunicate in a Cathedral or Parochial Church every six Months, that others may have notice of them*; and until the *sentence* be thus declared, I do not know how far particular persons can think themselves obliged to *forbear Communion* on the account of a *general sentence* of *excommunication,* though it be said to be *ipso facto.* For although the sentence seem peremptory, yet, *ipso facto,* doth suppose *a fact,* and such as deserves *excommunication* in the sense of the *Church*; of which there must be evident proof brought, before the *sentence* can take hold of the *Person.* And to make the *sentence valid* as to the *person,* there must be *due execution* of it; and the question in this case then is, whether any person, knowing himself to be under such qualifications which incur a *sentence* of *excommunication,* be bound to *execute* this *sentence* upon himself? which he must do, if he thinks himself bound to *separate* from our *Church* on the account of this *general excommunication.* And so Mr. *B.* himself seems to resolve this point; *Although,* saith he, *we are excommunicated* ipso facto, *yet we are not bound our selves to execute their sentence; but may stay in Communion till they prove the fact, and do the execution on us themselves by refusing us.* And so he hath fully answered his own objection. *But can those be called Schismaticks for not communicating*

Can. 6.

Aug. de vera Relig. c. 6.

De vitâ spir. lect. 4. concl. 14. prop. 2.

De reb. Eccl. l. 5. c. 9. n. 22, 23, 24, 25.

De Constit. c. quia incontinent. ipso facto.

Can. 65.

Plea for Peace, p. 233.

with a Church, who are first excommunicated by that Church? Yes, in these cases they may (1.) when there is a just and sufficient *Cause* for that sentence. For, otherwise, *no Church* could condemn any *excommunicated Persons* for *Schism*; if it declared before hand, that all those who held such *Doctrines*, or condemned such *Practices*, should be *excommunicated*. To make this plain by Instances: Suppose the *Churches* of *New England* declared the sentence of excommunication *ipso facto* against all that oppose *Infant-baptism*; *R. Williams* and his *Company* oppose it; they upon this are *actually excommunicated*; may the *Churches* of *New England* call these Men *Schismaticks* or not? If they are *Schismaticks* notwithstanding the *sentence* of *excommunication*; then the denouncing this *sentence* before hand doth not excuse them from the *guilt of Schism*. By the *Constitution* of the *Churches* of *France*, *every Minister that refuses to subscribe to the Orders among them is to be declared a Schismatick*; Would this make such a one not to be a *Schismatick*, because this amounts to an *excommunication ipso facto?* So in *Scotland*, 1641. *Subscription to the Presbyterian discipline was required under pain of excommunication*; if any had been *excommunicated* on this account, would this excuse them from the charge of *Schism*, in the judgment of the *Covenanters?* By the *Constitutions* of *Geneva*, *any one that opposes, or contemns the Authority of that Church for a year together, is liable to the sentence of banishment for a whole year*; as *Calvin* himself relates it. Suppose this were merely *excommunication* for so long; would not *Calvin* have thought them *Schismaticks* for all that? For he fully declares his mind in this case, on occasion of a certain *Non-conformist* in an *Epistle* to *Farell*; where he advises *that he should be first summoned before the Magistrate*; *if that did not prevail, they should proceed to excommunication of a person who by his obstinacy disturbed the order of the Church*; *which*, saith he, *is agreable to ancient Councils and the mind of God in Scripture*; *therefore let him that will not submit to the Orders of a Society be cast out of it.* Here we see *excommunication* justified against such as refuse to obey the *Orders* of a *Church*; and much more certainly, if they publickly affirm them to be *Impious*, *Antichristian* or *Superstitious*, as 8. *Canon* expresseth: And no *Church* in the world, but will think *excommunication* reasonable upon the like grounds; and therefore if there be such a thing as *Schism*, they may be guilty of it still, although *excommunication* be denounced against them on such accounts. (2.) If they proceed to form *new Churches*; as will appear evident to any one that reflects on the former instances; and let him judge, whether all persons so *excommunicated*, would not have been condemned much more for *Schismaticks*, if they had set up *new Churches* in opposition to theirs. S. *Augustin* puts the case of *good Men unjustly excommunicated*; and he saith, *they are to bear it with patience, for the peace of the Church, and such will still maintain the true faith*, sine ullâ Conventiculorum segregatione, *without running into separate Meetings*; *although they do believe themselves unjustly excommunicated. Such as these*, saith he, *the Father which seeth in secret, will reward and crown in secret. This kind seems very rare, but there want not instances, yea, there are more than can be believed.*

Discipl. de France, Des Minist. art. 5.

Calvin Ep. Olevian. p. 311. v. 132.

De verâ Rel. c. 6.

2. As

2. As *to the judgment of Conscience.* The *Author of the Letter out of the Country* lays the *Foundation* of the *Separation* upon the force of *Scruples*, mighty *Scruples*, *Scruples* of a *long standing*, and of a *large extent*; *Scruples that there is no hopes to remove, without some very over-powering impression on mens minds.* I am so much of another mind, that I think a little *impartiality*, and *due consideration* would do the business; but as long as men read and hear and judge only of one side, and think it a temptation to examine things as they ought to do, and cry out *they are satisfied already*, there is not much hopes of doing good upon such, but I think they can have no great comfort in such *Scruples.* Men that really scruple things out of *tenderness of Conscience*, are sincerely willing to be better informed, and glad of any light that brings them satisfaction, and do not fly out into rage, and violent passion against those who offer to remove their *Scruples.* Hath this been the temper of our *scrupulous Brethren* of late? Let their *Scruples* be touched never so tenderly, they cannot bear it, and take it extremely ill of those who would better inform them. Mr. *B.* freely tells me, *that he that thinks his own, or others reasonings will ever change all the truly honest Christians in the Land*, (as to the *unlawfulness* of the things imposed) *knoweth so little of matters, or of men, or of Conscience, as that he is unmeet to be a Bishop or a Priest.* What is the reason of such a severe saying? Where lies the *strength* and *evidence* of these *Scruples?* Why may not honest men be cured of their errors and mistakes, as I am persuaded these are such which they call *Scruples?* Is there no hopes to bring the *People* to a *better temper*, and *more judgment?* For I know nothing more is necessary for the cure of them. Here is no depth of learning, no subtilty of reasoning, no endless quotation of *Fathers* necessary about these matters. The dispute lies in a narrow compass, and men may see light if they will. *But what if they will not?* Then we are to consider, how far a *wilful mistake*, or *error of Conscience, will justifie men?* I say it doth not, cannot justifie them *in doing evil*; and that I am sure *breaking the Peace of the Church* for the sake of such *Scruples* is. And this I had said in my Sermon, which I take to be very material for our *scrupulous Persons* to consider. For suppose they should be mistaken, doth this *error of Conscience* justifie their *Separation*, or not? If not, they may be in an ill condition, for all their *Scruples*, or their confidence. And so Mr. *Baxter* hath long since declared, *that if we do, through weakness, or perverseness, take lawful things to be unlawful, that will not excuse us in our disobedience. Our error is our sin, and one sin will not excuse another sin.* But Mr. *A.* saith, (1.) *That I do ill to put together wilful Error and mistake of Conscience, when I say they do not excuse from sin, since there is so great a difference between a wilful Error, and a mistake of simple ignorance.* What strange cavilling is this? when any one may see that I join *wilful* both to *Error* and *Mistake.* And is not a *Mistake*, or *Error* of *Conscience* all one? If I had said *a Mistake of simple Ignorance doth not excuse from sin*, I had contradicted the whole design of that discourse, which is to shew that there must be *wilfulness* in the *Error* or *Mistake*, which doth not *excuse.* For I say expressly, if the Error be wholly involuntary, it doth excuse. This is but a bad beginning in a Discourse about *Conscience.*

§. 34. Letter out of the Country, p. 5, 6, &c.

Answ. p. 81.

5. Disputations of Church Gov. p. 483.

Mischief of Impos. p. 72.

2. *If no error will excuse from sin, why is the question afterwards put by me, What error will excuse?* I answer, (1.) It is an exercise of patience, to be troubled with a cavilling Adversary. (2.) Do not I say,

as

as plainly as words can express it, that a wilful error doth not excuse from sin? And the question afterwards put, concerns the same thing; and the Answer I give to it is, if the error be wholly involuntary, it doth excuse, but if it be wilful it doth not. Is this man's Conscience full of *Scruples* that writes at this rate, with so little regard to the plain meaning and words of him whom he pretends to confute?

P. 73. 3. He saith, *I put one of the wildest Cases that ever was put*, viz. *If a man think himself bound to divide the Church by sinful Separation, that separation is never the less a sin for his thinking himself bound to do it. For* (1.) *It may be justly questioned, whether it be possible for a man in his wits, to think himself bound to divide the Church by sinful Separation.* What *Sophisters* Arguments are these? As though we did not commonly speak of the thing *as it is*, and not as the *Person apprehends it.* S. *Paul* did think himself bound to a *sinful persecution*, although he did not think it so when he did it. The *Jews* thought themselves bound *to kill the Apostles*, which was *wilful murder*, and yet they were men in their wits. The *false Apostles* thought themselves bound to divide the Church by a *sinful separation.* How then comes this to be thought so impossible a case as to the thing it self? for I was not so foolish to put the case concerning men, who thought themselves bound to commit a sin, knowing it to be a sin. (2.) *He much questions, whether ever any did think himself bound to divide a Church, he may possibly think himself bound to avoid it.* If he may think himself bound to do that which makes *divisions* in a *Church*, it is sufficient to my purpose. And did not the *false Apostles* do so, and have not others followed their examples? And thus, after other trifling Cavils to the same purpose, after his manner, he yields all that I say, and saith, *It is freely granted by all the world, that wilful*
P. 77. *Error doth not excuse from sin.* And after many words about the case of an *erroneous Conscience*, he concludes, that *I deliver nothing but the common Doctrine of all Casuists; only he thinks it not pertinent to the matter in hand.* Why so? was not the matter in hand about the *duty* of *complying* with an *established Rule?* And was it not very pertinent to this, to shew how far an *erroneous Conscience* may, or may not excuse from sin? But Mr. *A.* saith, *it should have been about the Power of Conscience, concerning an established Rule of man's making; and such for which they have neither general nor particular warrant from God so to make.* Is not this indeed to the purpose? First to suppose an *unlawful Rule* imposed, and then to enquire what *Conscience* is to do about it. My business was to shew, that men were not in doubtful cases to satisfie themselves with this, *that they followed their Consciences*; because their *Consciences* might *err*, and if that *Error* happened to be *wilful*, being contracted for want of due care what they did, might not only be *sinful in it self*, but imputed to them as *sins.* Which all men who pretended any regard *to Conscience*, ought to have an eye to: For why do they pretend *Conscience*, but to avoid sin? And if under a *wilful error of Conscience*, they may still be guilty of great *sins*, as the *Jews*, and St. *Paul* were, then men ought not to satisfie themselves barely with this pretence, that they do as their *Consciences* direct them. This was the plain design of that part of *my Sermon*; and I leave any one to judge, whether it were not *pertinent.*

P. 78. But he saith, *the Errors of the Dissenters, if they be such, are wholly involuntary, and caused by invincible Ignorance.* If they prove so, it will be the better for them. I hope they have better Arguments in their

own

own breasts for it than what appears in some of their late Books; for neither a peevish, angry, scornful, provoking way of writing about these matters; nor a light, scurrilous, cavilling sophistical Answer to a serious discourse, are any great signs of such an impartial endeavour after *satisfaction*, as Mr. *A.* boasts of. I cannot tell how much *they have read the Scriptures, and studied this Controversie; nor how earnestly they have prayed for direction*, but I have seen enough of their *unfriendly debates*, which give me no great satisfaction in this matter. But I leave this to *God* and their own *Consciences* to judge, being very willing to hope and believe the best.

To return to the *Author of the Letter.* The main force of what he saith, lies in this, *that those who cannot conquer their Scruples as to communion with our Church, must either return to the state of Paganism, or set up new Churches, by joining with the ejected Ministers.* This is *new Doctrine*, and never heard of in the days of the *old Puritans*, for they supposed men obliged to continue in the *Communion of this Church*, although there were some things they *scrupled*, and could not *conquer those Scruples.* And this they supposed to be far enough from a *State* of *Paganism.* §. 35. P. 4.

But they scruple the use of the Sacraments with us; and much more living under some of our Ministers. I never heard this last alleged for a ground of separation till very lately, and it hath been considered already. And it is a very hard case with a *Church*, if *People* must fly into *Separation*, because all their *Ministers* are not such as they ought to be. But if they do scruple *joining in communion with our Church*, I would fain know, whether as often as men do *scruple joining with others*, their *Separation* be *lawful?* If it be, it is a vain thing to talk of any *setled Constitution of a Church*, whether *Episcopal*, *Presbyterian*, or *Independent*; for this *Principle* overthrows them all. I will instance particularly in the last, as most favourable to such kind of *Liberty.* And I need not suppose a case, since such hath already happened several times in *New-England.* *R. Williams* is one remarkable instance, who *scrupled many things in their Churches*, and therefore *could join no longer with them*; and thought himself bound to set up a *separate Congregation* among them; and the *People who scrupled as well as he, chose him for their Pastor.* What is there in this case, but is every whit as justifiable, as the *present separation?* But did the *Churches* of *New-England* allow this for a *just Cause?* so far from it, that *R. Williams* published grievous complaints to the world, of the *persecution* he underwent for it. Mr. *Baxter* mentions another instance since this, from the mouth of Mr. *Norton*, an *eminent Minister* of *New-England*, viz. *of a Church that separated from a Church, on the account of their Preachers having human learning; and upon all the applications and endeavours that could be used towards them, their answer was, That is your Judgment, and this is ours*, i. e. *they could not conquer their Scruples*, and therefore must persist in *separation*, or return to *Paganism.* Mr. *Cobbet* of *New-England* mentions a third instance; one *Obadiah Holmes* being unsatisfied with the proceedings of the *Church of Rehoboth*, withdraws from their *Communion*, and sets up another *Assembly* in the *Town*; and upon his obstinate continuance therein, was solemnly *excommunicated* by them. And what the late differences among them concerning the *Subject of Baptism and Consociation of Churches* may come to, time will discover. I would only know, whether if Mr. *Davenport* and the *dissenting* P. 8.

Answer to *Cotton's* Letter. Bloody Tenent.

Defence of the Cure of Divis. P. 124.

Cobbet's Append. to Magistrates Power, P. 51.

party

party there, from the determination of their *Synod*, should proceed to *Separation*, this *Separation* be *justifiable* or not? This is certain, that the *Dissenters* there do charge their *Brethren* with *Innovation* and *Apostasie from their first principles*; and say, *their consciences cannot comply with their Decrees:* and if they proceed, those *Churches* may be broken in pieces, by these *principles* of *Separation*. As the *Separate Congregations* in the *Low Countries*, most of them were by *new Scruples*, which the People could not conquer; for the *Anabaptists* commonly raised *Scruples* among their *members*, and carried away many of them. And so they had done in *New-England*, and dissolved those Churches before this time, if this principle had been allowed there, *viz. that where People cannot conquer their scruples, they may proceed to Separation.* No, they tell them, they must preserve the *Peace of their Churches*, and if they cannot be quiet among them, the world is wide enough for them. So they sent *R. Williams* and others out of their *Colonies*; notwithstanding the far greater danger of *Paganism* among the *Indians*. This I only mention, to shew that no *settled Church* doth allow this *liberty* of *Separation, because men cannot conquer their Scruples.* And upon the same ground, not only *Anabaptists* and *Quakers*, but the *Papists* themselves must be allowed the *liberty of setting up separate Congregations.* For, I suppose this Gentleman will not deny, but they may have *Scruples* too, *many Scruples, and of long standing, and among great numbers, and they have Priests enough at liberty to attend them.* And by that time all these have set up among us, shall we not be in a very hopeful way to preserve the *Protestant Religion?*

First Principles of *New-England* by *J. Mather*, 1675.

These consequences do flow so naturally from such principles, that I wonder that none of those who have undertaken to defend the *Cause* of *Separation*, have taken any care to put any stop to it, or to let us know, where we may fix and see an end of it; what *scruples* are to be allowed, and what not: and whether it be lawful to *separate* as long as men can go on in *scrupling*, and say *they cannot conquer their Scruples.* Are there no *Scruples* among us, but only against *the sign of the Cross*, and *God-fathers and God-mothers in Baptism*, and *kneeling at the Lord's Supper?* Are there none that *scruple the lawfulness* of *Infant-baptism* among us? Are there none that scruple *the very use of Baptism and the Lord's Supper*, saying they are not to be literally understood? Are there none that scruple giving *common respect* to others as a *sort of Idolatry?* Are there none that *scruple* the *validity of our Ordinations*, and say, we can have *no true Churches*, because we renounce *Communion* with the *Pope?* What is to be done with all these, and many more *Scruplers*, who profess *they cannot conquer their Scruples* no more than others can do theirs about *our ceremonies*, and such weighty things as the use of *God-fathers* and *God-mothers.*

§ 36. This I mention, because this *Gentleman* seems to look on it, as a more dreadful thing than *the sign of the Cross.* For, having spoken of that, he adds, *Nor is it in it self of less weight (perhaps 'tis of much greater) that in Baptism the Parents are not suffered to be Sponsors for their Children, but others must appear and undertake for them:* which he repeats soon after. And yet *T. C.* who saw as much into these matters, as any that have come after him, in the *Admonitions* declared, *that this was a thing arbitrary, and left to the discretion of the Church.* And in his first *Answer* he saith, *For the thing it self, considering that it is so generally received of all the Churches, they do not mislike of it.* So that, on the same

p. 6.

p. 8.

T. C.'s first Answer to Whitg. p. 157.

same ground it seems, all other *Protestant Churches* may be scrupled at, as well as ours; and yet not only this *Gentleman*, but Mr. *B.* several times mentions this, as one of the *grounds* of the *unlawfulness* of the *Peoples joyning in Communion with us*: nay, he calls this, *his greatest objection*; and yet he confesseth, *that if the Sponsors do but represent the Parents, our Baptism is valid and lawful.* Now where is it, that our Church excludes such a *representation?* Indeed by *Canon* 29. *the Parents are not to be compelled to be present, nor suffered to answer, as Susceptors for their Children*; but the *Parents* are to *provide* such as are fit to undertake that *Office.* In the *Bohemian Churches*, there seems to be an *express compact* between the *Parents* and the *Sponsors*; but there is no *declaration* of our *Church* against such an *implicit* one, as may be reasonably inferred from the consent of the parties. For the *Parents* desire of the *Sponsors* undertaking such an *Office* for his *Child* is in effect transferring his own *Right* to them; and so they may be said to represent the *Parents.* If our *Church* had appointed the *Sponsors* without or against the consent of the Parents; then none could in reason suppose, that there was any *implicit compact* between them. But since they are of the *Parents choosing*, what they do in that *office*, is supposed to be with their *full consent.* If *Baptism* were solemnly celebrated as of old, at some certain seasons only, and indispensable occasions required the *Parents absence*, might not they appoint others to be *Sponsors* for their *Children* upon *mutual consent* and *agreement* among themselves? Our *Churches* not permitting the *Parents* themselves to be *Sponsors* is but like such an occasion of absence; and the intention of our *Church* is not to supersede the *obligation* of *Parents*, but to superinduce a farther obligation upon other Persons for greater security of performance. If men be negligent in doing their duty, must the *Church* bear the blame, and this be pleaded for a ground of *Separation* from her *Communion?*

Answ. p. 49. Plea for Peace, p. 143, 167. Defence of his Plea. p. 26. Plea for Peace, p. 149. *Ratio Discip. Fratr. c. 3. Sect. 2.*

But there is something beyond this, which lies at the bottom of this scruple; viz. *that the Child's Right to Baptism depends on the Right of the Parents, and therefore if the Parents be excluded, and only Sponsors admitted, the Children so baptized have no right to Baptism.* For Mr. *B's* first *Question* is, *which way the Child cometh to have right to Baptism, any more than all the Infidels Children in the world? And his next is, whether the Church of* England *require any ground of title in the Infant, besides the Sponsion of the fore-described God-fathers, and God's general promise?*

Defect of the Plea. p. 26.

I answer, (1.) The *Church* by requiring *Sponsors* doth not exclude any *Title* to *Baptism*, which the *Child* hath by the *Right* of the *Parents.* For the *Sponsors* may be supposed to appear in a threefold *Capacity.* 1. As *representing the Parents* in *offering up the Child to Baptism*; and so whatever *right* the Parents have, that is challenged, when the *Child* is brought to be *baptized.* 2. As *representing the Child in the Answers that are made in Baptism*; which is a very ancient and universal practice of the Christian Church; for it was not only observed in the Latin *Churches* in S. *Augustin's* time, and in the *Greek Churches* in S. *Chrysostom's*, and hath so continued ever since, but the *Æthiopick* and *Armenian Churches* do still observe it. 3. *In their own capacity*; when they *promise* to *take care of the good education of the Child in the principles of the Christian faith*, in the charge given to them *after Baptism.* So that since one of these *capacities* doth not destroy another, they all succeeding each other,

Aug. ep. 23. Chrysost. in Psal. 14.

there is no reason to say that the *Church* doth exclude the right which comes by the Parents.

(2.) If the *Parents* be supposed to have *no right*, yet upon the *Sponsion* of *God-fathers*, the *Church* may have *right* to administer *Baptism* to *Children*. Not as though their *Sponsion* gave the *right*, but was only intended to make them *parties* to the *Covenant* in the *Child's name* and *Sureties* for performance. To make this clear, we must consider, that *administration* of *Baptism*, is one considerable part of *the Power of the Keys*, which *Christ* first gave to the *Apostles*, and is ever since continued in the *Officers* of the *Church*. By vertue of this *Power*, they have *Authority* to give admission into the *Church* to capable *Subjects*. The *Church* of *Christ*, as far as we can trace any records of *Antiquity*, hath always allowed *Children* to be *capable Subjects of Admission into the Christian Church*; but lest the *Church* should fail of its end, and these *Children* not be afterwards well instructed in their Duty, it required *Sponsors* for them, who were not only to take care of them for the future, but to stand as their *sureties* to ratifie their part of the *Covenant* which *Baptism* implies. And the *ancient Church* went no farther as to the *right of Baptism* than this, for since the *Power of the Keys* was in the *Church* to give *admission* to *capable Subjects*; since the *Catholick Church* did always judge *Infants capable*, there seemed to be no more necessary for their *admission* than the undertaking of *Sponsors* in their name. All this appears from S. *Augustine*'s *Epistle ad Bonifacium*; where he saith (1.) That the *Child's* benefit by *Baptism* doth not depend upon the *intention* of those that offer him. For *Boniface* put the question to S. *Augustin* about some *who offered Children to Baptism, not for any spiritual benefit, but for corporal health*; notwithstanding this, saith S. *Augustine*, *if the due form of Baptism be observed, the spiritual effect of it is obtained.* (2.) That the *Church's* right is chiefly concerned in the *baptism* of *Infants*. *For*, saith he, *the Children are offered to Baptism and the Spiritual Grace to be received thereby, not so much by those in whose arms they are carried* (for so the *Sponsors* used to carry them in their *right arms*) *as by the whole Society of the Faithful. Tota ergo mater Ecclesia quæ in sanctis est facit, quia tota omnes, tota singulos parit:* so that it is by the *Church's right*, that he supposeth them to receive *baptism* and the *benefits* by it. (3.) That there is no necessity, *that the Parents themselves offer their Children.* For he calls *it a mistake to think that Children receive the benefit in Baptism, as to the remission of Original Guilt, on the account of their Parents offering them. For many are offered to Baptism by strangers, and slaves sometimes by their Masters. And when Parents are dead, Children are offered by such as take pity upon them*; *and sometimes Children exposed by Parents, and sometimes as they are taken up by holy Virgins, which neither have Children, nor intend to have any.* (4.) *That the Answers made by the Sponsors in Baptism in the name of the Child, are a part of the solemnity of Baptism. Not as though the Child did really believe, yet it is said to believe on the account of the Sacrament which supposeth faith. For the Sacraments because of the resemblance between them and the things represented by them, do carry the name of the things represented*; *as*, saith he, *the Sacrament of Christ's body after a certain manner is called his Body*; *and the Sacrament of his blood is called his blood, so the Sacrament of faith is called faith, i. e.* the Baptismal *Covenant* supposing believing on one part, the *Church* supplies that part by the *Sponsors*, which cannot be performed by the *Children*. Thence he saith,

Tertul. in Baptismo. c. 18.

ipsa responsio ad celebrationem pertinet Sacramenti, so that then the *Church* looked upon the *Sponsors answering*, as a necessary part of the *solemnity* of *Baptism.* Thence S. *Augustine* elsewhere saith, that the *fide jussores* or *Sureties did in the name of the Children renounce the Devil and all his Pomp and Works*; and in another place he declares, *that he would not baptize a Child without the Sponsors answering for the Child, that he would renounce the Devil, and turn to God, and that they believed he was baptized for the remission of sins.* *Serm. 116. de Tempore.* *De peccat. meritis & remiss. l. 1. c. 34.*

(3.) Those who think themselves bound to *baptize Children* only by vertue of *the Parents right*, must run into many *perplexing Scruples* about *baptizing Children*, and be forced to exclude the far greater number of those that are offered. For, (1.) They are not well agreed, what it is which gives *Parents a right* to have their *Children baptized*; whether a *dogmatical Faith be sufficient*, or a *justifying Faith* be necessary? If *saving Faith* be necessary, whether the *outward profession* of it be *sufficient?* Whether that ought to be taken for a *true profession* which is only *pretended* to be *a true sign of the mind*, or that only which is *really so?* Whether *profession* be required for it self, or as a *discovery* of *something farther?* Whether *seeming seriousness in profession* be *sufficient*, or *real seriousness* be required? What we must judge *real seriousness in profession*, as distinct from *inward sincerity?* What *contradiction* may be allowed to make a *profession not serious?* Whether besides a *serious profession* it be not necessary to be a *practical profession?* and what is necessary for the judging a *profession* to be *practical?* Whether besides mere *practical profession* the *positive signs* of *inward Grace* be not necessary? And whether besides all these, *actual confederation* and joyning in *Church Covenant* be not necessary? And if it be, whether the *Children of confederated Parents not being confederated themselves, can convey a right to their Children?* About these, and other such like Questions, those who go upon *the Parents Right* are in *perpetual disputes*, and can neither give others, nor hardly themselves *satisfaction* about them. (2.) The consequence of this is, that *they must baptize many with a doubting mind*; and must exclude many more, than they can baptize. For Mr. *B.* saith, *if he took a dogmatical faith it self, or any short of justifying for the Title and necessary qualifications of them I must admit, I would baptize none, because I cannot know who hath that dogmatical faith, and who not.* The like others are as ready to say, of his *serious, voluntary, not prevalently contradicted, practical profession*; or at least, that no man can baptize with a *good Conscience*, till he hath upon good evidence throughly weighed the *lives* of the *Parents*, and is able to pronounce that the actions of their lives do not *prevalently contradict their profession.* Others must reject all those in whose *Parents* they do not see *positive signs of Grace*; or are not *actually confederated* with them. And upon all these several bars to the *Parents Right*, how few *Children* will be left, that a man can *baptize* with a *safe Conscience?* Is not this now a more likely way to reduce the far greatest part of *Christianity* to *Paganism* than denying the *lawfulness* of *Separation?* Thus I have considered this main Scruple against *the Use of entitling and Covenanting Godfathers*, as Mr. *B.* calls them; and have shewed how little reason there is to make use of this as so *great an objection* against our *Church's Communion.* Preface to Right to Sacraments

Conferences First Part.

As to *kneeling* at the *Communion*, I find nothing particularly objected against that deserving consideration, which I have not answered in another place.

Mischief of Impos. p. 85, 86, 87.

Sect. 37. Mr. *A.* hath one thing yet more to say against the *terms* of our *Church's Communion*, viz. *that upon the same Reason these are imposed, the Church may impose some use of Images, Circumcision, and the Paschal Lamb.* To which I answer,

(1.) That our Question is about *Separation* from the *Communion* of our *Church* on the account of the *terms that are imposed*; and is this a reasonable pretence for men not to do what is required, because they do not know what may be required on the same grounds? A Father charges his Son *to stand with his Hat off before him, or else he shall not stay in his House*; at first the Son demurs upon *putting off his Hat* to his *Father*, because he hath some *scruples*, whether *putting off the Hat* be a *lawful Ceremony* or not; not merely on the account of its *significancy*, but because it seems to him to be *giving worship to a Creature.* This he thinks so *weighty a scruple*, that he charges his *Father* with *Tyranny over his Conscience* for *imposing* such a *condition*, on his continuing in his house, and thinks himself sufficiently *justified* by it in his *disobedience* and *forsaking his Father's House*, and drawing away as many of his *servants* from him, as he can infuse this *scruple* into. But let us suppose him brought to understand the difference between *Civil* and *Religious Worship*, yet he may upon Mr. *A*'s grounds still justifie his *disobedience.* For saith he to his *Father*, "Why do you require me to *put off* "*my Hat in your Presence*, and to make this the *condition* of my staying "in your *House?* Is it not enough that I own my self to be your *Son*, "and ask you *blessing* Morning and Evening, and am very willing *to sit* "*at your Table*, and depend upon you for my *subsistence?* Are not "these sufficient *Testimonies* that I am your *Son*, but you must expect "my *obedience* in such a *trifling Ceremony* as *putting off my Hat?* You "say, *it is a token of respect*; I say for that reason I ought not to do "it. For, how do I know when you will have done with your *tokens* "*of respect?* It is true, you require no more now, but I consider what "*you may do*, and for all that I know, the next thing you may require "me will be to *put off my Shoes before you*, for that is a *token of respect* "in some Countries; next you may require me *to kiss your Toe*, for "that is a *token of respect* used some where; and who knows what you "may come to at last; and therefore I am resolved to stop at first, and "will rather leave your *House*, than be bound to *put off my Hat in* "*your Presence.* Let any one judge whether this be a reasonable ground for such an *obstinate disobedience* to the *Command* of his *Father.* Or suppose a *Law* were made to distinguish the *several Companies* in *London* from each other, that they should have some *Badge* upon their *Livery Gowns*, that may represent the *Trade* and *Company* they are of; would this be thought a just excuse for any man's refusing it, to say, "What do I know how far this *imposing Power* may go at last? it "is true, the matter is small at present, but I consider it as a *Badge*, it "is a *moral significant Ceremony*, a dangerous teeming thing, no man "knows what it may *bring forth* at last; for how can I or any man li-"ving tell, but at last I may be required to wear a *Fool's Coat.* Would such an unreasonable jealousie as this justifie such a man's *refractorineſs*, in rather choosing to lose the *privilege* of his *Company*, than *submitting* to wear the *Badge* of it? So that the *fears* of what may be required

is no ground for *actual disobedience* to what is required. (2.) There can be no *reasonable suspicion* that our *Church* should impose *any other Ceremonies*, than what it hath already done, supposing that it might do it, on the same ground: Because the *Church* hath rather *retrenched* than *increased Ceremonies*; as will appear to any one that compares the first and second *Liturgies* of *Edw.* 6. And since that time no one new Ceremony hath been required, as a *condition of Communion.* But besides, our *Church* gives a particular reason against the *multiplying* of *Ceremonies:* because *the very number of them, supposing them lawful, is a burden*; *of which St.* Augustin *complained in his time, and others had much more cause since*; *and therefore for that cause many were taken away*, And withal, *it is declared that Christ's Gospel was not to be a Ceremonial Law.* So that for these reasons there can be no just fears that our *Church* should contradict her *own doctrine*, which it must do, if it *increased our Ceremonies*, so as to make a *new argument* against them, from the *number* of them. (3.) There is not the *same Reason* for *introducing* the things mentioned by Mr. *A.* as for the *Ceremonies* in *Use* among us. For, (1.) *As to the Use of Images*, our *Church* hath fully declared against any *Religious Use* of them, in the *Homilies* about the *Peril of Idolatry*; and that from such reason, as cannot extend to our *Ceremonies: viz.* from the *express Law of God*, and the *general sense* of the *Primitive Church*; which allowed and practised *the sign of the Cross*; at the same time when it disputed most vehemently against *Images.* (2.) *For Circumcision*, which he tells us, *may be used as signifying the circumcision of the Heart.* He knows very well that our Church joins *significancy* and *decency* together in the *matter* of *Ceremonies*; and no man can imagine that such a kind of significancy as that he mentions, should be sufficient to introduce such a practice which is so repugnant to *Decency* among us. Besides that St. *Paul* makes it so great a *badge* of the *obligation* to the *Law*, that he saith, *If ye be circumcised Christ profiteth you nothing:* which was never said of any of our *Ceremonies.* And whereas he saith, *it is observed in* Abassia *as a mystical Ceremony*; he is much mistaken, if their *Emperor Claudius* say true; for he saith, *it is only a National Custom without any respect to Religion, like the cutting of the face in some parts of* Æthiopia *and* Nubia, *and boring the ear among the Indians.* And *Ludolphus* proves it to be no other, *because it is done by a woman in private, without any witnesses.* (3.) *As to his Paschal Lamb in memory of Christ our Passover that is sacrificed for us*; We owe greater *Reverence* to *God's own Institutions* that were intended to *typifie Christ to come*, than to presume to turn them quite another way to *represent what is past.* Especially since *Christ* is become *the great Sacrifice for the sins of mankind.* And he might as well have mentioned *the Scape-Goat and the Red Heifer as the Paschal Lamb*; since they were all *Types* of the *great Sacrifice* of *Propitiation.* But why are things never used by the *Primitive Church* (*for as to his story of Innocent* 2. be it true or false, it is nothing to us) brought to parallel our *Ceremonies*, when the great *Reason* of our *Churches* retaining any *Ceremonies* was declared from the beginning of the *Reformation* to be out of *Reverence* to the *Ancient Church*, which observed the same kind of *Ceremonies?*

Preface to the Common-Prayer.

Confessio Fidei Claudii Regis Æthiopiæ.

The only remaining pretence for the *present Separation*, is, *that there is a parity of reason, as to their Separating from us, and our Separating from the Church of* Rome. For so Mr. *A.* urgeth the argument, *we Separate*

Mischief of Impos. *Preface.*

parate from them because they impose doubtful things for certain, false for true, new for old, absurd for reasonable; then this will hold for themselves because they think so; and that was all I opposed to T. G. But is it possible for any man that pretends to be a *Protestant Divine* to think the case alike? When (1.) *They confess our Doctrine in the* 39 *Articles to be true*, we reject all their *additional Articles*, in *Pius* 4. *his Creed*, not only *as false*, but some of them as *absurd* and *unreasonable*, as men can invent, *viz.* that of *Transubstantiation*; which is made by them the great trying and burning point. But what is there, which the most inveterate enemies of our *Church* can charge in her doctrine, as *new*, as *false*, as *absurd?* nay, they all yield to the *Antiquity*, to the *Truth*, to the *Reasonableness* of our *Doctrine*; and yet is not Mr. *A.* ashamed to make the *case* seem parallel. But what new and strong Reason doth he bring for it? You may be sure it is some mighty thing; for he saith, presently after it, *that my Importunity hath drawn them out of their reservedness, and they have hitherto been modest to their prejudice.* Alas for him, that his modesty should ever hurt him! But what is this dangerous *Secret*, that they have hitherto kept in, out of mere *veneration to the Church of* England? Let us prepare our selves for this unusual, this killing charge. Why, saith Mr. *A. In the Catechism of the Church, this Doctrine is contained* (It is *matter* of *Doctrine* then, I see; although we are confessed *to be agreed in the* 39 *Articles, as far as they concern Doctrine:* But what is this *notorious Doctrine?*) *It is*, saith he, *that Infants perform Faith and Repentance by their Sureties.* Did I not fear it was some *dreadful thing*; some *notorious heresie*, condemned by one or two at least of the four *General Councils?* But is it said so, in plain words? or is it wire-drawn by far-fetched Consequences? No, it is plain enough; for the Question is, *What is required of Persons to be baptized.* Answ. *Repentance whereby they forsake sin; and faith, whereby they stedfastly believe the promises of God made to them in that Sacrament.* Quest. *Why then are Infants baptized, when by reason of their tender age, they cannot perform them?* Answ. *Because they promise them both by their Sureties; which promise when they come to age themselves are bound to perform.* But I pray doth it hence follow, that *Infants do perform Faith and Repentance, by their Sureties?* Are not the words express, *that they promise both by their Sureties?* And is *promising* and *performance* all one? I do not find it so by this *Instance.* For here was a greater matter *promised*, and nothing *performed.* It is true the *Catechism* saith, *Faith and Repentance are required of them that are to be baptized:* which supposeth the persons to be baptized *capable* of performing these things themselves. And then comes a *Question*, by way of *objection*; *why then are Infants baptized*, &c. to which the sense of the *Answer* is, that although by *reason* of their Age they are *uncapable* of *performing* the *Acts* of *Repentance* and *Believing*; yet the *Church* doth allow *Sureties* to enter into *Covenant* for them; which doth imply a *Promise* on their parts for the *Children*, and an *obligation* lying on them to *perform* what was then *promised.* And now let the Reader judge, since this *horrible Secret* is come out, whether this ought to be ranked in an equal degree as to the justifying *Separation* with the *monstrous, absurd* and *unreasonable doctrines* of the *Roman Church.* And I know nothing can do them greater Service, than such *Parallels* as these.

(2.) We

(2.) We charge them with those *Reasons* for *Separation*, which the *Scripture* allows; such as *Idolatry*, *perverting the Gospel* and *Institutions* of *Christ*, and *Tyranny* over the *Consciences* of men, in making those things *necessary to salvation*, which *Christ* never made so: But none of these, can with any appearance of *Reason* be charged on the *Church* of *England*, since we profess to give *Religious Worship* only *to God*; *we worship no Images*; *we invocate no Saints*; *we adore no Host*; *we creep to no Crucifix*; *we kiss no Relicks*. We equal no *traditions* with the *Gospel*; we lock it not up from the *People* in an *unknown language*; we preach no other *terms* of *salvation* than *Christ* and his *Apostles* did; we set up *no Monarchy* in the *Church* to *undermine Christ's*, and to dispence with his *Laws* and *Institutions*. We *mangle* no *Sacraments*, nor pretend to know what makes more for the *honour* of his *Blood* than he did himself. We pretend to no skill in *expiating mens sins when they are dead*; nor in turning the bottomless pit into the Pains of *Purgatory* by a *charm of words* and a quick motion of the hand. We do not cheat mens souls with *false bills* of *exchange*, called *Indulgences*; nor give out that we have the *Treasure* of the *Church* in our keeping, which we can apply as we see occasion. We use no *pious frauds* to delude the *People*, nor pretend to be infallible, as they do when they have a mind to deceive. These are things which the *Divines* of our *Church* have with great clearness and strength of Reason made good against the *Church* of *Rome*; and since they cannot be *objected* against our *Church*, with what face can men suppose the *cases* of those who *separate* from each of them to be *parallel?*

(3.) As to the *Ceremonies* in the *Roman Church* and ours, there are these considerable differences,

(1.) They have a *mighty number*, as appears by their *Rituals* and *Ceremonials*, and the great *volums*, written in *explication* of them; we, *very few*, and those so very easie and plain, that it requires as great skill not to understand ours, as it doth to understand theirs. (2.) They place *great holiness* in theirs, as appears by the *Forms* of *consecration* of their *Water*, *Oyle*, *Salt*, *Wax*, *Vestments*, &c. but we allow *none* of these, but only the *use* of *certain ceremonies*, without any preceding *Act* of the *Church* importing any *peculiar holiness* attributed to them. (3.) They suppose *great vertue* and *efficacy* to be in them, for the purging away *some sorts of sins*; we utterly deny any such thing to belong to our *ceremonies*, but declare, that they are appointed only for *Order* and *Decency*. (4.) They make their *ceremonies* being appointed by the *Church* to become *necessary parts of Divine Worship*; as I have already proved; but our *Church* looks upon them, even when determined *as things in their own nature indifferent*, but only required by vertue of that *general obedience* which we owe to *lawful Authority*. So that as to *ceremonies* themselves there is a *vast disparity* between the *Roman Church* and ours; and no man can pretend otherwise, that is not either *grosly ignorant*, or doth not *wilfully misunderstand* the *state* of the *Controversie* between them and us.

Thus I have gone through all the *Pleas* for the *present Separation* I could meet with, in the *Books* of my *Answerers*: and I have not concealed the *force* or *strength* I saw in any of them. And however Mr. *A.* reproaches me with *having a notable talent of misrepresenting my Adversaries*, (a thing which I have always abhorred, and never did it *wilfully* in my life, it appearing to me an act of *injustice* as well as *disingenuity*) yet I do assure him, I have endeavoured to understand them truly, and

Mischief of Impos. p. 51.

to

to represent them fairly, and to judge impartially. And although I make *no such appeals to the day of Judgment* as others do; yet I cannot but declare to the world, *as one that believes* a day of Judgment to come, that upon the most *diligent search*, and *careful inquiry* I could make into this matter, I cannot find any *Plea sufficient* to justifie in point of *conscience*, the *present Separation* from the *Church* of *England*.

Monseigneur,

DEux voyages que j'ay été obligé de faire, m'ont empêché de répondre aussi tost que je l'aurois souhaité a la Lettre dont Vôtre Grandeur m'a fait la grace de m'honorer. Comme j'étois sur le point de vous en faire des excuses, Monsieur de L'Angle est arrivé en ceste Ville, qui me les a fait encore differer, dans l'esperance, qu'il voudroit bien se charger de ma reponse, & qu'elle pourroit par ce moien vous être plus fidellement rendue. Il est vray, Monsieur, que si j'en croyois mon déplaisir, je la remettrois encore a une autre fois; car je ne peux vous ecrire sans un extreme douleur, quand je songe à la matiere sur laquelle vous me commandés de vous dire mon sentiment. Je croy que vous les sçavés deja bien, & que vous ne me faites pas l'honneur de me le demander comme en ayant quelque sorte de doute; vous me faites plus de justice que cela; & vous ne me comprenez pas au nombre de ceux, qui ont touchant l'Eglise d'Angleterre une si mechante opinion. Pour moy, je n'en avois pas une si mechante d'aucun veritable Anglois, & je ne pouvois pas me persuader qu'il y en eut un seul, qui crût qu'on ne peut éstre dans sa communion sans hasarder son propre salut. Pour ceux qui sont engagés dans le parti de l'Eglise Romaine, j'en jugeois tout autrement. Ils ont des maximes particuliers, & agissent par d'autres interests. Mais pour ceux qui n'ont aucune liaison avec Rome, c'est une chose bien singuliere de les voir passer jusqu' a cette extremité que de croir que dans l'Eglise Anglicane on ne peut faire son salut. C'est n'avoir gueres de conoissance de la Confession de foy, que tout le monde Protestant a si hautement approuvée, & qui merite en effect les loüanges de tout ce qu'il y a de bons Chrestiens. Car on ne pouvoit rien faire de plus sage que cette Confession, & jamais les articles de foy n'ont été recueillis avec un discernment plus juste, & plus raisonable que dans cette excellente piece. On a raison de la garder avec tant de veneration dans la Bibliotheque d'Oxford, & le grand Juellus pour l'avoir si dignement defendüe, est digne d'une loüange immortelle. C'est d'elle dont Dieu se servit dans le commencement de la Reformation d'Angleterre, & si elle n'avoit pas étè comme son ouvrage, il ne l'auroit pas benit d'une façon si avantageuse. Le succes qu'elle out, devroit fermer la bouche a ceux qui sont les plus animés, & l'avoir veue triompher de tant d'Obstacles devroit faire reconnoitre a tout le monde, que Dieu s'est declaré en sa faveur, qu'il est visiblement mêlé de son établissement, & qu'elle a la verité & la fermeté de sa parole, a qui elle doibt en effect sa naissance, & son origine. Elle est aujourdhuy ce qu'elle étoit quand elle étoit formée, & on ne peut pas reprocher a Messieurs les Evêques qu'ils y ayent depuis cette terme lá, apporté quelque changement. Et comment donc s'imaginer qu'elle ayt changé d'usage? & peut on rien voir de plus inique, que de dire, qu'un

Instrument

Instrument que Dieu employa autrefois pour l'instruction de tant de gens de bien, pour le salut de tant de peuples, pour la consolation tant de fidelles soit aujourdhuy devenüe quelque chose de funeste, & pernicieuse. Si vôtre Confession de foy est pure, & innocente, vôtre service divin l'est aussi. Car on n'y voit rien de tout qui tend a l'idolatrie; vous n'adorès que Deu seul; dans vôtre culte il n'y a rien qui se termine a la creature, & si l'on y trouve quelques ceremonies qui ne se rencontrent pas ailleurs, c'est faire profession d'un terrible Theologie, avoir depouillé toute charité, ne sçavoir guere ce que valent les ames, ne connoitre point la nature de choses indifferentes, que decroire qu'elles sont capables de perdre eternellement ceux qui s'y veulent assujettir. C'est avoir une même dureté que de croire que vôtre discipline ecclesiastique est capable de damner les hommes. Car ou a t'on jamais vû que pour des articles de discipline le salut des hommes se trouve interessé, & de choses qui ne regardent que le dehors, & l'ordre de l'eglise, & qui ne sont que comme l'ecorce, & les envelopes de la verité, peuvent elles causer la mort, & glisser du poison dans une ame? Certes on ne les comprend jamais au nombre de verités essentielles, & comme il n'y a que celles cy qui sauvent, il n'y a qu'elles aussi qui peuvent exclurre du salut. Pour le gouvernement Episcopal, qu'a t'il qui soit dangereux, & qui puisse raisonnablement alarmer des consciences? & s'il est capable de priver de la gloire eternelle, & de boucher les avenües du ciel, qui est ce qui y est entré l'espace de plus de quinze cents ans? Puisque pendant tout ce temps la, toutes les Eglises du monde n'ont point eu d'autre gouvernement. S'il étoit contraire a la verité & a l'aquisition du bonheur eternel, est il croyable que Dieu l'eut si hautement approuvé, & qu'il eut permis que pendant tant de siecles son Eglise en eust été tyrannisé? Car qui est ce qui l'a gouverné, qui est ce qui a composé ses conciles tant generaux que particuliers, qui est ce qui a combatu les Heresies dont elle a esté de tout temps attaqué? ont ce pas été les Evêques, & n'est ce pas a leur sage conduite, que la parole de Dieu est redevable, apres Dieu, de ses victoires & de ses triomphes. Et sans remonter jusqu'au berceau, & la naissance de l'Eglise, qui est ce qui dans le siecle precedent delivra l'Angleterre, de l'Erreur dont elle étoit envelopée? Qui est ce qui y fit resveiller si miraculusement la verité? fut ce pas le zele, & la fermeté des evêques, & leur ministere? degagea t'il pas les Anglois de l'oppression sous laquelle ils gemissoient de puis si long temps; & leur exemple aida't y pas puissamment a la Reformation de toute l'Europe? En verité je croy qu'ils en pouvroient user comme fist autrefois Gregoire de Nazianze au milieu de Constantinople. Quand il y arriva, il trouva que l'Arianisme y avoit fait de fort grand progres, cependant, son courage, son zele, son sçavoir affoblioent si forte le parti des Heretiques, qu'en peu de temps la verité y apparut plus belle que jamais, & il volut que le Temple ou il l'avoit si fortement appuiée portoit le nom d'Anastasie, parce qu'il l'y avoit comme deterrée, & degagée de dessous l'erreur, & par ses soins continuels, il y avoit comme fait sortir du tombeau, & glorieusement resuscitée, c'est ce qu'ont fait aussi les Evesques d'Angleterre. Ils voyoient non une verité seulement, mais quasi toutes les verités fondamentales ensevelies sous un nombre espouvantables d'Erreurs. Ils voyoient le joug de Rome plus pesant au milieu d'eux qu'il n'étoit nulle part ailleurs. La difficulté qu'il y avoit a reüssir dans la Reformation étoit capable de décourager des personnes d'une capacité, & d'une zele mediocre, & neantmoins rien ne les detourne d'un si gene-

reux dessein. Les ennemis de dehors, ceux de dedans, tous terribles qu'ils paruissent, ne les intimident point ; ils entreprenent ce grand ouvrage, & ne l'abandonnent point qu'ils n'en soient venus au bout, & qu'ils n'ayent remis sur le throne la verité resuscitée. En sorte qu'ils pouvoient laisser par tout des monuments de ce miracle & nommer justement toutes leur Eglises du nom d'Anastasie & de resurrection. Mais si ce Tiltre manque a leur Temples, la chose en soy leur convient, & l'on n'entend resonner au milieu d'eux que les Lessons, & les Loüanges de la pure Verité. Ce que doit obliger tous les gens de bien à ne s'en ecarter pas, & a regarder l'Eglise Anglicane comme une Eglise tres Orthodox. C'est ce qui font les Protestants de France, ceux de Geneva: ceux de Suisse, & d'Allemagne, & ceux d'Hollande aussi. Car ils se firent un fort grand honneur, d'avoir dans leur Concile de Dordrecht des Theologiens d'Angleterre, & monstrerent bien qu'ils avoient pour l'Eglise Anglicane une profonde veneration. Et d'ou vient donc, que des Anglois mêmes en ont aujourdhuy si mechante opinion, & rompre si temerairement comme ils font, avec Elle ? est ce pas rompre avec toute l'Eglise Ancienne, avec toutes les Eglises Orientales, avec toutes les Eglises Protestantes qui ont toujours fort consideré la pureté de celle d'Angleterre ? est ce pas une horrible dureté que de l'excommunier sans misericorde, & s'en faire etrangement a croire que de s'imaginer qu'ils soient le seuls en Angleterre & même au milieu de tout le monde christien, qui soient destinés au bonheur eternel & a soustenir, comme il faut, le verites necessaires au salut. Certes on pourroit faire un parallele fort odieux entre ces Docteurs, & le Pape Victor, qui volut excommunier les Eglises d'Asie par ce qu'elles ne celebroient le feste de Pasque au même jour que Rome le faisoit ; entre eux & les Audiens, qui rompoient avec les Christiens, & ne vouloient point suffrir d'Evêques riches. Entre eux & le Donatistes, qui ne vouloient point de communion avec ceux qui avoient esté ordines par des Evêques laches, & qui s'imaginoient que leur societé étoit la veritable Eglise, & lépouse bien aimée qui paissoit son troupeau vers le midi. Entre eux & ceux de la communion Romaine, qui ont si bonne opinion de leur Eglise, que hors d'elle ils ne s'imaginent pas qu'un puisse jamais acquirer le Salut. Pour moy quelque enclin que je sois a la tolerance, je ne pourois pourtant me persuader qu'il en faille avoir pour ceux qui en ont si peu pour les autres, & que s'ils étoient les maitres feroient assurement un mauvais quartiér a ceux qui dependroient d'eux. Je regarde ces gens là, comme de perturbateurs de l'Estat, & de l'Eglise, & qui sont infalliblement animés d'un esprit de sedition. J'ay même de la paine a croire qu'ils soient justement ce qu'ils disent estre, & je craindrois bien que sous ces Docteurs il n'y eust des ennemis tres dangereux qui fussent cachés. Des Societés composées de telles personnes seroient extremement perilleuses, & on ne les pourroit soufrir sans ouvrir la porte au disordre, & travailler a sa propre ruine. Il y en a de composées de personnes plus raisonnables. Mais j'y voudrois qu'elles le fussent assez, pour ne se point separer de celles qui composent l'Eglise Anglicane ; particulierement au terme ou nous sommes elles devroient tout faire pour une bonne Reconciliation ; & dans le conjuncture des affaires presentes ils devroient bien s'aperçevoir qu'il n'y a qu'une bonne reunion qui puisse prevenir les maux dont l'Angleterre est menacée. Car pour dire la verité, je ne voi pas que leur Meetings *soient de fort grand utilité, & qu'on puisse s'y consoler davantage, que dans les Eglises Episcopales. Quand j'estois a Londres, il y a bien tost cinq ans, je me trouvay en plusieurs assemblées particulieres pour voir comme on l'y pre-*

noit pour l'instruction du peuple, & la predication de la parole de Dieu. Mais j'avoüe que je n'en receus aucune edification. J'entendis un de plus fameux Non-conformistes. Il prechoit en un lieu ou il y avoit trois hommes, & soissante, ou quatre vingt femmes. Il avoit choisi un texte touchant le restablissement des ruines de Jerusalem, & pour l'expliquer, il cita cent fois Plinie & Vitruve, *& n'oublia pas de dire en Italien ce proverbe,* duro con duro non fa muro. *Tout cela me parut hors de propos, fort peu a propos pour des femmelettes, & tres éloigné d'un esprit qui ne cherche que la consolation & l'edification de ses auditeurs. Se Cantoner & faire un schisme pour avoir la liberté de debiter de telles vanités est une fort mauvaise conduite; & les peuples paroissent bien foibles de quitter leur mutuelles assemblées pour de choses qui meritent si peu leur estime, & leur preference. Je n'estime pas, qu'on soit en obligation de souffrir ce dereglement. Il est vray qu'autrefois on souffroit les Assemblées de Novatiens à Rome & à Constantinople, & que le Donatistes a voient en la premiere place quelque sorte de liberté. Mais c'estoit les Estrangers, & cela même ne dura pas long temps & comme il y en avoit peu, cela ne tiroit pas en consequence. Mais c'est un autre fait en Angleterre, & comme le bien de l'Estat, & de l'Eglise depend absolument de l'union du peuple sur le poinct de la Religion, on n'y pourroit trop presser une union universelle. Mais il la faut procurer par les bonnes voyes, & comme Messieurs les Evêques sont de personnes d'une grande experience, d'un sçavoir extraordinaire, d'un zele, & d'une bonté, envers leur peuples veritablement paternelle, jespere qu'ils s'employeront a ce grand Ouvrage avec toute la prudence & la charité qui sont necessaires pour faire reüssir une si louable entreprise. Vous particulierement, Monseigneur, dont la moderation & la capacité sont reconnües de tout le monde, il semble que ce soit un dessein reservé pour vôtre grande Sagesse, & si vous n'y reussistes pas, apparemment que tous les autres y travailleront inutilement. Pour moy, je ne puis contribuer d'icy que de voeus, & que de prieres; aussi vous puis bien proteser que j'en fais tous les jours de fort sinceres pour la prosperité de l'Eglise Anglicane, & pour qu'il plaise a Dieu faire en sorte, que tous les Protestants d'Angleterre ne soyent a l'avenir qu'un cœur, & qu'une ame. Je prie Vostre Grandeur d'en estre bien persuadé, & de croire qu'il n'est pas possible d'estre avec plus de respect que je le suis,*

Monseigneur,

Vôtre tres humble, & tres
Obeissant Serviteur,

A Leyden, 3 Septemb. 1680.

LE MOYNE.

Firſt Letter.

A Letter from Monſieur le Moyne, *Profeſſor of Divinity at* Leyden, *to my Lord Biſhop of* London, *concerning the nature of our preſent Differences, and the unlawfulneſs of Separation from the Church of* England.

MY LORD,

TWO Journeys that I have been obliged to take, have hindred me from anſwering the Letter, with which your Lordſhip did me the favour to honour me, ſo ſoon as I could have wiſhed. Juſt as I was about to excuſe my ſelf to you for it, Monſieur *de l'Angle* came to this Town, which made me defer it longer yet, in hopes that he would charge himſelf with my anſwer, and that by that means it might be brought unto you more ſafely. It is true, my Lord, that if I ſhould hearken to my own unwillingneſs, I ſhould put it off ſtill to another time; for I cannot write unto you without being extreamly grieved, when I think upon the matter, of which you command me to tell you my opinion. I believe that you know it already, and that you do not do me the honour to ask it of me, as if you had any kind of doubt of it. You do me more right than ſo; and you do not account me of the number of thoſe that have ſo ill an opinion of the Church of *England*. For my part I had not ſo bad a one of any true *Engliſh-man*, and I could not have perſwaded my ſelf that there had been ſo much as one, which had believed that a man could not be of her Communion, without hazarding his own Salvation. For thoſe that are engaged in the party of the Church of *Rome*, I judged quite otherwiſe of them; they have particular Maxims, and act by other intereſts. But for thoſe that have no tye to *Rome*, it is a very ſtrange thing to ſee them come to that extream, as to believe that a man cannot be ſaved in the Church of *England*. This is not to have much knowledge of that Confeſſion of Faith, which all the Proteſtant World has ſo highly approved, and which does really deſerve the praiſes of all good Chriſtians that are, For there cannot be any thing made more wiſe than that Confeſſion, and the Articles of Faith were never collected with a more juſt and reaſonable diſcretion than in that excellent piece. There is great reaſon to keep it with ſo much veneration in the Library of *Oxford*; and the great *Jewell* deſerves immortal praiſe for having ſo worthily defended it. It was this that God made uſe of in the beginning of the Reformation of *England*. And if it had not been as it were his work, he had never bleſſed it in ſo advantagious a manner. The ſucceſs that it has had, ought to ſtop the mouth of thoſe that are the moſt paſſionate, and its having triumphed over ſo many obſtacles, ſhould make all the World acknowledge that God has declared himſelf in favour of it, and that he has been viſibly concerned in its eſtabliſhment; and that it has the truth and confirmation of his word, to which in effect it owes its birth and original. It is the ſame at preſent as it was when it was made, and no one can reproach the Biſhops for having made any change in it ſince that time. And how then can it be imagined, that

it has changed its use? And can there be any thing more unjust, than to say, that an instrument which God has heretofore employed for the instruction of so many people, for the consolation of so many good men, for the salvation of so many Believers, is now become a destructive and pernicious thing? if your Confession of Faith be pure and innocent, your Divine Service is so too: for no one can discover any thing at all in it that tends to Idolatry: You adore nothing but God alone; in your Worship there is nothing that is terminated on the Creature: And if there be some Ceremonies there, which one shall not meet with in some other places; this were to make profession of a terrible kind of Divinity, to put off all Charity, not to know much what souls are worth; not to understand the nature of things indifferent, to believe that they are able to destroy those eternally, that are willing to submit themselves unto them. It is to have the same hardness to believe that your Ecclesiastical Discipline can damn any. For where has it been ever seen, that the salvation of men was concerned for Articles of Discipline, and things that regard but the out-side, and order of the Church, and are but as it were the bark and covering of the truth? Can these things cause death, and distil poyson into a Soul? Truly these are never accounted in the number of essential truths; and as there is nothing but these that can save, so there is nothing but these that can exclude men from Salvation. For the Episcopal Government, what is there in it that is dangerous, and may reasonably alarm mens consciences? And if this be capable of depriving us of eternal Glory, and shutting the Gates of Heaven, who was there that entred there for the space of fifteen hundred years, since that for all that time all the Churches of the World had no other kind of Government? If it were contrary to the truth, and the attainment of eternal happiness, is it credible that God had so highly approved it, and permitted his Church to be tyrannized over by it for so many Ages? For who was it that did govern it? Who was it that did make up its Councils, as well general, as particular? Who was it that combated the Heresies with which it has been at all times assaulted? Was it not the Bishops? And is it not to their wise conduct, to which next under God, his Word is beholden for its Victories and Triumphs? And not to go back so far as the birth and infancy of the Church; who was it that in the last Age delivered *England* from the error in which she was inveloped? Who was it that made the truth to rise so miraculously there again? Was it not the zeal and constancy of the Bishops, and their Ministry, that disengaged the *English* from that oppression under which they had groaned so long? And did not their Example powerfully help forward the Reformation of all *Europe?* In truth I think they might make the same use of this, as *Gregory Nazianzen* did heretofore at *Constantinople.* When he arrived there, he found that Arianism had made a very great progress in that place; but then his courage, his zeal, his learning did so mightily weaken the party of the Hereticks, that in a little time the truth appeared there again more beautiful than ever; and the Church where he had so stoutly upheld it, he would have to bear the name of *Anastasia*; because he had brought the truth as it were out of the earth and cleared it from the error that lay upon it; and by his continual cares had caused it, as it were, to come out of the Grave to a glorious Resurrection. It is this too that the Bishops of *England* have done; they saw not only one truth, but almost all the fundamental truths buried under a formidable number of errors; they saw the yoke of *Rome* hea-

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viet among them, than it was any where else: The difficulty that there was of succeeding in the Reformation, was enough to discourage Persons of an ordinary capacity and zeal. Nevertheless nothing turns them from so generous a design; the enemies without, and those within as terrible as they seem, do not fright them; they undertake this great work, and do not leave it till they had brought it about, and raised up the truth, and placed it again upon the Throne; in such a manner that they might every where have monuments of this Miracle, and justly have called all their Churches by the name of *Anastasia*, or Resurrection. But if their Churches have not that title, the thing it self belongs unto them; and you shall hear nothing discoursed of in these, but lectures and praises of the pure truth. Which ought to oblige all good men not to separate from it; but to look upon the Church of *England*, as a very Orthodox Church. Thus all the Protestants of *France* do, those of *Geneva*, those of *Switzerland* and *Germany*, and those of *Holland* too; for they did themselves a very great honour in having some Divines of *England* in their Synod of *Dort*, and shewed plainly that they had a profound veneration for the Church of *England*. And from whence does it then come, that some *Englishmen* themselves have so ill an opinion of her at present, and divide rashly from her, as they do? Is not this to divide from all the ancient Churches, from all the Churches of the East, from all the Protestant Churches, which have always had a very great respect for the purity of that of *England?* Is it not horrible impudence to excommunicate her without mercy, and to make themselves believe strangely of her, for them to imagine that they are the only men in *England*, nay, in the Christian World, that are predestinated to eternal Happiness, and to hold the truths necessary to salvation, as they ought to be held? Indeed one might make a very odious Parallel betwixt these Teachers and Pope *Victor*, that would needs excommunicate the Churches of *Asia*, because they did not celebrate the Feast of *Easter* the same day that they did at *Rome*. Betwixt them and the *Audeans* that divided from the Christians, and would not endure rich Bishops. Betwixt them and the *Donatists*, that would have no communion with them that had been ordained by lapsed Bishops, and imagined that their Society was the true Church, and the well-beloved Spouse, that fed her flock in the South. Betwixt them and those of the *Roman* Communion, who have so good an opinion of their own Church, that out of her they do not imagine that any one can ever be saved. For my part, as much inclined to Toleration as I am, I cannot for all this perswade my self, that it ought to be allowed to those that have so little of it for other men: and who, if they were Masters, would certainly give but bad quarter to those that depended upon them. I look upon these Men as disturbers of the State and Church, and who are doubtlessly animated by a Spirit of Sedition. Nay, I can scarce believe, that they are just such as they say they are; and I should be something afraid, that very dangerous enemies might be hid under colour of these Teachers. Societies composed of such persons, would be extreme dangerous; and they could not be suffered without opening the Gate to disorder, and advancing towards ones own ruine. There are some of these that are composed of more reasonable Men, but I could wish they were reasonable enough not to separate from those of which the Church of *England* is composed. Especially in the case we are in, they should do all for a good agreement; and in the present conjuncture of affairs,

affairs, they should understand that there is nothing but a good reunion, that can prevent the evils with which *England* is threatned. For to speak the truth, I do not see that their Meetings are of any great use, or that one may be more comforted there, than in the Episcopal Churches. When I was at *London* almost Five years ago, I went to several of their private assemblies, to see what way they took for the instruction of the People, and the preaching of the Word of God. But I profess I was not at all edified by it. I heard one of the most famous *Non-Conformists*, he preached in a place where there were three Men and three or fourscore Women? he had chosen a Text about the building up the Ruins of *Jerusalem*, and for the explication of it, he cited *Pliny* and *Vitruvius* a hundred times, and did not forget to mention a Proverb in *Italian*, *Duro con duro non fa muro.* All this seem'd to me nothing to the purpose, and very improper for the poor Women, and very far from a Spirit that sought nothing but the comfort and edification of his hearers. To cantonize themselves, and make a Schism, to have the liberty to vent such vanities, is very ill conduct, and the People seem very weak to quit their mutual Assemblies for things that so little deserve their esteem and preference. I do not think that any one is obliged to suffer this irregularity. It is true, that the Assemblies of the *Novatians* were sometimes suffered at *Rome* and *Constantinople*, and that even the *Donatists* had some kind of liberty in the first of these places. But they were only strangers; and that neither did not indure any long time; and as there were but few of them, that is not to be drawn into example. But it is another case in *England*; and seeing the good of the State and Church depends absolutely upon the union of the People in the point of Religion, one cannot there press an universal union too much. But it ought to be procured by good means; and since the Bishops are persons of great experience, of an extraordinary knowledge, of a true fatherly zeal and goodness towards their people, I hope that they will employ themselves in this great work with all the prudence and charity that are necessary to the succeeding of such a commendable undertaking. You particularly, My Lord, whose moderation and capacity are acknowledged by all the World; it looks as if it were a design reserved for your great Wisdom; and if you do not succeed, it is clear, that all others will labour in it but in vain. For my part, I can contribute nothing to it where I am, but Vows and Prayers; and of these I can protest that I make very sincere ones every day for the prosperity of the *English* Church; and that it would please God to order things in such manner, that all the Protestants of *England* for the future, might be of one heart and of one soul. I beg your Lordship to be well assured of this and to believe that it is impossible to be with more respect than I am,

My Lord,

Your most Humble and most Obedient servant,

Leyden Sept. 3. 1680.

Le Moyne.

A Paris

A Paris l' 32. d'Octob.

Monseigneur,

Rien ne vous a due paroistre si estrange ny si incivil que mon silence sur la lettre que vous me fistes l'honneur de m'escrire il y a environ trois mois ; Il est pourtant vray que je n'ay rien a me reprocher sur cela, & a fin que vous le croyiez comme moy, vous voulez bien me permettre de vous dire comment la chose s'est passée. Quand on m'apporta vostre lettre, j'estois retombé dans une grande & violente fiebure dont Dieu m'a effligé durant quatre ou cinq mois, & qui m'a mené jusqu' a deux doits de la mort. Je priay un de mes amis, qui estoit alors dans ma chambre, de l'ouvrir & de me dire le nom de celuy qui me l'escrivoit, mais il se trouva que vous aviez oublié de la signer, sur quoy je me l'a fis apporter, pour voir si je n'en connoistrois point le caractére ; Et ce fut encore inutilement, par ce que jusqu'alors je n' avois rien veu de vostre main : Cela me fit croire qu'elle avoit esté escrite par celuy lá mesme qui l'avoit apportée, pour m'attrapper dix ou douze sous de port ; car ce petit stratageme est assez commun en cette ville : & aprez cela, je ne me mis pas fort en peine de ce qu'elle deviendroit. Elle se conserva pourtant dans mon cabinet par le plus grand hazard du monde, & m'estant heureusement tombée sous la main, il y a deux ou trois jours, je la relus ; & l'aiant trouvée trop sage & trop grave pour avoir esté escrite par un homme tel que je me l'estois imaginé, je la monstray à Monsieur Claude qui y reconnut d' abord vostre escriture, & qui me dit que vous en estiez l'Auteur. Je pense Monseigneur que cela suffit pour me justifier auprez de vous d'un silence, qui bien que je n'en sois aucunement coupable, ne laisse pas de me donner quelque espece de confusion. Mais pour venir au contenu de vostre lettre, je ne vous puis exprimer avec quelle douleur j'apprens que vos divisions continuent, en un temps auquel il y a des raisons si pressantes de se réünir ; Ce que vous me dites sur tout des escrits que l'on publie a cette heure, pour faire croire que la communion avec l'Eglise Anglicane est illégitime, & que les Ministres ne la peuvent permettre aux particuliers sans crime, me paroist une chose si deraisonnable en elle mesme, & si fort à contre-temps, que j'aurois peine a la croire si elle ne m'estoit atteslée par une personne de vostre mérite & de vostre poids. Vous savez bien Monseigneur quels sont & quels ont toujours esté mes sentimens sur cela, & la maniére dont j'en uzay il y a deux ans dans mon voiage d'Angleterre, en fréquentant vos assemblées, & en preschant mesme dans un troupeau qui est sous la Jurisdiction de l'Eglise Anglicane, monstre assez que je suis bien éloigné de croire que sa communion soit illégitime ; Et cela mesme prouve d'une maniére bien évidente, que mon sentiment a cet égard est celuy de nos Eglises, parce qu'il n'est pas imaginable que j'eusse voulu faire, sans nécessité, une chose qui m'eust attiré l'indignation de mes fréres, & qui, a mon retour, m'eust exposé à leures reproches ou a leurs censures. Pleust a Dieu, Monseigneur, que tout ce qu'il y a de Chrestiens égarez dans le monde vouluſſent recevoir vostre Reformation, que je répandrois de bon cœur tout ce que j'ay de sang pour leur procurer un si grand bien. Et que je suis asseuré de la

joye

joye extresme avec laquelle nos Eglises entreroient dans leur Communion, Si en estant dans la pureté de vos, sentimens pour les dogmes, ils ne differoient plus d'avec nous que par des Surplis, par des Cérémonies innocentes, & per quelque diversité d'Ordres dans le gouvernement de l'Eglise. Et cela, Monseigneur, vous fait assez comprendre, ce que j'ay a respondre a vostre seconde question. Car puis que l'Eglise Anglicane est une véritable Eglise de nostre Seigneur, Puis que son Culte & ses Dogmes sont purs, & n'ont rien de contraire a la parole de Dieu, Et puis que quand la Reformation y a esté receüe, elle y a esté receüe, avec l'Episcopat. Et en y establissant la Liturgie & les Cérémonies qui y sont aujourdhuy en uzage, il est sans doute du devoir de tous les Réformez de Vostre Royaume de se tenir inséparablement unis a Cette Eglise; Et ceux qui ne le font pas, sous ombre qu'ils desireroient, plus de simplicité dans les Cérémonies, & moins d'inegálité entre les Ministres commettent asseurément un tres grand péché. Car le schisme est le plus redoutable mal qui puisse arriver à l'Église; Et pour l'éviter, la charité Chrestienne oblige tous les gens de bien a supporter en leurs fréres des choses bien moins supportables que ne le doivent paroistre celles dont il s'agit, aux yeux de ceux lá mesmes qui les ont le plus en aversion : Et c'estoit lá si bien le sentiment de nostre Grand & Excellent Calvin, que dans son traitté de la necessité de la Réformation, il ne fait point de difficulté de dire. Que s'il se trouvoit des gens assez deraisonnables pour refuser la Communion d'une Eglise pure dans son culte & dans ses Dogmes, & pour ne pas se soumettré avec respect a son Gouvernement, sous ombre qu'elle auroit retenu l'Episcopat conditionné comme le vostre, il n'y auroit point de censure ny de rigueur de discipline qu'on ne deust exercer contre eux. * Talem nobis Hierarchiam si exhibeant, in qua sic emineant Episcopi ut Christo subesse non recusent, ut ab illo tanquam ab unico capite pendeant & ad ipsum referantur, in qua sic inter se fraternam societatem colant ut non alio modo quam ejus veritate sint colligati, tum vero nullo non anathemate dignos fatear, si qui erunt qui non eam revereantur, summaque obedientia observent. *Et Beze mesme, qui n'approuvoit pas en général le gouvernement Episcopal, fait une telle distinction du vostre, et est si éloigne de croire que l'on puisse, ou que l'on doive en prendre sujet de se séparer de vostre Eglise, qu'il prie Dieu ardemment qu'elle puisse toujours de meurer dans l'heureux estat ou elle avoit este mise et conservée, par le sang, par la pureté de lay foy, et par la sage conduite de ses Excellens Evesques.* * Quod si nunc Anglicana Ecclesia instaurata suorum Episcoporum & Archiepiscoporum authoritate persistat, quemadmodum hoc nostra memoria contigit, ut ejus ordinis homines non tantum insignes Dei Martyres, sed etiam præstantissimos Pastores & Doctores habuerit, fruatur sane ista singulari Dei beneficentia, quæ utinam illi sit perpetua. *Mais, Monseigneur, quoy que les premiers Auteurs de la séparation qui vout trouble soient extraordinairement coupables, et que ceux qui la continuent et qui la fortifient par leurs escrits de raisonnables et emportez le soient aussy extrémement, il est neanmoins certain que dans la multitude qui les suit, il y a une infinité de bonnes gens dont la foy est pure et la pieté sincére; et qui ne demeurent eloignez de vous que parce que leur simplicité est surprise, et qu'on les a effrayez par ces grands mots de Tyrannie, d'Oppression, de suppostz de l'Antechrist dont on leur bat perpetuellement les oreilles: Je les mets au rang de ces foibles qui disoient qu'ils n'estoient point du corps et dont St. Paul dit qu'ils estoient du corps pourtant; Et il me semble que les bons et charitables Evesques comme vous, en doivent dire, quoy qu'en un sens un peu different, ce qu'Optat de Miléve disoit des Donatistes de son temps,* Si collegium

* Calv. Edit. Amstel. tom. 8. p. 60.

* Bez. contra Sarrav. ad cap. 8. art. 3. pag. 270. Edit. Francof. ann. 1601.

gium Episcopale nolunt nobiscum habere, tamen fratres sunt: *Au nom de Dieu donc, Monseigneur, faites tout ce qui vous sera possible pour les ramener a leur devoir par la douceur et par la Charité qui seule est capable d'opérer de grandes choses en ces occasions. Car les hommes qui ont toujours de l'orgueil, se soulevent ordinairement contre tout ce qui leur paroist n'agir que par la seule Authorité, mais ils ne manquent presque jamais de se rendre au support et a la condescendance,* Mansuetus homo, cordis est medicus. *Je ne pretens pas Monseigneur m'ingérer de vous donner la dessus aucun conseil particulier; Vous qui voiez les choses de prez, et qui avez le cœur tout pénetré de la charité Chrestienne jugez mieux que personne des remedes qui sont les plus propres a un si grand mal; Et je suis asseuré, que s'il ne falloit pour le guérir que s'abstenir de quelques expressions, que quitter quelques cérémonies, et que changer la couleur de quelques habits, vous vous y resoudriez avec grand plaisar, et a quelque chose de pluz difficile. Il me semble mesme avoir leu en quelque endroit des* Vindiciæ *de Monsieur le Doien de Winsor que ce furent lá les sentimens charitables que fit paroistre l'Eglise Anglicane par la bouche de trois ou quatre de ses Evesques dans une Conférence qui se fit sur les moiens de réunion, en la premiére année du restablissement de sa Majesté Britannique, et qu'il ne tint qu'a quelques Ministres de ceux qu'on appelle Presbyteriens que la chose ne passast plus avant. Quoy qu'il en soit je prie Dieu de tout mon cœur qu'il ouvre les yeux des uns pour leur faire connoistre la foibleste des raisons sur lesquelles ils fondent une séparation si affligeante, Et qu'il conserve & qu'il augmente de plus en plus dans les autres, la piété, le zéle et la charité dont ils ont besoin pour travailler heureusement a une réünion qui réjouira les hommes et les Anges, et qui attirera mille bénédictions de la terre et du Ciel sur ceux qui y auront le plus contribüé: Et je vous avouë, Monseigneur, que je ne serois pas consolable si je voicis qu'on ne fist pas au moins quelque nouvel effort pour reüssir dans ou ouvrage si saint et si important dans un temps qui m'y paroist si propre. Car outre que les interests de Vostre Estat et de Vostre Eglise le demandent extraordinairement, J'apprens que par une admirable bénédiction du Ciel, toutes vos Chaires Episcopales sont maintenant remples par d' Excellens Serviteurs de Dieu, qui aiment Jesus Christ et son Eglise, et qui ont tous les qualitez de la teste et du cœur qui sont necessaires pour pouvoir et pour vouloir contribuer a cette bonne œuvre. Et a en juger par vous Monseigneur, et par Monseigneur l' Archevesque de Canterbery, et Monseigneur l'Evesque d' Oxford que j'ay eu l'honneur de voir durant mon sejour en Angleterre, je n'ay pas de peine a me le persuader. Mais j'ay peur de vous avoir ennüyé par cette longue lettre, je vous en demande tres humblement pardon, Et je vous supplie d' estre bien persuadé que je conserve toujours une extresme reconnoissance de l' amitie dont vous m'honorez, et que je suis avec tout le respect que je vous dois*

Vostre tres humble & tres,
obeysant Serviteur,

De l' Angle.

Monseigneur,

Monsieur Claude mon Excellent Collegue a qui j'ay monstre cette lettre, m'a prie de vous dire, en vous asseurant de son tres humble service, qu'il la souscriroit de bon cœur et quil est absolument dans mes sentimens.

Paris, *Octob.* 31. 1680.

Second Letter.

From Monſieur de L'Angle *one of the preſent Preachers of the Reformed Church, meeting at* Charenton *near* Paris, *upon the ſame Subject.*

My Lord,

NOthing may ſeem ſo ſtrange and ſo uncivil to you, as my ſilence upon your *Letter* you did me the honour to write me about three months ago. But yet it is true that in this caſe I have nothing to blame my ſelf for; and that you may believe it as well as I, you will give me leave to tell you how the matter happen'd. When your Letter was brought me, I was relapſed into a great and violent Fever, with which God has afflicted me for the ſpace of four or five months, and which has brought me very near the grave; I prayed one of my friends, which was then in my Chamber, to open the Letter, and to tell me the name of him that wrote it; but it chanced that you had forgotten to ſubſcribe it, upon which I made it be brought to me, to ſee if I did not know the Character; but it was to no purpoſe, becauſe till then I had not ſeen any thing of your hand. This made me believe that it had been written by the ſame man that brought it, to get ten or twelve *Sous* for the carriage; for that little ſtratagem is common enough in this Town. After this, I did not much trouble my ſelf what became of it; but yet it was preſerved in my Cabinet by the greateſt chance in the world; and being happily fallen into my hands two or three days ſince, I read it over again; and having found it too prudent and grave to have been written by ſuch a one as I had imagined, I ſhewed it to *Monſieur Claude*, who preſently knew your hand, and told me that you were the Author of it. I think, my Lord, this is enough to excuſe me to you, for a ſilence, for which though I am not any way faulty, yet I cannot chooſe but be ſomething aſhamed.

But to come to the contents of your Letter; I cannot expreſs to you with how much grief I underſtand that your diviſions continue, at a time in which there are ſuch preſſing reaſons for being Re-united. Above all, that which you tell me of writings that are at this time publiſhed, to make men believe that Communion with the Church of *England* is unlawful, and that the Miniſters cannot permit it to private perſons without ſinning, ſeems to me a thing ſo unreaſonable in it ſelf, and ſo very unſeaſonable now, that I ſhould ſcarce believe it, if it were not atteſted by a perſon of your merit and conſideration. My Lord, you know well what my ſentiments are, and always have been in this matter: and the way which I uſed two years ago, when I was in *England*, in frequenting your aſſemblies, and preaching too in a Congregation that is under the juriſdiction of the Church of *England*, ſufficiently ſhews that I am very far from believing that her Communion is unlawful. And this alſo proves very evidently that my opinion in this matter is the ſame that is holden by our Churches; becauſe it is not imaginable

ginable that I would without any necessity, have done a thing which would have drawn the displeasure of my Brethren upon me, and which at my return would have exposed my self to be blamed, if not to be censured by them. My Lord, I would to God that all the mistaken Christians that are in the world would receive your Reformation; I would with all my heart spend all the blood I have to procure them so great a good. And I am sure with what an exceeding Joy our Churches would enter into their Communion, if being pure in their Opinions for Doctrine, they differed no more from us, than by Surplices, and innocent Ceremonies; and some diversity of Orders in the Government of the Church.

And by this, my Lord, you may perceive what I have to answer to your second question. For since the Church of *England* is a true Church of our Lord; since her Worship and Doctrines are pure, and have nothing in them contrary to the word of God; and since that when the Reformation was there received, it was received together with Episcopacy, and with the establishment of the Liturgy, and Ceremonies, which are there in use at this day; it is without doubt the duty of all the Reformed in your Realm, to keep themselves inseparably united to the Church. And those that do not do this, upon pretence that they should desire more simplicity in the Ceremonies, and less of inequality among the Ministers, do certainly commit a very great sin. For Schism is the most formidable evil that can befal the Church: and for the avoiding of this, Christian charity obliges all good men to bear with their Brethren in some things much less tolerable than those, of which the dispute is, ought to seem, even in the eyes of those that have the most aversion for them. And this was so much the opinion of our great and excellent *Calvin*, that in his Treatise of the necessity of the Reformation, he makes no difficulty to say; That if there should be any so unreasonable as to refuse the Communion of a Church that was pure in its Worship and Doctrine, and not to submit himself with respect to its Government, under pretence that it had retained an Episcopacy qualified as yours is; there would be no Censure nor rigour of Discipline that ought not to be exercised upon them. *Talem nobis Hierarchiam si exhibeant, in qua sic emineant Episcopi ut Christo subesse non recusent, ut ab illo tanquam ab unico Capite pendeant, & ad ipsum referantur; in qua sic inter se fraternam societatem colant, ut non alio modo quam ejus veritate sint colligati; tum vero nullo non Anathemate dignos fatear, si qui erunt qui non eum revereantur, summaq; obedientiâ observent.* And *Beza* himself, who did not in the general approve of the Episcopal Government, makes such a distinction of yours, and is so far from believing, that one may, or that one ought to take occasion from thence to separate from your Church, that he prays earnestly to God that she may always remain in that happy estate in which she had been put and preserved, by the blood, by the purity of the Faith, and by the wise conduct of her excellent Bishops. *Quod si nunc Anglicana Ecclesia instaurata suorum Episcoporum & Archiepiscoporum authoritate persistat, quemadmodum hoc nostrâ memoriâ contigit, ut ejus ordinis homines, non tantum insignes Dei Martyres, sed etiam præstantissimos Pastores & Doctores habuerit, fruatur sane istâ singulari Dei beneficentiâ, quæ utinam illi sit perpetua.*

Calvin opera Edit. Amstel. Tom. 8. p. 60.

Beza contra Sarrav. ad cap. 8. art. 3. pag. 270. Edit. Francf. anno 1601.

But, my Lord, although the first Authors of the Separation, which troubles you, be extraordinarily to blame, and though those that continue it, and strengthen it, by their unreasonable and passionate Writings,

tings, be extreamly so too; it is certain yet that among the multitude that follows them, there is a very great number of good men, whose faith is pure and whose piety is sincere, and who remain separate from you only because their simplicity is surprized, and because they have been frightned with the bugbear words of *Tyranny*, *Oppression*, *Limbs of Antichrist* which are continually beaten into their ears. I rank these with those weak ones who said they were not of the Body; and of whom St. *Paul* said they were of the Body for all that. And it seems to me that the good and charitable Bishops, such as you, ought to say of them, though in something a different sense, as *Optatus Milevitanus* said of the *Donatists* of his time, *Si Collegium Episcopale nolunt nobiscum habere, tamen Fratres sunt.* In the name of God then, my Lord, do all that possibly you can to bring them back to their duty by sweetness and charity, which is only able to do great things on these occasions. For men, who have always something of Pride, do commonly oppose every thing that seems to them to act by bare Authority only: but they scarce ever fail to yield themselves up to forbearance and condescension. *Mansuetus homo, cordis est medicus.*

I do not pretend, my Lord, to thrust my self in to give you any particular advice in this case; you that see things near at hand, and that have a heart deeply affected with Christian Charity, will judge better than any man, what remedies are the most proper for so great an evil; and I am sure that if there were nothing wanting to cure it, but the abstaining from some expressions, the quitting some Ceremonies, and the changing the colour of some habits, you would resolve to do that, and something more difficult than that, with great pleasure. And I think I have read in some part of the *Vindiciæ* of Mr. Dean of *Windsor*, that these were the charitable sentiments which the Church of *England* declared by the mouth of three or four of her Bishops, in a Conference that was held concerning the means of re-union, the first year that his Majesty was restored; and that nothing hindred the matter from going farther, but some of those Ministers they call Presbyterians. However it be, I pray God with all my heart, that he would open the eyes of the one to make them see the weakness of the reasons upon which they ground such an afflicting Separation; and that he would preserve, and increase more and more in the other, that piety, that zeal, and that charity which they have need of for the happy proceeding to a re-union, which will rejoice men and Angels, and bring down a thousand blessings of Heaven and Earth upon those that shall contribute the most unto it. And I assure you, My Lord, I should be past all Comfort if I should see that some new attempt at least were not made for the success of a work so holy, and of such consequence, in a time that seems to me so proper for it. For besides that the interest of your State, and Church do require it in such an extraordinary manner; I hear that by a wonderful blessing of Heaven, all your Episcopal Sees are filled at this time with excellent servants of God, who love *Jesus Christ* and his Church, and who have all the qualities of the head and the heart, which are necessary to make them able, and willing to contribute to this good work. And to judge of it by you, My Lord, and My Lord Archbishop of *Canterbury*, and My Lord Bishop of *Oxford*, whom I had the honour to see during my stay in *England*, I am easily persuaded of it.

But I am afraid I have tired you with this long Letter; I humbly beg your pardon for it; and I beseech you to be very well assured that I always preserve a very grateful acknowledgement of the Friendship with which you honour me, and that I am with all the respect that I owe

Your most Humble and most Obedient Servant,

De L'Angle.

Monsr. *Claude* my excellent Collegue, to whom I have shewed this Letter, has prayed me to tell you, with assurance of his most humble service, that he would subscribe this with all his heart, and that he is absolutely of my Opinion.

The Third Letter, from Monsieur *Claude*, on the same Subject.

A Paris 29 Novemb. *Stilo Novo.*

Monseigneur,

MOnsieur de l'Angle *m'ayant rendu la Lettre qu'il vous a plû m'écrire, j'ay esté surpris d'y voir que vous m'aviez fait l'honneur de m'en écrire une autre que je n'ay point receüe, & à laquelle je n'eusse pas manqué de faire réponse. Vous me faites beaucop d'honneur de vouloir bien que je vous dise ma pensée sur le different qui vous trouble depuis long-tems, entre ceux qu'on appelle Episcopaux, & ceux qu'on nomme Presbyteriens. Quoy que je m'en sois deja diverses fois expliqué & par des Lettres que j'ay faites sur ce sujet à plusieurs personnes, & dans mon livre mesme de la Defense de la Reformation, où parlant de la distinction de l'Evesque & du Prestre, j'ay dit formellement* que je ne blame pas ceux qui l'observent comme une chose fort ancienne, & que je ne voudrois pas qu'on s'en fist un sujet de querelle dans les lieux où elle se trouve établie, *pag.* 366. *& quoy que d'ailleurs je me connoisse assez pour ne pas croire que mon sentiment doive estre fort considerè, je ne laisseray pas de vous temoigner dans cette occasion, comme je feray toujours en toute autre, mon estime Chretienne, mon respect, & mon obeissance. C'est ce que je feray d'autant plus que je ne vous diray pas simplement ma pensée particuliere, mais le sentiment du general de nos Eglises.*

Premierement donc, Monseigneur, nous sommes si fort éloignez de croire qu'on ne puisse en bonne conscience vivre sous vostre discipline, & sous vostre Gouvernement Episcopal, que dans nostre pratique ordinaire nous ne

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faisons nulle difficultè, ni de donner nos chaires, ni de commettre le soin de nos troupeaux à des Ministres receus & ordinez par Messieurs vos Evesques, comme il se pourroit justifier par un assez grand nombre d'exemples, & anciens, & recens, & depuis peu Mr. Duplessis *ordinè par Monsieur l'Evesque de* Lincoln *à esté establi, & appellè dans une Eglise de cette Province, & Monsieur* Wicart, *que vous, Monseigneur, avez receu au S. Ministere nous fit l'honneur il-n'y-a que quelques mois de Prescher à* Charenton *à l'edification universelle de tout nostre troupeau. Ainsi ceux qui nous imputent à cet égard des sentimens éloignez de la paix & de la concorde Chretienne, nous font assurement injustice.*

Je dis la paix & la concorde Chretienne, car, Monseigneur, nous croyons que l'obligation à conserver cette paix & cette concorde fraternelle, qui fait l'unité exterieure de l'eglise, est d'une necessitè si indispensable que S. Paul *n'a pas fait difficultè de la joindre avec l'unite interieure d'une mesme foy, & d'une mesme regeneration, non seulement comme deux choses qui ne doivent jamais estre separées, mais aussi comme deux choses dependantes l'une de l'autre, parce que si l'unité exterieure est comme la fille de l'interieure, elle en est aussi la conservatrice.* Cheminez, *dit il* Ephes. 4. comme il est convenable à la vocation dont vous estes appellez, avec toute humilité, & douceur, avec un esprit patient, supportant l'un l'autre en charité. Estant soigneux de garder l'unitè de l'esprit par la lien de la paix. *D'un cotè il fait dependre cette charitè fraternelle, qui nous joint les uns avec les autres, de nostre commune vocation, & de l'autre il nous enseigne qu'un des principaux moyens de conserver en son entier cette commune vocation qu'il appelle l'unitè de l'esprit, est de garder entre nous la paix. Selon la premiere de ces maximes nous ne pouvons avoir de paix, ni de Communion Ecclesiastique avec ceux qui ont tellement degenerè de la vocation Chretienne qu'on ne peut plus reconnoitre en eux une veritable & salutaire foy, principalement lors qu'à des erreurs mortelles ils ajoutent la tyrannie de l'ame, & qu'ils voulent contraindre la conscience, en imposant la necessitè de croire ce qu'ils croyent & de pratiquer ce qu'ils pratiquent. Car en ce cas le fondement & la veritable cause de la communion exterieure n'estant plus, la communion exterieure cesse aussi de droit, & il n'y-en peut plus avoir de legitime. Selon la seconde maxime nous ne croyons pas qu'une simple difference de gouvernement, ou de discipline, ni mesme un difference de ceremonies innocentes de leur nature, soient un sujet suffisant pour rompre le sacrè lien de la communion. C'est pourquoy nos Eglises ont toûjours regardè & considerè la vostre, non seulement comme une soeur, mais comme une soeur aisnée pour qui nous devons avoir des tendresses accompagnées de respect & de veneration, & pour qui nous presentons sans cesse à Dieu des voeux tresardens. Nous n'entrons point dans la comparaison de vostre ordre, avec celuy sous lequel nous vivons. Nous savons qu'il-n'y-en a, ni n'y-en peut avoir aucun entre les hommes, qui par nostre corruption naturelle, ne soit sujet à des inconveniens, le nostre à les siens comme le vostre, & l'un & l'autre sans doute ayant leurs avantages & leurs desavantages à divers égards,* alternis vincunt & vincuntur. *Il nous suffit de savoir que la mesme Providence Divine qui par une necessitè indispensable, & par la conjoncture des choses, mit au commencement de la Reformation nos Eglises sous celuy du Presbyterat, à mis la vostre sous celuy de l'Episcopat, & que comme nous sommes assures que vous ne mepriseż point nostre simplicitè, nous ne devons pas aussi nous élever contre vostre dignitè. Ainsi, Monseigneur, nous desapprouvons entierement, & voyons avec douleur,*

douleur, de certeines extremitez où se jettent quelques uns de une part & d'autre, les uns regardant l'Episcopat comme un ordre si absolument necessaire que sans luy il-n'y peut avoir ni de societè Ecclesiastique, ni de legitime vocation ni d'esperance de salut, & les autres le regardant avec indignation comme un reste d'Antichristianisme. Ce sont également des chaleurs & des excés qui ne viennent point de celuy qui nous appelle, & qui pechent contre les loix de la sagesse & de la charitè.

Voylà, Monseigneur, nos veritables & sinceres sentimens communs, pour ce qui vous regarde, & puisque vous desirez que je descende un peu plus particulierement à l'état où se trouve vostre propre Eglise, par les divisions intestines qui la travaillent, Permettez moy que je ne vous dise mes pensées qu'en vous expliquant mes souhaits, & les desirs de mon coeur, sur une chose aussi importante que l'est celle là. Je souhaiterois donc de toute mon ame que ceux qui sont allez jusqu'à ce point que de songer à rompre les liens exterieurs, & la dependance mutuelle de vos troupeaux, pour donner à chaque Eglise particuliere une espece de souveraigntè de gouvernement, consideràssent bien si ce qu'ils prètendent faire n'est pas directement contraire à l'esprit du Christianisme qui est un esprit d'union, & de societè, & non de division. Qu'ils consideràssent que sous prétexte que le principe des Reformez est d'avoir en horreur la domination humaine sur la foy, & sur la conscience, comme une chose destructive de la Religion, il ne faut pourtant pas ni rejetter tout frein de discipline, ni secoüer tout joug de Gouvernement, ni se priver des secours que nous pouvous tirer de l'union generale pour nous affermir dans la vraye foy, & dans la vraye pietè. Qu'ils consideràssent enfin que la mesme raison qui leur fait desirer l'Independence des troupeaux, peut estre aussi employée pour établir l'Independance des personnes dans chaque troupeau. Car un troupeau n'a pas plus de droit de vouloir estre Independant des autres troupeaux, qu'une personne en auroit de vouloir estre Independante des autres personnes. Or ce seroit aneantir toute discipline, jetter l'Eglise entant qu'en nous seroit dans une horrible confusion; & exposer l'heritage du Seigneur à l'opprobre de ses adversaires.

Pour ce qui regarde ceux qu'on appelle parmy vous Presbyteriens, comme je suis persuadè qu'ils ont de la lumiere, de la sagesse, & du Zele, je souhaiterois aussi de tout mon coeur qu'ils gardassent plus de mesure dans le scandale qu'ils croyent avoir autrefois receu de l'ordre Episcopal, & qu'ils distinguassent les personnes d'avec le Ministere. Les personnes qui occupent les charges non seulement ont leurs defauts, mais il peut mesme quelquefois arriver que les plus saintes, & les plus eminentes charges soient possedées par des méchans, & en ce cas la raison & la pieté veulent également qu'on ne confonde pas le Ministère avec le Ministre. A present que Dieu par sa grace a ote ce scandale de devant leurs yeux, & qu'il leur a fait voir dans les personnes de Messieurs les Evesques de la Piete, du Zele, & de la Fermete, pour la conservation de la Religion, j'espere que cela mesme ne contribuera pas peu à l'adoucissement des esprits. D'ailleurs je souhaiterois qu'il leur plust de considerer que si dans le Gouvernment Episcopal il-y-a des inconvenients facheux, comme je ne doute pas qu'il-n'y-en-ayt, il-y-en-à aussi & de tres-facheux dans le Presbyterien, comme je l'ay deja dit. Nul ordre dont l'exercice est entre les mains des hommes n'en est exempt, l'egalite a ses vices, & ses exces à craindre, de mesme que la superiorite. Le plus sur & le plus sage n'est donc pas de voltiger de l'une à l'autre, ni de risquer de faire un ébranlement general, sur l'esperance d'estre mieux, quand mesme on seroit en autoritè & en pouvoir de le

faire.

faire. Le prudence, la justice, & la charité Chretienne ne permettent pas d'en venir à ces éclattantes & dangereuses extremitez, pour une simple difference de Gouvernment. Le plus sur, & le plus sage est de tacher d'apporter quelque temperament pour éviter, ou pour diminuer autant qu'il se peut les inconveniens qu'on apprehende, & non de recourir à des remedes violens.

Je ne craindray pas d'appeller de ce nom celuy de faire des assemblées à part, de se separer des assemblées communes, & de se soustraire de vostre gouvernement. Il n'y a personne qui ne voye que ce seroit un veritable schisme, qui en luy-mesme & de sa nature ne peut jamais estre qu'odieux à Dieu, & aux hommes, & dont les auteurs, & les protecteurs ne sauroient eviter qu'ils ne rendent conte devant le Tribunal de nostre commun Maitre. Quand S. Paul *nous a defendu* de delaisser nostre commune assemblée, *il a non seulement condamné ceux qui ne s'y trouvent point en demeurant dans leur particulier, mais ceux aussi sans doute qui en font d'autres opposées aux communes, car c'est rompre le lien de la charité Chretienne qui ne nous joint pas seulement avec quelques uns de nos freres, mais avec tous nos freres, pour recevoir d'eux de l'edification, & pour leur en donner de nostre part, en vivant ensemble dans une mesme societé. Et il ne serviroit de rien de pretextur que la conscience resist à se trouver dans des assemblées qui se font sous un Gouvernement qu'on n'approuve pas, & que ce seroit approuver exterieurement, ce que l'on condamne interieurement. Car outre qu'il faudroit bien examiner la question si ces resistances ne viennent pas d'une conscience trompée, par un jugement precipité, puisque les plus gens de bien sont souvent sujets à se former de tels scrupules qui au fond ne sont pas tout à fait legitimes. Outre cela, il faut distinguer trois sortes de choses, les unes que la conscience approuve, & recoit, & ausquelles elle acquiesce pleinement, les autres qu'elle regarde comme insupportables, & comme destructives de la gloire de Dieu, de la vraye foy, ou de la vraye Pieté, & de l'esperance du salut, & les autres enfin qui tiennent le milieu, c'est-a-dire qu'on n'approuve pas à la verité pleinement, mais qu'on ne croit pourtant pas mortelles à la vraye piete, & au salut, en un mot qu'on regarde comme des taches & des infirmetez supportables. J'avoüe que quand on trouve dans des assemblées des choses de ce second ordre, ou que la conscience les juge telles, on ne peut y assister, & toute la question ce reduit à savoir, si l'on ne se trompe pas, sur quoy il fait bien prendre garde de ne pas faire de jugemens temeraires. Mas de s'imaginer qu'on ne puisse en bonne conscience assister à des assemblées, que lors qu'on y approve plenement & generalement toutes choses, c'est assurement ne pas connoitre ni l'usage de la charité, ni les loix de la societé Chretienne. Ce principe renverseroit toutes les Eglises, car je ne say s'il-y-en a aucune dont le Gouvernement, la Discipline, la forme exterieure, les usages, & les pratiques soient dans une telle perfection, qu'il-n'y-ayt absolument rien à redire, & quoy q'uil en soit comme les jugemens des hommes sont fort differens, ce seroit ouvrir la porte à des separations continuelles, & abolir les assemblées. Il est donc constant que la conscience n'oblige point à se soustraire des assemblées, mais qu'au contraire elle nous oblige de nous y choquent sont supportables, & qu'elles n'empechent pas l'efficace salutaire de la parole, du culte divin, & des Sacremens. Et c'est à la faveur de ce support de la charité qu'est couverte l' assistance que nous donnons à des choses que nous n'approuvons pas entierement. Voyez ce que S.* Paul *dit à ses* Philippiens, *chap.* 3. Si vous sentez quelque chose autrement, Dieu vous le revelera aussi. Toutefois cheminons en ce à quoy nous sommes pervenus d'une même regle, & sentons une

même chose. *Cela est bien éloigné de dire, des que vous aurez le moindre sentiment contraire separez vous, la conscience ne vous permet pas de demeurer ensemble.* Consilia separationis, *dit St.* Augustin *contre* Parmenian, Inania sunt & pernicioſa, & plus perturbant infirmos bonos quàm corrigant animoſos malos. *Quels funestes effets ne produiroit pas une telle separation si elle s'établissoit au milieu de vous? De la maniere que les esprits des hommes sont faits, on verroit bientôt naitre de là la difference des interets, celle des partys, celle des Sentimens à l'égard même de la societé civile, la hayne mutuelle, & toutes les autres tristes suites que la division, qui n'est plus temperée par la charité, produit naturellement. Je laisse à part le scandale qu'en reçevroient toutes les Eglises reformées de l'Europe, la joye qu'en auroient leurs adversaires, & les avantages qu'ils en retireroient, qui selon toutes les apparences ne seroient pas petits. J'ay trop bonne opinion de ces Messieurs qui croyent que la Gouvernement Presbyterien est preferable à l'Episcopal, pour n'estre pas persuadé qu'ils sont de sages & de serieuses reflexions sur toutes ces choses, & sur tant d'autres que leurs lumieres leur fourniſſent, & que la conscience, & l'amour de la Religion Protestante les empechera toujours de rien faire, qui puisse estre blamé devant Dieu, & devant les hommes, Car enfin je ne saurois croire qu'il-y-en-ayt aucun parmy eux, qui regarde ni vostre Episcopat, ni vostre Discipline, ni quelques Ceremonies que vous observez, comme des taches & des erreurs capitales, qui empechent qu'on ne puisse faire son salut, & même avec facilité dans vos Assemblées & sous vostre Gouvernement. Il ne s'agit icy ni de* l'esse, *ni du* bene esse, *mais seulement du* melius esse, *qu'ils disputent avec vous, & cela estant ainsi la justice, la charité, l'amour de la paix, la prudence, & le zele pour le general de la Religion ne consentiront jamais qu'ils se détachent de vous.*

Mais, Monsigneur, puisque vous m'avez mis la plume à la main sur ce sujet, Pardonnez je vous supplie à ma liberté si elle và jusqu'à vous dire ce que je croy que vous aussi devez faire de vostre part. J'espere donc que dans ces occasions que Dieu vous presente vous ferez voir à toute la terre, & en convaincrez les plus incredulez que vous aves de la pieté, du zele, & de la crainte de Dieu, & que vous estez de dignes ouvriers, & de dignes serviteurs de Jesus Christ. C'est deja le temoignage que vous rendent les gens de bien, & que nul quelque mal intentionné qu'il soit, n'ose contredire, & je ne doute pas que vous ne pousſiez vostre vocation jusqu'au bout. Mais outre cela, Monseigneur, j'espere que vous ne defaudrez point aux devoirs de la charité, & de l'esprit de paix, & que, quand il ne s'agira que de quelques temperamens, ou de quelques Ceremonies qui servent d'achoppement, & qui en elles mêmes ne sont rien en comparaison d'une entiere reünion de vostre Eglise sous vostre saint Ministere, vous ferez voir que vous aimez l'Epouse de vostre Maître plus que vous mêmes, & que ce n'est pas tant de vostre grandeur, & de vostre dignité Ecclesiastique que vous desirez tirer vostre gloire & vostre joye, que de vos vertus Pastorales, & des soins ardens que vous avez de vous troupeaux. J'espere aussi que ceux que vous avez choisis, & appellez au S. Ministere, & ceux que desormais vous y appellerez avec un prudent discernement, reglez non seulement par la douceur, mais aussi par la severité de la Discipline, quand la severité sera necessaire, marcheront sur vos traces, & suiront heureusement l'exemple que vous leur donnerez, pour estre eux-mêmes en exemple, & en edification aux Eglises qui leur sont commises. Je finis, Monseigneur, par des prieres tres-ardentes que je présent à Dieu de tout mon cœur, afin qu'il luy plaise de vous conserver à jamais le flambeau de son Evangile, de repandre

pandre sur tout le corps de vostre Ministere, une abondante mesure de son onction & de sa benediction celeste, dont celle de l'ancien Aaron *n'estoit que l'ombre, afin qu'elle soit non l'embleme & l'image de la concorde fraternelle comme cette ancienne, mais qu'elle en soit la cause & le lien. Je le prie qu'il veuille de plus en plus ramener le cœur des enfans aux peres, & des peres aux enfans, afin que vostre Eglise soit heureuse, & agreable comme un Eden de Dieu. Je le prie enfin qu'il vous conserve, vous Monseigneur, en parfait & longue santé pour sa gloire, & pour le bien & l'avantage de cette grande & considerable pertie de son champ qu'il vous a donné cultiver, & que vous cultivez si heureusement. Je vous demande aussi le secours de vos saintes prieres, & la continuation de l'honneur de vostre affection, en vous Protestant que je seray toute ma vie avec tout le respect que je vous dois,*

MONSEIGNEUR,

Vostre tres-humble,

& tres-obeissant Serviteur,

& Fils en Jesus Christ,

CLAUDE.

Paris Novemb. 29. Stilo Novo.

MY LORD,

MOnsieur de L'*Angle* having given me the Letter which you have been pleased to write to me, I was surprized to see by that, that you had done me the honour to write me another, which I have not received, and to which I had not failed to make an answer. You do me a great deal of honour to desire that I should tell you my thoughts of the difference that has troubled you so long, betwixt those they call *Episcopal*, and those they name *Presbyterians*. Although I have already explained my self about this divers times, both by Letters which I have written upon this Subject to several persons, and in my Book too of the Defence of the Reformation, where speaking of the distinction betwixt the Bishop and the Priest, I have said expresly, That I do not blame those that observe it as a thing very ancient, and that I would not that any one should make it an occasion of quarrel in those places where it is established, *pag.* 366. And though I otherways know my self sufficiently not to believe that my opinion should be much considered, I will not forbear to assure you upon this occasion, as I shall always do upon any other, of my Christian esteem, my respect, and my obedience. This I shall do the rather, because I shall not simply tell you my private Thoughts, but the opinion of the generality of our Churches.

First then, my Lord, we are so very far from believing that a man cannot live with a good Conscience under your Discipline and under your Episcopal Government, that in our ordinary practice we make no difficulty, neither to bestow our Chairs, nor to commit the care of our Flocks to Ministers received, and ordained by my Lords the Bishops; as might be justified by a great number enough of Examples both old and new: And a little while since Mr. *Dupleſſis* that was ordained by my Lord Bishop of *Lincoln*, has been established and called in a Church of this Province. And Monsieur *Wicart*, whom you, my Lord, received to the Holy Ministery, did us the honour, but some months ago, to preach at *Charenton*, to the general edification of our Flock. So that they who in this respect do impute unto us any opinions distant from peace, and Christian concord, do certainly do us wrong.

I say Peace and Christian concord; for, my Lord, we believe that the obligation to preserve this Peace, and this Brotherly concord, which make up the external unity of the Church, is of a necessity so indispensable, that St. *Paul* has made no difficulty to join it with the internal unity of the same Faith, and the same Regeneration; not only as two things which ought never to be separated, but likewise as two things depending the one upon the other; because if the external unity be as it were the Daughter of the internal, she is likewise the preserver of it. *Walk*, says he, Ephes. 4. *worthy of the calling wherewith ye are called, with all lowliness and meekness, with long-suffering, forbearing one another in love: Endeavouring to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace.* On the one side he makes this brotherly love, which joins us one with another, to depend upon our common vocation; and on the other side he teaches us that one of the principal means to preserve our common vocation entire, which he calls the unity of the spirit, is to keep peace among our selves. According to the first of these maxims we cannot have peace, or Ecclesiastical communion with those that have so degenerated from the Christian vocation, that one cannot perceive in them a true and saving Faith; especially when with mortal errors they join tyranny over the Soul, and that they will force the Conscience, by imposing a necessity to believe that which they believe, and to practise that which they practise. For in this case the foundation and true cause of external communion being no more, the external communion too its self ceases of right, and there is not any that is lawful to be had any more with such. According to the second maxim, we do not believe that a single difference of Government or Discipline, nor even a difference of Ceremonies innocent in their own nature is a sufficient occasion to break the sacred bond of Communion. Wherefore our Churches have always looked upon and considered yours, not only as a Sister, but as an Elder Sister, for which we ought to have a kindness accompanied with respect and veneration, and for which we do present most ardent prayers unto God without ceasing. We do not enter into the comparison of your Order, with that under which we live. We know that there is not, neither can there be any amongst men, which by reason of our natural corruption is not subject to inconveniencies, ours has hers, as well as yours; and the one and the other without doubt have their advantages, and disadvantages in divers respects: *alternis vincunt, & vincuntur.* It is enough for us to know that the same Divine Providence which by an indispensable necessity, and by the conjuncture of affairs, did at the beginning of the Reformation put

our Churches under that of the Presbytery; has put yours under that of the Episcopacy; and as we are assured that you do not despise our simplicity, so neither ought we to oppose our selves against your pre-eminence. So that, my Lord, we utterly disapprove, and see with grief, certain extremes whereinto some of the one side, and the other do cast themselves. The one looking upon Episcopacy as an Order so absolutely necessary, that without it there can be no Ecclesiastical society, nor lawful vocation, nor hope of Salvation, and the other looking upon it with indignation, as a Relique of Antichristianism. These are equally heats and excesses which do not come from him that calls us, and which do offend against the Laws of wisdom and charity.

These, my Lord, are our true and sincere common Opinions. For what concerns you, since you desire that I would descend a little more particularly into the state that your own Church is in, by reason of the intestine divisions that trouble it; give me leave not to tell you my thoughts, without declaring my wishes, and the desires of my heart, upon a matter so important as this is. I could wish then with all my soul that those that are gone so far as this point, to think to break the external bonds, and the mutual dependence of your Flocks, to give every particular Church a kind of sovereignty of Government, would consider well, whether that they pretend to do be not directly contrary to the spirit of Christianity, which is a spirit of union, and society, and not of division. That they would consider, that under the pretence that the principle of the Reformed was to abhor mens domineering over Faith, and Conscience, as a thing destructive of Religion, we ought not for all that to reject the bridle of Discipline, nor to shake off the whole yoke of Government, nor deprive our selves of the succours we might draw out of a general Union, for to strengthen us in the true Faith, and in true Piety. That they would consider, in fine, that the same reason which makes them desire the Independency of the Flocks, may be likewise employed to establish the Independency of the persons in every Flock. For a Flock has no more right to desire to be Independent upon other Flocks, than a person might have to desire to be Independent upon other persons. But this would be to bring all Discipline to nothing, to throw the Church, as much as in us lies, into a horrible confusion, and to expose the heritage of the Lord to the reproach of its Adversaries.

For what concerns those which amongst you they call Presbyterians, as I am perswaded that they have light, and wisdom, and zeal, so I could wish with all my heart, that they would observe more moderation in the scandal they believe they have heretofore received from the Episcopal Order, and that they would distinguish the Persons from the Ministry. The persons that possess the places have not only their faults, but it may happen too sometimes that the most holy, and most eminent places may be possessed by wicked men; and in that case reason and piety do equally require that we should not confound the Ministry with the Minister. At present that God by his grace has taken away this scandal from before their eyes, and made them see piety, zeal, and constancy for the preservation of Religion in the persons of the Bishops, I hope that this will not a little contribute to the sweetning of their spirits. Besides, I could wish that they would be pleased to consider that if there be some unpleasant inconveniencies in the Episcopal Government, as I do not doubt but there are, there are too some very unpleasant ones in the Presbyterian,

Presbyterian, as I have said already. No order whose execution is in the hands of men, is exempt from them; an equality has its faults and excesses to be feared, as well as a superiority. Therefore it is not the most safe and wise way to leap from the one to the other, nor to hazard the making a general concussion, upon the hopes of being better, though one should be in authority and power to do it. Christian prudence, justice and charity do not permit us to proceed to such daring and dangerous extremes, for a single difference of Government. It is most safe and wise to endeavour to provide some kind of temper to avoid, or to lessen as much as may be, the inconveniencies that are feared, and not have recourse to violent remedies.

I shall not be afraid to give that name to the holding of assemblies apart, and separating from the publick assemblies, and withdrawing themselves from under your government. There is no man that does not see that this would be real schism, which in it self and of its own nature cannot choose but be always odious to God and men, and of which the Authors and Patrons cannot avoid the rendring an account before the Tribunal of our common Master. When Saint *Paul* forbad us to forsake the assembling of our selves together, he did not only condemn those that did not come thither, but stayed at home; but those too without doubt that held other assemblies in opposition to the publick ones. For this is to break the bond of Christian charity, which does not only join us with some of our brethren, but with all our brethren, to receive from them, and to give them edification by living together in the same communion. And it would be to no purpose to pretend that our conscience did oppose our being present at those assemblies that are held under a Government that we do not approve; and that that would be to approve outwardly, what we inwardly condemn. For besides that it would be necessary to examin well the question, whether these oppositions do not proceed from a conscience mistaken by a precipitate judgment; since that the best men are often subject to frame themselves such scruples, as are not altogether lawful at the bottom. Farther then it is necessary to distinguish three kinds of things; the one those which the conscience approves, and admits of, and in which it does fully acquiesce; the other which she looks upon as intolerable, and destructive to the glory of God, and the true faith, or true piety, and the hopes of salvation; and others lastly which are between these, that is to say such as we do not fully approve as to the truth, but yet we do not believe them mortal enemies to true piety and salvation; in a word such as we look upon as stains, and tolerable infirmities. I affirm that when we find things of this second rank in any Assemblies, or those which the Conscience judges such, we cannot be present there; and the whole question will be reduced to this, to know, whether we be not mistaken, where we ought to take good heed that we do not make a rash judgment. But to imagin that we cannot with a good Conscience be present at Assemblies, but only when we do fully and generally approve of all things in them, it is certainly not to know neither the use of charity, nor the laws of Christian society. This principle would overturn all Churches, for I cannot tell whether there be any, whose government, discipline, outward form, usages, and practices be of such perfection, that there is nothing at all in them to blame; and however it be, as the judgments of men are very different, this would be to open the gate to continual separations, and to abolish all Assemblies. It is therefore certain that Conscience does

not

not oblige us to withdraw from the Assemblies, but on the contrary it obliges us to join with them, when the things that offend us are tolerable, and do not hinder the salutary efficacy of the Word, of the Divine Worship, and of the Sacraments. 'Tis the favour of this charitable patience that justifies our being present at those things which we do not perfectly approve. See what St. *Paul* says to the *Philippians*, chap. 3. *If in any thing ye be otherways minded, God shall reveal even this unto you. Nevertheless, whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing.* This is very far from saying, as soon as ye have the least contrary sentiment separate your selves, Conscience will not allow you to remain together. *Consilia separationis*, says St. *Augustin* against *Parmenian*, *inania sunt & perniciosa, & plus perturbant infirmos bonos, quam corrigant animosos malos.* What deadly effects would not such a separation produce if it were established amongst you? As the dispositions of men are, one should quickly see to spring from hence a difference of interests, of parties, of opinions, even in respect of the civil society, mutual hatred, and all the other sad consequences which a division not tempered with charity does naturally produce. I let alone the scandal which all the Reformed Churches of *Europe* would receive by it, the joy which their Adversaries would have, and the advantages which they would draw from it, which in all appearance would not be small. I have too good an opinion of those Gentlemen who believe that the Presbyterian Government is to be preferred before the Episcopal, not to be persuaded that they make wise and serious reflections upon all these things, and many more which their own knowledge furnishes them with; and that conscience, and the love of the Protestant Religion will always hinder them from doing any thing, that may be blamed before God and men. For in fine I cannot believe that there is any one amongst them that looks upon your Episcopacy, or your Discipline, or certain Ceremonies which you observe, as blots, and capital errors, which hinder a man from obtaining salvation, even with facility in your Assemblies, and under your Government. The question here is not about the *Esse*, or the *bene Esse*, but only about the *melius Esse*, that they dispute with you; and this being so, justice, charity, the love of peace, prudence, and zeal for Religion in the general will never allow that they should divide themselves from you.

But, my Lord, since you have put the pen into my hand upon this subject, I beseech you pardon my freedom if it go so far as to tell you what I think you also ought to do on your part. I hope then that on these opportunities that God presents unto you, you will make all the world see, and convince the most incredulous, that you have piety, zeal, and the fear of God, and that you are worthy labourers, and worthy servants of Jesus Christ. This is the testimony which all good Men do already give you, and none how spightful soever he be dares to contradict it, and I do not doubt but that you will carry on your calling to the end. But besides this, my Lord, I hope you will not be wanting in the duties of charity, and the spirit of peace, and that when the dispute shall be only of some temperaments, or of some Ceremonies that are a stumbling-block, and which in themselves are nothing in comparison of an intire re-union of your Church under your holy Ministry, you will make it seen that you love the Spouse of your Master more than your selves; and that it is not so much from your greatness,

greatneſs, and your Eccleſiaſtical dignity that you deſire to receive your glory, and your joy, as from your paſtoral vertues, and the ardent care you take of your Flocks. I hope too that thoſe you have choſen and called to the holy Miniſtry, and thoſe which hereafter you ſhall with a prudent diſcretion call unto it, being governed not only by ſweetneſs, but likewiſe by ſeverity of diſcipline, when ſeverity ſhall be neceſſary, will tread in your ſteps, and happily follow the example which you ſhall give them, that they may be themſelves for an example, and edification to the Churches that are committed to them.

I conclude, my Lord, with very earneſt prayers which I preſent to God with all my heart, that it would pleaſe him always to preſerve unto you the light of his Goſpel, and to pour out upon the whole body of your Miniſtry, an abundant meaſure of his unction and heavenly benediction, of which that of the old *Aaron* was but a ſhadow; that it may be not the emblem, and image of brotherly concord, like the unction of old, but the cauſe and bond of it. I pray him that he would more and more bring back the heart of the Children to the Fathers, and of the Fathers to the Children, that your Church may be happy and pleaſant as the Paradiſe of God.

Laſtly I pray that he would preſerve you, my Lord, in perfect and long health, for his glory, and the good and advantage of that great and conſiderable part of his field which he has given you to cultivate, and which you do cultivate ſo happily. I deſire too the help of your holy prayers, and the continuance of the honour of your affection, proteſting to you that I will be all my life with all the reſpect that I owe you,

My Lord,

Your moſt humble

and moſt obedient Servant

and Son in Jeſus Chriſt,

CLAUDE.

FINIS.